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
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
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Japanese Deny U.N. Decision

By LEWIS GULICK
Associated Press

Japanese cabinet officers left Washington yesterday denying that Japan has decided against cosponsoring a proposed U.S. resolution aimed at keeping Nationalist China in the United Nations while allowing a seat for Red China.

Privately, however, U.S. officials expressed belief that Tokyo will not formally join the United States in the move aimed at preventing Nationalist China from being ousted from the world body.

And without Japanese cosponsorship, they said, the effort to retain Taiwan's membership will face an extra tough fight at the U.N. General Assembly session opening later this month.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers asked Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda for Japanese cosponsorship during the two-day U.S.-Japanese joint Cabinet parley that ended here Friday night.

Prospects Cited

At a news conference at the windup, Rogers said failure of Japan to join in cosponsorship would hurt prospects for success of the move at the United Nations. Fukuda indicated Tokyo had not yet decided what it would do.

But at a separate news conference shortly after, Fukuda, speaking in Japanese, was quoted by his interpreter as saying he is sure the United States "has

an adequate understanding of why Japan cannot be a cosponsor of the American resolution."

As the Japanese cabinet group took off yesterday afternoon for a Canadian visit, the Japanese embassy here issued this statement:

"Owing to a mistake of the simultaneous interpretation of Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda's remarks during the press conference held at the Shoreham Hotel last evening, some American news media reported to the effect that the Japanese rejected cosponsorship with the United States of the draft resolution on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

"The exact intention of Foreign Minister Fukuda's remarks was that he was of the view that the American government understood Japan's reasons for not being able at this time to commit itself to cosponsorship of such a resolution."

Phrase Emphasized

The phrase "at this time" was underscored in the embassy release.

Persons fluent in both languages said that actually, the English interpretation had been correct, but the ambiguity of the Japanese-language phrasing in this instance had left open the possibility of other interpretations also being correct.

The problem, as explained here, stems from a domestic po-

litical situation in Japan which finds the ruling Liberal Democratic party deeply split on the China question. It has become a hot political issue as various aspirants maneuver for successorship to the prime minister's post now held by Eisaku Sato, informants said.

They said that Tokyo has not yet made some decisions necessary on matters involving liberalization of international economic policy and foreign aid.

Senior State Department authorities said the Japanese had gone part way toward meeting U.S. desires for easing restrictive policies, but not far enough to suit the Americans.

While differences remained following two days of blunt talk, the Japanese leaders got a red-carpet sendoff in keeping with the avowed desires by both sides to maintain the longstanding friendship between the two nations.

U.S. Can't Get Support for 2-China Policy

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 13 — U.S. officials admitted today that they were "unable to secure significant cosponsorship or support" for the American resolutions to admit Peking to the United Nations without expelling Taiwan, because the draft resolutions did not explicitly award China's Security Council seat to Peking.

State Department spokesman Charles Bray told Washington questioners, however, that the United States still has not made a final decision on the status of the council seat in the draft resolutions.

American sources here predicted that the final resolutions would be available this week. They may have been discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet in Washington today. George Bush, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, attended the meeting as he usually does.

U.N. diplomats regard the ultimate inclusion of the Security Council seat for Peking in the American resolution as a certainty, because without it, the American campaign for "dual representation" has no chance at all.

Some diplomats cautioned that while the American proposal would be doomed without mention of the Security Council seat, putting it in would not guarantee success. The longer the delay in putting it in, the fewer votes will be garnered, they predicted.

These diplomats said the same thing was true of Japanese cosponsorship of the American resolutions: without it, dual representation will surely fail; with it, there is still no guarantee of success.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers said Friday that if Japan does not become a cosponsor, it could be "detrimental" to the American effort.

The Japanese themselves reportedly estimate the odds for dual representation at no better than 50-50 even if they do become cosponsors, and worse than that if they do not. Observers here believe that the final Japanese decision on cosponsorship will be deter-

mined by counting probable votes in the faction-ridden Japanese ruling Liberal Democrat Party rather than in the U.N. General Assembly.

Premier Eisaku Sato's government is being assailed both for risking Japan's present relations with Taiwan if it does not become a cosponsor and for risking Japan's future relations with Peking if it does. Sato is also suffering at home because Washington did not consult him before announcing that the United States would reverse course and support the seating of Peking at the United Nations this year.


The American effort to preserve Taiwan's seat involves two resolutions. One calls for the seating of the People's Republic of China (Peking) and the continued membership of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The other calls the expulsion of Taiwan an important matter requiring a two-thirds vote.

The traditional Albanian resolution calls for the "restoration of the lawful rights" of Peking at the United Nations and the expulsion of "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek." It won a majority last year for the first time by a vote of 51 to 49 with 25 abstentions, but failed because the assembly had decided that the whole question of Chinese representation was an important matter and required a two-thirds vote.

The Albanian resolution assumes that there is no question of the expulsion of a member, only of who represents a member. The General Assembly is likely to endorse this legalism even if it then makes a political decision to keep Taiwan in, according to most observers.

Constantine Stavropoulos, U.N. undersecretary general for legal affairs, strengthened this likelihood last week when he told a press conference that the U.N. charter names states, not governments.

This could make it easier for the Americans to redraft their resolution to give the China seat on the council explicitly to Peking.



The New York Times/Jack Hanlon

DISCUSSES COMMUNIST CHINA: Secretary General Thant during news conference at the United Nations yesterday.

Thant Expects China-Issue Solution at This Session

By HENRY TANNER

Special to the New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. Sept. 14—

Secretary General Thant said today that he accepted as a "firm statement of policy"

Communist China's declaration of Aug. 20 that it would refuse to take a seat in the United Nations as long as the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan remained a member.

Mr. Thant said also that he felt the chances of solving the China issue during the session of the General Assembly beginning Sept. 21 were "much brighter" now than in the past.

The two points, made at a news conference, were interpreted by many diplomats as an implied prediction by Mr. Thant that Peking was likely to gain admission to the United Nations this fall on its own terms, namely with the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists.

"Things are moving fast," the Secretary General said. He added that a firm prediction was not yet possible because several governments had informed him that they would make up their minds at the last minute.

As for Peking's intentions, he said, "I know what their thinking is although I have no contact with Peking either directly or indirectly."

Support for Peking Seen

At a time when the American campaign to save the Chinese Nationalist seat is running into ever greater difficulties, Mr. Thant's remarks were seen by diplomats as giving added support to Peking's case.

American sources today said that the drafts of two American resolutions would be filed at the United Nations on Thursday or Friday, after a long delay.

One of the draft resolutions states that the expulsion of Nationalist China is an "important question" and requires a two-thirds majority for decision. Last year an Albanian resolution calling for Peking's admission and the expulsion of

Nationalist China won a bare majority, 51 to 49.

The other American draft resolution calls for the seating of Peking and the continued membership of Nationalist China.

American efforts to get Japan to co-sponsor these resolutions have so far been in vain, and American officials said they had virtually given up hope.

Other Sponsors Uncertain

The co-sponsorship of Australia and New Zealand is still uncertain even though the United States was reliably reported to have agreed reluctantly to include in the second resolution the stipulation that Peking must be seated in the Security Council, where as a permanent member it would have veto power. Australia and New Zealand had insisted on this change from the original draft, saying that the resolution

would otherwise have no chance of success.

Also at his news conference today, Mr. Thant reiterated in stronger terms than ever his determination to step down as Secretary General at the end of his term, in December. He used the words "categorical," "final" and "irrevocable" in describing his refusal to be drafted "even for the limited period of one year."

Departing from his policy of withholding comment on all proposals made at the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, Mr. Thant said that the seven-point plan submitted on July 1 for the Vietcong by Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh was "perhaps the best opportunity so far for breaking the deadlock" in Vietnam. He added that the proposal needed clarification. The Vietcong plan offered to release all prisoners by the end of this year if the United States agrees to a complete withdrawal by then.

U.S. Delay May Cost Taiwan Its U.N. Seat, Diplomats Say

By FAD SZULC
New York Times News Service

Efforts to save a Nationalist China's seat in the United Nations may fail if the United States does not decide immediately on its diplomatic tactics in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, in the judgment of foreign diplomats who are friendly to the U.S. position. This view was expressed in more than a score of background interviews in Washington and at the United Nations in the last week.

These diplomats warn that American tardiness in formulating final drafts of the two resolutions designed to keep the Nationalist government in the United Nations while offering a separate seat to Peking may prevent governments that support the United States in principle from making their own decisions in time for the voting.

"These resolutions should have been ready two weeks ago," one Western ambassador said. "As matters now stand, the whole process of consultation is virtually paralyzed although the General Assembly is only three weeks away."

American officials, confirming that United States tactics still are under study in Washington and said they hoped the two draft resolutions could be presented to potential co-sponsors after Labor Day.

The General Assembly is scheduled to open Sept. 21, and diplomats reported that immediate action on the China question

would be sought by Albania and 16 other countries sponsoring a resolution that calls for the ouster from the United Nations of the Nationalist government on Taiwan.

How U.S. Worked Before

In past years, when the United States concentrated on blocking Peking's entry to the United Nations, the U.S. position was firmly established and coordinated with Taiwan and other diplomatic allies as early as May.

This year, however, the U.S. diplomatic effort, aimed at securing "dual representation" for China — U.S. officials shy away from talking about "two Chinas" — could be launched only after Secretary of State William P. Rogers formally announced on Aug. 2 that the administration would support the seating of Peking and oppose the ouster of Taiwan.

Bush's 'Track Record'

Since then, George Bush, the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, has conferred with 94 of the 126 U.N. delegations on the subject of Chinese representation. Diplomats described Bush's activities as, probably a new "quantitative track record," but they were skeptical as to whether the political results matched his effort. Simultaneously, American embassies in dozens of foreign capitals have been campaigning for support for the "dual representation" formula for China at the United Nations this fall.

"The Americans are trying to

call in all their I.O.U.s," a foreign delegate remarked. "But the problem is that they still seem unable to tell the governments precisely what they want."

According to diplomats, the most serious complication encountered by the United States is the question of the veto-wielding permanent seat for China in the Security Council.

In his statement on Aug. 2, Rogers said the United States would abide by the decision of "the members of the United Nations" on whether Taiwan or Peking should be on the Security Council.

The preliminary drafts of the American resolutions simply ignored the problem. But when the United States and Japan went in search of co-sponsors for the "dual representation" resolutions, they discovered that most of the "reputable" candidates insisted that the Security Council seat be earmarked for Peking.

Specifically, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines informed Washington they could not co-sponsor resolutions lacking this provision. They and others also suggested they might even find it difficult to vote for such resolutions.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

TUESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1971

PAGE A14

China and the U.N.: The U.S. Gears Up

Since we have all become accustomed to the imagery in another context, the American strategy for dealing with Chinese admission to the United Nations might most simply be described as an effort to "freeze" Taiwan's seat in the General Assembly and "float" its seat on the Security Council. Peking would be admitted to the General Assembly. Taiwan would also retain its seat there. The Security Council seat now held by Taiwan would, on the other hand, be disposed of according to the will of the Security Council members—it generally being conceded that Peking's claim would prevail. The parliamentary and political intricacies involved in this position have been ably described by Stephen M. Schwebel in two articles that recently appeared on this page. In our estimation, the U.S. strategy seems reasonable—given the cross pressures of domestic and international politics to which it must respond. The question, however, is the same that applies to all strategies: Will it work?

Recently there has been some complaint on the part of other U.N. members on whose support the administration has been counting, that American delay in actually formulating the resolutions it will introduce has endangered the prospects for their being successfully maneuvered through the U.N. This delay, in turn, proceeds from administration efforts to reconcile three separate (and conflicting) pressures.

There is first that from Peking which has indicated it will not enter the United Nations so long as Taiwan retains an Assembly seat—a position widely believed to be negotiable. However, the timing and substance of that negotiation is the subject of some controversy between the United States and other member states, which brings one to the second set of pressures: apparently a sizable

body of U.N. opinion and potential U.S. supporters in this fracas believe that the effort to prevent Taiwan's expulsion from the General Assembly either cannot or should not be sustained so long as the U.S. remains neutral on the question of the Security Council. The "deal," so to speak whereby Peking takes the Security Council seat and an Assembly seat and Taiwan is permitted to stay in the Assembly must be made—according to this line of thought—out loud, in the open, and now. From this it should not be difficult to imagine the third conflicting force that comes into play, namely, American (and specifically congressional) political feeling—feeling that might be painfully aroused by an overt U.S. effort to gain the Security Council seat for Peking.

This is not a particularly enviable dilemma for the administration. Evidently its tacit acceptance of the seating of Peking on the Security Council is not considered enough, and its reluctance to make its arrangements (or concessions) so far in advance of the Assembly meeting this month is being sorely challenged. What the administration is faced with, then, is the prospect that Taiwan will in fact be kicked out of the U.N. if the U.S. does not move to a more explicit position on Peking's seating in the Security Council—a move that is ironically bound to be received by important segments of political opinion at home not as an effort to save Taiwan's presence in the U.N., but as complicity in its ouster. Sensible as the original strategy struck us, we would assume that should it be demonstrated to be unworkable and self-defeating so far as Taiwan's membership is concerned, the administration would abandon it—and make plain to potential political opposition its reasons for doing so. The time for making the relevant judgment is pretty short.

Chiang UN Fate Hangs on a Hair

By STAN CARTER

Of THE NEWS Washington Bureau

It is touch-and-go whether Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan will be booted out of the United Nations to make room for Mao Tse-tung's Communist regime on the Chinese mainland.

There is no longer any question but that the UN General Assembly will vote within the next month or two to admit the People's Republic of China to the world organization—after 22 years of isolation—and give the Chinese seat in the UN Security Council to the Communist regime.

The assembly will convene its 26th session tomorrow in the UN's glass house by the East River. It is likely to be the liveliest gathering of the world's statesmen since the late Nikita Khrushchev pounded his shoe on an Assembly table a dozen years ago.

Chinese Communist diplomats dressed in Mao tunics may arrive in New York even before President Nixon's planned "journey for peace" to Peking, which is expected to take place late this year, probably between Thanksgiving and Christmas.

With Peking's admission already assured, the remaining question before the Assembly is whether there will be one or two Chinas in the United Nations—only the Communists, or both the Communists and the Nationalists.

As of now, the outlook is, at best, uncertain for the Nation.



George Bush
Calls chance 50-50

(Continued on page 18, col. 3)

Chiang's Fate in UN Is in Doubt

(Continued from page 2)

alists, despite optimistic statements by American officials.

U.S. Ambassador George Bush insisted yesterday that the chance of keeping the Chiang regime from being voted out of the world body was "better than 50-50."

But other UN diplomats rate the odds as less than even, although close.

Almost all of America's European allies have deserted the United States on the Taiwan issue. Britain, France, Canada and other nations which voted with the United States on most of the big issues before the UN in the past will vote this time to "expel the Chiang Kai-shek clique" while seating the Communists.

Small Nations the Key

Even Japan is hesitant about co-sponsoring the U.S. effort to keep Taiwan in the organization, although Bush said on the Face the Nation TV program yesterday that the Japanese were "helping us tremendously" in lining up votes for the Nationalists.

But in the end, it will be the smaller, newer nations which now make up the bulk of UN membership whose votes will decide the issue, and many of them—probably most—have not yet decided how they will vote.

Thus, everybody agrees that the debate will be a cliffhanger until the actual vote, probably in late October.


When Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced last month that the United States was reversing 22 years of opposition and would vote this fall to admit the Chinese Communists to the UN, he stressed that Washington would fight to keep its old friend, Taiwan, in the organization as well.

They're Trying Hard

Despite early skepticism by some, all the indications are that the State Department and the American delegation in New York are, indeed, making an earnest, hard effort on Taiwan's behalf. Nationalist Chinese Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai repeated twice on the Meet The Press TV program yesterday that "we believe the United States is sincere."

The United States will introduce two resolutions. One will call for dual representation in the General Assembly while giving the Security Council seat to Peking. The other will declare that expelling Taiwan from the organization would be an "important question" requiring a two-thirds vote instead of a simple majority, making it more difficult to boot out the Nationalists.

Also before the Assembly will



Clack News
9-20-71

Reconciling Moral and Military Obligations

Some Implications of Admitting China to the U.N.

By Charles W. Yost

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FROM THE perspective of history, our children and grandchildren will no doubt be amazed that the government which unquestionably controlled the whole of China except Formosa was denied representation in the United Nations for more than two decades after it won the civil war. This prolonged exclusion was an impressive, though hardly an inspiring, demonstration of the power the United States exercised during those decades.

For years many governments, including many that voted against Peking because they opposed the expulsion of Taiwan, or merely out of friendship for the United States, felt it increasingly illogical and unfair that there should be no place, in an international institution which aspires to be

The writer is a former United States ambassador to the United Nations.

universal, for the government firmly in control of the world's largest population.

Even many of those most friendly to the United States were growing increasingly unhappy with its insistence that they conform to a policy they felt was obsolete and damaging to their own interests and those of the United Nations.

President Nixon himself had several times voiced his belief that the People's Republic of China should be drawn out of its long-standing isolation and into participation in the common endeavors of the international community.

The stage was already set at the beginning of 1971, therefore, for some dramatic movement during the fall General Assembly, which begins Sept. 21.

It did not require much perspicacity to divine that in these circumstances even the United States must be seriously reconsidering its policy, its interests and its options.

It was in this highly fluid environment that there occurred the famous Ping Pong episode, a clear signal from the People's Republic that it was at last prepared to respond to the cautious overtures for more normal relations which the Nixon administration had for some time been putting forward.

For its part the United States Government, with admirably agility and flexibility, almost at once replied with the secret Kissinger visit to Peking and with the extraordinary announcement of the President's intention to visit the Chinese capital.

It is not relevant to the subject of this article to go into all the implications of the President's decision — to discuss, for example, whether a summit meeting with the Chinese before one with the Soviets is wise; whether such a meeting could or could not hasten a Vietnam settlement or whether it is likely to prove politically profitable or unprofitable to Mr. Nixon in November 1972.

Two points are, however, both clear and relevant. First, the visit is a bold and imaginative step which, whatever its other consequences, cannot but help to reduce the regrettable isolation of China.

Second, many if not most UN members will interpret this gesture by the chief traditional adversary of Communist China as removing any conceivable justification for its further exclusion from the United Nations.

Unfortunately, however, nothing is ever simple in international relations. The United States also has long-standing obligations and commitments to the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Washington has jettisoned the last vestige of fiction that this government has any legitimate claim to mainland China; but it cannot, without loss of "honor" and "credibility," abandon altogether a faithful ally and a strategically important Pacific outpost. How to reconcile these moral and military obligations to Taipei with the newly emerging relationship with Peking is as difficult a problem in diplomacy as one can imagine.

INSOFAR as the UN aspects are concerned, the administration has chosen to straddle, to try to have its cake and eat it too — in other words, to breathe new life into the old concept of "two Chinas." Washington is urging that "the People's Republic of China should be represented and at the same time provision should be made that the Republic of China is not deprived of its representation."

On the face of it, this position does not seem illogical or unreasonable. There has in recent years been a growing sentiment among UN members, which has also been voiced by the Secretary-General, in favor of "universality," that is, that the UN should become as nearly universal as possible.

In particular, it has been felt, and the Secretary-General has urged, that the states di-

vided after World War II should no longer be excluded pending reunification, but that the governments established in both parts should be represented in the UN — of course without prejudice to eventual reunification by agreement between them.

This "dual representation" would presumably include the two Germanys, the two Koreas and perhaps, after the war there is ended, the two Vietnams.

It is probable that, had the United States been willing to support or accept a "dual representation" formula for China several years ago, even one or two years ago, the Assembly would have approved. But having — as in other cases — waited too long, the United States (and Nationalist China) may well have missed the bus.

Of course the Nationalist government, still claiming to be the government of the whole of China, has itself hitherto strongly opposed "dual representation," but it might be prevailed upon to live with it if the only alternative were total exclusion.

However, the real, and probably decisive, obstacle to adoption of a "dual representation" formula for China in 1971 is that the People's Republic, which a majority of UN members now certainly desire to see seated in the UN, continues to insist that it would not under any circumstances sit if Taiwan were still there.

Peking reiterated this condition in the most categorical terms last month following

the, even if it should be temporarily successful, could be profitable to the United States or to anyone else.

Peking no doubt expects the United States, at least for the present, to remain loyal to the Nationalists and to continue to maintain their right to sit in the General Assembly. It seems doubtful, however, that the People's Republic would expect the United States, just after having agreed to the summit in Peking, to carry its loyalty to Taipei so far as actually to mobilize a UN majority for a posture which Peking has repeatedly and categorically stated would prevent its assuming a UN seat.

If this should occur, one wonders what would happen to the new climate of détente between the two countries. Certainly there would be an outburst of rage in Peking which would be more than ritualistic. Under those circumstances would the Nixon-Chou meeting take place as and when planned? If it did, would it in that atmosphere be able to accomplish the objectives the participants originally had in mind?

In announcing the meeting far in advance, both parties have given hostages to fortune in that each has to some extent constrained himself not to take, in the interval, action so obnoxious to the other that the meeting would be called off — or, if held, would prove a fiasco. In his respect President Nixon would seem to have more of a problem than the Chinese prime minister, for he would suffer politically at home and abroad more than would Chou En-lai if his dramatic initiative should fizzle out.

In light of these considerations, perhaps



Secretary of State William P. Rogers' announcement of the latest United States position.

There is no reason not to take the condition seriously, particularly since Peking must calculate that the tide is moving so irresistibly in its favor that, even should the American tactic prevail this year, it would almost certainly be set aside by the Assembly next year.

There would appear to be almost no incentive for Peking to compromise on an issue which has for years been so central to its national aims. Indeed the Chinese are likely now, in the light of the diminishing United States presence in East Asia and their obvious concern that a rearmad Japan might eventually fill the "vacuum," to be even more determined than before not to admit that Taiwan has even the shadow of a right to a status separate from the mainland.

The United States administration is therefore now confronted with a dilemma perhaps even more acute than that which existed before the proposed summit meeting was announced. It has felt compelled to move in two opposite directions, at once — and the two objectives have become wholly incompatible.

Just why the administration, so soon after dramatically renewing contact with the People's Republic of China and committing itself to a summit meeting in Peking, should display such zeal in pursuing in the UN a policy it knows to be utterly obnoxious to the Chinese, is far from clear.

Perhaps the very fact that it leaned so far and so suddenly toward Peking, to the consternation not only of Taipei but of Tokyo and other friends in East Asia and to the horror of some right-wing opinion in the United States, has caused the administration to attempt to compensate and to reassure those thus offended by ardently defending the "rights" of Taiwan in the UN.

IT IS hard to see, however, how this tac-

what we should devoutly hope for is that despite its conspicuous efforts, the United States would fall in the forthcoming UN Assembly to obtain approval of any form of dual representation; that Peking would be seated in the Security Council and the General Assembly on its own terms, and the Nationalist Chinese would consequently lose their seats.

Actually this would seem to be the more probable outcome. It seems doubtful that so strong a tide could be stemmed at the last minute by a tactical device which, no matter how plausible and attractive it may seem in principle, how consonant it may be with the widely routed goal of "universality," would nevertheless clearly frustrate the will of the majority that the mainland at last be seated. It seems questionable that the majority would tolerate any such frustration.

The United States is therefore likely to be saved by its friends, hopefully this year rather than next, from the hazards of the curiously ambivalent tactics it has chosen to pursue.

Washington Post
9-19-71

U.S. WILL SUPPORT SEAT FOR PEKING IN COUNCIL OF UN.

Decision Is Designed to Win Co-Sponsors for Moves to Keep Taipei in Assembly

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15 —

The United States has decided in principle to support actively the assignment of China's permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council to the Government in Peking.

Authoritative administration officials said today that this decision was finally made so that the United States might win adequate co-sponsorship for its simultaneous effort to prevent the expulsion of Nationalist China from the United Nations at the annual session of the General Assembly, which opens in New York next Tuesday.

Earlier Failure Conceded

Official spokesmen would not confirm, however, that the American resolutions for "dual representation" for China would contain a specific provision ceding the Chinese Security Council seat to Peking because Washington still wanted to retain diplomatic flexibility in the round of intensive consultations scheduled to begin tomorrow here and in New York.

Earlier this week, State Department spokesmen acknowledged that the United States had been unable to find co-sponsorship for resolutions lacking the commitment of the Security Council seat to Peking.

If the American formula is successful—and foreign diplomats here have serious doubts about its chances—Nationalist China would be merely one of the General Assembly's 127 members. Since the formation of the United Nations 26 years ago, the Chinese Nationalist Government has held one of the five veto-wielding Security Council seats reserved for the major powers.

U. S. Doubtful of Support
United States officials acknowledged privately that Washington had "no certainty" whether an adequate co-sponsorship could be obtained for its two resolutions.

For this reason, they said, the final texts of the American resolutions may remain in abeyance until the very eve of the General Assembly's session.

If the United States fails in its quest for enough influential co-sponsors, officials said, it may finally drop the provision granting the Security Council seat to Peking and confine itself to moves to retain membership in the world body for the Nationalist Government in Taipei.

The State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray 3d, said that the texts of resolutions would be submitted for the consideration of potential co-sponsors at a meeting in New York tomorrow by George Bush, the chief United States

Continued on Page 11, Column 1

delegate to the United Nations. Informed foreign diplomats cautioned, however, that some delegations might be unable to make a commitment without consulting their governments.

This, they said, may leave the question of co-sponsorship unsettled past the opening date for the General Assembly session and create a situation in which a procedural debate on Chinese representation could open with the American delegation operating "in the dark."

One of the key elements in the United States diplomatic effort is the position of Japan. During his visit here last week, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Takeo Fukuda, told Secretary of State William P. Rogers that his Government, which the United States had counted upon as a co-sponsor, needed "more time" for a decision.

U. S. Aides Pessimistic

American officials, who are pessimistic over the outcome of the present debate within the Japanese Cabinet, said that no final word was expected before Friday, when Mr. Fukuda is due to return to Tokyo. He is now in Ottawa.

Secretary Rogers said last Friday that Japan's failure to be a co-sponsor would be "detrimental" to the efforts to keep Taiwan in the United Nations.

Foreign diplomats said today that a negative decision by Japan might well influence the attitude of other potential co-sponsors, some of which are said to be wavering.

Contrary to the views circulated both by the United States and the Soviet Union, a large number of governments are known to accept Peking's public insistence that it would not enter the United Nations unless Taiwan was expelled.

Thant's Remarks Are Cited

American and Soviet diplomats have been privately telling other delegations that Peking may abandon its tough bargaining stance and become "more flexible" if it is invited to the Security Council. Yesterday, however, Secretary General Thant of the United Nations said publicly that he took Peking's warnings at face value.

Under the circumstances, many governments are unwilling to go through what they fear may be a futile diplomatic maneuver in Taiwan's support that may complicate their future relations with Peking.

Five of the nations mentioned as potential co-sponsors—Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Argentina and Brazil—were reported today to be still noncommittal.

The crucial move by the United States is to be a resolution declaring Taiwan's "exclusion" from membership to be an "important question" requiring, under the United Nations Charter, a two-thirds majority for approval.

Outcome Is In Doubt

To qualify Taiwan's exclusion as "an important question," a simple majority is needed but there were serious doubts here whether the United States could marshal even that many votes.

Foreign diplomats said that the American move might collapse as a result of mass abstentions.

Nevertheless, the State Department took a position of public optimism. Mr. Bray, the spokesman, said that "we think our position will be a very strong one and that we will have a very good chance to win."

The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations said in a statement issued by its chairman, Dr. Walter Judd, that "if Communist China is admitted with the assistance of the United States, we will inescapably be strengthening that common enemy of all the world's freedom-loving peoples."

N.Y. Times
9-16-71

9 Nations to Co-Sponsor 2-China U.S. Proposal

By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Foreign Service

UNITED NATIONS Sept. 16—Nine countries indicated willingness to co-sponsor the United States resolutions for "dual representation" of Peking and Taiwan in the United Nations today after the U.S. put on the record its willingness to support Peking for China's seat on the Security Council.

About 35 countries attended a meeting at the U.S. mission to discuss the China question.

None would identify the nine likely co-sponsors, but it was understood that Costa Rica and Honduras were among them and Japan was not. Australia and New Zealand are believed likely to become co-sponsors, but their governments have not yet committed themselves.

After the meeting, U.S. Ambassador George Bush told newsmen: "The draft we discussed today did have provision for the Security Council seat to go to Peking."

President Nixon told an impromptu press conference today that the United States "supported" Peking's admission, including a Security Council seat.

Foreign diplomats said the draft resolution now inserts a mention of the Security Council seat at the end of the paragraph that says the General Assembly "hereby affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China."

See NATIONS, A22, Col. 1

Nine to Co-Sponsor U.S. 2-China Plan

NATIONS, From A1

The following paragraph "affirms the continued right of representation of the Republic of China"—i.e., Taiwan.

Informed sources said the revised wording did not satisfy all the supporters of dual representation. Latin American nations are particularly conscious of the legalisms involved, and some observers said it was significant that Argentina had not yet agreed to be a co-sponsor.

Japanese sources said they expected their government to make its final position on co-sponsorship clear on Saturday. They said it was possible that Japan might agree to co-sponsor the resolution on dual representation, but not the accompanying U.S. resolution declaring the expulsion of Taiwan, an important question that must be decided by a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.

Bush said the United States would offer its resolutions early next week. This appeared to mean a further delay to some diplomats here, though U.S. sources insisted it was within the time span originally envisaged. It certainly appeared to be intended to leave maximum time to obtain possible co-sponsors, particularly Japan.

"Japanese sponsorship would make the thing more respectable," said one Western diplomat whose country has not yet decided how it will vote, "but the key question is not how many co-sponsors you can get. It is how many votes you can get. The two may not be connected."

Bush said he came out of this morning's meeting "with a distinct feeling of forward motion ... We were encouraged by the forthcoming nature of the delegations and it hasn't always been that way in our meetings here ... I am confident that we'll have the kind of support as co-sponsors (of preventing Taiwan's expulsion) is a winnable policy."

Western supporters of the Albanian resolution to "restore the lawful rights" of Pe-

king and expel "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" repeated their disagreement Bush today, warning that the American approach might freeze Peking out of the United Nations for years to come.

They take at face value Peking's statements that it will not take a U.N. seat as long as Taiwan remains. If the United Nations were to adopt the American proposal for dual representation, Taiwan might be considered to have membership status apart from the question of who represents China. If Peking then stayed away and Taiwan remained, the Nationalists would be much harder to expel than some delegates expect them to be this year.

That may be why Taiwan's foreign minister, Chow Shukai, spoke of "going into joint battle" after he met with Secretary of State William P. Rogers in Washington today. He also said that Taiwan cannot accept dual representation or "countenance" giving its Security Council seat to Peking. He did not explain the contradiction, but U.S. officials said: "Privately, they know dual representation is the only chance they've got."

Washington Post

9-17-71

to the Emperor [whose duties and powers are spelled out in the first chapter] and his place in the hearts of the Japanese people. For my own part, and in terms of its decisive importance, I should prefer the Renunciation of War to be Chapter I of the Constitution."

There were further delays after the February meetings, but SCAP obviously held all the cards. The new constitution was ratified on Nov. 3, 1946, and took effect six months later. In almost every significant respect, the document mirrored the version drawn up by Whitney and his officers. And, except for two additional phrases, Article 9 became law in the form dictated by MacArthur.

From the beginning, MacArthur apparently intended Article 9 to deny Japan any military capacity at all—even for self-defense. But when American occupation troops were drawn off to fight the Korean War, Japan—under strong American pressure—created what eventually became the Self-Defense Forces (now numbering 238,980 men). Subsequent court decisions have upheld the view that such a non-army army is perfectly constitutional. But to some people, even this loose (and possibly questionable) interpretation of the article is not enough.

Vacuum: Today, the U.S. would like Japan to step into the partial military vacuum that will be left by the reduction of American forces in Asia. And there are those in Japan who would like to overturn Article 9. These would-be reformers include right-wing groups, "cultural" societies, the families of wartime casualties and such nationalist eccentrics as Yukio Mishima, the novelist who committed suicide last November after shouting to a crowd of soldiers: "Why do you try to defend the constitution that denies your existence?" In addition, many members of the ruling party favor revising Article 9 to explicitly authorize the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces.

But for all the talk of resurgent militarism in Japan, the great majority of the Japanese people prefer to leave Article 9 the way it is. In one of the most recent polls on the subject—conducted in 1967—only 19 per cent of the people surveyed were in favor of revising the article. "Most Japanese don't resent the fact that the constitution was pushed down on us," contends Kiichi Miyazawa, a former LDP minister. "Although it reads rather badly in Japanese, the substance is not so tremendously bad." Many citizens, in fact, believe that Article 9 is their strongest bulwark against war and that, without outside pressure, it would never have been written. "We should reflect on the fact that we could not draw it up by ourselves before it was forced on us," declares law professor Hideo Wada. Thus, in his own imperious fashion, Douglas MacArthur probably did the Japanese a favor when he jotted down what is, in all likelihood, the most idealistic passage ever included in the constitution of any country.

BRITAIN:

To Russia Without Love

When London's Evening News broke the story last week that a top Soviet intelligence agent had defected to Britain, it caused only a ripple of excitement. After all, British counterintelligence had lured Russian spies out of the cold before. But it soon became apparent that this was no ordinary defection. Later the same day, the British Foreign Office announced that the Russian agent—a high-ranking KGB official in England—had blown the lid off a mammoth Soviet spy ring. Then an indignant Prime Minister Edward Heath ordered 105 Soviet officials to leave Britain—the largest diplomatic expulsion in peacetime history.

The unprecedented scale of the expulsion was matched by the rare tone of contempt with which British officials im-

received no reply he sent a second letter, loaded with sarcasm, in which he told Gromyko: "You are no doubt aware that the total number of Soviet officials on the staff of . . . diplomatic, commercial and other organizations has now risen to more than 500, and you are presumably able to ascertain what proportion of these are intelligence officers." When this letter, too, was ignored, London's wrath boiled over. Said a British Government spokesman: "The Soviets' indifference was beginning to fester, so we decided to lance the abscess."

In the meantime, Britain's counterintelligence agency, DI-5, began preparing a massive set of dossiers on the Russian spy network in Britain. And when the top KGB agent defected a few weeks ago—along with a set of names of Russian spies operating in Britain and, possibly, in other Western capitals—London was ready to move. "Some of the Russians



UPI
Expulsion: Soviet diplomat Ippolitov (above) and Russia's spy-infested embassy



plemented their action. According to London, the 105 Soviet officials, who were given two weeks to leave the country, were scattered everywhere from the walled Soviet Embassy at 13 Kensington Gardens to the Russian trade delegation headquarters on Highgate hill. In numbers, they represented nearly a fifth of the huge 550-man Russian Embassy and commercial staff in England. What's more, Moscow, through its chargé d'affaires in London, Ivan Ippolitov, was informed that henceforth it would not be permitted to replace any Soviet official expelled for spying.

Lance: If the move came as a shock to Britons, the Russians had no reason to be surprised. For months, the British Government has been warning the Kremlin that its patience with Soviet espionage activities in England was wearing thin. Last fall, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home raised the matter personally with visiting Soviet Foreign Secretary Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko's response at the time: "Write me a letter." Sir Alec did just that, and when he

may have escaped the crackdown," said a British official, "but I doubt it."

If, in fact, the British have succeeded in eliminating the Soviet spy network, that would represent quite a coup. For in the postwar period, British security has been breached time after time by such famous spies as Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Kim Philby. In recent years, British exasperation has focused on the constant and often blatant attempts by Soviet espionage agents to bribe and blackmail British citizens into passing over industrial information, particularly on computers and electronics. This has included information about equipment on the list of goods strategically embargoed by NATO against sale to the Russians, plus data on the Anglo-French supersonic Concorde airliner and its British-built Olympus 593 engines.

Despite a mild public reaction by Moscow to the humiliating ouster of its officials, there was a strong likelihood that the Soviet Union would retaliate against the 90-member British diplomatic delegation in Moscow. Perhaps the one fac-

INTERNATIONAL

tor that might restrain the Soviets was London's implied threat to sabotage the notion of a European Security Conference, which Moscow is trying so hard to organize. "The Soviet Government," the British remarked pointedly in their expulsion note, "can hardly fail to be conscious of the contradiction between their advocacy of a conference on European security and the scale of the operations against the security of this country. Her Majesty's government would like to see this contradiction resolved before the preparation of a conference on European security begins." Faced with such diplomatic pressure, the Soviets may well tone down their retaliation this time. "It's up to the Russians," said one Heath aide last week, "to decide whether they are more interested in espionage or in having good relations with us."

world body expel Nationalist China and admit Communist China—be "merged" on the agenda with a U.S. item. This would mean that the American proposal for the admission of Peking to the Assembly and Security Council—and the retention of Taiwan's seat in the Assembly—would be debated at the same time as the Albanian proposal, theoretically giving neither any parliamentary advantage.

Portent: The debate that followed seemed an ominous portent for the U.S. Labeling the American position "artificial," the Soviet Union's Yakov Malik lined up more forcefully with the pro-Peking forces than his delegation had done for years. Moreover, Britain's Sir Colin Crowe, advancing "serious doubts" that the American dual-representation formula was "compatible with the charter," made it clear that his government would

YUGOSLAVIA:

The Man From Moscow

Leonid Brezhnev was all smiles as he flew into Belgrade last week. After more than two decades of polemics between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Communist Party chief declared that the time had come to bury the hatchet. And to prove his point, he strongly implied that if Yugoslavia wanted to tamper with Communism and do its own economic thing, well, that was all right with him. But no sooner had he raised hopes that the Kremlin was ready to tolerate the Yugoslav road to Communism—and, by implication, greater independence for all the nations of Eastern Europe—than Brezhnev began backpedaling. And by the time he wound up his four-day visit, he sounded a lot more determined—as he himself put it—to "protect the interests of socialism from all of its enemies."

Whatever that meant, it certainly left the Yugoslavs confused—which may have been what Brezhnev intended. Indeed, there seemed to be no other explanation for his contradictory pronouncements. Shortly after his arrival, the Soviet leader stunned his hosts by publicly denying the existence of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty," under which the Soviet Union reserves the right to intervene militarily in the affairs of fellow socialist states when the Kremlin sees signs of grave internal danger. (Brezhnev's denial struck his listeners as curious since Moscow used the Brezhnev doctrine to justify the Russian-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.) And on the heels of this bombshell, Brezhnev asserted that Soviet-Yugoslav relations were still based on the tenets of the Belgrade declaration of 1955, under which former Premier Nikita Khrushchev recognized in principle the full sovereignty of all East European nations.

Inviolability: Puzzled by this apparent about-face in Soviet policy, the Yugoslavs were determined to find out if Brezhnev really meant what he said. In a tough speech, Yugoslavia's President Josip Broz Tito told his guest that peace and stability for the Balkan nations depended on the guarantee of "their full independence, the inviolability of their frontiers and their protection from aggression . . . or threats of force." Unstated but unmistakable was the question: did Comrade Brezhnev agree?

The answer came soon enough. The principles of the Belgrade declaration, Brezhnev noted with calculated vagueness, might have to be modified as they were applied to "contemporary conditions." And the next day, Brezhnev bluntly told a group of Yugoslav factory workers that their cherished system of self-management was "unacceptable" to Moscow and that, in his view, Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment had its limits. "In the struggle against imperialist ag-



Ambassadors Bush, Crowe and Malik: Opening round on the China question

UNITED NATIONS:

Win Some, Lose Some

Since he was appointed U.S. ambassador to the United Nations eight months ago, George Bush has been cramming for the 26th session of the U.N.'s General Assembly. Gradually, the handsome Texas Republican learned all the parliamentary ins and outs on such questions as the Middle East, disarmament and the one issue that will dominate the current session—China. And last week, almost as soon as the departing Assembly president, Edvard Hambro of Norway, turned the gavel over to Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Bush was given a chance to show his diplomatic stuff.

The opening round came in the General Committee, a 25-member body that recommends an agenda to the full General Assembly. And there, it was soon apparent that Ambassador Bush was in considerable trouble. The American ambassador proposed that the so-called Albanian item—which demands that the

support the Albanian solution. When the vote was taken, the Albanian proposal was placed first on the agenda, giving Peking's supporters a slight parliamentary edge.

Two days later, the Albanians tried to deal the American position another rebuff. This time it was in the full, 130-member Assembly, where they asked that the body reject the General Committee's recommendation that the American item be on the agenda at all. When the vote was tabulated, however, it was Ambassador Bush who came off with something of a victory: the American item was retained on the agenda by a vote of 65 to 47 with 15 abstentions. Since many states have not yet decided how they will line up on the crucial votes next month, the Assembly vote was not necessarily a harbinger of a U.S. success. But it nevertheless buoyed the American delegation. "We are tremendously pleased," Bush commented. Then remembering his diplomatic manners, he added, "But we are not taking anything for granted."

JOURNAL

des
NATIONS UNIES



MERCREDI 29 SEPTEMBRE 1971

N° 5266

PROGRAMME DES SEANCES ET ORDRE DU JOUR

Mercredi 29 septembre 1971

ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

10 h 30 1944ème SEANCE PLENIERE Salle de l'Assemblée générale

Suite de la discussion générale [9] :

Venezuela

Canada

Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord

Liban

15 heures 1945ème SEANCE PLENIERE Salle de l'Assemblée générale

Suite de la discussion générale [9] :

Gabon

Maroc

Islande

Norvège

Zambie

COMPOSITION DES COMMISSIONS

Afin que les listes indiquant la composition des grandes commissions puissent être établies le plus tôt possible, les délégations qui n'ont pas encore rempli la formule contenue dans le document A/INF/142 sont invitées à le faire sans retard et à renvoyer ladite formule au bureau 3802-E, bâtiment du Secrétariat.

Commissions

DEUXIEME COMMISSION

10 h 30 1369ème séance Salle de conférence 2

1. Déclaration du Secrétaire général adjoint aux affaires économiques et sociales
2. Organisation des travaux de la Commission (A/C.2/263; A/C.2/L.1142, L.1143).

TROISIEME COMMISSION

10 h 30 1824ème séance Salle du Conseil
15 heures 1825ème séance de tutelle

Organisation des travaux de la Commission (A/C.3/624; A/C.3/L.1849 et A/INF/136).

QUATRIEME COMMISSION

10 h 30 1919ème séance Salle de conférence 3

1. Election du Vice-Président et du Rapporteur
2. Organisation des travaux de la Commission (A/C.4/734).

SIXIEME COMMISSION

10 h 30 1248ème séance Salle de conférence 1

Rapport de la Commission des Nations Unies pour le droit commercial international sur les travaux de sa quatrième session (A/8417; A/C.6/L.820) [87].

COMITE SPECIAL DE L'APARTHEID

10 h 30 183ème séance Salle de conférence 8

Ordre du jour provisoire

1. Adoption de l'ordre du jour
2. Examen du projet de rapport du Comité spécial
3. Questions diverses.

TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF

14 h 45 séance privée Salle C-209

CONSEIL DE SECURITE

15 h 30 1586ème séance Salle du Conseil de sécurité

REUNIONS A VENIR

Jeudi 30 septembre 1971

ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

10 h 30 1946ème SEANCE PLENIERE Salle de l'Assemblée
15 heures 1947ème SEANCE PLENIERE générale

Suite de la discussion générale [9].

(suite au verso)

Commissions**DEUXIEME COMMISSION**

10 h 30 1370ème séance Salle de conférence 2
15 heures 1371ème séance

TROISIEME COMMISSION

10 h 30 1826ème séance Salle du Conseil
15 heures 1827ème séance de tutelle

SIXIEME COMMISSION

10 h 30 1249ème séance Salle de conférence 1

**COMITE CONSULTATIF
POUR LES QUESTIONS ADMINISTRATIVES ET BUDGETAIRES**

10 h 30 séance privée Salle de conférence 13
15 heures séance privée

TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF

11 heures séance privée Salle C-209

CONSEIL DE SECURITE

15 heures 1587ème séance Salle du Conseil de sécurité

ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

NOTE : Le COMITE DES UTILISATIONS PACIFIQUES DU FOND DES MERS ET DES OCEANS AU-DELA DES LIMITES DE LA JURIDICTION NATIONALE se réunira le jeudi 14 octobre 1971 pour examiner le projet d'additif (A/AC.138/L.4/Add.2*) à son rapport.

APERÇU DES SEANCES

Mardi 28 septembre 1971

ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

SEANCE PLENIERE 1942ème séance

Suite de la discussion générale [9]

L'Assemblée entend des déclarations faites par le Ministre des affaires étrangères de Suède, S. E. M. Krister Wickman; par le Ministre des affaires étrangères de France, S. E. M. Maurice Schumann; par le Ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, S. E. M. Andrei A. Gromyko; et par le Ministre des affaires étrangères de la République démocratique du Congo, S. E. M. Mario Cardoso.

1943ème séance

Suite de la discussion générale [9]

L'Assemblée entend des déclarations faites par le Ministre des affaires étrangères d'Ouganda, S. E. M. Wanume Kibedi; par le Premier Ministre et Ministre des affaires étrangères du Laos, Son Altesse Royale le Prince Souvanna Phouma; par le Ministre des affaires étrangères de Haute-Volta, S. E. M. Joseph Conombo; par le Ministre de la Justice et Ministre d'Etat de Guyane, S. E. l'Honorable S. S. Ramphal, S.C.; par le Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires étrangères de Somalie, S. E. Omar Arteh Ghalib; et par le Secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires étrangères de Guinée, S. E. M. Damantang Camara.

Le représentant de l'Inde exerce son droit de réponse.

Commissions

TROISIEME COMMISSION 1823ème séance

La Présidente fait une déclaration.

Organisation des travaux de la Commission

La Commission est saisie d'une lettre du Président de l'Assemblée générale adressée à la Présidente de la Troisième Commission,

donnant la liste des questions de l'ordre du jour renvoyées à la Troisième Commission (A/C.3/624), ainsi que d'une note de la Présidente (A/C.3/L.1849). La Commission entend les représentants de l'Arabie Saoudite, de la Suède, de la RSS de Biélorussie, de la Yougoslavie, du Sénégal, de l'Afghanistan, de la France, du Costa Rica, de la Pologne, des Pays-Bas, de Cuba, de la Syrie, de la RSS d'Ukraine, du Nigéria et du Ghana.

CONSEIL DE SECURITE

1585ème séance

La situation en Namibie

a) Lettre datée du 17 septembre 1971, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par les représentants de l'Algérie, du Botswana, du Burundi, du Cameroun, du Congo (République démocratique du), de l'Egypte, de l'Ethiopie, du Gabon, du Ghana, de la Guinée, de la Guinée équatoriale, de la Haute-Volta, du Kenya, du Libéria, de la Libye, de Madagascar, du Mali, du Maroc, de Maurice, de la Mauritanie, du Niger, du Nigéria, de l'Ouganda, de la République centrafricaine, de la République populaire du Congo, de la République-Unie de Tanzanie, du Rwanda, du Sénégal, de la Sierra Leone, de la Somalie, du Soudan, du Tchad, du Togo, de la Tunisie et de la Zambie

b) Rapport du Sous-Comité ad hoc de la Namibie (S/10330)

Avec l'accord du Conseil, le Président invite le représentant du Sénégal à prendre part à la discussion, sans droit de vote, en plus des autres représentants déjà invités dans les mêmes conditions.

Le Conseil poursuit l'examen de cette question de l'ordre du jour en entendant les représentants du Libéria et de la Sierra Leone. Le représentant de l'URSS exerce son droit de réponse.

CONSEIL ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL

COMMISSION DES STUPEFIANTS
Vingt-quatrième session
Office des Nations-Unies à Genève

LUNDI 27 SEPTEMBRE 1971

686ème séance

Ouverture de la session

M. P. Beedle (Royaume-Uni), Président sortant, déclare ouverte la vingt-quatrième session ordinaire.

Election du bureau [1]

Sur la proposition du représentant du Royaume-Uni, qu'appuient les représentants de la France, de la Yougoslavie et des Etats-Unis, M. F. Johnson-Romuald est élu Président; sur la proposition du représentant de la France, qu'appuie le représentant de la Yougoslavie, M. J. E. Ingersoll (Etats-Unis) est élu Premier Vice-Président; sur la proposition du représentant de la Yougoslavie, qu'appuie le représentant des Etats-Unis, M. A. C. Kirca (Turquie) est élu Deuxième Vice-Président; et sur la proposition du représentant du Canada, qu'appuient les représentants de l'Egypte, de la Suisse et de la Yougoslavie, M. B. Bolcs (Hongrie) est élu Rapporteur.

Adoption de l'ordre du jour [2]

La Commission adopte l'ordre du jour provisoire (E/CN.7/533).

687ème séance

La Commission prend note du rapport de la Division des stupéfiants pour la période allant du 1er novembre 1968 au 30 juin 1971, tel qu'il figure dans le document E/CN.7/537, sauf en ce qui concerne le chapitre II. La Commission entend les représentants de la France, de l'Egypte, de la Suède, de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, du Canada, de la Yougoslavie, de la Suisse, de la Turquie, du Mexique, du Brésil, du Royaume-Uni, des Etats-Unis et du Togo, les observateurs de l'Espagne, des Pays-Bas et du Bureau permanent de la Ligue des Etats arabes pour le contrôle des stupéfiants, ainsi que le représentant du Fonds des Nations Unies pour la lutte contre l'abus des drogues.

Le représentant de l'Egypte annonce que le 18 juillet 1971 son pays a ratifié la Convention de Genève de 1971.

AVIS

Ecoute des débats

Mercredi 29 septembre 1971

Salle de conférence	Langue	Numéro	
		<i>Matin</i>	<i>Après-Midi</i>
Salle de l'Assemblée générale	Original	5	5
	Anglais	6	6
	Français	7	7
Salle du Conseil de sécurité	Original	-	05
	Anglais	-	06
	Français	-	07
Salle du Conseil de tutelle	Original	05	4
	Anglais	06	04
	Français	07	004
1	Original	1	-
	Anglais	01	-
	Français	001	-
2	Original	2	-
	Anglais	02	-
	Français	002	-
3	Original	3	-
	Anglais	03	-
	Français	003	-
8	Original	4	-
	Anglais	04	-
	Français	004	-

COMMUNICATIONS A LA REDACTION

Prière d'adresser les textes à insérer dans le Journal au bureau 1137 (postes téléphoniques 807 et 829)

Publié au Siège, New York

put to include both

93 and 96
2

JOHN BODKIN

FOREIGN PHOTO ED

1) speak generally

262-78100

2) speak on draft resolutions

3) speak on right of reply

4) explain vote before vote

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UN DAY this year 24th

sittings
12 ~~meetings~~ on China

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week after we open.

1) speaker once on right of reply

SEEK SUPPORT FOR PRIORITY FOR IQ

Austria
Canada
Ethiopia
France
Iceland
Iran
Italy
Malaysia
Morocco
Peru
Sierra Leone
Singapore
United Kingdom

COUNTRIES WHICH WE SHOULD PRESS FOR SUPPORT ON ALL
FOUR QUESTIONS

Argentina
Bahrain
Barbados
Belgium
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
CAR
Cyprus
Dahomey
Ecuador
Ghana
Greece
Guyana
Ireland
Israel
Jamaica
Jordan
Kuwait
Laos
Libya
Malaysia
Maldives
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
Niger
Nigeria
Portugal
Qatar
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Togo
Trinidad/Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Venezuela

CO-SPONSORS OF EITHER RESOLUTION PLUS THOSE WHOSE
FULL SUPPORT SEEMS CERTAIN

Australia
Chad
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Fiji
Gambia
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Japan
Lesotho
Liberia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Philippines
Swaziland
Thailand
United States
Uruguay

plus

Brazil
Ivory Coast
Khmer Republic
Lebanon
Luxembourg
Malawi
Senegal
Upper Volta

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CO-SPONSORS OF EITHER RESOLUTION PLUS THOSE WHOSE

WHICH SUPPORT SEEMS CERTAIN

Australia
Chad
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Ecuador
Ghana
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Japan
Lesotho
Liberia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Philippines
Swaziland
Thailand
United States
Uruguay
Zaire
Algeria
Bahrain
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Cuba
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Yugoslavia

Dinner
Oct 14
Process
Iran

CONSERVATIVES WHOSE SUPPORT FOR ALL ISSUES BUT DR

SEEMS ASSURED

Congo (K)
Malagasy
Panama
Paraguay
Saudi Arabia

plus

El Salvador
Guatemala

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

Downey O.C.
Fecto ^{trap} file
prisoners
China

FORTUNE

Time & Life Building Rocketteller Center New York N Y 10020

Putney Westerfield
Publisher

10121 556 4015

July 28, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I write as the onetime Yale roommate of John T. Downey, imprisoned for the past 19 years in a Peking prison with one other American, Richard Fecteau.

Two years ago when you kindly met with our Foreign Policy Discussion Group at the City Tavern, you told me quite understandably that there was no hope on the horizon for release of the prisoners. Now with your historic diplomatic mission to Peking and the heartening prospect of the President's trip, there is heightened hope and expectancy among Downey's family and his hundreds of devoted friends that the changed atmosphere may provide conditions leading to his freedom.

Would it not be reasonable to impress on the Chinese that the release of these prisoners would be most favorably received by the American public generally and would help establish a climate here which would help facilitate the resolution of other political and diplomatic issues.

Likewise, isn't it reasonable for the U.S. government to concede that the charges brought 19 years ago against these men were indeed legitimate and that the Chinese government did indeed act according to international law and with rightful protection of its sovereignty. In my own experience it has been clear that the Chinese harbor resentment over the persistence that these men were sentenced on drummed-up charges in violation of international law. Isn't it time for the President to place higher value on the freedom of these men than on efforts to vindicate the policies and practices pursued by prior administrations two decades ago.

Handwritten signature and date: 7/28/71

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
July 28, 1971

You are probably aware of the facts: In 1952 Downey was a civilian CIA employee training Chinese agents to operate just over the Yalu River in Manchuria. While dropping supplies to the team, and attempting a "snatch", the Chinese -- who knew the plane was coming (having doubled the radio) -- shot it down. Two years later, in November, 1954, Downey, Fecteau and eleven other U.S. airmen were tried and sentenced. In 1955 most other American prisoners (about 40) were released following a Peking announcement that they would free all prisoners. However, before the last few were let out, a renewal of hostility between Secretary Dulles and the Chinese government closed the prison gates.

In the past 16 years Downey's mother and brother have made three trips to Peking through the good offices of the Chinese National Red Cross.

I would greatly appreciate an opportunity to discuss this further with you, in part to seek your advice on how those of us working toward Downey's freedom should be behaving during these delicate diplomatic times.

Sincerely,

Putney Westerfield

PS: You may recall my brother, Professor Bradford Westerfield, at Harvard in the fifties. He now heads the Political Science Department at Yale.

FORTUNE

Time & Life Building, Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y. 10020

Putney Westerfield
Publisher

(212) 556-4015

August 10, 1971

My dear Mr. Secretary:

When you so kindly spoke to a FORTUNE dinner gathering at The Metropolitan Club in April, we discussed the plight of U.S. prisoners in Peking. I write now as the onetime Yale roommate of John T. Downey who has spent the past 19 years in Chinese prisons with one other American, Richard Fecteau.

Now with the heartening prospect of the President's trip to Peking, there is heightened hope and expectancy among Downey's family and his hundreds of devoted friends that the changed atmosphere may provide conditions leading to his freedom.

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The Honorable William P. Rogers
August 10, 1971

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Sincerely,

Putney Westerfield

The Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 "C" Street
Washington, D.C. 20520

DRAFT IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Charter,

Decides that any proposal in the General Assembly which would result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the United Nations is an Important Question under Article 18 of the Charter.

8-3-71

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8-3-71

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES POSITION ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UN

United States policy has two aspects: (a) to support action at this Assembly which will provide for seating the Peoples Republic of China; and (b) to oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive it of representation in the United Nations.

This policy is consistent with the course which President Nixon has taken from the beginning of his Administration designed to bring the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the international community.

The presence of the People's Republic of China at the UN, while it will present us with some problems, will provide increased opportunities for contact and communication and also help promote cooperation on common problems which affect all member nations regardless of political differences.

The new United States policy recognizes existing reality--for more than 20 years the People's Republic of China has exercised governmental authority over one-quarter of the human race. We recognize that if there is to be a balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake, it must provide scope for the influence which China's achievements entitle it.

At the same time, we will not abandon old friends by ignoring another reality--the Republic of China. In addition to vigorously opposing all attempts to deprive the Republic of China of representation in the UN, we will maintain our existing treaty relationships.

It became clear for the first time at the 25th session of the UN that a majority of the members believe that the time has come to have the People's Republic of China represented at the United Nations. To have maintained our old tactics would have meant the certain defeat of the old Important Question resolution, the adoption of the Albanian resolution and the expulsion of the Republic of China.

Therefore, the best hope of retaining a place in the United Nations for the Republic of China lies in the success of our draft resolutions.

Although it is not happy about the present situation, we have reason to believe that the Republic of China will remain in the United Nations if our resolutions are adopted.

Concerning the question will the People's Republic of China come to the United Nations if our resolutions are adopted, we obviously do not know how they will react when confronted with the choice of either coming to the UN under dual representation or remaining outside.

Recent public opinion polls reveal that the overwhelming majority of the American people support President Nixon's policy on Chinese Representation.

Amb. Bask

I feel certain you
will appreciate my
reasoning and tactics.

Shall speak with you
later - at your convenience.
— if you would be good
enough to listen. —

Nauphal
Warrington

P.S.

I feel very bad
that you felt you
had to leave your seat. R.

XR-98A

To: TRIPLEX
From: FLOMMY

CHINESE STATUS REPORT 9-15-71

(62 6)

A. Important Question

Will Co-Sponsor Probably Co-Sponsor Will Support Probably Support Non-Committee

2 Australia
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Gambia
Guatemala
Lebanon
New Zealand
Panama
Uruguay
El Salvador
Honduras

Philippines
Switzerland
Upper Volta
Uruguay
X-Haiti

6

11/HAITI

Belgium ✓
Brazil
Cambodia *
China *
Cyprus *
Ecuador
Ghana
Greece
✓ Haiti
Honduras
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan *
Lithuania
Madagascar *
Malawi
✓ Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Saudi Arabia *
S. Africa *
Spain *
Liberia
Togo
X-Thailand

Jamaica *
Kenya *
Libya *
Thailand
✓ Trinidad *
✓ Fiji

Austria *
Botswana
Camp. A2
Congo
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Senegal
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia *
Mauritius *
Iceland *
Peru
X-Zambia

Support

CHREP STATUS REPORT 9-15-71

3. Dual Representation

Will Co-Sponsor Probably Co-Sponsor Will Support Probably Support Non-Committal Negative

✓ Australia	✓ Philippines	Belgium	Jamaica *	Austria *	Canada *
✓ Colombia	Rwanda	Cambodia *	Kenya *	Botswana	Denmark *
✓ Costa Rica	Switzerland	Cyprus *	Libya *	Cent. Af. Rep.	Sweden *
✓ Gambia	Uruguay	Dominican Rep.	Thailand	Ireland	UK *
✓ New Zealand	X-Bahamas	Ecuador	Trinidad *	Luxembourg	Norway *
✓ X-Chad	11	Costa Rica	FLJI	Senegal	Finland *
✓ X-Honduras		Honduras		Uganda	Ecuador *
HAITI		Japan		Indonesia *	Malaysia *
		Jordan		Malta *	X-Argentina
		Lebanon		Mauritius *	
		Lesotho		Netherlands	
		Malawi		Iceland *	
		X-Nicaragua		Peru	
		Niger		X-Samoa *	
		North Africa			
		Nigeria			
		Togo			
		X-Tibet			
		X-Upper Volta			
		X-Zimbabwe			

HAITI

CONFIDENTIAL

CHINA
FILE

TALKING POINTS FOR AMBASSADOR BUSH'S SEPT 14 MEETING WITH MALIK

1. Main purpose of call is to pay respects. We would like to have another meeting before the opening of the GA to discuss tactics in more detail.
2. We noted with great interest Foreign Minister Malik's statement in Tokyo to effect Indonesia supports presence of PRC in UN while opposing expulsion of ROC. This seems to be close to our own position and we very much hope that our two Delegations will be on the same side of this important issue.
3. We are having a meeting at USUN on Thursday of some 40 countries in an effort to firm up co-sponsorship. We hope to be able to submit our draft resolutions to the Secretariat for circulation no later than Friday, September 17.
4. As the Foreign Minister is aware, we have decided to state in the operative part of our resolution that the SC seat should go to the PRC. We are in dead earnest on this project and we are making an all-out effort both in N.Y. and in capitals.
5. We have been in touch with Stavropoulos and 25th GA President Hambro about the composition of the Credentials Committee. We favor 5-3-1 and have so stated. We know that Stavropoulos is in favor of 4-4-1 and he has discussed this with Indonesians, Soviets and others. We will be talking to Hambro about this matter as soon as he arrives.
6. In the General Committee we favor combining the two CHIREP items under a neutral heading. *We hope Indonesia will also support us on priority for the IQ and DR.*
7. We have decided to try to defeat inscription of the Cuban item in Puerto Rico and are actively canvassing.
8. We also think it would make sense to postpone Korea this year and we together with our cosponsors are taking soundings on this possibility.

Five

9-15-71

ROC - 60 countries have diplomatic relations;
57 of these are U. N. members.

63 nations recognize; of these 60 are
U. N. members.

PRC - 57 nations have diplomatic relations;
53 are U. N. members.

65 nations recognize; of these 61 are
U. N. members.

(from Mr. Thayer)

Excerpt from State Department briefing by Charles Bray, Sept. 15, 1971, on China:

Q Charlie, on China, it's getting kind of late in the day on introducing our resolutions. Have we kind of given up on Japan co-sponsoring?

A We don't yet have final resolutions to table on this subject. There will be a meeting tomorrow morning in New York in which possible cosponsors and we will have an opportunity to consult on the nature and texts of resolutions which might be tabled.

So I think the answer to your question is a indirect no, Bob. When the Japanese Foreign Minister was here, he said that they had not yet been able to arrive at a decision on this point. On BACKGROUND, if I recall correctly, he and his party went on to Canada after the meetings here last week and will be returning to Tokyo on the 17th, and I would anticipate that a decision with respect to cosponsorship would come sometime thereafter.

Q Who will be the countries meeting with us?

A We don't have a firm fix on that.

Q Can you say how many?

A No, I don't even have a firm fix on that. We would hope a significant number would be at that meeting.

PA/Mytko ✓

cc: Amb. Bush, Amb. Phillips, Amb. Bennett, Amb. Schauffele
Mr. Newlin, Mr. Thayer, Miss McSweeney.

9-15-71

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- - - - -
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53 are U. N. members.

65 nations recognize; of these 61 are
U. N. members.

(from Mr. Thayer)

HUGH C. NEWTON AND ASSOCIATES
PUBLIC RELATIONS

618 SOUTH LEE STREET (OLD TOWNE) TELEPHONES: (202) 296-4980 (703) 549-5825
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

China File

August 30, 1971

A CHINESE SEAT?

Much has been written about the ease with which Red China is supposed to enter the U.N. this fall and replace the long time friend and ally of the United States, the Republic of China. Little notice has been taken of the procedural problems or the legal rights of the Republic of China to its place in the world organization.

-- six governments --

For instance, few analysts have pointed out that the Republic of China is the name of a government, not a territory, and that government is specifically singled out in the U.N. Charter as a permanent member of the Security Council. Corroboration of this point is born out by the fact that during the founding of the U.N. in San Francisco in 1945, there were six or more governments in control of portions of the mainland, including both the Nationalists and the Communists. To change the Charter by striking the name of one government and inserting another is a rather formidable legal and parliamentary obstacle, as a simple look at the U.N. Charter will reveal.

-- Nixon scholar --

Dr. David Nelson Rowe of Yale University has provided illuminating testimony on this question and other U.N. problems to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The substance of his arguments are repeated in the attached

. . . over

article reprint. Dr. Rowe is a noted Sinologist and in 1968 served as co-chairman of the Scholars for Nixon Committee.

-- U.N. Charter --

✓ Other questions of "universality" as regards U.N. membership: the lack of Red China's qualification as a "peace loving" nation under Article 4 having been twice recorded as an aggressor in U.N. proceedings and once deemed
✓ guilty of genocide; and the question Senator Javits raised in Senate hearings of the American people's willingness to continue to support the U.N. if it
✓ expells the Nationalists in favor of the Communists: all these have not been fully developed either. But in an attempt to contribute a bit of light rather than heat to the public discussion we are also enclosing an official copy of the CHARTER TO THE UNITED NATIONS for your own reference and use.

Hugh C. Newton

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John P. Roche

Nixon's China Policy

IT IS VERY difficult to figure out President Nixon's "game plan" for Taiwan. We have announced our support for the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations and our opposition to the expulsion of Chiang's Republic of China. This makes sense even though both Peking and Taipei reject it: there are two Chinas just as clearly as there are two Germanys. Whether this will be true indefinitely is a problem the future can cope with; we are living in the present.

So far, so good. The Nixon policy reflects the reality that the Nationalists run Taiwan but not the mainland, and that the Communists run the mainland but, even with Mao's inspiration, they cannot walk upon the water. If neither Peking nor Taipei will play under these rules, that is their problem. Our concern is with the rationality of American foreign policy, not with Chinese egos.

However, there are strange and ominous noises in the background, and presumably in administration back-grounds, which hint that our policy may go beyond the common sense premise of two Chinas, that we might possibly, conceivably, under some circumstances dump Taiwan. Suppose the U.N. General Assembly voted, for example, to expel the Re-

public of China, would we rise up in wrath and use our Security Council veto? Or would we simply vote against expulsion in the General Assembly, weep a tear or two on losing, and announce in a burst of good sportsmanship that "you can't win them all"?

ONE DOES NOT have to be a member of the "Committee of One Million" or a China lobby stalwart to worry about such a development. Chiang Kai-shek has never been among my favorite statemen and I suspect that if I were in Taiwan, I would spend most of my time in jail. (Of course, the Chinese Communists would have shot me years ago — a distinction that merits some thought.) But whether Chiang would qualify for the calendar of liberal saints is irrelevant to the broader problem: our reputation for fulfilling our commitments.

Back in February, 1955, the Senate approved a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China. A number of liberals (myself included) opposed this agreement. In debate the late Sen. Estes Kefauver said that he could "see no reason for having our nation enter into treaty obligations with the government of Chiang Kai-shek," that he did not "wish to give the color of sovereignty and permanency to Nationalist China." We lost, 65 to 6,

which is to say that the United States made a firm, solemn and formal commitment to the Nationalist. And no senator ever claimed that the vote was obtained by Presidential duplicity.

OF COURSE, today it would take our high theorists about five minutes to justify wailing on this treaty. The first line of attack is that Chiang's authoritarianism absolves us of any obligations. Unfortunately this particular gambit has a bad history. Is anyone now prepared to argue that the League of Nations should have ignored Haile Selassie's plea for help against fascist aggression because Ethiopia was an undemocratic, feudal state? Or that the Nazi invasion of Poland was historically trivial because the Poles had a military junta?

And while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee may want to pretend that the mutual defense treaty doesn't exist, the hard fact is that from the vantage point of the world's other capitals an alliance is an alliance. In Jerusalem or Tokyo the question is not "What moral grounds do the high-minded Americans have for quitting?" It is simply and starkly: "Will the Americans quit?" A simple question to which there should be a simple answer... but as one watches both Congress and the President, he begins to wonder.

objective the development of the Chinese economy, not the acquisition of Taiwan or membership in the United Nations. In this perspective, detente with the United States is essential to get the keys to Japan, to obtain from the world's third economic power the kind of development assistance that could bring China into the modern world. Thus, I argued Peking needs us more than we need them and we should play a very cold hand.

It should be noted that implicit in this analysis is the conviction that Peking cannot call off the war in Vietnam even if it tried. Hanoi has never been on a string, either to Moscow or Peking. For years, high officials in Washington nursed the notion that we could get the Soviets to blow the whistle on Ho Chi Minh, and Moscow played along to the extent of offering to try—in exchange for Berlin! Now we seem to be on the same track with Peking, and I regretfully submit that we are moving down another dead-end street. Perhaps the Chinese have agreed to discuss ending the war with their friends in Hanoi—in exchange for U.N. membership and a long-run promise of Taiwan.

Because of our obsession with Vietnam, President Nixon has, I fear, acted far too rashly and, in effect, made himself a Chinese prisoner of war. One can understand his response; liberal Democrats in Congress are behaving in a shamelessly opportunistic fashion. An ad hoc committee of House liberals, which calls itself "The Group," met on July 7 to explore ways and means of exploiting the Pentagon Papers.

On the agenda for this meeting were a list of proposals for antiwar activities.

ITEM 6 demonstrates Mr. Nixon's dilemma in the sharpest fashion possible and is quoted in its entirety: "6. The political focus must be shifted away from the Kennedy/Johnson administration. Nixon will argue in 1972 that he ended the war that the Democrats got the

... over



John P. Roche

Nixon Is Peking's POW

SOME TIME before President Nixon announced his plan to visit Peking, it was suggested here—in connection with the Ping-Pong gambit—that the American government should move with extreme caution to-

wards normalizing relations with Red China. This advice was not founded on Pavlovian anti-communism (I have supported U.S. recognition of the Chinese People's Republic for about 20 years), but on the premise that pre-

cipitous action could easily undermine the whole structure of stability in the Far East.

This hypothesis is founded on the view that Chou En-lai and the military junta running Mainland

July 27, 1971

Syndicated Nationally by King Features

NIXON SHOULD KNOW**Two Chinas Barred By U.N. Law****By John Chamberlain**

PRESIDENT Richard Nixon, a lawyer by profession, is strong for law observance. Given his predilection, I don't see how it is remotely possible for his "two-China" policy to come to any fruition, at least where the Red China desire to crash the U.N. is concerned.



Chamberlain

Prof. David Rowe, the Yale University Sinologist, in a paper put into the record at a meeting of Sen. Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee, has shown how the basic law of the U.N. itself ties up the whole question in knots. This is predicated on the fact that the Taiwan Chinese, who hold their seat on the U.N. Security Council in perpetuity by virtue of Article 23, Chapter V of the U.N. Charter, choose to fight things out to the end.

THE FULBRIGHT Committee didn't want to hear Prof. Rowe; to its staff he is an "extremist" because he is a stickler for legality. But Sen. Peter Dominick, invoking senatorial courtesy and speaking for the Committee for One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, disregarded Fulbright's attempted totalitarian control over Foreign Relations hearings and took Dr. Rowe into a session as his adviser. So Fulbright had to hear the bitter truth.

What Rowe has to say must shake the White House, for the law of the U.N. is plain: Red China stands in violation of the charter by the U.N.'s own decision

that it has been an "aggressor" and is therefore ineligible for membership even if the Taiwan Chinese are expelled. Chapter I, Article 2, Paragraph 6 of the Charter says so, as Rowe tried to tell Sens. Fulbright and Aiken.

When the U.N. Conference at San Francisco drew up the charter in 1945, there were at least a half dozen regimes on Chinese soil.

These included Japanese puppet regimes in "Manchukuo," Peking and Nanking, several warlord governments in South China and elsewhere, the Communist regime in the Northwest, and the Chiang Kai-shek government in Chungking. The Chiang government being the legal government, it naturally got the nod.

AS A WORLD WAR II victor, it became a Security Council permanent member and, as such, cannot be deprived of its seat except by charter amendment. The amending process necessitates ratification by two-thirds of the U.N. members, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

This little word "all" means that the Taiwan Chinese can control their own U.N. destiny. They are protected in their Security Council membership, they cannot be expelled so long as they live up to international law, and they can exclude Red China by insisting that the "aggressor clause" be invoked against it.

In the utterly unlikely event that the United States were to vote in the General Assembly for expelling the Republic of China (Taiwan) on the ground that it had become an "unrepresentative" government, the U.S. would be

violating the "supreme law" of its own land, which has accepted the original U.N. Charter as a treaty under the Constitution. The "supreme law," of course, is just as binding on President Nixon and the State Department as on the rest of us. And the law that has the force of a U.S. treaty binds the U.N. to refrain from expelling anybody except on the prior recommendation of the Security Council, where the Taiwan Chinese have a veto.

The objection has been made that one should not resort to "legalisms" when dealing with the problem of the "two Chinas" in the U.N. But law consists of legalisms by definition. Dr. Rowe points out that the U.N. was set up to develop "a genuine and all-encompassing world community based on law." At the very minimum, he says, "the U.N. must comport itself in full respect for its basic charter. It can do otherwise only at the grave risk of its basic integrity, probably leading to its ultimate death."

RECENTLY THERE was "Free China Week" in Washington, and representatives of Free China presented 4 million signatures collected on Taiwan against taking the Red Chinese into the U.N. This represents almost one-third of Taiwan's total population, including 2 million Nationalist Chinese who went to the island in 1949. With such support, how can the Free Chinese give up on their U.N. rights? And, with Dr. Rowe's analysis of the basic U.N. law confronting him, how can Nixon himself insist on his "two-China" policy insofar as the U.N. itself is concerned? If he remembers his law school training, he can't.

King Features Syndicate

country into. It is critical that he not succeed. Only by undermining his present policies and by obtaining a Democratically-sponsored congressional action forcing the acceptance of the present Vietcong proposals, (emphasis added) can we recover lost ground?"

How Congressmen Burton, Conyers, Dow Eckhardt, Edwards, Fraser, Harrington, Helstoski, Kastenmeier, Koch, Mikva, Rosenthal and Ryan reacted to this brand of catastrophe politics is a

question that should be addressed to them. Our concern here is with President Nixon's response to this kind of unconscionable political blackmail. And with all due respect to his talents, I'm afraid he has set himself up for a Peking put-down. In attempting to end-run his critics on Vietnam, he may well have given a green light to a Peking-Tokyo axis and undermined the pro-American forces in Japanese politics.

PRIME MINISTER Sato and his Liberal Democratic Party have been staunch de-

fenders of the American alliance. Now even they are looking for the exits. After all, on any serious map Japan is far more vital than Vietnam or Taiwan, but Sato learned of Henry Kissinger's hegira to Peking by reading the papers. Sato, who is hard pressed by anti-American political groups who favor a pro-Peking stance, was simply sandbagged by his American friends. Confronted by opposition leaders waving copies of "Nixon's Thoughts," Sato had to change course and offer to visit Red China. Japanese trusts immediately began canceling contracts

with Taiwan and Seoul in a race to obtain Peking brownie points and an edge into the mainland market.

Reading this pessimistic analysis, one constantly asks, "Didn't the President hedge his bet?" Certainly neither he nor Kissinger is unaware of this gloomy scenario. But then you keep asking "HOW?" and that simply cannot be answered. Let us hope that there is some answer that does not rely on Chou's good will.

GUARD

THE MAGAZINE OF
YOUNG AMERICANS FOR FREEDOM

SEPTEMBER 1971

VOL. XI, NO. 6

When Senator Fulbright and President Nixon call on "China experts" they apparently do not call upon Prof. David Nelson Rowe of Yale. Prof. Rowe, in a paper written before the trip to Communist China was announced, explains the political questions involving China and the U.N. p. 10.

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

"Two Chinas" U.S. Policy and the China question in the U.N.

by Dr. David Nelson Rowe



My discussion of the so-called "China Question" in the U.N., as it is generally termed, will be strictly from the point of view of U.S. policy. Before we can talk about this in any logical way, we must define the current U.S. policy in this respect. Here, it seems clear that the current U.S. policy is a "two Chinas" policy, that is to say, one of keeping our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, usually known as the Nationalist Government, and to keep it in the U.N., but at the same time to try to gradually "normalize" our relations with the People's Republic of China, that is, the Red Chinese regime in Peking, and eventually to bring it into the U.N.

This policy, it now seems clear, had been decided upon in the State Department since the early days of the Kennedy administration, and every attempt has been made to persuade successive Presidents of the United States to adopt and implement such a policy. Very little success has been had along this line until President Nixon's policy switch of recent months. For example, in his first "State of the World" Report of February 18, 1970, there is no trace of any such policy. In that Report (p. 142) the closest the President could come to any such idea was to affirm

that "sooner or later Communist China will be ready to re-enter the international community." At the same time (p. 141) he stated "We intend to maintain our treaty commitment to the Republic of China" the Nationalist Government on Taiwan.

Nixon's Reports

But in his second "State of the World" Report of February 25, 1971, he shifted his ground drastically. First, he reiterated in even clearer terms the intention of the U.S. to support the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan against any possible Chinese Communist attempt at forcible take-over (p. 107-8):

"The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own commitments. Our attitude is public and clear. We will continue to honor our treaty commitments to the security of our Asian allies. An honorable relationship with Peking cannot be constructed at their expense.

Among these allies is the Republic of China....

Our present commitment of the security of

the Republic of China on Taiwan stems from our 1954 treaty. The purpose of the treaty is exclusively defensive, and it controls the entire range of our military relationship with the Republic of China

I am recalling the record of friendship, assistance, and alliance between the United States and the Government of the Republic of China in order to make clear both the vitality of this relationship and the nature of our defense relationship. I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China [Communist China]. As I have tried to make clear since the beginning of my Administration, while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the differences between Taiwan and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved by peaceful means."

This is the "two Chinas policy" in its clearest form: maintain our current political, economic and military relationships with the Republic of China on Taiwan while moving toward "normal relations" between Washington and the Communists in Peking.

The implications of this in respect to the question of Red China and the U.N. are then spelled out clearly in the President's Report (p. 108):

"In that connection, I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the Peoples Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations. The question of its place in the United Nations is not, however, merely a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation. For a number years attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of China of its place as a member of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. We have opposed these attempts. We will continue to oppose them."

In other words, the President has said we are quite willing to see Peking in the United Nations but not on terms of expelling the Republic of China from that organization. He clearly wants a "two Chinas" solution in the United Nations.

Now what are the requirements for the success of any such policy as this? If such a policy is to succeed it is of course obvious that the Republic of China cannot be expelled from the U.N. Such expulsion is actually the whole purpose of the recent movements in the U.N. on the part of Algeria and the other supporters of Red China. Their resolutions have stipulated in detail the necessity of expelling the Republic of China from the United Nations.

Actually, to prevent any such expulsion of the Republic of China it is necessary only to secure the application of the relevant provision of the U.N. Charter in Chapter II, Article 6, which reads:

"A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

This gives to the Security Council the jurisdiction over the question of expelling states which are members of the United Nations, in the sense that the General Assembly cannot act on such a case without its prior recommendation. This means that the whole series of General Assembly resolutions dealing, in its words, with the so-called question of "Chinese representation," but actually providing for the expulsion from the U.N. of a Charter member, have no validity whatever under the law of the United Nations.

It will no doubt be asserted that this is merely a resort to "legalism" and a case of having recourse to a legal device in regard to a question which is primarily political. Actually, however, it is vital for the whole future of the United Nations that any action in respect to the status therein of Charter Members be taken only in full respect of the provisions of the Charter itself, the fundamental law of the Organization. This is absolutely vital to the whole question of the future of the U.N., constructed as it was and is upon the fundamental aim of eventually developing a genuine and all-encompassing world community based upon law. This is what we are working for under the United Nations. In the first instance, at the very minimum, the U.N. must comport itself in full respect for its basic Charter. It can do otherwise only at the grave risk of its basic integrity, probably leading to its ultimate death.

SAN DIEGO UNION
BOSTON HERALD-TRAVELER

July 29

Copley News Service Feature

By RAY McHUGH
(Copley News Service)

EXCITED surprise over Nixon's upcoming trip has clouded some memories, but Prof. Franz Michael, head of the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, put them into sharp focus in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

"Peking violations of the (U.N.) charter stipulations are a matter of record," he said. "Admission without a change in Peking's policy would make a travesty of the charter. Peking has violated its principles not only in the past; the new, increased emphasis on 'wars of national liberation' supports a form of aggression which clearly falls under the illegal use of force referred to in the United Nations charter."

"The United Nations General Assembly, in its last session, was very specific in prohibiting the use of force in violation of existing demarcation lines between countries and within divided countries and in the obligation to refrain from organizing guerrilla forces and other groups to cross boundaries and penetrate into other countries. The proclaimed policy of Peking today, therefore, is clearly hostile to the basic concept of the United Nations."

American strategists, Michael said, must find a way to counter this danger and still protect whatever usefulness the United Nations still has. The White House has given no hint whether Henry Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai agreed on some procedure during their recent Peking talks.

om: THE COMMITTEE OF ONE
LLION Against the Admission
Red China to the U.N.

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WASHINGTON POST
August 23
Distributed Nationally
by King Features



John P. Roche:

Will Nixon Ditch Taiwan?

It is very difficult to figure out President Nixon's "game plan" for Taiwan. We have announced our support for the admission of the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations and our opposition to the expulsion of Chiang's Republic of China. This makes sense even though both Peking and Taipei reject it: there are two Chinas just as clearly as there are two Germanys. Whether this will be true indefinitely is a problem the future can cope with; we are living in the present.

So far, so good. The Nixon policy reflects the reality that the Nationalists run Taiwan but not the mainland, and that the Communists run the mainland but, even with Mao's inspiration, they can not walk upon the water. If neither Peking nor Taipei will play under these rules, that is their problem. Our concern is with the rationality of American foreign policy, not with Chinese egos.

However, there are strange and ominous noises in the background, and presumably in Administration backrounders, which hint our policy may go beyond the commonsense premise of two Chinas, that we might possibly, conceivably, under some circumstances dump Taiwan. Suppose the U. N. General Assembly voted, for example, to expel the Republic of China, would we rise up in wrath and use our security council veto? Or would we simply vote against expulsion in the General Assembly, weep a tear or two on losing, and announce in a burst of good sportsmanship that "you can't win them all"?

One does not have to be a member of the "Committee of One Million" or a China lobby stalwart to worry about such a development. Chiang Kai-shek has never been among my favorite statesmen and I suspect that if I were in Taiwan, I would spend most of my time in jail. (Of course, the Chinese Communists would have shot me years ago—a distinction that merits

some thought.) But whether Chiang would qualify for the calendar of liberal saints is irrelevant to the broader problem: our reputation for fulfilling our commitments.

* * *

Back in February, 1955, the Senate approved a mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China. A number of liberals (myself included) opposed this agreement. In debate the late Senator Estes Kefauver said that he could "see no reason for having our nation enter into treaty obligations with the government of Chiang Kai-shek," that he did not "wish to give the color of sovereignty and permanency to Nationalist China." We lost, 65-6, which is to say that the United States made a firm, solemn and formal commitment to the Nationalists. And no Senator ever claimed that the vote was obtained by Presidential duplicity.

Of course today it would take our high theorists about five minutes to justify welshing on this treaty. The first line of attack is that Chiang's authoritarianism absolves us of any obligations. Unfortunately this particular gambit has a bad history. Is anyone now prepared to argue that the League of Nations should have ignored Haile Selassie's plea for help against fascist aggression because Ethiopia was an undemocratic, feudal state? Or that the Nazi invasion of Poland was historically trivial because the Poles had a military junta?

And while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee may want to pretend that the mutual defense treaty doesn't exist, the hard fact is that from the vantage point of the world's other capitals an alliance is an alliance. In Jerusalem or Tokyo the question is not "What moral grounds do the high-minded Americans have for quitting?" It is simply and starkly: "Will the Americans quit?" A simple question to which there should be a simple answer . . . but as one watches both Congress and the President, he begins to wonder.

(over)

An Editorial
CHATTANOOGA NEWS, FREE PRESS
August 8

Lies Bring Danger

Violating the UN Charter provision for admission only of "peace-loving nations" as new members, the United States is proposing seating Communist China (which it now is speaking of as "Mainland China" to dodge the familiar Red name). The United States says it does not propose kicking out anti-Red Nationalist China. But there seems to be a catch.

The UN Charter provision dealing with admission of new members says: "The admission of any such state (peace-loving nation — ready to live up to the obligations of membership) will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

Nationalist China is a member of the Security Council. If regular procedure is used to admit Red China with "recommendation of the Security Council," Nationalist China will have a chance to use its veto and the matter will never come up.

So is the Red China membership move going to try to dodge Security Council action?

If it is successful in doing so, that will bring into question another membership provision relating to kicking members out: "A member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the principles contained in the present charter may be expelled from the organization by the General Assembly upon the

recommendation of the Security Council."

Russia has violated the UN Charter. It hasn't been kicked out because the UN has not had the chance and because Russia, a Security Council member, would veto such Security Council recommendation.

But if Red China is approved dodging the Security Council some way so it can come in, it would keep the Security Council from being dodged to keep the reckless and irresponsible majority of the UN General Assembly from subsequently kicking out nonaggressive Nationalist China by dodging the Security Council and installing Red China, whose aim is contrary to the stated aim of the UN?

The whole thing is an immoral defiance of the basic UN rules. If Red China is in, the United States ought to get out — but here is the United States under the Nixon Administration proposing UN membership for the Communists.

At the same time the U.S. supports a UN boycott of Rhodesia which is anti-Red, nonaggressive and our friend — resulting in our buying essential chrome from Russia at high prices rather than from Rhodesia at lower prices.

When our policy calls Rhodesia a threat to peace and sponsors Red China as a "peace-loving nation," we are in the hands of liars and thus in great danger.

An Editorial
BARRE (Vt.) TIMES ARGUS
August 11

US-China Chess Game

It may be that the Nixon administration, and its supporters on the issue of Red China, are beginning to see examples of what may be expected to happen on the world front in reaction to the recent overtures made by the United States toward that country.

As in a chess game, a sudden, dramatic move on the part of one opponent is likely to prompt more bold moves on the part of the other. Such seems to be the case on the issue of the President's "two-China" policy.

News reports of recent days have indicated at least a hint of a restructuring of the world stage that could upset the delicate balance of power in many places where the Soviets and the US have been sparring mostly on a limited and covert basis up to now. Soviet overtures in the Middle East, Monday's announcement of a Soviet-Indian friendship, the increasing presence of the Soviet

Navy in the Indian Ocean and the "discovery" of the Japanese all serve as reminders that the China policy will undoubtedly have a price.

The discouraging part is that free-world news reports from inside Red China are nothing less than gloomy about the actual gains that may be made through President Nixon's proposed visit there. New York Times writer James Reston, who is just now ending several weeks in Peking, has been saying that Chou En-lai is firmly entrenched in the same political philosophy that has motivated him in the past, namely that there can be only one China and that before meaningful relations can exist between his country and the United States, the US must pull out its troops from Taiwan.

Unless the President is holding cards that have yet to be disclosed—and he keeps hinting that he does—the United States could have succeeded in escalating the cold war into a rapid search for allies that could end who knows where, and which could reap fewer rewards than most have hoped.—NM

August 13

Hill Study: 34 Million Died in China

WASH POST 8/13
Associated Press

A study published yesterday by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee estimates Chinese communism has cost at least 34 million lives and possibly as many as 63 million in the past 50 years.

The author of the study, Richard L. Walker, director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, said: "A reasonable estimate would be that the figure approaches 50 million Chinese."

The study, titled "The Human Cost of Communism in China," was ordered printed by the subcommittee July 27, nearly two weeks after announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming "journey for peace" to Peking.

Sen. James O. Eastland (D-Miss.), subcommittee chairman, said in an introduction to the study that its publication "comes at a particularly opportune moment."

He said, "there is nothing new historically about accommodations or alliances between basically hostile powers," adding that "in certain situations, such arrangements are not only desirable but well-high unavoidable."

able but well-high unavoidable."

"But if we are to have relations with Red China," Eastland said, "let us do so with our eyes open."

He described Walker as "widely recognized as one of this country's foremost China scholars" and said he was requested by the subcommittee last fall, on the initiative of the late Sen. Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.) to prepare the study.

Eastland said the great merit of the study was that "while it does not deny the Communists credit for certain important economic and social accomplishments, it paints the picture whole by assessing and bringing to life the terrible human cost at which these accomplishments were achieved."

"The cost of progress achieved under Communist rule is too high for the conscience of the world to absolve its perpetrators," Walker said. "In terms of human life and human suffering and in terms of destruction of moral and cultural values this cost cannot be condoned by any rationalization."

"The high Chinese Communist Party leaders who sit down at convivial banquets with visiting Americans may be guilty of as great crimes against humanity and their own people as were Hitler and Stalin and their followers," he said.

"In the case of Chou and Mao," Walker said, "their commitment to their Communist faith has been one of more than a half-century, and in its name they have not hesitated to commit any act."

"For some strange reason," Eastland said, "most of the newspapermen who have traveled to China for the American press in the wake of Peking's invitation to the American Ping Pong team felt called upon to paint Communist China in the most positive

hues and to ignore the massive evidence of inhumanity and aggression that has characterized Communist rule in China."

Walker said "the direct cost in human lives" of the Chinese Communist movement is difficult to measure but he drew on various sources in and out of China in offering estimates of the possible toll.

Moscow Radio, which he at one point calls "obviously not the most reliable of sources," nevertheless is quoted as charging that "in the course of 10 years, more than 25 million people in China were exterminated."

Walker said in the study, "It is probable that the Chinese forced labor camps have exacted a higher toll in human life than the mass executions."

An Editorial

ST. LOUIS GLOBE DEMOCRAT - August 17

Grisly Toll in Red China

A study published by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee puts Red China in a light which all Americans would do well to observe carefully.

Titled "The Human Cost of Communism in China," the study reveals that the first 50 years of the Chinese Communist movement have been extremely costly ones in terms of human life. It estimates that at least 34 million persons and possibly as many as 63 million have lost their lives as a result of mass political executions, purges, slave labor camps and terror tactics.

Author of the study, Richard L. Walker, director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, said, "A reasonable estimate would be that the figure approaches 50 million Chinese."

This is a grisly price to pay for progress achieved under Red rule. This awesome toll of humanity should be remembered by those who tend to feel politically compassionate toward the mainland Communists.

Mississippi Sen. James O. Eastland, subcommittee chairman, notes in an introduction to the study that its publication "comes at a particularly opportune moment." In declaring "there is nothing new historically about accommodations or alliances between basically hostile powers," and the Senator observed that in certain situations "such arrangements are not only desirable but well-high unavoidable."

But Eastland cautions that if we are to have relations with Red China "let us do so with our eyes open."

This is sound advice. There is no indication that the Peking government has mellowed in its rise to power. The Administration should be wary in any new dealings with Peking China.

An Editorial

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

August 21

As for Communists, an interesting report on—

THE NATURE OF THESE ENEMIES

—has just been released by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee of which Sen. James O. Eastland (D-Miss.) long has been the distinguished chairman.

It is entitled "The Human Cost of Communism in China," and can be obtained at 20c a copy from Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The key figure in the report, by China expert Dr. Richard Walker, is an estimate that the Chinese Reds, since driving Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists off the mainland in 1949, have killed at least 34 million persons in one way or another. These victims opposed Communism, or were deemed dangerous to Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and their comrade butchers.

Communists, in countries they control, don't trifle with the opposition. They kill it off, fast or slowly—just as the Russian Reds have slaughtered an estimated 35-45 million persons to keep the Kremlin bosses in power.

President Richard M. Nixon knows these grisly facts. Let us hope that he will keep them firmly in mind when he goes calling on Chou En-lai in Peking some time soon.

To kid himself that these professional killers can or will change their characters in any important respect could be extremely dangerous, both for the President and for the American people.

August 16

Syndicated Nationally to

140 Newspapers by McNaught

Y HOLMES ALEXANDER:

Human Cost of Communism in China

WASHINGTON.

IN JULY, 1970, which was to be the last summer of his public and mortal life, the late Sen. Tom Dodd noted that Robert Conquest's superb work of research and expose, "The Great Terror," dealt only with the 1 years of Stalinist terror and did not cover the whole half-century of communism in Russia.

Dodd thought it would be useful for the Senate to ask Conquest to do a 10,000-word study of Soviet inhumanity to man, and to find an authority to do a similar study on Red China.

At Dodd's request, Conquest and Dr. Richard Walker (University of South Carolina) were commissioned to write the two pamphlets. The second of them is entitled, "The Human Cost of Communism in China," and gives this fatality list on page 1 with both high and low estimates of fatalities reported as follow:

	low estimate	high estimate
(1) First Civil War (1927-36)	250,000	500,000
(2) Sino-Japanese War (1937-45)	50,000	1,250,000
(3) Second Civil War (1945-49)	1,250,000	1,250,000
(4) Land Reform (purging "feudal bullies")	500,000	1,000,000
(5) Political Liquidation (purging defeated leaders)	15,000,000	30,000,000
(6) Korean War	500,000	1,234,000
(7) Great Leap Forward (Modernization drive)	1,000,000	2,000,000
(8) Subduing minority nationalities, including those in Tibet.	500,000	1,000,000
(9) Cultural Revolution	250,000	500,000
(10) Deaths in forced labor camps and frontier development	15,000,000	25,000,000
TOTALS	34,300,000	63,784,000

Professor Walker, director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, is too honest a scholar to call these figures anything except "estimates" (some come from tainted sources in Russia), but there is no historical doubt that the "People's Republic" is built on people's skulls.

As Chairman Mao said in 1927 when it all began, "A revolution is not a dinner party. . . To put it bluntly, it is necessary to create terror for awhile in every rural area." Defectors and fugitives are still escaping to

An Editorial

JACKSONVILLE TIMES UNION

August 15

China: Morality and Pragmatism

President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Red China has given rise to much study and analysis of Mainland China.

Consider, on one hand, a study just published (and the timing probably was no coincidence) by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. The report was prepared for the subcommittee by Richard Walker, director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of South Carolina, and it isn't one which pulls any punches.

"There has been the same monumental inhumanity and the same commitment to political terror as a means of crushing the opposition," Walker wrote, as existed during the Stalin era in Russia.

Political liquidations and forced labor under unbearable conditions have taken the lives of "more than 30 million Chinese," Walker found.

"Those who wish to rationalize public assassinations, purges of classes and groups of slave labor as a necessary expedient for China's progress," he concluded, "are resorting to the same 'logic' which justified a Hitler and his methods for dealing with economic depression in the Third Reich."

The report concluded that the total of all progress achieved on the China mainland has been with a cost "too high for the conscience of the world to absolve its perpetrators. . ."

All this is quite true. It must not be dismissed, or mentally shoved aside, by anyone under the current emotional impact of "tearing down walls."

However, just as true — and just as much to the point — are

the words, made public almost simultaneously albeit half a globe apart geographically and even further apart in viewpoint and motivation, of one Yuri Arbatov, who happens to be the Politburo's chief advisor on American affairs.

Arbatov wrote in Pravda, the official organ of the Soviet Communist party, a wounded assessment of what is going on.

First he pointed out that Red China's fierce propaganda attacks against the U.S.; its unconcealed support of our enemies, should "have shocked and frightened bourgeois-Philistine America."

"But in fact something different happened. This America proved not at all so gullible, and it formed its opinion not on the basis of Peking's loud words but its deeds."

"These deeds convinced the pragmatic American bourgeois that China by no means presented a real threat to United States policy. . ."

"(These deeds) engendered the hope that with Peking's help the United States would be able to end the Vietnam war on terms acceptable to the American bourgeois. . ."

Arbatov went on to rant about the move as a threat to "the Soviet people" and to "world socialism," etc. But already he had made the valid point, as far as the U.S. is concerned.

Richard Nixon is not going to Peking to pin a "good conduct" medal on Mao; nor does in any way the decision, for two leaders of conflicting ideologies to talk, apply any moral approbation on part of either. The motive for the talk, on both sides, is pragmatic.

tell of the continuing assassination and execution. The Communists in China and everywhere believe that the end of building a socialist state justifies the means, however barbaric.

If any or all of these are Chinese purposes, we must assume that they will be pursued with the opposite of a no-win policy, and that the human cost of Chinese communism is not yet accounted for.

Where's The

'68 Nixon?

GOING FULL SPEED ahead with its plans to bring Red China into the United Nations, the Nixon administration has quietly hinted that it is about to abandon its annual effort to require a two-thirds vote for Peking's entrance.

Dropping demands that admission constitutes an "important" question means that mainland China could become a member this year through approval by a simple majority of UN members. Yet the consequences of eliminating the two-thirds rule may be even more severe: last year two more than a simple majority voted on a resolution that would have admitted Peking while simultaneously kicking out our Nationalist ally, Taiwan.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S bewildering not to say stunning — diplomatic maneuvering is even more astounding when one looks over Richard Nixon's campaign promises of 1968. Here, for instance, is candidate Nixon on WTTV-TV Milwaukee, Wis., in September of that election year:

"Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China. This does not mean, as many would simplistically have it, rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations and to ply it with offers of trade — all of which would serve to confirm its rulers in their present course.

"... ONLY AS THE nations of non-Communist Asia become so strong — economically, politically and militarily — that they no longer furnish tempting targets for Chinese aggression, will the leaders in Peking be persuaded to turn their energies inward rather than outward.

"... For the short run, then, this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility.

"... I DO NOT BELIEVE we should recognize Communist China now or admit it to the United Nations because that would be, in effect, putting the seal of approval on Communist China's present very aggressive course against India and against our forces, of course, in Vietnam, and against all its neighbors."

(Mr.) Nixon in Hillsboro, N. H., February 23, 1963: "Why do we resist the Chinese coming into the United Nations? It's because they at the present time are engaged in a course of aggression against members of the United Nations

U.N. CHARTER POWERS

Nationalists Can Bar Red China

Secretary of State William P. Rogers makes the point that the "realities of the world" require that both the Nationalist and Communist governments of China be represented in the United Nations. Thus he makes public what had been anticipated — that there is to be an alteration in the historic position of the United States of America opposing the admission of Red China to the U.N.

In Peking, meanwhile, Chou En-lai has let it be known that the Communists see their own "realities." They view themselves as the "sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people." If Nationalist China remains in the U.N., Chou declares, "we will not go there."

These mutually exclusive interpretations of reality arise from a failure to view the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations within the context of the U.N. itself. It supports the right of the Nationalist government to remain in the U.N. and to play a major role in its affairs as a member of the Security Council.

The charter states that the Republic of China, whose delegates signed the charter in 1945 and have represented China continuously and honorably in the U.N. ever since, shall be one of five permanent members of the Security Council. It is hard to see how the Republic of China could be removed unwillingly from the council without amending the charter.

Further, the powers given to the Se-

curity Council under the charter put the Republic of China in a powerful position to defend the principle that it is the bona fide representative of China in the U.N. New members are admitted to the U.N. "upon the recommendation of the Security Council." Such a recommendation must have the concurrence of all five permanent council members — including the Republic of China — if it is a "substantive" rather than a "procedural" question. Surely a recommendation in behalf of one nation which is conditioned upon the expulsion of another — itself a member of the Security Council — would fall into the former category.

Further, any attempt to resolve this issue by an amendment to the U.N. charter would also encounter the requirement that all five permanent Security Council members concur in the amendment. Clearly, Nationalist China's veto power in the Security Council stands as a formidable roadblock to any legitimate formula for admission of Red China.

No amount of procedural shorhorning can squeeze a Peking delegation into the U.N. as a representative of a single person in China so long as the rights of the Nationalist delegation under the charter are respected.

That is a reality which Peking and its friends must face in the jockeying for representation at the U.N. It is also a reality that could keep the widely touted "two China" policy from getting past the door at the U.N.

and they do not qualify as a peace-loving nation, in effect, as the UN Charter does require."

(MR.) NIXON BEFORE the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 19, 1968: "I would not recognize Red China now, and I would not agree to admitting it to the United Nations, and I wouldn't go along with those well-intentioned people that said, 'Trade with them, because that may change them.' Because doing it now would only encourage them, the hard-liners in Peking and the hard-line

policy they're following. And it would have an immense effect in discouraging great numbers of non-Communist elements in free Asia that are now just beginning to develop their own confidence."

Old Asian hands are admittedly puzzled at the switch in policy by the President. What evidence is on hand, they would like to know, showing that Red China is any less imperialist today than it was when Richard Nixon was running for the presidency over two years ago?

COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION

—Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations (Suite 500, 1735 DeSales St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; Dr. Walter H. Judd, chairman) is reacting in an interesting fashion to President Richard M. Nixon's planned visit to Peking, Red China.

The committee has drawn up a set of seven questions which it hopes the President will put to Red China's Premier Chou En-lai when the twain meet face to face.

We find these questions so illuminating and provocative of thought that we print them in full:

1—When will you release the American servicemen whom you have held as prisoners for as long as 20 years?

2—Do you now accept the United Nations designation of Communist China as the aggressor in the Korean War?

3—Do you now concede that you committed genocide [deliberate extermination of a national or racial group] in your invasion of Tibet as the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva has so stated?

4—Do you admit that you are responsible for the deaths of thousands of American servicemen in Vietnam through your supplying most of the small arms and ammunition to the Viet Cong?

5—Will you now apologize to my country and to me personally for describing me as a "chief butcher" and an "arch criminal" in your official publications?

6—Are you now prepared to abandon Mao Tse-tung's philosophy that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun?

7—Do you still believe that the U.S. is an "imperialist aggressor" and is surrounded by "running dogs"?

Take 'em away, Mr. President, and let's see Chou wriggle off those seven hooks if he can.

An Editorial
MILWAUKEE SENTINEL
July 24

Listen to Mao

Of all the sayings of Chairman Mao, probably the best known one is: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Westerners frequently cite this thought of Mao as evidence that the Communist Chinese regime is based on crude force.

True as this is, it is insufficient reason for dismissing the Mao saying as nothing more than a catchphrase capitalizing the philosophy of ruthless rulers.

For the saying that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun is applicable to all societies, including ours. It means simply that ultimate control rests with the strongest force, which may be benign but is more likely to be evil.

In America, according to the Declaration of Independence, political power is derived from the consent of the governed. As our system has evolved, it is supposed that political power grows out of the will of the majority.

Nevertheless, even in the United States, if one traces political power back to its ultimate source, one will find that it comes from the barrel of a gun or whatever instrument for exercising force prevails.

Thus Mao is merely being realistic when he says that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Rather than excoriating Mao for his brutal candor, we should be

heeding the wisdom of his observation and thanking him for opening our eyes to the realities of politics.

Conditioned by years of rule by ballots instead of bullets, Americans have lost sight of the fundamental fact of life that political power is, in the ultimate, based on force. In this regard, it is especially ironic to see clergymen involve themselves in politics, for in effect they are making alliance with those who govern by the use of aggressive force.

As for President Nixon's efforts to normalize relations with the political power on mainland China, it is to be hoped that he fully understands and keeps in mind what Mao is telling us when he says that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

When you are in a match with those who govern by aggressive force, you play by their rules, not by your own. And their basic rule is that the one with the strongest force, and the will and the skill to use it, wins.

That's not a sweet or pleasant thought, but that's the way it is in the real world.

Quid pro quo

The admission of Red China into the United Nations is now a foregone conclusion. The question is only when and under what conditions.


The same can't be said for the future of Nationalist China's seat. By throwing that question to the membership—even while stating the U.S. would fight the ouster of Nationalist China—the administration probably has sealed the doom of Taiwan.

Red China and Taiwan both have said they don't want a two-China policy. For more than two decades we have chosen to ignore one of the largest countries in the world. The realities of current world politics make it necessary to recognize the mainland Chinese and, at the same time, insist we will fight to continue our relations with our friends on the off-shore island.

But, what does Red China intend to give the United States in return for our opening the door to the UN for them after all these years. Absolutely nothing, as near as we can see, except for another forum from which to castigate this country's policies.

For instance, all they want for easing the world's tensions is for the United States to withdraw all troops from Japan, Korea, The Philippines, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. That means, move our defense back to the Pacific Coast.

Perhaps they'd like to borrow the USS Missouri and arrange a proper surrender ceremony.



'No Tickee No Washee'

An Editorial
OKLAHOMA CITY TIMES
August 3

Giving Away Chips

AFTER Monday's announcement of the official United States position favoring Communist China's membership in the United Nations Organization, President Nixon will have little if anything to hold out to Chou En-lai as a reward for civilized behavior.

Nixon has already played all his cards in this international poker game. He has reduced the strength of the Seventh Fleet, which has guarded the territories governed by the Republic of China for many years. He has carried out the promise of President Lyndon B. Johnson to return Okinawa to Japanese rule. He has withdrawn most of the American combat forces and more than half of all our forces from Indochina, making the Vietnamese War a contest between heavily armed forces supplied and supported by Moscow and Peking and forces with lighter and less certain arms supplied from America.

AND perhaps most important of all, he has continued the disarmament of this country at an accelerated

pace, despite campaign promises to rebuild our strength. This removes the primary deterrent to Chinese aggression.

Now the Nixon administration has offered support for a Peking bid to join the UN. Peking has made clear, time after time, that it has not asked for such membership. Only last month, Chou En-lai said once more that Peking would join the international body only on its own terms. Those terms run counter to the terms of the San Francisco Charter.

BUT Secretary Rogers says we will support the seating of Red China, and at the same time insist that the Republic of China keep its seat, in the UN. Presumably, we would favor Security Council membership for Peking. In any case, the statement is a classic example of trying to carry water on both shoulders.

If it was the U. S. intent to support Peking at the UN next fall, the offer could have been held in abeyance at least until the President's visit to Peking. As it is, it gives away the last of his potential bargaining counters before the talks have even begun.

Nixon Errs on China: Judd

No Longer a Nixon Fan

BY ROBERT J. DONOVAN
Times Associate Editor

WASHINGTON—When President Nixon moved of sending an American Ping-pong team to Peking without simultaneously insisting that China send a baseball team to the United States, Dr. Walter H. Judd, commanding voice of the old China lobby, scented trouble.

If the Chinese were to be given a chance to class the United States in Ping-Pong, Judd felt, the Americans should have had the same opportunity to clobber the Chinese baseball.

If that has happened since the Ping-Pong team—the Kissinger visit to Peking, the President's announcement of his own forthcoming trip to China, the U.S. decision to support China's admission to the United Nations—has convinced Judd that he was right that Mr. Nixon is courting trouble. Judd thinks the President is clear out of his

depth," Judd, a former Republican congressman from Minnesota, told me the other day. "It will be a wonder if he can extricate himself. He will be up against the pros in trickery and deception. The President's great mistake is he hasn't paid attention to the people who know about Asia.

"When the Ping-Pong invitation came along, people said, 'Doesn't this show Red China is trying to end the belligerent chapter?' But the Chinese knew what they were doing, and we didn't act appropriately.

"They can lick us at Ping-Pong. Their third team could beat our first team. This makes them heroes to two-thirds of the world's people who are non-Caucasians.

"The appropriate response to the invitation would have been: we send you a Ping-Pong team and you send us a baseball team. Our third team could beat their first team. The Chinese wouldn't have been insulted. They would have respected us. They would have thought we were catching on to the facts of life. Instead they gave us a rabbit and we gave them a horse.

"Mao's invitation to the Ping-Pong team was not a means of calling off the conflict but of winning it. He has got us on the ropes. He pours it on."

A medical missionary in China as far back as 1925, Judd is now chairman of the Committee of One Million against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

This 18-year-old organization probably comes closer than any other to being the successor to the so-called China Lobby of the postwar years, a group composed of advocates of Chiang Kai-shek. Mr. Nixon, as a congressman, was a conspicuous part of it. In the years following the war, the House of Representatives often crackled with Judd's attacks on the Chinese Communists. His oratory reached a peak in 1960 when he was the keynote speaker at the Republican National Convention in Chicago which nominated Mr. Nixon for President the first time.

Judd recalled the other day how Mr. Nixon had congratulated him for proposing, in the keynote address, a "Strategy for Victory" against the Communists.

"Now," Judd continued, "we're throwing in the sponge. If Dick had won in '60, the world would be different. He would have been a better President than now. He could have been stronger because the country was stronger, externally, internally, morally."

Judd views the President's new China policy as one that is motivated largely by a quest for political advantage in 1972 and by a desire for more trade.

Judd believes, however, that China policy could backfire on Nixon on election day.

1960—Keynote speaker Judd makes a point at the Republican convention.

"He is losing a lot of his own followers," he cautioned. "He thinks they have no place to go, but they may stay home on election day. Or vote for Wallace, if he runs. There is a lot of disenchantment."

Judd is pessimistic that Mr. Nixon will win any meaningful concessions in Peking.

"The only thing that counts," he said, "is renunciation by them of their world program of support, encouragement and even direction of revolutionary movements in other countries. If we don't get that, all we have done is given them carte blanche to increase their revolutionary violence.

"But of course Nixon can't get this because it means renunciation of communism, but this is the only one of the possible concessions that counts for anything. They are winning as it is. Why give it up?"

"The President has diagnosed the problem wrong. The problem isn't whether Peking is or isn't in the U.N., where they would have a chance to make more trouble. The problem is the character of the regime. It represents nobody but itself. It stamps out everything Chinese. Mao must make people different from what they always have been or they will pull him down.

"We can wait until the regime is weakened and the Chinese pull it down."

9/4—Walter H. Judd appears before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to speak against admission of Red China to the U.N.

Syndicated Nationally by King
Features To More Than 200 Newspapers

John Chamberlain

Red China Pays Its Bills

WASHINGTON — George Watt, a British civil engineer who spent three years in Red Chinese prisons, came to the U.S. "with a story to tell" about the difficulties of making money in Red China.


The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Red China to the UN tried to get him before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only to be curtly informed that there is a rule against hearing "foreigners" on the subject of foreign relations. This is sort of like excluding Nils Bohr from a hearing on atomic energy.

The exclusion of George Watt was a phony; he could have been heard by a special subcommittee or at a privately organized senatorial luncheon. But Sen. Fulbright apparently just doesn't want to know about the difficulties of doing business with Mao or Chou En-lai.

SO LET MR. WATT pass on his story through the medium of this column. The man, immensely earnest though not without humor, was juggled on a spy charge in Lanchow in the far interior of China after completing the construction of a synthetic fiber plant.

He insists that the espionage case against him was entirely false, which is believable when you consider that he was sentenced for only three years. (If he had been spying the Red Chinese could only have assumed that his knowledge would have remained dangerous for a longer period.)

Mr. Watt did not, however, come to the U.S. seeking any personal vindication. He wanted simply to warn American businessmen to get cash on the



FULBRIGHT

barrelhead before performing services for Mao Tse-tung, who in Mr. Watt's opinion is just about as safe a contractual partner as Fidel Castro.

Mr. Watt went to China in charge of a Vickers-Zimmer Company crew of engineers who had been hired by the Red Chinese to build a fiber plant in the Red Chinese atomic development center. Vickers-Zimmer is an Anglo-German firm which specializes in doing business in Communist countries.

MR. WATT did not particularly enjoy his stay for Vickers-Zimmer at Chernivog in the Ukraine, but at least the Soviets paid for the services they got. The Red Chinese, however, turned out to be an entirely different risk. They confiscated the Lanchow fiber plant the minute it was finished and demanded that Vickers-Zimmer directors fly at once to Peking to answer charges of cheating on the construction.

When the Vickers-Zimmer directors, scared out of their wits by the seizure of Mr. Watt in Lanchow, failed to appear

in Peking, the Red Chinese declared that this "signified guilt." The Vickers-Zimmer directors were "fined" *in absentia* for a million dollars, which "absolved" Peking from paying the Britishers and the Germans for the construction job they had done.

The plant, incidentally, was worth three million pounds. The British taxpayer has been stuck with the loss, for the British government has a special set-aside fund to cover the risk of being defrauded by totalitarian states.

MR. WATT says his own experience in China was no isolated case. Lurgi, a West German company, had its site manager, a Herr Von Xylander, sentenced for 10 years on a charge of spying. Von Xylander was subjected to two years of "interrogation," a word which covers a multitude of cruelties.

Watt himself, in a six-month period of interrogation, had his shoulder dislocated, and was stabbed in the hand. The sight of his right eye and the hearing in his left ear are still defective because of the "help" he received in answering questions. He was "tried" by an open air mob and was sentenced by a female judge who spat in his face.

After the trial, the judge led the mob in a cheer, then spat at Watt a second time. Before starting on his three-year sentence, Watt was beaten by troops until he lost consciousness. His worst torture was still to come: In prison, he had to read four volumes of Marx's "Das Kapital" through. This was called "remolding."

Any American civil engineers who want to volunteer to build plants in Red China? On the basis of the Watt experience, they can count on a good education in Marxist economics, both practical and theoretical.

Peking's no help

IT NEVER WAS likely that Communist China would give the United States any help in getting out of Vietnam militarily except in a posture of full retreat. And the Nixon administration probably didn't expect anything new as a result of that upcoming trip to Peking.

But if there were any such hopes Premier Chou En-lai laid them to rest in an interview with James Reston of the New York Times the other day.

CHOU TOLD Reston that the mainland government "will not mediate in any way," and will continue to supply North Vietnam with weapons and transportation until all American forces are withdrawn.

In Red China's book, withdrawal is defined as cutting off air support and economic-military aid as well as ground troops.

HISTORICALLY, there never has been much love lost between the Chinese and the Indo-Chinese and the coolness continues down to the present.

Red China has sent small arms and ammunition to help North Vietnam and built roads and rail lines for Hanoi. But North Vietnam hasn't wanted massive Chinese help of the kind provided with "volunteer" troops to North Korea in 1951.

Meantime, the U.S. has switched away from its long-time opposition to a U.N. seat for Red China in order to get the ball rolling, and liberalized trade policies. If Chou or Mao or other Chinese leaders have made any comparable concessions we haven't heard of them.

Courtship Of Red China

Somehow the words of Patrick Henry keep crowding into mind as we wrestle with President Nixon's latest "Everybody please love me" overture.

"Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery?"

Americans are the captives of a strange influence these days, and it is no surprise that the President's leap toward the bosom of Red China finds wholesale acceptance and applause.

But there is no cheer from this corner. We will not lend our voice nor approval to any effort to give respectability to murderers and tyrants.

Certainly we long for a world in peace for all time. Certainly we would welcome the peaceful exchange of goods and services between individuals of this country with the individual people of Red China, indeed of all the world.

But history speaks to us with thunder, and the monster that Communist China is not to be camouflaged from our eyes. We still can see the dagger behind the ping pong paddle.

The goal of communism is the destruction of capitalism and those ideas and ideals which produced in America man's greatest achievement on this globe.

"Has our President forgotten so soon his stalwart stance in opposition to communism? Has he forgotten so soon that thousands of American lives were lost in Korea fighting the spread of communism? Has he forgotten even now his command of American men fighting and dying in Vietnam? The enemy is communism, and Red China is its most militant stronghold. The turn of events boggles the mind.

Here our President will smilingly go to the capital of Red China, sip tea and be photographed with the leader of a political organization that has murdered and enslaved millions of human beings. In so doing, he will be saying to the world, "Here's a nice man, Chou En-lai, and we all want to be good friends and neighbors." And while he's sipping his tea, American lives will be snuffed out and American bodies will be mangled in the dusty plains, screaming jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam.

And whatever face America had in the Orient is lost forever.

Just how far will Nixon go on his "please love me trail?"

Nixon must know that Red China's price to pretend friendship with America will be the death of Free China.

Oh well, what's a few more murders?

No Change

President Nixon's decision to visit Peking and to drop U. S. opposition to Red China's membership in the United States may have engendered a relaxation of attitudes in this country toward the Asian giant — but Peking isn't reciprocating.

Secretary of State William Rogers announced the United States will favor Red China's U. N. membership this fall, while opposing expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime — the two-Chinas policy. And U. N. Ambassador George Bush immediately called a meeting of friendly delegations to formulate strategy along these lines.

But from Peking, the response has been a heated blast at "imperialist tricks" — that same two-Chinas policy.

The tone of the Peking response is hardly different from what has previously issued from Red China regarding the United States. There is no hint of conciliation, no weakening of the hard line taken

previously toward Washington, no hint of an approach to friendliness.

Evidently Peking intends to remain adamant: nothing will suit except the expulsion of Nationalist China from the United Nations, the withdrawal of U. S. troops from Formosa, the recognition of Formosa as part of mainland China — in short, total repudiation by this country of the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

Of course, totalitarian governments can manage reversals of policy: all it takes is a pronouncement from on high and presto! A 180-degree turn accomplished. Perhaps that is what is shaping up now: perhaps the option of bile from Peking will be replaced at some time with compromise on the U. N. question which will result in both neglecting Peking and allowing the continued existence of Chiang Kai-shek's government, at least during his lifetime.

If not, then President Nixon's visit to Peking would appear to have bleak, bleak prospects.

An 'Old China Hand' Is Worried

By BRUNO SHAW

Having lived in China from the beginning of the Chinese Communist movement, witnessed the murder of countless Chinese farmers in Hunan Province at the hands of Mao Tse-tung in the mid 1920s and had a first-hand personal acquaintance with the leadership and the program of the Chinese Communist regime, I am firmly convinced that if President Nixon persists in the folly of a visit to China in pursuit of world peace, he will go down in history as:

--In China, a barbarian chieftain who was permitted to enter the Middle Kingdom bringing tribute to Peking;

--In the West, as the Neville Chamberlain of our time. And Taiwan will become the disabused Sudetenland of the East, no matter what fine words are uttered by the politicians who are presently in charge of our destiny.

American journalists, in their eagerness to laud the Nixon adventure, have used the Mao Tse-tung phrase to describe its content: "a great leap forward."

The fact is, of course, that Communist China's "Great Leap Forward" under the instruction and guidance of Mao Tse-tung in the early 1960s was the greatest man-made disaster in the history of modern China. And its catastrophic results compelled Chairman Mao to initiate his Cultural Revolution to maintain his control of government and party; and in the dreadful aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, thousands of innocent Chinese people were slaughtered, and hundreds of thousands were exiled into hard-labor concentration camps in China's rugged northwest.

In his TV address to the nation on July 16, President Nixon said that he was taking this step "to seek normalization of relations between the two countries" with a "profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China."

What the President and his counsellors utterly fail to comprehend, apparently, is that the Chinese Communist revolution is not merely a revolt against oppressive economic and political conditions in China, but a crusade against the peace and security of the world. It is a repetition, on a vastly broader scale, of the Tai Ping Rebellion of the mid-nineteenth century in China, led by a fanatical sect whose leader, one Hung Hsin-ch'uan, inspired by a Protestant bible on which he had been doing some translation work, believed that he was called by God to transform his country. And he began by leading his fanatical followers on a crusade in which millions of Chinese were murdered--a crusade that lasted a full decade until, because he was acting in organizational ability, it collapsed.

Mao Tse-tung was inspired by the Marx-Lenin bible. He is a far better master of organization and propaganda than was Hung Hsin-ch'uan. And because he has had at his command far more effective weapons, he has been able to kill many more millions of his people in sacrifice to Marx-Lenin than did Hung in his middle-minded service to God.

Mao Tse-tung, and his chosen successor

Lin Biao, and Chou En-lai, are the leaders of this Communist crusade to remold not only the minds of the Chinese people by means of violence and terror, but the minds of all the people of the world. And these are the men whom the President of the United States is going to visit "with pleasure" for the purpose of "normalization of relations between the two countries." How much is an American President able to know of what goes on in the world about him?

In his essay on coalition government ("Selected Works") of April 24, 1945, Mao said very clearly: "We Communists never conceal our political views. Definitely and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum program is to carry China forward to socialism and communism. Both the name of our party and our Marxist world outlook unequivocally point to this supreme ideal of the future, a future of incomparable brightness and splendor."

But Mao Tse-tung also said, on Dec. 30, 1948, "The enemy will not perish of himself. Neither the Chinese reactionaries nor the aggressive forces of U.S. imperialism in China will step down from the stage of history of their own accord."

And how will "U.S. imperialism" be brought down from the stage of history? Mao has given us his prescription for this in his New Democracy, as long ago as 1945: "It is only the Communist ideology and social system that grow and spread in the world, with a mighty thundering force that can level mountains and overturn seas. . . . The world now depends on communism for its salvation, and so does China."

On Nov. 17, 1957, when Mao visited Moscow during the period of the Communist-Soviet honeymoon, he made one of his customary "We desire peace, but . . ." speeches. "We desire peace," he said. "However, if imperialism insists on fighting a war, we will have no alternative but to take the firm resolution to fight to the finish before going ahead with our reconstruction."

In reading Mao Tse-tung's "Selected Works," one has the clammy feeling that all this has happened before, in our time. And it has. Adolf Hitler, who gave us his blueprint of the barbaric catastrophe he intended to inflict upon the world, on May 21, 1935, made one of his customary pledges of peace. "Nationalist Socialist Germany wants peace," he said, "because of its fundamental convictions."

But, alas, no one, it seems, paid much more attention to Hitler's "Mein Kampf," which was published as early as 1925, than they are paying now to Mao Tse-tung's "Selected Works." Or gave much thought to the fact that in 1936, while Hitler was plotting his assault upon the world, Berlin was the site of that year's Olympic Games, not mere Ping-Pong matches. And in that year, we were told, "The problem of unemployment in Germany had been largely licked" and visitors to the Olympic Games, "especially those from England and America, were greatly impressed by what they saw; apparently a happy, healthy, friendly people united under Hitler."

Now again, as in the 1930s, dozens of books, hundreds of reports and columns and countless editorials in our leading newspapers have falsified and misled their readers about the Chinese Communists as they did then about the Nazis, and are assuring us that we can get along with Mao as they were assuring us then that we could get along with Hitler--and, after World War II, with Stalin.

There should not have been quite as much astonishment as there was about Peking's invitation to the Ping-Pong players, or about Mr. Nixon's ploy against his principal enemy here--the Democratic Party--in his "I will go to China" announcement. He did, after all, make a commitment to attempt just that, in his inauguration speech on Jan. 20, 1969, when he said, "We seek an open world--open to the exchange of goods and people, a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation."

And the People's Republic of China is the only country in the world that has been so described by him and by other members of the Nixon administration. Actually, as we know now, he had been putting out feelers to Peking for some time.

Two things should be borne in mind in connection with the projected visit of the President of the U.S. to Communist China. One, that once having gone, there will be no turning back, and this great country will be involved, and become increasingly involved, in shady deals with the leaders of that present-day scourge, as we became involved with Stalin at Yalta, where the possibility of a free China was sold down the river, a further result of which was President Truman's invitation to the Soviet Union temporarily ("to fill a vacuum") to occupy North Korea on conclusion of the war with Japan--which Moscow did, and then, much to Mr. Truman's chagrin, refused not only to move out and let the legitimate government of Korea come in, but refused even to allow a representative of the U.S. government to cross the 38th parallel.

The basic motivation of the Chinese people on mainland China today is fear--a dreadful fear that shows in their eyes and in their trembling voices when explanations are demanded of them by People's Liberation Army representatives in their commune, their factory or their school.

I only hope that the action our President is taking will not lead one day to a similar look in our eyes. I would feel more assured that it will not, if he were to call off his trip for reasons of more important business--the need of trying to do something about conditions in all the deteriorating areas of life here at home.

Mr. Shaw lived in Hankow for 10 years. During that time he founded, edited and published the Hankow Herald, an English-language daily newspaper. He has also been an Associated Press correspondent and associate editor of the China Weekly Review, in Shanghai. All told, he has spent 15 years in China, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and Korea. He is the author of "The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" (Harper & Row). An editorial on this subject appears today.

August 15

N.Y. TIMES
August 17

Subversion Makes China

Unit for U.N.

By VICTOR LAWRENCE
Star-Telegram Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Can the President of the United States successfully practice personal diplomacy as Richard Nixon is trying to do with Communist China? Sen. Peter Dominick, Colorado Republican, doesn't think so and cites these examples:

President Roosevelt did and Yalta was the result.

President Truman did and Potsdam came out of it.

President Kennedy did and we found up in the rose garden in Vienna. Subsequently came the Berlin Wall and the Cuban crisis.

Dominick has been an outspoken foe of Red China and long before President Nixon's dramatic announcement that he would meet with Red leaders in Peking to discuss improvement of relations between the two countries.

The senator says he is determined to continue opposing admission of Communist China to the United Nations until such time as Peking demonstrates compliance or at least a willingness to comply with international law and the terms of the UN Charter.

The pattern of Red Chinese subversion in Latin America, Africa and other world trouble spots is well known. But it is well known, claims Dominick, is the role Red China is playing in the Middle East.

He points out that ever since Palestinian guerrillas have been active in the tactics on the Israelis they have taken training and guidance from Communist China. In May, Palestinian Liberation Week was held in Peking and 10,000 Red Chinese showed up at a mass rally. The same day, People's Daily published an editorial calling on the guerrillas to "firmly grasp the gun and recover our lost homeland through armed struggle — this is the only road chosen by the Palestinian guerrillas and people."

Dominick asserts, "We must once again ask ourselves if this is a government we want seated in a world organization dedicated to peace, when it openly and enthusiastically fends the flames of revolution around the world."

In the senator's opinion, to grant Red China a seat in the United Nations would simply be opening the doors to a new headquarters for espionage and subversion — a Red Chinese mission in New York.

"Of course, we all know that Peking would not be the first nation to spy on us from its diplomatic residence here, and one might say, at first glance, that this is not sufficient justification to deny admission to the United Nations," he explains.

"I would be inclined to agree, except that the government of which I speak has declared in every possible way its support for those who would destroy this nation from within, and it has contributed men and material to wars of liberation throughout the world."

Dominick says an object lesson is visible just over the border in Canada. Since establishment of the Communist Chinese embassy in Ottawa Peking has dispatched Huang Hua as its ambassador to Canada. Huang is known to be a key Chinese operative in the field of subversion and espionage, whose activities span 35 years and much of the globe while engaged in helping to spread the revolutionary concepts of Mao.

There is no question but that President Nixon has a selling job before him to convince the American people the time has come to change their view on Red China.

A recent survey in six states showed 42 per cent opposed the admission of Red China to the United Nations, 40 per cent favored Peking's admission and 18 per cent were undecided. But when those who favored the admission were asked if they would favor admission even if it meant the elimination of Free China as a U.N. member, the percentages shifted dramatically — 68 per cent opposed admission of Peking while only 10 per cent favored her entry. The remaining 24 per cent had no opinion.

Mao's Red Shadow

By J. EDGAR HOOVER

RED Chinese intelligence in the United States, as compared with Soviet Russia's, has a major handicap in that Peking is not recognized diplomatically by this country nor is it a member of the United Nations. This deprives the Red Chinese of a legal base from which to operate spies.

Peking is attempting espionage in a variety of ways. One is to endeavor to introduce deep cover intelligence agents into the United States, trained Peking agents who clandestinely enter this country using false identities and identifications and attempt under the cover of being an American to conduct spy operations.

Third countries are used as bases of attack against the United States. The New China News Agency, an agency of Communist China, has an office in Canada. Though claiming to be a legitimate news-gathering organization, it is obvious that the New China News Agency serves as Red China's chief propaganda outlet abroad and has the potential of supplying Peking with intelligence of all types.

Penetration of Chinese ethnic groups in the United States is also tried. The overwhelming majority of Chinese Americans are loyal to this country, and only a very small percentage are sympathetic to Peking.

The shadow of Mao Tse-tung can be seen and felt in the United States today. We can expect the subversive danger to grow as time passes. The only way to meet it is to be prepared. This the FBI is doing through its investigations and the training of its personnel. For example, we are giving instruction to FBI agents in the various Chinese dialects. In this way, our agents are capable of conversing in the native tongue, and the FBI will be able to handle present and likely future contingencies.

These the excerpts from "Mao's Red Shadow," an article written by the F.B.I. Director for the Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine. Mr. Hoover had planned a reprinting and wider distribution of the article, but said recently that he had decided not to "for budgetary reasons."

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The Case Against Red China

In the following pages, HUMAN EVENTS presents a variety of Asian experts—including some Old China Hands—who provide what we believe to be compelling reasons against our current policy of vigorously courting Peking. These men and women detail the horrors of the genocidal regime on the mainland, they remind us of Peking's arduous efforts to subvert free governments around the world, and they underscore the point that the compromising of Taiwan is far too dear a moral and strategic price to pay for a temporary détente with the band of cutthroats that rule 750 million Chinese.

There may be, of course, some merit in trying to "improve" our relations with Peking for the purpose of playing it off against the Kremlin. But such diplomatic gamesmanship should hardly be pursued if it involves the shattering of old alliances and the undermining of loyal friends. Yet what is so ominous about the Administration's public posture is that it looks as if this is precisely the sort of policy it is following. The current rulers of the regime on the mainland are so steeped in blood and treachery, as the articles in this supplement make clear, that it takes a great act of will to believe that any good can come

from offering up our friends to win Mao's friendship.

The Administration, however, has gone about its business in a way almost calculated to unnerve our friends.

The short notice given the Chinese Nationalists about the President's journey to Peking amounted to nothing more than a crude insult. Ambassador Shen was told about the visit, despite its enormous implications to Taiwan, just 20 minutes before President Nixon's dramatic TV announcement. The Administration conveniently arranged to have Vice President Agnew, whose reservations on the Red China "détente" policies are well known, out of the country when the Kissinger-Chou liaison occurred.

The most vocal senatorial critics of the Administration's China policy—Senators Peter Dominick (R-Colo.), John Tower (R-Tex.) and James Buckley (C-R-N.Y.)—have been provided with no information to relieve their anxieties about how far the Administration is prepared to go in sacrificing Taiwan's interests. "If the President is not about to stick the dagger into Chiang," asked one observer, "then why won't

he reassure anyone in this regard?"

So shattering has the President's announced "journey for peace" been, in fact, that not only has it caused consternation in Taiwan, but it has stirred extreme concern in such anti-Communist Asian countries as South Korea, Thailand, South Viet Nam and Japan. Even neutralist India has been close to alarm, with Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh having warned Parliament that he hoped that any "Sino-American détente will not be at the expense of other countries...."

Indeed, India's recent signing of a 20-year pact with the Soviets is said to be partly related to the President's softening policies toward Peking.

What is so extraordinary in all this adventurist diplomacy is that the President is openly relinquishing concession after concession to Mao, with no apparent yielding in return.

The President, for instance, has already lowered the trade barriers against Red China, called for its admission into the United Nations, insulted the Nationalist leaders, downgraded the importance of Taiwan and seriously harmed

our relations with many of our Asian allies.

We have also abandoned our spy flights over the mainland and, according to recent reports, have ordered a halt in the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos. Moreover, as officials of the International Security Affairs Department in the Pentagon have related, the Administration has turned down a proposal to shift American nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Taiwan in order not to take the bloom off our budding friendship with Mao.

Face-conscious Asians, furthermore, will undoubtedly be reassessing their allegiances as Richard Nixon, once Red China's mortal enemy, goes kowtowing to Peking. From Madagascar to Indonesia, millions of overseas ethnic Chinese, dominant in trade and many of the professions in Southeast Asia, will be encouraged to shift their loyalties from Taiwan to the rising Red Star on the mainland. Taiwan and the mainland have competed for influence in the underdeveloped areas, and the U.S. move is bound to increase Red Chinese penetration.

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A U.N. Seat for Red China?

One of the foremost authorities on the Far East examines some widely held fallacies about the international body and Communist China's role in world affairs

By WALTER H. JUDD

1. The admission of Red China to the United Nations is "inevitable." The U.S. should change its policy of opposition to avoid a humiliating diplomatic defeat this fall.

Judd: Such predictions have been made before.

In 1953, after the Panmunjom agreement, it was declared "inevitable" that Peking would be admitted into the U.N. the following year. But when North Korea and Red China refused to release American POWs taken in the Korean War, as promised in the Panmunjom agreements, the U.N. members voted 43 to 11 against admission, with 11 abstentions.

In 1958 the "inevitability" argument was again advanced and appeared to be having some effect on the U.N. But Mao's behavior in the ludicrous Great Leap Forward and the invasion of Tibet was too much, and the vote in 1959 was 44 to 28 against admission, with nine abstentions.

Then, for two years, a well-planned propaganda campaign on behalf of admission was built up to a climax in 1965, resulting in a 47-to-47 tie, with 20 abstentions. Just as now there was a chorus of agitation that admission was "inevitable" in 1966. But Mao started the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," and its excesses demonstrated all too vividly why Peking is not qualified for membership. In the fall of 1966 the General Assembly once again voted against the admission of Peking 57 to 46, with 17 abstentions.

Until the Mao regime changes its attitude and behavior toward free government (as contrasted with its obvious efforts to turn people, including the American people, against their own government), there is no possible justification for the United States to let Red China into the U.N. If Red China is seated in the U.N. this year, it will only be because we have finally agreed to vote for her admission. Yet even our voting in her favor does not ensure her entrance. The U.N. could very well vote to admit Red China while simultaneously refusing to expel Taiwan. If this occurs, it is quite possible that Red China will refuse to come into U.N., since it insists that it is the only China.

2. The U.N. is an international organization based on the principle of universality, and every nation should be represented.

Judd: This is simply not true. The U.N. was never intended to be a "universal" organization. It was intended to be a union of peace-loving nations to pool their resources against international lawlessness from whatever source. Article 4 of its Charter provides for expulsion from membership. Why would there be a provision for expulsion if all nations were to be members, no matter what their conduct?

Article 2, clauses 3 and 4, read:

"All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."

Dr. Judd, chairman of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Red China to the United Nations, served as a Republican congressman from Minnesota from 1943-63, and gave the keynote address at the 1960 Republican National Convention. A world-renowned expert on the Far East, Dr. Judd speaks and writes fluent Chinese. He lived with the Chinese people as a medical missionary for 10 years, treating Lin Piao among others.

"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."


Clearly, Communist China, with its invasion of South Korea, Tibet, India, its sponsorship of the attempted coup d'etat in Indonesia, its declared policy of encouraging "wars of national liberation" around the world, does not qualify as a "peace-loving state"—the requirement specified in the U.N. Charter.

'Universality' Argument

The "universality" argument disintegrates completely when you consider that for two decades the Soviet Union has blocked admission of West Germany. Why isn't there a nationwide campaign to seat West Germany? It qualifies.

3. The Chinese Communist regime is firmly established on the mainland, and there is no evidence that it will soon be overthrown. To continue denying Peking a seat in the United Nations is "unrealistic." It is a futile effort to ignore 700 million people and deny them a voice in the world organization.

Judd: The devastating "Cultural Revolution" is barely two years old. Its total effects on the people and the country are yet to be measured. A military dictatorship under the direction of Lin Piao to-



Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime may well be left out in the cold as a result of the so-called thaw in Sino-U.S. relations.

day controls Mainland China. An increasingly frail Mao will be 78 in December. In November 1970 more Chinese attempted to escape to freedom in Hong Kong than East Germans have ever tried to go over or under the Berlin Wall since it was erected in 1961.

The Chinese Communist party is so uncertain of its power that it submitted the draft of its new constitution to only 170 members of the Central Committee. It hasn't been able to decide on a new President since unseating Liu Shao-chi in November 1968.

To admit Mao's regime would truly be to ignore the 700 million Chinese people and deny them the representation in the U.N. to which they are entitled under a government of their own choosing and representing their own interests, not a self-appointed, self-perpetuating ty-

ranny that represents no one but itself.

4. Without Communist China's participation, world disarmament is meaningless. International agreement on the control of nuclear arms must include Peking and its growing arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Judd: Unfortunately, Peking has repeatedly declared that it will not take part in any nuclear disarmament talks, inside or outside the U.N. It denounced the partial test ban treaty in 1963 and vowed to continue its nuclear tests in the atmosphere under all circumstances. In 1968 it not only spurned an invitation from the U.N. to endorse the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but denounced the pact after it had been signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This spring it refused to be a party to the nuclear sea-bed treaty.

5. How can we deal with Red China if it is not in the U.N.?

Judd: The same way we deal with West Germany, Spain, Switzerland, etc., which are not members. The only thing necessary for normal relations is that a government be willing to act as a responsible member of civilized international society. Red China has thus far refused that role. What incentive would there be for Peking to change its conduct once it has already been given the benefits of membership?

6. Just as Stalin's "Iron Curtain" belligerence was succeeded by the present Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence," so will Mao Tse-tung's hard line be followed by a more mellow and less hostile policy toward the United States and the free world. If the U.S. offers the bait of membership in the U.N. (and even diplomatic recognition), the new generation of Chinese Communist leaders will be encouraged to be more conciliatory and consistent with the peace-keeping principles of the U.N.

Judd: Leaving aside the question of just how "peaceful" is the Soviet version of "peaceful coexistence" (vide military and economic support of Egypt, Cuba, North Viet Nam—every trouble spot in the world today), the record is clear that Peking, until April 1971, rejected every overture of the United States to improve relations between the two nations.

Between 1958 and 1971 four American Presidents suggested everything from an exchange of journalists to a gift of wheat to limited trade to tourism, only to be ignored or rebuffed in every instance. It was the Chinese Communists who abruptly cancelled, in February 1970, the talks between us and them that had been going on since 1955. It is the Chinese Communists who have publicly declared that until the U.S. recognizes their sovereignty over the island of Taiwan, where the Republic of China is located, there is no point in even discussing diplomatic relations.

As for Peking's so-called "ping-pong diplomacy," even the New York Times, a long-time advocate of admission, reported from Washington on April 18 that "few Asian specialists here believe that much progress has been made on the central questions that divide the two governments."

Those central questions include: (a) The sovereignty of the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan; (b) The Viet Nam war in which Peking supplies nearly all of the small arms and ammunition to North Viet Nam; (c) Communist China's encouragement of "wars of national liberation" in Southeast

Asia, Africa and even the United States; (d) Communist China's willingness to abide by the Charter of the United Nations and that organization's designation of Red China as the "aggressor" in the Korean War; (e) The release of American prisoners in Mainland China, at least two of whom have been held since 1952 (see page 11).

7. A working relationship with Peking will give the U.S. added leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union. Moscow's fear of encirclement is deep-rooted and the prospect of improved communications between Peking and Washington will move the Soviets toward a reduction of tensions with the West.

Judd: Power politics is a dangerous and risky business, particularly when a free country like the U.S. is pitted



Dr. Judd points out that the liberal-inspired notion that Peking deserves U.N. recognition in order to facilitate disarmament is misleading, as the Reds have already shown their disdain for any treaties dealing with arms limitations.

against two Communist countries. It is about as safe as getting involved in a quarrel between a man and his wife.

We must remember that the Soviet Union and Red China are both Communist, both avowedly dedicated to world communism. Their essential disagreement with each other is not whether but how they can communize the world. For all the disputes over boundary lines, ideological purity and the rest, the facts are that these two Communist nations have been working together against the U.S. in the Viet Nam war.

They concluded a new trade agreement which increases Soviet assistance to Peking. They have abandoned much of the hostile rhetoric which filled the air during the Cultural Revolution. We must not be so vain as to think that Moscow and Peking do not fully understand our attempt at power politics and will disregard the wedge we are trying to drive between them.

Has Communist China earned a place in the United Nations?

The Miami Herald summed it up in a recent editorial:

"Over much of a generation Peking has carried on a propaganda campaign, particularly in Africa and parts of Asia, against the United States. The Maoist wing of the Communist party has been ardently engaged in subversion in Latin America and elsewhere.

"In short, as a putative friend Mainland China still talks and acts like a sworn enemy.

"A constructive relationship with the world community requires the world good citizenship which Peking has yet to demonstrate by word and deed. Until it does, there will be no reason to thrust respectability upon it."

The Case for Free China

By DeWITT S. COPP

Since the ping-pong match, political myth-making has shifted into high gear amongst a gaggle of old/new China hands who see in Peking the same road to glory that like-minded devotees saw in Moscow some years past. Nowhere is this pursuit more apparent than when the myth-makers focus their rhetoric and penmanship on the Republic of China in Taiwan.

Their needlework usually begins with a numbers game (Sen. J. William Fulbright is an expert player) as illustrated in a recent article in the *New Republic* titled "Repression in Taiwan" by Mr. Phil Ginsburg. Mr. Ginsburg opens as follows: "Taipei:—The Nationalist Chinese government, made up for the most part of two million mainlanders who moved here in 1948-49, rides uneasily on the backs of 12 million native Taiwanese...." (italics added).

Originally the number of Taiwanese was listed by the myth-makers as somewhere between eight and 10 million, but now it has grown to 12 and as the population of the island is presently approaching 15 million, it will no doubt soon be increased to 13. On the other hand, the figure of "two million mainlanders" holds firm—just as it has for more than twenty years. What the Fulbrights, the Kennedys and the Ginsburgs would have us believe is that for over two decades two million people have remained fixed in time and place, none passing away, none giving birth, none moving outside the original grouping; or if by chance some have died others have given birth to keep the number uniform. One would think that if the political dispensers of this genetic miracle were correct the scientific community would rise up *en masse* to proclaim the wonder of it. The real point behind this tortured use of numbers is to establish in the mind of the public that two million escapees from Communist imprisonment and death a generation ago rule Taiwan with an iron fist, making life miserable for the rest of the inhabitants. The point has about as much validity as the numbers on which it is based.

The truth of the matter is that the inhabitants of Taiwan are Chinese, and that for several centuries Taiwan has been considered a part of China. Portuguese explorers had originally given the island the name Formosa, which means beautiful isle. The Chinese called it Taiwan, which means terraced isle, and as a result, Westerners have long referred to the inhabitants as Formosans or Taiwanese. But under either name they were and continue to be Chinese—just as Americans from Connecticut or California or Hawaii continue to be Americans.

In 605 A.D., Chinese navigator Ho Man reached Formosa, claiming it in the name of the Sui dynasty. Formosa officially became a protectorate of the Chinese empire in 1206, though it was not until two to three hundred years later that colonizers from the southern provinces of China began to settle the island. When the Manchu dynasty was firmly installed on the mainland in 1682, the Chinese on Formosa recognized the suzerainty of the Manchu emperors and became administratively part of the Chinese coastal province of Fukien. And it remained under Chinese rule until the

Mr. Copp, a Washington-based free-lance writer and businessman, is an expert in national affairs and has a particular expertise on the subject of China. A bomber pilot in World War II, he co-authored with Marshall Peck *The Odd Day*, a book dealing with Nationalist Chinese affairs. His story for HUMAN EVENTS on March 27, 1971, foreshadowed the change in U.S. policy toward both Chinas.



Nationalist China's industry is such that not for years has Chiang's nation had to receive any U. S. foreign aid.

Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 when Japan wrested it from China.

At the end of World War II, Taiwan, which had by then been a Japanese possession for half a century, was returned to the Republic of China as stipulated at the Cairo Conference in December 1943. The inhabitants of the island, with the exception of about 100,000 aborigines, were still Chinese—Chinese by ancestry, language, culture and ties to the mainland. Away, then, with the myth that some alien horde of mainlanders somehow invaded Taiwan and saddled it with a foreign government. What really occurred when the Republic of China moved the seat of its government from the mainland to Taiwan was this:

During the war there had been an active resistance movement on the island against the Japanese and a number of its members had served on the mainland as well. Thus when the Japanese were defeated and Chinese troops came from the mainland, they were welcomed as liberators. In short order the welcome was outworn, for Gen. Chen Yi, who commanded the troops and had been appointed governor of the island, was not only a poor administrator, but was also a brutal one whose loyalties were not with the Nationalist government.

The 'Repressive' Myth

In February 1947, a repressive act in Taipei triggered long smoldering resentment and rioting broke out. It was harshly put down. Troops fired on the rioters. Some were killed, others imprisoned. On March 10 more rioting broke out and spread to other parts of the island. These incidents are referred to by the myth-makers as "the 2-28," and it is from this act of violence nearly 25 years ago that all else stems in their attack on the Republic of China. Nowhere are mitigating circumstances mentioned. Nowhere are the counter-attacks of the government offered.

At the time of the trouble Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces were hotly engaged with those of the Communists and his attention and that of his government was not in any way directed toward the off-shore province of Taiwan. However, when news of the events reached the Chinese capital in Nanking, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang (KMT) met in emergency session and voted to recall Chen Yi and severely punish him. This was done, and Chen was subsequently executed not only for his misguided rule of Taiwan but also because it was found that he was in league with the Communists.

His replacement as governor was a diplomat, Wei Tao-ming, who had formerly served as ambassador to France and to the United States and just recently retired as the Republic of China's foreign minister. Wei's job was to correct the abuses of his predecessor and to try to heal the wounds created by them. He began diligently working toward that end. However, by the summer of 1949 Chiang's forces were in full retreat because as Gen. Douglas MacArthur stated, "During seven crucial months of fruitless negotiations, the Generalissimo had received no munitions or supplies from the United States, but the Soviets, working day and night, reinforced the Chinese Communist armies."

"The great mass of military supplies we had sent them at Vladivostok during the latter stages of the war, none of which had been used, was largely transferred to the [Red] Chinese forces, so that when hostilities were resumed the balance of power had shifted."

As a result, Taiwan was considered as a possible place of retreat and to prepare for that eventuality, Gen. Chen Cheng, then chief of staff of the Nationalist armies and later vice president, was selected in August 1949 to replace Wei as governor. Chen was noted for his administrative ability and his capacity for getting things done. It was during this period that the influx of the two million escapees began and it naturally created disruption and renewed animosity—just as it would in any small state that suddenly had its population increased by 25 per cent.

However, despite this period of uncertainty and confusion, Chen, who in March of 1950 had become—through Chiang's nomination—president of the powerful Executive Yuan, announced popular elections to be held in counties and cities. The first took place in July, marking the beginning of self-government in Taiwan.

The following year Chen Cheng was the guiding force behind a reduction of 37.5 per cent in farm rents, and this act was swiftly followed by an announcement that public land would be sold to tenant farmers on easy payment terms. This was the inception of the most successful land reform development in modern times. It had previously been tried in capsule form on the mainland. Today it is known as the land-to-the-tiller program, and by the time it had been fully implemented, 85 per cent of the farmers of Taiwan owned their own land and the former landlords had not been executed or sent to forced labor camps, as was done on the mainland by the Communists, but properly recompensed.

As dramatic a story as is Taiwan's land reform program is its amazing industrial development. In a recent report the First National City Bank of New York stated: "In only 20 years, Taiwan has advanced from an agricultural economy to one of the most important manufacturing centers in Asia.... It has grown at an average rate of 9.5 per cent per year from 1960 through 1969."

Taiwan has the second highest per capita income in Asia, next only to that of Japan. And much of the reason it is doing so well is that Japan does over three-quarters of a billion dollars trade with this nation.

Other economic indicators are equally impressive: inflation over the last decade has averaged only 3 per cent a year; industrial production was up 20 per cent last year; exports this year are up 40 per cent from a year earlier; and gold and foreign exchange reserves total \$750 million.

June 30, 1965, is a date celebrated by the Republic of China, for at that point U.S. economic aid ceased, just 16 years after a supposedly moribund government made its last retreat. Taiwan, in fact, is a donor rather than a recipient of foreign economic aid and its total foreign trade is expected to surpass that of the People's Republic of China within 18 months.

As the *Wall Street Journal* recently noted: "It is, in short, a prosperous island, and the signs of it are everywhere, from rice paddies in the countryside to new construction in the capital. Premier Chou several months back told some American visitors to Peking that Taiwan wouldn't suffer economically if Peking took it over. That might be a difficult pledge to fulfill."

In a recent edition of *U.S. News & World Report*, it was noted that of the 23 nations that make up the continent of Asia, 16 are embroiled in some kind of war, rebellion or civil strife. Much of it has been instigated or supported by Peking. Conversely, the Republic of China has been involved in helping underdeveloped countries provide higher living standards for their people. Ten years ago Taiwan began sending its agricultural experts into Africa and today they are providing to nations throughout the world one of the most successful food development programs ever devised.

Over one thousand Chinese specialists have been sent to such countries as Liberia, Libya, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Niger, Cameroon, Upper Volta, Chad, Togo, Malawi, Gambia, Dahomey, Malagasy, Central African Republic, Ghana, the Congo, Thailand, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Brazil.

Their work has saved livestock, brought about the building of sugar mills and pottery kilns, fiber and hemp processing plants, duplex houses and, of course, the successful growing of rice. (So far the only myth-maker to attack this extremely productive and positive program is Sen. George McGovern, who complained that part of it was being financed with U.S. funds. The reason for that is the Johnson Administration became so impressed with the program's accomplishments in Africa that it began providing money for the program via counterpart funds obtained from the sale of surplus commodities to Taiwan.)

The Chinese specialists in these overseas programs have been commended by their hosts for their dedication and hard work in overcoming trying conditions. The results will make many agri-

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How China Was Lost

The Pro-Red China Lobby Rides Again

By FRED A UTLEY

A quarter of a century has passed since China was rendered incapable of resisting Communist conquest by President Harry S. Truman's directive to George C. Marshall in December 1945 to secure "fair and effective" representation for the Chinese Communists in a coalition government.

Pursuant to this directive (which Marshall himself helped to draw up) instructing him to be impartial, he not only insisted on various truces whenever the Nationalist forces were in the ascendant, but in July 1946 embargoed the delivery of arms and ammunition to the anti-Communist forces. Subsequently, on Aug. 18, 1946, President Truman issued an Executive Order saying that China was not to be allowed to acquire any surplus American weapons which could be used in fighting a "civil war." For almost a year thereafter, the Nationalist government was prevented from buying, much less being given, a single round of ammunition. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist forces were abundantly supplied by Russia from stacks of Japanese arms surrendered in Manchuria.

As Col. B. Moody of the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps testified, "bullets, just bullets," were what the anti-Communist forces needed most. "The foreseen and inevitable defeat of the Nationalist Armies," he said in 1950, "was due to a Nationalist deficit and Communist superiority in infantry weapons and ammunition resulting from persistent United States action."

The billions of moldy cigarettes, blown-up guns, junk bombs, and discarded vehicles from the Pacific Islands given to China were of no use against the Communists, but together with the cost of repatriating some two million surrendered Japanese soldiers, were nevertheless all set down as "aid to China."

Even after the 80th Congress, as a result of the Republican control of the House of Representatives, passed the China Aid Act of April 1948, granting \$125 million of military aid to China, the Chinese Nationalist government was unable to obtain the munitions it desperately needed until the end of that year, when it was too late to turn the tide of Communist conquest.

As Vice Adm. Russell S. Berkey said in May 1950: "The Chinese Reds would still be north of the Great Wall if specific items of arms authorized by Congress two years ago had reached the Nationalist forces in time. For some reason or other it took nine months to get these items to China. Somewhere in the United States somebody slipped up, bogged down, or was interfered with. It has never been made plain why this material did not arrive in time."

The withholding of arms and ammunition to the people on our side in China is only part of *The China Story*, as I told it in detail in my 1951 bestseller.

Prejudiced against Chiang Kai-shek by his old friend "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, captivated by Chou En-lai like so many Americans before and after him, Mar-

Mrs. Utley, author, lecturer, journalist and former member of the British Communist party, is a life-time observer of Russian and Chinese politics. As a special correspondent in the China war zone in 1938, and again for Readers' Digest from 1945-46, she became acquainted with all of the leading Chinese personalities. She testified before closed State Department hearings on John Davies in the 1950s, and was a witness against Owen Lattimore before the Tydings Committee. Her 1951 best seller, The China Story, was used in Senate hearings on Gen. MacArthur. She has also written Lost Illusions, Japan, Seat of Clay, and Odyssey of a Liberal.



In 1946, Gen. George Marshall (left) met with the Communist Chinese at Yen-an in an unsuccessful effort to mediate the dispute between the Reds and the Kuomintang. To Marshall's left in the picture are Gen. Chu Teh, Gen. Chang Chi-chung and Mao Tse-tung.

shall implemented his directive to be impartial without a clue as to the real nature and aims of the Communists, or any realization of the importance of the outcome of the "civil war" to the United States. Nor did he realize that American pressures could be exerted only against the people on our side.

Whenever the tide of war went against them, the Communists said it was "up to Chiang Kai-shek to yield to Marshall and negotiate." Even after his efforts on their behalf were unappreciated and vicious attacks made against him by the Communists, Marshall told them that "if the Communists doubted his impartiality as a mediator, they needed only to notify him accordingly and he would immediately withdraw from the negotiations." At the same time he repeatedly warned the Nationalist government that he would go home if it didn't take his advice and stop fighting the Communists.

This threat of complete withdrawal of American interest in the outcome of the conflict forced Chiang Kai-shek to give way to Marshall and lost him his chance to re-establish the Nationalist government's control over China. Thanks to the United States, a breathing space was again and again afforded the Communists, until eventually they became strong enough to conquer China militarily and politically.

It has been said that "belief in things which just ain't so" has worse consequences than ignorance. The false notion prevails in the West that we gave billions of dollars to the Nationalist government to resist the Communist onslaught, and it is also generally believed that we gave political support to Chiang Kai-shek during the crucial years.

The true record of how and why we "lost China" is generally unknown, thanks to the lasting influence of the "China experts" who favored the Chinese Communists, misled the American government and public, perverted American policy, and are now again riding high despite their temporary discomfiture in the '50s by Sen. Joe McCarthy, by the McCarran Senate committee hearings, and by the revelations of the 1951 Senate hearings on Gen. Douglas MacArthur's recall.

The wheel has come full circle. John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, Prof. John K. Fairbank of Harvard, et al., are now being represented by Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee and by the media as farsighted

China experts victimized during the McCarthy "reign of terror," and today "vindicated by events."

Mao Tse-tung's old friend Edgar Snow writes for *Life*, and one waits only for Owen Lattimore, the most astute of them all, to emerge from obscurity. Prof. Fairbank, who never ran the risk of exposure, has influenced a whole generation of scholars.

The pro-Chinese Communist lobby, formerly centered around the Institute of Pacific Relations, which represented the Chinese Communists as "agrarian reformers," democrats and champions of civil rights, as against Chiang Kai-shek's corrupt and evil dictatorship, are once again in the saddle leading America to repeat on a larger scale the tragic errors of the past.

Errors of judgment which lost China to the Communists led to the Korean



State Department official John Stewart Service was among those urging that the United States cease its backing of the Nationalists.

and Viet Nam wars in which thousands of American soldiers lost their lives and now bid fair to deliver all Southeast Asia to Communist control.

Today we are being told by the Washington Post that the "pretext" for the attacks against John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies was "their reporting from China that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists were corrupt and inept and

likely to be defeated by the Communists." As if this was all they did! No admission that their recommendations, as implemented by the U.S. government, practically ensured this outcome.

Reporting from Chungking on Nov. 15, 1944, John Davies wrote:

"A coalition Chinese government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us. It provides our greatest assurance of a strong, united, democratic, independent and friendly China—our basic strategic aim in Asia and the Pacific."

John Stewart Service's reports as reproduced in the "White Paper" were distinguished by political romanticism and naivete rather than the belief in *realpolitik*, which motivated John Davies. Service seems to have been sincere in his belief that the Chinese Communists were not "real Communists," but good liberal democrats in whose favor we should abandon Chiang Kai-shek. The same can be said of Ludden and other men in the Foreign Service who followed John Davies' lead.

Service as early as 1944 recommended to Washington that the United States publicly abandon Chiang Kai-shek in favor of Mao Tse-tung for the sake of our "future interest in China."

In a report dated October 10, he wrote: "We need not support Chiang Kai-shek in the belief that he represents pro-American or democratic China. All the people and all other political groups of importance in China are friendly to the United States." Copies of these and other secret reports recommending that the U.S. arm the Communists and withdraw support from the Nationalists were given by Service to Yen-an, vastly increasing Communist confidence and their intransigence toward the Nationalist government.

Service was arrested by the FBI in connection with the famous *Amerasia* case involving the theft of hundreds of secret U.S. documents found in the office of this Communist-controlled magazine. Service admitted giving such documents to its editor, Philip Jaffe. Service was not prosecuted, but Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, who had urged the *Amerasia* arrests and was a hindrance to the pro-Chinese Communist lobby, as concerned Japan as well as China, was forced to resign in August 1945. He was succeeded by Dean Acheson, who proceeded to play his part in facilitating the Communist takeover in China and North Korea.

After numerous clearances from State Department agencies, Service was at last suspended as a "loyalty risk" by order of the Civil Service Orderly Review Board Dec. 13, 1951. The Review Board concluded: "We are not required to find Service guilty of disloyalty, and we do not do so, but for an experienced and trusted representative of the State Department to so far forget his duty to his trust as his conduct with Jaffe so clearly indicates, forces us with regret to conclude that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty."

The Board handed down its order: "The employee, John Stewart Service, should be forthwith removed from the rolls of the State Department." Service was subsequently suspended, but in 1957, thanks to a Supreme Court ruling that the secretary of state had acted

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Escapees Help Tell Story

The Flight from Mao's Prison

The real story of Peking's 22 years of iron rule is not only bitterly graphic, it is also one largely unreported. It is not the story presently being written by sympathetic U.S. journalists of clean streets and Orwellian communes, nor the recent admittance by Premier Chou En-lai that 170,000 Chinese Communist party members were purged during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Neither is it the story of the daily vitriol and venom poured out by Radio Peking and echoing publications, attacking the United States on every front just as strongly now that President Nixon has announced the lowering of trade barriers and the easing of all restraints—as before the ping-pong ball began to bounce.

It is, instead, the grimly enlightening story of those millions who have fled the awful tyranny of Mao Tse-tung's people's paradise and all those who have perished in the attempt. Nowhere in modern history is there a more sustained chronicle of escape and nowhere is there one that has received less attention.

As the *United Journal*, a major Chinese-language newspaper in New York commented in April: "If a refugee should have died in his dash for freedom from East to West Berlin, international press agencies could be counted upon to play it up and let the whole world learn the tragedy. Then why not give adequate reportage to the corpses drifting down from the West River to the waters around Hong Kong and those who died in their bid for freedom near the border between Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland?... Why not, indeed?"

How many have died there is no telling, but a reasonable estimate would put the figure in the millions, for since 1949 it is known that close to three million men, women and children have made the escape safely. That is an official figure, but it is also estimated by the police that for every Chinese escapee who is registered by the authorities in the Hong Kong area, four or five go unregistered. Last year officially over 3,000 made it to Hong Kong. This year in the month of May alone, the *London Daily Telegraph* put the figure at 800. The numbers only give the framework of the story—it is the reasons and the means employed by those who make the ultimate gamble that give it substance and clarity.

They come from all walks of life—hungry peasants to disillusioned officials—desperate young people who have lived all their lives under communism—desperate adults from the professions—artists, writers, teachers and technicians—the whole gambit of Red Chinese society. And with one voice they tell the same story—slavery! For 22 years theirs has been a chorus to which the Western world has paid scant heed and today, in the U.S., seems to be heard hardly at all. Listen to the words of a few and multiply them by millions:

Chang Chaun-tsi—fisherman of Foochow escaped by sampan with his wife and family of eight to Nankan Island in the Nationalist-held Matsu complex. For months Chang and his wife had carefully planned their escape, and they accomplished it literally under the noses of Communist patrol boats. If caught they expected to be executed, their children dispersed to communes. But if they had attempted it? "They would have taken our children from us anyway," Chang said. "Without the family, what is life?"



This corpse is but one of many of those who tried to escape from Mainland China to Hong Kong. During the Red Guards' terror, many such bodies were found, often bound and mutilated by their Communist captors.

Life for Wang Pan-Fu, a 17-year-old farm boy who had been separated from his family and sent to work in a fishing commune, was working from dawn to dusk without enough to eat under the watchful eye of Red brother. Twice he had tried to go home to Kiangsi and twice he had been caught and beaten. He made another plan, stole a volley ball and with its help and the tide managed, after a whole night of swimming to reach the safety of Erhtan Island—outermost of the five that form the Quemoy complex at the entrance of Amoy Harbor.

On Taiwan, Lt. Liu Ching-tze, of the Chinese Communist Air Force, was more vocal than Wang after he had made a daring flight to freedom in his MIG 17. "We were the elite. We ate well, had privileges, but you never knew who was watching you, never knew if what you said was going to be used against you. Political lectures never ceased, hate America never ceased either. I had heard about Taiwan. I didn't know if it was good or bad, but since my instructors had said it was very bad, I decided it must be good. I decided to find out. Coming here was like coming to a new world, a dream."

There are more than 70,000 others resettled in Taiwan after their escape who say essentially the same thing. But Chang, Wang and Liu did not make their escape this year or last—they made it 10 years ago, and while the names may be different, the message is the same today.

In April, at the same time the U.S. ping-pong team was meeting with Chou En-lai and newspapers here were heralding the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Red Chinese relations, two young men fleeing the mainland used a plastic bag stuffed full of ping-pong balls to keep them afloat as they swam five miles against wind and current to Hong Kong.

One of them, Chen Ta-niu, told how he and his companion spent four nights hiding in stream beds and thick bushes to avoid their pursuers and police dogs. Chen said that while they were in the water they saw a running man brought down by the dogs. He also said that life under Communist rule is unbearable and that many talk of escaping. And many are trying it, for on the day that Chen and his friend were lucky, so were six others, one a woman, and within a four-

day period 37 others made it, including four women.

"Don't send us back, if you do we will all be killed," they told the Hong Kong police. "We risked our lives to escape because we can't stand commune life. We want to start a new life here."

"Here" is many places besides Hong Kong—in countries throughout Southeast Asia, in India and Nepal, and even Afghanistan, in some of the Middle Eastern countries, and in the countries of the West. "Here" is anywhere outside the reach and control of Peking.

Naturally, most of those who make the bid for freedom live close to the water in Fukien Province near the Quemoy and Matsu Island complexes, or in Kwangtung Province close to Hong Kong. But others risk it from much farther away. In May there were two such parties. One group of six had planned their escape for two years. By bicycle they traveled 100 miles, carrying with them food they had secreted away for months. They moved only at night, and it took them nine days to reach their escape point.

To help them in their long dangerous swim, they carried football bladders, not hard to conceal but most difficult to come by. The other group had journeyed from Kwangsi Province, on the road for three weeks, hiding by day and dodging Communist military patrols. Some escapees admit that often they are given an assist by Communist cadres who are themselves fed up with life under Mao.

The British-owned *South China Morning Post* reported in early June that Hong Kong is witnessing the largest influx of escapees from Red China since the "Big Exodus" of 1962. But the area of flight has spread to Yunnan and Tibet, bordering Burma and Nepal.

The situation in Kwangtung has become so serious in Peking that Yao Wen-huan, Politburo member, was dispatched to the province to meet with Communist officials there to make plans to prevent the escapes from continuing. Cadres have been informed they have until 1972 to seal off the province. The date is revealing, perhaps indicating that by Peking's time table it expects to be in the United Nations and have diplomatic relations with the U.S. by then and that a continued exodus of its people, all speaking out against its harsh rule, could prove to be an embarrassment.

According to the *Hong Kong Standard*, by the end of May the police had

picked up 7,000 escapees since the first of the year. "Many are women," the paper reported. "Most escapees are between 16 and 30. Many are former Red Guards sent to remote communes during the Cultural Revolution. Many die in the freedom dash." "Every day" the *Standard* continued, "long files of bloody freedom swimmers file into Yuen Long police station, some limping; some helped by police, but all agreeing that the risk was worth it."

At about the same time the ping-pong balls began to bounce in Peking the testimony of two escapees was released to the American public. Few read it, few will read it. The two were Prof. Ma Szutsung, former professor at Sun Yat-sen University and conductor of the China Symphony Orchestra. He had also served as a deputy of the Nation People's Congress of Communist China. The other was Prof. Richard K. Diao, who had been in the Ministry of Finance in Peking and then as an associate professor of finance and then deputy chief of teaching and research in the same field. Prof. Diao also served for nearly three years in a slave labor camp to undergo thought reform for having believed in 1957 that Mao Tse-tung actually was seeking constructive criticism to improve conditions in China.

Accused of being a U.S. spy, Diao was forced to work at hard labor from 14 to 16 hours a day, seven days a week in bitter cold with little food. Many who worked with him died. Once he was released he was given manual work, which included cleaning public toilets. He was also required to report weekly his thoughts and his deeds to an assigned party member.

This, in part, is what Prof. Diao had to say about life in Red China: "There is no religion in China any more...it



These four mainlanders are among the lucky ones that have successfully escaped from Mao's China.

makes no difference which religion is involved, whether it is Christian, Buddhist or what. It is all bad as far as the party is concerned. I believe the Catholics were persecuted the most because the government felt they had closer ties to the West...."

"Everyone who has reached the age of 18 may vote in China.... If you don't vote they question you as to the reasons. To vote, you go to the voting place and pick up your ballot. You go in to the voting booth, mark the ballot, and drop it in the ballot box. All the nominees have been screened by the party and match exactly the number of posts to be filled and thus all are elected. You just

(Continued on page 15)

'Domino Theory' Vindicated

Peking's Record of Global Aggression

By STEFAN T. POSSONY

In addition to old-fashioned territorial expansion, the main Maoist objective is to implant Maoist regimes in a maximum number of countries. But just as the Soviets did not incorporate Hungary or East Germany into the USSR, so Maoist China does not plan to incorporate India or Afghanistan into the People's Republic of China. Instead, it wishes that the target countries be taken over and ruled by Maoist Communists.

For this purpose they have been using, and clearly intend to use in the future, psychological, economic and political warfare operations and people's wars. Ultimately, if we take Lin Piao at his word, they hope to run such people's wars simultaneously on several continents.

To the extent that their nuclear capabilities grow and become effective, Maoist strategy can be facilitated through blackmail. The Chinese Communist party (CCP) is not a purely political organization like the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Instead, it is an integrated politico-military set-up. The top party leaders have wide military experience, and the top soldiers are holding top party ranks.

All strategic decisions combine political with military strategy. The CCP strategists are not "adventurist" but prudent, as befits the continuing weakness of China. Neither are they passive. Instead, their strategy is planned for a "protracted" struggle period expected to last from 50 to 100 years.

The use of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) outside the borders of China is as yet logistically infeasible except in a few contiguous areas. Hence, the Maoists plan to support foreign "liberation" forces but refrain from doing the liberating themselves.

The first step in such a strategy is to establish and enlarge Communist parties in target countries, add subordinate combat organizations, and exercise those in preliminary actions.

To deploy native guerrilla and political forces, the Maoists provide organizational know-how, propaganda support, advisers, training, weapons and small amounts of money. They also enable the local CP's to earn money through the free utilization of printed materials (e.g., magazines) and films, through trade, and through fund collections via the international Maoist network.

The second step in the Maoist strategy is to build up bases where the guerrillas can be drilled, deployed and rested. These bases also are needed to store and maintain arms and supplies. Most importantly, they help the guerrillas to save themselves from destruction by their opponents. Bases in neutral or Communist-controlled countries usually are the best, because the counter-insurgent forces are not normally allowed to cross borders. Bases that are practically inaccessible to the troops of the target country but can be reached by Chinese supply units from the sea are the second best.

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China borders on or has land access to 14 states. It has actual and potential land and sea access to 24 states altogether, including four Communist states. Those adjacent states are inhabited by approximately 1.4 billion people which together with China herself comprise two-thirds of the world's population.

More distant countries in Western Asia and Eastern Africa also can be regarded as "accessible."

The third step would be to take advantage of opportunities by provoking and exploiting incidents such as riots and coups, and instigating people's wars in such a way that the Communists who run the operations will be joined by large numbers of "nationalist" and "democratic" "freedom fighters."

Maoist forces were involved during the 1960s in numerous operations in Berlin and Tokyo; they participated in the Paris uprisings of 1968, joined in the Quebec troubles of 1970 in Canada, and they appeared to have played a role in the unrest in Northern Ireland.

The Chinese Maoists practiced aggression by limited ground war in Korea, for which action they were condemned by the United Nations. In 1950-1951 they seized Tibet, committing "genocide," according to the International Committee of Jurists. From 1950-54 they provided decisive support for the Viet Minh in their fight against France, and they have furnished crucial military and strategic support to North Viet Nam since the late 1950s.

In 1958 the Chinese Maoists attacked Quemoy and Matsu, and are continuing symbolic shellings of Quemoy in 1971.


The assault on the off-shore islands was a maneuver to activate the USSR against the U.S. Mao reportedly expounded the theory that a nuclear holocaust, costing the lives of one-third or two-thirds of mankind would not matter if only the revolution were to win. The Kremlin did not agree and withdrew nuclear, technological and economic assistance. China was plunged into a serious economic and political crisis, and Mao sought cover by resorting to additional military actions.



Mao Tzu-tung's strategy, backed by his many military advisers, is to wage a "protracted struggle" lasting up to 100 years.

Vexed by a mass flight of Chinese in 1962, he threatened to invade Taiwan again, but then backed off.

Equally vexed by a flight of Uighurs and Kirghiz into the USSR, he threw troops into Sinkiang, closed the Soviet consulate at Urumchi, and sealed the Soviet borders. This incident of 1962 probably was the start of the long series of



border incidents which temporarily ended in 1969.

In 1962, too, the Chinese Maoists fought a short war with India, to ensure their road communications into southern Sinkiang. This was an entirely unprovoked war which resulted from a Maoist grab of foreign territory. Designed to demonstrate strength, the operation coincided with the U.S.-USSR-Cuban missile crisis and thus provided a clue to the intended Maoist behavior pattern in future constellations.

Also in 1962, the Maoists penetrated into Laos and facilitated Viet Cong occupation of the main passes and approaches to South Viet Nam. Without this penetration, the aggression against South Viet Nam would not have been feasible.

In 1964 the Maoists injected themselves into the unrest in the Congo. Using complicities in Burundi, Uganda, Tanganyika and Brazzaville Congo, they tried to help the local Maoists to seize power. A Maoist coup had been successful in Zanzibar, which then merged with Tanganyika to form Tanzania, where China today wields an extraordinary amount of influence. They also plotted with Ghana's Nkrumah, as well as with Algeria and Egypt, but those African ventures failed.

Meanwhile, Communist operations in Viet Nam appeared to be succeeding. So the Maoists embarked on a more ambitious strategy which Lin Piao disclosed on Aug. 1, 1965, in his notorious strategic pronouncement on tri-continental war.

The new strategy was clearly offensive and aimed to split up and defeat "the colossus of U.S. imperialism." The U.S. was to be destroyed "piece by piece" by the "peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and other regions."

The new strategy was coordinated with Ho Chi Minh and was initiated by the explosion of the first two Chinese nuclear tests, a major increase in the Chinese defense budget, the reorganization of the armaments industry, and the streamlining of the PLA. The next steps were planned as follows:

- Victory in South Viet Nam was to be achieved by the end of 1965, and to be supplemented by the subjugation of Laos and Cambodia. For this purpose the "Buddhists" called a general strike in South Viet Nam (Jan. 11, 1965); half of the Laotian air force was destroyed by sabotage (January 24); regular units of the North Viet Nam army were deployed into South Viet Nam; the VC escalated the war (February 10). On August 7 Peking announced it would send volunteers to Viet Nam if requested. Some 50,000-100,000 Chinese were ultimately sent but were not used in combat.

- The Thai Patriotic Front was formed in China (January 23) and Foreign Minister Chen Yi forecast that a people's war would be raging in Thailand within the year. Operations did start in the summer of 1965.

- The new strategy also was coordinated with Indonesia's Sukarno, who was preparing to initiate war against Malaysia. Peking formed a Malaysian National Liberation Front in 1964 and Indonesia initiated guerrilla operations in Sarawak during October of that year. Early in 1965 Indonesia withdrew from the U.N. Sukarno apparently had given his assent to a Communist take-over of the whole of Indonesia, scheduled for Oct. 1, 1965. Chen Yi hinted that war was imminent, and on Oct. 1, 1965 the *People's Daily* stated that war with the United States was inevitable and that the U.S. would be defeated.

- In April 1965, Pakistan, acting

its own interest and also as a proxy of China, undertook guerrilla operations in Kashmir. After a truce, a short war between Pakistan and India followed, which was liquidated by the USSR. Early in 1966, the Maoists began guerrilla operations in West Bengal and Calcutta.

Guerrilla activity in the Philippines, dormant for several years, was resumed in 1965.


- Various attempts, culminating in the Tri-Continental Conference at Havana (January 1966), were made to support Mao's Asian strategy through stepped-up guerrilla activity in Africa and Latin America.

- The tense international situation and political restlessness resulted in demonstrations and riots in the U.S., most of which were under the influence of Castroites, VC sympathizers and CPSU-oriented organizers.

The Maoist Progressive Labor party did not get much involved in organizing against the Viet Nam war. But Peking supported RAM, whose "chairman in exile," Robert F. Williams, also was "president" of the Republic of New Africa, a black separatist movement in the U.S. Asked whether he thought he could whip the U.S. Army, Williams, speaking in Peking, replied: "With the aid of nuclear weapons from our allies, such as China, sure we could." (*Congressional Record*, Jan. 6, 1969, p. H83).

Williams advocated urban guerrilla warfare as early as February 1964. RAM and PLP were the groups mainly responsible for the disorders in Cleveland and the Harlem riots. The Black Panthers, who were strongly Maoist, at least originally, were founded in 1966.

Not all the shots of the international Maoist movement were necessarily called from Peking, but the strategists at Peking sang the tune to which, like in a jazz band, local Maoist groups added their own harmonies and rhythms. There is little doubt that Maoists also were helped by the Castroites. This strategy excelled in combining the principles of centralization and decentralization and it



Guerrilla operations such as that operated by North Viet Nam's Ho Chi Minh are an integral part of Chinese plans against the West.

lends itself to repeated application. The scheme of 1965 was grandiose, but it failed.

- The USSR, which was to be embroiled in major undertakings, especially against the U.S., committed itself to aid North Viet Nam but otherwise refused to play Mao's game. (At the moment of escalation in February 1965 Kossygin was in Hanoi and Peking.) The USSR protected India, did not oppose Sukarno's overthrow and the decimation of the Indonesian CP, reoriented its alliance with Mongolia against China, and late in 1965 initiated a major military deployment along the Chinese borders.

- The U.S. deployed strong forces to Southeast Asia and prevented the Communist take-over of South Viet Nam, thus blocking the key Ho-ist operation.

- The Indonesians, by crushing the

Communist coup, disrupted this key Maoist undertaking.

By the end of 1965 Mao was in trouble. To save himself, he launched the cultural revolution in 1966 and continued it till 1969, when the threatening Soviet deployment forced him to consolidate and commit the country to the defense of its northern borders. However, Mao's strategy did not become defensive.

At this writing, regular Chinese forces—about one division—are building roads in northern Laos, largely to improve the logistics on the approaches to Thailand. This penetration dates back to 1962.

Peking and Hanoi co-sponsor Com-



Highlighting the Red Chinese influence in the newly independent countries of Africa is this visit of Chou En-lai to Tanzania, now almost a Communist satellite.

munist guerrillas in Cambodia. Chinese support to the Red Khmers predates the U.S. operation in 1970.

Maoist guerrilla operations in Thailand have been conducted in the south for more than 10 years and in the north and northeast since 1965. At one time, Mao thought of creating a Greater Thai state which would combine the Thais of Thailand, Burma, Laos and possibly North Viet Nam (but not of China). This plan is still on the shelf. Meanwhile, Thai-speaking individuals from the Communist countries are used for infiltration into Thailand.

Maoist guerrillas have been active in Burma for more than 20 years. They still are operating. The Maoists are utilizing pre-existing ethnic strife and may be contemplating a partition of the country.

Operations against India (West Bengal, Calcutta, Nagaland and Chin Hills) have been going on since before 1965 and they still are continuing. In several Indian states Maoist groups are being organized and engage in terrorism. In 1971 further troubles arose in connection with the unrest in East Pakistan and the resultant flow of refugees into India. The Maoists promote the establishment of the People's Republic and Bengal that would comprise East Pakistan and Indian Bengal. The Maoists did not trigger the crisis, but they have been exploiting it, at the expense of India, and of Pakistan which has been Peking's ally.

There have been residual Maoist guerrillas in northern Malaysia since the early 1960s when the British subdued a protracted Maoist rebellion. In 1969 there was a big outburst which almost ruined the country. It probably was instigated in China. Guerrilla activity is now reported from Sarawak and Sabah (Borneo).

Maoist activity in the Philippines has been endemic for 20-odd years and is still continuing.

In Indonesia Maoist guerrillas became active in 1965 and are now operating (with great difficulty) on Sumatra and Borneo, possibly on Celebes.

Early in 1971 Maoist guerrillas engaged in a people's war *en miniature* on Ceylon. This force has not yet been liquidated.

In the Middle East, Maoist-supported Arab guerrilla organizations tried repeatedly during 1970 to take power in Jordan and to provoke another Arab war with Israel. The Maoists, partly through Al Fatah, have been feeding a "liberation war" in Eritrea. They also have been active in southern Yemen and since

instructors to all camps where the African governments allow them in. Brazzaville Congo and Guinea; and possibly Gambia and Zambia, are available as base areas. The Maoists carry on guerrilla operations in Mozambique, Angola, Cabinda, and Bissau-Guinea.

In Europe, the Maoists are at present very active in Paris and are working toward a new "Red May."

Most of those operations are as yet in their preparatory phases and some are merely diversionary. But clearly, aside from their objectives vis-a-vis the USSR, Japan and the U.S., Peking wishes to "Maoize" Southeast Asia, minus "Indochina" which they are willing to cede to Hanoi, and to dislocate India which conceivably would be divided along ethnic lines, with most or all ethnic groups under Maoist rule.

It has been said that Maoist strategy has not been very successful. This is highly debatable because the play has barely progressed beyond its prologue. The point is, however, that a weakening or termination of U.S. presence in Asia or the abandonment of Viet Nam and of our Asian SEATO allies would enable the Maoists to branch out in all directions and to pluck the fruits which they have been planting during the last two decades.

If America leaves or gives its tacit blessing to the Maoists, several Asian governments will seek USSR protection (which will be freely given), and others will throw in their lot with Maoist China.

The "domino theory" may be viewed with skepticism. But the fact is that Maoist forces are already emplaced in most of the target countries. If the President's visit to Peking should result in sacrificing our allies or weakening the will of Peking's neighbors to resist Maoist aggression, then these forces will clearly expand in strength. Hence, the President must make it clear that we have no intention of abandoning our allies.

If we leave them now for some vaporous promises from Peking, we will find ourselves at some future date fighting under greater stress, at far greater costs and risks, and with much higher casualties, than if we stick to the strategy which, by and large, has contained Maoist aggression since 1949.



The Human Cost of Communism in China

Mao Tse-tung's bloody record of Red despotism revealed

(At the initiative of the late Sen. Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut, the Senate Internal Security subcommittee requested Prof. Richard L. Walker, a lifetime student of Chinese affairs, to prepare a study on "The Human Cost of Communism in China." Prof. Walker, who serves as the distinguished director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, has produced a scholarly piece of work that is particularly timely in view of the President's proposed journey to Peking. The study, we think, is a useful antidote to so many of the journalistic accounts now emanating from Mainland China which come close to exalting the Red Chinese regime. Excerpts from the Walker report follow.)

On July 1, 1971, the Chinese Communist party celebrated half a century of existence. These five turbulent decades have been filled with prodigious changes, but also with weighty tragedy for great numbers of the inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom. It can be doubted whether the 12 young revolutionary idealists who gathered in a girls' school in Shanghai in 1921 to set their party in motion could have foreseen the impact which their actions would have upon China.

One of the 12, Mao Tse-tung, was to occupy the center of the stage in the Chinese Communist movement for more than 35 years. During the period of protracted conflict which led the Communists to power, Mao was, in many respects, the Lenin of China. Shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China, he was chairman of the PRC, and he was the central figure in the Chinese Communist movement for more than 35 years.

Mao, Stalin Parallel

This parallel with the Stalin era deserves our sober attention. Aspects of it are uncomfortably precise. There has been the same monumental inhumanity and the same commitment to political terror as a means of crushing the opposition. There is an aura of mystery surrounding the activities and whereabouts of the "great supreme commander"; the cult of personality has at times reached ridiculous extremes; his whims and arbitrary decisions have made his associates tremble and have caused untold suffering for his people.

There has been the intellectual isolationism of his country, now a great bulwark and fortress for the spreading of his truth. And, above all, there has been distrust and suspicion focused against the very people who could help to gain support for the leader and aid the progress of the country: the intellectuals and students.

There is yet another aspect of the parallel between the Mao and Stalin periods deserving of attention—the treatment of their rule among the scholars and journalists in the outside world.

It is difficult for many to remember the praise heaped upon Stalin in the 1930s, but we are made acutely aware of the fascination with Chairman Mao, through a surfeit of scholarly and journalistic attention which helps to build his cult and his image as a sort of superman. It is not surprising that Stalin is still a great hero in Communist China. His picture was prominently displayed in Peking on Oct. 1, 1970, the 21st anniversary of the People's Republic of China.)



Chairman Mao receives the applause of young Red Guard militants during the upheaval which saw him victorious over Liu Shao-chi, whose present whereabouts are now unknown.

anniversary of the People's Republic of China.)

For more than two decades those few voices in the West who attempted to call attention to the realities of Stalin's terror were drowned out by the strident chords of praise sung by the "intellectuals" in the outside world who were fascinated with the grandiose experiments in the "land of socialism."

Those who called attention to the dark side of the revolution, to the fact of slave labor, to the use of the Gulag, to the repression of the intelligentsia, were severely criticized or even persecuted. It was as if they did not seem to understand that some sacrifices have to be made for revolutionary progress. Even the show trials of the great purges were pronounced as signs of growing democracy.

Such myopia seems almost incredible to us today in the wake of subsequent revelations from the USSR itself, the outpourings of works like those of Solzhenitsyn, and the wealth of refugee testimony which became available after World War II.

But it was the Khrushchev "Secret Speech" of February 1956 which really jolted those who had for decades apologized ritualistically for crimes against humanity in the Soviet state. The American Stalin Prize winner, Howard Fast,

"It is probably not inaccurate to say that a great number of China specialists in the West have been almost as instrumental in building up the image of Mao the superman as were the Soviet specialists who analyzed Stalin's supposed brilliance in the 1930s. The Stalin-like features of Mao Tse-tung have been brilliantly analyzed by Arthur H. Cohen. See *Problems of Communism*, 15.5 (Sept.-Oct., 1966), pp. 8-16 and 16.2 (Mar.-Apr., 1967), pp. 97-9. Cohen clearly has the better logical and academic position in an exchange with Stuart R. Schram, a Mao biographer and contributor to the image of the all-wise leader. The Western "analysts" of Chairman Mao frequently devote page after page to explorations of the workings of his mind in such a way as to indicate that he thinks in all fields and solidly at least 72 hours per day. The frequent visitor to Communist China and a semi-official biographer of Mao, Edgar Snow, has through his writings and reporting been probably the chief contributor to the romanticized view of Mao as a humanist revolutionary concerned about the fate of mankind. Snow hardly deigns to mention the almost constant persecution of creative intellectuals by a Mao who has been grasped up into the vortex of his own infatigability. As Cohen has noted in the second of the pieces cited: "Most totalitarian rulers (including Hitler, Stalin and Mao) have justified their actions—to others, and no doubt to themselves—in terms of some greater good which their actions would supposedly bring to their subjects. What Mao shares with Hitler, however, is the frank and explicit rejection of 'humanism' as a motive or goal for his policies."

was moved to deep soul-searching:

"It is a strange and awful document, perhaps without parallel in history; and one must face the fact that it itemizes a record of barbarism and paranoid bloodlust that will be a lasting and shameful memory to civilized man....

"Where I failed miserably and where I swear by all that is holy that I will not fail again, was... [in failing] to see that... to abandon the holy right of man to his own conscience, his own dignity, his right to say what he pleases, to speak freely and boldly for the truth as he sees the truth—and fearing no man, whether right or wrong—is no victory at all.... I knew that writers and artists and scientists were intimidated, but I accepted this as a necessity for socialism....

"This I can never accept again—and never again can I accept as a just practice under socialism that which I know to be unjust.... Never again will I remain silent when I can recognize injustice—regardless of how that injustice may be wrapped in the dirty linen of expediency or necessity. Never again will I accept the 'clever' rationale, which appears to make sense but under scrutiny does not."

Howard Fast's statements in 1956 make an eloquent point of departure and a warning for those who might still be tempted to hold up double standards—those who are prone to excuse the crimes and terror practiced against humans in the name of socialism and yet are in the forefront in fighting other injustices.

Naive Scholars

Fast also centered in on some of the very items which tend to set humans apart from other living creatures—the independence of the human intellect, the striving for freedom, and the standards of decency and individuality which dare not be sacrificed.

The China scholars in the West have not yet had the equivalent of a Khrushchev "Secret Speech" detailing Mao's many crimes against his fellow Chinese and Communist comrades. Perhaps for this reason many still harbor those same sentiments which caused the Howard Fast to ignore Soviet realities in Stalin's time; but surely the accumulated evidence as well as the ex-

ample from the Soviet experience should give pause.

For the sake of the Socialist "higher goals" many of these scholars have been prone to excuse massive injustices on the questionable assumption that these injustices were only temporary.

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, not a few American "China-watchers" have hastened into print to denounce Chiang Kai-shek's government for this or that injustice, such as the imprisonment of Lai Chen, the editor of *Free China* in September 1960 (the author joined in protesting what seemed to be a clear case of political persecution). But those same "China-watchers" have turned admiring eyes on the Chinese Communists and have either remained silent about some of the human costs described in the pages which follow, or have rationalized that these are a necessary part of some vague "inevitable" Chinese revolution.

With good reason the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been called "the largest enterprise in the history of mankind." The problems of adjusting the world's longest lived, richest and most traditional culture to the demands of the age of the computer, atomic energy or jet aircraft are indeed unprecedented for any regime. These, too, are factors that have weighed heavily in the minds of intellectual sympathizers.

Further, there is the factor of the guilt complex of the Western world toward China because of the period of imperialism in China. This has tended to make many Western observers more inclined to suspend judgment of the Chinese Communists and to hold to those double standards which for so long blinded the outside world to the realities of the Soviet system. And yet, can the world ignore the monumental human cost of Mao's China or its Stalinoid features, especially since the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958?

It is my considered judgment, after following Communist China closely for



Rod China's Chou En-lai has a reputation as a shrewd and successful bargaining agent.

more than two decades, that the cost of progress achieved under Communism is too high for the conscience of the world to absolve its perpetrators. In terms of destruction of moral and cultural values this cost cannot be condoned by any rationalization. The high Chinese Communist party leaders who sit down at convivial banquets with visiting Americans may be guilty of as great crimes against humanity and their own people as were Hitler and Stalin and their followers.

On the eve of the final Communist victory in China in 1949, Mao Tse-tung paused on the 28th anniversary of the founding of the CCP to survey the past and plot the future. The first 28 years had seen the party single-mindedly, through reverses and successes, pursue its one overriding goal—the capture of state power.

In his commemorative work *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Mao promised to continue in the path which had brought success. He warned that the "people's army, people's police, and the people's courts" would be used to defend the dictatorship which was being established and to aid with the completion of the revolution.

Dictatorship Defined

In this work Mao defined "the people" who were to be exercising the dictatorship as consisting of four classes: the peasants, the proletariat, the national bourgeoisie, and the petite bourgeoisie—all under the leadership of the "working class and the Communist party." All others were, in an Orwellian sense, "unpeople." And he warned that the latter, whom he termed "reactionaries," were to have no rights and that if "they speak or act in an unruly way they will be promptly stopped and punished."

In one of his earliest published works in March 1927, Mao had warned: "A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous."

He continued that for the revolution to succeed, "To put it bluntly, it is necessary to create terror for a while in every rural area. . . ." The leader of the Communist party of China was a good Stalinist who believed in the efficacy of terror for the sake of the ultimate goal.

In 1949 the Chinese people were indeed deserving of peace and an opportunity to unify and reconstruct their ravaged country. The more than two decades of Communist power, however, have brought no respite to struggle, violence, warfare, or misery for China.

There have been external wars such as in Korea (1950-53), with India (1962), and along the Soviet borders (1969); there have been formidable conflicts with areas where minority nationalities are situated, particularly in Tibet where hostilities assumed major proportions in 1959 and have continued sporadically since; there have been the struggles waged in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, such as that in Kwangsi in the summer of 1968 where an estimated 50,000 were killed in the city of Wuchow alone.

But perhaps even more tragic has been the pattern of rule which Mao and his fellow Communists have used to bring about political control of the Chinese people and the development of power for the Chinese state. Since 1949 China has been subjected to a pattern of wave after wave of mass campaigns breaking upon the countryside and only gradually receding.

The naming of some of these campaigns is enough to evoke apprehension among refugees in Hong Kong, where a minimum of two million Chinese have moved to escape from Chinese Communist rule.

There was the Agrarian Reform of 1949-52 which brought about the execution of several million landlords.

Then came the campaign against counterrevolutionaries of 1951-52 during the first 12 months of which it was estimated that one and one-half million were executed.



Above is a Soviet-built Il-28 jet bomber used by a Red airman who defected to Taiwan. Such aircraft have the ability to hit many targets near China such as Japan and other Free World countries.

The three-anti and five-anti campaigns of 1951-53 purged the business, finance and industrial circles with executions and a wave of suicides. All of these were linked to bandit suppression campaigns from 1949 to 1956.

In connection with the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shushih in 1955, Mao launched yet another campaign against "hidden counterrevolutionaries" in 1955. Following this, he moved on yet another front with a drive for collectivization of the peasants in "agricultural producers' cooperatives" which he demanded be completed by the end of the First Stalin-type Five-Year Plan (1953-57). It was at the end of this period that he finally persuaded the intellectuals and others who had joined in the united front of 1949 to speak up and voice criticisms in the spring of 1957. Their vehemence against the Communist party and Mao's leadership resulted in an anti-rightist campaign which terrorized China during the ninth and tenth years of Communist rule, and fused into the "Great Leap" of 1958-1959.

Public Executions

Millions were executed in the immediate post-power seizure period in Communist China. Many of the executions took place after mass public trials, in which the assembled crowds, whipped up to a frenzy by planted agitators, called invariably for the death penalty and for no mercy for the accused.

The first example below is of public trials which took place in Peking (as, indeed, in all major cities in Mainland China) during the spring of 1951. It is taken from the *China Missionary Bulletin*, a Hong Kong monthly, of May 1951 and quotes extensively from the official Chinese Communist sources:



Ping-pong diplomacy took a different turn as a Mainland Chinese escapee used a life jacket fashioned out of ping-pong balls to flee the country. Mao, at left, is shown in this photocopy unearthed by the San Francisco Chronicle.

Mass Murders in Peking

The bloody terrorism erupted in Peking on March 24 and 25, and was imitated immediately by other large cities. A terrifying mass display was staged on the 24th of March under the slumbering trees of the Central Park in Peking. According to the Communist report, more than 5,000 people were present, representatives of political parties, of factories, commercial firms, religions, schools, etc. The band of "anti-revolutionaries," those to be executed, were led to the meeting to be charged publicly. Thus the typical *K'ung su hui*, so widespread in the countryside, appeared in a slightly different guise in the large cities.

Here, instead of accusations arising from the masses, they were made by the mayor of Peking and the various department heads of the city government. With each speech the bitter hatred was blown more white hot. In all, the meeting lasted five hours. At the end the mayor of Peking, P'ang Cheu, again stood before the emotionally worked-up audience and in a dramatic speech asked them to pass sentence: "Comrades, what should we do with all these criminals, bandits, secret agents, evil landlords, heads of reactionary Taoist sect organizers?"

The crowd unanimously roared "Shoot them!"

The mayor continued: "Should we have mercy on them?"

"No mercy!" the crowd shouted back.

The mayor commented: "Truly, no mercy for them. If we would pardon them, that would be a sin on the part of the government."

The next question was: "Is it cruelty to execute all these criminals?"

The answer came back: "It is not cruelty!"

The mayor commented: "Truly it is not cruelty. It is mercy. We are protecting the lives of the people whom they harm."

The last question was put: "Comrades, are they right or are we right?"

And the last answer: "We are right," started the cheering for the mayor and Mao Tse-tung.

The mayor concluded: "We are here representing the people. It is our duty to do the will of the people. We suppress the anti-

revolutionaries. This act we perform according to the law. Those who have to be killed, we kill. In cases where we could kill or not, we do not kill. But when it has to be killing, we kill. . . . Now you all want them to be suppressed. Tomorrow the court will pronounce the judgment and they will be executed." (*Jen Min Daily*, March 25, 1951.)

The next day a big meeting was held outside the city walls (although it is not clear who were present) and the executions took place and were broadcast over the radio. (*Jen Min Daily*, April 3.)

Trial of 'Landlords'

The second example comes from an official Chinese Communist book distributed in English to the outside world in 1951. It is Peking's version of one of the trials of the "landlords" whom Mao had decreed should be eliminated as a class. The executions of many innocents in the countryside were also accomplished through mass meetings and demonstrations.

With raised fists, the audience below shouted in one voice, "Down with reactionary landlords!" "We demand that Peng Ehr-bu be shot!"

The masses again shouted in unison, "Down with criminal landlords who hide and disperse their properties!" "Long live the unity of the peasants!"

It had started raining. But the tense atmosphere did not in any way lessen. . . .

By four o'clock over 20 peasants had poured out their grievances from the platform. Mass sentiment had surged to the boiling point. Over and above there was a curious hush of expectancy. Not one person left or took shelter in spite of the terrific downpour.

(Then the people's tribunal met to deliberate.)

"Peasant comrades!" The judge's voice was grave. "We have just heard some of the accusations made by local peasants. From these accusations, it ought to be clear to everyone how the landlord class has always worked hand in glove with the enemy of the peasants—whether it was Japanese imperialism or the KMT [Kuomintang]—to oppress the peasants themselves. The same motive has prompted them to act as fawning lackeys to American imperialism, since American imperialism is directly opposite to the people's interests too.

"Our verdicts on the three criminal landlords are as follows: . . . Pen Yin-ting, age 49, native of Hsinlu Village, has caused the deaths of patriotic youths during the Resistance War. After liberation he organized superstitious societies and spread rumors to delude the public. Also he has hidden firearms with the intent to plan for an uprising. The sentence for him is—death. Do you all agree?"

The sound of applause that came from below the platform was deafening. . . .

With one arm sheltering his tear-stained face, Pen Yin-ting was hurried along. . . . When Grandma Li, with her bony fist clenched, edged her way through the crowds and tried to hit him on the shoulder, the guards immediately stopped her. A cordon was quickly formed by them around the prisoners as more blows were about to shower from all directions. . . .

The prisoners were escorted to the graveyard south of the temple. From the back of the graveyard came the sound of several shots.

The sound shrilly pierced through the thick, moist atmosphere enveloping Huiling hsiang. Sighs of relief were heaved as justice was meted out to the convicted.

"Down with the reactionary landlords!"

"Long live the emancipation of the peasants!"

"Long live the Communist party!"

"Long live Chairman Mao Tse-tung!"

The masses, for the first time freed from their dread and restraints, let out these slogans with a voice stronger than ever.

The third account of the mass executions which have characterized Communist rule is of particular significance because it was written by one of the

Continued from page 9

The Bloody Record of Mao and Chou

leaders who initially participated in Mao's coalition government and after several years escaped to Hong Kong.

The gates of the Bureau of Public Security opened, and out came a police truck with about 20 policemen standing on it, guns in hand, followed by 20-odd trucks carrying prisoners and four police guards each. The trucks went slowly past our hostel, and I saw that every prisoner had been stripped to his pants and had his wrists tied behind his back. They were crouching on the trucks, still and lifeless, and, at first glance, gave one the impression of so many pigs going to slaughter. The loudspeakers began to boom, "Shoot the counterrevolutionaries" and the crowd shouted and clapped. All around me, people were calmly chatting and laughing. After the trucks went by, the huge crowd closed in after them and followed them to the execution ground.

That day, more than 400 so-called counter-revolutionaries were shot. I did not go to the execution ground, but I was told that the place was packed, and that after each execution, the crowd, under direction, applauded.

That night, I borrowed a copy of Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities* from another member of the Mission who happened to be a writer. As I read, I could understand why it was possible for the French to derive pleasure from killing. They hated the French aristocracy. But what I had seen that day was different. The masses had no quarrel with those who were executed, yet they shouted and applauded the government-sponsored massacre. I think in their hearts they must have been frightened.

During this early period Mao and his colleagues made no effort to conceal the violent course being followed. On the contrary, the most gruesome and detailed accounts were printed in the Communist press and broadcast over the official radio for the purpose of amplifying the condition of mass terror the trials were clearly intended to induce.

'Great Leap Forward'

The second decade of Chinese Communist rule began in the midst of the "Great Leap Forward." This mobilized tens of millions of the Chinese to smelt iron in primitive and ineffective backyard furnaces (a testament of the Chairman's ignorance of the modern scientific world) and sought to push the Chinese peasants into communal-type militarized living replete with, in some cases, separation of sexes and families, communal dining halls, and abandonment of all personal and family items.

The human cost of this grandiose Maoist scheme in terms of wasted energy and resources, suffering and death can probably never be reckoned. Not surprisingly, even this found apologists in the West, including Edgar Snow, who claimed that the movement was spontaneous and voluntary on the part of the Chinese peasantry and people and that it was a success in terms of teaching modernization as well as productivity.

In 1965-66 Mao launched yet another great campaign, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted until 1969. This, too, brought in its wake executions, purges and terror.

This brief recounting of the Maoist "rule by drives" is enough to make one marvel at the resilience of the Chinese people. Already in 1959 there were estimates that the first decade of the People's Republic of China had brought the extermination of 30 million people. The additional cost in casualties and suffering since the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution have yet to be measured.

CASUALTIES TO COMMUNISM IN CHINA

	Range of Estimates	
1. First Civil War (1927-30).....	250,000	500,000
2. Fighting during Sino-Japanese War (1937-45).....	50,000	50,000
3. Second Civil War (1945-49).....	1,250,000	1,250,000
4. Land reform prior to "Liberation".....	500,000	1,000,000
5. Political Liquidation Campaigns (1949-55).....	15,000,000	30,000,000
6. Korean war.....	500,000	1,234,000
7. The "Great Leap Forward" and the Communes.....	1,000,000	2,000,000
8. Struggles with minority nationalities, including Tibet.....	500,000	1,000,000
9. The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" and its aftermath.....	250,000	500,000
10. Deaths in forced labor camps and frontier development.....	15,000,000	25,000,000
Total.....	34,300,000	63,784,000

The table above offers in extremely rough form possible parameters of the estimates of the direct cost in human lives occasioned by the movement which Mao and 11 others started in 1921 to "liberate" the Chinese people. It is entirely possible that a reasonable estimate would be that the figure approaches 50 million Chinese—also members of the human race.

The question which must concern us also is not whether this or that figure is exaggerated, but the extent to which mass unstructured killings have been and continue to be a part of the mode of rule in Communist China.

What sort of rule is this which occasions the execution of untold numbers of young people, such as those whose bodies floated into Hong Kong in 1968 and again in 1970? Where is the consistency of apologists who maintain that the rule of Mao has brought new spirit to China, and then argue about the disfigured, tortured and bound bodies floating into Hong Kong, that the Chinese have always been that way?

It is worth remembering that at the very moment in June 1971, when reporters were commenting on Mao Tse-tung's creation of the new Chinese man (see, for example, Seymour Topping's dispatches in the *New York Times*), troops of the People's Liberation Army were machine-gunning scores of their fellow Chinese who were attempting to escape to Hong Kong from Mao's new paradise.

Many of the youths drowned in the attempt, and others—the few—who made it told stories which were reported in the Hong Kong press, but were omitted in the euphoria that surrounded the first American direct access to Communist China for journalists and a few specialists in more than two decades. The number of casualties occasioned by attempts to flee China, though not included in the preceding table, cannot be considered insignificant.

The correspondent of the *Baltimore Sun* reported from Hong Kong on Sept. 19, 1970, that yet a new wave of public executions and show trials was in progress again in Mainland China. There were a few futile signs of resistance to the high cost that the Chinese people were paying for Communist rule.

One of the most interesting was the arrival in Hong Kong in the spring of 1970 of some bamboo flutes for sale in the British Crown Colony. The workmen who made the flutes in Kweichow had carved some traditional verses in classical calligraphy on them. As Stanley Karnow noted, the flutes reflect "the feeling of quiet desperation that must grip sensitive, educated Chinese striving to survive amid the turmoil convulsing Communist China." One of the poems

reflected a reaction to Communist violence and terror:

"That I was born into this world is too foolish.

"Turning my head towards my motherland, I am overcome with grief and despair.

"I came to this world to create but am stifled.

"I seek to become a monk and cannot.

"Who can see my silent weeping in the darkness?"

Surely one of the high human costs which the Chinese people have paid for rule by the Communist party has been the system of "Reform Through Labor Service," a euphemism for forced labor or slave labor. This has been a part of the Chinese Communist political system from the outset, though the formal 77 regulations—worked out with the aid of Soviet "experts" sent by Stalin—were not drawn up until June 27, 1952 and not officially promulgated until Aug. 26, 1954.

During the early years Peking talked quite openly about this system, which it was confident would help to remold the class character of those former enemies whom it hoped to "save."

On the score of forced labor, as with casualties, figures are imprecise. The United Nations' report of 1955 listed some 20 to 25 million in regular labor camps and another 12.5 million in corrective labor camps. One scholar in the West estimated the number at about 14 million in 1954.

It is probable that the Chinese forced labor camps have exacted a higher toll in human life than the mass executions—as Robert Conquest has shown to be demonstrably the case in the Soviet Union.

Food supplies and the precarious nature of life in China anyway hardly offered hope for decent treatment for slave laborers. Reporters who visited the Chinese mainland from the United States in the spring and summer of 1971 and were entertained at sumptuous banquets by an affable Chou En-lai were hardly likely to raise the impolite question of slave labor or the arbitrary movement of personnel to forced labor brigades. But escapees give an almost constant stream of gruesome details about the system, for those who are inclined to listen.

There is general agreement that in our quest for peace and security we must, perforce, deal with the Chinese Communists. But in doing so, it is important that we not allow a temporary tactic or a Chou En-lai smile to obscure our understanding that the top leaders of the Chinese Communist party remain committed to their faith and to their past record.

In a dinner party with American correspondents in Peking on June 21, 1971, Chou argued that the American protective shield should be withdrawn from Taiwan so that the Taiwan problem could be solved as a strictly internal matter. He assured his guests that no revenge would be inflicted on the mainlanders in Taiwan who would be permitted to return to their homes, and he was quoted as saying, "Far from exacting revenge on them, we will reward them."

Such words sound convincing to those Americans who are anxious to disengage from responsibilities in the Western Pacific and who have short memories. But these were just the terms which Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung promised to the former Nationalists and third-party intellectuals who joined the Communists on their accession to power in 1949; yet they were among the first victims who are now statistics in the sobering table of casualties given here.

These, too, were the terms which Mao offered in the "Hundred Flowers" period of 1957; yet in the anti-rightist campaign which followed, a vindictive revenge was exacted.

Would this same Chinese Communist leadership whose record has been detailed above be likely to behave in any different manner once they had, by their current soft line, won the very concession from the United States which they have sought for two decades by a hard line?



The current Red hierarchy consists primarily of Lin Biao (left), considered likely to be Mao's successor and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai.

A Briton's Ordeal in a Peking Prison

By FRANCES GRIFFIN

While Sen. J. William Fulbright is eager to hear the testimony of John Stewart Service, John Paton Davies, John K. Fairbank and other friends of Chou En-lai, he is, at the same time, equally as zealous to cast aside Chou's enemies.

When George Watt, a British businessman who spent four years (1966-1970) in Red China, flew 3,500 miles from London to bear witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the horrors of life behind the Bamboo Curtain, Mr. Fulbright would have nothing to do with him.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee invoked its long-standing rule that forbids foreign nationals to testify and Watt was left out in the cold, without the courtesy of even a private meeting or an informal discussion with the senator.

But Watt's story cannot be hushed up, despite the efforts of some to do so. The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Red China to the United Nations (1735 DeSales St., Washington, D.C.), Watt's host while in America, has arranged for the Briton to return this fall to tour our campuses.

In an exclusive interview with HUMAN EVENTS, Watt narrated his tale of his four years in a Red hell (the majority of it in prison), much of which will be detailed in his forthcoming book. In addition, his "My Years of Terror in Red China," an eight-part series about his adventures, is soon to be released to the U.S. press.

George Watt is a robust, easy-going, 42-year-old English gentleman of northern Irish origins. A former professor of the Belfast College of Advanced Technology, Watt spent four and one-half years in pre-independence Nigeria as a government officer in technical education (1960-1964), then in Ghana, West Africa, as a department manager with Kaiser Engineers (of California), and later as a construction engineer with the Anglo-German firm, Vickers-Zimmer, in the Soviet Ukraine.

Not unfamiliar with the pressures and complexities of work in backward and Communist nations, Watt was commissioned in late 1966 by Vickers-Zimmer to construct a fiber plant in the Red Chinese atomic development center in Lanchow, Mainland China. Curious, hopeful and sincerely optimistic about constructing an example of British excellence in engineering, Watt arrived in Lanchow, capital of Kansu Province, on Dec. 19, 1966, in the midst of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution.

Was this a period of stunning progress and remarkable achievements with great strides towards the advancement and unification of Communist China? Watt voices an emphatic "no" to this dangerous illusion. The Cultural Revolution was a devastating period of severe internal chaos and barbarism, Watt recounts. Its catastrophic results have yet to completely surface.

China underwent a total collapse of law and order with the "masses of the Chinese people in a state which I can only describe as a mixture of fear and bewilderment," Watt affirmed.

By the time of Watt's arrival, the Red Guard had triumphed in rupturing the social order. Watt vividly recollects sev-

eral illustrations of their destructive activities:

- About one week after he arrived in Lanchow, Watt witnessed a dozen Red Guards hurl a bundle to the pavement and cluster around it, cheer Red slogans, blow shrill whistles and wave the precious little Red books of Mao's thoughts. The "bundle" was the charred corpse of a three-year-old boy. The reason behind this cold-blooded madness? The baby's family was an "enemy of the people," and had, no doubt, unwittingly displayed its hateful bourgeois tendencies.

- On another occasion Watt was walking through Anti-Revisionist Square and saw that a howling mob had just lynched the friendly Chinese man who had been Watt's dinner host a few days before. This individual's crime was not murder or even petty theft; rather, as the Communists explained to the horrified Watt, he was killed because "he has taken the capitalist road and has lorded it over his comrades by wasting public funds on high living and needlessly entertaining foreigners."

- In mid-August 1967, Watt journeyed to the British Embassy in Peking where he learned that the week before the Red Guards had invaded and destroyed the office of the British diplomatic mission, and had violently assaulted the embassy staff. The British girls had been dragged by their ankles through the capital's streets; the British chargé d'affaires had been badly beaten and suffered severe head wounds and brain damage.

- On yet another occasion, Watt observed some of the victims of the Red Guard purges. About 50 vehicles came through Lanchow, each with one or two human beings lashed to the front grill, or strapped to the backs and roofs of the trucks. "They drooped helplessly," Watt reported, "as Red Guards pushed and prodded them." These individuals, tortured and beaten as they were, at least escaped the fate of some 34 million of their kinsmen who have been butchered by Mao's liberators since 1949 (see page 8).

The height of violence in Lanchow was a "civil war" between the city dwellers and the plant workers in August 1967. Lanchow was plagued with fires, riots and chaos. Doors, windows and entranceways were blocked off by stone and concrete. The dead and injured were strewn all over the city. Watt's half-completed plant was torn apart, and the foundation piping, the vital arteries of his site, was chopped into six-foot lengths by the mob to use as spear shafts and other do-it-yourself weapons.

Forsaken in an alien land, George Watt was totally at the mercy of the Chinese Communists.

One night he abruptly received his hotel bill and was told to pay up immediately. Realizing that something was going to happen, Watt hastened to call the British Embassy. But before he could reach the telephone, six Red Guards burst into his room, twisted his arms behind his back, and jabbed a gun into his side.

The next thing he knew, he was facing the "People's Court" in a reception hall on the same floor of his hotel room.

"You do not have diplomatic immunity," he was informed. Neither was he granted a lawyer or the right to speak up in his own defense. Soon the judge read the long list of his "crimes" and insults against the Chinese:

(1) Watt had aided and abetted the British diplomats in Peking while they were receiving punishment; (2) he had performed "deliberate acts of provocation" (e.g., Watt had gone shopping for one of the diplomats' wives); (3) he had

propagated false rumors; and (4) Watt had entertained the "imperialist" British diplomats "while they were under restriction."

The Peking Revolutionary Committee then announced that the defendant was to be deported to Lanchow, where other charges were pending. It was Sept. 27, 1967, and Watt sadly reflected that if all had proceeded as originally planned, his fiber plant would be near completion, and he would be arranging for his next assignment.

Instead, he was about to be humiliated once more, this time by his airport "reception," in Lanchow, where thousands of Chinese ranted, jeered and shook their fists at him. He was escorted from the plane by 30 armed security police, who formed a procession of six lines with Watt boxed in the middle. As promised, additional charges were read. "George Watt," they said, "the masses have detected that you are a British imperialist spy!"

A gruesome six-month investigation by the Public Security Bureau followed in which Watt was brutally interrogated from 12 to 15 hours daily. "You took photographs of prohibited areas," they reiterated. "You stole a large amount of important intelligence about Chinese military, economic and political affairs." But the pictures of the alleged "prohibited areas" proved to be nothing more than one of the Yellow River and another of some anti-British posters.

Six months of interrogation is enough for any man, and Watt determined that he would confess to "spying" if they would allow him to distinguish between a trained spy and one who is an engineer and not a trained agent. At this, the Chinese were completely exasperated. "You either are a spy or you are not. So



George Watt has words of warning for those who think trading with Red China will prove to be a profitable enterprise.

admit you are!" When Watt wavered, the Communists completely exploded: "This is your last possible chance," he was told. "Here's your confession. Sign now or pay the price of your guilt!"

Fatigued and weary with pain from the constant jabbing he had received during his interrogation, Watt at last heeded their demands. He mechanically signed each of the 50 pages of the confession without reading them.

The day after he "confessed," Watt was given a trial to determine his just punishment. He was paraded to Anti-Revisionist Square where the jeering mob of the outdoor "People's Court" spat, shook their fists and shouted at him.

The woman judge, her face twisted with hate, read Watt's "crimes" and his "confession," pausing occasionally to

spit in his face. No lawyer was present to defend the accused, and Watt could do little more than stand in front of the screaming mob and bow in forced penitence.

Constantly during this public kangaroo court, Watt was savagely beaten, kicked, prodded with rifle muzzles, goaded, provoked and tormented. After this ordeal his right eye, swollen to the size of a golf ball, was throbbing with pain; his ear was oozing blood, and his body ached with hundreds of bruises. It was March 1968, and Watt was not to see a doctor or receive any medical treatment for over two years.

After sentencing, Watt was transported to the Peking Ideological Remolding Centre, "an establishment," he explains, "which deals with foreigners who are reluctant to acknowledge the superiority of all things Chinese." This is a brainwashing station where Watt was to spend the next two and one-half years of his life in solitary confinement, with four volumes of *The Thoughts of Chairman Mao* as his only source of amusement.

Watt's journey to this Peking prison was as grueling as his trial. He was incessantly tortured, and at one point the security guards punched him in the face, pulled his already bleeding ear, and hit him over the head. After he fell to the ground, they kicked and stomped on him.

Upon arriving in Peking, he was immediately placed on display. With an arm twisted behind his back until his hand reached his neck, he was forced to run through the prison yard. Each time he stumbled, there was jubilant cheering and clapping from his onlookers.

It was at the Peking Ideological Remolding Centre that Watt was able to make contact with the forgotten Maj. Philip Smith, an American prisoner of the Chinese Communists for the last six years. Smith, an Air Force commander, was shot down over the South China Sea in 1965. Although he had suffered innumerable beatings, Watt found that he had an "indomitable spirit," one which will not "be broken after six years of Communist detention."

The state of the two other American POWs who Watt observed, Richard Fecteau and John Downey, was not as encouraging. Both were U.S. civilians arrested during the Korean War, and both have been held in solitary confinement for over 20 years. They were totally incomprehensible, Watt reported, "shuffling from their cells down the prison halls like zombies."

After several months of resisting the indoctrination, Watt concluded that his only hope for release was to pretend that he had been brainwashed. He resolved to deceive the Communists into thinking that he was being "remolded." He studied the Maoist line, diligently prepared his "homework," and recited the Communist clichés his captors wanted to hear. After two years, this strategy began to pay off.

The Communists stated that he was good "revolutionary material," but that he must prepare "to fight for the revolution." Finally, after two and one-half years in solitary confinement, he was informed that he appeared to be sincerely atoning for his crimes. The announcement which he had been waiting for came at the end of July 1970: "George Watt, British imperialist spy, you are to be released immediately because you have accepted our remolding." He was freed on Aug. 2, 1970, with the final reminder: "Always remember, you owe us your life."

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A Firsthand Report

The Potential of Maoist Subversion in the U.S.

By PHILLIP ABBOTT LUCE

With the 1960 split between the Soviet Union and Communist China, a number of existing Communist parties were tossed into internal convulsions. To the outside world the split might seem insignificant, but to those inside the Communist orbit the division was both real and all-encompassing. Communist parties around the world actually separated into warring factions, with both sides, for instance, even ending up murdering each other in a Mafia-style war in such countries as Belgium.

For the present the two sides are managing more or less to co-exist. In the United States, the Communist party is the kept woman of the Soviet Union. The Progressive Labor party (PLP) represents the Communist Chinese faction, though it is not dominated by Peking the way the CPUSA is dominated by the Kremlin. (Interestingly enough, Progressive Labor has no special attraction for the vast majority of Chinese living in the United States. While I was a member, I cannot recall a single member who was Chinese.)

The venerable director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, has spotlighted the role of PLP in promoting subversion in the United States. Not only does he show it to be "working zealously for the Red Chinese cause," but he adds that "PLP's chief contribution... has been the 'pulling off' of an almost unbelievable revolutionary feat—that of not only influencing, but ideologically capturing a sizable number of America's most militant and radical youth."

If Communist China is voted into the United Nations this fall, we can expect that Progressive Labor and a variety of other Maoist organizations will find themselves considerably strengthened both materially and morally.

Mao's representatives can be expected to use the diplomatic immunity provided foreigners assigned to the United Nations as a way of increasing Red China's espionage activities. Hoover has warned that Peking is "attempting espionage in a variety of ways," including the introduction of "deep-cover intelligence agents" through false identities and identifications. Mainland China is also seeking the "recruiting of agents among indigenous pro-Maoist groups."

But aid to the American Maoists will undoubtedly be forthcoming as well. I recall most vividly the transactions that took place when Progressive Labor operatives and I met with Castro agents at the United Nations' Cuban mission, a classic case being the time the Cubans gave us money in an "Alliance for Progress" paper bag. The Cuban mission has served as a conduit for both propaganda and money for the New Left since it became part of the U.N., and I can't imagine that the Chinese will pass up the opportunity to spread subversion from there in the same manner.

Progressive Labor today not only functions as a quasi-political party and a revolutionary action organization, but it has also spawned at least one significant "front" organization by capturing control of the Students for a Democratic Society.

In June 1969 a PLP-sponsored college group, the Worker Student Association (WSA) attempted to gain control

Mr. Luce, a one-time organizer of the Progressive Labor party, the Maoist faction of the Communist Party, U.S.A., broke with the PLP in 1963. He is a frequent speaker and debater on college campuses, and is currently editor of the bimonthly "Pink Sheet On the New Left." His books include The New Left, Road to Revolution and The Intelligent Students' Guide to Survival.



Black militant Robert F. Williams is among the Maoist cadres who received guerrilla training in Peking.

of the SDS. The effort shattered SDS, leading to the rise of factions such as the extremist-anarchist Weatherman organization. The WSA faction, however, usurped the SDS name. Today this PLP-controlled group operates out of Chicago and issues a newspaper, *New Left Notes*, the name of SDS's former official paper.

"In other words," as the FBI director informs us, "an Old Left group, believing in Maoist communism, with its strict discipline, organizational control, and concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was able to influence and control students who, caught up in the mood of New Left extremism, were denouncing the 'tyrannical Establishment' and demanding more 'freedom!'"

The PLP-controlled Students for a Democratic Society have recently become so outrageous as to have even repelled their left-wing brethren. At the third national convention of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) held July 2-4 at New York City's Hunter College the PLP/SDS created a riot within the convention leading to its being bodily ejected from the auditorium. The next day the PLP/SDS bunch picketed the convention (which was controlled by the "Trotskyite" Socialist Workers party) and created yet another serious disturbance when they began pelting NPAC participants and New York City police with sticks, stones and rocks.

The Progressive Labor party, as I told the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1968, has compiled a record of violence. Its members have been involved in an attempt to carry on, in Monroe, N.C., the revolutionary doctrines of Robert Williams after he fled to Cuba.

They have attempted to arm miners in Hazard, Ky., during a strike. Progressive Labor organized the two student trips to Cuba in the summers of 1963 and 1964, and was responsible for two riots in New York's Times Square called to protest the war in Viet Nam. It has also been involved in a "ghetto" riot in San Francisco, stored firearms in New York, and developed an "underground" program.

The role of Progressive Labor in the Harlem riots in 1964 demonstrates its violent and destructive nature. Harlem's PLP chieftain, Bill Epton, established a special front group to foment the riots. This "Harlem Defense Council" was designed to create the framework through which organized guerrilla warfare could be carried out against the police. The Defense councils not only taught karate,

but enlisted the support of various criminals and ghetto gangs.

Epton, who was later convicted for his part in the Harlem riots, told me that the councils were set up to get the people into the streets whenever a confrontation with the police took place.

The role of Progressive Labor in promoting the riots was so evident to anyone involved on the left wing that even the American Communist party was forced to conclude, in a *Worker* article on Nov. 15, 1964, that the PLP played a "provocative role in the recent Harlem riots."

The CP was not indulging in propaganda. Just two hours before the explosive riots began, Epton told an open-air PLP-organized rally in Harlem: "...we will not be fully free until we smash this state completely and totally. Destroy and set up a new state of our own choosing and our own liking. And in that process of smashing this state, we're going to have to kill a lot of these cops, a lot of these judges, and we'll have to go up against their army. We'll organize our own militia and our own army...."

The July 1964 riots that began in Harlem and spread to the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn left one dead, 118 reported injured, some 465 arrested and over 400 business establishments damaged and looted at a cost of millions of dollars in the New York City area. But in October Progressive Labor held a national coordinating committee meeting to discuss the riots and to lay plans for future ghetto "agitation." As Milt Rosen, PLP's national leader, stated: "I'm fighting for the dictatorship of the proletariat. When I talk about revolution, that [is] what I mean."

Progressive Labor stands as the organization most closely allied with Mao and one that is certain to have its hand strengthened with the admission of Red China into the United Nations. But there are numerous other Maoist groups likely to benefit as well.

Originally based in the San Francisco area, the Maoist Revolutionary Union has now spread to other cities in the South, Midwest and East. The RU is more physically violent than Progressive Labor at this juncture in history. Apparently under control of Bruce Alexander, a self-proclaimed Maoist who was responsible for a good deal of damage inflicted on Stanford two years ago,

the RU believes guerrilla warfare is essential to revolutionary action.

Among some of its doctrines and slogans: "We recognize the need for organized armed struggle against the power of the state...." "The people must be armed...." "The organized repressive violence of the state [police] must be met with the organized revolutionary violence of the people." FBI probes show that RU members have accumulated weapons and have engaged in firearms and guerrilla warfare training.

Another fascinating Maoist group is a type of Red Guard outfit operating out of New York's Chinatown. It is known as I Wor Kuen, which roughly translates (I apologize to my Chinese readers) as "Righteous Harmonious Fist." The I Wor Kuen, which published a newspaper entitled *Getting Together*, has put out a "12 Point Platform and Program" that is strikingly similar to that of the Black and White Panther parties: The platform (point 8) calls for "Freedom of all Political Prisoners and All Asians" and states (point 12) that "We Want a Socialist Society."

The I Wor Kuen proudly flies the flag of Communist China and openly proclaims Mao as its idol. The Central Committee of this Maoist group has admitted that it is at war with two institutions: (1) U.S. "imperialism" and (2) "the ruling clique of the Chinatown community."

No brief overview of Maoist activity in the United States would be complete without mentioning Robert Williams. Williams is properly the subject of a full study, but a condensed profile will have to do. The Negro militant was once the leader of the Monroe, N.C., chapter of the NAACP. By 1960, he had been temporarily suspended because of his advocacy of violence. After reinstatement, he journeyed to Cuba on a Fair Play for Cuba Committee-sponsored trip and returned a confirmed "Fidelista."

His involvement in a violent racial demonstration in Monroe in August 1962 caused him to become an exile. He and his followers were charged with having kidnapped a white couple who were later released unharmed. But the kidnapping charge inspired Williams to flee to Communist Cuba, where I met him in 1963.

(Continued on page 14)



Highlighting the effect of Red Chinese worldwide influence is this view of an Italian general strike with workers parading with pictures of Mao Tse-tung and Stalin.

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The Case for Free China

cultural deficit countries self-sufficient, and put them on the road to attaining a more stable economy. Furthermore, and Sen. McGovern might take note, the technical assistance programs of the Republic of China in many of these countries are of inestimable value to the United States aid program. It is helping to establish the seed economy from which the more advanced type of aid by the United States can take root, and produce the results for which the aid was programmed.

Typical of the growing sentiment and ties between most African countries and the Republic of China as a result of the technical assistance program have been the comments of President Mobutu of the Congo (Kinshasa). He has expressed hope that the Republic of China will step up its agricultural aid to his country because China had attained "miraculous achievements" in farming on limited arable land. He praised the hard work of Chinese farmers in Africa and said many people in his country had not seen the growing of paddy rice until the arrival of the Chinese farm demonstration team.

Aid to Africa

The Congolese chief of state has also remarked that his country has been strongly anti-Maoist and has opposed any attempt to seat the Peking regime in the United Nations because: "During the first years of the independence of the Congo, the Chinese Communists caused many disturbances and much bloodshed in our country through infiltration and subversion. At that time, I was chief of staff of the army and discovered that they had smuggled weapons under the guise of Red Cross shipments. We came to realize the real nature of the Peking regime and since then have been against the Maoists."

The Republic of China's helping hand with its technical assistance program is the most successful answer to Red China's expansionist plans in Asia and Africa.

On the subject of Red China's well-known subversive activities in Africa—its present efforts to convert Tanzania into a military base from which to launch "wars of national liberation"—Sen. McGovern is strangely silent.

However, there is one point on which all China myth-makers are loudly vocal, and it is that the Republic of China is a government of repression. This dirge is sung in close harmony with the "two-million mainlanders" theme and like it stresses no change.

Objectively examined, however, the degree of political and civil liberty found on Taiwan is far greater than that to be found in most of the countries seeking her expulsion. And it defies rationality that those who wish to expel Taiwan for its repression are so willing to invite into the U.N. the Hitlerian government of Mao Tse-tung. Unlike the regime on the mainland, the government on Taiwan permits its citizens to worship freely, to own land, engage in commerce, husband property and to move about unrestricted.

Local elections are contested vigorously, and freedom of speech is permitted short of sedition. The right to a speedy trial by jury and the right of appeal through two levels of higher courts is assured. In cases affecting national security, military courts are employed. Some of these cases have given critics of the Republic of China a point of attack.

Admittedly, the press is not wholly free and the national elections are carefully controlled. Part of the reason for this, however, is that the Republic of

China is still in a state of war with the mainland. No country, ROC officials explain, can enjoy full democratic freedoms when it is under a severe threat from an aggressor nation.

Nor is it true, as the myth-makers would have you believe, that the "mainlanders" have somehow excluded the "Taiwanese" from participating in the social, economic and political structure.

As already noted, the first free elections were held in Taiwan over 20 years ago. The most recent provincial and municipal elections were held in January 1968, and the next will be held in January 1972.

At the time of the '68 elections there were 929 incumbent county, city and assembly members running for office, 839 of whom were island born, including 97 women. Of the 74 provincial assemblymen, 68 were native to Taiwan. Of the island's 21 mayors and county magistrates, 20 of the incumbents were also native to Taiwan. All, of course, had been elected by secret ballot and were representatives of one of three political parties, or were independents. Perhaps more revealing in these figures than anything else is the fact that 90 of the freely elected candidates were mainland born and could never have been elected without Taiwanese support.

On the national level, in December 1969 parliamentary elections were held for 26 seats—15 in the National Assembly and 11 in the Legislative Yuan. These elections were the first of their kind since the last free election held in Mainland China in 1947-48. Of the 20 candidates nominated by the KMT, all were Taiwan born. The fact that the KMT did not put up candidates for all 26 seats was to encourage the participation of the other two political parties.

Mr. Ginsburg in his article for the *New Republic* has described the government of the Republic of China as a "gerontocracy"—a government of old men. The description fits with all the rest. The average age of the Cabinet and the all-important Central Standing Committee is 63, the youngest member being 54, the eldest 70. The average age of the newly elected assemblymen and legislators is 52 and that of Taipei City Council—similar to the D.C. government—is 43.

Again with regard to representation, 17 per cent of the Cabinet members were born in Taiwan. Only Kwangtung Province has as large a percentage. It should be understood that this representation includes a total of 36 provinces, for the government's position has always been that despite its location it speaks for all China. On another level, there are 260,080 civil servants within the government and of this number 160,000 are Taiwanese. Today 92 per cent of those taking civil service examinations are also native to Taiwan.

J. Bruce Jacobs, writing in a recent edition of *The China Quarterly* on "Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan," observes that "Five of the six new appointees to the Central Standing Committee, the center of power in Taiwan, are experts in natural sciences or economics, giving to the CSC a technical expertise it has previously lacked."

"Chiang Yen-shih, the secretary-general of the Cabinet, is an agricultural expert with a Ph.D. from Minnesota. Yen Chen-hsing, at the time minister of education, is a scientist with a Ph.D. from the State University of Iowa. Sun Yun-hsuan, previously minister of communications and now minister of economics, is an engineer with an international reputation. Li Kuo-tung, who moved from the Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of Finance, is the leader

of the economic specialists. Lin Ting-sheng, the Taiwanese president of the huge Ta-tung Company, is now speaker of the Taipei City Council."

What can also be seen from the foregoing is that the government on Taiwan is seeking well-educated young men, vigorous men, the best men, and place of birth has less and less to do with the selection. As Jacobs also observes: "Along with the stress on new faces and youth, the Taiwan press has stressed the rising educational level of the new politicians...." And "...there has been an explicit effort to increase Taiwanese participation in the political system."

There is in being a "Taiwanese Independence Movement." Its leader for many years was Dr. Thomas Liao, who returned to Taiwan in 1965 because he recognized the great progress that has been made by the government and because, as he declared, he saw the Chinese Communists as the real enemy. Today Dr. Liao is deputy director of a major water conservation project as well as director of the Chemical Institute at the College of Chinese Culture, near Taipei.

To those who look to Chou En-lai for solace and somehow believe that he would promote the independence of Taiwan, they may be a bit surprised to learn that Chou has stated that the Taiwan Independence Movement is not native to the island, but is largely the creation of outside forces in the West.

One might get the same idea from the amount of copy that has been coming out on the subject since the formulation of President Nixon's "two Chinas" policy, which long antedated the official announcement (see HUMAN EVENTS, March 27, 1971). However, there has been nothing said on the degree of support by the more than 12 million overseas Chinese for the Republic of China.

In Canada the Chinese community is now displaying ROC flag stickers on their cars. Chinese organizations in France sent a personal letter of protest to the President on his decision to go to Peking. Similar protests have been voiced by spokesmen for Chinese organizations throughout the U.S. and elsewhere. But the public hears nothing of this.

Kennedy's 'Facts'

Today almost all of the nearly four million students attending schools and universities on Taiwan were born there. In between their generation and that of the one that came from the mainland in 1948-49, two decades of intermarriage have passed. But whatever the degree of mixing between those born on the island and those who came to it, as Chinese they all have the same fundamental attributes in common—their culture, their arts, their traditions and their way of family life. These their government has sought to preserve and foster while men in Peking have sought to destroy them. This point is often lost and there is no more graphic example of this than the recent statement offered by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy.

On Aug. 2, 1971, the senator made two consecutive statements on the floor of the Senate. In the first he called for the unequivocal ouster of the Republic of China from the United Nations. He did so on the grounds that "the Peoples' Republic of China controls the overwhelming bulk of China's people and territory." (Italics added.)

Never mind the Charter. Never mind the contributions made by the Republic of China to those things for which the U.N. supposedly stands. Just throw it out!

The senator's following statement was a report on the plight of world refugees which he said, "underscores a simple fact—that the troubles of our times are taking a growing toll in the

flight of people from conflict and oppression." (Italics added.)

Perhaps the senator did not bother to read the statistical report by the U.S. Committee for Refugees which he submitted with his statement, for in it is revealed that in 1970, 2,284,360 of those fleeing from the "oppression" of which he speaks fled from being controlled by "the Peoples Republic of China." In this same regard, since 1949 the Free China Relief Society under the Republic of China has provided aid for more than 6.5 million escapees from the "control" of Peking, 154,000 of whom have been resettled in Taiwan, including more than 14,000 Chinese prisoners of the Korean War who voluntarily opted to forego returning to Red China.

If Taiwan were dominated in some fashion by the Chinese Communists, it would threaten the Ryukyus to the north and the Philippines to the south, and its loss would have a profound political influence over the rest of Asia—far more adverse to our interests than any possible gains in our relations with Mao.

In a strategic sense, notes veteran military analyst Hanson Baldwin, Taiwan represents an important flanking threat to the Chinese Communist mainland positions. Taiwan and the Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu dominate the Chinese coast from Swatow through Amoy to Fochow and control the hundred-mile, wind-swept Taiwan Strait, which links the East China and South China seas. Its geographic position, coupled with Chiang's threat to return to the mainland, has considerably limited Peking's military freedom of action, even during the Korean and Viet Nam wars.

Asian Defense Link

A sizable part of the Chinese Communist army—totaling probably 600,000 to 800,000 men out of a total ground strength of more than 2.5 million—has been constantly deployed opposite Taiwan. When the Sino-Soviet split led to shooting incidents on the Manchurian and Sinkiang frontiers, it was the Chinese concentrations near North Viet Nam that were thinned out and shifted northward, not those opposite Taiwan.

During the war in Viet Nam, Taiwan has also provided a variety of support activities, including air transport staging fields and repair and reworking facilities for aircraft.

Taiwan has also been a strategic outpost for U.S. intelligence. Chinese Nationalist reconnaissance vessels and aircraft, high-flying "spy planes," electronic and communications monitoring stations, and agents infiltrated into the mainland from Taiwan or the offshore islands provide tremendous amounts of pertinent military, economic and political data about the fortunes of Chinese communism—far more than would be gathered from a U.S. Embassy.

Says Baldwin in his recent book, *Strategy for Tomorrow*: "Together with Hong Kong, Taiwan and its subsidiary islands represent by far the most important intelligence outposts in the Far East... it is well to remember that the Chinese Communist order of battle in North Korea and Manchuria was first furnished, in precise detail, to the United States from Taiwan in 1950 before U.S. and South Korean forces had encountered the Chinese Communists in the field."

None of these facts seem to make any impression on those who so assiduously seek accommodation with Peking. The myth-makers would rather sing a song of two million mainlanders sitting on the backs of 12 million Taiwanese when the reality is one of 14 million Chinese standing as a beacon of hope to 750 million of their enslaved countrymen and to the world.

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Pro-Red China Lobby Rides Again

summarily in removing him, he was restored to government service.

The McCarran Internal Security subcommittee hearings and report reveal that Dr. Fairbank was also an active supporter of the Chinese Communists and sympathized grandly with their efforts to gain control of China. Analyzing his career, the subcommittee concluded that he was one of those who "sought to bring pressure to bear to undermine the Chinese government [of Chiang Kai-shek], and to exalt the status of the Chinese Communist party first to that of a recognized force, and then to that of a member of a coalition government."

Fairbank has been a consistent apologist for the Communist Chinese. In reviewing *Thunder Out of China* in 1947, he wrote that if China were to go Communist it would be because "Chinese Communist Democracy" has succeeded in appealing to the people more effectively than the Kuomintang.

Another indication of Fairbank's attitude is the fact that he was among the organizers of the defense publicity campaign for Owen Lattimore, who was also a skillful propagandist for Red China. (Lattimore was described by the McCarran report as a "conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy.")

When Mao's Red Army swept over China proper in 1949 and Chiang had to retreat to Formosa, Fairbank was one of the first to advise the State Department to abandon that island. "To try to hold Formosa with troops," he maintained, "would give such ideological ammunition to the Chinese Communists that it would unite China more readily against us."

Those were the days when democracy was equated with readiness to collaborate with Communists; when Walter Lippmann advocated a "united political front" of Russia, Britain and the U.S. to force the reorganization of the Chinese government on a "broader democratic basis" by inclusion of the Communists, according to a formula "like that made at Yalta for Poland"; when the *Herald Tribune*, among other newspapers, suggested that "the same degree of sanity" should be shown by the U.S. in dealing with China as President Roosevelt had displayed at Yalta with regard to Poland.

Today the word is "realism" instead of "sanity," for what Stewart Alsop recently designated in *Newsweek* as acts of "international treachery" such as selling out the Chinese Nationalist government or South Viet Nam.

A double standard was applied to Communist Russia and Nationalist China. The latter was excoriated for the poverty of the people, inflation and inequality of sacrifice, while few words of condemnation were ever uttered concerning Russia's totalitarian tyranny, concentration camps, and the glaring contrast between the privileged position of the Communist ruling aristocracy and the masses.

"Uncle Joe" Stalin's Russia received the benefit of every doubt, while all the ills of China were ascribed to the corrupt "fascist" regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

In an article published by Eugene Lyons in the *American Mercury* in September 1944, I admitted all the short-

comings of the China Nationalist government, but insisted that far from being a "fascist state": "One difficulty in China's war effort is that she is not a totalitarian state... if Chiang Kai-shek had the same complete power over his country as Stalin and Hitler over theirs he would find it easier to mobilize manpower and resources for war; easier to force the rich to sacrifice, to stop speculation and graft, enforce agrarian reform and abolish age-old abuses."

It would in any case have been a miracle, I also wrote, if China with its main ports and cities in Japanese hands, without the factories or materials to procure goods for the people, had been able to institute democratic government and abolish all the old evil practices while continuing to resist a powerful invader.

Those who were most severe in their castigation of the Chinese Nationalist government ignored the realities of the situation in a country which had been fighting the Japanese for eight years with precious little help from us even after Pearl Harbor, because America's major war effort was directed against Nazi Germany. Only a trickle of aid was given to China as against the billions delivered to Soviet Russia. Nor was any account taken of the fact that the Chinese Nationalist armies had borne the heat and burden of the day, while the Communists had praised the Russo-Japanese pacts, directed their main "war effort" against the Nationalist forces, and after V.J. Day started wrecking communications and in general adding to the devastation wrought by Japan.

Nothing is more annoying, or frustrating, to those who know the facts, than the constant repetition of the myth that the Chinese people chose communism, and are today represented by the totalitarian dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung, whose regime has murdered millions, bludgeoned those who could not escape to Hong Kong or Taiwan into conformity, and condemned the "workers and peasants" to a life of unremitting toil, almost as miserable as that in Soviet forced labor camps. Nor, of course, are such camps missing in Red China, although American politicians, ping-pong players, journalists and tourists will never come within sight of them.

Those who are now urging us to give the *coup de grace* to the Nationalist government on Taiwan totally ignore the effect on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Latin America. These minorities, which play a significant role in the economies of many underdeveloped countries have hitherto looked to the Nationalist government, supported by the United States, for leadership and some protection from rampant nationalism in the host countries. Without it some will have no recourse but to give their allegiance to Peking, much as they hate and fear the Communist system. Nor will the significance of the abandonment of our old ally be lost on every small country, not to speak of Japan, where the people on our side may be driven to abandon the American alliance, lest they be sold down the river as demanded by Chou En-lai.

We hear a lot in the press about discrediting "ideological differences," but no mention is made of the real and valid economic reasons for Red China's fear of Japan, and insistence on possession of Taiwan. Not on account of any present prospect of revived "Japanese militarism," but because of the vastly greater productivity of a free enterprise, or incentive "capitalist," system over the backward and nonproductive Communist-regimented way of life.

The "opening to the West" now

sought by Peking is surely mainly due to Communist China's need of Western technology, know-how, machinery and credits to salvage its stagnant economy. To the valid fear that so long as Japan and Taiwan enjoy the freedom to develop their productive capacities to the full, as they have been doing at a spectacular rate during the past two decades, Peking must find it more and more difficult to maintain its stifling totalitarian tyranny against the will of the Chinese people.

If one were to regard the situation only in terms of power politics, it is conceivable that one day America will be accused of having given aid and comfort to Communist China in order to slow down the development of China's huge economic potentialities by riveting the Communist system on its "industrious and talented" people.

Just imagine for a moment the competition we should have to face if the 600 or 700 million Chinese people were freed from the shackles imposed on them by the stultifying Communist regime, to become as productive and competitive as the Japanese and the Chinese in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In which event the long forgotten "yellow peril" menace would have some substance!

I am not suggesting that either the

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Maoist Subversion in U.S.

By this time Williams was heading a group known as the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), which identified itself with the Chinese model of revolutionary warfare.

RAM was founded in Philadelphia in the winter of 1963 under the direction of Max Stanford, but Williams provided the group leadership while in Cuba and later, in 1966, when he lived in Peking. The Maoist-oriented RAM became involved in numerous violent activities in the United States and, following the Cleveland riots in 1966, a grand jury implicated the organization. The jury also noted that one of the principals in the city's riot, Lewis G. Robinson, was a member of RAM.

Other RAM members have been leading revolutionaries, including Robert Collier, who helped found a RAM "front" and who later turned out to be the mastermind behind the bizarre plot to blow up the Statue of Liberty and the Washington Monument.

While in Cuba Williams edited a newsletter called the *Crusader* which openly advocated violence in the United States. On August 8, 1963, during Williams' first visit to Red China, Mao issued a public statement specifically addressed to Williams in which he pledged the support of the Chinese people to black liberation in America.

Williams left Cuba in 1965 and journeyed to Communist China. While in China, he continued to edit his revolutionary newsletter—which revealed such juicy morsels as where to best place dynamite in Grand Central Station—and he frequently appeared publicly alongside Chairman Mao. In August 1966 the Chinese rulers assembled more than 10,000 people in Peking to hear Robert Williams and his new friends "support American Negroes' use of revolutionary violence against counter-revolutionary violence." It is worth noting that at this same rally a message to Williams from Progressive Labor was also read.

Williams continued to publish his *Crusader* newsletter until, for reasons not yet completely understood by this writer, he decided to come back to the United States. Upon his return, Wil-

liams demanded asylum in Detroit, where he was named (but has since resigned) the head of yet another group with Maoist links, the Republic of New Africa. (RNA leaders only two weeks ago were involved in a 20-minute gun battle with police in Jackson, Miss.)

The fact that 95 per cent of the Chinese prisoners in American hands at the end of the Korean War opted to go to Taiwan rather than return home, despite the retaliation on their families, is sufficient proof that the Chinese people would have rallied to the Nationalist government's standard had we permitted its American-equipped forces to fight with us in Korea.

On the other side of the ledger, however, is the fact that totalitarian Communist dictatorships are able to go from strength to strength militarily by concentrating on armaments, regardless of their voiceless peoples' consumer needs. So that even if Western policies obviate trade competition by helping the Communists in China as in Russia maintain their tyranny, the effect in our time is to diminish the relative strength of the free world. Whatever the verdict of "historians of the future," if any such creatures survive until 1984, Richard Milhous Nixon would now seem to be following in the steps of Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Yalta.

In a curious "move," Williams then agreed to testify in secret session before the Senate Committee on Internal Security headed by Sen. James Eastland (D-Miss.). Since then he has been free to travel the nation, and he recently spoke in San Francisco at a black radical meeting. It can only be assumed that Williams has made his peace with the Central Intelligence Agency and is now free to act out his own destiny in this country. It is to be hoped that within the near future the SISS will release the Williams testimony so more light can be shed on his role in spreading subversion in the United States.

For whatever the reason, there are today in the United States a number of unaffiliated Maoists (such as the Panthers) that are engaged in such activities as dynamiting banks and blowing up buildings. No matter what they call themselves, they are part and parcel of the Maoist syndrome and they all consider themselves super-revolutionaries somewhere outside of the pale of American politics.

Ultimately, Maoism is a matter of faith. This is best exemplified by Lin Piao's statement: "Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. He has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism with genius, creatively and comprehensively and has brought it to a higher and completely new state."

I am finally drawn to Mao himself for a synopsis of the thinking of his followers in the U.S.: "People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs! People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people. Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed."

Appeasing Mao, I fear, will do nothing less than swell the band of these extraordinarily dedicated zealots.

Continued from Page 1

The Case Against Red China

The President's move has already shaken the pro-American governments of Japan and Australia, and may have dire consequences for pro-U.S. governments elsewhere. As columnist Kevin Phillips noted:

"Add it all up, and it is hard to avoid concluding that (1) the U.S. government has behaved badly towards its allies; (2) we are on the retreat in Asia; (3) the President's actions will injure pro-American parties in East Asia and Australia, tilting key internal structures leftward; and (4) the 'spirit of Peking to be' will greatly promote the international advance of Red China."

The statement issued by Secretary of State Rogers on U.S. policy toward Red China's admission to the United Nations only tends to confirm the thesis that we are about to betray Taiwan. In reversing a consistent policy of 22 years, Secretary Rogers said we would vote to let Red China into the United Nations.

The secretary also said that we would fight to keep Taiwan represented as well, but the secretary did not suggest, which he could have, if the Administration were seriously interested in preserving the Taiwan government, that we would only vote to admit Peking if Taiwan were not expelled.

As a result of our stance, rumors are still flying that we don't really intend to fight very hard to keep Taiwan in the world body—another concession, supposedly, to our new "friends" on the mainland. And that Taiwan could be tossed out—the incessant chant of Peking—hardly seems far-fetched at this time. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg has predicted as much. As he so aptly put it: "The floodgates are open and the battle is over."

While the U.S.—at least on the surface—appears to be falling all over itself to appease Mao and Chou, one looks in desperation for crumbs of concessions by the Red Chinese. If the President has received any diplomatic gifts from the mainland, they are by no means apparent. Nor, do many experts believe, will he be able to go to Peking with much of a bargaining hand.

With division over the war at home, a stubborn determination to run as a "peace" candidate in 1972, and his yielding of our nuclear cards at SALT, the President will be able to exert very little pressure on Peking.

Even Oliver Edmund Clubb, an Old China Hand who was extremely sympathetic to the Communist Chinese during the 1940s, has wondered whether the President might not be at a diplomatic disadvantage at the summit.

"Because the meeting has been arranged at our initiative," Clubb said recently, "the President must bring home some tangible agreement. Failing that, he will suffer a major diplomatic setback. China, on the other hand, doesn't have to make many concessions because its political fortunes are already too clearly on the rise."

Since the President announced his trip on July 15, in fact, the Red Chinese have laid down a steady barrage of anti-American propaganda and assumed an even more inflexible diplomatic stance than they had previously. Joseph Kraft, a liberal columnist who favors the Nixon maneuver, has remarked that the notion that Peking was going to turn pliable on a broad range of issues was just a set of illusions. "As it happens," he noted,

"the familiar sore spots have all been rubbed a little harder."

Indeed, they have. Just two days after the news that the President would travel to the mainland, Peking Radio blasted the "reactionary ruling circles" in America who "are actively carrying out the policies of aggression and war...."

New York Times correspondent James Reston, who had a major interview with Premier Chou En-lai when he was recently in Peking, wrote that "you live in an atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda...." While Chinese officials are pleased with Nixon's visit, "Peking media relentlessly characterize the American government as the 'arch criminal' of the world. The United States, they insist, has been 'beaten black and blue' in Viet Nam, but still goes on backing a 'fascist clique' there and is reviving 'Japanese militarism' and plotting new wars of aggression in Korea and the rest of Asia."

Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, President Nixon's prospective host, continues to beat the drums for an end to America's military presence in South Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, South Korea, Formosa, Thailand and Japan. He says that Peking will never drop its demand for the return of Taiwan, and he insists that Peking will continue to give aid to the Communist forces in Viet Nam "until the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces."

In his now-famous interview with Mr. Reston, who grandly sympathized with so many of Chou's major requests (such as the scuttling of Taiwan), Chou reiterated his "U.S.-must-go" theme, demanding, even, that the United States must withdraw from the Philippines!

Hardly a day goes by when Peking's top officials aren't making a new rash of humiliating demands upon the President.

Perhaps President Nixon may wave a magic wand when he voyages to Peking and produce a miracle that will justify his seemingly unjustifiable actions at the present time. Perhaps he has an excellent reason to visit the Red Chinese, who have killed anywhere from 34 to 64 million of their own people, according to Prof. Walker (see page 8).

But for the present our view of what's happening coincides with that of Bruno Shaw, a China expert who wrote a scathing denunciation of President Nixon's trip to the mainland in a recent edition of the *Wall Street Journal*. Said Shaw:

"Having lived in China from the beginning of the Chinese Communist movement, witnessed the murder of countless Chinese farmers in Hunan Province at the hands of Mao Tse-tung in the mid 1920s and had a first-hand



Even New York Times columnist James Reston was forced to note the strident anti-U.S. propaganda he witnessed.


personal acquaintance with the leadership and the program of the Chinese Communist crusade, I am firmly convinced that if President Nixon persists in the folly of a visit to Red China in pursuit of world peace, he will go down in history as:

• "In China, a barbarian chieftain who was permitted to enter the Middle Kingdom bringing tribute to Peking;

• "In the West, as the Neville Chamberlain of our time. And Taiwan will become the disposable Sudetenland of

the East, no matter what fine words are uttered by the politicians who are presently in charge of our destiny."

We hope, of course, that we are wrong, that the President is fully aware of the enormity of Red China's treachery and the disastrous consequences that could befall American foreign policy by betraying such allies as Taiwan. In case the President and his policy-makers need to be reminded, however, they could do worse than to read the articles contained in this supplement.



The above is a typical street scene in Peking. The massive regimentation of the people through such devices as organized parades is a common feature of everyday life behind the Bamboo Curtain.

Continued from Page 5

The Flight from Mao's Prison

don't have any choice. To avoid trouble people just vote for the candidates listed.

"In China so many people are informers for the authorities of one sort or another even though they are not directly linked to the secret police that there is a saying that if you don't need the answer, don't ask the question, and never trust anybody, even your own kin. It is hard to tell who is a secret police source. As a result you never ask your friends any questions. You comment on the weather and that's about all."

Prof. Ma Szu-tung described life in Mainland China in this fashion: "Everyone lives in a state of fear. Fear is everywhere. Everyone is isolated from everyone else by this fear. Allegations made by anyone can bring you before a people's tribunal and there is no defense. Any of these groups that I have mentioned can send you away to a labor camp.... Each person is like a bee in a honeycomb, confined to his own cell by the fear of being denounced by someone for something...."

"The farmers are tied to their communes. They are treated like cattle and probably live and die without ever having left their commune, except for a party display or two.... The Chinese have lived under so much cruelty and sorrow for so many years that they have become adaptable to much of this.... The only rights a person has in China are to work and to praise Mao Tse-tung. I feel the Chinese people now live in complete slavery...."

And as for the attitude toward America, Prof. Ma, speaking al-

most a decade after Lt. Liu Ching-tze, said: "The individual all his life is taught that America is the No. 1 enemy of China and the people of China...."

It doesn't matter whether the escapees from Red China made their bid for freedom 20 years ago, or 10, or today. The story is ever the same—Red China is a slave camp for most of its vast population. Some benighted members of the U.S. ping-pong team were quoted as saying they found the Chinese a very friendly people, one stating he would prefer the Chinese system if it could be set up in the U.S.

The people were friendly as ordered. If they had been ordered to tear the ping-pong players to bits, they would have done that, too. As for the 18-year-old who would prefer the Chinese system, it is a pity he cannot go to Hong Kong to talk to people his own age who have escaped from it. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson once remarked, "The conduct of Red China must greatly improve before attaining the level of barbarism."

Those in this country who are trying to sell the American public on the idea that Red China must be brought into the U.N. because it represents over 700 million people are selling a bald-faced lie. It represents its people on a par with calling itself a "Republic." It represents no one but its 17 million Communist party members. The rest it enslaves in the world's largest prison camp. To know it, all one has to do is to ask anyone who has escaped from it... yesterday... today... tomorrow.

How Lawmakers View China Detente

Sen. James L. Buckley (R.-N.Y.):

"I am deeply concerned over the implications which the President's extraordinary announcement will have both here and abroad. At home it will inevitably strengthen the hands of those seeking accommodations with the Communist world at almost any price; and in Asia, the grand scale of this overture to Peking will be anything but reassuring to those who have to live with the aggressive reality of Mainland China."

Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr. (Ind.-D.-Va.):

"It would be a mistake for the U.S. to welcome Red China into the international family of nations without first waiting for Peking to show some initiative."

Sen. Peter Dominick (R.-Colo.):

"I cannot see how progress toward lasting world peace would be enhanced by downgrading the standards of the U.N. Charter by admission of a government which has publicly denounced the U.N. Charter and continues to sponsor world revolution. What is needed is patient insistence that Communist China upgrade its behavior to the level of standards prescribed in the U.N. Charter. If Peking wishes the benefits of membership in the community of nations, it can take the necessary steps to meet those standards."

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.):

"It is my feeling that the passage of time alone has not altered the need for the brutal government of Mao Tse-tung to change many of its attitudes, actions and policies."

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.):

"In a short length of time the U.S. has set aside several restrictions on trade and travel between Red China and the U.S. In a country that is tired of war, there is a strong appeal for peaceful relations between the most populous Communist nation and the strongest free country. However, as editor Clayton Kirkpatrick points out, just because Red China was civil to our ping-pong team, that does not mean Red China's basic imperialistic plans have been changed. To plunge ahead without regard to Peking's motives would be utter folly."

Sen. John G. Tower (R.-Tex.):

"I have viewed recently the trend toward liberalizing trade with Communist China with a great deal of interest and some very real trepidation. I am convinced that the U.S. should change her policy in regard to Red China, if at all, only when it is in the overwhelming best interests of the U.S. and in return for some genuine concessions from the Communist Chinese. So far, I have seen nothing concrete to indicate that we should change our policy vis-a-vis the current rulers in Peking."

Rep. Watkins Abbott (D.-Va.):

"Anyone who has not lost his sense of proportion by Peking's smiling faces would notice that its hostility toward the U.S. government, especially toward President Nixon, never slackened a bit while the ping-pong games were going merrily on. Its official propaganda organs were doing the usual business of grinding out piece after piece of anti-Americanism day in and day out."

Rep. John M. Ashbrook (R.-Ohio):

"Any policy regarding Red China should be based on whether that regime seeks to establish justice and insure domestic tranquility and whether it seeks to 'secure the blessings of liberty' for the people of Red China. The answer is obvious: the Red Chinese government presides over a slave state, just as cruel and brutal as the government of Nazi Germany, and any attempt to appease the Red Chinese leaders will eventually result in similar disastrous consequences."

Rep. Omar Burleson (D.-Tex.):

"Americans generally received the impression that Red China is coming out of its angry shell, that Peking's bark is worse than its bite, and they may look to a period of relaxed tension between the two coun-

tries. Our newspapers and television paint a picture of those nice Chinese going about their own way, regimented maybe but not robots, thus subtly conveying the message that the Chinese though Communists are no different from us and they could not really mean what they say.

"This is as I see it the greatest danger. Nobody believed Hitler when he said he would rebuild Germany and chase out the Jews. And nobody believed Lenin when he said he would build in Russia the utopia of communism."

Rep. Bill Chappell (D.-Fla.):

"They [Asians] are opposed to communism as we are opposed to communism. The common people everywhere are opposed to communism. It is our leaders who sometimes forget the true attitude of the people and think they can engage in diplomatic games without disastrous consequences."

Rep. Philip Crane (R.-Ill.):

"We must also remember that the United Nations Charter does not advocate universal membership. Rather, it has specific qualifications for membership, and Communist China does not meet them. The Communist regime has shown a consistent and total disregard for fundamental human rights. It has disregarded the dignity of persons, and it has obliterated the rights of individuals."

Rep. Edward Derwinski (R.-Ill.):

"I still believe that admission of Red China would be a mockery of the principles of the United Nations. Unless Red China demonstrates that it will completely abide by international law, it does not deserve admission to the United Nations. The Red Chinese are continuing subversive activities in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and admitting them to the U.N. would in effect be encouraging their future transgressions."

Rep. O.C. Fisher (D.-Tex.):

"There can be no rational justification for trade with any country which supplies manpower and materials for the killing of Americans—and that is being done by Red China. Let us not compromise with such infamy."

Rep. Barry Goldwater Jr. (R.-Calif.):

"...the Red China propaganda machine has taken advantage of favorable public reaction here to try to divide the American government and its people. There can be no doubt that Peking has no intention of meeting this country halfway, and remains hostile towards our government. In short, it is waiting for us to deliver Taiwan on a silver platter before it will condescend to talk to us. It is counting on smiles alone, without any concession on its part, to get into the United Nations."

Rep. John Hunt (R.-N.J.):

"It seems to me there can be no doubt that Mao is determined to antagonize the whole world and is definitely bent on world conquest, not only in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, but for his own self-aggrandizement in the tradition of the Alexanders, Napoleons and Hitlers."

Rep. Jack Kemp (R.-N.Y.):

"If the U.S. moves to recognize or further support Red China, it must do so with the knowledge that Communist China is the most blatantly anti-semitic nation in the world. This alone is the cause for prolonged thought and extreme caution in dealing with Peking."

Rep. Mike McKeivitt (R.-Colo.):

"Most of the continent of Asia, 16 nations out of 23, is engaged in war, rebellion or civil strife, and Peking is fueling much of this fire."

Rep. John McMillan (D.-S.C.):

"The irony today is that when we are being fed glowing stories of Peking in our press, the influx of Chinese refugees into Hong Kong continues on an increasing scale. It could testify to one fact: The Chinese Communist regime is anything but stable.

The younger generation which is brought up under communism are so disillusioned with it that they are voting with their feet to escape from Mao's land."

Rep. Otto Passman (D.-La.):

"In particular, I want to talk a little bit about the solidarity of the Chinese Communists in Peking and the Arab guerrillas who are creating havoc in the Middle East and have, through international air piracy, taken their terror throughout the Western world.

"I think that everybody should see how clearly the Peking Communists are supporting revolutions all over the world and creating unrest wherever they turn. I for one do not think there is anything to be gained by attempting to deal with such Communist regimes as though they were responsible freedom-loving nations."

Rep. John H. Roussetot (R.-Calif.):

"[There are] those of us who have felt for many years on the basis of the record that dealing with Red China or any totalitarian regime is really an impossibly dangerous task. There is no such thing as an honorable exchange with tyrants of this type."

Rep. Bob Sikes (D.-Fla.):

"For a great many years, it has been the policy of the United States to stand by its friends, the Chinese on Formosa being the staunchest of friends. If we now are to abandon this firm friendship in exchange for the vacillating policies of the Communists then truly United States foreign policy is in need of congressional review."

Rep. Sam Steiger (R.-Ariz.):

"It seems to me that it is preposterous to presume that the leopard has changed its spots overnight, more suitably that the dragon has ceased to breathe fire. I would like to think that Mainland China is a reformed country which could truthfully declare, as the United Nations Charter requires, that it is a peace-loving country; that it has become tolerant of domestic critics, and its oppressive ways have ended. I would like to believe that, but candidly, I can find no evidence to support such conclusions. It has been and continues to be an aggressor nation, an outlaw nation."

Rep. Joe D. Waggoner (D.-La.):

"The terror of the recent 'cultural revolution' in China, the intervention of Peking in North Viet Nam, the support of extremist revolution in Africa and Latin America and the unremitting paranoia of the Communist Chinese do not suggest to me that the government there is in any way a peace-loving nation with which we should exchange ambassadors or support in their bid for membership in the U.N."

REPRINTS

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DRAFT REPRESENTATION RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The Representation of China in the United Nations",

Noting that since the founding of the United Nations, fundamental changes have occurred in China,

Having regard for the existing factual situation,

Noting that the Republic of China has been continuously represented as a member of the United Nations since 1945,

Believing that the People's Republic of China should be represented in the United Nations,

Recalling that Article 1, Paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations establishes the United Nations as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations,

Believing that an equitable resolution of this problem should be sought in the light of the above mentioned considerations and without prejudice to the eventual settlement of the conflicting claims involved,

1. Hereby affirms the right of representation of the People's Republic of China;
2. Affirms the continued right of representation of the Republic of China;
3. Recommends that the Specialized Agencies take into account the provisions of this resolution in deciding the question of Chinese Representation in those agencies.

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DRAFT IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Charter,

Decides that any proposal in the General Assembly which would result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the United Nations is an Important Question under Article 18 of the Charter.

8-3-71

BACKGROUNDER

Thurs., August 12th - - 11:30 A.M.
12th Floor

INVITEES

1.	AP	Bill Oatis
2.	UPI	Bruce Munn
3.	N.Y. Times	Sam Pope Brewer
4.	L.A. Times	Don Shannon
5.	Washington Post	Tony Astrachan
6.	N.Y. Daily News	Jerry Clapso
7.	N.Y. Post	Mike Berlin
8.	Christian Science	
	Monitor	David Winder
9.	Wall Street Journal	Everett Martin
10.	NBC	Pauline Fredrick
11.	CBS	Olga Henkel
12.	ABC	John Mac Vane
13.	IPS (USIA)	Dick Carl

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UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

Press Release USUN-114(71)
August 17, 1971

U.S. INSCRIBES ASSEMBLY ITEM ON CHINA

The United States today asked for inclusion of an item entitled "The Representation of China in the United Nations" on the agenda of the 26th General Assembly. The request came in a letter to Secretary-General U Thant from the United States Permanent Representative George Bush, as follows:

17 August 1971

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I have the honor to request, under Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of an item entitled "The Representation of China in the United Nations".

An explanatory memorandum is attached in accordance with Rule 20.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

George Bush

Enclosure

His Excellency
The Secretary-General
of the United Nations

-more-

Explanatory Memorandum

In dealing with the problem of the representation of China, the United Nations should take cognizance of the existence of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China and reflect that incontestable reality in the manner by which it makes provision for China's representation. In so doing the United Nations should not be required to take a position on the respective conflicting claims of the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China pending a peaceful resolution of the matter as called for by the Charter.

Thus the People's Republic of China should be represented and at the same time provision should be made that the Republic of China is not deprived of its representation. If it is to succeed in its peacekeeping role and in advancing the well-being of mankind, the United Nations should deal with the question of the representation of China in a just and realistic manner.

* * * * *

PRESS BRIEFING PAPER

IO
August 18, 1971

Subject: Chinese Representation

QUESTION: What did Ambassador Bush give to the Secretary General yesterday?

SUGGESTED REPLY:

Ambassador Bush gave to the Secretary General a brief letter requesting the inclusion on the agenda of the 26th UN General Assembly of an item entitled "The Representation of China in the United Nations" and a memorandum of explanation.

QUESTION: Under what rules did Amb. Bush operate yesterday?

SUGGESTED REPLY:

The request for inclusion of the agenda item was made in accordance with Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.

(Any Member or principal organ of the United Nations or the Secretary General may, at least thirty days before the date fixed for the opening of a regular session, request the inclusion of supplementary items in the agenda.....")

The explanatory memorandum was submitted in accordance with Rule 20 of the GA Rules of Procedure.

("All items proposed for inclusion in the agenda shall be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum and, if possible, by basic documents or by a draft resolution.")

QUESTION: Is this the first time the US has ever requested the inclusion of an item on the agenda?

SUGGESTED REPLY:

No, the US has introduced many agenda items in previous year. However, this is the first time we have introduced an item calling for the seating of the Peoples Republic of China.

QUESTION: Will we be introducing a resolution by ourselves or jointly with others?

SUGGESTED REPLY:

We expect to have wide co-sponsorship of the resolution.

QUESTION: When will we be submitting the draft of a resolution?

SUGGESTED REPLY:

That decision has not yet been made.

Clearances: UNP - Mr. Feldman

IO - Mr. Herz

EA/P - Mr. Bishoar

IO:FJOBlachly:TL

UNITED STATES MISSION

1971 AUG 19 AM 9:57

MAIL CONTROL

CHIREP MEETING AUGUST 17, 1971

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Argentina: Alternate Rep PRAT GAY

Brazil: Minister SOUZA E SILVA

Colombia: Minister PINZON

Costa Rica: Amb. MOLINA and Mrs. Barish

Dom Rep: Amb. BETANCES

Ecuador: Deputy PermRep SEVILLA-BORJA

Haiti: Minister MEHU

Mexico: ~~Minister MENDOZA~~ VALLARTA (Second Secy) and MEYER PICON
(Second Secy)

Nicaragua: Amb. SEVILLA-SACASA

Panama: Amb. RIOS

Paraguay: Minister JARA RECALDE

Venezuela: Minister ALVARADO

EUROPE

Belgium: Amb. LONGERSTAEY

Netherlands: Amb. FACK

Spain: Minister MESSIA

NEAR & MIDDLE EAST

Greece: Counsellor STATHATOS

Turkey: Amb. EREN

FAR EAST

Australia: Amb. McIntyre

Japan: Amb. NAKAGAWA

New Zealand: Amb. SCOTT

Philippines: Amb. REYES

Thailand: Counsellor KLOS

Fiji: Amb. SIKIVOU

Chung file

AFRICA

Botswana: Charge MPUCHANE (First Secy)

? Gabon: Amb. DAVIN

Ghana: First Secy SEKYIAMAHA

Ivory Coast: Charge KOUAME

Lesotho: Charge SEKHONYANA

Malagasy: Amb. RABETAFIKA

Malawi: Minister BANDA

Niger

Nigeria: Minister ADENIJI

Rwanda: Charge BICAMUMPAKA (First Secy)

Swaziland: Second Secy. FAKUDZE

~~Togo xxxxxx~~

Tunisia: First Secy FAYACHE

Dr. M. M. - DR

Brazil
pro IRA

with DR

17 August 1971

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UN-3703/C

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Thus the People's Republic of China should be ^{represented} ~~seated~~ and at the same time provision should be made that the Republic of China is not deprived of its representation. If it is to succeed in its peacekeeping role and in advancing the well-being of mankind, the United Nations should deal with the question of the representation of China in a just and realistic manner.

China file

Secretary: We are suggesting the following caveats to any and all speaking on this issue.

DON'T SAY: Taiwan is an independent country and therefore should be represented in the UN. DO SAY: There are two realities, one on the mainland and one on Taiwan; both should be represented because neither, by itself, is able to speak for all of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

DON'T SAY: US favors admission of PRC to UN. DO SAY: US favors seating both PRC and ROC. (Note: question is not one of admission of a new member.)

DON'T SAY: US favors "two Chinas" (or "One China - One Taiwan") policy, or that US favors seating "both Chinas." DO SAY: US favors representation for both PRC and ROC.

DON'T SAY: We think PRC ought to be in the UN as the representative of Mainland China and the ROC as the representative of Taiwan. DO SAY: Both the PRC and the ROC are realities; both should be in the UN because neither, by itself, is able to speak for all of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

1. JAPAN
2. CONSULTATIONS OTHER GOVT
3. PRES. TRIP -

CONTINGENCY PRESS Q & A -- Full, not for field transmission

Questions on PRC Entry

Does this mean the US now favors seating Communist China in the UN?

The US favors seating both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in the UN, its specialized agencies and other international bodies. Both the People's Republic and the Republic of China are contemporary realities. Neither one is able to speak for all the people on both mainland China and Taiwan. Therefore both ought to be represented.

When do you plan to introduce your proposal at the UN?

Tactical questions are still under consideration.

Q. Considering that Red China has been branded as an aggressor in Korea, how can the US advocate its admission to the UN?

A. This is not a question of admitting a new member. The question is, "How shall China, which is already a member, be represented?" Both the People's Republic and the Republic of China are realities, and if the UN is to be effective it must deal with the world as it is. Therefore we believe both should be represented.

Q. The US opposed Peking's entry for decades, why does it suddenly come out in favor? Isn't it just because the old policy has failed and you're counting on the fact that if Taiwan stays in the UN, Peking won't come?

A. Circumstances change over time and that causes modification of policies. The total context of our relations in East Asia has changed over the years. Moreover, we have come to believe very strongly that one of the reasons why the UN has not been the effective instrument hoped for at its founding is because it is not really reflective of contemporary realities. We believe that having both the PRC and the ROC in the UN would be a major step toward getting the UN better in tune with those realities.

QUESTIONS ON DUAL REPRESENTATION

✓ Q. "Dual Representation" or a "Two Chinas" policy has been denounced by both Peking and Taipei. Is it realistic to think this kind of approach can be a solution to the problem?

A. It is important to avoid emotionally charged labels like "two Chinas" or "one ~~Six~~ China one Taiwan" is discussing what is after all a very complex situation. We won't know whether the approach I have outlined will lead to a solution of the problem until we have tried. What we have done is set forth our views on what we think would be the most reasonable solution and the

one which would best enable the UN to increase its effectiveness in solving world problems. We do think it's "realistic" because it takes full account of the real de facto situation.

Q. If the PRC takes China's seat in the UN, how can the ROC stay in?

A. Just as it would be a mistake to continue to deny representation to the 800 million people on the mainland, it would be equally mistaken to deny representation to the 14 million people on Taiwan. Both should be represented and the General Assembly has ^{the} power to so decide.

Q. If the ROC were to stay in the UN at the same time as the PRC, would it not have to change its name to Taiwan or Formosa?

A. That's not necessary. There is no reason why there cannot be a Republic of China and a People's Republic of China. The name it uses is up to each government to decide.

✓ Q. Doesn't this mean that one of the two has to apply for admission as a new member?

A. That's not necessary. Since China is already a member of the UN, the question is really to decide on how China shall be represented. It is well within the powers of the General Assembly to decide that, until some other solution is worked out through peaceful means, both ought to be seated.

Q. How can one nation--China--be represented by two members?

A. Let me point out that the Soviet Union is represented in the General Assembly by the USSR, the Ukraine and Byelorussia, and has been since 1945.

Q. If both the PRC and the ROC are represented in the UN, would they each have a separate vote?

A. Yes, that is what we envision. (Note: can use the USSR-Ukraine-Byelorussia example here as well.)

Q. Why is the US so concerned to prevent ROC expulsion if that is what a majority of UN members want, as indicated by the vote last year on the Albanian Resolution?

A. We don't think that is what the majority of UN members want. There has never been a vote in the UN on a resolution providing representation both for the PRC and the ROC. Although the Albanian Resolution got a simple majority last year, 25 countries abstained. We think many of those 25, and even some of the countries who voted for the Albanian Resolution, still are opposed to expelling the ROC. Many voted the way they did last year because all they had was an "either/or" choice, and many abstained for the same reason. We think there is a majority who want to see both seated in the UN.

Questions on the Security Council

Q. Does your announcement mean that the US favors replacing the ROC with the PRC on the Security Council?

A. The statement speaks for itself.

Q. Will the US vote for the PRC in the SC?

A. The statement speaks for itself. (On Background) We would go along with the majority in this.

Q. How do you think the question will arise in the Security Council and what position will the US take?

A. I have explained our view already. I don't want to go into a lot of hypothetical contingencies.

Q. If the Albanian Resolution to expel the ROC passes, will the US use its veto in the Security Council to block ROC expulsion?

A. That's a very hypothetical question. I've already said we favor a resolution to seat both the PRC and the ROC. We think that a majority will favor seating both rather than expelling the ROC.

Q. For years the UN has opposed the admission of Communist China to the UN. Many people have argued that its entry would be a very disruptive factor. How can the US cease opposing

being seated on the Security Council where they can use the veto to cripple the UN?

A. Obviously there are going to be problems and some of them may be very severe. But there are problems already: Indochina, the arms race, environmental pollution, international hijacking, and so on. It is in everyone's interest that the UN become better able to work on these problems effectively. To be effective, the UN must work with present day realities to solve present day problems. It cannot do that by locking out 800 million people, or for that matter by locking out 14 million people. I think we have to count on the hope that Peking will understand--and I believe they do understand--that their own vital interests will be bound up in solving these hard problems. We are all riders on this earth together.

✓ Q. Since the ROC is named in the Charter as a member of the Security Council, wouldn't the Charter have to be amended before the PRC could take their place?

{ A. We think this is basically a political problem.

Q. Wouldn't a Charter amendment need ratification by the Senate?

A. Yes.

Questions on Admission of other Divided States (Universality)

Q. You have said that the UN should recognize contemporary world realities. Does that mean the US is prepared also to support membership for East and West Germany, North and South Vietnam, and North and South Korea? Are you calling for universality of UN membership?

A. The question of Chinese representation is not the same as the issue of admitting the other entities you mention. There is already a membership for China in the UN, and the question is, "How shall China be represented?" The other entities are not members of the UN. If the question of their being admitted as new members came up, we would have to consider the special circumstances in each case in the light of what the UN Charter says about qualifications for admission.

The Important Question resolution

✓Q. Do we still consider that the Chinese Representation issue should be an Important Question requiring a two-thirds vote?

A. We are going to support action at the UN to seat both the PRC and the ROC, and we consider action to deprive the ROC of UN representation as requiring a two-thirds vote.

Q. Does this mean you think that the PRC can be seated by a simple majority but it should take a two-thirds vote to expel the ROC?

A. Yes.

Bilateral Relations with PRC and ROC

Q. Does this mean we regard the PRC as the legitimate government of mainland China or that we have recognized it de facto?

A. We are not dealing with a question of recognition here. Mainland China has been controlled and administered by the People's Republic for over 21 years, and for some time we have been dealing with that government on matters affecting our mutual interest. At the same time, the US continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, and we have a mutual defense treaty with it. The fact that we now advocate representation in the UN for both the PRC and the ROC, as I have said, is simply a matter of having contemporary realities reflected in the UN.

Q. Do you still recognize the Republic of China?

A. Obviously if we maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, we recognize that government.

Q. You've said the UN should recognize and deal with contemporary realities. Shouldn't the US also recognize and deal with contemporary realities by establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC?

A. I do not wish to speculate on the possible scope of future exchanges of view with the PRC. I have nothing to add to what the President has said in this subject.

Legal Status of Taiwan

Q. You have spoken of China--in the singular--being a member of the UN already, and you have characterized the problem as one of representation and not admission of a new member. Does this not mean that the US regards Taiwan as a part of China?

A. As you know, a number of differing views regarding the status of Taiwan have been expressed. Both the PRC and the ROC consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores are part of the sovereign state of China. The principal interest of the United States is that this question be resolved peacefully.

Q. Does this mean you no longer consider the status of Taiwan to be unresolved?

A. Since this is obviously a political problem, I don't think it helps to get involved in complicated legal arguments.

Conversations with PRC, ROC and others

Q. Which countries has the US consulted?

A. We have talked with a number of countries that are closely concerned with this issue. I don't want to go beyond that.

Q. Have we discussed this with Peking?

A. No comment.

Q. Have we discussed this with Taiwan--if so, what was the reaction?

A. We have had frank and frequent discussions with them on this question. I think the Republic of China is in the best position to state its views.

IO/UNP:HJFeldman/LRStarbird:lt

Clearances: L - Mr. Salans

IO - Mr. Herz

EA/ROC - Mr. Shoesmith

EA/ACA - Mr. Jenkins

EA - Mr. Green

S/PRS - Mr. McCloskey

IO/UNP - Mr. Armitage

China File

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CHIREP: List of Invitees to Co-Sponsors Meeting

Australia	Thailand
Argentina	Togo
Belgium	Tunisia
Botswana	
Brazil	
Colombia	
Costa Rica	
Gabon	
Gambia	
Ivory Coast	
Japan	
Lesotho	
Luxemburg	
Madagascar	
Mexico	
New Zealand	
Paraguay	
Philippines	
Senegal	
Spain	
Switzerland	Swaziland

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CHIREP: Additional Potential Co-Sponsors:

Ghana

Iceland

Ireland

Kenya

Netherlands