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
Record Group/Collection: Donated Historical Materials
Collection/Office of Origin: Bush, George H.W., Collection
Series: Personal Papers
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Folder ID Number: 25864-009

Folder Title:
Personal Notes - Oct. 73 - Aug. 74 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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
May 10, 1974



5-10 74

Rose Woods called me

- 1) "great fun"
- 2) not easy
- 3) just want you to know we appreciate it
- 4) Sec. Dent calling
- 5) "get lot of good calls from precinct people"
- 6) poor P.R. -



7) sound like this was
all he did during
this time -


8) things that went on
in Kennedy admin.

9) He has served the
country & world well

10) must get supportive
stuff out - love to

put this

55 minutes to hour to tape



11) Kean, LBJ, Ike
all listening, taping
etc.

12) more favorable
reaction - bring
country to nothing -

13) charge monument
going this way

call vice I
try to overcome
get out more good stuff

May 8, 1974 - This has been almost a turning point day. The reactions from the National Committee people to the President's tapes have been pretty darn bad. Tommy Thomas in Florida who has followed up til now, is shook up. Jack Edwards of Alabama saying he sees impeachment for the first time. Most of the Committee people distraught, concerned, deeply depressed about the lack of morality and what the President appears to have done. They are also confused from a very practical sense. They are not talking in terms of impeachable offenses or John Dean's credibility - simply a disillusionment with the man and with what he has done to the office and their dreams and their ideals. Tom Lias and Mary Louise are gathering up the national committee reactions.

I went over to the House of Representatives gym dinner^(longworth) and there had a talk with many of the members - like Del Latta and Sam Devine, among the hardest core supporters, feeling the President ought to get out. Sam saying, "I'll stick with him til the end but this is what he really ought to do." The more liberal people -- Mallary, Chuck Whalen, Howie Robison completely distraught - thoughtful, careful, jumping on the resignation theme, thinking it out in terms of the system, but feeling that something has to give. Nobody oddly enough feeling on the strict definition of 'impeachable offense' that the President is closer to impeachment. But almost unanimous in feeling that he has to get out. Jack Edwards told me that his mail from hard-core Nixon people is the worst he has ever seen. Walter Kennedy, who works the floor, told me he had never seen such rapid deterioration. John Rhodes himself not sure whether it can be held together or should be. Gary Brown, VanderJagt shook up. Had a big indebt discussion with Tom Kleppe, a moral, decent man -

tremendously concerned. John Anderson of Illinois obviously concerned. Robison offering to bite the bullet and ask the President to step out along with others that are not running if 'that would be helpful'. The mood of the entire place was unbelievable. The whole thing appeared at that meeting to come unraveled. The Democrats didn't seem gloating or happy about it. And quite a few were there. Boggs, Gonzales, Natcher, many being kind of solicitous to me, almost as if they understood the damnest, weirdest kind of a feeling. My own gut reactions are really mixed up. I believe this thing about resignation being bad for the system and yet for the first time it seems like it might be the only answer. I am not talking about short term politics. I am talking about the Presidency and what has happened to it because of these ugly revelations. Probably they went on before but that no longer seems to be the point. Others that were reported to be deeply concerned or wanted resignation are Lou Wyman, up for the Senate in New Hampshire, Jack Edwards mentioned above, Bill Wampler told me that he was staying with the President but that the overwhelming majority wanted resignation. It is almost like a cork out of a bottle - everything flowing out. Rhodes relayed Goldwater's view that it couldn't last more than two weeks. And that a concerted action would have to be taken. Rhodes has head off petitions of members calling on the President to resign. These are troubled times and they are difficult too -- to know what is the right and fair thing to do. The grandstand play is clear. The instant credibility with moral agony - get great headlines and yet it seems wrong, it seems outside the system, it seems unfair to a man to whom I owe loyalty but to whom I can no longer serve with the same sense of inner drive because the tapes have offended me so much.

I know it's the presidency and it's the Nixon man of accomplishment but there is a certain questioning of fundamentals that makes it tough to do this job correctly. Tough to speak the truth - if not telling the whole truth. My father taught me too well.

Wednesday night I called Dean Burch - reported to him on the deterioration I had seen at the House gym dinner. I asked if Haig knew about this. He said he felt he had. We alluded without mentioning names to a person from the southwest. I was thinking of Goldwater and his willingness within two weeks to join in a call for the resignation of the President. He was thinking of two people from the Southwest, one of whom "didn't seem shook up by all of this." I am not sure we are talking about the same incident. When I asked if there was any good news, he mentioned Bill Frenzel. Frenzel of Minnesota was not shook up and saw nothing impeachable. I told Burch that at the gym group none of them were talking impeachment, they were all talking disgust and demoralization about the tone of the tapes. We discussed the Chicago Tribune editorial hitting tomorrow. I told him that I advised nothing happening - letting everything sit for awhile. Keep it in a very low profile. I told him I didn't feel that the real bad stuff had hit in the country yet. I mentioned to John Rhodes that the Vice President ought to be completely kept out of these talks by members of congress about delegations or petitions. He should have absolutely no knowledge of, or role in, anything like that. All in all the lowest I have felt since I have been in this job.

(NIXON)
CHICAGO (UPI)--THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE, LONG REGARDED AS ONE OF THE NATION'S MOST STAUNCH REPUBLICAN NEWSPAPERS, WEDNESDAY CALLED FOR PRESIDENT NIXON TO LEAVE OFFICE FOR THE SAKE OF "THE PRESIDENCY, THE COUNTRY AND THE FREE WORLD."

IN A THREE-PART EDITORIAL APPEARING IN ITS THURSDAY MORNING EDITIONS, THE TRIBUNE SAID, "IT IS SADDENING AND HARD TO BELIEVE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR HISTORY, IT IS BETTER THAT THE PRESIDENT LEAVE OFFICE THAN TO FIGHT TO KEEP IT. BUT THINGS HAVE REACHED SUCH A STATE THAT MR. NIXON'S DEPARTURE, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, IS THE BEST COURSE...."

THE TRIBUNE SAID NIXON SHOULD LEAVE THE WHITE HOUSE EITHER BY RESIGNATION OR THROUGH THE PROCESS OF IMPEACHMENT, BUT SHOULD LEAVE IN ANY CASE.

REFERRING TO ITS PAST SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, THE TRIBUNE SAID, "WE SAW THE PUBLIC MAN IN HIS FIRST ADMINISTRATION AND WE WERE IMPRESSED. NOW IN ABOUT 300,000 WORDS WE HAVE SEEN THE PRIVATE MAN AND WE ARE APPALLED.

"WHAT MANNER OF MAN IS THE RICHARD NIXON WHO EMERGES FROM THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE WHITE HOUSE TAPES?

"WE SEE A MAN WHO, IN THE WORDS OF HIS OLD FRIEND AND DEFENDER, SEN. HUGH SCOTT, TOOK A PRINCIPAL ROLE IN A 'SHABBY, IMMORAL AND DISGUSTING PERFORMANCE.'

"THE KEY WORD HERE IS IMMORAL. IT IS A LACK OF CONCERN FOR MORALITY, A LACK OF CONCERN FOR HIGH PRINCIPLES, A LACK OF COMMITMENT TO THE HIGH IDEALS OF PUBLIC OFFICE THAT MAKE THE TRANSCRIPTS A SICKENING EXPOSURE OF THE MAN AND HIS ADVISERS.

"HE IS PREOCCUPIED WITH APPEARANCE RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. HIS AIM IS TO FIND A WAY TO SELL THE IDEA THAT DISREPUTABLE SCHEMES ARE ACTUALLY GOOD OR ARE DEFENSIBLE FOR SOME TRUMPED-UP CAUSE.

"HE IS HUMORLESS TO THE POINT OF BEING INHUMANE. HE IS DEVIOUS. HE IS VACILLATING. HE IS WILLING TO BE LED. HE DISPLAYS DISMAYING GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE. HE IS SUSPICIOUS OF HIS STAFF. HIS LOYALTY IS MINIMAL. HIS GREATEST CONCERN IS TO CREATE A RECORD THAT WILL SAVE HIM AND HIS ADMINISTRATION."

THE TRIBUNE SAID NIXON HAD MADE A STRATEGIC ERROR, BOTH WHEN HE RELEASED THE TRANSCRIPTS AND WHEN HE MADE PUBLIC HIS INCOME TAX RECORDS.

"BOTH STRIPPED THE MAN TO HIS ESSENTIAL CHARACTER, AND THAT CHARACTER COULD NOT STAND THAT KIND OF SCRUTINY," THE TRIBUNE SAID. "BOTH MISCALCULATIONS DEMONSTRATED AN ESSENTIAL NIXON DEFECT--AN INSENSITIVITY TO THE STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND MORALITY THAT AMERICANS EXPECT OF THEIR LEADERS...."

"THE PRESIDENT IS RIGHT IN URGING A QUICK END TO THE WATERGATE AFFAIR. HIS COUNTRY NEEDS A SWIFT AND MERCIFUL TERMINATION OF THIS AGONY.

"TWO ROADS ARE OPEN. ONE IS RESIGNATION. THE OTHER IS IMPEACHMENT. BOTH ARE LEGITIMATE AND WOULD SATISFY THE NEED TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS."

UPI 05-08 05:42 PED

UPI 149

CORRECTION:

IN (UPI-128) IN 5TH PGH READ IT X X X IF NEEDED.
DOAR REPLIED: "DEFINITELY NOT." (DOAR STED RODINO AND FIXING QUOTE)
UPI 05-08 04:34 PED

UPI155

(PAT)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- TAKING A SWIPE AT THE PRESS BECAUSE OF WATERGATE TROUBLES, PAT NIXON SAID WEDNESDAY "WE WILL WIN BECAUSE WE ARE RIGHT."

MRS. NIXON MADE THE REMARK TO SOME 50 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COUNSEL OF THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CLUB WHO VISITED THE WHITE HOUSE TO EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT NIXON.

MRS. GORDON LAMONT, CHAIRWOMAN OF THE GROUP, TOLD THE FIRST LADY THAT THE COUNCIL HAD PASSED ONTO THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF REPUBLICAN WOMEN A RESOLUTION "REAFFIRMING THEIR FAITH IN THE PRESIDENT, HIS PROGRAMS AND HIS CONSTRUCTIVE CONCEPTS FOR THE COUNTRY AND THE MEN IN CONGRESS WHO SUPPORT THEM."

"WE GET THIS KIND OF THING EVERYDAY," SAID MRS. NIXON. "IT'S NOT JUST HOW THE PRESS FEEL."

THIS WAS THE FIRST LADY'S FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE NIXON RELEASED HIS 1300 PAGE "BLUE BOOK" OF CONFIDENTIAL WATERGATE CONVERSATIONS IN HIS STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPEACHMENT. SHE EXUDED THE FIRST FAMILY'S FIGHTING SPIRIT.

MRS. PHILIP GOODMAN OF RIDGEWOOD, N.J. TOLD HER "WE'ER PROUD OF YOU EVERYDAY. EVERYONE BELIEVES SINCERELY IN WHAT THE PRESIDENT IS DOING. WE THANK GOD FOR THIS PRESIDENT AND YOU HAVE MANY FRIENDS."

"WE GET THIS KIND OF THING EVERYDAY FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY," MRS. NIXON RESPONDED.

MRS. LAMONT TOLD HER THAT THE WOMEN WERE BRINGING WITH THEM "THEIR FULL SUPPORT" AND THE FIRST LADY REPLIED: "I DIDN'T KNOW THIS WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A TESTIMONIAL. I THOUGHT IT WAS A HAND SHAKER."

MRS. LAMONT ALSO QUOTED SEN. STROM THURMOND, R-S.C., AS SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT IS VERY BELEAGUERED AND HE HAS DONE NOTHING THAT IS ILLEGAL.

"YOU HAVE MORE FRIENDS THAN YOU WILL EVER KNOW," MRS. LAMONT ADDED.

MRS. ROBERT PATTERSON, WHOSE HUSBAND SERVED AS SECRETARY OF WAR UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMAN, TOLD REPORTERS "THANK GOD THEY DID NOT HAVE TAPES IN THOSE DAYS. I'M FOR COMPLETE EXONERATION."

MRS. PATTERSON WHO RESIDES IN NEW YORK, SAID THAT SHE DOES NOT PLAN TO READ THE TAPES AND ADDED "I THINK THIS IS THE TIME TO RALLY," BEHIND THE PRESIDENT.

BEFORE MEETING WITH THE GOP WOMEN, MRS. NIXON HONORED THE FIVE MILITARY WIVES OF THE YEAR WHO TOLD HER THAT THEY WERE PROUD OF THE PRESIDENT.

UPI 05-08 05:28 PED

May 21 - 27, 1974 - During the week of May 20 there was a kind of a lull, a quiet settled over the Hill after the emotion of the release of the tapes. I almost got the feeling that no one across the country is reading the tapes because the mail has kind of tapered off - expressing indignation or concern about them after the original emotional impact.

There is however a kind of 'let down' feeling about the President. A lot of his own supporters, a lot of the Party people, are turned off by the tapes, discouraged, feel that it is ugly. I sometimes think perhaps I feel that more strongly than many do, but nevertheless it's not good.

I had a meeting with Goldwater - 9:00 a.m. May 22, Old Senate Office Building. We talked at length. He raised with me the 'cue' theory without[?] mentioning any names. I didn't pick it up when he said that, but at the end of the conversation I came back and told him that I knew that people in the White House, and even a good fellow like Bryce Harlow, had expressed concern to me on that point. I told them that if there was any truth to that it would be most serious and outrageous. He told me that he felt we were playing it about right. He thought that if the House voted in large numbers to impeach the President, the President should resign and would resign. He talked about the timing to call on the President for resignation - not indicating what he would do but implying that at a future time he might have to do that. He almost seemed to feel that impeachment in the House was inevitable. He told me how he was playing the story at home, saying that he didn't like a lot of the things that had happened and he was against a lot of the things but that there were some good accomplishments etc. He didn't seem worried about his own re-election at all. I did not

visit with John Rhodes last week. I did visit with many members of congress in Hugh Scott's office. There is a kind of feeling of 'resignation' due to the gravity of the situation. Helplessness to do anything about it. Concern, let down, etc. The House seems unanimous in its opposition to withholding data, further information. The public does not understand it either. I had a talk with Al Haig who called me on Sunday in Greenwich just to chat. I told him I hoped we wouldn't get into the confrontation position and permit the members of congress to 'get off the hook' on the issue of not furnishing dope. I felt a lot of them would like to get off the hook on this, thus avoiding a vote as to the guilt or innocence of the President. Haig seemed to indicate that this would not happen. The more I hear Ziegler speaking about criticizing the Committee etc., the less helpful I think it is. My frustration is growing.

The Vice President is taking a position that the information should be forthcoming but defending the President on issues - "no impeachable offense," "House won't vote to impeach," etc. Our position this week has been "let the system work" - low profile. "People will approach it in a statesman-like way. Not prejudice, give credit for good things that have happened, etc." Oddly enough there has not been an escalation of talk that the tapes themselves do great damage to the President's case. He might make the point that it has worked the other way. I saw where President Nixon appointed Ken Rush to be the economic co-ordinator. My mind went to the chat I had with him about the No. 2 job in the State Dept., a job I would sorely like to do - couldn't do now, and maybe couldn't do in even normal political times, given the strong personality of Henry Kissinger, for whom I have great respect but for whom it would be very difficult to work with his method of operating.

In the talk with Haig Sunday he seemed to indicate that things were getting better, his mail turned around. He had a much more optimistic view than I do of things. Where he is getting it from I do not know. If I didn't feel so deeply about the tapes, the discrepancies, the abysmal handling of the matter by those around the President, by the cover-up -- it really disturbs me to see Magruder being an instant hero given what he did - perhaps if I didn't feel concerned I could do a more overt, all-out job of Rabbi Korff-ing the situation. But I can't do that. I do owe a certain judgment to the committee and my own judgment is that this Watergate matter - the amoral tone of the tapes, is no good at all. Having said that, there has been much irresponsible reporting - the leaks, the epithets (Jew boy, Wap) - shown not to exist by Garment. This is just an example of many.

I am commissioning a poll to try to measure the effect of all of this on congressional candidates. The Cincinnati experience and also Indiana, saying simply stay out of the state to all national figures, is an example of the deterioration of things politically. Even though I continue to feel there will be no wipe-out in the Fall.

June 11, 1974 - Meeting with the Vice President - 9:00 a.m. - EOB - meeting lasted about 45 minutes. Ford is still the same relaxed, easy-to-talk-to individual. I reported to him on the national poll we were taking, on his finances (we were about \$110,000 in the hole - having been billed \$210,000 and receiving about \$100,000). We talked about our national television program. Ford expressed an interest - wants to do it, wants to help on it. Discussed the overall White House situation. I did not get the feeling that Ford felt pressured by the White House. Indeed he had received a hand-written note from the President. The President told him as he had left for the Middle East that he had written it at 3 a.m. on Saturday morning - pointing out that he writes very few hand-written letters. The letter was apparently complimentary of the job Jerry was doing and Ford of course was very pleased with this.

He told me about a meeting he had had with Rabbi Korff under which Korff had taped his comments for a book he was writing. Korff led off by asking if indeed the President was impeached and convicted by the Senate would Ford then announce ahead of time that he was not willing to serve under those conditions. Ford was absolutely shocked and amazed. I told him that we had serious reservations about Korff's judgment, that a lot of the people in the Korff movement were real nuts. I knew Korff didn't think the national committee was doing enough but that we were trying to act restrained. I also reported to the Vice President on my discussion in the oval office in which I told the President the tapes were playing badly, and I took exception to Fred Dent's statement as reported by Haig to the President that the free enterprise system would be dead if the President got out. We were talking about credibility, recognizing that it had to be retained. I told Ford the one place I would have to part company with the

done publicly
several times
by GWS

White House would be on any refusal to live up to a Supreme Court decision. The Vice President indicated that he had said publicly that this should be complied with and that he agreed. I told him that I thought John Rhodes had done the right thing to position himself on the Supreme Court question.

Ford used the theme last night at the UNA dinner about the President is the one that should be getting the ultimate credit for foreign policy, a theme very much like the one I used in the AP broadcasters. We both agree it is a sound position. Ford felt that the President's chances to not be impeached were somewhat improved. Ford was very nice, as I left thanking me for the job I was doing for the party etc. He was very high in his appreciation of Dean Burch and though we didn't talk about it as much, his appreciation for the job Al Haig is doing. The tension that Hartman alluded to several weeks ago after the Cabinet meeting between the Vice President and the White House seems to be ameliorated. The President's meeting with Ford helped on this - Ford making clear that he had to be his own man, and had to retain credibility if his defense of the President was going to mean anything at all.

July 11, 1974 - Right after the Cabinet meeting on July 11 I had a visit with Al Haig. We discussed the poll that we had taken and I left him a copy of it. I told him how adversely the integrity issue had affected the Republican Party. Haig seemed to understand. I recall a difference. The last time I talked to him he was telling me that it would be the end of the Party if the President left office, but this time he simply shook his head and seemed to understand what it was that I was saying. I told him that this poll and other things made me more and more convinced than ever that we had to have a national television program - that we would handle the President's foreign policy proudly. Haig agreed in principle with this. I told him the only reason I discussed it with him is that the President expressed a reservation when I saw him but that we had absolutely no choice - that we had to go forward. Again he concurred with that.

I wrote a long letter about the need to replace Ziegler and Clawson, pointing out that nobody believed them and that the White House position was ill-served by having both of them there. I handed the letter to Haig - told him that I thought it might be useful but that I wouldn't leave it if it would cause any problems. I had not signed the letter. Al read through it - held up the last page and indicated that I should go ahead and sign it. He kept it. He told me that he originally had had great problems with Ziegler in terms of vying for authority and fighting for position but that that had been worked out and things were going much more smoothly. The President had worked it out and insisted that it be worked out. He had indicated that he had wanted to bring Klein back although he really preferred McCloskey. He did not indicate one way or another whether action would be taken on the recommendation. I also briefed him on the Vesco matter, that we might be sued,

alleging corporate funds from the Nixon campaign in '68. I left him the letter on that. He told me that he was going to call Robert O. Anderson about being ambassador to England - call him today. Anderson had indicated to Annenberg that he would accept. He also told me that on the Veterans thing that Paul Beuka was not acceptable, that he did not have the organizational clout that he needed, that he was not going to get the job, that he had so told Perot, and that Perot had indicated that he agreed he wasn't ready for the job. I told him Teague's reservation, the political problems that Teague told me would exist regarding Bryan of California. I said we were staying out of the matter but I felt he should know this, in as much as Teague had volunteered it, indicating that if Beuka was turned down for being young why could a man younger be put in. Haig expressed genuine feeling that Roudebush would be no good whatsoever. I told him that candidly I didn't disagree with that, that I felt that Hammerschmidt, ranking member of Veterans, agreed but it is very difficult to publicly take a position against a member of congress.

Also July 11, breakfast with Tom Railsback and Pete Biester. I came away impressed with the sincerity and conviction and integrity of Railsback and Biester. Tom filled me in on where things stood in the Judiciary Committee -- as of today he thinks there are three undecided votes. He said that Mann, who hates Nixon, will vote for impeachment. He said he, Flowers and Butler are the only ones undecided. Cohen will vote for impeachment. Twenty Democrats are for impeachment. We discussed Butler. He said that Butler can do it politically because he has great integrity. He warned that John Anderson of Illinois might lead a fight on the floor which would attract maybe thirty Republican votes for impeachment. He teased Biester about being uncommitted, figuring that Biester would vote to impeach. Rails told me that Flanigan had called Bill Hewitt, Deere and Company out in his district, trying to get Hewitt

to put pressure on Rails. Hewitt called up and told Tom to do what he wanted to do and Tom refrained from going public. Can you imagine the press if that was out that the White House was putting pressure on the members? I don't think the White House conceives it this way. He said that Getts in his district was also with him. He was worried about hush money and the prostitution of the institutions on behalf of the President. The other issues like ITT and the milk fund stuff didn't add up to any problem at all. He is still clearly uncommitted as to what he is going to do. He pointed out that on him and one or two others the press were playing them up as apt to vote for impeachment. And he is already getting pressure to 'stick with' the voting for impeachment. He named a Mary McGrory story and Harry Kelly story in the Chicago Tribune. We discussed at length the effect on his congressional district, the no-win situation that many congressmen would find themselves in. Biester felt that a pro-Nixon vote was much easier politically than an anti-Nixon vote by a Republican.

We had a long discussion on that and they agreed that the evidence wasn't as hard as so all reasonable people could agree. I made a pitch that if it wasn't hard evidence it seemed to me you could justify a non-impeachment vote even though you didn't like the tone of things. Incidentally at the Haig meeting thereafter Haig told me he was absolutely convinced the House would not impeach, Rhodes and Ford so reported to the President this morning. Biester and Rails advised keeping the Party in as much a neutral stance as possible just to protect as many members, recognizing that it would be perfectly OK to criticize when there was partisanship surfacing. They both conceded I was on a very delicate wick. I discussed with them some of the polls, showing

where it was good on behalf of Republicans that the Party should be supporting the President. There is a real dilemma there. Rails told me he is going to talk with Walt Flowers before the vote. They agreed that they would really think it through together. They were convinced that the matter would be decided by August 23 in the House.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	CLASS.
1. Diary	Diary Entry for July 14, 1974 (4 pp.)	07/14/74	C	
COLLECTION George Bush Personal Papers Republican National Committee Files				
FILE LOCATION Personal Notes - Oct. 73 - Aug. 74 [2] OA/ID Number Date Closed 10/06/99				

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Photo Copy Preservation

July 18, 1974 - Jo Good came in - devoted her whole life to the Party.

She told me last week when the Judiciary Committee released the unedited transcripts, the ones that showed the ugly discussions in the White House of Party, the effort to show O'Donnell as a whiner so that in Texas you can bypass the Party if that's the only way to do it. She was demoralized. She said that her friends don't even talk to her. She feels betrayed. She feels let down. Her heart isn't in it. She can't work positively. She wasn't whining. She was simply in great sorrow, saying how it was. She doesn't understand the White House and why they don't understand the problems of the Party. Larry Koffman (?) had a story in the paper last night talking about the pressures on the White House. They still are a little insensitive to others. Their whole point is the survival of the President. There is no real concern over Party and my own sense of frustration is growing and increasing. I find I am not condemning those things I would normally condemn. I am certainly not condoning them, but given the sensitivity of this job, the political realities, and indeed given the judicial process, the fairness that is required of me, I cannot quantify my indignation as I would like to, and thus I am probably not giving the kind of moral leadership to the Party that it ought to have.

I had a long talk with Larry Hogan this morning. I think he is less certain of a vote for the President than the White House feels. He's a decent guy. He feels there is some ugly stuff in the transcripts - just unbelievable. The White House must not consider each vote not to impeach as a condonation of these things that went wrong. There is a demoralization amongst Republicans, even the President's strong supporters, who feel let down. Hogan told eloquently of the arrogance of the White House and the way it had never had any responsiveness at all. I told him that I hadn't really seen this and he then launched into details of how bad it had been over the years and how ill-served the President had been.

photo Copy Preservation

July 19, 1974 - Iowa Convention - I am most impressed with Governor Bob Ray - tremendously popular in Iowa - went from being state chairman to being Governor and won over the more conservative elements by simply being a strong leader with a big following. This year he shows way ahead of his closest competitor. Dave Stanley, the candidate for Senator, may beat John Culver - spoke too long - in his hiking clothes from walking across the state - voice trained and lacking a certain sincerity and yet in other ways he did a pretty good job. He'll probably win against Culver or at least he has a good chance to beat him. John MacDonald, the State Chairman, a very decent guy, a thorough going professional. He would make a good national chairman if indeed the President had a different view of the national committee.

I rode out with Wiley Mayne, a member of the Judiciary Committee, to Iowa. I did not talk to him about how he would vote. I had breakfast with Larry Hogan the day before and I did not talk to him about how he'd vote. I have seen Railsback a lot and I've not talked to him about his vote. It is tempting to ask and most of the members there are very good friends but I view the proceedings as so serious that I would not want them to misunderstand my intentions. I am concerned that some people in the White House don't understand this. Encouragement for Rabbi Korff worries me. Korff invites the chiefs of states and ambassadors to go to his presidential rally. It seems to me grossly abusive to do this. I so advised Bruce Herschensohn, Pat Buchanan, and Dick Moore at the White House, strongly urging that this be discouraged and strongly urging that Target 38, Korff's group that was supposed to go marching on the various 38 members of the Judiciary Committee, be kept under control. Herschensohn advised properly that they can't control Korff but once he is perceived to be that close to the President it is hard to separate the

White House from what he does. He had that week given the President a copy of his book. I just met with Jerry Ford at lunch with the New Jersey delegation and Ford again told me how insensed he was by Korff's question, "If the President is impeached, by the Senate, would you refuse to serve as President"? Ford's answer came out kind of stuttering in the paper but Ford explained that this guy Korff, coming from the White House, having had an interview with Nixon, slipped up on his blind side - and I can certainly understand this. I am on record with the White House in writing about Korff and yet I guess if I were in the President's shoes I could feel that embattledness and say thank God someone at least is standing up for me.

What I think is needed now is effective persuasion by the peers of the members on the Judiciary Committee in the House. I think it is right that they consider politics although the final decision should be made on the evidence itself. The politics of it in my view is that the worst thing for Republicans this fall would be to have the President twisting slowly in the wind, to turn an old Ehrlichman phrase, with the Senate trial during the elections. The best thing politically would be to have the House fail to impeach the President and thus have Watergate somewhat behind us. I would make a prediction today that the House might fail to impeach by a small vote but it would not at all surprise me if 5 or 6 Republicans on the Committee voted to impeach. I don't think that will happen. John Rhodes is very confident that it won't. I talked to him yesterday before leaving for Iowa, telling him I thought we had a bad day the day before, and he told me he disagreed. He and the leadership had met with the Judiciary Committee and they didn't think that Cohen was set to vote for impeachment. I had a

long talk with John Anderson and I get the distinct feeling that he is giving serious consideration to leading the impeachment fight against the President on the Floor. Anderson of course is suspected by the White House. I talked to Barber Conable at the Ways and Means Dinner. He told me he himself doesn't know how he is going to vote. My problem is that many of the people I respect the most in the House appear to be thinking about impeachment. I am sure Pete Biester fits this description. Railsback and I had breakfast with him. What I try to do is to explain the political implications of where we stand and the impact of Watergate on the party etc. and then of course stop short of dictating what they should do. I jumped on Strauss the other day when he said he had reviewed all the evidence and felt as a lawyer the President was guilty. My position has been different. The system should work expeditiously. There ought not to be a predetermination of guilt. There is a difference when you express confidence that a man will be acquitted (presumption of innocence) but I have tried to stay out of quantifying the evidence and out of being shrill with attacks on the Judiciary Committee.

I have the distinct feeling that Jenner has been a tremendous disappointment. He has gone at it almost as a surrogate for Doar - not recognizing that there can be times when minority members need strong and articulate leadership for positions that the majority might not agree with. Several members have told me that Jenner was far less able than they thought as well. The problem at this point in time boils down to the fact that there is an accumulation of bad things. The IRS stuff by Ehrlichman, all the Colson crap, of course Segretti, and Magruder and all he didn't stand for - total downgrading of the political process - nasty remarks in the transcripts about the Texas Republican Party and Peter O'Donnell - just a whittling away by sheer ugliness of any confidence that the Party or the people felt for the President. And

yet throughout it there does not seem to be evidence that was promised and almost pledged by the various aspects of the press. There is a certain insensitivity and indecency that comes through everything that makes me absolutely sick and makes this job almost impossible, and yet in fairness I keep saying well what is the hard evidence to throw the President out of office? What does it amount to? I don't believe it's there and yet I sometimes wonder how I would vote.

The White House still does not basically have a feel for the Party or its problems. They are properly concerned about the survival of the President. The high-levels seem to understand the problem I have. Dean Burch is very sensitive to it. I think Al Haig is. I know Richard Moore is. I am sure Pat Buchanan is to a degree. But it is not their job to worry about the Party. On the Strauss attack, I had the feeling others wanted me to climb on him much harder but in fairness no one mandated it. They did call me as a member of the President's cabinet to go to the Korff Dinner. I told them I could not make it. This came through a secretary in Guthrie's office. I told them that I was not invited and couldn't go because of the Ways and Means dinner. At that dinner Carl Albert, Al Ullman were both talking impeachment and I heard Ullman talking about 40 or 60 votes for impeachment.

July 23, 1974 - was the day that Larry Hogan held a press conference and announced that he was going to vote for the impeachment of the President. He said, "My President has lied," and all in all made a very big, grandstand announcement. I can't say this caught me totally by surprise. I had breakfast with Larry Thursday or Friday of last week. He indicated that there were 6 to 8 votes in the Judiciary Committee that were undecided. I remember conveying this to Dean Burch, telling him that I was worried about the President's support, that there had been a certain erosion. I related the Hogan conversation to him although Hogan did not in any way tell me what he was going to do. I just felt uneasy about his position and tried to show him the best thing politically would be for the House not to impeach the President (in terms of pure politics).

Bill Timmons called me. I got the call in Dallas. He was all concerned and asked me to call Hogan. I told him I doubted Hogan would return the call but I placed it and sure enough I never did get it. After the Hogan statement I talked to Dean Burch. I urged him not to be too shrill and not to be used though he told me he felt he had to hit Hogan for this. I told him I did not feel I could do this as Republican National Chairman. We simply cannot get in a position of attacking every Republican who takes a position different from the White House and the President on impeachment. Dean told me that he understood this very clearly. Later that afternoon, the 23rd, I talked to Johnie Rhodes who is concerned about a flap of his own where Norris Cotton had misquoted him out of a Senate Policy Committee luncheon, indicating that Rhodes had said the President was apt to be impeached, that the votes were there to impeach the President. Rhodes was very concerned about this and he was also concerned about Hogan. He and I both agreed that I ought not

to be positioning the whole Republican National Committee or Party on the Hogan question. He felt that it would backfire and it would hurt the President and would certainly be resented by Republican Members who might end up voting for impeachment. I talked to Rhodes from the airport in Dallas on my way to El Paso. When I got to El Paso it turned out the White House was urgently trying to get me -- Al Haig, Rog Morton and Ziegler. I talked first to Haig who told me he hoped I would consider 'coming out on this' tomorrow. He told me that Vice President Ford was up on the Hill, that he had met with the Good Guys. He told me that Hogan colleagues had 'marked him as the #1 traitor'. He indicated that they were not too shaken by what he did. He indicated that Ford feels we ought to have Party unity on this. Haig was very open, very friendly, no pressure, but did point out that they would like me to have a comment supportive of the President and against Hogan. I raised this question with Haig of the erosion of Democratic support by making this a purely partisan matter. I reminded him that I had attacked Strauss for making it partisan and that now I would be doing exactly the same thing I accused him of. I also told him I felt what I did would be resented by Republicans and would cost the President Democratic support -- and there are more of them than there are us, I told him, and if it turns out to be a purely partisan vote it seems to me we let conservative Democrats off the hook by attacking and making it a party unity position. Haig very openly agreed that the argument was worth discussion. We vowed to stay in touch and once again I appreciated the enormous strain that he is under. I had a feeling that perhaps he had a feeling of the predicament that I was in in terms of being head of the Party and what this kind of problem does to our chances of the election in the fall. I told him I just didn't want to

divide the Party any more on this. I then talked to the office and talked to Ron Ziegler who was calling in about a quote by me where I said that I disagreed with Ziegler about the hearings by the Judiciary Committee being a Kangaroo Court. Ziegler pointed out that this wasn't what he said. He had simply accused Doar of using Kangaroo Court tactics. I told him that I had simply responded to a question - that I was glad to have the clarification - that I in no way meant to attack him but that I very strongly agreed with St. Clair and Ford that the Committee for the most part had approached their hearings in a judicious manner. I reminded Ron that I had indeed spoken out at times when I felt this hadn't been the case. Ziegler said, "I am not upset about it but I just wanted you to know what I had actually said." I continue to feel that Ziegler could best serve the President by leaving. I like him but he has totally lost credibility.

I listened to the radio, to the tube - heard Clawson's attack - I guess I heard that Wednesday morning. Heard Burch's statement which I thought was fairly reserved. Haig told me that Rog Morton had really blasted Hogan. I then returned Rog Morton's call to Maine. He was great. He indicated that he never had attacked Republicans, that he had been asked to do it, that he felt badly about it, but that he also felt that Hogan had done something wrong. He read me the statement which was somewhat personal and quite negative about Hogan but on the whole was not a blustery, savage attack. It seems to me that Louise Gore will now escalate her attack on Hogan, rallying to the President's side. I don't quite know what effect this will have in the primary. In my view Hogan made a mistake in kind of grandstanding this, especially with the debate going on. We have asked for judicious and expeditious hearings, in my view the whole thing should be determined fully, and the debate should be

finished before people express their views. I told Rog that I didn't take exception to his statement but that I did feel that we had to be careful about attacking Republicans and that I simply couldn't get into this. I told him that I thought his constituency, being a friend of the President and in his Cabinet, was somewhat different from mine - all in all we ended up agreeing. Morton told me - "I feel really bad but he got the message from Haig "The President wants you to take him on". Rog suggested that we need a policy on all of this. He termed Hogan's move political and "one of self-interest".

Wednesday morning I talked to Jerry Ford. I told him what I had told Haig. I urged that we not get into a Party unity bit on this and that we not attack other Republicans. He agreed that he and I were in unique positions and that we must not do that. I told him that that was the position that I had taken rather firmly with Haig, and that Haig seemed to understand. Ford agreed with me totally. It will be interesting to see what happens. As I write this the Hogan affair has been replaced in the news by the Supreme Court decision - the 8-0 decision against the President - another reason not to react.

Ford is in a tremendously delicate position. The White House obviously sees Ford slipping away. They do not like it but the strong reaction with each unfavorable event will not help. The more the White House reacts with vindictiveness - ala Clawson - the more firm the resolve of Members of Congress including certain Republicans. Those attacks of the White House are counter-productive. They simply don't understand that and yet I can understand that sometimes the President must feel all alone and under-represented.

July 23, 1974 - I am dictating this on the way from Los Angeles to San Francisco. I came to Los Angeles to do a press conference on our television show and all the questions were on the Supreme Court decision of 8-0 that the President should give up the tapes. I predicted at the press conference that he would abide by the decision, and therefore I would not speculate on alternatives. I got four questions - two of them repeats on the show and all the rest of them, at a very large press conference, on the Supreme Court decision, one on Hogan that was quickly shoved off the newspages by the tape decision. I feel a clear deterioration over the President's position in the committee.

I called Tom Railsback and talked with him. He indicated that there would be some attempt to delay until all the evidence had been seen. He thought the Republicans would want to postpone it and would want to do this. He went over and reported to Rhodes on his position. He felt that Rhodes was very understanding. He thinks there will be six Republicans voting for impeachment. They would be Cohen, Railsback, Fish, Butler, Hogan and maybe McClory. He said I will be one of them - the case on the cover-up is devastating. He told me that he had been to the Sperling group for breakfast. They asked the question, "Will you hurt yourself if you vote for impeachment?". He indicated that maybe so, but the Republican Party would bounce back strongly. He said this White House does not represent the future of the Republican Party. He predicted fifty on the floor would vote for impeachment. He mentioned Dean's testimony where Nixon told him to go back and work on the IRS to get the returns out on all the McGovern staffers. He said that John Rhodes knows that it's all over. He told me that McClory wants to vote for impeachment but for the wrong reasons; namely that the President didn't comply with their subpoena. Rails indicated

he thought this was stupid. Rails told me I want to come over and show you the case. When you go over the tapes and the information you will understand why I have concluded what I have. I know you well enough to know that you probably would vote to impeach to, given these facts. I told him I wouldn't comment on that but that I respected Republicans for diversity, that I would not attack Hogan or others, and agreed that the situation was deteriorating. I then called Dean Burch. I told him that we were faced with a real deteriorating situation. He knew it. He predicted that the President would comply with the Supreme Court decision. I indicated to him that this wouldn't lend itself for P.R.

The question of resignation came up again at the press conference - the first time I had been asked this in a long time. I will predict that there will be an increased cry now for resignation if the House votes by substantial numbers to impeach the President. There was a question at the press conference asking who was the head of the Party - the old divisive effort to drive the wedge between the Party and the President. I have pointed out that the President is the head of the Party traditionally and presently and that's the way it should be. I also tried to get in the pitch about the positive accomplishments and emphasizing the pluses, but it all rang rather hollow with the enormity of that 8-0 Supreme Court decision. Burch indicated that it had taken them by surprise. He indicated they had not felt it would be that unanimous.

There is a certain fatalistic mood now and I feel frustrated that there is really nothing one can do. My job is to try to hold this party together. They asked me whether I would criticize Hogan and I said, "No", that I was not going to criticize any Republican. I hadn't since I was in this job and I simply wasn't going to do it. I can imagine the concern at the White House given this position.

It is very difficult to know what the next move is. I'll go to San Francisco - there will be another press conference on a television show but the questions will all be what the President has said regarding the Supreme Court and what will happen in the House. These are complicated times. I can't imagine a set of circumstances in terms of Party that are more complicated. I feel frustrated that our programs and our philosophy and the President's magnificent record on war and peace would normally have us riding high even in spite of the problems of inflation. This Watergate thing dominates all the news. It doesn't dominate the concern of the voters. The concern of the voters is still on inflation where of course we have a tremendous problem.

July 31, 1974 - Al Haig had called me last night when I was at the ballgame. I called back and said that if he still wanted me I was in. This afternoon he called and I asked him to come by after he went to see Kissinger and Eastland. He said that might not work out. I offered to come to his office and he said fine. I went down there about 2:20 and we talked for close to an hour. He reviewed the entire situation. I spoke to him very frankly about the President's chances. I told him that I thought we were worse off in the House than the White House probably thought - losing votes from people that we should be getting them from and that I thought the Senate would similarly deteriorate. He indicated the following to me:

- that there would be more bad news including a major shock from one of the tapes
- a sentence that the President had been up the mountain top and down several times meaning considering resignation. Haig's own view lended toward resignation though he certainly told the President he obviously would stick by the decision (the more I see Haig, the more I realize what tremendous pressures he's been under)

He told me that Ziegler was no longer going to speak out on Watergate and agreed that the Kangaroo Court wordage that he thought might have come from the President, came from Ziegler. He told me the President denied he had even had anything to do with it. Ziegler is now out of the Watergate statement business but it's too darn late in my view.

The President is holding up pretty well. He is under tremendous pressure. I reminded Haig that nothing we had ever discussed had been leaked in any way. He noted that, and preceded to be very frank with me. I told him that the Party, normally unimportant in terms of total power, was beginning to unravel but that I didn't see any party people that were going to make immediate statements saying the President ought to get out. We both agreed that any resignation should come from the President and there should be no delegations to which he would respond or anything of that nature.

Haig made some reference to the fact that the decision would be made within the next twenty-four hours and he thought the decision was going to be made all out to go ahead. If it was made the President would have to take the offense, go up and testify himself, work with the Party, work with the Senators, have a very strong offense. I asked how the family was holding up. Haig said fine. Haig was terribly complementary of Ford and the job he was doing, indicating that that was one of the best things the President had ever done.

We talked about the House leadership. He was furious at John Rhodes, feeling that Rhodes held the gun to the President's head in the past on impeachment, that he still hasn't made up his mind on how he's going to vote, and indeed he was not providing any leadership to the House - never get re-elected etc.

I was reminded here of the conversation I had had with him in Lancaster, Ohio when he was deeply upset with Jerry Ford.

I don't know how Haig remains as decent and pleasant as he is under this enormous pressure where I am sure he feels great isolation. Certainly he did not discount resignation in its entirety. We talked over and over again about various scenarios and combinations of vote. I told him that in my view if the President was going to resign he ought to do it now rather than later. If he resigned after the elections we would probably take a bigger bath in the elections and then the new president would be faced with a Congress far to the left of where the country stood and he would also be denied a honeymoon period because many of the people coming in would have no personal affection for the Vice President such as the present members of Congress both Democrats and Republicans feel. I felt that the honeymoon period now indeed would help the country and clearly would help the country keep from moving left in the elections. I told Haig I didn't feel that

political expediency should be a consideration for resignation however. But it was hard to discount politics. We both agreed that what is best for the country counts. We discussed the effect on the President, the humiliation, the economic effects. I suggested that clearly the country would not expect him to be dragged through courts and stuff. Haig talked about Robespierre and the need to pursue after somebody is driven from office in history. I was not familiar with all of this but I told him I thought many responsible journalists, even those that hated the President, would relent. I told Haig that in my view that what happened to the President was just an accumulation of the weight of it all. One shock after another. Matters like the Connally indictment, the Ehrlichman conviction, the various White House aides, etc. were the things that all added up and dragged the President down. I told him that I wished the President did not have to leave the opinion that these were the two finest servants. Haig indicated to me that he realized that he had been had by the finest top aides. I told him how very strongly I felt on this. Haig stopped short of being critical of me although I will readily concede the White House probably feels I have not done enough to partisanize it. He feels the proceedings of the Judiciary Committee have been much less than fair, that there has been a vendetta, that they oozed evidence out to hurt the President, that many of our people bit the bullet and are going to have revenge taken by the voters. I told him I didn't think there would be as much of this as he felt. I told him the adverse affects on Party in terms of money, morale, deterioration of support, of real strong support. I told him that I did not love the President, I respected his achievements and asked whom the President was talking to. Haig indicated he did not go out and discuss with others but that he was getting all kinds of inputs through Haig and that he was very realistic about the situation. We talked about what Goldwater might do, but I gathered that Haig feels Gold-

water is firm. I talked about the so-called Fry plan. I told him I had sent a memo down to him. He said it wouldn't work. He thought it was too gimmicky etc. I argued that it would get Republicans off the hook even if the Democrats turned it down. The President could make it that he tried to spare the nation. I told him the reaction of the people at the Grove to the President's speech - good but really not focusing on it because of the impeachment proceedings. It was normally first class news but was overtaken by all the events of the moment. Haig was convinced that Rhodes would never be leader again because of his position. He thinks Ford understands this about Rhodes - that he's not strong.

We discussed how everything had changed in a year. Haig alluded to, but was not crying about, the difficulty he had in getting the facts and in getting the President to address himself to things. He felt the President would agree to things and to do things and then he would just completely change his mind, and change the orders 'behind his back'. The meeting in summary was exploratory. I gathered he wanted my views on it. We had a very frank discussion - where I disagreed with him I told him. There was much more detail than I have recorded here, agonizing over the various options -- resignation, toughing it out, how to treat it in the Senate, the general feeling of what might happen in the Senate, where the country should go. I respect Haig for the view "what's best for the country". He gets so close to the forest that I am sure he doesn't see the trees at times and he gets a little disproportionate input - feeling embattled and surrounded down there but generally he is broadgadged and has an enormous grasp of things. Al is one of my favorite people. Someday we may have a clash because he'll want me to do something I can't do but I expect he's the kind of guy I will always respect.

August 5, 1974 - a calamitous day. Burch called me right after noon and asked me if I could come down to the White House, that he had some news, that he was going to go out and brief Johnny Rhodes and was taking Buzhardt with him. Wondered if I could come down there and ride out and get clued in. I went down. The news was, of course, the tapes. All we had was the statement. We didn't have a copy of the tapes. We went out to Rhodes' house. Presented it to Rhodes who had been clued in on it by Wiggins.

It became clear we were all upset. I even suggested that in order to move things forward I would consider resigning, saying the President was entitled to some kind of defense but I could no longer defend him. Therefore I would resign. I would call a meeting of the national committee and let them select a chairman who could. (That buzzer ringing on the tape at 10 minutes of 10 was Al Haig calling me at home) My feeling being not to run away but simply to highlight the dilemma. Burch and Buzhardt said that somebody needs to be around to pick up the pieces and clearly this wouldn't be a good thing to do.

I felt at the time I should have made clear to them that it was not my intention to run away from a tough situation but rather to lead, because I feel so strongly about what happened. We talked at length to Rhodes who indicated that the President didn't know what was right and do it. A reiteration of his resignation call perhaps. John was sick - had laryngitis and had cancelled a press conference to state his position on impeachment. I then went with Buzhardt up to the Hill. He went in to talk to the Judiciary Committee people and I ducked into the cloak-room. There the President's statement was passed around and there was a kind of general wondering what it all meant.

Jim Collins, Bill Harsha, Clarence Miller - a whole bunch of them - I told them I thought it was going to be serious, a real bombshell. A little later the announcement started coming on TV in the cloakroom and then Charles Sandman came in and told us that he thought all Republican members would vote for impeachment. It was a real tough blow for him.

From that moment on the thing unraveled mercilessly. We called the National Committee at night. Jean Sullivan felt betrayed. Gordon Luce and Banowsky called for resignation, and for the first time we saw enormous cracks in the Republican National Committee structure in terms of support. Many hoping he would quietly get out. I had several talks with Dean Burch who hadn't been truly 'clued in'. The President was isolated, calling on no one outside for decisions. Al Haig, strong and helping, but with not really the political feel on the Hill he should have. I talked to Haig at 9:50 in my office. He indicated that he didn't think it was a surprise, he didn't feel the President ought to speak out like Agnew, but of course he was giving a lot of consideration to resignation. I told him about the erosion on the National Committee, that I thought it was serious. He asked me to be sure of my judgment etc. I told him I was, and he said if we get that kind of erosion then we can be sure the President will do the right thing. He simply is waiting for the right time. He thinks he can survive in the Senate. He realizes there is a tremendous deterioration in the House. But he says "Not so in the Senate. Guys are hanging tough in the Senate." He mentioned Eastland and Stennis. He mentioned Norris Cotton and Bennett. I told him I wondered who he was talking to - though I hadn't talked to them I wasn't too sure about it. Haig said we must think big, think big about the country first. Let's worry about the country first. I tried to indicate to him that that was what we were doing. He did not think the President's survival

is the answer, but he does think that we should be moderate and reasonable and be sure of the weight of the thing. They had just called about a Cabinet meeting. I asked him what that was for. He said he was going to tell why he did and what he did. He told me I was in a very difficult position, getting whip-sawed and kind of complimented me on the way it was going. Although I told him I felt in a half-assed position -- neither fish nor fowl. He told me he had spent an unbelievable week with this guy -- meaning the President. Bitter - very tough week. He didn't know how the President keeps going. I asked him if he predicted what would happen in the Senate Judiciary Committee. He said he hoped that three or four would stay with him. They realized that Article 1 was a tough problem, and sure enough they are staying with him on article 2 and 3. He cautioned me to do what was reasonable and fair. I told him I felt I really owed them my judgment and that I hated to always be reporting bad news but that I had to do it factually. He told me it was the worst week of his life. He said, "Why the President still talks to me I don't know. I am surprised."

He predicted the President would not survive but that we would look back when we were both 80 and say he had been one of the great presidents of our time. He mentioned that he wished Wiggins had waited 24 hours and not gone for a tearful TV job. I, of course, strongly defended Wiggins and Charlie Sandman, to Haig -- telling him they were speaking from deep convictions and I hope they, above all, would not get damaged. He said it is always hard on the heroes etc. He indicated that as long as the President wants to test the water a little more we ought to stay with him. He made a strong pitch for loyalty, those who stand by come out alright. I asked how the family was. He said the

family is sustaining the President very well. He said, "Not me I'm sure," in terms of sustaining. I get the feeling that Haig has discussed resignation with him in depth and all around. Al ended up saying, "G d bless you." All in all he was very decent. He sounded fairly relaxed and I'd say somewhat resigned to the future. I have enormous respect for Haig. I again am not sure he understands the great depth of feeling in this congress. I am sure he is misreading the Senate at this point if he thinks they are hanging in there for the President. It is a very difficult and trying week for sure. I pointed out again that the Party although not important was --- that we had called fifty people and asked them to call the other 100 and though not important --- for the first time we are seeing serious erosion.

As I dictate this memo at 10:10 p.m. on August 5 I do not feel the President can survive. We have our television program coming up. It's almost impossible. I have decided not to issue a statement, to simply sit and let the storms whirl around, although give some leadership to the committee by telling them not to get too far out front. I am torn between wanting to express my own agony and my own emotion, and get out front and cry resignation and this is too much. And at the same time recognizing that this system must work, should be permitted to work fairly, and as Burch says somebody has got to pick up the pieces. I got torn between how to lead and what is leadership at a point like this. Oddly enough at this moment leadership may mean doing nothing. There's an awful lot of noise out there. I have just read the tape. The reactions, of course, will be lost, but most congressmen and senators feel they must take some position or say something. Maybe by

sitting quietly there, accurately reporting, trying to hold the party together, one can do the most service. But it means the risk that people won't know how strongly and deeply I feel about this whole grubby Watergate mess. It is beneath the dignity of that oval office, and yes the President's accomplishments are magnificent, but Watergate is a shabby, tawdry business that demeansthe Presidency. Am I failing to lead by not stating that? That's the \$64,000 question.

August 6, 1974 - a traumatic day. The Cabinet meeting, set back from 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., proved to be a grueling session. The only staff people present were Haig and Ziegler, compared to the normal alignment of Flanigan, Stein, etc. etc. The photographers were permitted in, they swarmed in with great fanfare. Ziegler ordering them out at the appropriate time. There was a kind of carnival atmosphere, everyone expecting the President to resign. My Cabinet notes reflect the substance but the atmosphere was one of unreality in one sense. The President sat there, strong, determined, announcing his decision to remain in office and yet unreality prevailed. Jerry Ford reiterated his position that because of his peculiar situation he was not going to involve himself in the President's defense. The statement is public. It kind of cast a pall over the meeting. Haig later told me he thought it was wrong, the President was clearly shook up. Ford later told me that he wondered if it had offended the President and how it had gone over. I told him I thought that he had done the right thing and that I had told Haig, which I did, that Ford was simply reiterating a position he expressed the day before, so that the President would be sure to know it. Because the President indeed at that meeting was saying we should all go out, be together, be unified, go forward, etc. The President tried to express his concern about the affairs but it just didn't come through. His explanation of this awful lie was not convincing. It simply was unreal, but everybody just sat there. Ford made his statement - then there was a long discussion of the economics. Bill Saxbe spoke up as they were suggesting bringing congressmen down to have a meeting with the President. He said don't do it now, let it set for a week.

Let's see if 'you can govern'. Ford later told me that Saxbe had prepared a four page statement on all of this. I then joined in and said that Saxbe was right, the deterioration on the Senate and House was so much that it would be wrong to bring these people down now. On the economic discussion I added that I hated to go back to Watergate but that I had to do it -- one of the major factors was conscience and that given the President's decision to remain in there, he would have to make clear that the system should move expeditiously. There is a feeling abroad in the Senate that it was going to be dragged out for six months. I said that it was wrong, a major problem with economy was confidence, that Watergate contributed to it and that the President should go forward.

The President looked uncomfortable, once he smiled over to me and with his lips said, "George", smiled and looked warm and my heart went totally out to him even though I felt deeply betrayed by his lie of the day before. The man is amoral. He has a different sense than the rest of people. He came up the hard way. He hung tough. He hunkered down, he stone walled. He became President of the United States and a damn good one in many ways, but now it had all caught up with him. All the people he hated -- Ivy League, press, establishment, Democrats, privileged - all of this ended up biting him and bringing him down.

My two interventions at the Cabinet meeting were one - don't bring those people down here now, the mood on the Hill is just unraveled and you will be subjecting the President to something unbelievable in terms of confrontation. Two, the question of expediency on a presidential trial. I wondered if the President at the time really realized how things had deteriorated. What the real story was.

The minute the meeting was over I got aside with Al Haig. People filtered out. The Vice President came over and we chatted a little and he told me he wanted to see me and talk about our California visit. Bill Simon walked in and said he was willing to go out and meet the press with loyal, wonderful Fred Dent. But again there was an unreality prevailing. I told Haig the whole god damned thing had come undone and there was no way it could be resolved. I told him about my talk with Goldwater, my talk with Wallace Bennett, my talk with Tower. I said your count senate is wrong (the night before Haig had told me the Senate was in fair shape and that people were hanging tough). I told him that people were not leveling with the White House. That it was much worse. Haig in his total decency pointed out to me that the President did understand this. I requested a meeting with the President. I told him I felt that if I were going to say something publicly, I should first do it to the President. I didn't want to be dramatic. I didn't want to be the barer of bad tidings, my heart ached for him and for his family but I felt I had a real obligation to make clear the point. Haig told me to kind of stand by (I told him I was going to have lunch with Dean Burch) and he would then let me know whether the President would see me. "Al", I said, "I must request the meeting with the President." Rog Morton gave an opinion to me that the President should indeed get out - resign. But again the Cabinet meeting was unreal. It is easy to say what one should say but one also respects the office so much that he is inclined to hold back particularly if the agenda appears structured.

I left the meeting, went to Burch's office, talked to Jennifer, Kaye -- Burch had already gone to lunch. Kind of hung around waiting for Haig to call to see if I would see the President. Nothing happened. I then went down and had a solitary lunch at the conference mess, made a few calls. All there was were messages that the press were calling frantically. My temptation was to blast the President, blast the lie, and then I thought why add to the personal tragedy and the personal grief. Events were moving so fast that it just didn't seem right to kind of 'pile on'. When I was finishing dessert the phone rang and Gen. Haig had returned from his meeting with the President. I went up to him, walked into his office. He was all alone, rather resigned, rather relaxed. Haig is a thoroughly decent guy with the most wonderful instincts and sense of decency. He has been through hell. He has tried to make the President look at things but he knows that the President is an 'amoral' man. He is loyal almost to a fault and yet I know that he represents to the President what is right. He told me that he had urged the President to resign on several occasions, that it was the family that demanded the President stay in there. They discussed the timeliness of the resignation. Should it happen all at once with the release of this information or should it happen after the awful impact. I still feel that Haig and all of them underestimated the totality of the impact.

Al believes he knows what the congress does and he is great in many ways, but I don't think he has a real feel. I told him earlier about Bennett, Helms, Goldwater, the whole ball of wax.

I see Dean Burch getting ground up in all of this. He shares my views completely. He is honest, total integrity. I went out to his house Monday night for dinner and Pat told me how she and Dean had talked about all of this. I pointed out that in the White House you have one constituency, in my job or something else another. The press doesn't understand this. It's all very easy for them. You slam a guy. You carve him up. You do your thing. You get the story and the headline. But they don't understand this question of loyalty, the question of what's fair, what's right. Burch, agonized by all of this, wants to preserve a certain sense of integrity and yet he recognizes the conditions under which he accepted all of this. The question came out about a Republican National Committee statement. We surveyed the committee, told them to study the evidence and read the President's statement. What now appears to be so obvious was unbeknownst to many of them. They hadn't heard it at all. And they didn't want to believe it. But the returns were unanimous. Betrayal. Distrust. Resignation (though maybe not wanting to say it publicly). But nevertheless that the President had had it. And, of course, as my total feeling, tempered only by my respect for his massive accomplishments and my almost love of his family. I think of that little Julie and I think of even that stiff Tricia who is sensitive and thoughtful and loyal too, and I wonder my god what would that be like for our family. At the end of my luncheon Haig called. I went up to his office and he told me that the President did not want to see me. Parenthetically he mentioned that he was going to see Korff, one of my most unfavorite people. I told Haig, "Suppose it comes out that the National Committee Chairman has requested a meeting and the President wouldn't see him, but he will see Korff." Haig threw up his arms and said, "Oh My God, No." I said, "Al, I am not going to leak that."

But here's how it looks. Here's what the problem really is." Haig fully understood. He told me that the President was actively considering resignation. That he had gone to the mountain top and had decided he would resign and then the family had talked him out of it. He assured me that the President knew what had happened, that the President had indeed talked to Goldwater as I urged him to do, having given him Goldwater's message to me, and that Goldwater told him "You have 12 to 15 votes." He had further told him that they were tired of the President lying to them. I had gone back, called Goldwater after all of this, and Goldwater told me that "I think the President was listening to the phone call but I laid it on the line with Haig. We agreed we could do no more.

This morning I talked to Bill Roth, a thoroughly decent man, gave him the information, and asked him for his judgment. He had called me. He told me that it was deteriorated, that he wanted the President to get out, that he was insensed with the Newsweek coverage. I called Senator Bennett, and asked him because the White House was counting on his support. He told me that it killed him to the bottom of his toes - circumspect, decent, ethical. He said he didn't know how he would vote but he gave me the concept of the total erosion. I talked to John Tower. The same was essentially true there. Tower saying the President could not survive. I went back to the office after having a long, philosophical discussion with Haig. He told me that he was convinced the President would now resign, that he knew the story, that he would come back to it, that we should stay in touch, that if he saw a change in direction from resignation that he would let me know. I talked about our television program on the West Coast. I said it seemed trivial but that we had a quarter of a million dollars

in it and I wanted it to be successful. We agreed we would stay in touch. I am determined if I do nothing else to make clear my respect for him, my admiration for Haig. Sometimes his loyalty obscures his judgment which in these troubled times is not altogether bad. But for the most part he is on the mark - reasonable, sensitive, decent, certainly not like me - a partisan Republican - but concerned for the overall part about his country. He expressed a concern about the Vice President's comment, thinking it was a little selfish, but I pointed out to him that the Vice President had to be on record not knowing what the President knows or what he doesn't know.

Sideline - during one of my talks with Burch he told me that right after the Cabinet meeting he was in Haig's office. Ziegler and Buzhardt waiting for Haig. Ziegler was 'posturing', standing by the window dramatically, turned to Burch and said, "How do you know about the deterioration in the Senate vote" to which Burch told me he turned to Ziegler and said, ~~"DAA"~~ "shit". You have got to understand what the situation is. Ziegler is a nothing to me and a total, absolute nothing. I think of Ron Ziegler and I think of loyalty which I respect, but he has no judgment and as he goes through the tapes and documents he is a neuter. He is no force for good. He is unwilling to speak up. He is overawed by the Presidency to the degree that he doesn't owe the President his judgment.

Random comments - I must confess that I was somewhat offended by the President not seeing me but I am determined not to make it public. I asked Al, "What was his reaction? Why don't he see me?" He said, "Well, he just wasn't up to it. He said, 'maybe tomorrow'." Here I am on my way to Los Angeles knowing damn well that that's impossible and having explained to Haig that that was impossible. The President simply cannot bring himself to talk to people outside of a tiny, tiny circle and this has brought him to his knees.

I had a long meeting with the Vice President at 4:30. The Vice President was worried about his statement. I told him not to worry about it, that yes Haig had been concerned but I didn't think the Cabinet had, and I explained to Haig that the Vice President had to get on the record. The Vice President seemed almost not to realize the complexity of the situation and the enormity of it. Though I am sure he did. Jack Marsh and Bob Hartman were with us at the meeting. I strongly urged the Vice President to come to our television program in Los Angeles. I pointed out the fact that maybe it wouldn't work out and I would thoroughly understand in which case I wanted him on tape. Jack Marsh asked my judgment on the Vice President's schedule for next week, which included three appearances for congressmen. Hartman pointed out that they were kind of chicken shit appearances and that the Vice President could not be going to these kind of things. I agreed in principle but suggested the television program was enormously important - a major market - and that the Vice President should come, but I would understand if events moved too fast.

I leveled with the Vice President on my feeling that the President would now resign. I told him about Haig's comments to me, that Haig had taken the President to the mountain top, had almost talked him into resigning and then only to find the family had talked him out of it. Haig may get a bum rap out of all this, but he doesn't deserve it.

We talked at length about the Vice President's schedule. I told him the need for the television program. He totally agreed - agreeing to do it on tape if he became President. I told him that I thought that the situation had deteriorated so much and the President himself understood it. And though the Cabinet meeting didn't indicate it, that he Jerry would be President very soon. It was a weird feeling, sitting in that majestic

Vice Presidential office on the third floor of the EOB. Ford commented on Kissinger's wonderful statement about the President and yet sticking in my mind was a certain political connotation - Kissinger's support was unequivocal and I guess you might say proper, and yet I couldn't help but think of the Rockefeller connection, bearing in mind also Reagan's statement that perhaps the answer was the 25th amendment where the President would step aside, clearly a political ploy. Dick Rosenbaum, whose judgment I respect, having told Tom Lias of Rocky's position and yet I know very well that Rocky would like to see Nixon out of there.

After the meeting with the Vice President at which I told him I was going to Los Angeles, I made many of the press calls. John Apple, the most insistent and most irritating, knew that my statement was a break from the President. Lou Cannon, the next most irritated and the next called, had the position that well I have talked to several national committee people and they wonder whether you're the head of the national committee or whether you're the President's man. It made me so furious I could hardly speak. I knew it was a journalistic gimmick. I like Lou and I respect him, but he had that irritating, arrogant Washington Post desire to get the news and he couldn't quite sublimate it to his own decency. A sorry commentary on where things stand. I kind of told him that I was unable to give him the information that he wanted but that if he'd read the statement carefully, he would see that I had established an independent position. In our release after the Cabinet meeting I talked about the President doing the right thing (clearly I feel he is now going to resign and this was a signal) and that my heart ached for those who had defended him. But this was not enough for the Washington Post or for Lou. I was disappointed in him I must confess. John Apple with all his

irritating calls to the secretaries saw it as quite a break. I did
Charles Bartlett, my good friend. It is so hard to know what is fair
and right. It is so easy to get a headline. It is so difficult to
assess how the sublimation of one's views in a position of leadership
might be detected as softness. All of this is quite clear to those on the
outside but it is never clear to those on the inside. I don't want to
pile on. I don't want to add to the woes of the President, I don't want
to increase the agony of his family. And yet I want to make damn clear
the lie is something we can't support. My statement may be too equivocal
but more important than the statement is what lies behind it. I have made
very clear to the President, admittedly through Haig, that the President
must resign. Haig knows it. Maybe even Ziegler knows it. But this
era of tawdry, shabby lack of morality has got to end. My feelings are
ambivalent at this moment. Here is Nixon with his massive contributions
to world peace and his tremendous toughness and fiber but coupled with it
is a total amorality, a total sense of selfish survival. I will take
Ford's decency over Nixon's toughness because what we need at this juncture
in our history is a certain sense of morality and a certain sense of decency.
Nixon can no longer present it. My own views are that the President should
get out and get out now. I think we can make a case for the system going
on, and on the surface and in public you have got to say the system can
work. But I am also convinced that given the enormity of the lie that
if the President gets out, the system will work. And we will be strong.
We have had a lot of press calls about Ford picking me for Vice President.
Bill Steiger called and said that he and Martha Griffiths had decided
that I was the guy - Martha of all people. Mary Matthews in Barber Conable's

office said that Barber had said that's what it should be. Jerry Pettis said that he and many are undertaking it. The press are hypothecating. And yet I am convinced that it won't happen and almost that it shouldn't because the Vice President needs something separate, apart and clean. And unfairly or not I may have tracked it in and kind of spread it around the living room carpet - not by design and hopefully not by character, but rather by an association. It's a weird, weird world. My own views are that the Vice President can make it as President. He needs to surround himself by quality, stature, academicians, brilliance but I am not sure it will happen. I think it will though because he asks for advice and you know he wants to listen. He is a latter-day Eisenhower. He is an Ike without the heroics but he has that decency the country is crying out for right now. These last couple of days have been traumatic. There is a great tendency to get out front, to be on the screen, to wring one's hands in righteous indignation and yet I think my role has been a good one, trying to affect a decision but do it in a way in which the President is apt to accept it. I have detailed the case to the President's leaving office but I have not done it with an insensitivity to the role of family and to his fighting, tough spirit. Time will tell. Not much time. But time will tell. .

The party will survive all this. Most Republicans in the House are aware that their lot is better off now as they all come out for impeachment. It is easier because it is clear and precise.


Comments on press calls. Press of course was calling - went out of its skull trying to get some kind of statement. Cannon of the Post pointing out that I was the only one who had not made a statement, was it an unwillingness. He raised the question with Pete - is he the chairman of the President or the Party. To me it smacked of a phone call to Bill McLaughlin and it was mean, cruel. But it is a symbol of the times. I respect Lou Cannon but I was disappointed in that. John Apple had called, three or four times, telling that he had helped me and why the hell didn't I return his call. When I talked to him he said that he had talked to Pete and he had calmed down. I told him, "John, I am calling you because you were reported to be the maddest of all those that called me. And I have not made one single press call." He said, "I told Roussel I am no longer mad." They all wanted a statement. My great friend Charlie Bartlett was the only one I really leveled with, pointed out my comments on resignation after the Cabinet meeting, told him what this meant. I trust him entirely. A close, close friend. Cannon is an honorable reporter and I leveled with him although he kept pressing and squeezing and turning, wanting more information. I guess that is the mark of a good reporter, but it also shows a certain insensitivity to my own difficult situation. Apple was much more understanding - caught in the statement the breach between President and Party, that I intended to convey on this particular matter. Hays Gorey of Time was understanding as well. The press must get their story. There is a vicious competitiveness in this sense that unless the talons can grasp the raw flesh they will not be happy. A guy like Bartlett is the exception. And so indeed is someone like John Apple. I was disappointed in Lou. Lou told me that he had talked to several people, unnamed sources of course, and they were making this comment. I immediately suspected Bill

McLaughlin, whom Lou always quotes and perhaps it is unfair to him, but I am sure he would say something like that. Having talked to most of the national committee I knew they understood damn well the position I was in.

Our statement was designed to be fair to the President yet point out my concern about what he had done without 'piling on'. The incivility of the press had been a disturbing and paralyzing kind of thing over the last few months. And now it continues, that blood lust, the talons sharpened and clutched, ready to charge in there and grab the carrion of this President. I am sick at heart. Sick about the President's betrayal and sick about the fact that the major Nixon enemies can now gloat because they have proved he is what they said he is. No credit, no compassion, no healing, simply the meat-grinder at work. I suppose when it is written one can establish that perhaps I should have done more, but I am not made up to walk on the body of a man whom I don't love but whom I respect for his accomplishments. I talked to Jerry Ford about our television program. There was a certain unreality. I am convinced in the presence of the next President of the United States and yet there is no visible awareness of all of this. It was too unreal, kind of unbelievable. Ford is relaxed, decent, down-to-earth self, asking advice, a trait I wish the President had. And yet an agonizing worry in one corner of my mind "Is Jerry up to all of this?" And then coming back to if he asks advice of people like me; when he gets to be President he'll ask the advice of people far smarter than I. And so he'll make it if he has to - no question in my mind. Right now there is a terrible crying out for moral leadership and as Ike did it, as Truman did, Ford can do it. I was sorely tempted there with the Vice President to talk about immunity. I did tell him about my concern and agony over the family, but I felt like saying, "Jerry, you must, you have got to clear this matter from the nation's concern, conscience by declaring

when you become President that Watergate is behind us." The President will not be harrassed by every penny ante judge or prosecutor in this country. Surely this nation has that much forgiveness in its heart.


Fred Malik called me for lunch today. What the hell does that mean. Ron Ziegler according to Pete is prepared to submit statements to the National Committee for certain expenses - what the hell does that mean. I have not seen Rose Woods and I wonder how she feels. The gloom in the White House is unimaginable, difficult to describe. It is brought dramatically home that this President is a liar, a total liar and we cannot face up to it in fairness, in the nation's interest, in any other way. Bill Steiger having said he would note to impeach said that he would resign as head of Rule 29. I thought my god here is political expediency beckoning. It can solve all the hostility problems about Steiger, yet of course I wouldn't accept that. He has done a first-class job, he's fair, he's decent, he's honorable. Let Clark Reed bitch about him. But for God's sake don't lose enough judgment to permit him to resign because he said the President should be impeached. All that I talk to in the Senate are saying he should get out. This is an end of an era.



From the desk of
GEORGE BUSH

Al Hay


- 1) not a surprise
- 2) talk about sneaking out like Agnew
- 3) if we get that kind of emotion like he can
- 4) "not so in senate guys hanging tough in Senate"
- 5) "think too big - think about country first - must worry about country first"



From the desk of
GEORGE BUSH

2

6. Cab. meeting tomorrow
you get whip saved
- 7) spent week with guy -
better he projects now
he keep going - then
it turns out
- 8) he hoped ~~that~~ would
hang in on 1
call him on next.
- 9) in terms of you yourself
you over



From the desk of
GEORGE BUSH

3


10) more work at my
late -
why ^{he} still talks to
me - I am surprised

11) don't think ^{he} will
survive -

12) much work until 24
hours - not gone for
feared TV job

13) GB talk on Sandmen.

14) Sandmen -



From the desk of
GEORGE BUSH

15

4
as long as wants to
test water a
little more -

16

family sustaining
him - 'not we & in
sure'

God Bless you