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Chinese Representation [7]

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~~Herb - This is same copy
you saw and scribbled on before.
I transferred all your changes
to copy 2. gave Burke (who
DRAFT gave it to Bush).~~

October 11, 1971

George
~~Opening~~ Statement by Ambassador Bush on Chinese Representation
GA Plenary, about October 18, 1971

before the General Assembly on
Mr. President:

For 22 years the question of the representation of the great nation of China in the United Nations has been a major international issue -- a troublesome and intractable one.

In the history of this issue, the year 1971 can be, and ought to be, a year of change and decision.

For 21 years the Assembly faced, on this question, only two stark alternatives. We could either leave things as they were, with no representation here for the enormous population of the Chinese mainland, or we could agree to a formula which, in a single stroke, would make room for the People's Republic of China by expelling the Republic of China, a member in good standing. As to this latter step, the Assembly has always been aware of its drastic nature and fateful implications for the UN -- and year after year has refused to take it, even though this meant prolonging the ^{absence} ~~(exclusion)~~ of the People's Republic of China from this organization. So the situation remained frozen.

Now, everybody has known, all through those years, that there was a third possibility. Instead of throwing out one of these ~~(Chinese)~~ governments to make room for the other, it was

perfectly possible for the United Nations to accommodate them both. The fact that discussion of such a solution was highly distasteful to the settled policies of both was not, in itself, a conclusive argument against it, since the peaceful ^{resolution} ~~settlement~~

of strongly held conflicting views
believe all of us are aware that ~~of conflict situations~~ very often requires difficult decisions. There has been a steadily growing discussion, although ~~so there was a constant undercurrent of discussion about a~~ muted, ~~about a practical way to accommodate the realities of the China way to accommodate both these realities within the UN.~~ question within the UN.

~~However~~, until very recently this approach did not gain much headway. This was only partly because both the parties opposed it. More fundamentally, I think, it was because the ~~general attitude~~ ^{Posture} of the People's Republic of China toward the outside world, ~~including~~ ^{and} the United Nations, during most of this period ~~was~~ ^{seemed to be} hostile and aloof. There was strong reason to doubt whether a government in that frame of mind could usefully participate in the UN. And, hence, there was doubt that it

PP would be worth while to laboriously hammer out a formula for achieving this. ~~Because of the negative impact of Peking's former posture~~ ^{Given the cold and forbidding attitude in} ~~Peking~~ ^{of course} most members ~~(-- and the United States, frankly, was~~ ^{a majority} one of these ~~were content to see the issue presented in the old way, and fully expected that the perennial Albanian resolution would still fail, to muster the necessary majority. And it did fail, year after year.~~ ^{usually by wide margins.}

Now that situation has changed. The People's Republic of China has in many ways moderated its attitude and its conduct toward the outside world and toward the United Nations. It has actively sought normal contact with many countries. And it has made known its positive desire to sit in the United Nations -- a marked change from its attitude of aloofness and disdain in earlier years.

[Finally, this year, after more than two years of silence, the People's Republic of China has responded affirmatively to the overtures of President Nixon for better relations and for direct contact at the highest level between itself and the United States. These overtures were an important new step in American policy, a step designed as one major element in our country's basic objective of a more stable and peaceful world.]

In these changed circumstances it has become increasingly clear that the past pattern of UN decision ~~amounting to an annual decision not to expel the Republic of China as the price for admitting the People's Republic~~ -- is no longer sufficient. The time [in history] has arrived to find a way, [both realistic and just -- however difficult that may be -- by which] to welcome the People's Republic of China into the UN [without unacceptable damage to other interests.] It must be a way which would avoid the unacceptable route of expelling a law-abiding and faithful member. It should be a way that could command the assent of a

In so doing, however, we must act with due regard for ~~justice~~, realizing the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Justice,

(substitute)

has been

→ It should be a way which facilitates the tasks of this organization in working for peace.

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sufficient majority in the General Assembly. My Government set out to develop such a proposal, and in the process we consulted with very nearly the whole membership of the UN.

In embarking on this course my Government was well aware of the difficulties. For many years the issue had been posed in sharp black-and-white terms and positions had been frozen on each side. But we went ahead in the belief that this year ought to be, and could be, a year of decision -- and that the decision must be sound and realistic and just, and not one which this Organization would later have cause to regret.

~~In this spirit we proceeded to shape an alternative to an alternative which reflects the views of its 19 cosponsors and the Albanian Resolution -- the first real alternative ever offered in this Assembly.~~ ^{final}

The result is embodied in a draft resolution whose text appears in document A/L.638. It is sponsored by ^{some 12} members including the United States.

[As a framework for this proposal, and a sign of our serious intent, we offered, and the Assembly agreed to inscribe, a new agenda item which is now before us, and which bears an appropriately non-prejudicial, noncontentious title: "The Representation of China in the United Nations."]

Our draft resolution is short and carefully worded. I shall read it at this point:

((Read text of DR resolution.))

For P. 4, 2d full para. (substitute)

In this spirit, and with the help of many governments,
we proceeded ^{to shape} ~~to shape~~ an alternative to the Albanian Resolution.
final result is embodied
The/~~result is embodied~~ in a draft resolution whose text
appears in document A/L.633. It is ~~sponsored by~~ co-sponsored
by nineteen Members including the United States.

Our draft resolution is short and carefully worded. I shall
read it: ~~(at this point)~~

(double space and indent this long quote, which
is attached)

II The General Assembly,

Noting that since the founding of the United Nations fundamental changes have occurred in China,

Having regard for the existing factual situation,

Noting that the Republic of China has been continuously represented as a Member of the United Nations since 1945,

Believing that the People's Republic of China should be represented in the United Nations,

Recalling that Article 1, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations establishes the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations,

Believing that an equitable resolution of this problem should be sought in the light of the above-mentioned considerations and without prejudice to the eventual settlement of the conflicting claims involved,

1. Hereby affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China and recommends that it be seated as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council;

2. Affirms the continued right of representation of the Republic of China;

3. Recommends that all United Nations bodies and the specialized agencies take into account the provisions of this resolution in deciding the question of Chinese representation.

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I need comment only briefly on this draft resolution.

Its terms are simple and direct. In essence, it would

recommend that the People's Republic of China take over China's place as a permanent member of the Security Council, and would provide representation both for the People's Republic of China and for the Republic of China in the General Assembly.

The sponsors of this resolution believe it is the most realistic, pragmatic and equitable solution to this problem.

Under its terms,

-- the Republic of China, which governs 14 million people, continue to be represented in the General Assembly instead of being

summarily and unjustly ejected, without having the right to be heard -- the People's Republic, with its enormous territory and

population, would no longer be excluded from the General Assembly seat of China and, in addition, would occupy the Chinese seat in the Security Council;

-- all the people of China would thus at last be represented in the United Nations by the governments which for over 20 years have actually governed them.

Moreover, this resolution, while achieving these things, has been carefully written in order to avoid any prejudice to various related matters. It does not ask Member States to alter their recognition policies or their bilateral relations.

* We are aware that some, although recognizing this as a political initiative to solve a practical political problem, have raised legal questions. It is unavoidable that what we propose should be new and without precedent, because the situation with which it deals is new and without precedent. But the Charter, which is flexible enough to allow for the

It does not in any way purport to divide China into two separate states or to commit those who vote for it on how they may in future regard the legal or diplomatic situation of the parties involved. It does not take either a "two Chinas" position, or a "one-China-one-Taiwan" position, ^{or in any other way seek to} ~~or any other~~ ^{dismember China} ~~position on that subject.~~ It is founded on the reality of the present situation as we all know it to be, but it does not seek to freeze that situation for the future. On the contrary, it expressly states in the preamble that a solution should be sought without prejudice to a future settlement.

* [I know well from our discussions with other delegations during the past two months that some would prefer more detailed and explicit language as to the legal aspects of the step we propose, since there is no exact precedent for it in UN history. I have great respect for this point of view but I do not share it. It is unavoidable that what we propose should be new and without precedent, because the situation with which it deals is new and without precedent. If we attempt now, at this stage, to state explicitly all the ^{conceivable} legal aspects and meanings of what we propose to do, then I very much fear that we might become so tied up in legal disputations that we would miss this historic opportunity to act. Therefore, the sponsors decided to leave ~~these legal issues~~ to one side.

representation of Byelorussia, is certainly ^{up to} ~~flexible~~ enough to accommodate this situation.

60 ON 706A

- 6A -

(After "flexible enough to accomodate this situation"

at the end of p. - 6 - , add the following sentences:)

Therefore we have sought to develop a resolution that

is compatible with the law of the Charter and which

recognizes that ~~if~~ ^{is to be} if the UN, ~~in order to be~~ strong and

keep pace with the times ~~must not~~ ^{it cannot} be afraid to innovate.

That is the nature of this proposal we have placed before you. It is ^{an eminently realistic, fair and practical} ~~(the only) realistic, equitable and viable~~ proposal to solve this historic problem of Chinese representation.

There is ^{another} ~~one other~~ proposal ~~[and only one]~~ before the Assembly: the Albanian resolution. It would not only admit the People's Republic of China, but would also, in the same stroke, "forthwith" expel the Republic of China from the UN and all its organs.

That act of expulsion, fellow delegates, is the issue before us. Both sides agree that the People's Republic of China should be admitted, and should sit in the Security Council as a permanent member. One ^{fundamental} ~~essential~~ point divides us: whether to retain or to expel the Republic of China.

I submit that the course of expulsion, first, is most ill-advised and dangerous as a precedent in the UN, and, second, is ^{an unacceptable} ~~(an unnecessary)~~ price for the entry of the People's Republic of China into this organization. Let me give my reasons for both these points.

First, as to expulsion as a precedent.

In the 26-year history of the UN, no member has been expelled or deprived of its seat. In fact, the whole trend has been the other way -- so that the original 51-nation membership is now ~~up to~~ 131, including an immense variety of sizes and political systems. Yet here it is proposed that a ^{member in good standing} ~~state~~ be expelled.

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representing
government over 14 million people, with no Charter violations
against its name and ~~is not~~ ^{on the contrary, with} a most constructive record, should
be expelled utterly from the UN and all its agencies -- solely
because certain ~~other~~ ^{question} governments ~~deny~~ its legitimacy.

And let us remember realistically that, once expelled, the
likelihood of the Republic of China ever being readmitted to
the UN as a separate member, under whatever name or label, would
be approximately zero -- given the fact that under the Charter
(~~such~~ ^{its}) admission could be vetoed by the People's Republic of
China.

If the Assembly is going to travel down that road, where
do we stop? Who can predict what UN member will be next?

Surely there is many another member in this organization which,
though fully in possession of ~~(its own)~~ territory and governmental
powers, could one day become the target of some political com-
bination in this ^{commanding a simple majority} ~~(very)~~ hall, aiming to throw it out of the UN
solely because its right to govern is disputed by others.

If we are going to start playing with the right of members
to sit in this Organization, as if that right were a chip in
some international poker game, we will have started the UN
itself down a ~~dangerous and slippery~~ ^{perilous} slope. Such a step ^{we think} ~~could~~

~~might or might not greatly affect the world outside these~~
~~halls, but it would profoundly affect the UN itself. It would~~

lead away from universality, away from realism, and toward

have a profoundly ~~degrading~~ ^{degrading} effect on this Organization and on the
attitudes of ~~the~~ ^{many members} ~~many members~~ ^{and on the attitudes of many members}
towards it.

Isent
would damage the
factionalism, recrimination and irrelevancy. It ~~could well~~
~~tear this organization apart.~~ very fabric of this organization.

~~And it would cause many people in many countries --~~
~~including my own country, I can assure you -- to question~~
~~[very seriously what hopes for world peace continue to reside]~~
~~(in this organization how could effectively strive for world peace through its~~
~~task to maintain international peace and security.~~
We should frankly face the fact that this session of the
UN Assembly cannot and should not try to write the last
chapter in the history of China's relations with itself or
with the rest of the world. We should concentrate on writing
today's chapter in the history of China's relations with the
UN. If we can do that, and do it right, we will have accomplished
a great deal and, I believe, ^{we} will have given the UN a new lease
on life.

~~(This leads me to my second point.)~~ There are those who
argue that the Republic of China has to be expelled, however
regrettable that is, simply because the People's Republic has
announced in advance that it will not participate on any other
basis. I respect the sincerity of those who make this argument, ^{but} /
for several reasons, I do not agree.

In the first place, there is an implication here that for
the People's Republic to be asked to reconsider its announced
position on this point would be asking too much. / But surely

Insert P 9

7. At this point, Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about universality. During the 25th Anniversary session last year, two Declarations were adopted which endorsed the goal of universality. Many distinguished speakers in this year's general debate ^{have} ~~also~~ reiterated their ~~governments'~~ governments' dedication to this ideal. As we understand universality, Mr. President, it means the creation of circumstances whereby all peoples ^{eventually} can be represented in this world organization. While we respect the views of our opponents, ~~even while strongly disagreeing with them,~~ We honestly do not see how the supporters of the Albanian resolution can ^{logically} ~~at the same time~~ invoke the principles of universality. ~~They~~ Although they may question the legitimacy of the Republic of China none of them contests the

~~unblinking~~ unblinkable
~~irrefutable~~ fact that it is very much a reality. In our view, a
vote for the Albanian resolution ^{is a vote against} ~~means less representation, not~~ ^{universality}
~~more, a step away from universality, not a step toward it.~~

all governments, including the People's Republic of China, must change -- and have changed -- their attitudes on some issues in order to resolve international problems. On this particular problem of who is to speak for China in the organs of the United Nations -- including the Security Council -- surely others have made concessions and moved from long-held positions, and it is neither unrealistic nor unfair that the People's Republic of China should do its part.

Besides -- and this is a most important point -- the formula we have proposed has been most carefully written to avoid placing any unnecessary difficulties in Peking's way. The resolution neither says nor implies that there are "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan." ~~It does not attempt to define the present status, or to prejudice the future status, of either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China, or the relations between them, or their relations with other countries.~~ ^{carefully closes no doors concerning} It ~~does not say that its terms shall settle forever the Chinese representation issue in the UN, no matter what happens in the future~~ ^{developments} It simply provides that, given the existing state of affairs, the People's Republic of China, which is not in the UN, should come in and should take over the Security Council seat; and that the Republic of China, which is in the UN, should remain in the UN. ^{It} The resolution does not,

It does not attempt to prejudice the status of China or of future developments between the Republic of China and the Peoples Republic of China or of relations between them.

of the parties;
to be sure, accept the claims ~~of Peking with respect to the~~
~~Republic of China or Taiwan;~~ but neither does it deny or
reject or prejudice those claims. It is completely silent
on them. Nothing, consistent with the realities of the
situation, could be less prejudicial ~~or difficult for Peking~~
~~to accept.~~

The fact is that nobody can know for sure how Peking will
react to the adoption of this resolution until ^{after} it is adopted.

Naturally, until that moment, it is ~~perfectly legitimate and~~
standard tactics to say "no" in the most categorical and
any resolution which falls short of its maximum demands
seemingly irreversible terms to ~~this obviously distasteful~~
resolution -- in the obvious hope of causing the resolution to
be defeated. Others in this body, in similar situations, have
done the same -- only to show a surprising flexibility after
the fact. // The adoption of the "dual representation" resolution
will create a new situation in which, for the first time, it
will become necessary for all concerned to look at the facts
and decide how they will act. ^{Only after that moment comes} ~~when that moment comes~~, and
^{will it will be possible to know} ~~not before, we will find out~~ whether or ~~not~~ the People's
Republic will accept ^{what we believe is a generous and reasonable} ~~this entirely non-prejudicial~~ invitation
to take its place in the United Nations.

For all these reasons, then, I commend to the General Assembly the ^{19-power} ~~(23-power?)~~ draft resolution known as the "Dual Representation" Resolution.

-- It is a new approach responsive to a new and more hopeful situation in the relations between China and the world.

-- It provides, for the first time, effective representation in the United Nations for all the people ^{of China by those who} ~~(under the two~~ ^{actually govern them,} ~~Chinese governments that exist)~~

-- It realistically provides that the People's Republic of China, which governs the largest population of any government on earth, should occupy the Security Council seat.

-- It avoids the expulsion of the Republic of China, ^{and} ~~an unnecessary~~ unrealistic, dangerous, irreversible ~~(and unnecessary)~~ step -- which is the distinguishing feature of the Albanian resolution.

-- It carefully avoids any attempt to prejudice or foreclose the ultimate solution of any of the disputed issues relating to China, or to affect the recognition policies or bilateral relations of any member.

Fellow delegates, the time has come for the United Nations to settle this question -- and to do so in a way that will be just to all parties, realistic in its reflection of the facts, and constructive for the United Nations and its members. I

- It is a major step further towards the goal of universality.

believe that can be done, and that the Dual Representation resolution will do it. ~~By~~ contrast, the expulsion of a member in good standing, which would result from the Albanian resolution, is ^{simply} unrealistic, ~~unnecessary~~, and ^{certainly} dangerous in the highest degree for the future of the ~~UN~~ United Nations.

It is for this reason that the United States and its co-sponsors have also proposed a second resolution, under which a proposal to ~~expel or exclude~~ the Republic of China ^{from the UN} is an important question within the meaning of article 18 of the Charter, thus requiring a two-thirds vote for adoption. It is only logical that this procedural point should be settled before the voting on the substantive resolutions, and accordingly my delegation will request priority in the voting for the "important question" resolution.

Mr. President and fellow delegates, the question before us is the most serious and important that will face the Assembly in this session or, possibly, for years to come. Let me assure you that the United States approaches it in a most serious and forthright spirit. ^{I categorically deny the utterly false rumor that} Contrary to some reports, my country is ^{now} ~~not~~ engaged in an elaborate maneuver to perpetuate the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the UN. Nor, ~~on the other hand~~, are we merely going through the motions of seeking to assure the continued representation of the Republic of China. We ^{seriously} want to see both these entities in the UN. As all

As for the United States, our present policy is a logical evolution of the position we stated in this hall on this issue last year. Ambassador Phillips stated on November 12, 1970,

Insert P 13

Insert for p. 13 as a substitute for the beginning of the first full para.

It is for this reason that the United States and its co-sponsors have proposed a second resolution. This resolution

~~Assembly should decide,~~
~~asks that the General Assembly, and I quote,~~

~~"that any proposal in the General Assembly which would~~

~~result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in~~

~~the UN.~~

reference to
begins with a brief recalling of the provisions of the Charter.

and then reads, and I quote:

"Decides that any proposal in the General Assembly which would result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the United Nations is an important question under Article 18 of the Charter."

resolution
In practical terms, our ~~non-expulsion resolution~~ would

not obtain a two-thirds majority in order to be adopted.
require ~~that the Albanian Resolution or any other resolution~~ *that the Albanian Resolution or any other resolution* ~~two-thirds vote for adoption.~~ *requiring the effect of depriving the Republic of China of representation*

It is only logical and in keeping with UN practice that this

procedural point should be settled before the voting on

proposals.
~~the substantive resolutions.~~ Accordingly, the United

States delegation moves that the General Assembly vote first

on the resolution ~~contained~~ *2* contained in document A/L.637. *2*

the matter is, the United States is as interested as any in this room to see the ~~People's~~ Republic of China play a constructive role among the family of nations. All of us are mindful of the industry, talents and achievements of the great people who live in that ancient cradle of civilization."

members must know, we have devoted major diplomatic energies to this cause. We know well, and the People's Republic knows well, that our policy and theirs on this question are not the same. This need not and does not interfere with the plans for President Nixon's visit or with the mutual desire of the two sides to develop better contact with each other. ^(I must) ~~The~~ question of Chinese representation in the UN ~~is a long way~~ in United States contacts with the People's Republic of China and as far as my Government is concerned it will not be.)

Indeed, nothing could more clearly demonstrate the seriousness with which my Government presents this proposal to the Assembly than the fact that we do so at the very moment in history in which ~~at last~~ we seek to develop direct and, ~~if possible~~, constructive contacts with the People's Republic of China ~~and to help end its isolation from the world.~~ We have said, and we mean it, ^{and I repeat it here} that as far as the United States is concerned these contacts will not be at the expense of any other party.

Many difficult issues surround the relations of the Chinese People's Republic with the rest of the world. They cannot all be resolved overnight. We in this Assembly certainly cannot resolve them all by any amount of resolution-making. What we can do is to decide -- here, now at long last -- the vexing

Insert pg 14

reports

Let me lay to rest once and for all that the discussions now underway
in [^]eking on arrangements and the agenda for President Nixon's
trip also involve negotiations on the ^{issue} ~~matter~~ of U. N. representation.

On October 6, 1971, the White House ¹Press Secretary, in
response to erroneous press accounts that matters we in
this Assembly are now considering would be taken up by
Dr. Kissinger on his current visit, stated, and I quote:

"That is not the purpose of his trip. The purpose of his trip is to
make concrete arrangements for the President's visit and to
outline the agenda."

TRANSCRIPT

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*SAVE
CHIRPER*

CBS NEWS

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FACE THE NATION
as broadcast over the
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Thursday*

GUEST: WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

REPORTERS:

George Herman, CBS News

— George Sherman, Washington Evening Star

Marvin Kalb, CBS News

PRODUCERS: Sylvia Westerman and Prentiss Childs

NOTE TO EDITORS: Please credit CBS News' "Face the Nation"

GEORGE HERMAN: Secretary Rogers, Egyptian President Sadat, before leaving for Moscow this morning, proposed a new Suez Canal settlement which would have Egyptian troops crossing the Canal immediately, a concept previously rejected by Israel. Does this run counter to indications you've been getting from Arab leaders that a settlement is now possible and could be worked out?

SEC. ROGERS: No, Mr. Herman, it does not run counter to those suggestions because President Sadat has proposed this before. This is one of the things that he thinks is very important from his point of view. As you know, Israel at the moment rejects that, rejects the concept of Egyptian troops crossing the Canal and this is one of the things that would have to be worked out before an interim agreement could be achieved.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS Washington, FACE THE NATION, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview with Secretary of State William Rogers. Secretary Rogers will be questioned by CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb, George Sherman, Diplomatic Correspondent for the Washington Evening Star, and CBS News Correspondent George Herman.

HERMAN: Mr. Secretary, your department has given some indications of being more encouraged recently about the possibility of an Arab-Israeli settlement, and yet this seems like the two sides are as nose to nose as ever before, no sign of give. What is encouraging?

SEC. ROGERS: I think you have to recognize, Mr. Herman, that in all negotiations, when they seem to be stalled, each side states its maximum position, and publicly it doesn't concede anything until there

is a settlement. Now in this case, the United States at the request of both Israel and Egypt has played a role of mediator, if you will, at least a good office's role, attempting to find out the positions of each side, to determine the parameters, and to see if we could play a useful role in reaching an agreement. Now as a result of the discussions that we've had with both Israel and Egypt, we believe that the parameters are fairly clearly set forth. We believe it is possible to work out a settlement. I am convinced myself that both sides want a settlement, and, furthermore, it's the only viable alternative. Everyone at the United Nations that I've talked to, and I've talked to 70 foreign ministers during the last ten days on an individual private basis, acknowledges that the United States' initiative, under the leadership of President Nixon, is the only viable alternative at the moment, so we are going to do everything we can to play a useful role to bring about an interim agreement. And I am cautiously optimistic that that is possible.

SHERMAN: But, Mr. Secretary, in practical terms, Israel has had a very hostile reaction to your putting forward the six point approach to the interim agreement. They suggest, in fact, that your doing that had undermined your role as the middleman in reaching this. Can you tell us what you hope to achieve from putting forward those six points?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, Mr. Sherman, you'll understand that the six points that we put forth are really the parameters of an agreement, they are not proposals by the United States. It is true that Israel has reacted, I noticed publicly, adversely in some instances, but there has been no criticism of my speech as such, and I talked to Mr. Eban after I had made my speech, and he didn't make any mention of any

criticism, or object to any particular portion of my speech. And I think the position of the United States and the United Nations, as a result of this statement, which is President Nixon's position, has been very favorably received. Now, obviously if either side agrees publicly with what we have stated, it might appear that they are making concessions, but I think that both Egypt and Israel have responded in a fairly positive way.

KALB: Mr. Secretary, the Egyptians and the Russians have a formal relationship with one another, the 15 year treaty of friendship. Do you feel that one way of breaking out of the impasse on the Suez effort is to have a long-term formal association with Israel that could perhaps take the form of a congressional resolution?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, we are open to any possible suggestion that would lead to peace in the area, and we have indicated that we support Israel, we support its sovereignty, we support its right to exist as a nation, and we have, as you know, have been very helpful to Israel, and the Prime Minister of Israel has said that President Nixon has done more for Israel in these last two years, in two and a half years, than any other President has done. I don't think it's necessary to have that kind of an arrangement in order to work out a peaceful settlement, but we would not preclude it.

SHERMAN: Well, would you be in favor of an exchange of letters perhaps, or some sort of written document stating American security guarantees for Israel if they make concessions on this withdrawal?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I don't, Mr. Sherman, want to be involved in hypothetical discussions of what we might do.

SHERMAN: Have you discussed this with Israel?

SEC. ROGERS: No, we have not in the terms that you've mentioned.

HERMAN: The other big power in this situation is the Soviet Union and Mr. Sadat is now on his way to Moscow. Do you have any indications as to what the Soviet Union might urge towards a settlement in the Middle East?

SEC. ROGERS: No, I do not. I had a long discussion with Mr. Gromyko on this subject. I am convinced that they do not want an outbreak of war in the area because they've realized that it might result in a confrontation with the United States, so to that extent I think they would like to have the cease fire continue. What their ultimate objective is, I'm not sure.

SHERMAN: Mr. Secretary, in your speech, one of your points, you said it's possible for a compromise on this issue of the Egyptian troops crossing the Canal. The Israelis say flatly they will not compromise on this. Can you give us some indication of where you see the compromise developing?

SEC. ROGERS: No, I can't, Mr. Sherman, for the reasons that I've mentioned. Obviously both sides say they are not going to compromise. If they say they are going to compromise, that would undercut their position. So in any negotiation, whether it's this or the Berlin talks, or even a labor negotiation, both sides say we won't make any further concessions. All I'm saying is that based on our discussions, we think, given the goodwill and good intentions of both nations, that an interim agreement is possible.

KALB: Mr. Secretary, getting back to these security guarantees for Israel, the topic anyway, there was a story that was published earlier last week and it was not only not denied by U.S. officials,

but it was basically confirmed, that there have been discussions of security arrangements with Israel that -- I believe Mr. Sisco, when he was in Israel during the summer, discussed some of these arrangements. What form would they take, if it would not take the form of some kind of congressional resolution or something more formal than the ad hoc arrangement that now exists?

SEC. ROGERS: Mr. Kalb, one of the reasons that it's necessary to have quiet diplomacy is because every answer that you make to one question relates to another question. Now what the form of guarantee would take would depend upon what kind of arrangement was made. Obviously if Israel makes an interim agreement, to some extent its military position is changed. Now if it has changed as a result of that interim agreement to its detriment, then some provision would have to be made to reassure Israel that its security was not impaired as a result of that agreement, and we are prepared to consider that, but we are absolutely convinced that it is vital to the peace in the area and to peace in the world, for that matter, to work out this problem, and we don't think the time has ever been more favorable than now. Everyone accepts the idea that the cease fire has been very fortunate, everyone accepts the idea that there should be an interim agreement -- this was President Sadat's idea -- and Israel has responded favorably to the idea -- now it's a matter of working out the terms and conditions so that it's clear to Egypt that this is not a final step, that this is merely a step toward an overall settlement under the Security Council resolution, and to satisfy Israel that its security is not in peril.

HERMAN: Do you take President Sadat's deadline at the end of

this year seriously? Do you think that's hard and fast?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I take what President Sadat says seriously. I think he very much wants to do the things that he can do to bring about an interim settlement. I think he wants to create a sense of urgency, and that's understandable. I naturally dislike any threats about renewed hostilities. I think it's of great importance that all parties, as much as possible, resist from statements that make the situation even more tense.

HERMAN: A little over a week ago, Mr. Secretary, you said that you hoped that events inside the mainland Chinese Republic would not affect the possibility of President Nixon's making a trip there. What do you think now?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, as I said at that time, I have no reason -- none of us have any reason in this administration to think that the events, whatever they have been in the People's Republic of China, will adversely affect the President's visit to Peking. We are proceeding on the theory that it is going to take place, Dr. Kissinger's trip is consistent with that belief, and we have no reason to think it won't work out just as planned.

KALB: Do you have any hard information, as reported this morning, that Lin Piao, the designated successor to Mao Tse-tung, is ill?

SEC. ROGERS: No, we do not, Mr. Kalb, have any hard information.

SHERMAN: Mr. Secretary, it's been almost three months now since the President announced he was going to Peking. Can you tell us this morning in any way what he hopes to achieve there specifically?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, not beyond what has been said, Mr. Sherman. The President has pointed out that he wants to improve our relations

with the People's Republic of China, it represents seven hundred million people in the world, it should not be isolated from the world, we're prepared to do our part to improve those relations. We would expect that our prospects for increased trade, cultural exchange, scientific exchanges, changes of journalists and so forth. Now beyond that we can't be sure, but whatever we can do to improve our relations, as long as it's not at the expense of our friends and allies, we will certainly seriously consider.

KALB: That gets right to the heart of the issue now with the United Nations, trying not to have Nationalist China expelled. How do you think that American effort is going?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I think it's going reasonably well. As you know, I've had a lot of meetings recently on -- I've talked with a lot of foreign ministers on this subject -- at the moment I think the vote would be very close. It's a horse race, but I think we're going to be successful; I am reasonably optimistic that we will succeed. Now let me say, Mr. Kalb, that our position is that the Republic of China should not be expelled from the United Nations, and if it happens, I think it's a very dangerous precedent indeed to expel a nation by a majority vote. Regardless of how you justify it, whether you justify it on the grounds of representation or what, it's a very dangerous precedent and will be very, I think, ^{detrimental} to the future of the United Nations because I can think of ten other nations that would be on the list in the future.

KALB: Mr. Secretary, a number of delegates up at the UN feel that the United States really is going through the motions up at the UN, trying to build up a good, creditable public defense of Nationalist

China's interests, but basically, given even the announcement this week of the Kissinger visit to Peking, you've got your eye on Peking, not Taiwan?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, that/^{just}is not true, Mr. Kalb. We're doing ^{that} everything/we possibly can to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China. In addition to the point that I just made about the precedent that would be created, let me say too that if the Republic of China is expelled, I can imagine that nations like Albania and others might claim that because of that action, expelling the Republic of China, that all the actions taken by the Security Council in the United Nations since its beginning were illegal. In other words, if the United Nations is going to take that position, that after all these years in dealing with the Republic of China, that it should be expelled and thereby be an international outlaw, and its presence was never appropriate in the first place, I could imagine an attack on the United Nations that would be very serious indeed, so I can't tell you how serious the United States is about doing everything we can to fight, to prevent the expulsion of China. And I think that when nations start analyzing it carefully, and thinking about the consequences that might result from this action by the United Nations, they may change their view. I might also say that some of the newspaper reports that I've seen to the effect that some of these nations are going to vote against us, I do not believe are correct. They've assured us otherwise in private discussions, and I believe --

(MORE)

HERMAN: Which ones?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I'm not going to say, but I can tell you that in several cases, I have been assured privately that they are going to support us on the important question resolution. As you know, that important question resolution says that Taiwan will not be expelled by two-thirds vote.

SHERMAN: Given the nature of your commitment, very deep commitment, the fight you're waging in the General Assembly, the feeling in Congress evidently, about this issue, do you foresee that if the Nationalists are expelled from the United Nations, that the executive branch will have a difficult time gaining the financing from Congress for the United Nations?

SEC. ROGERS: Mr. Sherman, I have not said that in my discussions, because President Nixon has not so indicated. He has ^{not} indicated he would himself back away from any support of the United Nations--

SHERMAN: No, but I asked whether you think you'll have difficulty--

SEC. ROGERS: Yes, I think we will have difficulty, and I pointed that out. It's clear that many senators already have expressed themselves to that effect, that they would hesitate to give the United Nations the same financial support that they have in the past, and also many members of the House of Representatives.

KALB: Would the administration throw its weight and support behind an effort on behalf of Congress to cut funds for the UN?

SEC. ROGERS: Why, we haven't faced up to that, Marvin. No, I wouldn't want to say anything like that because that would appear to be a threat, and we are not approaching this problem that way at all.

We are approaching them as a matter of principle. The principle is very important. If you expel a member of the United Nations--

HERMAN: Let me pick you up on that one word--we haven't faced up to that, is what you said.

SEC. ROGERS: Yes.

HERMAN: You mean that when that happens, then you will have to consider what you will do about the support -- American support --

SEC. ROGERS: No, I haven't faced up to it because I think we're going to win the vote.

HERMAN: But on the -- on the-- if you should not, will that then be a time to face up to it and make a decision?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, we'll have to decide what the Congressional attitude is on the subject. President Nixon strongly supports the United Nations and always has, and will continue to, and that's why we feel very strongly on this question of the expulsion of the Republic of China. I can't think of anything that would be more destructive to the United Nations than expelling a government that is in existence and has been a good member all these years, representing fourteen million people. I can't--at a time when most of the speakers in the United Nations are talking about universality, which means that all governments should be represented, so it's quite inconsistent with the whole trend of the United Nations.

SHERMAN: If nationalist China should be expelled, would you see that its isolation from the world community might convince Peking that it could use force to take back Formosa?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I don't think so. We have no reason to think that, but of course, if the Republic of China is expelled from

the United Nations, as I say, it suggests that it's a non-fact of life, that it's a nonentity. The fact of the matter is that the Republic of China is a government in existence and will continue to be in existence for some time to come unless the evolutionary process somehow brings about a reconciliation between mainland China and the Republic of China.

KALB: Mr. Secretary, one wrinkle of this new China policy is that it appears, anyway, that there is a rather strong sentiment, even in the State Department, that the effort to improve relations with China has certainly led to a deterioration in our relations with Japan, which is certainly a fulcrum of the whole Nixon doctrine in Asia, if it is to succeed. How badly, to ask you a leading question, do you think those relations have been damaged?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I don't think they've been damaged, Mr. Kalb, by the President's initiative to visit Peking. We have problems with them --

KALB: The economic problems?

SEC. ROGERS: --Economic problems, but I don't believe it's been a problem. I think it's a problem temporarily with Japan, because we were not in a position to give them any notice in advance, because we didn't notify other nations either. We had an agreement with the Peoples' Republic of China that we would make the announcement simultaneously, and we felt if there was any leak about that, it would look as if we had double-crossed them. But I think Japan realizes that.

SHERMAN: But, Mr. Secretary, aren't we in fact setting up a double standard of alliances? It's an article of faith in this

administration that in all our dealings with the Soviet Union, we have very close consultations with our West European allies, yet on the other side of the world, ever since July 15, with this sudden announcement, the United States government seems to have done everything possible to dissociate itself from the government of Japan in its dealings with Peking, to the point where reports from Tokyo are that Premier Sato may fall very shortly, and I'm just wondering whether in our rush for a dialogue with Peking, we're not really undermining our relationship with the real power in Asia, which is Japan.

SEC. ROGERS: Well, we aren't, Mr. Sherman. Of course, the first part of your question is not quite accurate either. We certainly didn't consult with the Soviet Union about the President's visit to Peking.

SHERMAN: No, no, but I mean, in dealing--in our dealings with the Soviet Union, we consult with West European allies, yet in our dealings with Communist China, we don't seem to consult with Japan, which is our main ally in Asia.

SEC. ROGERS: No, that isn't true. We consult with Japan very closely on almost everything. As a matter of fact, in the ministerial meeting, I sent Japan the draft of the statement that I was going to make at the meeting, so that they could give us their suggestions. The only thing we haven't done--

KALB: It leaked.

SEC. ROGERS: It leaked. (LAUGHTER)

HERMAN: Mr. Secretary, I seem to be the one who always likes to throw up quotations from the past to our guests, and I noticed

that you said in June of 1969 that the administration was not wedded to any government in Saigon, only to the idea of a free choice for the people of South Viet Nam. Have they now had a free choice?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I think -- you're speaking about the presidential election. I think that it's quite clear that we're disappointed that there wasn't a contested election. I have pointed out, though, there was a contested election as far as the parliament was concerned and there was a fairly well conducted election and the opposition gained twenty seats in the assembly.

HERMAN: I guess my point is, do they have a government of their own choice, do you think?

SEC. ROGERS: What's that?

HERMAN: Do they have a government of their own choice, do you think?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, I think the parliament does, and I think that probably President Thieu does represent the will of the people, but you can't tell, because there wasn't a contested election. It is, I think, fair to say, though, Mr. Herman, that both the candidates who were proposed as possibilities, Minh and Ky, did have the opportunity to run and decided against it. Now, I think there is a good deal of debate about the circumstances that provided the opportunity, but you know, it's one of those facts of life. We have said publicly that we're disappointed that there wasn't a contest in Viet Nam.

KALB: Mr. Secretary, there have always been so many shifting rationalizations offered by your administration and others, too, about why the United States is in Viet Nam, and one of the major

ones has always been self-determination. There are a lot of people who feel, and you yourself have just expressed disappointment, that that did not happen last Sunday. What now is the basic rationalization for the continued presence of American forces in Viet Nam? What is--what is beneficial to the United States?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, we have made a tremendous national commitment. We have had roughly 50,000 Americans killed; we've had two million men serve in the armed forces there, because we believe that they have the right to determine their own future. Now, that doesn't necessarily -- determine their own future -- mean free election as we know it. As a matter of fact, as President Nixon pointed out in his press conference, about sixty out of the ninety nations in the world that we help do not have the elective process as we know it, and we think that Viet Nam is--South Viet Nam--has come along well. Its economy is fairly stable. We think that the Vietnamization program has worked and we think that they will manage to work out an elective process just as South Korea has that will be satisfactory. We don't think that just because this one election happened to be one that we were not entirely satisfied with, that the events in the future are not going to be satisfactory. We had the same criticism made in the case of South Korea.

(MORE)

KALB: But why make the comparison with Korea? Excuse me, I just want to pursue this. Why is what happened in Korea relevant to what is happening in Viet Nam or even could happen there?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, because, at first the system was criticized because it wasn't the elective system as we know it, and I think in South Viet Nam, if things go well, and I'm inclined to think they will in the future; I think South Viet Nam will be a free, independent nation, and I think they will manage to have an elective system that we can be proud of. They certainly did in the parliamentary elections.

HERMAN: To sum up, I think, what we're after, do you think that the elections will have any impact on the speed of withdrawal of our troops or America's tie to South Viet Nam?

SEC. ROGERS: I don't think so. Let me say this, President Nixon started out with a program of getting American forces out of Viet Nam. It's progressed just as he predicted it would; we are going to continue that process. Our casualties, as you know, are way down; we're going to continue that process, and President Nixon is living up to his commitment to get American forces out of that war. Furthermore, he's taken the lead throughout the world in the cause of peace. We brought about a cease fire in the Middle East; everyone acknowledges that. We have had very active discussions with the Russians in Europe, in the SALT talks, in Berlin and so forth, which appear to be succeeding. He now is talking with the People's Republic of China. In other words, President Nixon is a world leader for peace, and I think that people throughout the world realize that.

SHERMAN: Mr. Secretary, do you have any information that the North Vietnamese, in fact, are building up for a new offensive in

South Viet Nam at a time when the President is about to make a new announcement on further troop withdrawals?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, we never know for sure, of course, but the indications are that they are not. There always is a possibility, as you know, there was a great deal of speculation about the fact that they might launch a major offensive just prior to the election, which they didn't do. So there's no indication based on our current intelligence which would suggest that.

KALB: Mr. Secretary, if I could swing you around to Greece and the upcoming visit there of the Vice President, is this something that you, the State Department, support, and how is it justified?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, yes, we support it. As you know, Vice President Agnew has Greek ancestors. He has wanted very much to go to Greece for some time for obvious reasons. We have good relations with Greece. We're members of an alliance. Greece is a very important nation to the United States in terms of that whole part of the world and the Mediterranean in particular, so we want to continue to have good relations with Greece. We have, of course, expressed some disappointment that they haven't moved more quickly to representative government, but we have to keep in mind that there is a limit to what we can do to affect other governments, and we -- in the past we've been much too anxious to criticize other governments.

HERMAN: We have one minute. Doesn't this affect us? Are we not somehow affecting the Greek government by sending our Vice President there, somehow?

SEC. ROGERS: Well, we -- it's always a question -- it's always a question whether we have greater influence when we're closer to a

government or when we're more hostile to a government. My own view is that we'll have a better opportunity to -- as a result of consultations -- to affect the events in the way that we hope they'll be affected.

HERMAN: Let's sneak you one in the last 30 seconds. Did you turn down a nomination to the Supreme Court at the hands of the President?

SEC. ROGERS: No, I have not. I would never have to turn him down, turn down that suggestion because he knows how I feel about the Court. We've been good friends for a long time, and he knows exactly how I feel.

HERMAN: How do you feel?

SEC. ROGERS: Oh, I feel that he will select an outstanding man for the Court, and I've made it clear over the years that I have no interest in any such assignment.

HERMAN: Thank you very much, Secretary Rogers, for being with us today on Face the Nation.

SEC. ROGERS: Thank you.

ANNOUNCER: Today on FACE THE NATION, Secretary of State William Rogers was interviewed by CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb, George Sherman, Diplomatic Correspondent of the Washington Evening Star, and CBS News Correspondent George Herman. Next week another prominent figure in the news will FACE THE NATION.

6 This statement was not issued.

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like

STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT NIXON - October 13, 1971
ON CHIREP

THIS PETITION--EXPRESSING AN OVERWHELMING AND BI-PARTISAN OPPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE EXPULSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM THE UNITED NATIONS - REFLECTS CLEARLY THE SENTIMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION.

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNS THE POPULATION LARGER THAN 2/3RDS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. FOR OVER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY, IT HAS BEEN A LOYAL AND HONORABLE MEMBER OF THAT BODY; IT HAS MET ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS; IT HAS PAID ALL ITS DUES.

WERE THE UN TO EXPEL THIS LOYAL MEMBER, SURELY THE HOPES AND CONFIDENCE OF MILLIONS OF AMERICANS IN THE WORLD BODY WOULD DRAMATICALLY DIMINISH; AND THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF WOULD BE SETTING A MOST DANGEROUS PRECEDENT.

THIS ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO THE PROPOSITION THAT THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA SHALL NOT BE DEPRIVED OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS. WE ARE BENDING OUR EFFORTS TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE; WE HOPE AND ANTICIPATE, WITH THE COOPERATION OF OTHERS AROUND THE WORLD, WE SHALL SUCCEED.

- 15 -

problem that is properly before us: how China should now be represented in the United Nations.

Let us take that decision realistically, wisely, equitably, and in a way that will strengthen the UN for its service to peace.

#

WLR:nj:pra 10-11-71

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING 07/10/79
PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.3 (C)

O = Decided in Favor = 44
LIF = Leaning in Favor = 14
Total in Favor = 58
X = Decided Against = 51
LAG = Leaning Against = 9
Total Against = 60

IQ ~~SECRET~~

Sept. 6

G. H. Chirico
fate

LAAS = Leaning Toward Abstention = 9
UNKN = No Clear Idea on Position = 3

COUNTRY	LIF	LAG	LAAS	UNKN	COUNTRY	LIF	LAG	LAAS	UNKN
Afghanistan X					Kuwait			✓	
Albania X					Laos O				
Algeria X					Lebanon P	✓			
Argentina		✓			Lesotho O				
Australia O					Liberia O				
Austria			✓		Libyan Arab Republic	✓			
Bahrain	✓				Luxembourg O				
Barbados	✓				Madagascar O				
Belgium O					Malawi O				
Bhutan X					Malaysia X				
Bolivia O					Maldives Is. ABSENT				
Botswana	✓				Mali X				
Brazil O					Malta	✓			
Bulgaria X					Mauritania X				
Burma X					Mauritius P	✓			
Burundi		✓			Mexico			✓	
Byelorussian S.S.R.					Mongolian P.R. X				
Cameroon X					Morocco		✓		
Canada X					Nepal X				
Central African Rep. ✓					Netherlands			✓	
Ceylon X					New Zealand O				
Chad O					Nicaragua O				
Chile X					Niger O				
China O					Nigeria X				
Colombia O					Norway X				
Congo (K) O					Oman	✓			
Costa Rica O					Pakistan X				
Cuba X					Panama O				
Cyprus				✓	Paraguay O				
Czechoslovakia					Peop Dem Rep of Yemen				
Dahomey O					Peop Rep of the Congo				
Denmark X					Peru X				
Dominican Republic					Philippines O				
Ecuador		✓			Poland X				
Egypt X					Portugal			✓	
El Salvador O					Qatar			✓	
Equatorial Guinea					Romania X				
Ethiopia X					Rwanda	✓			
Fiji O					Saudi Arabia O				
Finland X					Senegal P	✓			
France X					Sierra Leone X				
Gabon O					Singapore X				
Gambia O					Somali Republic				
Ghana		✓			South Africa O				
Greece	✓				Spain O				
Guatemala O					Sudan X				
Guinea X					Swaziland O				
Guyana X					Sweden X				
Haiti O					Syrian Arab Republic				
Honduras O					Thailand O				
Hungary X					Togo P	✓			
Iceland	✓				Trinidad and Tobago				✓
India X					Tunisia	✓			
Indonesia		✓			Turkey		✓		
Iran	✓				Uganda		✓		
Iraq X					Ukrainian S.S.R.				
Ireland				✓	U.S.S.R. X				
Israel	✓				United Kingdom				
Italy X					United Rep of Tanzania				
Ivory Coast O					United States O				
Jamaica O					Upper Volta O				
Japan O					Uruguay O				
Jordan O					Venezuela O				
Kenya	✓				Yemen Arab Republic				
Khmer Republic O					Yugoslavia X				
					Zambia X				
LEANING IN FAVOR	14					14	9	9	3
LEANING AGAINST	9								
LEANING TOWARD ABSTENTION	9								
UNKNOWN	3								

F. Min has
power divide

Follow up
Kamul

Jamaica

- ~~Cover~~
- Omen

Bahrein

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

7 October 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR BUSH

FROM: Herbert Reis ^{HR}

SUBJECT: The "Veto" and Chinese Representation

~~Reis~~
Chung-fu

We have nothing on this subject so I have drawn up
a little memo, which is attached.*

I can easily redraft if it doesn't seem on line.

*P.S. This is a gross oversimplification;
the academics would be condemnatory.

HR *u*

Attachment: Memo

HReis:10/7/71

SUBJECT: The "Veto" and Chinese Representation

The United States veto power in the Security Council cannot be used to assure continued Republic of China participation in the U.N. It is for this reason that we and other countries have introduced "non-expulsion" and "dual representation" resolutions in the current General Assembly.

Not surprisingly, the practice of the U.N. under the Charter has been to let each principal body decide for itself controversies between rival authorities claiming the right to represent a Member State of the United Nations. In effect, each house determines these matters for itself. Thus, the General Assembly has the power to determine whether representatives of the Peoples Republic of China should be substituted for representatives of the Republic of China or whether representatives of each should participate in its work. Since the veto applies only to questions coming before the Security Council (e.g., whether to engage in economic sanctions in a particular case), we cannot rely on the veto to stop efforts to oust ROC representatives from the General Assembly.

As to Chinese representation in the Security Council, a sizeable majority of the 15-member Council is likely to regard the question of who should represent China, a permanent member of the Council, as involving merely issues of "credentials". That is, some 10 members, more or less, might be likely to regard the question of Chinese representation in the Council as merely a "procedural" one -- to which, of course, the veto does not apply. In these circumstances, an effort to cast a so-called "double veto" -- vetoing a question and then trying to veto a vote in the Council that that question had been procedural -- would not be successful for long.



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
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540

See
Page 5
For scenario

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE

September 23, 1971

TO:



FROM: Marjorie Ann Browne
Analyst in International Organization

VIA: Chief, Foreign Affairs Division

SUBJECT: Possible procedure which might secure a "substantive" vote
in the Security Council on the seating of the People's
Republic of China on the Council.

The information sketched out below is in response to your telephone
request yesterday for specific information on the Chinese question in the
UN Security Council.

Hypothesis: The General Assembly of the United Nations has accepted the
two-China resolutions of the United States, thus seating both the People's
Republic of China and the Republic of China in the General Assembly. The
two Chinas are vying for the China seat in the Security Council.

Object: Plot the procedure the United States might use to bring the
question of which entity will occupy the seat of China in the Security
Council to a vote which can be vetoed, that is, to a vote on a matter
of substance.

Actors: The Security Council, which consists of fifteen members:

Argentina
Belgium
Burundi
*China
*France
Italy
Japan
Nicaragua

Poland
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Syria
*USSR
*United Kingdom
*United States

Chung

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

The above is the Security Council membership in 1971. The five permanent members, which have veto power on questions of substance, are asterisked. The Presidency of the Council rotates monthly, in the alphabetical ordering of the above list. In August the representative of Italy was President of the Council. On 31 December, five nations will complete their terms of membership: Burundi, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone and Syria.

Other pertinent information:

UN Charter-Article 27 (2). "Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members. (3) "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members"

Under the second part of Article 27 (3) obligatory abstention from voting as a member to a dispute applies only when the Council is voting on proposals for pacific settlement.

Definition of "procedural" and "substantive" matters.

The confusion which reigns relative to the definition of these two terms and thus what proposals and draft resolutions of the Security Council are subject to the veto, is traced to the silence of the Charter (see Article 27, above) and of the Council's Rules of Procedure on the subject. A statement at San Francisco by the permanent members of

the Council, on June 8, 1945, on voting procedures in the Security Council, does specify matters which they regarded as procedural, and thus passable by an affirmative vote of any seven (now nine) members,

- (1) adopt or alter its rules of procedure; (2) determine the method of selecting its President; (3) organize itself in such a way as to be able to function continuously; (4) select the times and places of its regular and special meetings;
- (5) establish such bodies or agencies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions; (6) invite a Member not represented on the Council to participate in its discussions when that Member's interests are specially affected; and
- (7) invite any State, when it is a party to a dispute being considered by the Council, to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute.*

The Statement also indicated that "the decision regarding the preliminary question as to whether or not ... a matter is procedural must be taken by a vote of seven (nine) members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the permanent members," thus subject to veto.

The Rules of Procedure of the Council are of little help in determining what is procedural and what is substantive; in fact, they are still

"provisional" primarily because no agreement could be reached on the mechanics of voting and "on the majority by which various decisions of the Council should be taken." (Bailey, page 16). Mr. Bailey observes that practice has identified the following matters as procedural:

* Bailey, Sidney D. Voting in the Security Council. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1969. page 14. [This book is a major source for the information in this memo.]

In 1950, in the only Security Council vote on the question of replacing the Republic of China (ROC) with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Council considered the question a procedural one of approval of credentials, thus not subject to veto. The US delegate, Ernest A. Gross, declared that his vote against the resolution should not be considered a veto (see Appendix F, attached). However, since there is really no hard and fast rule on the matter, ROC supporters might first try to secure a ruling that any resolution on unseating ROC and seating PRC in the Council is of such significance that it is a substantive matter and subject to the veto.

Is the question of representation on the Security Council, procedural or substantive?

Attached is General Assembly Resolution 267 (III) of 14 April 1949, which was sponsored by China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, but was not accepted by the Soviet Union. The categories outlined in the resolution are only suggestions, guidelines.

[Bulley, page 17]
 Convocation of emergency special sessions of the General Assembly.
 Which the Council is asked:
 Attention or removal of items from the list of matters of
 Order of voting on proposals;
 Suspension or adjournment of a meeting;
 Postponement of consideration of items on the agenda;
 Challenges to ruling of the President;
 Invitations to participate in the proceedings;
 Order of items on the agenda;
 Inclusion of items in the agenda;

Scenario:

1. The United States addresses a letter to the President of the Council, requesting a meeting of the Security Council on the question of Chinese Representation on the Council, under Articles 34 and 35.
2. The President calls a meeting of the Council (Rule 3).
3. After adoption of the agenda (Rule 9), the US representative calls the attention of the Council to the recent action of the General Assembly and requests the President of the Council to make a ruling that any action by the Security Council to unseat the ROC and accept, instead, the credentials of the very different government of the PRC, be considered "substantive," thereby requiring the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Council. The US should encourage the President to use the French text of the Rules (Rule 30), if there are objections to his ruling. In this way, if his ruling is challenged, he asks for a vote to support the challenge and the challenger must locate nine yes votes or the ruling will stand (see Andrew Boyd, page 348, attached). [Note: The President should be from a nation favorable to the ROC and to the US -- Japan (in September) or Nicaragua (in October) -- so that the matter of the ruling and the use of the French text will be worked out prior to the meeting and the US will be assured that the ruling will be satisfactory.]
4. PRC supporters -- the frustrated challengers -- take the next step, offering a resolution calling for the rejection of the credentials of ROC and the acceptance of the credentials of the PRC. After lengthy debate, the draft resolution, vetoed by the United States and by the ROC, is defeated and the ROC remains.

DATE 10-8-71 SYMBOL _____

ACTION	OFFICERS	INFO	INITIALS
COPY TO:	Lias		
	Bush		
	Phillips	✓	
	Bennett		
	Zagorin		
	Schaufele		
	Newlin	✓	
	Carter	✓	
	Combs		
	Grigg		
	Irwin, J.	✓	
	Mahon		
	McSweeney	✓	
	Naas		
	Sacksteder		
	Smith		
	Thayer	✓	
	Gunther		
	McKesson		
	Connett		
	Murphy	✓	
	Scotes		
	Waring		
	Kitchen		
	Dunn		
	Koehring		
	Lennon		
	Marin		
	Rothenberg		
	Stillman		
	Bender		
	Kuttner		
	Reddington		
	Stottlemeyer		
	Trinks		
	Irwin, W.		
	Reis		
	Rosenstock		
✓	Schottke		
	Darner	FOX	
	King		
	Foster		
	Roussel		
	MSC		
✓	Reference		

CAR TRANSMITTAL ACTION



Duck

AUSTRALIAN MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK *CB*

29th September, 1971.

My dear Ambassador,

Save China

In connection with the forthcoming debate in *File*
the General Assembly on the question of Chinese
representation in the United Nations, I am enclosing
for your information a paper prepared by the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs on some legal aspects of
the question which have been cited as grounds for contesting
the validity of the proposals co-sponsored, amongst
others, by Australia.

Yours sincerely,

L.R. McIntyre
(L.R. McIntyre)
Permanent Representative

His Excellency Mr. George H. Bush,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations,
NEW YORK, N.Y.

AIDE MEMOIRE

In the course of intergovernmental consultations on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, it has on occasion been argued that the proposals submitted by the United States, Australia and others seeking to admit the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and at the same time preserve the membership of the Republic of China are incompatible with the terms of the United Nations Charter and with concepts of international law.

Though the objections are differently expressed, they seem for the most part only variants of the same five-pronged contention:

- (i) Only one "China" is a member of the United Nations.
- (ii) The representation of "China" is basically a mere question of credentials - i.e., which of the rival authorities in "China" is entitled to appoint the representatives of "China"?
- (iii) If only because Taiwan is merely a province of "China", this question must be answered in favour of the People's Republic of China.
- (iv) No question arises of the "expulsion" of a member of the United Nations, but only of the exclusion of invalidly appointed representatives.

- (v) Chiang Kai-shek's regime can only retain a place in the United Nations on application for a new membership, as a separate state of Taiwan.

The short answer to this objection is that it is explicitly "the Republic of China" that the Charter recognises as an original member of the United Nations: Articles 3, 23 and 110. That state, though now much abridged territorially, still exists, and indeed is still under the same government as the government by virtue of whose acts in 1945 it became an original member of the United Nations. The Chiang Kai-shek government is not a government in exile, or a government without territory. The People's Republic of China cannot claim to exercise present authority in Taiwan, any more than the Republic of China can claim to exercise present authority on the mainland.

Notwithstanding the difficulties created by the Charter text, the United Nations must now find some way of giving effect to the changes that have taken place in "China" since 1945. The result of the civil war is that since 1949 there have been two governments, each exercising authority as such, within different parts of the territory that belonged to China in 1945. It is in substance a case of partial, or dual, state succession. The question of representation cannot now be treated as a simple matter of credentials, any more than it could in 1947 when Pakistan was established as a separate state within the territory of the existing United Nations member, India - another case of dual or partial succession.

The "dual representation" resolution is an attempt to give practical effect to the changes in "China" since 1945. In the case of India/Pakistan in 1947, all that was necessary was to admit Pakistan as a new member in pursuance of Charter Article 4. But in that instance there was no Security Council problem, as there is now with "China". It was by virtue of Chiang Kai-shek's authority on the mainland that the Republic of China was accorded in 1945 the status of a permanent member of the Security Council. Logically, or at any rate as a matter of political principle, the replacement on the mainland of the authority of the Republic of China by that of the People's Republic of China should be followed by the like replacement in the membership of the Security Council. This step would be in accordance with the substance and intention of the Charter, though not in accordance with the actual text of Article 23.

There is no disposition among members of the United Nations to seek an amendment of the Charter, or for that matter to proceed in accordance with the India-Pakistan precedent. The reasons for this are well known. But some states do not seem to realise that both the Albanian and the "dual representation" resolutions alike involve some departures from the text of the Charter as it stands. We contend that overall the "dual representation" resolution is in accord with the whole substance and intention of the Charter, and departs from its letter only to preserve its substance.

The whole thrust of the Albanian resolution, on the other hand, is to deprive the Republic of China of international status, to relegate the position of Taiwan to that of a matter of purely internal or domestic concern for the People's Republic of China, and thus to set the People's Republic of China free from Charter obligations towards the Republic of China. In contrast, the "dual representation" resolution is in accord with the existing political and juridical realities in preserving the international status of the Republic of China, and in maintaining the application to it of the full regime of the Charter.

Some states seem to regard the fact that the Republic of China claims de jure sovereignty over the territory which is effectively ruled by the People's Republic of China as making it impossible for the Republic of China to continue as a member of the United Nations together with the People's Republic of China. As a legal proposition this has no substance. There are at least several members of the United Nations which claim de jure sovereignty over territory that is at present effectively ruled by another member - e.g., Philippines, Ireland, Argentina, Guatemala. Indonesia was for years in the same position as regards West Irian. Diplomatic recognition of a state does not of itself involve acceptance of that state's territorial claims. Still less does support for a state's admission to or representation in the United Nations.

The insistence by the People's Republic of China on being recognised as the "sole legal government of China" is an attempt

to secure a concession that the act of recognition would not of itself imply. Many states seem to regard acceptance of the "sole legal government of China" formula as obliging them to oppose the continued membership of the Republic of China in the United Nations. But this does not follow at all. In point of law, the recognition of a state, and its acceptance as a member of the United Nations, are altogether distinct from and independent of the recognition or acceptance of its territorial claims.

United Nations: Mao on the Threshold

For all the high ideals in the Charter, the United Nations is a very down-to-earth and pragmatic organization, which for the most part deals with hard political realities rather than with sweet reason or ideal aspirations. The opportunities for inspirational leadership or crusading are exceedingly rare.

SO said U.N. Secretary-General U Thant last week as he prepared to vacate the post he has held since 1961, a job that the U.N.'s first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, once characterized as "the most impossible in the world." In an ordinary year, the selection of a new Secretary-General would overshadow most other matters on the agenda of the General Assembly. Ten years

any doubt that the Communist government will immediately be granted China's permanent seat on the 15-seat Security Council; that, too, became a virtual certainty when the U.S. went on record last week as supporting such a move. The remaining question is whether, in the weeks to come, the U.S. will be able to prevent the U.N. from altogether expelling Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese regime.

Important Question. Washington's current policy, as outlined last month by Secretary of State William Rogers, is a one-China, one-Taiwan approach. The U.S. will support the admission of Peking without the expulsion of Taipei from the General Assembly. That stand involves harrowing legal problems. Ac-

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Accordingly, both Britain and France are expected to support the Albanian resolution, co-sponsored by 17 members, that calls for the admission of Peking as China's representative and the expulsion of Taipei. The U.S. had been counting on Japan to co-sponsor its resolution. Two weeks ago, however, the Japanese told Washington that they were having second thoughts, even though they still planned to vote for the resolution. In a sharp exchange during two days of meetings in Washington, Secretary Rogers declared to Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda: "I see your position as



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Historic Matter. The selection of a new Secretary-General will indeed be an important topic on the agenda, along with such perennial problems as the Middle East and such current troubles as the civil war in Pakistan. But when the 26th session of the General Assembly convenes in New York this week, under the presidency of Indonesia's Adam Malik, the delegates will be preoccupied with an even more historic matter: the admission of Mao Tse-tung's China to the United Nations.

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The U.S. tactic nonetheless is to argue that the matter of Taipei's expulsion is an "important question" calling for a two-thirds vote of the 127-member Assembly rather than a simple majority. But it is having great difficulty lining up support for this position, despite such efforts as U.N. Ambassador George Bush's meeting last week with U.N. envoys from 35 member states. As a British diplomat explained, "We don't question U.S. intentions on this matter, but the practical effect of the U.S. resolution would be to keep Peking out because Peking will not

totally illogical." Replied Fukuda: "Politics has its own logic." Premier Eisaku Sato's government was stunned by the announcement of Nixon's trip to Peking and by his economic policy, and those twin shocks have served to reinforce the arguments of Sato's critics that Japan should have a foreign policy more independent of the U.S. Even Sato's own Liberal Democratic Party is sharply divided over whether Tokyo should move immediately toward closer relations with Peking.

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There is no shortage of applicants for the \$65,000-a-year job. Foremost among these is Finland's Ambassador to the U.N., Max Jakobson, 48, who has won the backing of the other Scandinavian states. His chief asset is also a liability: an able man and an activist, he might strike the Soviets as being a bit too much like the late Dag Hammarskjöld, whom the Russians never forgave for inspiring the U.N.'s military operation in the Congo. Jakobson has an additional handicap: his mother was Jewish, a fact that might provoke opposition from Arab states and perhaps even their Soviet allies.

If Jakobson should be ruled out, a likely alternative might be Gunnar Jarring, 63, Sweden's Ambassador to Moscow and the U.N.'s Middle East negotiator. Jarring, however, is under heavy fire at home at the moment for his shabby treatment of Soviet Writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn. After Solzhenitsyn won the Nobel Prize for literature last year, much to the annoyance of Soviet leaders, Jarring refused to hold an award ceremony at the Swedish embassy in Moscow lest it offend the Soviet Union. The incident was widely criticized in the West as well as in Sweden, where one newspaper, *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, accused the government of "pitiful toadying" to the Kremlin.

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
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
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Secretary-General U Thant addresses U.N. correspondents: A sudden plunge into relevance

The U.N.: Will It Run—Or Punt?

Most years, the opening of the United Nations General Assembly has all the impact of a charity ball—a colorful occasion and a worthy cause, but strictly a ho-hum affair. This year will be a different story. The session that begins this week may well prove to be the most momentous in the U.N.'s 26-year history. For once, the world body will be in a position to take solid action on issues that really matter: the China question, the Middle East stalemate and the selection of a new Secretary-General. In the glass box on the East River, this sudden plunge into relevance has produced a mood of heady and hopeful excitement. As a Scandinavian diplomat puts it, "This could be the session that finally shakes the U.N. out of its doldrums."

It is still much too early to predict that the U.N. will become a vital force in world affairs, but the conditions for such a transformation would seem to exist. Several years ago, Krishna Menon, India's waspish former Defense Minister, declared: "When the United States and the Soviet Union agree, the United Nations is unnecessary; when they do not agree, there is nothing the United Nations can do." But the days when two superpowers divided up the world between them are drawing to a close. Today, there are more like five great powers: the U.S., Russia, Japan, Europe and China. As a result, the free-swinging diplomacy of the 1970s will most likely consist of shifting alliances and impromptu coalitions. And as a unique clearinghouse for diplomatic horse trading, the U.N. could just conceivably emerge as the one institution that can put it all together.

The maneuvering on the China issue last week underscored the extent to which the non-Communist camp had already been splintered. Many American allies were openly lobbying against Washington's campaign to make Peking's admission contingent on continued membership for Taiwan. And the U.S. was embarrassingly unsuccessful in its efforts to round up prestigious co-sponsors for its carefully balanced China resolution. "At one point," admitted an American diplomat, "we had only the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua." In an effort to lure Japan, Australia and New Zealand into the fold, President Nixon himself announced an abrupt change of course: for the first time, the U.S. openly advocated the transfer of China's Security Council seat to Peking. But Japan—still furious with the offhand treatment it has received from the U.S. recently—did not snap at the bait, and Australia and New Zealand were no more cooperative. "Any of the three," said a U.S. official, "is perfectly capable of telling us off publicly."

Tactics: For the record, U.S. diplomats insisted they still had hopes of signing up Australia, New Zealand and perhaps even Japan before the U.S. tables its resolution this week. But even if Washington lucks out, it will face tough going in the General Assembly. At last year's session, an Albanian resolution to admit Peking and throw out Taiwan received a two-vote plurality, and failed only because the U.S. had succeeded in designating the matter an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority. This year, Washington will try similar tactics. If it can designate Taiwan's expulsion an important question, there is a

good chance that the Albanian measure will fail again and that the American "two-Chinas" formula will prevail. In that case, Taiwan will stay on in the U.N., and Peking will probably boycott the organization until its arch-rival is expelled. But a great deal depends on making Taiwan's eviction an important question, and some U.N. observers were predicting that the U.S. would be unable to muster the simple majority needed for that purpose.

There was no way of knowing how it would all turn out. "The U.S. will not pull its punches in preventing the exclusion of Taiwan," American ambassador to the U.N. George Bush told *Newsweek's* Raymond Carroll. And after a meeting with 35 prospective co-sponsors, Bush declared: "I think we have a winnable position." Other diplomats were not so sure, and many of them were unwilling to take the risk of voting with Washington. "They have their future relations with mainland China to consider," explained one delegate, "and they don't want to be wrong in their voting this year." For their part, American officials were prepared to be good sports. "We made our peace with possible defeat when we decided to move toward better relations with the mainland," one explained. "We decided to take our licking like gentlemen if it came to that."

Gambit: From the U.S. viewpoint, the outlook for the Middle East debate was equally unpromising. In an opening gambit last week, Jordan asked the Security Council to investigate Israel's policy of settling Jews on Arab territory in the Jerusalem area—an issue on which the U.S. is out of sympathy with Israel. In

INTERNATIONAL

Cairo, meanwhile, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat accused the U.S. of "deception" in its efforts to arrange an agreement that would permit the reopening of the Suez Canal. At the canal itself, an Egyptian missile shot down an Israeli transport plane, and at the end of the week the two antagonists were trading rocket barrages in the most serious violation yet of the thirteen-month-old cease-fire (following story).

Timetable: When it gets under way—probably in November—the U.N. debate on the Middle East will probably be the stormiest of this year's session, a shouting match that one senior Israeli diplomat described last week as "our annual passage down the Via Dolorosa." Washington's greatest worry is that Egypt may succeed in revising Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967, which has provided the foundation for peace-making efforts in the Middle East. The revised version would probably demand Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories, and it might well lay out a specific timetable—provisions that Israel considers totally unacceptable. The result would probably be a hardening of positions on both sides, and when Secretary of State William Rogers visits New York later this week, he may try to persuade Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to block any effort to rewrite 242.

In addition to coping with China and the Middle East, the member nations will also have to find a replacement for Secretary-General U Thant. Until recently, it was widely assumed that Thant

might be persuaded to stay on for another year or two, if only to pursue his pet project: the creation of a world university (dubbed "Thant U" by some wags). But last week the 62-year-old Secretary-General, who has served for a decade, issued a Shermanesque statement that he would not stay in office "under any circumstances," and the hunt for a successor was on in earnest.

Already, four avowed candidates have emerged, along with a herd of dark horses (box, page 45). The U.S., at the moment, leans toward Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson, but the race is still wide open. One important issue is whether the U.N. will select a forceful, strong-handed Secretary-General, similar to the late Dag Hammarskjöld, or whether it will settle for someone of a more lackluster nature, along the lines of U Thant. Whatever the decision, every delegate is well aware that the new man will have to be acceptable to Peking—an awareness that some U.N. habitués describe as the "Manchurian Candidate syndrome."

Items: Altogether, the agenda for the U.N. session contains more than 100 other items, ranging from environmental measures to a resolution endorsing Puerto Rican independence. Perhaps the most important of these secondary topics is a proposal from the Soviet Union for a worldwide disarmament conference. Although the suggestion seems to be designed to steal part of the spotlight from China, the Russians insist that it is more than a propaganda move. And coming on the heels of the recent Berlin agreement,

it apparently indicates that the Kremlin is determined to maintain its momentum toward rapprochement with the West.

Despite its rich agenda, it is entirely possible that the U.N. may fail to make a dent on any of these significant issues. Conceivably, China still may be left out in the cold. And there is an even better chance that the Middle East crisis and the arms race will again fail to respond to treatment, or that the General Assembly will once more elect a relatively passive Secretary-General. Given its sorry record, the organization's critics can be pardoned for suspecting that instead of running with the ball, the U.N. will drop back and punt. But the world body has been handed a golden opportunity to revitalize itself, and in this year of surprises, nothing can be ruled out. If China can be brought into the fold, the U.N. will finally hold a valid claim to the universality that has always escaped it in the past. And that fact alone could help to make it a more effective forum for shaping and channeling the new balances of power in the post-postwar world.


MIDDLE EAST:

Sparring Along the Canal

Two weeks ago, when Israeli anti-aircraft gunners shot down an Egyptian fighter-bomber over the Suez Canal, diplomats hoped that it would remain an isolated incident. But last week, the Egyptians retaliated, blasting a World War II-vintage Israeli Stratocruiser out of the sky with SAM-2 missiles. In return, Israeli Phantom jets—carefully staying on their side of the canal—raked Egyptian positions on the west bank. And as tensions mounted, the tenuous thirteen-month-old Mideast cease-fire seemed in jeopardy.

This turn of events could not have come at a worse time for the Israelis. Engaged in an effort to stave off an Arab diplomatic offensive at the U.N., the Israelis were unlikely to have staged a calculated provocation. By contrast, the Egyptian attack on the lumbering Stratocruiser, which may well have been fitted out with electronic jamming and reconnaissance equipment, appeared to be a carefully planned and executed missile ambush.

What seemed likely was that Cairo was trying to heat up the situation along the canal on the eve of the U.N.'s General Assembly meeting as a reminder to all concerned that time was running out in the quest for a Middle East solution. Presumably neither the Egyptians nor their Russian patrons wanted to resume the all-out artillery and air war that raged along the waterway early last year. But the best intentions are sometimes confounded by events—and there was the distinct danger this kind of calculated use of force for diplomatic purposes could escalate into major military action and finally dash hopes for a peaceful Middle East settlement.



PACIFISTS AT WAR: Gathering at dawn last week near the site of a half-completed airport in Narita, 37 miles east of Tokyo, 2,600 Japanese students armed with bamboo staves attacked 5,500 policemen in the worst riot in Japan's turbulent history of student demonstrations. When the battle ended, more than 1,000 people were injured and three policemen lay dead. At issue was the government's right to expropriate land for a new international airport, which the students fear is the harbinger of a substantially expanded Japanese air force and the military revival they so dread.

The New S-G: Front Runners and Long Shots

Although U Thant's desire to retire as Secretary-General has been an open secret for a long time, the contest among his potential successors has been waged with such diplomatic reserve that it has often bordered on the desultory. And no wonder. For in the past, the race for the Secretary-Generalship has set off bitter haggling among the major powers and resulted in a compromise that eliminated the most prominent candidates. Indeed, every S-G—from Trygve Lie to Dag Hammarskjöld to Thant himself—has been a dark-horse choice.

Given this history, the man who eventually fills the top job at the United Nations could well emerge from the list of long-shot candidates. Among these are Iran's Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, who is the younger brother of the late Aly Khan and who has served as U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees since 1965; Ghana's Robert Gardiner, head of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa; Chile's former President Eduardo Frei Montalva; Felipe Herrera, the former president of the Inter-American Development Bank; Swedish Ambassador to Moscow Gunnar Jarring, and Norway's Edvard Hambro, the outgoing president of the General Assembly. As time for next December's voting nears, even more candidates may appear, but for now the front runners are:

Max Jakobson. The scholarly Finn announced his candidacy last January and is considered the leading contender for the post. In countless diplomatic cocktail parties—and even in a public press conference—Jakobson, who has been his country's permanent representative to the U.N. since 1965, has openly sought support. He has the backing of all the Scandinavian countries—the so-called Nordic group—and is the only candidate who commands the solid backing of a diverse array of nations, large and small.

There seems to be little dispute about Jakobson's ability. A onetime journalist who rose swiftly in the Finnish foreign service in the post-World War II years, he is known at the U.N. as a wily, behind-the-scenes negotiator, capable of formulating resolutions that contending nations find acceptable. He has also found favor among the African bloc members for his steadfast opposition to apartheid and colonialism in Southern Africa.

But the 48-year-old Jakobson faces some formidable obstacles. For one thing, his father is Jewish and so is his wife—a family background that has not commended itself to some of the Arab states. If the Arab states turn thumbs down on Jakobson, then it might be difficult for the Soviet Union to accept him as Secretary-General. What's more, in some members' eyes, Jakobson has a second handicap: if elected, he would be the third Scandinavian to hold the Secretary-Generalship, and there is strong feeling that the top U.N. post should be moved around geographically.

Endakachew Makonnen. The handsome, Oxford-educated former Ethiopian ambassador to the U.N. is the major African candidate for the Secretary-Generalship at this point. When he first arrived at the U.N. in 1966, some of his African colleagues saw him as an aristocratic Ethiopian pushed into high position because of family contacts close to the throne of Emperor Haile Selassie. Since then, however, Makonnen has gained respect as a sober, balanced and approachable diplomat.

An avid reader of history, Makonnen is known to admire Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln as well as Gandhi and Nehru. He also has come to have a deep faith in the U.N. as a "spiritual force that helps to keep the major powers on speaking terms." So far, however, Makonnen has been unable to rally unified support in the African caucus, many of whose left-

leaning members regard him as far too friendly to the West.

Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe. Witty and elegant, the representative from Ceylon cuts one of the more stylish figures in the U.N. corridors. A 58-year-old bachelor, he often sports a fresh rose in his buttonhole and has an eye for an attractive lady. Yet, when it comes to U.N. affairs, he is a formidable debater and a skilled negotiator. He has served as chairman of the U.N.'s important committee on the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor.

So keen is the Ceylonese Government to have Amerasinghe chosen as Secretary-General that Prime Minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike has sent letters to all members of the U.N. seeking their support. As an Asian and a Buddhist, like U Thant, he has considerable strength, but his support of the Arabs in the Middle East dispute and his apparent pro-Soviet leanings lead some diplomats to conclude that he cannot win U.S. support.

Kurt Waldheim. One diplomatic wag has described Waldheim as "sort of an honorary Scandinavian—meticulous, conscientious and a trifle dull." Still, diplomats who have worked with the 52-year-old Austrian ambassador to the U.N. attest to his professionalism as well as to his dedication to the work of the world organization. He also has, says one colleague, the quality of political *Fingerspitzengefühl* (in effect, political sense in his fingertips).

In the contest for the Secretary-Generalship, Waldheim has conducted a low-key, almost invisible campaign. But should Jakobson falter, the Austrian diplomat will be ready and waiting to pick up the pieces as the chief European candidate. One important obstacle to Waldheim's candidacy is a Soviet feeling that the Austrian—though from a technically "neutral" country—might be a shade too pro-Western.



Tony Hollo—Newsweek



Pictorial Parade




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Bernard Gotfryd—Newsweek

The leading contenders for Secretary-General: Amerasinghe, Jakobson, Waldheim and Makonnen



Fukuda and Rogers at Cabinet conference:
Will Japan become an 'economic Vietnam'?



Fred Ward—Black Star

The U.S. and Japan on Collision Course

Back in the early 1960s, in a magnanimous gesture to one of its Asian clients, the U.S. agreed to hold annual cabinet-level meetings with Japan on economic matters. And the Japanese, who had just emerged from the devastation of World War II, were appropriately grateful—even though the American delegates who came to Tokyo often dozed through the boring conferences, resting up for the round of lavish geisha parties that were thrown for them by their hosts. But when the eighth such meeting between the two nations opened last week in Washington, nobody there was caught napping. For the rapid deterioration in U.S.-Japanese relations over the past few months turned the once-routine affair into a verbal slugging match and threatened to ignite an economic war between two of the industrial giants of the non-Communist world.

The donnybrook was, perhaps, inevitable, for in the past decade economic relations between Tokyo and Washington have come full circle. Today, the protégé has surpassed its former master in industrial efficiency and has opened an estimated annual balance-of-trade surplus of \$2.8 billion in Tokyo's favor. "It's as if the U.S. is playing the role of the underdeveloped nation," says one economist, "supplying raw materials which the Japanese turn into manufactured products." Recognizing this fact, the Japanese Cabinet officers arrived in Washington last week confidently expecting to be treated as equals. Instead, they discovered that although they had closed the economic gap, the psychological gap between the two countries remained as wide as ever—and that the Americans still insisted on treating the Japanese like new boys in the school of global power.

This attitude on the part of the U.S.

was strikingly illustrated by the manner in which Secretary of State William Rogers lectured the Japanese in his address to the conference. All the relevant economic indicators point to Japan's great-power status, he chided them. "But your exchange rate has remained at the parity established in 1953 when Japan was weak and vulnerable... while imports into your markets have been hindered by quotas and licensing requirements." Then Rogers declared: "The result in psychological terms has been resentment in business and labor circles in the U.S. at the restrictions on U.S. exports and investment, and apprehension about the penetration of the U.S. market by Japanese goods."

Anger: The Japanese, whose polite stubbornness usually increases proportionately to their anger, refused to budge. After reading an advance copy of Rogers's speech, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda completely rewrote his original bland remarks. And when his turn came to speak, Fukuda gave as good as he got. He suggested that America's economic plight was due less to its trade imbalance with Japan than to the failure of its self-indulgent fiscal and monetary policies. What is more, ignoring Rogers's direct call for unilateral revaluation of the yen, the Foreign Minister warned that the U.S. had better revoke its recently imposed 10 per cent surcharge on imports lest "other countries... adopt countermeasures" that might cause "the collapse of the free-trade system."

Nor was Japan's new defiance confined to economic affairs. At a press conference following the conclusion of the meeting, Fukuda made it abundantly clear that Japan was not likely to co-sponsor two U.S. resolutions at the United Nations this fall that are designed to admit Communist China to the

world body while reserving a seat for Taiwan. Alarmed that Japan's hesitation may doom the U.S. initiative to failure, President Nixon quickly arranged a private meeting with Fukuda in what almost certainly turned out to be a futile effort to mobilize Japanese support.

Despite clear warnings in advance that Japan was in no mood for compromise, the U.S. was taken by surprise by Fukuda's stunning display of independence. Partly, this was because Japan's Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, ignoring the advice of aides, has continued to talk in public as though nothing had happened to disturb relations between Tokyo and Washington (box, page 38). Partly, too, Americans were simply not sufficiently aware of the new mood of assertiveness in Japan. Reflecting this mood, former Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka told *Newsweek*: "My personal suggestion for solving our problems is for Japan to give the U.S. a \$4 billion to \$5 billion loan which the U.S. ought to spend on public investments like during the New Deal."

Foolish: An even more significant factor in shaping Tokyo's policies was a growing national consensus that Japan cannot afford to bail the U.S. out of its problems. Thus, Japanese farmers, who form the backbone of the nation's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), have warned Prime Minister Sato not to give in to U.S. demands for quota concessions on the importation of American farm products. "If imports of these items are freed," said Agricultural Minister Munenori Akagi, "the LDP regime will collapse." And Sato's opponents within the LDP have argued—along with most Japanese business leaders—that Japan should not jeopardize its future relations with Peking by co-sponsoring the U.S. resolutions at the United Nations. Eager to up

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

Memorandum

TO : Ambassador Bush

FROM : POL - Harry Thayer

SUBJECT: CHIREP: Discussions with Other Missions

DATE: August 5, 1971

August 2:

Bush	Secretary General
Bennett	Australia (McIntyre)

August 3:

Bush	Argentina (Carasales)
	Brazil (Frazao)
	Colombia (Pinson)
	Costa Rica (Molina)
	Mexico (Merigo)
	Panama (Boyd)
	Paraguay (Jara)
	Botswana (Mpuchane)
	Gabon (Aubame)
	Ivory Coast (Ake)
	Liberia (Wilson)
	Madagascar (Rabetafika)
	Swaziland (Dlamini)
	Belgium (Van Ussel)
	Netherlands (Fack)
	Spain (Messia)
	Australia (Ashwin)
	Japan (Ogiso)
	Malaysia (Budin)
	New Zealand (Stokes)
	Philippines (Reyes)
	Thailand (Klos)
	ROC (Liu)
	Italy (Vinci)

August 4:

Bush	Kenya (Odero-Jowi)
	Brazil (Frazao)
	UK (Crowe)
	Canada (Beaulne)



5010-108

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August 4:

Bennett	France (de La Gorce) Iceland (Kjartansson) Malawi (Banda)
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August 5 (scheduled):

Bush	Fiji (Sikivou) Nicaragua (Sevilla-Sacasa and Lang) Ghana (Akwei)
Bennett	Turkey (Bayalken) Jordan (Toukan) Iran (Vakil)
Newlin	Greece (Stathatos)

August 6 (scheduled):

Bennett	Tunisia (Fayache)
Bennett	Saudi Arabia (Aldeghather) Singapore (Jayakumar)

At the close of business August 4,
USUN had given an opening pitch to

31 missions

Of these, you personally had seen reps
from

28 missions

By the end of the week, we will have
made opening pitches to

38 missions

These totals do not include USUN
follow-up contacts.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNCLASSIFIED

Memorandum

TO : Ambassador Bush

DATE: August 5, 1971

FROM : POL - Harry Thayer

SUBJECT: CHIREP: Discussions with Other Missions (Additional Contacts)

Mike Newlin this afternoon is also seeing:

Indonesia (Gontha)

Ireland (O'Riordan)

Thus, by the end of this week, we will have made opening pitches to at least forty missions.

POL:HETThayer:mos

