

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):

S

FOIA Number:

S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.**

---

**Record Group/Collection:** Donated Historical Materials  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** Bush, George H.W., Collection  
**Series:** Personal Papers  
**Subseries:** Republican National Committee

---

**OA/ID Number:** 25864  
**Folder ID Number:** 25864-010

---

**Folder Title:**  
Personal Notes - Oct. 73 - Aug. 74 [3]

---

---

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
<b>G</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>

---

*Demando Courtright's*  
*Beverly Wilshire Hotel*

CRestview 5-4282

8-7

AM  
7 PCT

1) called Lias  
dretato letter

2) called Haig  
(car with see state -  
other) talk

3) 9 EAT in 6 court  
turn.

*Serrano Courtright's*  
*Beverly Wilshire Hotel*

CRestview 5-4282

*total secrecy*  
*plan might blow up*  
*discussed show*

---

Annals Courtship  
Beverly Wilshire Hotel

CRestview 5-4282

Dear Mr. President,

It is my considered  
judgment that you should  
now resign.

~~It was possible, prior to this  
last revelation, to separate~~

I expect, in your ~~present~~ <sup>lonely</sup>  
embattled position, this will  
seem to you ~~like~~ as an act

---

Annand's Cairntrip's  
Beverly Wilshire Hotel

CRestview 5-4282

of disloyalty from one  
you have supported and  
helped in so many ways.

My own view is that  
I would not all serve  
a President, whose massive  
accomplishments, will always  
respect and whose family

Annandale Courtship  
Beverly Wilshire Hotel

CRestview 5-4282

I love, if I did not  
give you my judgment.

Until this moment  
resignation has been ~~for~~  
~~no~~ answer at all, but  
given the impact, and it  
will be lasting of the latest  
development. I now firmly feel  
resignation is best for this

---

Annals Courtship  
Beverly Wilshire Hotel

CRestview 5-4282

country and best for

this President. I believe  
this view is held by most Republican  
leaders ~~across~~ <sup>across</sup> the country.

Most Sincerely

This letter is made <sup>with</sup> more  
difficult ~~to~~ because of the  
gratitude I will always have for  
you ~~and because~~, if you do leave  
office, history in my judgment will

*Demands Courtship*  
**Beverly Wilshire Hotel**

CRestview 5-4282

private

record your ~~with the~~  
accomplishments ~~as I have~~  
or leaving report. sincerely;

~~private~~ ~~is a private~~  
~~is a private~~

~~private~~ ~~is a private~~ ~~is a private~~

~~private~~ ~~is a private~~  
will not be returned

*Arnaldo Courtright's*  
*Beverly Wilshire Hotel*

CRestview 5-4282

A1 -

This is a personal  
letter - I have  
no plans to release  
it.

Arnaldo Courtright's  
Beverly Wilshire Hotel

CRestview 5-4282

9 E.A. Train

week

a) called <sup>80</sup> Harp/  
told him of the  
~~the~~ ~~was~~ ~~to~~

*Hermands Courtrights*  
*Beverly Wilshire Hotel*

CRestview 5-4282

*K rest*

*202 - 965-2871*  
*965-5120*

August 7, 1974 - Wednesday - we arrived late Tuesday night in California.

The television show is reaching its final stages. We probably have \$200,000 invested in it. Literally hundreds of volunteers up and down the coast working on it. Knowing what I did from Haig and Birch I had to kind of go through the motions. At night before going to sleep I made the determination that I should in fairness and in honesty send the President a letter suggesting that he resign. I wrote him a very short letter and dictated it to Tom Lias. Jane typed it and Tom took it down to the White House and gave it to Gen. Haig. I then called Haig in order to tell him what I had done. I did the same thing with him the day before on our press release, not wanting to complicate the President's problem - wanting to be on record to give the Party some leadership and also to make sure the President knew my views.


Muriel told me that Haig was in a meeting with Kissinger and one other but he came on the phone. I told him that I was sending the letter down by Lias. He assured me that matters were moving forward and that indeed the schedule has now been arrived at and that Burch would call me later. I sat around and made a few other calls and then called Burch. He apparently had been told to call me several hours later. He told me that the scenario would unfold - that Goldwater, Scott and Rhodes would be invited to the White House by the President to give their assessment which they would do - he and Haig were having lunch with Goldwater. Rumors were rampant. I went over to the studio and read my part - did our thing. Rumors kept filtering in even to that meeting. The Providence paper, the Phoenix paper stating the President was going to resign that day. I clued Mary Louise Smith in and then Pete so we could make certain arrangements, plans. We agreed that Mary Louise would discreetly inquire as to how we go about cancelling. By noon rehearsal was

over and it was apparent to me that the show was a good one but that it of course would have to be scrubbed. I guess everybody there knew what was going on, but they never mentioned it. I went to a luncheon given by Bob Anderson. Talked again to Burch. He told me that it was unreal down there. He saw the President on the arm of Ziegler. He said it looked like a 100 year-old man on the arm of his male nurse. People in the White House are in a state of shock but obviously the word is filtering through there. I talked to him about cancelling the show - that I knew it would have to be cancelled. We decided that we would cancel it late Wednesday night or early Thursday morning. The Vice President was still publicly maintaining that he was coming though Rhodes, after I talked to him, sent me a telegram that he and Wyatt would not come and that he advised cancelling the show because of events.

Right after the luncheon with the Los Angeles men, at which I leveled pretty much on the views, though held back any comments on timing predictions, I went back to the hotel, talked to the White House several more times. I had a nice supportive phone call from Meade Alcorn. At a lovely dinner given by Mary Louise Smith I told the people that worked hardest on the show that we were going to abort the show, that Mary Louise and I were going back to Washington, that events were moving very fast there. I stopped short of saying that the President would resign Thursday night. I didn't tell them that by six o'clock tomorrow evening California time you should have some indication as to why I am doing what I am doing -- 9:00 eastern time being the time the President was supposed to request television time. I heard on one of the television programs (the Merv Field California poll) the announcer

saying that the people wanted vengeance, that there was no compassion. I watched the film - his trips to Moscow, signing the 18 year old vote, these triumphant memories of this President's accomplishments are almost overwhelming. And yet I simply keep coming back to this awful incident of the big lie on the tape. My thoughts are of his family, of the enormity of the shame, but gloating of those who early wanted him out, of the probable damage to some that stood with him, based on his word, to the almost certainty that the Party's fortune would improve dramatically, to my clear belief that the country would be much better off with him out of office, that confidence could be restored, still wondering how Jerry Ford would handle it all, what I should say to him knowing for sure that he should have his own person in this job, that as you move into '75 and '76 clearly it needs another chairman, more of a convention-oriented type chairman, wondering whether Ford would want me to stay in the Administration, but really not caring too much. Of course the Vice Presidential thing if worked out would be sensational, but I don't honestly believe there is much of a chance for that. I am not close to Laird and he is reported to have real great influence. Conable, Steiger, roping in Martha Griffiths, Jerry Pettis - all tell me what they want to do - working on this, but I don't believe they have the clout with Jerry. I am not sure how the Senators would feel although I guess there would be some support there.

I have thought about foreign affairs, but Kissinger looms as a problem to me. Ford will have to have Kissinger remain. Henry and I have had a run-in or two, as I have tried to defend the President. To see that the President gets credit. But in sum it doesn't really seem to matter. The overwhelming nature of the events in Washington to which I am now flying back to witness just can't be described.



AB HERMANN

*Bush*


August 6, 1974

TO: ✓ Chairman Bush - Tom Lias  
FROM: Joan Davenport  
RE: Phone Call from George Wilson  
RNC Member for Tennessee  
615/882-0121

The above called Mr. Hermann to state he thinks strong consideration should be given to a call meeting of the Committee. He believes they should take some positive action, pro or con, relative to their position.

He is primarily concerned with the political implications in his own state. They have a Gubernatorial race coming up and some "iffy" Congressional races.

He called to pass this suggestion to Mr. Hermann feeling he could then bring it to the Chairman's attention. He also stated, after receiving the telegram last evening, he spent a sleepless, uneasy night.



AB HERMANN

*Denz*

August 6, 1974

TO ✓ Chairman Bush - Tom Lias

FROM: Joan Davenport

RE: Phone Call From Mrs. Jean Sullivan  
RNC Member for Alabama  
205/875-2085  
205/874-9069

The above called Mr. Hermann and in view of his absence, she talked to me.

She conveyed her feelings concerning the possibility of the Chairman calling a meeting of the National Committee. She believes it would be a good idea to have one called for the latter part of next week. Bob Shaw called her and she so stated this to him also. She further stated, as much as it breaks her heart to do so, "the branch should be removed in order to save the tree."

Photo Copy Preservation

All Republicans are dismayed and concerned about the facts and the subsequent



~~As a result of the President's admission that he withheld certain facts,~~ I would be less than honest if I did not express my deep feelings for those who supported the President on the basis of the facts they knew and which they believed to be true. This includes ~~the~~ Party officials and Republicans generally all across the country who defended the President.

I have steadily maintained that the system can cope with whatever shocks it must absorb. Resignation is something that the President alone must decide. If it is to be <sup>an</sup> <sup>trial</sup> impeachment, I urge all in an official role to carry this process out in the most judicious and expeditious manner possible to spare the nation more trauma. Political expediency should not be one of the criteria.

~~The President will do what is right. What is best for the country.~~

I'm confident the President will do what is right -- what is best for the country.

Long after Watergate, it will be remembered that the American system worked preserving its proven stability.



Dear Birch

6-3

a) Rhodis →

8:30

a) By tomorrow at 9<sup>ACT</sup> everyone

Wants about

i.) Tactlessness →

ii.) More Productive →

12  
 3 today → Pres ask to meet  
 {  
 a) Rhodis  
 b) Gracie  
 c) Scott  
 at Pres' request.

Birch -

9 AM - ask for TV

Next act tomorrow -

a) 5<sup>30</sup> Home Leadership

b) 6<sup>00</sup> Friends - Sony M  
Joe W.

c) 9<sup>00</sup> Tomorrow - speech

d) 10 AM - departs -

Photo Copy Preservation

call Henderson see if VP cancelling

3) GB ask him to

ABC - call  
talk to Piro today

2) Z Hump NISC - ~~cancel~~ - discuss  
with

no migration talk  
no currency

1) pre-form meeting - ~~cancel~~

100 yr-old man provided  
by make name

Doesn't look like same

Ask -

Bull (cont)  
3/30

August 8, 1974 - I flew all night - got back to Washington and missed a breakfast scheduled with Dean Burch. I did call from the house the Vice President's office and told Mildred that I would like to see the Vice President though I would understand if he couldn't do it. They called back - set the appointment for 12:30 - I came to the office, took a lot of calls, confirmed with Burch that the schedule was to go ahead -- meeting with the congressional leaders in the afternoon -- the meeting with friends after was cancelled but there would be a going away at 9:30 the next morning with the Vice President to be sworn in at 12:00 - the family to leave with the President. The day was unreal. A pall was over the White House. I met with the Vice President. We discussed Dan Rostenkowski's offer to be helpful in lining up votes for the Vice President to grant immunity. I talked about the White House staff and my concerns about it. I particularly mentioned the press section, and that Ziegler had to go. I told the Vice President that I had dealt with this situation for a year and a half and would like to have an input based on experience with whomever was going to sort that all out. He indicated that he had seen the President, the President had told him that of the whole Cabinet in his view Kissinger should stay and in the White House Haig should stay.

I then went on to the National Security Council. I told him that in my judgment he should revert to something between what it used to be when Rogers was Secretary of State and what it is now when Kissinger totally dominates it. I said that the President must put an imprint of his own on foreign policy, that there must be a mediator in the White House as the head of NSC who would mediate between the Secretary of State and the Defense Department, and represent solely the President or present solely to the President the views of these two departments. But Kissinger while brilliant must not be permitted to run away

with things and that the foreign policy though it might be identical in thrust should be a forward foreign policy. The Vice President made little comment on this but seemed to have some appreciation of what I was talking about. I then went to the National Committee, told him that I should resign from there, that again the Vice President should be looking forward to '76 very soon, that there would be a honeymoon period during which the National Committee would do anything he wanted, that he should get his own man in there and get him in right away. He indicated that he wanted me to stay for awhile, that he had total confidence in me, that he didn't want it to look like he didn't have confidence in me, nor did he want it to look like I didn't have confidence in him, by doing anything percipitous. But of course I knew what he wanted short term, but that I was not suited for the job, there was some maneuvering going on by other candidates, that clearly the country ought not to go through a switch in our party in '76. I am convinced it should be Ford and he should get total control of the committee. The committee is not terribly important at all times but in election years it is. I also told him I was ill-suited to do this nuts and bolts job that is necessary for conventions and seminars. There was no real response from Ford on all of this. He did ask me about whether I was going to be in town this weekend. I think it was when we talked about the selection of the staff people. During the visit his son called in from way out in Utah. It was really amazing to hear the father talking to the son - down to earth. The son has heard part of what was happening -- and Jerry told him matter of factly that the next day at noon he would be sworn in and about how the kid was going to get there. There was a natural quality about it all. Bob Hartman and Jack Marsh were at the meeting. Hartman looked nervous. They were talking about a picture that he had to get out. Call from

Art Fletcher. Mentioned that Kissinger was coming at 3:00. It all seemed tremendously overwhelming.

I went over and saw Rose Woods. There was a pall over the entire White House. I debated about seeing her but I felt it was a kind thing to do. I felt she would probably be sore about my resignation request letter and she was strained at first. Eddie Cox was in there the whole time. Rose had some tears. I told her you'll probably differ with me but I am convinced that this is much the best thing for the President as well as the country. She said, "Yes, I do differ with you." She was sore with Griffin and Rhodes and others who have been close friends with the President. She was apparently blind to the enormity of what he had done. Faithful to the end. I pointed out that I remember a conversation she and I had had over a year ago when we talked about those around the President. She warmed to that subject and was rather bitter about Haldeman and having the taping system in there in the first place, going to the Secret Service to do it instead of the GAO who would normally do it. Again there was great sadness there. Phones were ringing on her secretary's desk offering support to the President, urging him not to resign. She said the prisoners had called to see what they could do and she was somewhat bitter, suggesting they should have done it six months earlier. I am glad I went by and I expect maybe she did appreciate it, but it was strained and again unreal.

I saw big Rog Morton. He I am sure felt exactly as I did. I had luncheon in the mess. There was a kind of hush and whispers throughout the building. It was like someone had die around there. I did not see Al Haig. I called Jimmy Stewart, Linkletter, Paul Keyes, thanked them for helping on the show. They all said they would help in the future. They felt the country was going to survive and the two-party system was. There was a certain optimism around the country once they realized what was happening I think.

August 9, 1974 - There is no way to really describe the emotion of the day. Bar and I went down and had breakfast at the White House. Dean and Pat Burch and the Buchanans were there in the Conference Mess. There was an aura of sadness, like somebody die . Grief. Saw Tricia and Eddie Cox in the Rose Garden - talked to them on the way into the ceremony. President Nixon looked just awful. He used glasses - the first time I ever saw them. Close to breaking down - understandably. Everyone in the room in tears. The speech was vintage Nixon - a kick or two at the press - enormous strains. One couldn't help but look at the family and the whole thing and think of his accomplishments and then think of the shame and wonder what kind of a man is this really. No morality - kicking his friends in those tapes - all of them. Gratuitous abuse. Caring for no one and yet doing so much. When he used the word 'plumbers' meaning it 'laboring with his hands' the connotation was a shock on me. I remember Lt. Col. Brennan who has been with him so long - Marine - standing proudly but with tears running down his face. Rabbi Korff, a brand new friend on the scene who told Kendall he wanted to start a Support for Ford Committee. Thrilled with the limelight. Coming in and standing around and looking for special attention, ending up sitting next to the Cabinet. People who labored next to Nixon's side forever are not invited. It's weird. The Nixon speech was masterful. In spite of his inability to totally resist a dig at the press, that argument about hating - only if you hate do you join the haters. We walked through the bottom lobby to go out. After the Ford swearing-in many of the pictures were changed with a great emphasis on the new President. We went over and hung around waiting for the swearing in of Ford.

And then the whole mood changed. It was quiet, respectful, sorrowful in one sense, but upbeat. The music and the band seemed cheerier, the talking and babbling of voices after Ford's fantastic speech, crowds of friends, indeed a new spirit, a new lift. I walked through the line and the President was warm and friendly, kissing the wives, telling Bar he appreciated my job, and on and on. It was much more relaxed. There of course were a lot of people that didn't know what they were going to do. There was great turmoil in that sense.

I went back to the National Committee and addressed them. I tried to identify with the feelings I am sure they all felt - of betrayal and distrust and yet pride. I told them we had been through the toughest year and a half in history and yet I now felt we were coming on an optimistic period. I told them that the President asked me to stay on. All in all it was a pretty good meeting although I felt drained emotionally and physically tired.

Saturday the 10th I attended the first Ford Cabinet Meeting. Notes kept on that. Mood calm. TerHorst had already called the day before to ask about the White House report - I told him what he could expect, he told me the Clawson job would be eliminated, that Clawson was going to be leaving, that the whole gut-fighting attack group would be eliminated. I told him this was a great decision and I was relieved. I had a long visit with Haig after the press had left following the swearing in during which Kissinger walked into the room. Bar and Pat Haig were talking and Haig and I were fielding various things. I told Haig my concerns about the NSC, how it had to be a more independent posture eventually. I recognized Kissinger's enormous ego problem but that the system needed to be somewhere between where the NSC used to be when he was there and ambassadors were walking in the side door and where it is now, simply a subsidiary to the

Secretary of State. It is essential that the President get objective recommendations, recognizing Defense's needs and recognizing State's needs. I told Ford a day or two before that he needed to get his own imprint clearly on foreign policy but that he had to have Kissinger stay. I noticed on the evening news of the 10th much more news about Kissinger and what he was going and saying in terms of what the ambassadors said. Haig told me that Kissinger had wanted to leave a time or two but it's my view that Ford ought to get positioned for the inevitable day when Kissinger does leave. I would like to see Haig go into the NSC job - have it built up, give it visibility and then perhaps he can move into the Secretary of State position, even though a military man.

The rest of the day was swirling around on the Vice Presidential speculation. We got our telegrams out asking for input from the National Committee. Clements talking to Jack Marsh on my behalf. Jerry Pettis working on it, a lot of speculation. Timmons called to say the President wanted to talk to me about this matter at 3:00 p.m. on Sunday. Lunch with Dick Moore. Tennis with Dick Williams. Quiet evening. Suspense mounting again. Deep down inside I think maybe it should work this time. I have that inner feeling that it will finally abort. I sure hope not. Another defeat in this line is going to be tough but then again it is awful egotistical to think I should be selected.

August 12, 1974 - Meeting with the President, Sunday, August 11. My meeting was one of eight or ten with Republican leaders - all alone - introduced me to a new photographer, a Pulitzer Prize-winning Time man. Tried different angles. We stood over near the window taking a few shots, then the man took some shots of the President and me together sitting in the familiar chairs. "Let's be informal," said the President. Then he said, "I would like to get your views on the Vice President."

I told him, "I am in a peculiar position because I know that my name has been considered." He confirmed that it had. "I am getting strong recommendations on it." And I said well if it would be agreeable with him and it didn't seem to be putting on the hard-sell I might give him my credentials as well as shortcomings and then try to be somewhat objective. He said he wanted me to do that. He said, "I am asking you to do that."

So I went through the resume - Phi Beta Kappa economics, Yale, East and West, successful in business, Ways and Means, finances in order, knowing the business community, press relations, politics, UN. We talked about all of these and I told him I thought he had to get his own mark on foreign policy, and I thought that there would be times when it would be good to have his total man - namely his Vice President going on these foreign trips and I felt I could do that well etc. He nodded and seemed receptive. That took about 14 minutes of the 30 minutes including the picture-taking and stuff.

He then asked me some other ideas. And he asked specifically about individuals. He asked about Ed Brook for example and a woman. I said there ought to be a black in the Cabinet, I mentioned Fletcher. He told me he thought Fletcher should definitely be involved. I suggested that a Cabinet slot would be good provided you could find back-up for him. On the woman I

gave a big pitch to Mary Louise Smith. I told him I didn't think he should move with either a woman Vice President or a Black at this particular juncture in history. I talked about Rockefeller. I told him that I had a strong regard for Rockefeller, that I worried about the divisions in Party from either right or left. I said Goldwater would certainly be acceptable but again he had to worry about the other part of the Party. I kept coming down on the middle ground, and in the back of my mind was 'it sounds like you're building yourself up , making your own case all the time.' I emphasized the press, I said that I thought whoever it was had to be totally supportive, that would not have any ideological hang-ups and be unable to support the President on whatever his policy was - domestic or foreign. I told him he needed to get his imprint on the Presidency, that the country did not need a challenge to him in '76, that he needn't say what he was going to do in '76 but that he had to, through his appointments and everything, make clear that it was his party, his move, his administration and his nomination. He asked me how the Democrats would feel. I clicked off some of the Democrats on my deal - I told him about Martha Griffiths, Dingell, told him about Bob Strauss' call, Gale McGee, and said that I felt they probably would be agreeable. And that I had been confirmed unanimously by the Senate. I mentioned Bob Ray - said if you want to get outside I'd recommend a good hard look at him or Dan Evans. He didn't seem to show too much interest in that. He asked about Rog Morton. I said excellent if his health is OK. He raised the name of Laird. I said clearly Laird would be your man, Laird is experienced, Laird can clearly do it. I told him I did not feel close to Laird personally but I would have to say that he would fit that description.

Bill Clements had told me about Jack Marsh' views on healing and bringing things together and I did feel that that should be emphasized. I pointed

that out in connection with whatever you do, you should get somebody who can heal and bring people together. Certainly there will be a need for partisanship but it shouldn't be shrill. I told him about my visit with Nixon - that I am not good at carving up Kennedy and Watergate. I told him how I had to speak out against Watergate. He was totally relaxed, had a yellow pad, we both sat facing each other on the little couches. There was a warm and friendly feeling - as I walked out I said, "Mr. President, it's a funny position I guess I was in, making this pitch and I hope it wasn't too strong." He said, "Not at all. I asked for it." I told him, "No matter who you pick you will have my total support." I looked him right in the eye when I said it and I wanted him to know how true it is. He said, "George, I don't have any doubt about that at all." He put his arm warmly around me and I felt, "My God, what a mammoth difference between the man I served and worked for with I hope total dedication and this wonderfully warm, uncomplicated, decent human being. If he gets a break on some of these major issues he will indeed be a great President."

I then went over and talked to Bill Scranton about transition, and gave him my strong views on the National Security Council - that it should be somewhere in between the step-child of the State Department and where it used to be when the State Department was its captive. I felt that the existing set-up was wrong. I told him the Kissinger relationship was such that it had to be handled with great delicacy. Oh - back to the other - he asked me about Brock. I told him I didn't feel that Brock had the strength of character and the strength of leadership necessary. I put in a strong word for Howard Baker. I told him Baker was head and shoulders above Brock. That only he could sort out the Watergate Committee problem but that Baker was clearly qualified to do the job.

I mentioned Kit Bond. Ford seemed to agree that Bond was too young. I said, "Maybe there's somebody that's not known that would be good." And he said, "That's true. I wasn't known at all." I am wondering if in all of this he is thinking of somebody totally unknown who could move in and do this job.

I left feeling somewhat better about my chances but with no degree of certainty or moving up to the head of the list. Ford is so warm and friendly and so clearly does not want to abuse or offend people that he could well have just been building me up. I indicated that I wanted to get out of this crazy job.

I went in to talk to Al Haig and told Haig I wanted to get a big favor from him. I don't know what's going to happen on the Vice Presidential thing, I said, but I do want your help if you ever do get a chance to say I ought to get out of this party job. The more I think of it, the more ill-suited I am for it. For the first time I have the feeling that it might work about the Vice Presidency.

Addenda - the President during the conversation about foreign policy asked how I got along with Henry Kissinger. I told him "pretty well" except I found that I had a couple of run-ins with him. I recited the incident about China and how I took exception because I was standing up for the President. I felt that others should stand up for him and be sure he got credit if he was taking a lot of blame. I told him Kissinger hadn't liked this. I told him after the China vote Kissinger and I had a little bit of a run-in but that I knew we had done a good job and that everyone else knew it, but with Kissinger being in China hadn't helped. I told him right after that though we got along very warmly. I mentioned shortcomings above. I told him my shortcomings were having lost the elections and frankly being a Republican National Chairman. He emphasized, "George, you and I are totally compatible on issues and I know I could work very, very well with you in every way."

Secret

File

don't transcribe  
rep. actual  
conversations

Notes = 8-20-74

phone calls

Maui

AFIG, PREZ, ETC.

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE  
310 FIRST STREET, S. E., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003



*From the desk of*  
**GEORGE BUSH**

Richard  
Moore called



From the desk of  
**GEORGE BUSH**

10 50

Rocky

in midst of interview

I'll tell you

Did David tell you

He did

if continued - wait

5 ready



From the desk of  
GEORGE BUSH

10<sup>35</sup>

Bush

very nice to  
call -

really putting for  
you

I talked to him 1 1/2  
hours on my deal -  
with you stay your section -

what happens -

psychologized for

SMITH-020

live - "go there too"

realistically

create - perfect

with "amnesty"

then comes up

with that cross-hair

great need



From the desk of  
**GEORGE BUSH**

10<sup>20</sup>

Mr. President

hard call  
greater depth  
talk later

know you'd  
understand  
my tough



From the desk of  
GEORGE BUSH

9:40  
Tuesday

That I'd

①

Better call

Decided other way

very

close →

President will call

later today -

---

Dicta-Tape on my mind



From the desk of  
**GEORGE BUSH**

Sunday

AI HAIL

1) Don't pay attention  
to it. Hogwash  
ineffective -

2) told Ann. checked  
with J's in FBI  
can up with FBI  
in Friday.



From the desk of  
**GEORGE BUSH**

Transition firm  
started on me  
in a firm.  
Rocky thing

No comments -  
Knows from Kelly  
matter problem -



*From the desk of*  
**GEORGE BUSH**

*The day*

*8-20*

Photo Copy Preservation

177-2461-032A (over)  
Dick Rowland  
John Haber

202-628-4200  
P.O. Box 301

confidence -

Dick Rosenbaum -

told him I was  
going to get out -  
very hard  
with confidence

① George Heriman -

Let down from Edgartown

very hard - terrible situation  
suffered self for party -

Don't get some look  
After you soaking with  
very warm water

Don't believe it  
that

From Bar

Not so good  
tenderly disappointed

Cherubs  
all  
Tenderly

Criteria

1) For transmission  
to guide - where  
to report

2) Price off to book  
stability

come out in  
R. Robinson being  
spent being  
concentration  
to with B  
12 study over


3) no question  
Lo ~~to~~ did it

4) but don't  
show I can

---

got to sit down  
and chat with  
you get back

---



*From the desk of*  
**GEORGE BUSH**

*Happy*

*207-276-5158*

# George Bush Presidential Library Transfer Sheet

**COLLECTION:**

George Bush Personal Papers

**ACCESSION NUMBER:**

1993.0004

FOIA/SYSTEMATIC  
PROCESSING CASE  
NUMBER (if app.):

Transferred During Accessioning

Transferred During Processing

The following material was transferred to:

Audiovisual Collection     Book Collection     Museum Collection     Other

Other (Specify):

Preservation - Dictabelt File

**DESCRIPTION:**

One (1) IBM 3" magnetic tape [recording of GB?, ca. 1973-1974]

When transferring  
material to the  
museum  
collection,  
complete the  
following.

Donor:

Donor Org.:

Address:

Telephone:

**Book Location:**

Row:  Section:  Shelf:  Position:

**Map Case Location:****Series:**

Republican National Committee

**Box Number:**

1

**Folder Title:**

Personal Notes October 1973 - August 1974 [3]

**OA/ID Number:**

25864

Transferred by: Debbie Carter

Date of Transfer:

9/16/2003

Received by:

Date Received:

Go to Database  
Navigator


Go to Accession  
Register

Go to Withdrawal Sheet

Print Record

Photo Copy Preservation


August 22, 1974



Bill Archer

8-22-74

1. Leon Tanowski - called Bill Archer
2. Final written report on GB Morsley - all OK
3. G.B., Reagan, Murray, Rodney  
4 he asked to ~~write~~ clear
4. Leon for you - so told  
W. Haver (Haver)
5. completely cleared
6. "someone down there  
trying to get you"
- 7) Newsweek never contacted  
Tanowski -
- 8) G.B. how long in business?  
maybe several months



L. Tawndri

9) "Difficult to get  
fair trial - anywhere  
in land"

10) no final decision

11) Rocky hunt in Texas

12) one county chamber  
resigned

13) "John W  
"divorced" troops  
in Texas"

August 22, 1974 - Meeting 4:00 p.m. - oval office - President Ford, Bill Brock, Bob Michel, Dean Burch, Bob Hartman and myself.

The President seemed relaxed. He had had a long, arduous schedule - unbelievable in length, including a two-hour picture-taking session with members of congress for campaign purposes. He said, "I'm glad to be here and I fully understand." The President explained that Dean Burch had Cabinet status, would be in charge of politics. He wasn't going to announce it as a political counselor but that indeed was what he was and that he had great confidence in him. Later he told me that he liked Burch and felt he was ideally suited for what he was going to do. We talked about the cufflinks souvenirs that were left over from the Vice Presidency. It seemed odd for the President of the United States to be dealing with such trivia. Bob Hartman handed him a memo on it. The other side is that it showed that he was thinking of Party - wanting to help, remembering how small things like that counted to political people.

We discussed the scheduling. He would be willing to do fundraisers. But he decided he would do no political trips until the later part of October - Burch and Hartman would get together and work backwards from the election in accordance with the Burch memo. We discussed Rocky's travel. It was my thought that Rocky should do very little politics if any until he was confirmed. Brock disagreed, wanting him to come to Tennessee in September but I think his disagreement was mainly related to that particular event. The President indicated that there are two times when Rockefeller could work - now until the time he comes back and then from adjournment until the election. It was agreed that Rocky's schedule would be coordinated with the President's to avoid duplication. Burch wisely suggested that the President set the schedule up and not have events seeking him - having us find the best events for him.

The President made a side remark to the congressmen about his first White House dinner. He said the dinner was fine but afterward there was an unlikely collection of members of congress. Betty Ford had turned the matter over to Peggy Stanton who on her own had made up the list including people like Seiberling, Brown, Reid, David Bowen and others. Some of the Democrats went and put out press releases that they were included at the first dinner, thus infuriating the Republicans. The President was very sensitive to this, very properly understood the Party position on it. We then went down the check list of policy questions which are on the attached memo. On all these nettling political questions the President was most cooperative to do what was wanted etc.

In the memo was the word 'surrogate'. Bob Hartman referred to it as 'sewer-gate'. The President said, "get ride of that word. I don't like it. Don't use that word 'surrogate'."

We did discuss the formula for paying for Presidential appearances. It was agreed we would ask Bill Seidman for the formula. In discussing fat-cat cocktail parties, we were reminded that the President won't go where the press can't go for at least five minutes. It was agreed not to combine governmental and political appearances if at all possible. On election eve and election day the President agreed that he preferred to be in Washington. He said that he used to pass them with the chairmen of the national committee and agreed that this is what he would do, with the leaders of the committee etc.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1974

JR  
SAWS  
WITH  
NOTES

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DEAN BURCH 

SUBJECT: The 1974 Campaign

(Briefing for Meeting, August 22, 1974, with  
Chairman Bush, Senator Brock, Congressman  
Michel, Counsellor Hartmann)

In approaching the strategy and mechanics of your participation in the fall campaign, I am making two assumptions. If either one turns out to be false, the plan will have to be reassessed.

First Assumption: Congress will adjourn on or about October 11.

Second Assumption: Governor Rockefeller will have been confirmed on or before October 11 and will be available, full time, for political activities only thereafter. (No reason, in my judgment, why he cannot take some part during the confirmation process; but it would have to be mostly short hops and largely for incumbents or in non-incumbency races.)

The theme of your campaigning, I would further assume, will be that until the economy begins to turn the corner, we cannot afford exotic government programs that entail major additional outlays, and that you need help in the Congress to set our economic house in order and trim Federal commitments to our capabilities.



① wait go where press wait go at least for 5 min

(3) Will you flatly refuse to do fat-cat cocktail parties and receptions, or may we consider them on an ad hoc basis?

(4) Will Mrs. Ford participate in the campaign? Solo? Only accompanying you? **Yes -** **No**

(5) Will your children have any role? **Mike No - Jack -**

(6) Do you want personally to approve all political letters, telegrams, etc., that go out over your name? **Yes - Deane you put em together**

(7) Will you consider rescheduling some of the engagements that were cancelled wholesale on August 9? For example, Senator Hugh Scott is terribly anxious for you to do the Philadelphia statewide fund raiser scheduled for October 9.

Press will not campaign + if congn. adjourn

(8) May we call on cabinet officers and other surrogates for campaign appearances (with the traditional exception of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Attorney General)? **YN**

(9) Will you mix Presidential appearances (e.g., a dam dedication) with campaign appearances? I would suggest no mixing. **1 prefer not combine - discuss out quiet**  
**2 ask Bill Sandman for formula -**

They should get it!  
Don't use word "surrogate"

(10) Will you advise us of any tacit or express campaign commitments you may already have made and want to honor? Will you also advise us as to the candidates and areas you particularly want to visit during the campaign? **N.Y. Calif., Ohio, Ill. possibly Texas**

(11) Where do you want to spend election eve and election day? **IN D.C.**

with leaders countries -

FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

I recommend that your appearances should be aimed at a regional or at least statewide audience (blanketing in all candidates in one shot). The Vice President and surrogates should for the most part handle appearances for particular Congressional Districts and candidates. The Vice President will generally be working states far distant from those in which you appear, and we would attempt to criss-cross: e.g., while you are in the Pacific Coast area, the Vice President would be in the East or South.

Press: 1) will not do it 2) not be stated

On the assumption that Congress does adjourn in mid-October, I would suggest that you do virtually no campaigning (the Philadelphia appearance might be a rare exception) prior to adjournment. Thereafter, I'd hope that we could schedule at least two days the week of October 14, three days the week of October 21, and four days the final week of the campaign. This would allow for major appearances in all regions of the country and would involve only one or two overnights away from the Capital. On each campaign day, I would suggest at least three appearances, usually in different states, with the national media event scheduled around noon.

I have not even mentioned national, regional, or statewide radio/TV set pieces (as opposed to covered campaign appearances) plus a host of other details involving staff, etc. But these are of less urgency, and they will depend on the basic decisions.

DRAFT - PRES FORD -

- 1) Thank them for their recommendations
- 2) consider only Republicans

ACTION:

\* \*

Pres-

- 1) Bush - will be Cabinet status -
- 2) Cuff-links etc. - send to us  
made between countries.
- 3) Resumes scheduling
  - 1) fund raising -
- 4) no polit. trip until latter part  
of October.
  - 2 time frames when can work
  - 1) now till
  - 2) adjournment 'til election
- 5) Rocky's travel
  - 1st work out Pres. schedule
  - then fill in things for him.
- 6) Peggy Stanton -

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Thursday - August 22, 1974

- 
- 6:30 Dr. William Lukash - Residence Office.  
(45 min.)
- 8:30 General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. - The Oval Office.
- 9:00 Secretary Henry A. Kissinger - The Oval Office.
- 10:15 Mr. J. F. terHorst - The Oval Office.
- 10:30 Senators Frank Church and Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.  
(10 min.) (Major General Brent Scowcroft and Mr. Tom C. Korologos).  
  
The Oval Office.
- \* 10:45 Signing Ceremony for Proclamation on Women's Equality.  
(10 min.) (Mr. William E. Timmons).  
  
The Oval Office.
- 11:00 Photograph Session with House Republican Candidates.  
(120 mins.)  
  
The Oval Office.
- \* 2:00 Signing Ceremony for S. 3066 - The Housing and Community  
(20 min.) Development Act of 1974.  
  
The East Room.
- \* 2:30 Mr. Paul Hall, President, Seafarers International Union of  
(30 min.) North America.  
  
The Oval Office.
- 3:45 Mr. Richard Keiser, Special Agent in Charge, Presidential  
(5 min.) Protective Division.  
  
The Oval Office.
- 4:00 Chairman George Bush, Senator Bill Brock, and Congressman  
(60 min.) Robert H. Michel. (Mr. Dean Burch). *Robert Hartmann*
- The Oval Office.
- 5:00 Chairman George Bush - The Oval Office.
- 7:30 Private Dinner - The Residence.

August 22, 1974 - Meeting in Oval Office - 5 to 6:05 p.m. - personal meeting with the President following a political meeting (Brock, Michel, Burch, Hartman). We sat at the desk in the oval office. The President indicated that the decision on the VP had been very close. You should have been very complemented by the support. What do you want? Haig had indicated that the President had told me George can have anything he wants. I discussed the Cabinet, mentioning Commerce. I told him my great friend Dent was there. If the change was definite I would want that, but I would in no way want to elbow Dent aside, since he was a close friend and his wife was one of our favorite people. Ford made no comment on all of this. I am wondering if he hadn't something else totally in mind for Commerce. I urged the President to put his imprint on the Party, at the Cabinet, on the foreign policy. We had a good discussion about this.

I discussed my concern about the Rockefeller and Kissinger deal. Kissinger told the President "I can help you with Rocky." This was backwards and was my concern. I said I think it is a good appointment. I am strongly supporting it. I just don't want to have you against them when it comes to the crunch in foreign policy or anything else. I told him of Kissinger scheduling a Middle East trip without Nixon knowing about it. Ford said he felt Nelson Rockefeller would be supportive. I totally agreed. I told him I foresaw some party problems as a result of this Rockefeller appointment but that we could totally handle them. We discussed the successor. He told me that he would ask Anne Armstrong about this. I agreed she would be great. We then talked about Mary Louise Smith. He said if Anne did it, what would she do. We both agreed she could do a good job. He suggested sub-cabinet or I said she would be good in an embassy. The President talked about the need for access - running it differently

than it had been done, being careful however not to ever downgrade Nixon. We discussed my being ambassador to UK, maybe China. He asked if I had any languages. I said, "No". He said, "Just like me". (very nice touch) He told me that Haig, you and me are the only ones aware of this at all. Not even Henry Kissinger. We discussed Haig. He talked about a good ambassador's job or even Abrams' job. He said that Abrams was very sick.

Back to Anne Armstrong - he said that Anne's moving would solve some problems here. He discussed Hartman's and Marsh's role. We discussed my being chief of staff if there was some real substance. I brought it up. Ford seemed very interested in that. Ford just having said however that the chief of staff job was changed - he wanted to see more people than Nixon did. He wanted to deal more with them himself. I told him I could see a role where I would deal with the embassies, special interest groups, etc. but only if there was some stature or substance involved in this deal.

We went back and talked more about England. He wondered if it was substantive enough - so did I. We talked about the money. I told him I had lost a lot of money and didn't know if I could afford it. He indicated there were some outside ways of doing this. I told him I was aware of this from my UN days.

Ford said, "I will mention it to Kissinger. I see no problems there." We also touched on France and China. We talked about timing. Ford said, "You want to get through clearances before adjournment. This would mean before election because Congress is supposed to adjourn by the second week in October - I indicated to the President that I had been through Fulbright's committee once - feel I could go again especially if you call him.

We went back to China. I told him the UN vote conceivably could be against me although I got along with them once they were there. I told him that I was very interested in foreign affairs. I wanted to do more in foreign affairs in the future. I told him I kind of crossed the domestic politics bridge with this Vice Presidential message. I indicated that way down the line, maybe 1980, if I stayed involved in foreign affairs, I conceivably could qualify for Secretary of State. The President seemed to agree. He was very warm, very grateful, very friendly. I told him that if I was appointed to England the party people would think he was moving me over and out - or kicking me upstairs. I told him this was perfectly OK with me though because I thought it was a great challenge. I told him, "You don't owe me a thing." "I could very easily go back into private life." Indeed we discussed it. He said, "I don't want you to do that. I don't want to lose your talents."

We talked about problems with Ken Rush. I told him I thought Rush would like an embassy or just as soon go home. I told him <sup>of</sup> my dinner with Rush a few nights before where Rush indicated that he liked the diplomatic business better. I told him I didn't feel Rush was all that happy in this new job.

8-22-74

5<sup>00</sup> to 6<sup>05</sup> Oval Office.

Very close - very complimentary about  
- "you should be  
what do you want - (Hag had  
said Mrs. said 'anything')

GB - Domestic - Commerce but  
great fiscal Dept. thing - If change  
definite - would want that - (no count)  
CB would impact on party, cabinet,  
for policy

vertical scribbles

Discussed Rocky HK deal -  
HK told him I can help with Rocky  
CB - just so you don't have  
2 vs 1 - there 2 vs you.

Told him of HK scheduling  
the trip without RN knowing it  
F felt RN should be supported GB  
agreed -

CB's some party problems - we can  
handle em -

vertical scribbles

Discussed succession -

with Anne A - GB agreed  
great.

OK what about MS -

GB - govt - high up on  
Embassy - or should go here

David UK - maybe China

do you have leprosy? - No -  
"just like me!" (nice touch.)

Hey, you, in only one emi down  
at the - not even HK -

David Hong -

Godparents job when subjects  
or emi Abrams - (Ake my sick)

AK "Dime warning would solve problems  
here" - Discussed Husbman,  
Mevsh note 2 -

GB - I'd be chief of staff if real  
substances - (Mach just having  
said c of staff job changed - he  
wanted to see more people than  
RN - deal with more etc

GB - work some with MC's  
special groups - labor etc  
only do it if statistical etc.

AK very interested if seemed

Back to England

is it substantive

money (afford) - Has check sources  
of help.

GF I'll mention to Ht - see no  
problems there.

Timmy - F 'you'd want to get through'  
clearances before admint'

GB - been thru Fallonglot's comm once.  
Feel can go again - "if you  
call him"

China - told him UN vote probably vs  
me.

told him - want work in foreign affairs  
for future - possibly see sec-state in  
1980 for a then Rep. president.

very warm - very grateful -  
my family

told him <sup>if</sup> Ht, <sup>Party</sup> people would think  
he was moving us out & out  
Baird or with me through - "great  
challenge"

G = You don't owe me a thing - please  
~~to~~ to could easily go back to  
private life -

F = "Don't want you to - Don't want  
to lose your talents" -


Talk about problem Rush - I told  
him he'd probably like an Embassy or  
go home - told him to feel Rush  
not all that happy in this job -

August 26, 1974 - 1:45 p.m. - The President called - munching on a sandwich - he said, "Excuse me. I'm in the process of eating." He said, "I'd like to talk more about the matter we talked about." I was in Maine. He said, "I have talked to Henry Kissinger about the diplomatic post as you and I had talked about them. Any one of them are OK with me. He said, "I think the one that is the best for you is China. Henry Kissinger thinks that UK would not challenge your capabilities enough." The President said, "There would be a lot of entertaining and a lot of form, but not enough substance. Kissinger pointed out that in case of China, you would have to understand that the major decisions were made by the chief of governments (a word of caution which I assured the President I understood about). Kissinger personally liked the idea of France because he felt there was so much substance there, but the President indicated that I had shown not much interest in France. I agreed with him on that. The President said I think you would be bored with the social life in Great Britain. He said, "I'd gathered you'd like China". I agreed with this. He said, "We are trying to put together a package. I am trying to get Flanigan for Spain and then he discussed Ken Rush going to Austria and asked me about Fulbright about the UK. I raised the question saying there were still political problems with Fulbright, worrying that some of the Party people might indicate the way you get ahead is to attack the Administration. I thought there were still some strong feelings on the war. He also talked about trying to get that fellow Bob Anderson to go to France, the one who Annenberg had wanted to get to follow him to England. I gave Bob Anderson a very strong recommendation. The President indicated he was going to talk to Hugh Scott on Fulbright, and also might check with John Rhodes. I told him I thought Fulbright would have no problems with it, but we might have some enormous party problems. He

indicated that he wanted to get it done soon. He wanted to get a reading on it. I asked him how his conversation with Anne had gone. He indicated Anne wanted to stay in the White House. Anne thought it would be a good idea for a woman to be party chairman but not Anne. He asked about Mary Louise Smith. I told him I thought Mary Louise Smith could do a good job and that I didn't think we would get strong party problems. I also thought that if we had a strong co-chairman that the committee definitely would buy the idea. In other words the President would recommend Mary Louise Smith and in consultation with Mary Louise they were both recommending a certain co-chairman. The President thought that idea was good, said he'd like to have somebody on the conservative side. Maybe from the South. I raised with him the question of Chief of Staff. He seemed to think that matter was still alive though he thought going to China was much better for me. I am inclined to agree with that.


I liked the way the President says "talking as a friend". I told him that I felt my political future was behind me and that I would really want to do what was best for him.

Note: He seems to be moving towards getting his own imprint on foreign policy, toward getting certain key ambassadors in place. It makes a good deal of sense. The President mentioned several times the need for total secrecy on all of this. On timing he wanted to get the nominations approved before Congress adjourned which would mean the end of October. My initial conversation lasted about 10 minutes. My initial instinct is that we will miss a lot in this country although of course we will get home plenty. But it seems to me to be a tremendous challenge and a tremendous opportunity of substance leading to somewhere - out of the foray, building enormous knowledge and having a great opportunity to learn. The President asked that I call him back about the Committee thing.



From the desk of  
GEORGE BUSH

1. talk about matter we talked about
2. talk H<sub>1</sub> - cuz we talked about all OK
3. one not best for you is China -
5. H<sub>1</sub> thinks H<sub>2</sub> would not challenge capabilities
6. H<sub>1</sub> - in case of PRC major divisions made
7. H<sub>1</sub> personally liked France - cuz so much substance
8. personally -
9. CF "bowed into social like in 1934 to get around - CF "I gathered you'd like China"



From the desk of  
GEORGE BUSH


1. talk about matter we talked about
2. talk H<sub>1</sub> - cuz we talked about one OK
3. one not best for you is China -
5. H<sub>1</sub> thinks H<sub>2</sub> would not challenge capabilities
6. H<sub>1</sub> - in case of PRC major divisions made
7. H<sub>1</sub> personally liked French - cuz so much substance
8. personally -
9. CF "bond into social like in GBH to get much - CF "I got much you'd like China"

August 28, 1974 - White House - Bar and I went down to Washington from Kennebunkport for the Cabinet dinner. I had a long discussion with Dean Burch ahead of time about who would be my successor at the RNC. I didn't tell Dean what the President had in mind for me, but I did indicate timing would be sooner rather than later, probably before the elections. The President had approached Anne Armstrong about being Chairman. She apparently had definitively turned him down. I had talked to the President about Mary Louise Smith and I mentioned it to Dean, asking his view on who would be a good number two. We explored the idea of having a member of congress, preferably from the South - the President had suggested bringing the conservative image more to the fore in the committee. Burch commented that Mrs. Smith was excellent, wonderful, able, but looked like 'everybody's grandmother'. Whereas Anne had a much more dynamic image, would have more appeal to youth, better speaker etc. I agreed with him though I have infinite respect for Mary Louise Smith. We talked about Kuykendall, Bill Archer, Hammerschmidt as possible co-chairman. He came up with the idea of Jack Kemp, the idea being to get a congressman who would conduct most of the liaison work with the elected members of the Party. He would still be Number 2 to Mary Louise. We kind of agreed that senators would not get into that posture. At the White House I stopped and had a brief visit with the President, telling him that I owed him a phone call since he did call me in Maine two days before and asked me for my opinion on a successor. He indicated that the China matter was still very much on track. I told him the more I thought about it the more enthused I was about it and that I hoped nothing happened to derail it. He indicated that it definitely would not. He indicated again that he thought Anne would talk to her and lean on her a little bit trying to get her to reconsider.

The President indicated regarding Anne on an earlier call that 'they get White House fever'. He felt the National Committee was much better for Anne than where she is now and so did Burch. I raised with the President the Fulbright matter again and he indicated well there will be something else that will offset this that will make the conservatives very happy. The evening was very relaxed. I sat next to Mrs. Ford, Barbara next to Rog Morton and the Secretary of Defense. It was a small dinner for Cabinet and a very few others. I was next to Mrs. Buekan. Betty Ford whispered - very quiet, looked pretty, seemed relaxed. We left right after the dinner had broken up to catch a ten o'clock plane. I began to wonder if we are getting pretty blase to leave a wonderful White House evening like that. The President made a toast - informal - men were dressed informally. He has a wonderful way of relaxing people. He came up to me to discuss the China matter - told me he was very pleased about it, told me the Chinese would be very pleased about it, told me that it should be two years, no less, told me there would be times when I would be dealing with the most secret aspects of our diplomacy, but times when there wouldn't be that much to do. Apparently the staff in our mission has only eight or so though he said you might want to build it. You could have at least twenty or more -- whatever you want.

I was surprised to find Kissinger as enthusiastic as he was. I think Haig had told me that I had been misreading Kissinger's reaction on this. Kissinger referred to this being so much more substantive than London. He said I couldn't care less who is in London. It's mainly entertainment, protocol. I agreed with him and I totally do. Bill Scranton stopped me as we walked in there - said, "I am very excited about all of this. You -- what's happening to you. You deserve it. It's the best possible thing for you. He was sincere and genuine."

He got Bar aside and told her the same thing. I was a little surprised that he knew about it since the President told me the only people he had mentioned it to were Haig and Kissinger.



From the desk of  
GEORGE BUSH

R

GB  
discussions  
with Lida

same notes

New Chairman  
~~~~~  
~~~~~

8-27-82

co-chairman

1. Ed Derwinsky ?

2. Bary Goldwater Jr.

3. Harry Dent !!

4. Ash Anne Armstrong


Mrs.

Tonite

515-279-5390

5. Dan Quayhead more & more  
resistance

6. Bill Cramm  
a) could live with  
Singer - but not lie on it  
- mcs not like -



From the desk of  
GEORGE BUSH

8-27

Mary Louise -

- ① wouldn't want conflict with Anne A.
- ② Anne told MLS Pres asked her to stay

Feel -


- ③ "Committee with accept reappointment of Pres. Ford."

D

---


It don't go Congressional route -

- ① I don't think it's made you ineffective but to feel pleasure you



*From the desk of*  
**GEORGE BUSH**

a) *ritty, gritty,*



From the desk of  
**GEORGE BUSH**

8-27

D Rumsfeld called from  
Brussels -

I can't figure why

---

wants to be RVC Chairman??

September 4, 1974 - 12:45 p.m. - talked to President Nixon - reserved, very reserved - "How's your family"? "Fine, George. Give my best to your family," he said. He was very formal, very perfunctory. I said it would be nice to come over there. Hinted twice about being nice to chat - like very much to visit on this, and the President never responded. He sounded very quiet. He chatted a little bit about China - saying that after 25 years - that it would be such a power - that it would be kind of lonely and quiet - things are isolated and separated - you only see people at big diplomatic functions - but it would be a great experience.

He was less than warm personally. I inquired about him and he was reserved. I gave him credit saying "This wouldn't have been possible of course without you" etc., etc., but he never warmed up at that. The conversation was very brief - Steve Bull put me on.

Reaction - I am glad I called but I feel ....

October 8, 1974 - Conversation with Sec. of State Kissinger.

Met at elevator - 3:45 - Henry K. rushing to President's speech on economy at Capitol - leaving at midnight for Middle East.

HECTIC!! worried about traffic etc. - mad-house.

Points of substance:

1. I raised question of being kept informed - mem-cons, etc. "You will be kept fully informed. Bruce has been kept fully informed."

(I know Bruce did not see all UN mem-cons, etc.)

2. I raised point - try to get to know new leaders? Did Solomon tell you to do that? "No. I've had good discussions with Solomon, but not on that." HK agreed it would be useful.

3. I told him I was worried about mood in Congress and what it meant to policy. I feel China policy, 'til now widely accepted. May come in for more flak if all that is seen are petty frustrations - refusing visas, no movement, etc.

HK picked this up - said when you get there you may want to impress on them need for forward movement in our November talks - (Action)

4. Consultations - asked if OK to come back as Bruce did.

HK - "Absolutely - I want you to come back."

5. HK said I should host a dinner for him in China - not at USLO but at General Hall of People. HK - Remember, I warned you - isolated, different etc. A lot of times boring but when substance very important. I will tell them that you are not just another ambassador but are to be trusted etc - same theme he gave to Chias at NY dinner.

"Pres - candidate" - close to Pres - could have had any ambassadorship he wanted - good man, etc."

All in all - cordial but at times pre-occupied - hectic.

HK does not retain personal grace when things are hectic - came alive as climbed out of car on Hill - waved to crowd etc. but with me never 'farewell', 'good luck' - yet when concentrating - very nice about all this.

I am enthralled by the brilliance of his sweep of history, mastering of his subjects, humor in diplomacy; but appalled at his vanity, disregard of others' feelings, disorganized hectic ways.

WOW!

HK spoke well of Holdridge.

PERSONAL NOTES  
OCT. 73 - AUG. 74.

OCT 73

BB  
Personal  
Notes