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THE BANGKOK POST TUESDAY, JANUARY 9, 1968

Support up, says visitor

A TEXAS REPUBLICAN member of the US House of Representatives, fresh from eight days in South Vietnam, said here yesterday more and more Americans are supporting President Johnson's war policy, as well they should.

Rep. George Bush, who flew into Bangkok yesterday, said during an interview at the Oriental Hotel most Americans who oppose President Johnson's policy "don't realise how hard it is to fight the war in Vietnam—a war that has no real front line."

Anti-war demonstrations in the United States, said Rep. Bush, don't represent the feelings of the majority of Americans "even though they have been led at times by some prominent Americans."

"I think the United States has shown a lot of patience to remain in Vietnam, patience to see that the country is free of any communist domination," said Bush.

However, he warned, the pacification program there "is going rather slowly," although the future of such a program "does look bright."

During his fact-finding tour in Vietnam, spent mostly outside of Saigon, Bush said he visited the harassed city of Da Nang and was there when the Viet Cong fired rockets into the airplane-filled airbase, destroying three US planes and damaging 23 others.

In spite of this, Bush said, the "morale of US and other allied troops there is excellent."

While in Vietnam, Rep. Bush said he conferred with US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and some top military men. From talks with them, Rep. Bush is confident that an increasing number of Americans at home are bound to appreciate the US war policy there.


Yesterday Rep. Bush called on US Ambassador Leonard Unger here and met briefly with other US officials on military and economic planning of this country.

Before leaving for the United States today, Bush will be guest of honour at a luncheon given by Unger at the Ambassador's residence.

What YOU Should Know About
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What YOU Should Know About **VIETNAM**



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What YOU Should Know About **VIETNAM**

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
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
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IN THE BEGINNING

By Richard F. Newcomb

The land known as Vietnam (both North and South) has known little peace, and less cohesion since history began.

It is essentially a fertile coastal plain, jutting out like an elbow into the sea, and backed by mountain ranges. Successive waves of would-be occupiers have come both from the land side and from the sea. Some stays have been long, some short, and all unhappy.

China has always been a presence, and it was China that imposed the first recorded suzerainty over what is now known as Vietnam. That was before the birth of Christ, and the Chinese stayed for a thousand years. They were followed by the Mongols, who held sway until ceaseless guerrilla depredations drove them out near the end of the 13th Century.

In the meantime, there had been other visitors, by sea. Arabic seafarers, Indians and possibly even the Romans knew this land. For a time the Cham people held most of the coastline, preying as raiders on the sea trade passing by, but by the end of the 15th Century the Chams were gone. Like all the other invading hordes, they at length had been brought down by the indestructibility of the native Vietnamese.

THE COLONIAL PERIOD OPENS

The modern, or colonial, period of Vietnam opened in the early 1600s. Portuguese and Italian Jesuits tried proselytizing around Da Nang as early as 1615. The Dutch attempted trading settlements in the 1630s, and the French and British in the period 1680-1700. None of these visitors found a welcome. It was not until the next century that the French began to force a hold on the Vietnamese coast.

The French approach was as missionaries, spreaders of Catholicism. By 1787 the French had achieved a treaty, signed at Versailles, between King Louis XVI and the local king of Cochin-China (now South Vietnam). But it would be another 100 years before French authority was fully established. In the meantime, dozens of bishops and missionaries were put to death. Since Spanish missionaries were also being persecuted, a joint French-Spanish naval expedition was sent out under Vice Admiral Charles Rigault. He took Saigon in 1859, but it was 1862 before the three eastern provinces of Cochin-China were ceded to France.

The fight for Indochina gradually changed from a missionary effort and was taken over by the French navy, the merchants, the engineers and the explorers. Moving north, the French took Hanoi in 1873 for the first time. They were soon driven out by Black Flag brigands, called in from Yunnan by the local ruler, Tu Duc. The French took Hanoi a second time in 1882, but again had trouble with Black Flag bands, now supported by imperial China. What eventually came to be known as French Indochina was finally established by the decrees of 1887.

PROSPERITY UNDER THE FRENCH

Under a governor-general, France was now technical ruler of territory which today comprises Laos, Cambodia and both Vietnams. Actual rule was achieved only by a gradual succession of agreements, cessions and expeditions against bandit groups.

The French settled their disputes with China in preliminary talks at Peking in April, 1885, and a final treaty was signed at Tientsin on June 9, 1885. Most of the insurgent groups in Indochina were subdued in the next decade, and the French made

great progress in fastening their image upon this unlikely territory. Hanoi and Saigon, both ancient towns, were transformed. As early as the 1790s French engineers had laid out a new Saigon, where then was only a fishing village. This was to be the "Paris of the Orient," with wide, tree-lined boulevards, parks and monuments.


Hanoi, the city from which the Chinese had ruled, also got the French treatment, and in 1902 became the capital of French Indochina. Universities were opened, railroad connections were laid out with China to the north and Saigon to the south. The development of Haiphong as a port for Hanoi was begun, as well as an elaborate system of dykes and irrigation canals to tame the delta of the Red River. An era of relative peace and flourishing trade began to develop.

By the eve of World War II, Indochina was the world's third largest exporter of rice. Exports in 1939 were 1.7 million tons, mostly grown in the Mekong Delta, south of Saigon. French estates in southern Vietnam and Cambodia exported 69,000 tons of rubber in 1939. Other products, from northern Vietnam, were coal, iron, manganese and zinc; from Cambodia, fish and pepper, from Laos, tin, livestock and hides. The overall balance of trade was heavily in favor of the French.

JAPAN MOVES IN—AND OUT

Then came World War II and, unrecognized by anyone yet, the beginning of the end for France in the Orient. Gen. Georges Catroux was appointed governor-general of French Indochina in August, 1939, and a month later Hitler marched. When the French republic fell in June, 1940, the Vichy regime replaced Catroux with Adm. Jean Decoux and the era of collaboration with Japan began. By 1941 the Japanese had bases in Indochina and control of the country's rice, rubber and transport. By the end of 1941 the Japanese had moved down through Siam (Thailand) and Malaya to Singapore. For nearly four years the Bamboo Curtain closed off all of Southeast Asia.


When the curtain began to part in 1945, French Indochina was gone, though this was not apparent for another nine years. Proclaiming "Asia for the Asians," the Japanese overthrew the French administration in March, 1945, killing or interning the French authorities. With the abrupt end of the war in August, the Japanese withdrew hastily, leaving a void in Hanoi. But



Ancient and modern routes into Vietnam.

French "pacification troops" on patrol in Vietnam.





there was a new force ready to fill that void.

Between the two world wars, the forces of nationalism had begun to stir in Vietnam. The movement was manifested in secret societies, the strongest of which was the Viet Minh. And at the head of the Viet Minh was a man little-known in the outside world, Ho Chi Minh. The world would come to know him well.

Soon after the Geneva conference, Hanoi had already taken on some of the aspects of a communist state. This street scene is dominated by a picture of the indomitable Ho Chi Minh.

HO TAKES POWER

Two days after the Japanese surrender on Aug. 14, 1945, Ho proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. For Ho it was the end of a long trail that had begun in 1912. In that year, aged 22, he had shipped out as a cabin boy on a steamer bound for Europe. Known then as "Ba," he had been named Nguyen Van Thanh when born. Later he assumed other names for political reasons. His father, a colonial employe, had been fired for anti-French activities.


Ho's first stop was in London, where he worked in the kitchens of the Carlton Hotel under the famous chef Escoffier. To this day he is reported to be a fine cook and a bit of a gourmet. Then he disappeared in the Communist underworld, first stop Paris. There he worked as a photo-retoucher, wrote articles denouncing capitalism, and met a Chinese student named Chou En-lai. By 1923 he was in Moscow and rising in Communist circles. In 1924 he addressed the Fifth Comintern Congress. He also began a close friendship with Stalin.

Soon he was in China, beginning his real life's work—promoting independence for French Indochina under a Communist regime. He was forced underground in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek turned against communism and sought a truly nationalist regime for China. Ho continued his work and absorbed enough nationalist elements to give a gloss to his scheme for Indochina, but underneath it he remained hard-core Communist. Ho organized Vietnamese exiles to infiltrate his native land, and when the Japanese invaded Indochina in 1941 Ho also returned.

By declaring he was not a Communist, Ho attracted support from Chinese Nationalists and liberal elements in other countries, including the United States. His gray head, his wispy beard, his scholarship and his generally soft exterior deceived many into believing he was merely a nationalist. When Japan fell, Ho was ready. He proclaimed a republic in which his Viet Minh was a minority but held the key posts.

A younger Ho poses for propaganda purposes with two little girls in this picture handed out at the time of the conference.





French troops stand guard at an outpost near Dien Bien Phu.

The French finally went back on March 6, 1946. Their troops under Gen. Jacques Leclerc landed at Haiphong. Faced by Ho's regime, the French recognized the republic of Vietnam as a "free state forming part of the Indochinese Federation and of the French Union." Ho then went to Fontainebleau, outside Paris, to discuss with France the real meaning of this relationship. The discussions ended in stalemate.

AND THEN DIEN BIEN PHU

In Indochina, meanwhile, there was friction between the French and the Vietnamese. This came to a head Nov. 20, 1946, when a French patrol boat seized a Chinese junk loaded with contraband in Haiphong harbor and was fired upon.

Three days later, the local French commander gave the Viet Minh a two-hour ultimatum to leave the Chinese quarter of the city, and a mob moved out in the direction of the French airbase at Cat Bi just outside the city. Unaware the mob was unarmed, the cruiser Suffren opened fire. Six thousand were reported to have died in the shelling and panic.

Fighting was only sporadic until Dec. 19 when the Viet Minh attacked French forces and civilians in Haiphong. Within a few hours, French strongholds throughout Vietnam were under attack. The Indochina war had begun.

For a time, the French controlled the coastal lands, but the Communist guerrillas controlled the upland. In 1949 the French attempted to compromise by placing Bao Dai, the former emperor of Annam, back on the throne. But Bao Dai's appeal to the people was virtually nil.

The French also, in 1949, recognized kingdoms in Laos and

Cambodia as nominally independent, but there was no peace in Vietnam. The turning point came in 1950, when the Viet Minh forced France to give up Lang Son, on the Chinese border, thus opening the flood gates for Chinese Communist arms. With these arms, the Communists steadily wore down the French, whose enthusiasm for Indochina was waning, both in the field and at home.

The end came at Dien Bien Phu, a valley outpost in the mountains west of Hanoi. The French poured in paratroops to hold this bastion, but the Communists ringed the hills with heavy artillery. On May 7, 1954, the French surrendered and 10,000 became prisoners. Some said the war was lost at Dien Bien Phu, others said it was lost in Paris by French ennui.

The war in Vietnam was not an isolated event, but part of the postwar upheavals shaking all Asia. Communist China not only entered the war in Korea, but at the same time gave powerful support to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. On the other side, the United States was supplying arms to France as early as 1952, considering her war in Indochina as an extension of the Korean war. This aid was in response to a formal French request in 1950 for support of the Bao Dai regime.

THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

With the French defeat, the question of Vietnam entered the international arena. An international conference was underway in Geneva in the summer of 1954 to deal with Far Eastern problems. Vietnam was one of them, and on July 21 the conference agreed on a cease-fire for Vietnam, and a pullback and cooling-off period. The French presence in Indochina had

ended. It had lasted 67 years—but a day in the long history of Vietnam. The eight-year war had cost France 35,000 men killed, 48,000 wounded.

The end came when Brig. Gen. Georges Delteil signed the Geneva Agreement for France, and Gen. Ta Quang Buu, deputy defense minister, signed for the Communist Viet Minh. Chou En-lai, premier of Red China, called the armistice "a tremendous success." So did Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet foreign minister. Even Britain and France hailed the agreement.

Then came the turn of the United States. Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith read from a statement: "My government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the conference such as is submitted here." In Washington, President Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a statement saying the United States was "not a party to or bound by the decisions taken by the conference."


Nor was the eventual Republic of South Vietnam. In Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem, who had been appointed premier of Vietnam by Bao Dai three weeks before the Geneva armistice, said the agreement would leave the South powerless to resist Communist "military and political expansion." In Formosa, Chinese Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek warned: "The stage is set for history to repeat itself."

Under the agreement, Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel and all Communist forces were to be withdrawn north of that line within 100 days. North and South Vietnam were required to forego military alliances and to halt the import of foreign arms. Free elections supervised by India, Canada and Poland were to be held in July, 1956, to reunite North and South Vietnam.

Not one of these provisions was ever carried out.

AMERICA IS INVOLVED

What actually happened was quite different. As soon as the agreement became known, a great exodus started from North to South. By August it was in full swing, and perhaps a million persons fled south to escape the Communist regime. How many Communist agents of Ho Chi Minh went with them is unknown, but certainly there were many. Hardly was the ink dry on the armistice than Ho was declaring the North would never rest until the South was "liberated."



The Geneva agreement was hammered out at this conference.

"The struggle will be long and hard," he said, "but all the people and soldiers of the North and South must unite to achieve final victory."

Right or wrong, the United States has been involved in the Vietnam question since the end of World War II. Under President Harry S. Truman, military aid to the French against the Communists flowed steadily. By October, 1952, the 200th United States ship carrying military aid had arrived in Saigon. The aid continued under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, even after the French withdrew as provided by the Geneva agreement.

On Oct. 24, 1954, President Eisenhower took a fateful step. He wrote to Premier Diem of South Vietnam that henceforth American aid would be given not through the French authorities but directly to the government of South Vietnam. "I am, accordingly, instructing the American ambassador to Vietnam to examine with you in your capacity as chief of government how an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your government can serve to assist Vietnam in its present hour of trial," the letter said.

It added that the United States expected that, in return for aid, the government would undertake "needed reforms." Two further steps remained. On Feb. 12, 1955, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group took over the training of the South Vietnamese Army. One week later the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty came into force. Under it, the United States was pledged to go to the aid of any party requesting assistance against aggression. The United States was committed, and still is.

THE LEGAL BASIS FOR AMERICA'S INVOLVEMENT

The nearest approach to a legal declaration of war in Vietnam by the United States is Public Law 88-408, the so-called Southeast Asia Resolution. It was passed by Congress on Aug. 7, 1964, a few days after American destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The vote in the Senate was 88-2, in the House 416-0. President Johnson signed it Aug. 10, 1964.

The two voting against the resolution were Sens. Wayne L. Morse, D-Ore., and Ernest Gruening, D-Alaska. They contended it was a "predated declaration of war." Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., one of the sharpest critics of American policy in Vietnam, nonetheless voted for the resolution.

Key paragraphs read as follows:

"The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

"The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution and the charter of the United Nations, and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

South Vietnam requested assistance of the United States.

The resolution is also broad enough to cover American operations in Thailand, which is a member of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

THE WAR-AND HOW IT GREW

1963

By October, 1963, the United States had about 14,000 men in South Vietnam. This had to be an estimate, because the administration of President Kennedy was not free with troop information in those days. When Pierre Salinger, the President's press secretary, was asked how many men the United States had in South Vietnam he replied, "We're not about to answer that question."

But optimism was the tone of the day. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor were just back from a week's survey in Saigon. A White House statement said they had reported "their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task (in Vietnam) can be completed by the end of 1965." After that date, the statement said, "there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel." Both the embassy and the CIA had reported, however, the possibility of a coup.

On Nov. 1, a military clique seized control in Saigon and President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated. Still there was optimism. By Nov. 20, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, McNamara, Gen. Taylor and American military leaders in the Pacific were meeting in Honolulu. Word from the conference was that the United States had established excellent working relations with the new regime in Saigon. The conference reported "an encouraging outlook for the principal objective of joint U.S.-Vietnamese policy in South Vietnam." That objective, as often stated, was "to support the efforts of that country to defeat aggression and build a peaceful and free society."

The conference reported that about 300 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam by Dec. 3, and another 700 by the end of the year.


Then came the event which shook the world. President Kennedy was assassinated Nov. 22 in Dallas. Two days later, President Johnson found his first opportunity to address himself to foreign policy. His first concern was Vietnam. He pledged the United States anew to winning the war against the Communist guerrillas there. He asked all U.S. personnel in South Vietnam to help the new Vietnamese government to consolidate its position and to develop support of the people.

He also said he would adhere to President Kennedy's schedule of bringing home 1,000 U.S. troops by the end of 1963, and all of them by the end of 1965. This latter was made contingent upon the South Vietnamese showing that they could handle the job themselves.

Some 220 U.S. servicemen actually did leave South Vietnam on Dec. 3, but that was both an end and a beginning. South Vietnam was seething with unrest—political, social, religious and military.

1964

One military clique followed another into and out of power. McNamara returned to Saigon in May, 1964, for a fifth visit. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge came home to campaign for Gov. William Scranton for President. Lt. Gen William C. Westmoreland succeeded his boss, Gen Paul Harkins, in Saigon, and Gen. Taylor succeeded Lodge. Instead of declining, the number of U.S. military and civilian advisers in South Vietnam



Eternal flame on President Kennedy's grave.



President Diem of South Vietnam, also assassinated.



President Johnson (with Rusk) faces decisions.

rose. By August it had passed 16,000. And then came the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

It was Aug. 4, 1964. One presidential nominating convention was over and Sen. Barry Goldwater was the Republican candidate chosen to face the Democrats' inevitable choice of President Johnson for the November election. At 11:37 p.m. President Johnson was on national television. He said: "My fellow Americans, as President and Commander-in-Chief it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile action against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply." The reply—air attack on "certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam." It was the first attack on North Vietnamese territory, and it had Goldwater's support: "I believe it is the only thing that he (Johnson) can do under the circumstances. We cannot allow the American flag to be shot at anywhere on earth if we are to retain our respect and prestige."

The affair had begun Aug. 2 on a hot Sunday afternoon. The destroyer *Maddox* was 30 miles off North Vietnam when three Communist PT boats launched torpedoes. The *Maddox* called in planes from the aircraft carrier *Ticonderoga*. One PT boat was sunk, the other two damaged.


Two days later the *Maddox* was back in the Gulf, this time with another destroyer, the *C. Turner Joy*. By late afternoon a number of PT boats were shadowing them, and at 9:52 p.m. launched torpedoes. The destroyers evaded them and opened fire. By 1:30 a.m. two PT boats had been sunk, and the others had broken off action.

As a result, Aug. 4 was a very busy day in Washington. President Johnson met twice with the National Security Council, once with the Cabinet, once with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and finally with 16 Congressional leaders, both Democrats and Republicans. The "action in reply" which the President announced that night consisted of 64 air sorties against four PT boat bases in North Vietnam and an oil storage depot at Vinh. They were underway as he spoke, and continued the next day.

The President said several other things: The matter was being raised "immediately and urgently" before the U.N. Security Council, and the President was asking Congress for a resolution "making it clear that our government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom, and in defense of peace, in Southeast Asia." Shortly after the speech, McNamara told newsmen that the United States had already "taken the precaution of moving substantial military reinforcements to Southeast Asia."

The action in the United Nations came to naught, but within two days Congress had passed the Southeast Asia Resolution. By the end of 1964 there were 23,000 American troops in Vietnam; by the end of 1965, when all U.S. troops were to have been out, there were 181,000.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident started the policy of air strikes in retaliation for specific attacks, but even that policy could not hold. There was steady infiltration of Communist soldiers and weapons from the North down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and terrorism mounted within South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese were still running their war; at least nominally; Americans were



there only as trainers and advisers. But increasingly, American blood was flowing.

In November the Viet Cong attacked the Bien Hoa airbase, north of Saigon. Five Americans were killed, 76 wounded. On Christmas Eve, two more Americans were killed and 98 wounded when the guerrillas bombed an American officers' billet in Saigon.

1965

And then, at last, on Feb. 7, 1965, there was the raid on Pleiku, an outpost in the central highlands. The battle lasted only 15 minutes, but eight Americans were killed and 126 wounded.

In Washington, President Johnson told the National Security Council, "I've had enough of this." Four hours later American planes were smashing Dong Hoi, a staging area 40 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone. The policy of retaliatory raids ended, the policy of raids to cut off Communist help from the north had begun.

"We seek no wider war," the President said, but "escalation" became a new word in the Vietnam lexicon.

Call it escalation or not, from Pleiku on the tide of war rose steadily. Feb. 10—the Viet Cong blew up a hotel at Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans and wounding 21, the largest toll of American lives yet in Vietnam. Feb. 11—160 planes, in the biggest raid yet, hit barracks and supply depots at Chanh Hoa and Chap Le, both deep inside North Vietnam. Mar. 8—3,500 Marines landed to guard the American air base at Da Nang; total Americans in Vietnam now 27,000.

Rusk said South Vietnam had asked for the Marines so that South Vietnamese troops could be released for combat. He also appealed for European help, instead of merely silence or condemnation.

The flow of U.S. troops to Vietnam continued, and by early June had passed 50,000. A short halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, from May 13 to May 19, only increased animosity on both sides. The United States announced it was disappointed at the lack of reaction from "the other side," and North Vietnam denounced the suspension as "a deceitful maneuver designed to pave the way for new U.S. acts of aggression."

During the suspension, President Johnson reportedly made approaches to Hanoi through diplomatic channels. He also, in a public statement, tried to drive a wedge between North Vietnam and Communist China. He said the Chinese wanted the war to continue whatever it cost North Vietnam. This Hanoi greeted as "a contemptible trick."

Sen. Fulbright, who had suggested a bombing pause as early as April 18, said he thought the suspension might still have some effect. "It may have been a good action for psychological reasons, if for no other."

The only noticeable effect was more troops to Vietnam, more bloodshed, and more clamor, both at home and abroad, against "escalation." Finally, on the morning of June 16, there was a "public speak out" against the war under McNamara's window at the Pentagon. The same afternoon the defense secretary announced another 21,000 American troops for Vietnam, bringing the total to nearly 75,000. He said their purpose would be to guard American bases, and to help South Vietnamese troops beat off specific Communist attacks. In these cases, he disclosed, the South Vietnamese would be under their officers and U.S. troops would be under theirs. The Americans were no longer mere advisers.

At last, on July 28, President Johnson laid it on the line. After a week of steady conferences with his Cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other government leaders, the President went

on television and spoke to an estimated 28 million Americans.

"This is a different kind of war," he said. "There are no marching armies or solemn declarations . . . But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power and to extend the Asiatic domination of communism. . . ."

"We did not choose to be the guardian at the gate, but there is no one else. Nor would surrender in Vietnam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression . . ."

And then came the word. "I have today ordered to Vietnam . . . forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later and they will be sent as requested. This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments."

At the same time, the President announced that he had sent Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg to the United Nations with a letter to Secretary-General U Thant "requesting that all of the resources, energy and immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam." He said the United States was prepared to negotiate with anyone, at any time, to find the way to peace. And this included the Viet Cong.

As Mike Mansfield, the Senate Democratic leader, said, the United States had extended at once "both the arrow and the olive branch." It was the arrow which the Communists seized. By the end of 1965, American casualties for the year were 1,365 killed, compared to 146 for all of 1964.

Back on April 7, 1965, the President had offered in a speech at Johns Hopkins University to enter "unconditional discussions" for peace in Vietnam. He had further proposed that the Southeast Asian countries, including North Vietnam, combine in a "massive effort to improve the life of man" in that part of the world. "For our part," the President said, "I will ask Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway." Only scorn from Hanoi.

Then came the May bombing holiday over North Vietnam, but during the summer and fall critics in the United States said it had not been long enough. An even longer one, and a full-fledged "peace offensive" were coming up. Beginning in November, and into December, President Johnson and his advisers discussed, in great secrecy, a second try at halting the bombing.

There were strong arguments on both sides: A bombing letup would permit Communist buildup from the North, on the other hand it might bring peace. The President decided to give it a try, and the Christmas cease-fire order of Dec. 22 said ground fighting would stop on Dec. 24 for 30 hours. The order also said bombing of North Vietnam would cease on Dec. 24, and did not mention resumption.

That was the beginning of a 37-day respite for North Vietnam. In South Vietnam the Viet Cong ground attacks resumed even before the 30-hour truce expired, but only reconnaissance planes went over North Vietnam. On Dec. 28 President Johnson commenced an extraordinary campaign; in the next three weeks special envoys fanned out to 40 world capitals. Roving Ambassador W. Averell Harriman took a special plane to Warsaw, his first call on a trip to 11 countries. Goldberg was whisked off a vacation beach in the Bahamas, met U Thant in New York the same night, then flew on to Rome to talk to Pope Paul VI and Italian leaders. Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy flew to Ottawa, Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann to Mexico, Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams around Africa, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey to Asia.

The substance of their message was a summary of U.S. diplomatic efforts of previous months, a renewal of the "uncondi-



American troops take a respite from warfare in a trench at An Thi.

tional discussions" offer, and an offer to withdraw from South Vietnam once the country was freed from "external interference." In Rangoon, the message was given directly to Hanoi's representative there.

Also, by this time, more and more U.S. politicians were getting into the act. The great debates over the war were beginning. In the late fall, of 1965, ten American governors were in Japan for a meeting and afterwards went to Vietnam on an inspection. Upon returning to the United States, one of them, George Romney of Michigan, termed American involvement in the conflict "morally right and necessary." Two years later, Romney charged he was "brainwashed" on that trip by everyone that spoke to him and said the United States should get out of Vietnam.

1966

There was no announcement of this offensive from Washington, but by Jan. 2, 1966, the Chinese Communist newspaper People's Daily was saying: "Monsters and freaks of all descriptions are scurrying hither and thither and raising a lot of dust with their sinister activities." On Jan. 12 the President said in his State of the Union message, "So far we have received no response to prove either success or failure."

On Jan. 21, Rusk returned from the funeral of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in India. He had met Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin there, but had heard nothing encouraging, Rusk said. And from Hanoi, only "bitter invective." The next day President Johnson, in replying to 76 House members who had asked him to persevere in the peace efforts, said: "It is increasingly clear that we have had only a hostile response to the present pause in bombing."

Three days later, the President invited 20 senior Senators and House members to the White House. He said he would listen to their views, but any decision would be his. Of the 20 present, only Sen. Mansfield and Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, voted to continue the bombing pause.

On Jan. 27, 16 Democratic Senators asked the President by letter to heed the call of Mansfield, Fulbright and Sen. George D. Aiken, Vermont Republican, for a continuation of the bombing pause. On Jan. 31 the bombers flew out again over North Vietnam, for the first time in 37 days.

President Johnson said he had ordered the resumption to save American lives. During the lull the Viet Cong had been steadily at work building its strength. President Johnson pledged "unflagging pursuit" of peace, but said at the same time "we have a heavy obligation not to add lightly to the dangers our troops must face."

In Peking and Moscow the U.S. peace offensive was declared "a hoax." In Rome, Pope Paul was reported disappointed that his appeal for peace through United Nations arbitration had failed. In London, the British government said it "looks with sympathy on the reasons that led to the resumption of the bombings."

Militarily, 1966 marked a turning point in the war. Some 160,000 American troops had swarmed into South Vietnam in 1965. Another 208,000 followed in 1966. Air Force strength rocketed, the Marines built up to two full divisions, and the Navy had at least three carriers on station at all times, plus cruisers and destroyers. Powerful bases were being rushed to conclusion at Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, Saigon and elsewhere.

The Viet Cong could no longer hope to drive American forces out of South Vietnam; in fact, the initiative passed to the

Americans. The Communists, plus the regular North Vietnamese units serving in South Vietnam, were harassed by ground forces and artillery, from the air by napalm, planes and helicopters. Even nauseous gases, flamethrowers and defoliation chemicals became weapons. The Viet Cong was being rooted out of areas it had controlled for decades.

But the other side had its escalation too. Across the Demilitarized Zone and down the maze of jungle trails and mountain paths known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail flowed thousands of men and Chinese and Russian weapons. Despite the steady American air attacks on roads, bridges and railways the infiltration rate increased steadily—from 1,000 a month, to 3,500, to 4,500 to 6,000.

On June 29, 1966, the air war entered a new phase; Hanoi and Haiphong were raided for the first time. These were not the city-obliterating raids of World War II, but selective attacks on petroleum facilities, power houses and factories. And now the cries of "escalation" and dissent really roared out, in the United States and around the world. The polls showed President Johnson's popularity at an all-time low, and the British announced "We must disassociate ourselves" from the Hanoi-Haiphong bombing.

But the bombing continued, and even grew, and the "hawks" urged that the port of Haiphong be closed. It would have been an easy matter to blast the dredges and pumping system that kept the port from silting up. But it could also have meant attacks on free shipping—British and Russian among them—delivering war and civilian goods to North Vietnam. Haiphong was left open.

By the end of 1966, fighting had reached major proportions. The United States had nearly 370,000 men engaged, the total South Vietnamese force had reached 617,000, other allies were supplying 52,000 men, mostly from South Korea. But despite air interdiction, infiltration from the north had risen to 8,000

men a month. During 1966 enemy strength in South Vietnam rose from 230,000 to about 287,000 men, in spite of a claimed 50,000 Communists killed.

1967

The year 1967 opened with South Vietnam ablaze from the Demilitarized Zone to the Delta. The New Year "truce" passed with 177 clashes reported, and the four-day Tet (Buddhist New Year) "truce" in February cost the lives of 20 Americans and 101 of the enemy. On March 10, U.S. planes made their first raid on North Vietnam's only major steel and industrial complex at Thai Nguyen, 38 miles north of Hanoi. In succeeding weeks it was blasted a dozen times more.

In April the B52 bombers began using Thailand bases and the Demilitarized Zone flared into a major battle arena.

Premier Ky announced construction of a little Maginot line just south of the Demilitarized Zone specified by the Geneva Agreements but never actually cleared of all forces. A proposal by the United States that each side pull back ten miles from the zone to create a neutral strip 26 miles wide was rejected by Hanoi.

The ground war in the northern provinces heated up and so did bombing raids on North Vietnam. In a fierce battle fought during a 12-day period starting late in April, Marines captured two strategic hills in the northwest corner of the Demilitarized Zone. Then they moved right into the buffer area, saying the enemy was using it as a sanctuary and attack base. Weeks of bitter fighting later, the Marines withdrew from the zone and established a 600-yard wide defensive bulwark a few miles south. It was designated a "free-fire" zone in which anything that moved would be fired upon.

Ready to strike at dawn, a plane aboard the Enterprise is positioned by the carrier crew.



As summer approached, fighting peaked on the ground and in the air. U.S. casualties for the week ending May 22 hit a record high of 337 killed, 2,282 wounded. Thereafter the conflict slackened and world attention centered on events in the Middle East, but on June 24, 80 Americans were killed and 25 wounded in an ambush in the central highlands.

It was good news, however, when Premier Ky announced in July his withdrawal from the presidential race in South Vietnam and his agreement to run for vice president on the ticket of his rival, Chief of State Thieu. This startling realignment—perhaps the most important since the military junta took over two years before—forestalled a possible split in the armed forces.

Heavy fighting again flared up near the Demilitarized Zone and the United States decided to add 12 miles to the previously cleared “free-fire” zone.

As arguments continued about the bombings, President Johnson announced that strikes would be maintained at the rate of 250 to 300 a day. Then the raids were reduced drastically for a few days when, on July 29, a fire aboard the aircraft carrier *Forrestal* killed 136 men and destroyed nearly 50 planes.

Following that tragedy, U.S. planes set new records of first 197, then 209, missions flown against North Vietnamese targets. Also, Johnson announced plans to send 45,000 to 50,000 more men to Vietnam to bring the total to 525,000 by June, 1968.

The ground war was at a lull as the South Vietnamese elections approached. U.S. officials said Washington's attitudes on bombing North Vietnam would hinge on the North Vietnamese reaction to the government voted into office Sept. 3.

The Americans didn't have long to wait for the reaction. In the election, despite intensified terrorist activities, there was an 83 per cent vote by those registered. Thieu and Ky were elected; the Vietcong and North Vietnam quickly denounced the outcome and said they would intensify the war.

Within two days, bitter fighting broke out from the Mekong

Delta to the northern provinces. By the end of the week, 337 Marines had perished. Con Thien, the forward allied strong-point guarding possible invasion routes from the North, was battered with thousands of shells from hidden batteries across the DMZ. Throwing in reinforcements to hold the strong point, the Marines stripped troops from heavily populated areas, leaving them more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks.

After a month of heavy fighting, however, the Marines announced that they had won the battle and that their foes were pulling back.

Air attacks on the North got closer and closer to China and the battling in the northern provinces brought a new U.S. plan into the open. Defense Secretary McNamara announced that the U.S. would build a complex barrier near the DMZ, in contrast to the “free-fire” zone previously announced.


In late August, McNamara had said there was no reason to believe that North Vietnam “can be bombed to the negotiating table.” In rejecting the recommendations of military chiefs for a wider air war against the North, McNamara stated “more targets would not materially affect the course of the war.” He specifically opposed, at that time, suggestions by the military that Haiphong harbor be mined and that other North Vietnamese ports be subjected to systematic bombing.

Somewhere along the line, things changed. On Sept. 11, U.S. planes hit port installations at Campha, 46 miles northeast of Haiphong. Soon they were bombing less than one mile from the center of Haiphong itself in an effort to disrupt further the North Vietnamese supply system. Obviously the military chiefs had won an argument.

And General Westmoreland said late in September that after two years of fighting, the allies in Vietnam “are now in a position from which the picture of ultimate military success may be viewed with increasing clarity.”

Fighting the Viet Cong with napalm at Bao Trai.





Two American fighting men help a wounded comrade.



"Of 85,000 wounded, we thank God that 79,000 have been returned or will return to duty shortly, thanks to our great American medical science and the helicopters."—President Johnson in September, 1967.

FATALITIES and WOUNDED, All Forces in Vietnam: 1961-1967*

	VIET CONG KILLED	SOUTH VIETNAMESE KILLED (ARVN)	U.S. KILLED IN ACTION	U.S. DEATHS (NON-HOSTILE)	U.S. WOUNDED (HOSPITALIZED)	U.S. WOUNDED (NON-HOSPITALIZED)
'61-'62	33,000	8,400	42	23	43	38
'63	21,000	5,700	78	36	218	193
'64	17,000	7,500	147	48	522	517
'65	35,500	11,000	1,369	359	3,308	2,806
'66	55,500	9,500	5,008	1,045	16,526	13,567
'67*	68,484	22,354	7,263	1,274	25,963	24,801
TOTAL	230,484	50,454	13,907	2,785	46,580	41,922

*as of Oct. 14, 1967

Source: Dept. of Defense



U. S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM

EISENHOWER

Feb. 12, 1955 Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel takes charge of training South Vietnamese Army	300
May 15, 1957. Defense Department admits U.S. strength is now	692

KENNEDY

Feb. 1962 When Gen. Paul Harkins takes over new U.S. Military Assistance Command	4,000
Oct. 1962, figure has risen to	10,000
Late Jan. 1963	12,000
Oct. 2, 1963	14,000

JOHNSON

End of 1963	16,500
July 1964	21,500
March 1965 First Marines to Da Nang	24,000
May 1965	45,000
July 1965	75,000
Sept. 1965	125,000
Nov. 1965	161,000
Feb. 1966	201,000
Sept. 1966	305,000
End of 1966	400,000
Present	475,000

Note: Figures for U.S. troop strength in Vietnam, particularly before mid-1965, were seldom exact, and in some cases were not officially announced. But the above are believed to be reliable approximations.

ALLIED FORCES SERVING IN SOUTH VIETNAM



Unit	No. of Men	Based at
AUSTRALIA		
1st Royal Australian Regiment		Nui Dat
2 infantry battalions		
1 artillery battery		
1 armored personnel carrier		
Advisors	150	Northern provinces
1 squadron B57 Canberra bombers		Phan Rang
Destroyer Hobart		
TOTAL AUSTRALIAN FORCES	6,000	
NEW ZEALAND		
1 artillery battery		Nui Dat
1 infantry company		Nui Dat
TOTAL NEW ZEALAND FORCES	400	

PHILIPPINES

1 engineer battalion	Tay Ninh
1 security battalion	Tay Ninh
TOTAL PHILIPPINE FORCES	2,100

THAILAND


1 transport and patrol boat contingent	200	Saigon
Queen's Cobra Task Force (forming)	2,300	

SOUTH KOREA

Tiger Division	18,000	Qui Nhon
White Horse Division	18,000	Ninh Hoa
Engineer Battalion	2,500	Di An
Blue Dragon Marine Brigade	5,000	Chu Lai
Support Command	1,000	Nha Trang
Navy Transport	1,000	Saigon
Hospital Unit	150	Vung Tau


GRAND TOTAL 56,650

U.S. AIRCRAFT LOSSES OVER NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM*



*as of Sept., 1967

Source: Dept. of Defense



The Other War - PACIFICATION

Beneath and behind the shooting war in South Vietnam is "the other war"—the war to make South Vietnam into a unified, independent state. "Nation-building," Washington calls it, and it is our stated reason for being there.

The dream is that South Vietnam is a country being saved from a Communist usurper, but sometimes that dream is hard to sustain. For South Vietnam is almost a non-country, rather more a region, rent by problems enough to try the sternest reformer.

South Vietnam is 16 million people inhabiting an area of 66,000 square miles, not quite the size of the state of Washington. Nearly half the people live in the Mekong Delta, and most of them are Annamites. About 400,000 Kmers live west of Saigon near the Cambodian border, and about 35,000 Chams are still left along the central coast. All of these are ancient peoples, having little in common with each other.

In the spine of mountains and hills running down the western border of South Vietnam live 800,000 mountain tribesmen. They are called Montagnards, are of 80 different tribes and speak some 36 languages. Then there are the Chinese, a million or so, mostly in the Saigon section called Cholon. They are the businessmen, the bankers, the landlords.

About 65 per cent of the population of South Vietnam is Buddhist, and about 10 per cent Catholic. The rest are split among hybrid sects such as the Cao Dai (about 2 million) and the Hoa Hao (about 1.5 million). All religions in South Vietnam have strong overtones of politics, often leading to violence in expression of views.

Society is based upon the family, which is patriarchal, and the clan, made up of a number of families claiming the same ancestor. Perhaps three-quarters of the Vietnamese belong to one of about 12 main clans. In much the Chinese manner, ancestors are revered and worshipped, thus bringing honor and social standing to the living.

The long arm of the central government is often short in South Vietnam. The proverb that "government ends at the village gate" is very nearly true. Throughout the centuries the many poor have been ruled by the few powerful. The many no longer much care who rules; to them it means only trouble and taxes.

In colonial times, which must sometimes look like the good old days, the French maintained reasonable order, ran their rubber and tea plantations, and the Mekong Delta produced enough rice to feed the south and export 1.5 million tons a year. Much of that rice went to the North, where the people were of different stock. After World War II, the principal export from the North to the South was communism, for Ho Chi Minh had taken over in Hanoi.

Whether the French lost to arms in Dien Bien Phu or to ennui in Paris, by 1954 they were ready to go. The Geneva Conference drew a line across Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, dividing it into North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The export of rice from the South stopped, but not the export of communism from the North.

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

The Geneva Conference decreed that, after a cooling off period, north and south would be reunited and choose its own



Behind barbed wire, a Buddhist monk endures detention stoically in South Vietnam.

government by free ballot. But Ngo Dinh Diem who was premier in Saigon, never accepted that, nor did the United States. Diem didn't even go to Geneva. Bedell Smith told the final meeting the United States was not prepared to sign the final declaration, but he read a unilateral declaration that the United States would not use force or the threat of force to disturb the agreements and that the U.S. "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern." The U.S. also pledged to work for free elections supervised by the United Nations. President Eisenhower pledged support to Diem.

Diem, a sort of Catholic mandarin, contended the Communists had already subverted Vietnam so that no truly free election was possible. On Oct. 26, 1955, he proclaimed South Vietnam a republic and himself the first president. The United States recognized the republic and began a program of help, economic and military. The program, still going on, has reached vast proportions.

The republic of Diem was not, in fact, a republic, but an oligarchy, or clique. Diem lasted until Nov. 2, 1963, when he was assassinated. His government was followed by one clique after another, none of which seriously attacked the ills of the country. That has been a major concern of the United States. That is the second war in South Vietnam, and it is a prodigious task.

What the United States is attempting is a social revolution within a civil war and an international war. The enemies are apathy, poverty, corruption, usury, banditry and external subversion. Before the revolution can succeed, the country must be pacified.

South Vietnam is a land of some 2,500 villages. In the past 10 years the Viet Cong has been engaged in a consistent program of terror. It has killed at least 12,000 civilians, kidnaped another 40,000, in a clear pattern to exterminate the village leadership class. In the words of an official report: "Steadily, quietly, and with systematic ruthlessness, the Viet Cong in six years have wiped out virtually a whole class of Vietnamese villagers. Many villages today are virtually depopulated of their natural leaders."

Until May 10, 1967, the United States was fighting the second war in South Vietnam as a civilian operation, under AID, short for the Agency for International Development. On that date Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker announced that henceforth

all pacification programs in South Vietnam would be under military control, directly under Gen. William C. Westmoreland. This was because the first requisite was security, Bunker said, and only the military can provide that.

In Washington, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara said pacification has been "very slow indeed," and that accounted for the shift to the military. Primary responsibility, he added, must be assigned to the South Vietnamese. "This is their desire; they recognize this is their responsibility and they are ready to carry it out," he said.


At least half the 150 battalions of the South Vietnamese Army have been assigned to pacification. In addition, a pacification school has been opened at Vung Tau, 35 miles southeast of Saigon. Here the government is training RD (revolutionary development) workers. Working in 59-man teams, they attempt to instill allegiance to the government in villages and hamlets through social, political and economic means. Former Premier Ky attended a graduation exercise for 2,600 RD workers in May, and they paraded with torches for him. He said nearly 600 RD teams were already at work. The Viet Cong has already killed nearly 1,000 RD workers.

Ky also placed great emphasis on the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program, to woo defectors from the Viet Cong. Those returning to the government, he said, would be "warmly welcomed as citizens," with full political rights, including voting and running for office. Chieu Hoi claimed to have brought in more than 60,000 defectors, with the rate running about 1,000 a week. Of nearly 100,000 prisoners taken, only about 3,000 remained in prison. The rest were told, in effect, to return to their villages and be good citizens. Those in the POW camps are hard-core Viet Cong or North Vietnamese infiltrators.

THE RICE BOWL BATTLE

Rice is also a weapon. When the Viet Cong took over the Mekong Delta, it also took away the rice. As recently as 1963, South Vietnam exported 323,000 tons of rice; by 1965 it was importing 300,000 tons and this year it will import 870,000 tons. Of that, 750,000 tons is a gift (\$175 million) from the United States. Another 100,000 tons will be bought in Thailand and 20,000 tons in Formosa. Until South Vietnam gets the delta back, it cannot hope to feed itself.

Here again, reforms are beginning to be felt. The government



now guarantees the farmer double the price he got a year ago. This is causing the Viet Cong to squeal; it means they have to pay more for rice and it is harder to get. The VC is now urging the peasants to "firmly keep and cleverly conceal foods, and sell at reasonable prices to the revolution to help our armed forces and people fight the enemy."

AID will also deliver 330,000 tons of fertilizer to South Vietnam this year (at \$38 million). Some officials advocate more fertilizer and less roads, schools and bridges. They say one shipload of fertilizer is worth four shiploads of food, and furthermore it encourages the peasant, whose allegiance is a major goal.

What is really needed is land reform and control of graft and thievery. Some progress is being made. As late as last year huge amounts of foreign aid goods were being stolen, virtually before they hit the dock. Such "essentials" as motorcycles, wine, air conditioners and refrigerators flooded into the country and went straight into the black market. Kickbacks, rakeoffs, absentee landlordism and overnight millionaires are still common. None of this does much to capture the mind of the peasant who had to pay 30 to 60 per cent of his crop to rich Chinese.

AID estimates its losses to thievery and corruption at 5 to 6 per cent in the latter part of 1966. Since then, the U.S. Army has taken over the docks in Saigon, the number of auditors has been doubled and new import and customs procedures installed. Still only 10 to 20 per cent of incoming AID-financed imports are spot checked, and the Army only guards the goods to the Vietnamese warehouses.

There are land reform laws on the books, but there are also problems. The government owns a million acres of land in the delta. It was bought for distribution to peasants, but the government can't even get to much of it. The Viet Cong controls it, squatters live on it without paying rent, and even where government agents can get to the land there's no village leadership to take over administration. In the words of the AID report: "The Prime Minister and his Ministers for Revolutionary Development and Agriculture support land reform and have made several constructive moves to accelerate its tempo. Neither they nor we are satisfied with the pace and impact of the program."

The list of activities sounds impressive. AID is distributing textbooks, seeds, fertilizer, fish fingerlings, pesticides. It is supplying diesel generators for 60 villages, organizing rural electric cooperatives, farmers cooperatives; building irrigation works, drilling wells, setting up cement-block plants. It is also building up the police force, taking a census, issuing national identity cards. More than 1,200 medical specialists have been brought in from many countries and are treating 150,000 patients a month.

One of the most vexing problems is the dislocation of the rural population by war. At least 1.5 million people have fled or been moved from their villages to get out of the path of fighting. Some eventually return to their homes, others settle in new areas, and thousands are being cared for in some 300 refugee camps. Until the countryside is pacified there can be no hope for normal life for millions of people.

South Vietnam has never known a stable, representative government, but this is one of the keystones of "the other war." After the 1963 murder of President Diem, the country suffered nearly two years of chaos. One military clique followed another in Saigon, and the Viet Cong greatly increased its control over the countryside. This was probably South Vietnam's lowest point as a nation, and an important factor in the United States' decision to provide massive military and economic support. Had it not acted, the whole game could have been lost.

NGUYEN KY TAKES OVER

On June 19, 1965, Nguyen Cao Ky became, at 34, South Vietnam's youngest premier. Until that time he had been known as a dashing aviator who had risen to air vice marshall, head of the South Vietnamese air force and a leader of a clique of young turks. But he settled into the job, exhibited political attributes and may be the first freely elected president of South Vietnam.

The first step toward civilian government for the nation was taken in 1966, with the election of a Constitutional Assembly. The second was taken last April 30 with local elections. The Viet Cong had threatened to kill the winners, but 2.5 million voters turned out, 77 per cent of the eligibles.



The next big hurdle was the national presidential election, on Sept. 3, 1967.

There was considerable surprise when Premier Ky bowed out to Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, the chief of state, as candidate on the government slate for the presidency, while going for the vice presidency himself. Ten other presidential hopefuls took the field, including ebullient Truong Dinh Dzu, a self styled peace candidate.

So great was the importance that President Johnson attached to the election as a portent of South Vietnam's future and the future of America's effort that he sent a 22-man observation team there to watch the proceedings. Whether because of that or because of the military government's well publicized vows to conduct a fair election, the results were hailed as generally acceptable under the circumstances.

In spite of Viet Cong terrorism, about 4.7 million voters cast ballots. To no one's surprise, the military slate of Gen. Thieu and Gen. Ky won hands down. To considerable surprise, the peace candidate, Mr. Dzu, finished a strong second, well ahead of two other highly touted civilians. This gave strong backing to Gen. Thieu's announced plans to seek a new bombing pause and make another try for peace talks.

U.S. officials considered it likely the new South Vietnamese government would take a fresh interest in peace maneuvers as a result of strong peace sentiments evident during the presidential election. Although there were no signs that North Vietnam or the Viet Cong would modify their refusal to deal with the new leaders. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said: "so far as the United States is concerned, the search for peace continues."

The Johnson administration applauded the large turnout of voters and the failure of the Viet Cong to disrupt the campaign and voting, but was disappointed that Thieu won by a plurality of only 38.4 per cent.

A great deal had rested on the election. If it had failed to be reasonably honest and widely representative and indicated there was little hope of South Vietnam ruling itself, an American keystone would have fallen.

Of at least equal importance is "security," or the ability of South Vietnam some day to defend itself. Until that day comes, the United States is pledged not to withdraw. Unfortunately, that day seems farther away than ever.

At the end of 1961 there were 3,164 American troops in South Vietnam. They were advisors, training and counseling the South Vietnamese Army. It was that army which was to drive



A homeless little Vietnamese girl wounded in a war not of her making.

the Communists from its own country. Today there are nearly half a million United States troops in South Vietnam, and they are fighting most of the war.

The South Vietnamese Army is about 320,000 men, and total forces under arms about 720,000. Their principal task now is behind-the-lines pacification, and even that is not going well; it has been placed under direct command of Gen. Westmoreland.

And what about the Viet Cong? Claimed kill ratios are up to 10-to-1 in favor of the Allies. Yet the Viet Cong has grown to an estimated 292,000.

In the shadow of this shooting war, "the other war" goes on. And no man can see the end of either one.

6

FIFTH MARINE DIVISION



5

173rd AIRBORNE BRIGADE




4

25th INFANTRY DIVISION



3



UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM



7

THIRD MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE



8

FIRST MARINE DIVISION




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THIRD MARINE DIVISION




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101st AIRBORNE DIVISION




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196th INFANTRY BRIGADE



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
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CAMBODIA


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199th INFANTRY
BRIGADE




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1 FIELD
FORCE




13

SPECIAL FORCES
(AIRBORNE)




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
NINTH INFANTRY
DIVISION




U.S. MILITARY
ASSISTANCE
COMMAND, VIETNAM



U.S. ARMY
VIETNAM



11 FIELD FORCE




15

FOURTH INFANTRY
DIVISION




U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMAND



1st LOGISTICAL
COMMAND



44th MEDICAL BRIGADE



1st SIGNAL BRIGADE




1st AVIATION
BRIGADE



18th ENGINEER
BRIGADE



SCALE
Approx. 25 miles



SAIGON, The Tarnished Pearl

Saigon is bursting at the seams with commotion and confusion. No one is certain how many people are living in the sprawling slums, or winding alleyways of Cholon, the Chinese sector, or in the maze of shacks and shanties along the rivers and canals, but the city's population is estimated at three million.

Many in the capital are refugees. Others came to the city hoping to profit off the wartime boom, or off the free-spending GIs.

Saigon residents used to complain about exhaust fumes and noise of motor-driven cycles. Now there are worse things to contend with. In addition to the thousands of bicycles, motor-scooters, motorcycles and cars of the Vietnamese themselves, giant American Army trucks lumber through the city, blatting their horns and emitting so much exhaust smoke that it sometimes is hard to see half a block. By comparison, New York or Tokyo traffic is kid stuff. Many of the convoys take advantage of the midnight to 4 a.m. curfew in the city so they can move with greater freedom. Every night, there's a continuous roar of motors.

The influx of some 30,000 military personnel in Saigon has had predictable results. The charming influence of French culture on an oriental city is fading away. Former placid boulevards—Rue Catinat, Nguyen Hue, Le Loi—now are lined with gaudy bars and showy souvenir shops.

Middle-class Vietnamese families no longer take evening walks to enjoy the breeze from the Saigon River. The tradi-


tional siesta is almost obsolete. Once upon a time, nearly everything halted from noon until 2:30 or 3 p.m. Now some shop-owners still close down at midday, but the endless traffic goes on and vendors keep a lookout for the American GI.

Travel brochures still repeat old cliches about Saigon, calling it "Pearl of the Orient," or the "Paris of the East." But like the offer to go big game hunting in the Vietnamese mountains, the phrases are obsolete. Whatever Saigon used to be, it isn't any longer.

With millions of dollars in U.S. aid pouring in, the downtown black market is prosperous. Efforts have been made to halt its operations but it always manages to reappear. Hundreds of rickety stalls crowd the main boulevards and alleys. The stalls are stacked with clothing, some of it olive drab, and with canned foods, radios, cigarette lighters, liquor, medical supplies and thousands of other items.

Aside from the military boom, two major U.S. construction projects have been completed recently. One right in town is the new U.S. embassy, on Thong Nhat street, Saigon's "embassy row." The \$2.6 million building will have 240 rooms and six floors. The other project, at Tan Son Nhut airport outside the city, is the \$24.4 million headquarters of U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam.

The new MACV compound, fondly dubbed "Pentagon East," is part of the U.S. military's program to move as many of its people as possible out of Saigon proper. More than 11,900 persons now in Saigon will move to the new structure which covers 22.7 acres.



PROVINCES


South Vietnam is divided into districts and provinces for government, with the province being the highest level of government usually encountered by the peasants. Since the Viet Cong concentrates on killing off district and province chiefs, there is virtually no connection between the rural peoples and Saigon. All the average peasant knows is that he must pay taxes to either the Viet Cong or Saigon, or both, and he has little control over which one it will be.

TRANSPORTATION

Ground travel in Vietnam is still difficult, uncertain and dangerous, though improved over previous years. Many roads once closed by the Viet Cong are now fairly safe in the daytime, though nighttime travel is always hazardous. Highways, laid out in numbered routes, were once mostly unpaved but some have been greatly improved, principally on routes of heavy travel by the military. Much military travel is still by plane, with the network of airports and the frequency of flights much increased in recent years. Travel by air or military convoy is still much the safest way to get around in South Vietnam.

(from North to South)

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|-----------------|------------------|
| 1. Quang Tri | 23. Binh Tuy |
| 2. Thua Thien | 24. Long Khanh |
| 3. Quang Nam | 25. Hau Nghia |
| 4. Quang Tin | 26. Gia Dinh |
| 5. Quang Ngai | 27. Chau Doc |
| 6. Kontum | 28. Kien Phong |
| 7. Binh Dinh | 29. Kien Tuong |
| 8. Pleiku | 30. Long An |
| 9. Phu Bon | 31. Bien Hoa |
| 10. Phu Yen | 32. Phuoc Tuy |
| 11. Darlac | 33. An Giang |
| 12. Khanh Hoa | 34. Dinh Tuong |
| 13. Quang Duc | 35. Vinh Long |
| 14. Tuyen Duc | 36. Kien Hoa |
| 15. Phuoc Long | 37. Kien Giang |
| 16. Ninh Thuan | 38. Phong Dinh |
| 17. Binh Long | 39. Vinh Binh |
| 18. Lam Dong | 40. Chuong Thien |
| 19. Tay Ninh | 41. Ba Xuyen |
| 20. Phuoc Thanh | 42. Bac Lieu |
| 21. Binh Thuan | 43. An Xuyen |
| 22. Binh Duong | 44. Phu Quoc |




WEATHER

Wet, hot and wretched describes the weather in most of South Vietnam. The country, in the same latitudes as Central America, has double monsoon seasons—summer and winter. The winter monsoons, blowing from the northeast off the South China Sea, blanket the northern and central coasts of South Vietnam with daily downpours from October to April. Summer monsoons come from the south and southwest, across the Gulf of Siam, and drench the Mekong Delta and central South Vietnam. Saigon, where the average temperature is 81.5 degrees, gets 80 inches of rain annually, twice that of New York City. Hue, in the north, has 128 inches annually. Temperatures in the delta and coastal country often exceed 100 degrees in mid-day, and Saigon takes a two-hour siesta around noon. The mountains of the interior are cooler, and nights there can be downright cold.

PRODUCTS

In normal times, South Vietnam eats very well by Oriental standards. The Mekong Delta country and coastal areas farther north are good food producers. Until quite recently, there was enough rice—over 5 million tons—to feed the country and provide an important export crop. But the Viet Cong guerrillas have cut off the flow of rice from the villages to the cities to such an extent that Saigon is now importing rice from the United States. Trop-

ical fruits and many vegetables also are produced. Cash crops include rubber (over 70,000 tons annually), mostly from Binh Duong, Binh Long and Tay Ninh Provinces; tea (4,500 tons) in Darlac and Pleiku Provinces, and coffee, (3,500 tons) in Phu Bon and Binh Dinh Provinces. There are no large industries in South Vietnam but some small enterprises such as cigarettes, beer and food canning.



South Vietnam Will Never Be the Same

In all its long history, Vietnam never saw anything like the military construction boom of 1965-66.

When the United States decided to pour in thousands of troops to save South Vietnam, that automatically presaged construction miracles.

The groundwork had been laid as early as 1962 with a joint venture first known as "Vietnam Builders" and later as RMK-BRJ, or just plain RMK. These were the initials of a combine of four large American construction companies: Raymond International of New York, Morrison-Knudsen of Boise, Idaho; Brown & Root of Houston, and J. A. Jones of Charlotte, N.C.

When the crash program began in mid-1965, RMK already numbered a construction force of 350 American supervisors and 9,500 Vietnamese laborers. A year later it was up to 3,500 Americans, 1,800 Koreans, 2,800 Filipinos and 40,000 Vietnamese. Contracts soared from a mere \$50 million to nearly \$2 billion. The civilian RMK accounted for some 75 per cent of U.S. construction in Vietnam. The other 25 per cent was accomplished by the U.S. Army Engineers and the Navy's Construction Battalions (the Seabees).

The miracle wrought was impressive.

Cam Ranh Bay, a fine natural harbor surrounded by a sandspit, was transformed into one of the great harbors of the Orient. Its piers now handle a dozen ocean freighters at a time, while ashore are ammunition, fuel and food depots, housing for 50,000 servicemen, two 10,000-foot runways, taxiways, aprons, repair shops and storage warehouses from which 100,000 different items can be ordered.

Similar miracles were performed at three other major bases—Da Nang, Qui Nhon and Saigon. Da Nang is really two huge bases, Da Nang East and Da Nang West, boasting ocean piers, storage depots, fuel farms, truck parks, housing, roads and airstrips. At Saigon, a whole new port was built to relieve pressure on the city docks. Qui Nhon is the support base for the offensive in central Vietnam.


As a result of the base build-up, shortages of bombs and ammunition, fuel and spare parts are things of the past. In the early days, as many as 100 ships waited offshore for weeks with no means to unload. Today shipping is handled quickly and efficiently, and imports of food and other items for civilians have slowed a runaway inflation.

But the base build-up was only part of the construction story. Along with it have come roads, pipelines, hospitals, housing and large inland bases. Pleiku, for example, once a lonely outpost, is now a booming base with a 6,000-foot runway, barracks, shops and a forest of microwave antennas. The communications network of which this a part ties together all U.S. military installations in Southeast Asia and plugs them in directly to the Pentagon by satellite. Another big base is now going up at Dong Tam, in the Mekong Delta.


A few statistics round out the construction miracle. In early 1965 Vietnam had three runways capable of handling jets; today there are 14. Once only 15 airfields could handle C130 cargo planes; today there are 89. Seven ports can now handle ocean freighters, and trucks take their cargoes inland at the rate of 160,000 tons a month. Storage capacity now totals 210,000 tons of ammunition and nearly 2 million barrels of fuel.



The major military construction is now completed, but other building is in full swing, and much of it of permanent value to South Vietnam. At least 10 hospitals for civilians have been built or rebuilt, as well as bridges, roads and housing of eventual use to the people. A new city for 50,000 servicemen is under construction at Long Binh, a \$1 million U.S. embassy in Saigon, and a new headquarters for Gen. William C. Westmoreland at Tan Son Nhut airport, just north of Saigon. That field is now handling 76,000 flights a month, and is one of the world's busiest. New bypass highways are being built around Saigon, Da Nang and Qui Nhon, to relieve city traffic.

As the object of this American construction miracle, South Vietnam will never be the same again.



New deep-water piers at Da Nang help relieve crush of supplies for U.S. troops in Vietnam. Right, air view of Cam Ranh Bay.





DEMILITARIZED ZONE

The Demilitarized Zone—a 39-mile strip bisecting Vietnam from the South China Sea to the Laotian border—was created at Geneva in 1954 in an "Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam." The agreement designated a provisional military demarcation line in the vicinity of the 17th Parallel. On either side of the line a demilitarized zone, 6.2 miles to 3 miles wide, was established as a buffer between the North and the South. But the DMZ is such in name only. Communist divisions face U.S. Marines there. In the fall of 1967, it was the hottest war zone in Vietnam.





CENTRAL HIGHLANDS

Towering mountains, wide plateaus and densely populated coastlands make up the area in South Vietnam known as the Central Highlands. In the late spring and summer, monsoon rains and mists settle over the Wyoming-like plateau, providing a perfect cover for enemy campaigns. Although the region is infiltrated with Communists, American forces also hold strong positions there. Every populated area, with the exception of a few along the southern coast, is under U.S. control. Two major roads are now open and 33 airstrips have been built, making it possible to move allied troops anywhere, anytime.

MEKONG DELTA

The Mekong delta is the rice bowl of all Vietnam. The seven million people living along the waterways, tilling the muddy soil, once provided crops that made Indochina an exporter of rice. Now much of their produce goes to the Viet Cong, and South Vietnam actually has to import great quantities of the grain. American soldiers find the swamps, canals, jungles and rice paddies tough terrain for fighting or pacification. The Cong still use it as a key source for recruits as well as for food.





SOUTH VIETNAM

NORTH VIETNAM

THAILAND

LAOS

Gulf of Tonkin

HAIPHONG

HANOI

VIENTIANE

Xiang Khouang

QUANG TRI

DONG HOI

QUANG KHE

HA TINH

VINH

THANH HOA

NINH BINH

HOA BINH

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NORTH VIETNAM: Another Country

At a quick glance, North Vietnam and South Vietnam show some similarities. Each has a mountainous interior and a coastal delta, the Red River in the North and the Mekong in the South. But just about there the similarity stops.

North Vietnam is smaller, about 61,000 square miles to South Vietnam's 66,000, and more densely populated, about 19 million to 16 million. The North has more industry and more natural resources—rich coal deposits and many metal ores—but much less rice. Before partition, the two economies were quite complementary; the south supplied the food, the north the raw materials and manufactured goods.

There is one other difference, a vital one. North Vietnam is a Communist dictatorship, old style; a rigid system of government ruthlessly imposed and ruthlessly maintained. Where the South has seldom known stable rule, the North has had but one regime since 1945. And that regime has always had but one aim—all of Vietnam under one rule, Communist rule.

Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on Sept. 2, 1945 in Hanoi. He was 55 then, and had put in 30 years of apprenticeship in the Communist circles of Europe and China. Since 1945 he has been the Communist boss of Vietnam, and the men around him then are with him still. Pham Van Dong was with him then, and has been his Prime Minister since 1955. Vo Nguyen Giap was the head of his fledgling army then, and is still chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces.

THE LAO DONG RULES

At first, Ho gathered diverse groups into a national front, an old Communist trick. But from the start the real power in Vietnam was the Lao Dong (Workers') party, and by 1951 it had come out in the open. Its tentacles stretched then, and still do, into the army, the factory, the village and the home, down to street-by-street control. North Vietnam today has a constitution, more or less liberal-sounding; a Cabinet, a National Assembly, even political parties—all the trappings of democracy—but it is the Lao Dong that rules, from the top down.

In the early 1950's the Communists began to drive the French from the northern frontier towns—Cao Bang, Lang Son, Lao Cai and in 1954 the French made their last stand at Dien Bien Phu. That defeat had more psychological value than military; the French were fed up and ready to get out of Indo-China. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, Ho Chi Minh accepted French withdrawal in return for partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel. He regarded the severance of South Vietnam as only temporary, and still does. Reunification, under Communist rule, is still the cardinal principle of his policy.

The price of Communist rule in North Vietnam has been paid in blood. In the early 1950's, thousands of peasants and leaders were murdered in the name of "agrarian reform." Some put the figure as high as 50,000 slaughtered, and other thousands were jailed or starved to death or committed suicide. The pogroms were halted for a time in 1956 because of "errors." Gen. Giap was quoted as saying: "Seeing enemies everywhere, we resorted to terror, which became far too widespread." But the Communists had broken the old pattern of village rule and achieved a degree of national control which has never been relaxed.

Even without the war, the struggle for economic viability has been a hard one for North Vietnam. The problems include overpopulation in the delta area (as many as 2,000 people per square mile in some areas); underpopulation in the mountainous interior; a high rate of population increase, as much as 3.6 per cent per year; inability of food production to keep pace; a need for more industry.

To cope with its problems, North Vietnam launched a three-year economic plan in 1958, followed by a five-year industrialization plan in 1961. The goals were never achieved, but some progress was made before the intensification of the war began in 1965.

With food imports from South Vietnam cut off, North Vietnam has made strenuous efforts to increase its own production. Labor parties were put to work to repair and extend the dikes, canals and irrigation works of the rice-growing sections in the Red River delta and other coastal areas. Peasants from the over-populated coast were moved into the hills to grow supplementary foods—yams, corn, beans.

By these efforts, production of rice, sugar, fish and other foods has been increased. Food distribution is rigidly controlled and there have been no recent famines, yet living standards have declined steadily. Thus North Vietnam sees a vital need for South Vietnam's Mekong "rice bowl" and the relatively underpopulated growing lands of central South Vietnam. The North's excess of peasants could be sent there to raise food.

Industrially, North Vietnam had good potential. The anthracite (hard coal) fields about Hon Gai, on the Gulf of Tonkin, were opened by the French and even before World War II were the largest source of coal exports in Southeast Asia. The French also opened cement works at Haiphong, a large cotton mill at Nam Dinh, and tin, tungsten and zinc mines. When Ho Chi Minh took over, his Communist friends came to his aid. China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe satellites contributed money, machinery and experts to train Vietnamese workers. Electric power plants were built or expanded, a large iron and steel complex was begun at Thai Nguyen, 40 miles north of Hanoi, and plastics, textile and food-processing industries were developed.

ITS INDUSTRY DEVASTATED

Then the war escalated. Ho Chi Minh's industry provided rich targets for American planes. First the power plants and petroleum storage areas around Haiphong and Hanoi were hit. On March 10 the Thai Nguyen steel complex came under attack for the first time. Railroad yards, bridges, textile mills, cement plants, sugar refineries have all been bombed. No matter how the war ends, North Vietnam's industry has been devastated.

Before the heavy bombing began, Hanoi had a population of about 600,000. Most of the residents have now been evacuated to the countryside. Of Haiphong's 350,000 people, some 200,000 have been dispersed. Yet neither city has been under general bombing. Specific targets, such as oil tanks, power plants and railroad yards, have been taken out by selective raids on both cities.

The raids on Haiphong have brought the United States close

to confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Russians have claimed damage to their ships in Haiphong and other harbors and the killing and wounding of Russian crewmen. The United States at first denied this, then admitted it might have happened. But raids on Haiphong do carry international implications. Haiphong is North Vietnam's only major port, and a prime entry port for Russian aid. The United States has not declared a blockade of Haiphong, and it is thus open, theoretically at least, to ships of all nations.

The U.S. State Department estimates that 60 per cent of North Vietnam's aid comes from the Soviet Union, 30 per cent from Red China and 10 per cent from East Europe. Russian aid since February 1965—military, economic and technical—is estimated at about \$1 billion. In the summer of 1967 two new factors began to complicate the problem of supplying North Vietnam.

The first was the Arab-Israeli war, which unexpectedly closed the Suez Canal early in June. Most Russian aid had been going by ship to Haiphong from Odessa and other southern ports in Russia. Much of it probably still does, but with the canal closed indefinitely the sea trip is far longer.

U.S. WIDENS ITS TARGETS

The second complication was an unannounced change in American bombing policy. On Aug. 11, American planes blasted the Long Bien bridge at Hanoi. Until that time this bridge, obviously one of the most important in North Vietnam, had mostly been left alone. The attack scored direct hits and dropped the 300-foot center span into the Red River. The Long Bien bridge was the main rail and road link bringing Chinese weapons and supplies into Hanoi. Other raids quickly followed the first one, and American planes also struck out vigorously against rail and road targets all the way to the border of Red

China. With bridges down, railroad cars and truck convoys bunched up and the U.S. planes blasted them. The wraps had clearly been taken off some hitherto sacrosanct targets, and the pilots pounded them with vigor.

One of the cleared targets was Hanoi's main power plant, lying a little away from downtown Hanoi. It was hit first on June 10.


American bombers have attacked only inadvertently one other prime target—the dike and irrigation system of the Red River delta. Over the centuries an elaborate system has been built to protect the delta from floods in the rainy season. During floods the Red River often rises as much as 30 feet above the level of Hanoi. Without constant dredging, the harbor of Haiphong would silt up quickly. Breaching of the dikes and destruction of the pumping, dredging and irrigation system could cause vast disruption of the cities and the rice economy. The "hawks" have often urged the bombing of this system.


From Ho's standpoint, the war has not been without advantage at home. The air attacks on the North, and constant warnings that the "American imperialists" are about to invade the North, have given the Communists the solid support of their people that they never had before. Believing he is fighting for his country, the peasant can accept the misery of life and of state dictatorship.

THE NORTH BIDES ITS TIME

The North believes the main shock of the air war has been absorbed and neutralized. What industry was left has been dispersed, aid still comes in from Russia and China, and it still moves south. That is partly true, but what the North does not say is that little heavy equipment moves into South Vietnam. Not even those coolies can carry tanks on their bicycles, or artillery on their backs.

Once a sleepy, tropical river town, North Vietnam's principal port at Haiphong has become a city of 375,000 residents, with docks, warehouses, light industry, petroleum storage and power plants. Lying 18 miles from the Gulf of Tonkin, it could be closed easily by mines or bombs. The narrow channel must be dredged constantly to maintain proper depth. "Hawks" have demanded closing of the port because of the military supplies that funnel through it from Russia and elsewhere. The American civilian command has been reluctant to do this for several reasons, but power plants and oil storage have been bombed and transportation facilities brought under increasing attack.





The capital of North Vietnam, many of whose 650,000 inhabitants have been evacuated for fear of air raids, has wide, tree-lined boulevards and parks—French legacies. It is the seat of Hanoi University, technical schools, libraries and theaters, and a transportation hub with highways and railroads that have been under mounting attack by American pilots bent on destroying links with Red China. It is vulnerable also because it is located in the flood plain of the Red River where an elaborate system of dikes wards off flood waters that might otherwise overwhelm both it and extensive croplands.

Still, the North believes that time is on its side. The South Vietnamese people do not believe in the war, they say. Only the mandarins in Saigon do, and the people don't trust them. In the meantime, younger generations are coming along in North Vietnam, generations fighting to save the North from the "imperialists."

Sooner or later the Americans will get tired and go home. Five years, ten years, even longer. One day they will go home, and then the North will take the South. That is the plan.

But in the war of here and now, there is no doubt that the air pounding is disrupting life in North Vietnam. The Soviet tankers still bring Rumanian oil into Haiphong, and trucks, MIG fighters and SAMs. But there are few big tanks left for the oil, and the trucks don't dare move by day. The North apparently has 100 to 150 MIGs at all times, but not the same ones. The MIGs are regularly destroyed in dogfights or raids on airfields. The loss ratio runs about three MIGs to one U.S. plane.

The SAMs have been effective in an unexpected way. They don't bring down many planes, but they force them to operate at lower altitudes where anti-aircraft fire can get them.

The Chinese are supplying North Vietnam with at least two vital items—rice and bicycles. The Chinese are expected to send from 600,000 to 800,000 tons of rice this year, making up the deficit North Vietnam used to get from South Vietnam. Some of that rice also represents lost production due to disruption from American bombing; thousands of workers have been pulled out of the paddies to repair roads, railroads and bridges and move war materials south for the Viet Cong. The Chinese are supplying rails and rolling stock to replace bombing losses, and are also sending small arms, mortars, machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons.

Many newsmen, including Americans and Russians, have testified to the disruption of travel. Bicycle and truck traffic is heavy, but only at night, and crossing of the many rivers is still possible, even ingenious, but certainly time-consuming. A Soviet newsman wrote that news of a local election in the city of Vinh, only 160 miles south of Hanoi, took four days to reach the capital. Telephone cables are constantly torn up, and emergency lines in many cases hang from trees. A trip from Hanoi to Vinh, the Russian said, takes a minimum of two days.

As in many Communist societies, there is a good deal of outright lying. The Viet Cong, for example, recently told Hanoi that it had killed 88,000 Americans in the first nine months of 1966. The United States figure at the time was 3,558. The deliberate pattern of exaggerations is probably necessary to sustain both Viet Cong morale and Hanoi's morale.


One thing of great concern to the United States is the treatment of prisoners. More than 350 American pilots are now prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Little is known of their conditions of life, and that little is disturbing. On at least one occasion, downed pilots were paraded through the streets and maltreated by the crowds. On other occasions, pilots seemingly drugged or brainwashed have been trotted out for news conferences. Protests to Hanoi are ignored.

North Vietnam is ruled by a politburo of a dozen or so men, all nearing the end of the line. Ho Chi Minh is 77, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong is 61, and Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap is in his 60s. But younger men are coming along, men like Le Duan, first secretary of the Communist party, and Trong Chinh, head of the party's control commission.

But no matter who takes over from Ho, there is small chance of any great change in communist goals, although tactics and performance might differ.

DA NANG UNDER FIRE

In the first seven months of 1967, the big U.S. air base at Da Nang was the victim of severe mortar barrages by the enemy. The last one—described as the “worst ever”—occurred on July 14, when Communist gunners loosed rockets on the air base killing 13 men and wounding about 150. Heavy damage was inflicted on the base's bomb storage area. About 20 planes were damaged or destroyed and their losses were estimated in the millions of dollars. Five firefighters were killed when bombs under a blazing jet exploded and four enlisted men's barracks, housing about 80 men each, were wrecked.






AIR STRIKES

American air commanders usually have a free hand on assignment of bombing targets in relatively non-sensitive areas of North Vietnam. But the big targets must be approved in Washington by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by President Johnson. Their decision is then relayed through the headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Adm. Ulysses Grant Sharp, and through the Pacific Air Force Headquarters, both in Hawaii, to the commanders in Vietnam, in Thailand and of the Seventh fleet.

This process takes time and has resulted in disputes. Commanding officers in Vietnam almost unanimously believe they should have more freedom in selecting targets.

Also, the fliers want to attack some primary targets still off limits. First among these in mid October were the MIG airfields at Phuc Yen and Gia Lam. Phuc Yen was the main MIG base in North Vietnam and includes the Russian-Chinese-North Vietnamese Air defense center. Gia Lam was the main civil airport for Hanoi, with a MIG base and airfield comparable to Saigon's Tan Son Nhut.

Through early October, North Vietnam's third largest port, Cam Pha, had had its port facilities hit only once. The dock area of the second largest port—Hong Gai—had never had its dock area attacked, although warplanes had struck nearby installations.



A large share of the air strikes against North Vietnam start from the Yankee Station of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. It always is manned with three carriers and a fourth rotates in and out of the area on 'R and R'—rest and recreation. In early October, the carriers on duty at Yankee were the Constellation, Oriskany and Intrepid. Among them were approximately 200 aircraft which made about 50 strikes per day. Each ship had more than 3,000 men aboard.

THAILAND-

The Silent Partner

Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that has never succumbed to a colonial power. And it has no intention of losing its independence to Red China or to North Vietnam.

Adroit diplomacy has kept Thailand free over the centuries, and also serves to explain the current United States presence there. The current menace to Thailand is Communist infiltration from the north; that is why the United States has been invited in to Thailand as a protector.

Thailand's support is of immense importance. The Thais sent a unit to fight on the United Nations side in Korea, and are sending in a combat force to fight with American troops in Vietnam. Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn put out a call in January, 1967, for 2,300 volunteers to serve in Vietnam with the "Queen's Cobra Task Force." Thirty thousand Thais signed up.

The United States buildup in Thailand is already tremendous. As in the case of Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, an American construction combine, Dillingham-Zachary-Kaiser, is transforming the port town of Sattahip into one of the biggest bases in Southeast Asia. It's a \$140 million project, which some are calling "the new Singapore." Part of it is the U Taphao airfield, with an 11,500-foot runway. American B52 bombers began using the

field in April 1967.


The port at Sattahip is being developed with deep-water piers for direct unloading of freighters and tankers. Working two 10-hour shifts a day under American supervision, 7,000 Thai laborers are installing piers, pipelines, barracks and communications. An undersea telephone cable to American headquarters in South Vietnam has already been completed.

Sattahip not only relieves the strain on the civilian docks at Bangkok, it also keeps military traffic off the streets of the Thai capital. This is important to the Thais, who want to avoid the impression of an American takeover. To preserve this status, U Taphao and Sattahip are known as Thai bases, not American. They are commanded by Thai officers and have Thai guards.

But the Thais are under no illusions. They know that Red China and North Vietnam are training cadres of disaffected Thais to form a fifth column for the conquest of Thailand. One such secret camp is at Hoa Binh, south of Hanoi. Intelligence sources say the camp has so far trained about 300 agents and sent them back into Thailand to form guerrilla bands. This pattern is familiar from South Vietnam.

The Thais quietly allowed the American buildup to start in 1965. U.S. fighter-bombers have been operating over North Vietnam for many months from Thailand bases at Takli, Korat, Udon and Ubon. At Korat, the U.S. 9th Logistics Command has "pre-positioned" stocks in division quantities, kept in sealed warehouses at constant 40 per cent humidity to prevent tropical rot. Korat has direct rail connections with the new base at Sattahip.

More than 37,000 American servicemen are now in Thailand. Obviously, more thousands could be delivered there quickly, with bases and supplies ready. Bob Hope once referred to Thailand as the "parking lot" for Vietnam. If Red China decides to move south, it could become a crucial theater of war.



The Third War--Dissent in the U.S.



As the tempo of war rose in Vietnam, so the variety and virulence of dissent rose at home. In 1964 the nation began to witness a spectacle possible only in a democracy. While fighting a very real war in a far country, the United States wrestled in public with its own conscience. All the world watched.

Students at Haverford raised money for the Viet Cong, demonstrators marched in Times Square, professors bought advertisements. Dissenters picketed the White House and the United

Nations, Oberlin students went on a fast, someone ran up the Viet Cong flag over San Francisco's new Federal Building, and in Detroit an 82-year-old woman turned herself into a human torch, even as Buddhist monks had done in Saigon.

Demonstrators held a prayer vigil at the LBJ ranch, there were "teach-ins" and "speak outs." Pacifists disrupted an Armed Forces Day parade on Fifth Avenue, others lay in front of troop trains in California. Anti-war leaflets were mailed to

troops fighting in Vietnam, and the widows of men killed there received ugly telephone calls in the night.

California students splattered paint on Gen. Maxwell Taylor as he spoke, and others planned a 64-day cross-country "run for peace." Even reservation Indians demonstrated. Viet Cong movies were shown on campuses and a Baltimore Quaker burned himself to death while clutching a baby.

THE HAWKS AND DOVES

Five hundred spectators walked out when U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg spoke at Berkeley, and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara had to be rescued from besiegers at Harvard. Four men showered San Francisco with leaflets from an airplane, and four housewives went to Hanoi to see the war from that side.

Draft card burning was followed by flag burning and finally, at a mass rally of more than 100,000 people in New York in April, 1967, civil rights somehow got mixed up with Vietnam. Hanoi and Moscow contributed regularly to the fires of dissent, and charges of Communist foment were freely bandied in the halls of Congress.

Sen. Fulbright has said: "The Vietnam war is poisoning and brutalizing our domestic life . . . diverts human resources from cities . . . feeds idea of violence as a way of solving problems. I believe the wisest policy at present is to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, to request the U.N. Security Council to put Vietnam on its agenda and to ask the Security Council, if that is done, to reconvene the Geneva Conference to work out a solution."

As the war widened, and casualties mounted, sentiment hardened on both sides. Mike Mansfield, the Senate majority leader, led a party of five Senators on a 35-day tour of Vietnam. Their conclusion: "All of mainland Southeast Asia, at least, cannot be ruled out as a potential battlefield." Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: "We'll be involved out there (Asia) till the end of the century. Our interest in the Far Pacific is precisely what our interest was in the late 40's and 50's in Europe. We want to see the small nations that are free remain free."

In April, Gen. William C. Westmoreland came home on his first visit from the battlefield and in a famous speech said: "Now I do not see any end of the war in sight. It's going to be a question of putting maximum pressure on the enemy anywhere and everywhere that we can. We will have to grind him down. In effect, we are fighting a war of attrition, and the only alternative is a war of annihilation, which I think we have ruled out as a matter of policy."

"WE WILL NOT GROW TIRED"

He also said: "But I am mindful that the military war in South Vietnam is, from the enemy's point of view, only part of a protracted and carefully coordinated attack, waged in the international arena. Regretably, I see signs of enemy success in that world arena which he cannot match on the battlefield. He does not understand that American democracy is founded on debate, and he sees every protest as evidence of crumbling morale and diminishing resolve. Thus, discouraged by repeated military defeats but encouraged by what he believes to be popular opposition to our effort in Vietnam, he is determined to continue his aggression from the North. This, inevitably, will cost lives—American, Vietnamese and those of our other allies."

That stung the dissenters to new fury, but by that time the sheer size of battle in Vietnam was making dissent and exercise in rhetoric.

And beyond it stood President Johnson's pledge: "We will not grow tired. We will not be defeated. We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement."

Hardly a day went by, however, that someone didn't get into print on the argument.

A Gallup Poll in May found that one of four U.S. adults back the use of atomic weapons for military activity. A "Support Our Boys in Vietnam" parade was organized by a New York City fire captain in protest against anti-war demonstrations. A Quaker meeting house in St. James, N.Y., was defaced with symbols and denunciations of the Quakers' opposition to the war.

Dr. Spock, the well-known pediatrician, headed a "Spring Mobilization to End War" delegation to Washington and was hit with an egg outside the White House. A court martial found Capt. Howard Levy of the Army medical corps guilty of disobedience and promoting disloyalty.

Student body presidents and editors from 200 colleges and universities sent President Johnson letters protesting the war.

Some Civil Rights leaders in the United States tried to link their problems with Vietnam, saying there is a bigger war at home. Politicians made it their business to take a stand on the war and let the public know it.

And so, the debate rolled on.

Another round of intensified Senate debate over the Vietnam war broke loose early in October. Most of it involved Republican doves like Cooper of Kentucky, Javits of New York and Percy of Illinois, and Republican hawks such as Murphy of California, Miller of Iowa, Dominick of Colorado and Thurmond of South Carolina.

The spark which ignited the forensics was President Johnson's most recent pledge to halt the bombing of North Vietnam, provided that would lead to productive peace talks.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper took direct issue with the President, contending that the initiative toward peace in Vietnam lay within the control of the United States. He urged that America take the first step toward negotiations by ordering an "unconditional cessation" of the bombing of North Vietnam.

Opponents not only objected to any bombing cessation but criticized the administration for not applying more military pressure.

Republican Sen. George Murphy of California, one of the observers of the Vietnamese elections, said: "I believe American military officers should be given a free hand to use air and naval power against the enemy."

Sen. Stuart Symington, Missouri Democrat who had just returned from a visit to Vietnam, suggested the U.S. test Hanoi's interest in negotiations by easing all military action in Vietnam, then, if North Vietnam and the Viet Cong fail to respond to this move, "let the U.S. intensify its military pressure and feel free to pursue this war in any manner of its own choosing."

Sen. Everett Dirksen, the Republican leader who, has defended the Administration's policy, called upon dissenting Republicans to moderate what he termed their "demeaning" criticism of Johnson. Dirksen immediately caught cross-fire from Democratic Sen. Fulbright who protested the administration's policy was undermining the long term security of the nation.

The Dirksen-Fulbright exchange provided an unusual free-wheeling, extemporaneous debate on the war of the sort the Senate had not heard in months. The two clashed for several hours over whether American security was at stake in Vietnam.

When the rhetorical fires had cooled, President Johnson's position on the war still seemed invulnerable, with support from top G.O.P. figures such as Dirksen, Sen. Thomas Kuchel of California and former President Eisenhower.

During the week, Sen. Charles Percy came up with a middle-of-the-road resolution which suggested that our Allies send more troops to Vietnam. If nothing else, the doves and the hawks agree on one thing: if the war must be fought in Vietnam, it would be nice for other countries to provide more help.

VIETNAM CHRONOLOGY

1954

- May 7—Fall of Dien Bien Phu
- July 21—Geneva Conference partitions Vietnam at 17th Parallel
- Oct. 24—President Eisenhower pledges support to Premier Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam

1955

- Feb. 12—U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group takes over training of South Vietnamese Army
- Feb. 19—Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty comes into force, with guarantees of defense of South Vietnam
- Sept. 25—Cambodia declares independence from France
- Oct. 26—Diem declares South Vietnam a republic, becomes first president



1956

- Feb. 18—Cambodia renounces SEATO, sides with Red China
- Aug. 5—Coalition government formed in Laos
- Oct. 26—South Vietnam's first Constitution promulgated

1957

- May 5-19—Diem visits U.S., addresses Congress, confers with Eisenhower, receives U.S. pledge of help against Communists

1958-59

- Viet Cong and bandit unrest, political and religious insurrection grow steadily in countryside

1960

- Apr. 17—North Vietnam accuses U.S. of turning South Vietnam into base for preparation of war
- May 5—U.S. announces it is increasing advisors in South Vietnam from 327 to 685 at Diem's request

- Nov. 10—South Vietnam charges regular army forces from North Vietnam attacking in Central Highlands

1961

- Jan. 22—Radio Hanoi praises National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam, pledged to "overthrow U.S.-Diem clique"
- Mar. 10—Front pledges to disrupt elections
- Apr. 9—Diem re-elected, but unpopular due to failure of promised reforms
- May 6—President Kennedy says U.S. considering use of U.S. armed forces to prevent Communist take-over in South Vietnam
- May 13—Vice President Johnson announces in Saigon additional U.S. military and economic aid will be given South Vietnam
- June 4—President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev in Vienna reaffirm their support of neutral and independent Laos
- Sept. 18—Communists seize provincial capital only 60 miles from Saigon
- Sept. 25—President Kennedy warns U.N. General Assembly of "smouldering coals of war in Southeast Asia"
- Oct. 11—President Kennedy announces he is sending Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to South Vietnam for survey and report
- Oct. 18—Diem declares state of emergency in South Vietnam
- Nov. 16—President Kennedy decides to bolster South Vietnam's military strength, but not commit U.S. combat forces at this time

1962

- Feb. 7—Two U.S. Army air support companies totaling 300 men arrive in Saigon, bringing U.S. total to 4,000
- Feb. 8—U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, established under Gen. Paul D. Harkins
- Feb. 24—Red China declares her security threatened by "undeclared war" of U.S. forces in South Vietnam
- Apr. 30-May 12—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara makes first inspection trip to South Vietnam



May 15—President Kennedy orders U.S. forces to Thailand at her request

July 30—5,000 Marines sent to Thailand withdraw

Oct.—Disclosed U.S. forces in South Vietnam now risen to 10,000

1963

May 8—Buddhist riots erupt in Hue

June 11—Buddhist monk burns himself to death with gasoline, aggravating religious unrest

Aug. 21—Diem proclaims martial law throughout South Vietnam to quiet unrest

Aug. 26—Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge presents credentials to Diem

Aug. 27—Cambodia breaks diplomatic relations with South Vietnam

Aug. 29—French President De Gaulle suggests U.S. leave South Vietnam

Sept. 2—President Kennedy says he believes Diem government is out of touch with the people.

Oct. 2—Defense Secretary McNamara and Gen. Taylor, after survey trip to South Vietnam, report to President Kennedy their view that "the major part of the United States military task can be completed by the end of 1965..."

Nov. 2—Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, assassinated in military coup

Nov. 2—Constitution suspended, National Assembly dissolved, first of several military governments is set up. U.S. recognizes it

Nov. 20—McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk confer in Honolulu with Lodge and Gen. Harkins

Nov. 22—President Kennedy assassinated

Dec. 18-21—McNamara makes third trip to South Vietnam, his first for President Johnson

Dec. 31—U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam now 16,500

1964

Mar. 6-13—McNamara's fourth trip to South Vietnam

Apr. 15—SEATO declares defeat of Viet Cong is essential to security of Southeast Asia

Apr. 25—Gen. William C. Westmoreland to replace Gen. Harkins


May 11-14—McNamara's fifth trip to South Vietnam

May 21—U.S. opens reconnaissance flights over Laos

June 7—Two U.S. planes shot down by Communist Pathet Lao fire in Laos

June 23—President Johnson appoints Gen. Taylor ambassador to South Vietnam

Aug. 2—North Vietnamese torpedo boats attack U.S. destroyer Maddox in Gulf of Tonkin



Aug. 4—Destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy attacked in Gulf of Tonkin

Aug. 4—President Johnson approves air attack on North Vietnamese gunboats and bases

Aug. 7—Congress approves Southeast Asia Resolution, authorizing aid to South Vietnam

Aug. 11—President Johnson signs it

1965

Jan. 8—South Korea sends 2,000 troops to South Vietnam

Feb. 6—Russian Premier Kosygin visits Hanoi

Feb. 7—Viet Cong attacks U.S. installations at Pleiku. President Johnson orders retaliatory raids against Communist bases, bridges, supply areas in North Vietnam. U.S. dependents ordered home

Feb. 10—Viet Cong bomb enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nhon, killing 23 American soldiers, heaviest U.S. toll to date in Vietnam

Mar. 8—3,500 Marines land at Da Nang to protect U.S. air base. First commitment of U.S. combat units. U.S. forces now total 27,000

Mar. 25—President Johnson offers aid to North Vietnam if peace is achieved

Mar. 30—Bomb explodes outside U.S. Embassy in Saigon, 17 killed 183 wounded

Apr. 11—North Vietnam denounces Johnson's offer to negotiate

May 3—Cambodia breaks relations with U.S.

May 13—U.S. halts bombing of North Vietnam

May 19—U.S. resumes bombing

May 25—Soviet Union announces construction of missile sites around Hanoi

June—173rd Airborne Brigade arrives in South Vietnam

June 16—U.S. announces additional 21,000 troops for South Vietnam, making total 75,000

June 18—First B52 raid from Guam, on Zone D

June 19—Military junta headed by Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky comes to power. Ky becomes sixth premier since Diem assassinated

June 23—My Canh floating restaurant in Saigon blown up, 44 killed including 12 Americans

June 28—U.S. Army troops in first major operation, in Zone D

July—101st Airborne Division arrives in South Vietnam

July 8—Lodge replaces Gen Taylor as ambassador

July 14-21—McNamara makes sixth inspection trip to Vietnam

July 28—President Johnson orders U.S. forces in South Vietnam increased to 125,000, promises more if necessary

Aug. 18—Marines launch first big operation, at Chu Lai

Sept.—1st Cavalry Division arrives in South Vietnam

Sept. 18—Helicopters of U.S. 1st Cavalry Division committed to battle for first time, in Central Highlands

Oct.—1st Infantry Division arrives in South Vietnam

Oct. 4—U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade moves into Iron Triangle

Oct. 20—Action begins around Special Forces camp at Plei Me

Oct. 26—1st Cavalry Division lifts siege of Plei Me

Nov. 14—Fighting erupts in Ia Drang Valley in highlands

Nov. 18—Viet Cong driven from Ia Drang Valley. U.S. casualties for week heaviest since war began: 247 killed, 570 wounded. Estimated 1,200 enemy killed

Nov. 28-30—McNamara's seventh trip to South Vietnam

Dec.—25th Infantry Division arrives in South Vietnam

Dec. 24—Bombing of North Vietnam suspended as U.S. and allies begin "peace offensive"

Dec. 31—U.S. casualties for 1965 are 1,365 killed, compared to 146 killed in 1964

1966

Jan. 1—U.S., Australian and New Zealand troops move into Mekong Delta for first operation

Jan. 15—Operation Crimp 25 miles northwest of Saigon destroys major tunnel systems, captures important Viet Cong documents

Jan. 17—Koreans terminate their first big operation, south of Tuy Hoa

Jan. 31—U.S. peace offensive fails, bombing of North Vietnam resumed after 37-day respite

Feb. 4—Operation Masher-White Wing winds up in Binh Dinh province 1,047 Viet Cong killed

Feb. 8—President Johnson and aides wind up three-day Hawaii Conference. Ky dedicates his government to "eradication of social injustice"

Feb. 20—After three weeks, 4,000 Marines wind up Operation Double Eagle south of Quang Nang, kill 210 Viet Cong

Feb. 21—Americans and Koreans complete Operation Van Buren in Phu Yen Province, kill 679 Viet Cong

Mar. 12—Special Forces camp at A Shau falls with heavy losses after three-day battle with North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong

Mar. 17—173rd Airborne killed 336 Viet Cong in Zone D, for loss of 5 killed

Mar. 25—Marine force lands at Rung Sat in delta south of Saigon

Apr. 8—Operation Lincoln kills 453 Viet Cong in Pleiku, Phu Bon and Darlac Provinces

Apr. 13—Viet Cong mortar attack on Tan Son Nhut airfield kills 8, wounds 201, destroys considerable materiel

Apr. 21—Marines and Vietnamese kill 173 Viet Cong in battle west of Quang Ngai

May 10—First of four Paul Revere operations begins west of Pleiku along Cambodian border. Ends late November with 1,500 Viet Cong killed

May 16—Operation Davy Crockett kills 374 Viet Cong in Binh Dinh Province

May 17—Operation Birmingham, first major drive in Zone C along Cambodian border winds up with 119 Viet Cong killed, huge supply caches captured

June 2—Operation El Paso II begins in Binh Long Province. Ends July 13 with 855 Viet Cong killed, 1,500 tons of rice captured

June 2—101st Airborne begins battle in mountains around Dak To, completed June 20 with 531 enemy killed.

June 29—First air raids on Hanoi-Haiphong area. Oil storage first targets, but quickly expanded to include factories, highways, railroads, trucks. World opinion inflamed.

July 7—Operations begin against Demilitarized Zone, eventually build to major operations across breadth of South Vietnam to Laos border

July 30—Bombing of DMZ begins

Aug.—4th Infantry Division and 196th Brigade arrive in South Vietnam, bringing U.S. forces to 300,000

Aug. 18—Australians in Operation Smithfield kill 245 Viet Cong, their biggest operation to date



Sept.—Vietnamese troops kill 500 Viet Cong in An Xuyen and Bac Lieu Provinces, at southern tip of South Vietnam
 Sept.—11th Armored Cavalry Regiment arrives in South Vietnam
 Sept. 11—South Vietnamese voters choose an assembly to draft civilian constitution for the country.
 Sept. 15—U.S. troops move into Mekong Delta to stay
 Sept. 23—Korean Tiger Division begins sweep in Binh Dinh Province, protecting rice harvest and killing 1,161 Viet Cong by November
 Oct. 8-14—McNamara's eighth trip to South Vietnam
 Oct. 15—U.S. forces begin Operation Attleboro, major drive to clean out Zone C. Kill 1,106 Viet Cong, capture 2,384 tons of rice
 Oct. 24-25—Manila Conference of allied powers fighting in South Vietnam. President Johnson attends during 17-day tour of Southeast Asia. Conference pledges to win war and then build better Asia
 Nov.—Heavy fighting, all areas, continues throughout end of year
 Dec.—9th Infantry Division and 199th Brigade arrive in South Vietnam
 Dec. 31—U.S. casualties for 1966 were 5,008 killed, reflecting clearing of major areas of South Vietnam. Estimated Viet Cong killed, 55,000.

1967

Jan. 1—Year opened with heavy fighting from the DMZ to the Delta. 177 clashes had occurred during the 48-hour New Year truce
 Jan. 7—Operation Cedar Falls, biggest of the war so far, begins to clean out the Iron Triangle. Ends Jan. 26 with 720 Viet Cong killed
 Jan 7—Premier Ky offers to meet Ho Chi Minh anywhere to talk peace
 Feb.—U.S. 9th Division opens campaign from Dong Tam to clear Mekong Delta
 Feb. 11—Full war resumes after four-day Tet truce, during which 20 Americans killed.
 Feb. 23—45,000 troops open "Junction City" operation, war's biggest, to clear Zone C.
 Mar.—Heavy fighting continues along DMZ, air and ground action steady all across South Vietnam
 Mar. 10—First air raid on North Vietnam's only steel mill, at Thai Nguyen, 38 miles north of Hanoi. Since raided many more times
 Mar. 15—Lodge retires as ambassador to South Vietnam, succeeded by Ellsworth Bunker
 Mar. 19—Guam Conference, with President Johnson, his aides, and South Vietnamese leaders present
 Mar. 21—Viet Cong attacks 4th Division base in Zone C, driven off with 631 killed
 Mar. 25—U.S. destroyer Ozbourne hit by enemy shorefire, first warship hit. Damage light, no casualties
 Apr. 11—B52s make first raid from Thailand bases
 Apr. 14—Work begun to clear DMZ, construct little Maginot Line
 Apr. 19—U.S. proposes 10-mile pullback on each side of DMZ, leaving no-man's-land 26 miles wide
 Apr. 21—Hanoi rejects pullback from DMZ
 Apr. 24—First air raid on MIG fields in North Vietnam
 May 4—Marines wind up a 12-day battle to capture Hill 861 and Hills 881 South and North, at northwest corner near DMZ
 May 10—Defense Department decides to recommission battleship New Jersey for service in Vietnam
 May 14—15,000 U.S. troops sent north to bolster forces in heavy fighting along DMZ
 May 18—Marines move into DMZ for first time, to clean out North Vietnamese hiding there



May 23—Marines withdraw from DMZ, announce it is now a "free fire zone," and anything moving in it will be fired upon
 May 24—Twenty-four hour "truce" for Buddha's birthday ends. Twelve Americans killed, 60 wounded in 71 incidents during truce
 May 26—U.S. announces casualties for week ending May 22 reached a record high—337 killed, 2,282 wounded
 June 2—Soviet Union charges U.S. planes bombed a Russian ship, the Turkestan, in Campha harbor, 50 miles north of Haiphong, gravely wounding two crewmen
 June 3—U.S. rejects Russian charge, says ship probably damaged by "anti-aircraft fire directed at American aircraft."
 June 4—Marines report killing 540 North Vietnamese Army troops in 16-hour battle 30 miles southwest of Da Nang, at cost of 73 Marines killed, 139 wounded
 June 5—U.S. planes shoot down three more MIGs in air battles over North Vietnam bringing total for war to 77 MIGs downed
 June 10—U.S. planes bomb Hanoi's main power plant for first time
 June 15—Premier Ky says he believes 600,000 U.S. troops will be needed to defeat the Communists in South Vietnam
 June 19—U.S. concedes its planes may have strafed Russian ship Turkestan on June 2

June 20—Some 172 Viet Cong killed in battle in delta south of Saigon. U.S. river monitors used for the first time since Civil War.

June 23-25—President Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin meet at Glassboro, N.J. Vietnam among subjects, but no results apparent

June 26—Revealed one company of 173d Airborne ambushed in Central Highlands June 22 with loss of 80 killed, 34 wounded. North Vietnamese casualties put at 106 killed

July 1—Premier Ky withdraws from presidential race and agrees to run for vice president on ticket of his rival, Chief of State Thieu

July 2—Fierce battle begins around Con Thien, just south of DMZ

July 5—Battle ends with 95 Marines killed, 211 wounded. Marines claim 250 North Vietnamese bodies counted on the field

July 5—McNamara's ninth trip to South Vietnam

July 26—B52s bomb north of DMZ for the first time since April. Meantime, SAM sites had been eliminated.

July 29—Fire on aircraft carrier Forrestal off North Vietnam kills 136 men. Nearly 50 planes destroyed, damage about \$85 million

July 30—Latest Gallup poll shows 52 per cent disapprove of Johnson's handling of the war, 41 per cent think the U.S. made a mistake in getting involved in the first place, and 56 per cent think the U.S. is either "losing ground" or "standing still"

July 31—Sen. Fulbright introduces a resolution to limit a "national commitment" by the U.S. to executive and legislative approval of "a treaty, convention or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment"

Aug. 3—Johnson announces plans to send 45,000 to 50,000 more men to Vietnam, to bring the total to 525,000 by June 1968

Aug. 3—U.S. planes set new record, flying 197 missions against North Vietnam targets

Aug 3—Operation Coronado II ends. The 7-day sweep in the Mekong delta cost the Viet Cong 285 killed. U.S. casualties 8 killed, 33 wounded

Aug 8—New U.S. command headquarters, dubbed "Pentagon East," opens at Tan Son Nhut airfield. The \$25 million complex houses 2,000 officers and enlisted men, including Gen. Westmoreland and 15 other generals and Ambassador Robert Komer, special deputy to Westmoreland for pacification

Aug 10—U.S. casualties for week ending Aug. 5 announced as 146 killed, 1,064 wounded, making totals 12,415 killed, 75,882 wounded

Aug. 11—Hanoi's main bridge bombed for first time. The 300-foot center span dropped into Red River

Aug. 17—Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach tells Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Southeast Asia resolution of Aug. 1964 (now called the Gulf of Tonkin resolution) gave President Johnson all the power needed to do what he has done in Vietnam

Aug. 18—President Johnson tells news conference, in effect, that if Congress doesn't like what's happening in Vietnam it can repeal the Southeast Asia resolution.

Aug. 19—U.S. fliers set another record, 209 missions in one day against North Vietnam

Aug. 21—Two U.S. Navy A6A Intruders shot down over China. Chinese say pilot of one plane captured, other 3 crewmen killed

Aug. 22—U.S. Air Force planes bomb the Canal des Rapides rail and highway bridge 5 miles northeast of Hanoi on the main rail line to China. Other pilots hit the rail lines, bridges and yards all the way north to within 35 miles of the Chinese border

Aug. 23—U.S. planes bomb center of Hanoi. Six American jets lost

Aug. 24—President Johnson names 22 Americans to serve as ob-

servers of South Vietnam political campaigns and Sept 3 election.

Aug. 27—Viet Cong launch wave of terrorist attacks on civilians, prior to elections. At least 335 people were killed or wounded

Aug. 31—Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee unanimously urges administration to widen air war against the North.

Sept. 3—Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Ky elected president and vice president of South Vietnam. American observers say voting was fair and turnout exceeded predictions

Sept. 4-5—Bitter fighting breaks out from Mekong Delta to northern provinces

Sept. 6—U.S. proposes that U.N. Security Council call for international peace conference in Southeast Asia

Sept. 7—McNamara announces U.S. plan to build complex barrier near northern border of South Vietnam to prevent infiltration.

Sept. 8—Heavy fighting in northern provinces of South Vietnam kills 537 Marines in week.

Sept. 18—American pilots attack a highway bridge seven miles from Chinese Communist border.

Sept. 29—President Johnson tells nation he would end bombings of North Vietnam if it would bring about prompt, productive discussions and if Hanoi would not take advantage of bombing pause during talks.

Oct. 3—North Vietnam rejects Johnson's latest offer of peace talks.

Oct. 4—Marines claim victory in battle at Con Thien after month-long artillery siege by North Vietnamese in which more than 50 Americans were killed and about 1,000 wounded





BY WILLIAM L. RYAN

What kind of peace may come at last to Vietnam? In that tormented country, peace has to be a virtually indefinable word. Who will supervise it?

Who will enforce it?

What guaranties will it provide for the future sovereignty and independence of South Vietnam?

What will it mean for the future unification of all Vietnam?

Will it result in complete withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign troops, or will it involve a U.S. military presence for a long time to come?

What will it mean for the rest of the Indochina peninsula—Laos, where a Communist guerrilla war is in being, and Cambodia, squeezed and threatened by Communism?

What sort of economic commitment from the United States may a settlement bring to South Vietnam—or, for that matter, to North Vietnam?

What will all this mean to Southeast Asia in general?

There are innumerable questions, and most are so complicated as to be unanswerable. At best, peering into the future is a guessing game. Only one assumption is fairly safe: the problem of Vietnam, either at war or in relative peace, will bedevil governments for years to come.

Any real peace has to be, in the nature of things, a distant goal. Leading to it are two main roads. One is through conquest by one side or the other, which would leave painful scars and enormous problems. The other is by negotiation, which promises problems hardly less complicated.

If pronouncements by official spokesmen on either side mean anything, conquest will be the least likely alternative. The Communists give every sign they know conquest is a dim prospect which, if achieved at all, will take many, many years. The U.S. has indicated time and again that, as Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg told the 22nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, "a military solution is not the answer."

Conquest by the anti-Communists would require success of political, economic and pacification programs, suggesting a need for the presence of U.S. military forces for many years. Conquest by the Communists would require full withdrawal of the Americans and collapse of the Saigon government.

On the other hand, negotiation poses the prospect of an agonizingly slow process, with no guaranty of an end to the fighting, even should a cease-fire be proclaimed. It would involve the problems of achieving, supervising and enforcing the cease-fire, withdrawal and regroupment of the combatants, the question of who would negotiate with whom, the achievement of a truce and finally the manifold problems of settlement.

It took two years after the cease-fire in Korea to establish even an uneasy, relative peace. It could take much longer in Vietnam.

WHAT WILL PEKING DO?

There are many imponderables.

One is Red China gripped by a "cultural revolution." The regime which launched that movement to retain its power has sworn opposition to any peace move in Vietnam. What will it do if North Vietnam defies it and agrees to negotiate? To keep

the "American imperialists" occupied, will Peking risk enlargement of the war?

What will be the attitude of the Soviet Union to negotiations? Will it exchange a lessening of tension in Southeast Asia, which it appears to want, for a settlement that might for a long time keep South Vietnam safe from the grasp of the Communist North?

It seems clear that in any negotiation neither side can hope to pick up all the points. Horse-trading will be necessary. Any negotiated settlement which might put the National Liberation Front in positions of power surely would be regarded as a threat to South Vietnam's sovereignty, whatever the published promises of the Front. Southeast Asia is all too familiar with such "programs" as the one advertised by the Front. In many respects it echoes that put forward by Mao Tse-tung before he took over China. He, too, promised freedom and a democracy. But, once in power, Communists nowhere have shown inclination to follow through on such pledges.

SAIGON WANTS GUARANTIES

Saigon's generals are not prepared to negotiate with the Liberation Front on an equal basis, on the theory that North Vietnam is the true master of the Front in any event. The Saigon regime would want any cease-fire, any truce, any points agreed, to be placed under strict international supervision, policed either by the United Nations or by a beefed-up International Control Commission.

The whole picture of Vietnam's future is splattered with if's.

If some sort of peace is imposed, it seems likely the United States, which has poured lives and money into the country, will want to maintain a shield against further encroachment from the North. This could involve occupation by sizable U.S. forces in the South, plus aid to the South Vietnamese military establishment, and to its police and paramilitary organizations, to give them a chance of coping with future terrorism. And if South Vietnam were to become viable and strong, heavy U.S. economic investment probably would be in prospect.

Even so, the long-range question of unification of North and South Vietnam would remain. It seems highly unlikely that in any negotiations, the Communist side would agree to shelve that question.

There is one possibility which cannot be overlooked in any discussion of Vietnam's future. That is the possibility of a Communist victory by default.

The Communist side often has indicated a belief that American democracy is "too soft" to hold out for long in a protracted war. To the Communists, this raises the possibility that, because of political pressures in the United States, there may be some sort of scale-down of the American military effort in South Vietnam, putting more of the burden of fighting on the South Vietnamese, and leading eventually to a gradual U.S. phase-out.

Finally, much seems at stake in Southeast Asia. Many of its leaders have appeared nervously ambivalent about the Vietnam war. While they expressed the wish that the Americans would go home, they seemed at the same time to fear the Americans would do so.

Any peace in Vietnam which appears in the long run to leave South Vietnam at the mercy of the Communists would have a strong psychological impact in Southeast Asia. It could mean for Southeast Asians that there is no real shield for them from Communist pressures. It could impel Southeast Asian governments to try to mollify their huge Communist neighbor, Red China, whose price likely would include expulsion of all American influence.

The search for peace in Vietnam thus is not just one problem, but an intricate and tangled maze of problems, all of them knotty enough to seem at times insoluble.





FACT SHEET

"FREEDOM HAS ITS PRICE"

President Johnson summarizes U. S. Position on Vietnam
in Addressing Tennessee State Legislature, March 15, 1967.

This morning, I visited the Hermitage, the historic home of Andrew Jackson. Two centuries have passed since that most American of all Americans was born. The world has changed a great deal since his day. But the qualities which sustain men and nations in positions of leadership have not changed.

In our time, as in Andrew Jackson's, freedom has its price.

In our time, as in his, history conspires to test the American will.

In our time, as in Jackson's time, courage and vision, and the willingness to sacrifice, will sustain the cause of freedom.

This generation of Americans is making its imprint on history. It is making it in the fierce hills and the sweltering jungles of Vietnam. I think most of our citizens—after a very penetrating debate which is our democratic heritage—have reached a common understanding on the meaning and on the objectives of that struggle.

Before I discuss the specific questions that remain at issue, I should like to review the points of widespread agreement.

It was two years ago that we were forced to choose, forced to make a decision between major commitments in defense of South Vietnam or retreat—the evacuation of more than 25,000 of our troops, the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in the face of subversion and external assault.

Andrew Jackson would never have been surprised at the choice we made.

We chose a course in keeping with American tradition, in keeping with the foreign policy of at least three administrations, with the expressed will of the Congress of the United States, with our solemn obligations under the Southeast Asian Treaty, and with the interest of 16 million South Vietnamese who had no wish to live under communist domination.

As our commitment in Vietnam required more men and more equipment, some voices were raised in opposition. The Administration was urged to disengage, to find an excuse to abandon the effort.

These cries came despite growing evidence that the defense of Vietnam held the key to the political and economic future of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle grew correspondingly.

It became clear that if we were prepared to stay the course in Vietnam, we could help to lay the cornerstone for a diverse and independent Asia, full of promise and resolute in the cause of peaceful economic development for her long-suffering peoples.

But if we faltered, the forces of chaos would scent victory and decades of strife and aggression would stretch endlessly before us.

The choice was clear. We would stay the course. We shall stay the course.

I think most Americans support this fundamental decision. Most of us remember the fearful cost of ignoring aggression. Most of us have cast aside the illusion that we can live in an affluent fortress while the world slides into chaos.

BASIC OBJECTIVES

I think we have all reached broad agreement on our basic objectives in Vietnam.

First, an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North.

Second, a Southeast Asia in which all countries—including a peaceful North Vietnam—apply their scarce resources to the real problems of their people: combating hunger, ignorance, and diseases.

I have said many, many times that nothing would give us greater pleasure than to invest our own resources in the constructive works of peace rather than in the futile destruction of war.

Third, a concrete demonstration that aggression across international frontiers or demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable means of political change.

There is, I think, a general agreement among Americans on the things that we do not want in Vietnam.

We do not want permanent bases. We will begin with the withdrawal of our troops on a reasonable schedule whenever reciprocal concessions are forthcoming from our adversary.

We do not seek to impose our political beliefs upon South Vietnam. Our republic rests upon a brisk commerce in ideas. We will be happy to see free competition in the intellectual marketplace whenever North Vietnam is willing to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.

So, these are the broad principles on which most Americans agree.

On a less general level, however, the events and frustrations of these past few difficult weeks have inspired a number of questions about our Vietnam policy in the minds and hearts of a good many of our citizens. Today, here in this historical chamber, I want to deal with some of those questions that figure most prominently in the press and in some of the letters which reach a President's desk.

QUESTIONS ASKED

Many Americans are confused by the barrage of information about military engagements. They long for the capsule summary which has kept tabs on our previous wars, a line on the map that divides friend from foe.

Precisely what, they ask, is our military situation, and what are the prospects of victory?

The first answer is that Vietnam is aggression in a new guise, as far removed from trench warfare as the rifle from the longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of subversion, of ambush. Pitched battles are very rare, and even more rarely are they decisive.

Today, more than 1 million men from the Republic of Vietnam and its six allies are engaged in the order of battle.

Despite continuing increases in North Vietnam infiltration, this strengthening of allied forces in 1966 under the brilliant leadership of General Westmoreland was instrumental in reversing the whole course of this war.

- We estimate that 55,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were killed in 1966, compared with 35,000 the previous year. More were wounded, and more than 20,000 defected.

- By contrast, 9,500 South Vietnamese, more than 5,000 Americans, and 600 from other allied forces were killed in action.

- The Vietnamese Army achieved a 1966 average of two weapons captured from the Viet Cong to every one lost, a dramatic turn around from the previous two years.

- Allied forces have made several successful sweeps through territories that were formerly considered Viet Cong sanctuaries only a short time ago. These operations not only cost the enemy large numbers of men and weapons, but are very damaging to his morale.

What does all of this mean? Will the North Vietnamese change their tactics? Will there be less infiltration of main units? Will there be more of guerrilla warfare?

The actual truth is we just don't know.

What we do know is that General Westmoreland's strategy is producing results, that our military situation has substantially improved, that our military success has permitted the groundwork to be laid for a pacification program which is the longrun key to an independent South Vietnam.

Since February 1965 our military operations have included selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. Our purposes are three.

- To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary;

- To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962;

- To limit the flow, or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and materiel from North Vietnam.

Our intelligence confirms that we have been successful.

MUST WE BOMB?

Yet, some of our people object strongly to this aspect of our policy. Must we bomb, many people will ask. Does it do any military good? Is it consistent with America's limited objectives? Is it an inhuman act that is aimed at civilians?

On the question of military utility, I can only report the firm belief of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, General Westmoreland and our commanders in the field, and all the sources of information and advice available to the Commander in Chief and that is that the bombing is causing serious disruption and is bringing about added burdens to the North Vietnamese infiltration effort.

We know, for example, that half a million people are kept busy just repairing damage to bridges, roads, railroads, and other strategic facilities, and in air and coastal defense and repair of power plants.

I also want to say categorically that it is not the position of the American Government that the bombing will be decisive in getting Hanoi to abandon aggression. It has, however, created very serious problems for them. The best indication of how substantial is the fact that they are working so hard every day with all their friends throughout the world to try to get us to stop.

The bombing is entirely consistent with America's limited objectives in South Vietnam. The strength of communist main-force units in the South is clearly based on their infiltration from the North. I think it is simply unfair to our American soldiers, sailors, and marines and our Vietnamese allies to ask them to face increased enemy personnel and fire power without making an effort to try to reduce that infiltration.

As to bombing civilians, I would simply say that we are making an effort that is unprecedented in the history of warfare to be sure that we do not. It is our policy to bomb military targets only.

We have never deliberately bombed cities, nor attacked any target with the purpose of inflicting civilian casualties.

We hasten to add, however, that we recognize, and we regret, that some people, even after warning, are living and working in the vicinity of military targets and they have suffered.

We are also too aware that men and machines are not infallible, and that some mistakes do occur.

But our record on this account is, in my opinion, highly defensible.

Look for a moment at the record of the other side.

Any civilian casualties that result from our operations are inadvertent, in stark contrast to the calculated Viet Cong policy of systematic terror.

Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese civilians have been killed, tortured, and kidnapped by the Viet Cong. There is no doubt about the deliberate nature of the Viet Cong program. One need only note the frequency with which Viet Cong victims are village leaders, teachers, health workers, and others who are trying to carry out constructive programs for their people.

Yet, the deeds of the Viet Cong go largely unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral double bookkeeping which makes us get sometimes very weary of our critics.

THREE REJECTIONS FROM HANOI

But there is another question that we should answer: Why don't we stop bombing to make it easier to begin negotiations?

The answer is a simple one:

- We stopped for five days and 20 hours in May 1965. Representatives of Hanoi simply returned our message in a plain envelope.

- We stopped bombing for 36 days and 15 hours in December 1965 and January 1966. Hanoi only replied: "A political settlement of the Vietnam problem can be envisaged only when the United States Government has accepted the four-point stand of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, has proved this by actual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and for good its air raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

- Only last month we stopped bombing for five days and 18 hours, after many prior weeks in which we had communicated to them several possible routes to peace, any one of which America was prepared to take. Their response, as you know, delivered to His Holiness the Pope, was this: The United States "must put an end to their aggression in Vietnam, end unconditionally and definitively the bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all American and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnamese National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

That is where we stand today.

They have three times rejected a bombing pause as a means to open the way to ending the war, and go together to the negotiating table.

The tragedy of South Vietnam is not limited to casualty lists.

There is much tragedy in the story of a nation at war for nearly a generation. It is the story of economic stagnation. It is the story of a generation of young men—the flower of the labor force—pressed into military service by one side or the other.

No one denies that the survival of South Vietnam is heavily dependent upon early economic progress.

My most recent and my most hopeful report of progress in this area came from an old friend of Tennessee, of the Tennessee Valley Authority—David Lilienthal, who recently went as my representative to Vietnam to begin to work with the Vietnamese people on economic planning for that area.

He reported—and with some surprise, I might add—that he discovered an extraordinary air of confidence among the farmers, village leaders, trade unionists, and the industrialists. He concluded that their economic behavior suggests "that they think they know how all of this is going to come out."

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Lilienthal also said that the South Vietnamese were among the hardest working people that he had seen in developing countries around the world, that "to have been through 20 years of war and still have this amount of 'zip' almost ensures their long-term economic development."

Mr. Lilienthal will be going with me to Guam Saturday night to talk with our new leaders about the plans he will try to institute there.

Our AID programs are supporting the drive toward this sound economy.

But none of these economic accomplishments will be decisive by itself. And no economic achievement can substitute for a strong and free political structure.

We cannot build such a structure—because only the Vietnamese can do that.

I think they are building it. As I am talking to you here, a freely-elected constituent assembly in Saigon is now wrestling with the last details of a new constitution, one which will bring the Republic of Vietnam to full membership among the democratic nations of the world.

We expect that constitution to be completed this month.

In the midst of war, they have been building for peace and justice. That is a remarkable accomplishment in the annals of mankind.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who has served us with such great distinction, is coming to the end of his second distinguished tour of duty in Saigon.

To replace him, I am drafting as our Ambassador to the Government of Vietnam, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker—able and devoted, full of wisdom and experience acquired on five continents over many years.

As his Deputy, I am nominating and recalling from Pakistan Mr. Eugene Locke, our young and very vigorous Ambassador to Pakistan.

To drive forward with a sense of urgency the work in pacification in Vietnam, I am sending Presidential Assistant Robert Komer.

To strengthen General Westmoreland in the intensive operations that he will be conducting in the months ahead, I am assigning to him additional top-flight military personnel, the best that the country has been able to provide.

So you can be confident that in the months ahead we shall have at work in Saigon the ablest, the wisest, the most tenacious, and the most experienced team that the United States of America can mount.

In view of these decisions and in view of the meetings that will take place this weekend, I thought it wise to invite the leaders of South Vietnam to join us in Guam for a part of our discussions, if it were convenient for them. I am gratified to be informed that they have accepted our invitation.

I should also like for you to know that the representatives of all the countries that are contributing troops in Vietnam will be coming to Washington for April 20 and 21 meetings for a general appraisal of the situation that exists.

THE U. S. POSITION

This brings me to my final point, the peaceful and just world that we all seek.

We have just lived through another flurry of rumors of "peace feelers."

Our years of dealing with this problem have taught us that peace will not come easily.

The problem is a very simple one: it takes two to negotiate at a peace table and Hanoi has just simply refused to consider coming to a peace table.

I don't believe that our own position on peace negotiations can be stated any more clearly than I have stated it many times in the past—or that the distinguished Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, or Ambassador Goldberg, or any number of other officials have stated it in every forum that we could find.

I do want to repeat to you this afternoon—and through you to the people of America—the essentials now, lest there be any doubts.

• United States representatives are ready at any time for discussions of the Vietnam problem or any related matter, with any government or governments, if there is any reason to

believe that these discussions will in any way seriously advance the cause of peace.

• We are prepared to go more than halfway and to use any avenue possible to encourage such discussions. And we have done that at every opportunity.

We believe that the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 could serve as the central elements of a peaceful settlement. These accords provide, in essence, that both South and North Vietnam should be free from external interference, while at the same time they would be free independently to determine their positions on the question of reunification.

We also stand ready to advance toward a reduction of hostilities, without prior agreement. The road to peace could go from deeds to discussions, or it could start with discussions and go to deeds.

We are ready to take either route. We are ready to move on both of them.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE: RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side. To follow any other rule would be to violate the trust that we undertake when we ask a man to risk his life for his country.

We will negotiate a reduction of the bombing whenever the Government of North Vietnam is ready and there are almost innumerable avenues of communication by which the Government of North Vietnam can make their readiness known.

To this date and this hour, there has been no sign of that readiness.

Yet, we must—and we will—keep trying.

As I speak to you today, Secretary Rusk and our representatives throughout the world are on a constant alert. Hundreds and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversations, free from the glare of front-page headlines, or of klieg lights, are being held and they will be held on the possibilities of bringing peace to Vietnam.

Governor Averell Harriman, with 25 years of experience of troubleshooting on the most difficult international problems that America has ever had, is carrying out my instructions that every possible lead, however slight it may first appear, from any source, public or private, shall be followed up.

Let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that it were within my power to assure that all those in Hanoi could hear one simple message—America is committed to the defense of South Vietnam until an honorable peace can be negotiated.

If this one communication gets through and its rational implications are drawn, we should be at the table tomorrow. It would be none too soon for us. Then hundreds of thousands of Americans—as brave as any who ever took the field for their country—could come back home.

And the man who could lead them back is the man whom you trained and sent from here, our own beloved, brilliant General "Westy" Westmoreland. As these heroes come back to their homes, millions of Vietnamese could begin to make a decent life for themselves and their families without fear of terrorism, without fear of war, or without fear of communist enslavement.

That is what we are working and fighting for. We must not—we shall not—and we will not—fail.

DoD GEN-18

VIET-NAM

FOUR STEPS TO PEACE



ARMED FORCES INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

This pamphlet is the text of an address made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the American Foreign Service Association at Washington, D.C., on June 23, 1965.

Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace

It is a very great pleasure for me to be here. It is a privilege for me to salute my colleagues, present and retired, of the Foreign Service and to express to you the gratitude of President Johnson and of the American people for a service which is marked by so much competence, dedication, and personal commitment.

Two and a half months ago President Johnson spoke to the world about Viet-Nam at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. Today I wish to talk to you on the same subject—to you who know that such

problems have deep roots, to you who have lived through and worked upon such problems before, and to you who know that such matters can gravely affect the future of our nation and the prospects for general peace.

The struggle in Viet-Nam has continued since April and indeed has grown the more severe. The harsh resistance of the Communists to any form of discussions or negotiation continues. The effort to destroy the freedom of Viet-Nam has been expanded. The trial by fire of the people of Viet-Nam goes on. Their own resistance has been courageous, but the need for American resolution and for American action has increased.

AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH

The root of the trouble in Viet-Nam is today just what it was in April and has been at least since 1960—a cruel and sustained attack by North Viet-Nam upon the people of South Viet-Nam. Now, as then, it is a brutal war—marked by terror and sneak attack, and by the killing of women and children in the night. This campaign of terror has continued throughout the spring.

Those of us who have not served in Viet-Nam may find it hard to understand just how ugly this war of aggression has been. From 1961 to the present date the South Vietnamese armed forces have lost some 25,000 dead and 51,000 wounded. In proportion to population, these South Vietnamese losses are 10 times as great as those suffered by Americans in the Korean war, and larger than our losses in World War II.

Even more terrible than these military losses are the cruelties of assassination and kidnaping among civilian officials and ordinary citizens. In the last 18 months, for example, more than 2,000 local officials and civilians have been murdered. When an official is not found at home, often his wife and children are slain in his place. It is as if in our own country some 35,000 civic leaders or their families were to be killed at night by stealth and terror.

These are the methods of the Viet Cong. This is the test to which the people of Viet-Nam have gallantly responded.

Meanwhile, from the North, heavy infiltration has continued. Intelligence now shows that some 40,000

had come down before the end of 1964. Toward the end of that year—well before the beginning of our own air operations against North Viet-Nam—the infiltration of regular North Vietnamese army units was begun, and important elements of that army are now known to be in place in South Viet-Nam and Laos, where they have no right to be.

And so we face a deliberate and long-matured decision by a persistent aggressor to raise the stakes of war. Apparently this was their answer to our own repeated affirmation that we ourselves did not wish a larger war. Apparently a totalitarian regime has once again misunderstood the desire of democratic peoples for peace and has made the mistake of thinking that *they* can have a larger war without risks to themselves. And hence the airstrikes against military targets in North Viet-Nam.

These actions have made infiltration harder. They have increased the cost of aggression. Without them South Viet-Nam today would face still stronger forces from the North.

These measured air operations have done what we

expected them to do—neither more nor less. For air attack alone cannot bring peace. I cannot agree with those who think it wrong to hit the logistics of aggression. It is the aggression itself that is the wrong. Those who worry about bridges and barracks and ammunition dumps would do well to give their sympathy instead to the daily victims of terror in South Viet-Nam.

EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE

The other side is obviously not yet ready for peace. In these last months, the friends of peace in many lands have sought to move this dangerous matter to the conference table. But one proposal after another has been contemptuously rejected.

We and others, for example, have sought to clear a way for a conference on Laos, and a conference on Cambodia—two neighboring countries where progress toward peace might be reflected in Viet-Nam itself. But these efforts have been blocked by North Viet-Nam and by Communist China.

Twice there has been an effort at discussions through the United Nations—first in the Security Council after the August attacks in the Tonkin Gulf, and later this

April, when Secretary-General U Thant considered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to explore the possibilities of peace. But in August there was a refusal by Hanoi to come to the Security Council. And in April both Hanoi and Peiping made it clear that they would not receive U Thant, and both regimes made plain their view that the United Nations is not competent to deal with that matter.

Repeatedly our friends in Britain, as a cochairman of the Geneva conference, have sought a path to settlement—first by working toward a new conference in Geneva and then by a visit of a senior British statesman. But the effort for a conference in Geneva was blocked, and the distinguished British traveler was told that he should stay away from Peiping and Hanoi.

Twice in April we made additional efforts of our own. In Baltimore the President offered unconditional discussions with the governments concerned. Hanoi and Peiping call this offer a "hoax." At that time the 17 nonaligned nations had appealed for a peaceful solution, by negotiations without preconditions. This proposal was accepted on our side. It was rejected by

Hanoi and by Peiping. And some of its authors were labeled "monsters and freaks."

The President of India made constructive proposals—for an end of hostilities and an Afro-Asian patrol force. To us this proposal was full of interest and hope. But by Hanoi and Red China it was rejected as a betrayal.

Our own Government and the Government of South Viet-Nam, in May, suspended air attacks on North Viet-Nam. This action was made known to the other side to see if there would be a response in kind. This special effort for peace was denounced in Hanoi as a "wornout trick" and denounced in Peiping as a "swindle." To those who complain that that so-called "pause" was not long enough, I would simply report that the harsh reaction of the other side was fully known before the attacks were resumed. And I would also recall that we held our hand for more than 4 years while tens of thousands of armed men invaded the South and every attempt at peaceful settlement failed.

HANOI'S RESPONSE

Reports in the first half of June have confirmed that all these violent rejections are in fact what they appear

to be—clear proof that what is wanted today in Hanoi is a military victory, not peace, and that Hanoi is not even prepared for discussions unless it is accepted in advance that there will be a Communist-dominated government in Saigon, and unless too—so far as we can determine—American forces are withdrawn in advance.

So this record is clear. And there is substance in Senator Fulbright's conclusion that "It seems clear that the Communist powers still hope to achieve a complete victory in South Viet-Nam and for this reason are at present uninterested in negotiations for a peaceful settlement." For the simple truth is that there is no lack of diplomatic procedures, machinery or process by which a desire for peace can be registered—that there is no procedural miracle through which peace can be obtained if one side is determined to continue the war.

As I have said, Hanoi is presently adamant against negotiation or any avenue to peace. Peiping is even more so, and one can plainly read the declared doctrine and purpose of the Chinese Communists. They are looking beyond the current conflict to the hope of domination in all of Southeast Asia—and indeed beyond.

But one finds it harder to understand Hanoi's aversion to discussion. More immediately than the Chinese, the North Vietnamese face the costs and dangers of conflict. They, too, must fear the ambitions of Communist China in Southeast Asia. Yet they are still on the path of violence, insisting upon the forceful communization of South Viet-Nam and refusing to let their brothers in the South work out their own destiny in peace.

In recent weeks, after 2 months of reduced activity, the enemy has sharply quickened the tempo of his military action in the South. Since early May, major Viet Cong units have returned to the battlefield, and already a series of sharp engagements has shown us that the fighting through the summer may be hard. Setbacks have occurred and serious defeats have been avoided only by the combination of continuing Vietnamese bravery and effective air and other types of support.

Losses on both sides have been heavy. From April first to date, we have had confirmed reports of almost 5,000 Viet Cong dead, almost 3,000 South Vietnamese, and almost 100 Americans. We must expect these losses to continue—and our own losses may increase.

ROLE OF U.S. FORCES

Since March we have deployed nine battalions of fighting men to South Viet-Nam. Six more are on their way. For as the President said in April, "we will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. . . . We will do everything necessary . . . and we will do only what is . . . necessary."

Our own battalions in South Viet-Nam have three related tasks. Their first assignment was and is to guard such major installations as the airfield at Da Nang. A second and closely related task is that of active patrol in nearby areas. And the third is to join in combat support of Vietnamese forces—when such help is requested and when our Commander, General Westmoreland, believes it should be given.

American forces so committed will carry with them the determined support of our people. These men know, as all our people know, that what they do is done for freedom and peace, in Viet-Nam, in other continents, and here at home.

SUPPORT FOR U.S. ACTION

In authorizing combat missions for our ground forces in Viet-Nam, the President acted to meet his constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief. He has recognized the obligations of this nation under the Southeast Asia Treaty, which the Senate approved by a vote of 82-1. He has acted under the joint resolution of August 1964, which passed the Senate by a vote of 88-2—and passed the House with no opposing vote. This resolution expresses our national readiness—as the President determines—"to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States" and "all necessary steps, including the use of armed force" to help Viet-Nam and Southeast Asian members of the SEATO who ask for help to preserve their freedom.

The President has acted on the unanimous advice of the American leaders in Saigon and his senior civil and military advisers in Washington.

He has acted in full consultation with the Government of South Viet-Nam.

And he has acted on his own considered judgment

of what is necessary at this time to stop aggression.

This decision—like all of our decisions in Viet-Nam—is open to review by Members of the Congress and open to reversal if it does not have their support. But the leaders of the Congress have been kept in close touch with the situation, and no such prospect should stimulate the hopes of enemies or the fears of friends. For America is not divided in her determination nor weak in her will.

In Viet-Nam today we face one more challenge in the long line of dangers we have, unhappily, had to meet and master for a generation. We have had to show both strength and restraint—courage and coolness—for Iran and for Greece, for Berlin and for Korea, in the Formosa Strait, and in the Cuban missile crisis. We mean to show the same determination and coolness now.

In 1954 President Eisenhower pledged our support to the Government of Viet-Nam, to assist that Government, as he put it, “in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means.” And this determination was reaffirmed again and again by

President Kennedy. “We are going to stay here,” he said. “We are not going to withdraw from that effort.” And that is our position still.

FIRMNESS AND RESTRAINT

Now, as in April, as the President put it, “We will use our power with restraint and with all the wisdom that we can command.” For it is others, and not we, who have increased the scale of fighting. It is others, and not we, who have made threats of gravely widened conflict. The firmness with which we resist aggression is matched by the firmness with which we will refrain from ill-advised adventure.

A few—a very few—may believe that unlimited war can take the place of the sustained and steady effort in which we are engaged, just as there may be a few—a very few—who think we should pull out and leave a friendly people to their fate. But the American people want neither rashness nor surrender. They want firmness and restraint. They expect courage and care. They threaten no one. And they are not moved by the threats by others.

ROLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

This contest centers in the defense of freedom for the people who live in South Viet-Nam. The sustained and increasing infiltration from North Viet-Nam has required the measured use of air attack on military targets in the North. We alone cannot determine the future—could we do so there would be a prompt peace. The other side, too, must decide about the future. And we must hope they know—as we do—that increased aggression would be costly far beyond the worth to the aggressor.

The political turmoil in South Viet-Nam has continued. It is easy to be impatient with our friends in Saigon as they struggle to establish and sustain a stable government under the stress of war. We see there the ferment of a society still learning to be free, even while under attack from beyond their borders.

We must remember that this ancient people is young in its independence, restless in its hopes, divided in its religions, and varied in its regions. The turmoil of Viet-Nam needs the steadfastness of America. Our friends in Viet-Nam know, and we know, that our

people and our troops must work and fight together. Neither of us can do the work of the other. And the main responsibility must always be with, and is fully accepted by, the South Vietnamese. Yet neither of us can “go it alone.” We would not be there without the urgent request for assistance from those whose land this happens to be. We have a tested faith in the enduring bravery of the people of Viet-Nam, and they, in turn, can count on us with equal certainty.

FORMULA FOR PEACE

The people of Viet-Nam long for peace. And the way to peace is clear. Yesterday the Foreign Minister of South Viet-Nam set forth the fundamental principles that can provide a “just and enduring peace.” Those principles, in summary, are:

- An end to aggression and subversion.
- Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny “in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources.”
- As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the

military measures now necessary by the Government of South Viet-Nam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Viet-Nam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam.

- And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam.

Now these are the fundamental steps. This is what the arguing and the fighting is all about. When they are carried out, we can look forward, as we have stated previously many times, to the day when relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the peoples of North and South Viet-Nam on the matter of reunification.

This forthright and simple program meets the hopes of all and attacks the interests of none. It would replace the threat of conquest by the hope of free and peaceful choice.

A LOOK TO THE FUTURE

And even while these hopes of peace are blocked for now by aggression, we on our side and other nations

have reaffirmed our deep commitment to the peaceful progress of Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia as a whole. In April the President proposed to the nations of Asia and to the United Nations that there be constructed a new program of support for Asian efforts and called upon Mr. Eugene Black to assist them. Now in June this work is underway. The Mekong River project has been given new life. A new dam is ready to rise in Laos. A billion-dollar bank is in the making for the development of Southeast Asia. And in Viet-Nam itself new impetus has been given to programs of development and education and health.

So let us call again on other nations—including the Soviet Union—to join in turning this great region of the world away from the waste and violence of a brutal war. For the hope of Asia is not in relentless pressure for conquest. It is in unremitting hope for progress—a progress in which rice production could be multiplied manyfold, where the expectation of life could be doubled, the education of the young could be tenfold what it is today, and there could be an end of cholera and tuberculosis and intestinal parasites and other human afflictions.

In April the President offered determination against aggression, discussion for peace, and development for the human hopes of all. And in June we reaffirm that threefold policy.

Aggression has increased, so that determination must be greater than ever.

Discussion is rejected, but our efforts to find a path to peace will not be stopped. We have welcomed the new initiative of Prime Minister Wilson and the Commonwealth conference and regret that it has received so little reception on the other side.

Beyond the terror of the aggressor and the firmness of our defense, we must, nevertheless, look to the day in which many new dams will be built, and many new schools opened, and fresh opportunities opened to the peoples of Southeast Asia. For we must look beyond the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and over the hard path of resistance to the broad plain of progress which must lie ahead for the peoples of Southeast Asia.

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Vietnam Report VII:

The Presidential Election

September 3, 1967

*Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam
Washington, D. C.*

FOREWORD

Perhaps few elections have attracted as much worldwide attention and were subjected to as much prejudgment as the Presidential Election in the Republic of Vietnam on September 3, 1967.

Much has been said about this election and the central issue revolved around the question of fairness. Now that the election is over, all evidence points to the fact that it has been fairly and honestly conducted, as testified by the reports of many newsmen and foreign observers on the spot.

The purpose of this paper is to give the interested reader some facts and figures about this election.

September, 1967
Embassy of Vietnam
Washington, D. C.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

CAMPAIGNING

The date of September 3, 1967 was set for the Presidential election by Law No. 001/67 promulgated on June 15, 1967.

The election campaign started on August 3 and ended at noon, September 2, 1967, the day preceding the election. This is in accordance with Article 23 of Law No. 001/67. The first three days of the campaign which took place in the capital, Saigon, where the candidates shared equal television and radio time to express their views, went on rather smoothly. The hitch, and the only hitch of the campaign, did not happen until the fourth day with the "Dong Ha Incident"* of August 6, when the candidates were supposed to speak to a crowd in Quang Tri, the first stop of their provincial tour. After a period of delay during which they pressed charges against the government and threatened to pull out to discredit the elections, the civilian candidates agreed to resume the campaign and appeared in the following cities and provinces: Bien Hoa, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Ban Me Thuot, Tay Ninh, Can Tho, Rach Gia, My Tho, Da Nang, and Hue. The campaign started and wound up in Saigon.

THE ISSUES

The issues became clearer as the campaign progressed. Attention focused on the main issues with the platforms of the various slates more sharply defined in response to the charges and accusations of other slates.

1. Peace

Peace is one of the overriding issues in the campaign. Of eleven presidential slates, nine, with varying degrees of emphasis, held similar views on the conduct of the war. They all rejected negotiations with the Viet Cong. They, however, favored attempts to persuade North Vietnam to bring the war to the conference table. If North Vietnam fails to respond positively to their peace overtures, they would be prepared to continue the war. Slate #6 advocated peace through military victory and liberation of the North, either by

*See Vietnam Report VI: In Saigon: The Issue is Fairness, Embassy of Vietnam, Washington, D. C., August 1967, pp. 25-28.

ground invasion or by bombing. Slate #4 advocated an unconditional end to the bombing both in the North and in the South, and direct negotiations with the Viet Cong. The following table is a graphic representation of the identifiable positions of the various slates regarding the technicalities of the question as to how to bring about peace:

Slate number and Candidates' Names	For "peace" in general	For "war for war's sake"	The NLFV as an independent party to the Conference table.	Negotiate with North Vietnam only	Seek negotiations, but failing any response, prepared to continue war	For peace through military victory only
1 Suu/Dan	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
2 Ky/Dinh	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
3 Binh/Khinh	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
4 Dzu/Chieu	Yes	No	Yes			
5 Huong/Truyen	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
6 Co/ Sinh	Yes	No	No			Yes
7 Ly/Duong	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
8 Hiep/Truyen	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
9 Thieu/Ky	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
10 Khanh/Dong	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	
11 Quat/Chan	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	

2. Corruption

All civilian slates had at one time or another leveled general charges of corruption against the Government, but none of them cared to substantiate their charges. As a consequence, they could only suggest general measures that lacked concreteness. The only slate with a definite program of corruption eradication was the military ticket which on August 25 promised that fifty officers accused of corruption would be put on trial and eventually submitted to disciplinary measures or punished according to the findings of the tribunals.

3. Enlargement of Freedom

Many freedoms have never been questioned in the Republic of Vietnam, such as the freedom of worship, the freedom of enterprise, etc.

The only freedom that was from time to time curtailed owing to wartime conditions was the freedom of the press. The Government realized that an election campaign would be meaningless if there were no complete airing of opinions. This prompted the Government to lift the censorship laws on July 22, fully two weeks before the actual campaign and during the whole campaign. Even now when the campaign is long over, the bars of censorship have not been reimposed on the press.

During the campaign, the civilian candidates all expressed their fears that the voting process would be rigged. The results of the election speak for themselves and should satisfy any lingering doubt that rigging of any scale was involved.

4. Other issues

Other issues included the relative merits and demerits of a civilian versus a military government (this is one of the main points of the Suu/Dan platform), land reform (both Suu/Dan and Thieu/Ky slates pledged acceleration of programs), the improvement of the standard of living (this is a general principle given adherence by practically every slate), the stabilization of the economic situation, the efficiency of government, the creation of a more solid political life, the improvement of the educational system, and the development of health and social services, etc.

VOTING

At 7 o'clock Sunday morning, September 3, 1967, the polls all over Viet-Nam opened for the voting for a President, a Vice-President, and 60 members of the Upper House of the National Assembly*. There were 8,824 polling stations in the 50 provinces and municipalities of Viet-Nam. Out of the 5,853,251 registered voters, 4,735,404 or 83.3% went to the polls. Only 132,862 or less than three per cent of the votes were invalid. The highest percentages of voter participation were recorded in the provinces of Ninh Thuan (93.9%), Quang Tin (93.1%) and Go Cong (92.2%). The polls closed at 4 p.m.

Each of the polling stations was staffed with electoral officials and was overseen by representatives of the various candidates. The procedures for voting and specific electoral safeguards are described in detail in the electoral laws passed by the Provisional Legislative Assembly (see Abstract of the Law in the Appendix).

The final list of Presidential slates -- as approved by the Provisional Legislative Assembly which controls and validates the elections -- numbered eleven, and arranged according to time of filing.

*The Senatorial election will be the subject of a forthcoming report.

OBSERVERS

The voting took place orderly and freely under the interested and scrutinizing eyes of hundreds of journalists and observers from 24 countries. Many came as independent observers, some being from non-aligned countries. They covered not only Saigon and the major cities, but also the remote hamlets to see for themselves the actual mechanics of this greatly publicized election.

The nearly unanimous impression of these observers was that the election was carried out orderly, fairly, and efficiently. Dr. Richard M. Scammon, Director of the Elections Research Center in Washington and a former Chairman of the U. S. Commission on Registration and Voting Participation, said of it: "This was an honest election, carried out under difficult conditions -- under the shadow of gunmen -- and a large majority of those who could, did vote." A respected political writer much acquainted with Viet-Nam, Denis Warner, wrote: "What was truly impressive, and certainly far beyond the competence of any government to fix or rig, was the sophistication of the voting trends as soon as the count began. In center after center I observed trends that were to become city-wide and then nation-wide after no more than a couple of hundred votes had been counted in each place" (The Reporter, September 21, 1967, p. 20).

The New York Times reporter R. W. Apple, Jr. summed it up this way : "A pool of 12 reporters for American newspapers who had studied the voting throughout the country, concluded that the election has been conducted honestly" (September 5, 1967).

MEANING OF THE ELECTION

What was amazing was the fact that the population showed greater interest and sophistication than many would have granted it, and as a whole they seemed to have voted on the basis of issues confronting the nation rather than on personal, religious, or regional loyalty.

The outcome produced some surprises as well as uncertainties. But a few points were made clear:

- That the government carried out the election with efficiency and fairness;
 - That the people of Viet-Nam were free to exercise their choice of national leaders;
 - That the voting took place in a country at war and being subjected to a concerted campaign of sabotage and terrorism by the communists;
 - That the election process was open to scrutiny by all.
- Observers and journalists went wherever they pleased without any governmental restrictions;


- That this is the fourth national election to take place in Viet-Nam within less than a year (the others being the Constituent Assembly election, the Village and Hamlet elections, and the Senatorial election);

- That the range of choice among candidates (eleven candidates for the Presidency and 480 candidates for the 60 Senate seats) stands in marked contrast with the party-selected, single candidacy in North Vietnamese elections;

- And finally, that the election plainly showed that the Viet Cong lack the support of the majority of the South Vietnamese and that nearly 80 per cent of the votes went to candidates who advocated no compromise with the Viet Cong.

The returns of the Presidential elections have long been completed, but they need to be validated by a plenary session of the Provisional Legislative Assembly after it has reviewed complaints of voting irregularities.

With the new Senate, elected on the same day, and the new House of Representatives to be elected on October 22, 1967, our people will have completed a long step forward in the process of building a democratic and viable nation.



PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS
(Subject to Validation by the Provisional Legislative Assembly)

<u>Slate Number</u>	<u>Presidential Candidate</u>	<u>Vice-Pres. Candidate</u>	<u>Total Votes Received</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
9	Nguyen Van Thieu	Nguyen Cao Ky	1,649,561	34.8%
4	Truong Dinh Dzu	Tran Van Chieu	817,120	17.2
1	Phan Khac Suu	Phan Quang Dan	513,374	10.8
5	Tran Van Huong	Mai Tho Truyen	474,100	10.0
2	Ha Thuc Ky	Nguyen Van Binh	349,473	7.3
11	Nguyen Binh Quat	Tran Cuu Chan	291,718	6.2
8	Nguyen Van Hiep	Nguyen The Truyen	160,790	3.5
10	Vu Hong Khanh	Duong Trung Dong	149,276	3.2
3	Hoang Co Binh	Lieu Quang Khinh	131,071	2.9
6	Pham Huy Co	Ly Quoc Sinh	106,317	2.2
7	Tran Van Ly	Huynh Cong Duong	92,604	1.9

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS BY TACTICAL ZONES

<u>Slate Zone</u>	<u>1 Suu/ Dan</u>	<u>2 Ky/ Dinh</u>	<u>3 Binh/ Khinh</u>	<u>4 Dzu/ Chieu</u>	<u>5 Huong/ Truyen</u>	<u>6 Co/ Sinh</u>	<u>7 Ly/ Duong</u>	<u>8 Hiep/ Truyen</u>	<u>9 Thieu/ Ky</u>	<u>10 Khanh/ Dong</u>	<u>11 Quat/ Chan</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>Number of Registered Voters</u>
Zone I	172,667	92,591	17,687	85,071	33,823	13,320	11,043	21,743	189,405	38,774	82,827	758,951	911,861
Zone II	114,510	54,272	21,728	114,569	56,303	20,870	19,391	42,283	437,433	23,836	69,495	974,690	1,132,268
Zone III	135,681	92,482	41,427	312,831	264,487	36,412	30,922	48,787	523,692	44,509	69,756	1,601,346	2,114,178
Zone IV	90,516	109,768	50,229	304,649	119,487	35,715	31,248	47,977	499,031	42,157	69,640	1,400,417	1,694,944
TOTAL	513,374	349,473	131,071	817,120	474,100	106,317	92,604	160,790	1,649,561	149,276	291,718	4,735,404	5,853,251

THE PLATFORM OF THE "DEMOCRACY" (THIEU/KY) SLATE

The platform of the winning slate underwent slight changes as the election campaign progressed, owing to the need to further define specific points in the program. In general, however, we can say that the following points formed the consistent answers that the military slate envisioned for the ills of Vietnam at the present time:

Building Democracy: The military ticket pledged to continue the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions from the hamlet and village level up to the central government level so as to enable the whole population to participate in national affairs. Furthermore, it pledged to encourage and assist in the development of political groupings based on actual political forces within the country, thus laying the foundation for an active national political life. In this connection, the slate also promised to respect the basic spirit of the freedom of the press.

Solution to the War: The slate proclaimed its willingness to enter into immediate negotiations to bring about an assured permanent peace. But as long as the Communists insist on reaping rewards for their aggression, they must be made aware both through military and political means that they cannot win and, therefore, must accept peace as the most advantageous outcome of the war to them.

Social reforms: The slate pledged to put an end to all war speculation by profiteers, to stabilize the war economy, to restrain inflationary pressures, to overcome the underdeveloped aspects of the economy, to complete the land reform programs, to build a new and modern educational system, to expand the health and social services, and to make plans for post-war economic development.

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
NGUYEN VAN THIEU

Biographical Sketch

President-elect Nguyen Van Thieu was born on April 5, 1923, in Ninh Thuan Province, Central Vietnam.

He attended secondary school in Hue. Afterwards he enrolled in the National Military Academy at Dalat and was a member of the first class that graduated in 1948. He then attended the Infantry School in Coetquidan, France, in 1949. In 1954, he became the Superintendent of the National Military Academy in Dalat.

Later, he attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, U.S.A., in 1957 and the Joint and Combined Planning School, Pacific Command, in Okinawa, in 1959. In 1960 he visited Fort Bliss, U.S.A., for a familiarization course with modern weapons.

In 1963 he commanded the Fifth Infantry Division stationed North of Saigon. In 1964 he became Commander of the Fourth Corps. In February 1965 he joined the government of Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense. Since June 1965 he has been Chairman of the National Leadership Committee and Chief of State. He holds the rank of Lieutenant General in the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

He is married to the former Nguyen Thi Mai Anh of My Tho, a city in the Mekong Delta. He has a thirteen year old daughter and a six year old son.

He likes fishing, hunting, and reading.

THE VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT
NGUYEN CAO KY

Biographical Sketch

Vice President-Elect Nguyen Cao Ky was born on September 9, 1930, in Son Tay, North Vietnam.

He attended Chu Van An Secondary School in Hanoi. In 1952, he was a member of the first class that graduated from the Nam Dinh School for Reserve Officers. After training at the Marrakech School of Aviation in Morocco and the Advanced School of Aviation in Avord, France, he assumed command of the First Squadron of the Vietnamese Air Force in 1954. In 1955, he became the Commanding Officer of Tan Son Nhat Air Force Base, Saigon.

From 1956 to 1958, he went to the Air Command and Staff College in Alabama, U.S.A. Upon his return to Vietnam, he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Operations and Commanding Officer of the First Transport Squadron. He has been Chief of the Vietnamese Air Force since 1963 and he holds the rank of Air-Vice Marshal.

Since June 19, 1965, he has been Chairman of the National Executive Committee and Prime Minister.

He is married to the former Dang Tuyet Mai. He has four sons and two daughters. He loves flying and scuba-diving.

THE VIET CONG AND THE ELECTIONS

As of 7:00 p.m. Sunday, September 3, 1967, the Viet Cong had launched at least a total of 238 terroristic acts throughout Viet Nam in their attempt to sabotage the Presidential and Senatorial elections.

Viet Cong directives for sabotaging the elections were given to local cadres within weeks after the promulgation of the electoral laws in June 1967. A document captured in the Nhon Trach district of Bien Hoa province, and signed by Nguyen Van Thong, a high Viet Cong official, stated:

"We must continuously attack the enemy in all fields so as to crush their plot of launching a two-pronged attack and defeat the so-called 'Presidential election'...The September struggle phase is aimed at demolishing the deceitful 'Presidential' election comedy From now to the enemy 'Presidential election day', guerilla forces are to search out and destroy early any group that propagandizes and advertises the enemy's tricky so-called election comedy.

On election day, guerilla forces are to stick to and attack at any price all enemy groups that force people to go to the polls and disperse people that are gathered by the enemy; the secret self-defense members are to be ready to attack right at the polling stations or operate in coordination with the guerillas to destroy ballot boxes and punish the tyrants.... In cities, we must pay attention to gaining control of all legal and semi-legal organizations with a view to gathering the people, educating them and leading them in their struggle."

Captured minutes of a Viet Cong meeting in Binh Thuan province ordered its agents to kill, kidnap or threaten government employees, especially those involved in the elections, specifically "to prevent people from registering to vote -- preferably by persuasion but by force if necessary -- and to confiscate voter registration cards. On election days, cadres are to set up ambushes along lines of communication to prevent people from going to polling places, and to attack polling stations and remove ballot boxes."

Another document captured near Da Nang was to the point: "Actively prepare for sabotage plans. When the situation permits, kill some enemies."

N. B. For a detailed report on the Viet Cong drive to sabotage the elections, see Appendix pp. 35-37.

Examples of incidents caused by the Viet Cong could be best seen in the reports of various Vietnamese newspapers reproduced below:

Vol. III N° 125 Sunday 3, September 1967 THE SAIGON SUNDAY POST

Terrorists Hit Tam Ky ; Drive Toll Hits 1,000

Most Vicious Yet

THE SAIGON POST, Sep. 2, 1967

VC Election Drive Toll Tops 800 Mark

----- Over 170 Kidnaped In Attacks
--- On Small Villages, Hamlets

SAIGON, Sept. 1 (UPI)— Viet Cong guerrillas, embarking on their most vicious bombing and kidnapping of the war, staged a series of raids today that boosted Vietnam's casualties of the week-long campaign to more than 800.

Military spokesmen said guerrilla bands striking throughout the northern provinces abducted more than 170 persons in two days of attacks on small villages and hamlets.

Phan Thiet Latest Target

SAIGON POST Friday, Sept. 1, 1967

4Th Province Capital Attacked Guerrillas Kidnap 39 Youths In Village

Thủ Tướng Cộng Sản Miền Bắc chính thức hạ lệnh cho Cộng Sản Miền Nam

PHẢI PHÁ BẦU CỬ 3-9 CHO BẢNG ĐƯỢC

Năm thứ 4 @ \$6 1.029 @ 8 Tháng 5 Đồng @ Phát Hành 1g. trưa Thứ Sáu. 1-9-1967 (Ngày 27 Tháng 7 Đinh Mùi)

Chính Luận

Chở Nhiệm Kiểm Chữ Bút • ĐẶNG-VĂN-SUNG • 13 Võ Tánh - SAIGON • Đ.T. : 25.977 • Thư Ký Tòa soạn @ TỬ - CHUNG

Tự Do

TIẾNG NÓI CỦA NGƯỜI VIỆT TỰ DO

NUMEROUS SABOTAGE INCIDENTS BY
VIET CONG DURING ELECTION DAY:
65 KILLED -- 306 WOUNDED

- *Entire population of some villages kidnapped
- *Viet Cong mortared Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, La Vang, Vinh Long, Kien Tuong, Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh
- *Viet Cong Election Day terror acts: 65 killed, 306 wounded, 25 VC agents downed, 2 agents captured

Ngày 5-9-1967

RẤT NHIỀU VỤ PHÁ HOẠI CỦA VC TRONG NGÀY BẦU CỬ: 65 NGƯỜI CHẾT - 306 BỊ THƯƠNG

- * Máy làng bị VC bắt cóc hết người
- * Việt Cộng bắn súng cối vào Quảng Trị, Quảng Ngãi, La Vang, Vinh Long, Kiên Tường, Ba Xuyên, Định Tường, Biên Hòa, Cam Ranh.

Các vụ phá hoại của VC trong ngày bầu cử: 65
Người chết, 306 bị thương, 25 VC bị hạ sát,
2 tên bị bắt sống

Communist Premier of North (Viet-Nam) officially
gives order to Communists of the South:
MUST SABOTAGE ELECTIONS OF 3 SEPTEMBER BY ALL MEANS

Sắp đến ngày bầu cử, khủng bố phá hoại xảy ra liên tiếp khắp nơi

VC TẤN CÔNG, NÉM LƯU ĐẠN VÀO 5 ĐỊA ĐIỂM ĐẦU PHIẾU

- * Ở Chợ Lớn, Cảnh sát đã bị bắn trọng thương còn hạ 1 Việt Cộng
- * Đường Cần Thơ-Chương Thiện bị ngăn vì cầu Rạch Gòi sập

Election day approaching, terrorism and sabotage
happen continuously everywhere
VIET CONG ATTACK, THROW GRENADES AT 5 POLLING PLACES
* In Cho Lon, a Police critically injured downs 1 VC
* Can Tho-Chuong Thien route cut, Rach Goi bridge
blown up

SAIGON BAO, 4-9-1967

Tổng kết nạn nhân trong MỘT TUẦN TRƯỚC NGÀY BẦU CỬ

- 190 thường dân bị giết, 426 người bị bắt cóc, và 426 người bị thương.
- Việt Cộng đột nhập thị xã Tam Kỳ.

Final total of victims during
WEEK PRECEDING ELECTION DAY

- * 190 civilians killed, 426 kidnapped, and 426 wounded
- * Viet Cong attack city of Tam Ky

INTERNATIONAL OPINIONS ON THE ELECTION

I. AMERICAN PRESS COMMENTS

(Excerpts)

Chicago Daily News (Sept. 6, 1967): "The Viet Cong enemy provided the best evidence that the election was not a sham. Its efforts to prevent the election and harass the voters expanded into the bloodiest sort of terror tactics as the day approached. For 83 per cent of the eligible voters to turn out in defiance of this threat required a high degree of courage."

The Christian Science Monitor (Sept. 6, 1967): "Just as in the elections for the Constituent Assembly a year ago, the Viet Cong did their best by propaganda and terror to prevent the South Vietnamese from voting. In one sense, then, simply casting a ballot was synonymous with a vote against the Viet Cong."

The Cleveland Plain Dealer (Sept. 4, 1967): "The Vietnamese voters contributed a spectacular display of courage. More than 80 per cent of those registered cast ballots and, despite relentless terrorism, voting was blocked in only three of the 8,824 voting places...There is no question about the determination of the Vietnamese people to establish a stable constitutional government."

The Evening Star (Washington): "Truly a remarkable event...The ballots were cast and the consensus of observers from 24 countries, invited by the Saigon Government, was that the election was more fair than unfair."

The New York Times (Sept. 5, 1967): "One of the prerequisites for successful negotiations has been a Government in the South that has both constitutional legitimacy and demonstrable popular support. A long step in that direction has now been taken."

The Philadelphia Inquirer (Sept. 5, 1967): "The horrible measures taken by the Communists to obstruct the election are indicative of how they feel about democratic processes."

Time Magazine (Sept. 15, 1967): "Among the Vietnamese, the overwhelming feeling about their own election last week was that it was as honest as they have ever known, more honest than anyone expected."

Washington Post (Sept. 5, 1967): "The fact that about 83 per cent of the registered voters went to the polls (compared to 62 per cent in our presidential election of 1964) is indicative of widespread interest...In order to vote at all they had to defy the orders of the Vietcong and risk death in a shocking campaign of terrorism."

II. OTHER FOREIGN PRESS

AUSTRALIA

Sydney Morning Herald: "...as fair and free as could be reasonably expected in the extraordinary conditions."

AUSTRIA

Der Kurier (Vienna): "Pacifists throughout the world chimed in with the communist cries of protest-these are no democratic elections! In their anger, real or feigned, they forgot that despite all shortcomings which undoubtedly existed, the South Vietnamese elections did offer real alternatives to the voters, in clear contrast to 'elections' in a Communist country where the customary 99.9 per cent for the regime does not surprise anybody."

Volksblatt (Vienna): The high voter turnout "has strikingly refuted the theory that the people of Vietnam are tired of politics and that they endure the war as well as the elections indifferently."

BURMA

The Rangoon Daily: "Observers from a number of countries watched the elections, and the consensus was that they were fair and just."

CHINA

The China Daily News: "The big turnout of voters in the presidential election represents a telling blow to the Viet Cong and the Ho Chi Minh regime. It is a demonstration of Vietnamese determination to defend their free and democratic system of government in total disregard to the terrorist campaign of the Viet Cong."

Chung Yang Jih Pao: "The success of the Vietnam election is a great victory in the political warfare against the Viet Cong."

Cheng Hsin Hsin Wen Pao: "From now on, nobody can attack Vietnam and interfere with the Vietnam war over the issue of democracy. The new democratic government of the Republic of Vietnam will be able to take initiatives both in the political warfare of 'peace talks' and in military operations."

DENMARK

Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen): "The election demonstrated that a prolonged war had not deprived the population of the will to decide its own destiny."

GERMANY

Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin): "It would be an injustice to minimize or mock this declaration of popular will in South Vietnam."

Die Welt (Hamburg): "The good showing of several civilian candidates demonstrated that the voting was mostly free."

INDIA

The Hindustan (New Delhi): "...a bold effort to establish democracy in time of war."

The Janmabhumi (Bombay): "...a rare experience and a glorious event in the history of democracy. Neither friends nor foes of that country can ignore the implications of such vast popular enthusiasm to set up a democratic government."

The Nav Bharat Times (New Delhi): "The large voter turnout indicated that the Vietcong is on the wane."

The Wishwamitra (Calcutta): "If 80 per cent of the people participated in the election, as reported, it will be considered as a considerable waning of Viet Cong popularity."

ITALY

Resto Del Carlino (Bologna): "Despite the possibility of falling victim to bombs or guns, the people voted, and that was their answer to the Communists and their allies who prefer gunfire to balloting."

JAPAN

Japan Times: "Although the inculcation of ideas of political responsibility can only be achieved slowly, we feel that the election with its comparatively large turnout of voters indicates that ideas of democracy are catching on."

Yomiuri: "The most desirable factor is for the new government to become a stable regime enjoying the support of the people."

MALAYSIA

Malay Mail (Kuala Lumpur): "The size of the vote for...Thieu and Ky...cannot possibly be explained away simply in terms of the electoral advantages they enjoyed as incumbent powerholders. Indeed had they manipulated the vote they would surely have collected a much bigger share - and their methods would surely have been apparent to some at least of the dozens of overseas observers invited to South Vietnam. The results must be judged fair."

The Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur): "Charges that the election would be fraudulent and a farce have been refuted.... To have held the election at all was an achievement."

NEW ZEALAND

The Dominion (Wellington): "The South Vietnamese had done what the Communists have long promised but consistently failed to do - launch a real social revolution.... It appears likely that the institution of a stable, legal government in Saigon...with greater stature than any of its predecessors possessed, will at last convince North Vietnam that it cannot win the war."

The Press (Christchurch): "Although this election has not produced a decisive popular vote for one leader, it has shown the readiness of the people to have their own government and not one thrust upon them."

NORWAY

Arbeiderbladet (Oslo): "A new democracy" had been born in South Vietnam and "the spread of the votes cast...fully proves the honesty of the elections."

Morgenbladet (Oslo): "If there had been any organized election fraud, the military would surely have made certain they got better results.... On the whole, the elections were an impressive performance and proof that democratic processes are under way in South Vietnam."

PERU

Correo (Lima): "The elections were a resounding success, considering the fact that the Viet Cong made every possible effort to frustrate them. They were a harsh blow to the Communists and a palpable demonstration that their popularity is more apparent than real."

PHILIPPINES

Manila Chronicle: "It is moving to read the accounts of how despite terrorism and actual violence...a big percentage of South Vietnamese of voting age braved the terrors to cast their vote."

Philippine Herald: "The world that watches the brave attempt of this war torn country to brace itself up would surely look with sympathy on the understandable imperfections of the democratic machinery only now installed and already so overwhelmingly challenged to survive."

SWEDEN

Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm): "The fact that South Vietnam will now get a government of somewhat democratic form...should present a new point of departure for peace negotiations. In any case it should be more difficult for the national liberation front and its leaders in Hanoi to shrug off the Saigon government as insignificant."

UNITED KINGDOM

The Economist (London): "Despite the scorn poured on it, the election has achieved several things. In the first place, it puts South Vietnam among the small collection of countries whose governments risk holding elections with any significant degree of choice at all.... In the second place, the election means that the Saigon government will now be obliged to submit itself, to some extent, to the give-and-take of political pressure."

The Guardian (London): "In spite of the skepticism and doubts for months beforehand, the South Vietnamese presidential election actually took place and was less of a charade than had been commonly expected. Although the Vietcong made a vigorous attempt to disrupt it, nearly five million people went to the polls."

The Daily Telegraph (London): "South Vietnam took a giant stride towards democracy in Sunday's election....on balance, South Vietnam's war effort and her position for getting peace negotiations started will be greatly strengthened. What can North Vietnam or the Viet Cong offer in comparison?"

III. OPINIONS FROM AMERICAN OBSERVERS

Mayor JOSEPH M. BARR of Pittsburgh: "There's less harassment of the voters than there is at the polls in the United States, and they have better identification with their voting cards than we do."

The Reverend Dr. EDWARD L. R. ELSON of the National Presbyterian Church in Washington: "One point should be made strongly. If not precisely fair, it is still a mighty move forward--an election in Asia in a country at war."

WARNER GULLANDER, President of the National Association of Manufacturers: "I think that this was an election with a great deal of integrity."

Governor WILLIAM H. GUY of North Dakota: "Too much attention had been focused on the possibility of election irregularities, and not enough on the really significant thing...that these people, with great courage, gave as moving and as profound an example of their desire for self-determination as you could find.... (The election) has been carried out with greater detail and checks and balances than many of our own."

Senator BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER of Iowa: "I don't know of anyone who claimed he saw evidence of rigging. Certainly I didn't."

Governor RICHARD J. HUGHES of New Jersey: "I have talked to people from top, including (Presidential candidate) Tran Van Huong, to bottom, including voters, and I have found nothing whatever to indicate that the elections have been tampered with. I was most impressed by efforts to shield from fraud the vote in that country, and the people's real sense of nationhood and pride."

E. ELDON JAMES, former National Commander of the American Legion: "South Vietnam has achieved the basic foundations for the establishment of a strong democracy and its people are resolved to bring it about."

JOHN S. KNIGHT, Publisher of the Knight Newspapers: "It was the unanimous opinion of the American observer mission which covered representative sections of the country that the election was, so far as we could determine, reasonably fair and honest."

This view was generally shared by observers from 23 other countries....

True significance of the voting is that a national election could be held under war conditions and strong threats from the Viet Cong."

Governor THOMAS L. McCALL of Oregon: "I thought it (the election) was quite an inspiration. Even the doves and those against the war were satisfied. It was very heartening."

THEODORE R. McKELDIN, Mayor of Baltimore: "Splendid, intelligent people."

Senator GEORGE MURPHY of California: "I have no reservations about calling this a free and fair election. I'll have little patience with anyone who starts telling us it was rigged."

Senator EDWARD S. MUSKIE: "We pretty much blanketed the country from north to south. The preparations were very thorough, with the greatest safeguards to protect the integrity of the ballot.... My impression was that there was a good turnout and the people seemed pretty relaxed, thoughtful and quite orderly. There was nothing about the activity around the polls to suggest pressure or harassment."

EUGENE PATTERSON, editor of the Atlanta Constitution: "The election machinery is much more elaborate than I expected, and more elaborate than in many places in the United States. The election was mighty clean compared to what we have had in Georgia and much of the South....The recent elections in Saigon may have hit Hanoi a harder blow than B52s could deliver"

Rabbi JACOB P. RUDIN, President of the Synagogue Council of America: "A wonderful experience....The Vietnamese fulfill what was obviously a serious obligation on their part. It was very moving, they were not taking it (the right to vote) for granted as we sometimes do here."

Professor RICHARD F. SCAMMON of the Government Affairs Institute of Washington: "Reasonably efficient, reasonably free and reasonably honest....I would use exactly the same words to describe elections in the United States."

DAVID SULLIVAN, Vice-President of the AFL-CIO: "I am impressed by the spirit and the will of the Vietnamese people to build a free and democratic nation. I am impressed by how many persons voted in the election, in defiance of the Viet Cong's threats and violence. I am particularly impressed with the positive role that the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor and its members throughout the country have taken in assuring full, intelligent participation of all the people in these critical elections."

WHITNEY YOUNG, Executive Director of the National Urban League:
"I returned completely satisfied that it was as free an election as possible under the circumstances--so many candidates, so much brutal terrorism as they have...So I left with the feeling that they had demonstrated a self-determination on forming their own government."

Congressman LESTER L. WOLFF of New York, and independent observer:
"From what I can see, charges of fraud in the balloting are groundless."

IV. OPINIONS FROM OTHER OBSERVERS

Representative ALI DIMAPORO of the Philippines: "The elections had taken place in perfect tranquillity and order. I have found no evidence of political pressure on the voters."

Mr. AREE IDDHIKASEM of Thailand: "Vietnamese officials have done their best to keep the elections honest. The elections were carried out in order on the whole, and the citizens have done their duty eagerly."

Mr. KIM SEONG JIN, Korea's Orient Press Agency: "The elections were carried out in order and honesty. I admired the Vietnamese voters for their resolution in building democracy under the most difficult circumstances."

ERICH METTLER, in Die Neue Zurichher Zeitung: "The voting was astonishingly free and well-ordered, especially since it was carried out in the midst of a war and despite the fanatical brutality of the Viet Cong."

Mr. AMAL MUKHERJEE, Chief of the Asian Bureau of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (Brussels): "I saw the orderly and peaceful balloting in progress. Despite mounting threats of sabotage, the elections went on -- a remarkable feat -- and I congratulate the people and the authorities and wish them every success in their democratic experiment."

K. NARENDRA, Editor of the Vir Arjun and the Pratrap (New Delhi): "It is clear that the Communists do not like such a process (election) because they believe in dictatorship. What was observed by visiting foreign correspondents was more than enough to convince them that the Vietnamese people have faith in democracy. The preparations that preceded the polling clearly showed that the people were anxious and greatly interested in exercising their right to vote as they liked."

Mr. VINCENTE ALBANO PACIS of The Manila Chronicle: "Considering that a war is going on inside South Vietnam and that the Viet Cong increased their terrorist activities to frighten people away from the precincts before and during the election, killing 2,500 civilians in the process, it seems fair conclusion to make that the big turnout of voters -- more than 80 per cent of registered electors, a percentage higher than the usual voters' turnout in the Philippines -- is an auspicious beginning for the new government."

Mr. K. S. WAI, Hongkong Publisher (Tin Tin Yat Po): "The elections were absolutely open and absolutely free. Everywhere I went, the voters were all behaving in an orderly manner...Viet Cong terrorism did not upset the voters. When a polling center was bombed, they washed the place clean of blood and queued up again to cast their votes....I found the passionate patriotism with which they are seeking to rebuild their country at a trying time most touching."

APPENDIX

THE PRESIDENCY AND VICE PRESIDENCY ACCORDING TO THE 1967 CONSTITUTION

Authority

Executive authority is vested by the people in the President. The President and the Vice-President, running together on one list, are elected at large through universal suffrage by direct and secret ballot. Their term of office is four years and they can be reelected only once.

The President is the Chief of State and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. He determines national policy, appoints the Prime Minister and, upon the latter's proposal, members of the Cabinet, and presides over the Council of Ministers. He promulgates laws and treaties, receives diplomatic credentials, grants amnesty and pardon. He appoints, with the approval of the Senate, chiefs of diplomatic missions and rectors of state universities. He may decree a state of national emergency which must be ratified, amended or rejected by the National Assembly. In a state of war and when elections cannot be held, the President may, with the approval of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Assembly, extend the terms of office of certain elected bodies and appoint province chiefs. During the first Presidential term under this Constitution, the President may appoint province chiefs.

The Vice-President is Chairman of the Culture and Education Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Ethnic Minority Council. He cannot cumulate any other position in the government. He may replace the President for the remainder of the term if it is less than one year, in case the President dies, resigns, or has a serious and prolonged illness. In case the President is impeached or the remainder of the term is more than one year, the Vice-President temporarily assumes the Presidency for a maximum of three months in order to organize elections for a new President and Vice-President.

Candidacy

Citizens who fulfill the following conditions may run for President and Vice-President: they must have Vietnamese citizenship since birth, have lived continuously on Vietnamese territory for at least ten years as of election day (time spent abroad on official missions or in political exile is considered as residence in Vietnam).

In addition, the candidates must be 35 years old as of election day, enjoy all rights of citizenship, have legal draft status, and meet all other conditions set forth in the Presidential election law.

PROVISIONS FOR THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

The first law passed by the Provisional Legislative Assembly (formerly the Constituent Assembly) is Law No. 001/67 governing the election of the President and Vice President. It was promulgated on June 15, 1967, and the election date was set for September 3, 1967.

Voter eligibility

Eligible to vote are those persons of Vietnamese nationality of either sex, having reached the age of 18 as of December 31, 1966, having been registered and in possession of a valid voting registration card. Each citizen can register on one voter list only.

Civil servants and military men on missions, transfers, or unable to return to places of residence where their names are registered on the voters' list, may cast their votes at their actual location on election day. In addition to their voting registration cards, they must show their "Mission Order" duly certified by the proper authorities. In such cases, the Chairman of the committee in charge of the polling station must prepare a supplementary list to be sent to the local Electoral Council.

Citizens who fulfill all conditions of eligibility to vote but whose names do not appear or appear incorrectly on the list of voters have the right to file a complaint with the proper authorities by July 25, 1967, at the latest.

Candidacy

1. (See conditions for eligibility according to the Constitution on pp. 26-27).

2. Ineligible to be candidates are those sentenced for criminal offenses and misdemeanors (such as theft, swindling, breach of trust, forgery, violation of good morals, bribery, influence peddling, and embezzlement), those sentenced to three or more months imprisonment for minor crimes, those convicted of hit-and-run traffic accidents, deprived of citizenship and electoral rights by a court under existing laws, those under legal guardianship or being mentally ill, those having gone bankrupt and not yet rehabilitated; those having not complied with draft orders; civil servants, military men, and government officials having been suspended, dismissed, removed, or having resigned for disciplinary reasons; those having directly or

indirectly worked for communism or pro-communist neutralism.

Filing of applications for candidacy

Applications for candidacy must be filed with the Secretariat of the Provisional National Assembly by midnight June 30, 1967, and must be accompanied by the following documents: a birth certificate, a judicial record not older than three months, a certificate of continuous residence for ten years on Vietnamese territory, a certificate of draft status, a certificate of leave of absence (in case of military personnel and civil servants), receipt of deposit for electoral campaign expenses, a list of candidate representatives to be assigned to the Central Electoral Campaign, a sample of symbols to be used, and five 4x4cm. photographs of each candidate.

Review of candidacy

The Provisional National Assembly reviews the application for candidacy and supporting documents submitted by prospective candidates. First posting of the list of candidates will be made at the site of the Assembly within twenty four hours after the deadline for the filing of applications for candidacy.

Voters and candidates may file complaints with the Secretariat of the Provisional National Assembly about the eligibility of candidates by July 6, 1967. These complaints and supporting documents will be transmitted to the Central Electoral Commission for review. This Commission will report its findings to the Secretariat of the Assembly by July 15, 1967.

The Central Electoral Commission is made up of the following members:

- | | |
|---|---|
| - The Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals | Chairman |
| - The Chairman of the State Council, or
Administrative Judge, his representative | Member |
| - The Dean of the Saigon Bar Association
or his representative | Member |
| - An Assembly Deputy representing the
electorate | Member |
| - The Special Commissioner for Administration,
or his representative | Secretary
(with voting
privilege) |

Before the Assembly meets in plenary session to decide on the second posting of the list of candidates, those candidates against whom complaints have been filed, may be invited to appear and answer the charges before the Special Committee of the Assembly.

The second posting of the list of candidates will be made no later than July 19, 1967. From the date of the second posting, no candidate may withdraw from the race or alter his list.

Election Campaigning

At the national level, there will be a Central Election Campaign Committee composed of one principal and one alternate representative from each ticket.

The Chairman of the Committee will be elected from among the candidates' representatives. He will preside over the committee deliberations, and in case of a tie, he will cast the deciding vote.

At the local level, a Committee of similar composition will be established in each municipality and province. Representatives on these local campaign committees are designated by members of the Central Election Campaign Committee.

Election Campaign Committees will:

- (1) determine the number, size, and color of handbills and posters;
- (2) determine procedures for printing, transporting, and distributing handbills and posters;
- (3) fix the date and places for putting up posters and distributing handbills which may also be passed out at voters' homes;
- (4) organize talks by candidates or their representatives with the electorate.
- (5) determine procedures governing press activities and press conferences by candidates or their representatives.
- (6) determine procedures for using sound trucks, radio, and television wherever available. Equal time must be apportioned among all tickets.

All expenses related to the organization of the elections, including compensations for the observers representing the various tickets, will be borne by the national budget. However, each ticket must deposit at the National Treasury a sum of two hundred thousand piastres (VN \$200,000). In case a ticket withdraws after the second posting of candidacies, or fails to poll ten percent of the total number of valid votes, it must reimburse the national budget for expenses incurred on its behalf in the printing of handbills and posters.

The campaign begins August 3, 1967 and ends at noon, September 2, 1967, and must be conducted in Vietnamese.

Voting procedures

At each polling station , there will be a committee composed of a chairman and a deputy chairman, appointed by the mayors and province chiefs, and an even number of members -at least two- chosen by the chairman from among the voters present when the voting begins. Each ticket has the right to designate an observer at each polling station.

The committee Chairman supervises the voting and is responsible for keeping order at the polling station. He must immediately make a written report in the event of irregularities or if there is a complaint lodged by the candidates' representative.

Voting begins at 7:00 a.m. and concludes at 4:00 p.m. on September 3, 1967.

A voter must cast ballots in person. He cannot vote by mail or by proxy.

He may not carry arms when entering the polling station. He must show his registration card along with his regular identification card before he is given ballots, one for each ticket, and one envelope.

The voter must enter the curtained voting booth alone, select the ballot of his choice and put it into the envelope. Unused ballots must be torn apart and discarded by the voter himself into a receptacle for this purpose.

Upon leaving the booth, he displays the envelope containing the ballot to show there is only one envelope in his possession, then places it in the ballot box. If a voter is physically unable to cast the ballot he may request the committee chairman to select another voter to help him.

After the voter has cast his ballot, his voting card will be stamped and a corner of his card cut off by a member of the committee in charge of the polling station. These card corners must be kept as a tally of persons who have voted.

The ballot box has a slot for ballots. When voting begins, the committee chairman opens the ballot box and shows it for the public to see that it is empty. It is then locked with two different types of locks. The chairman holds one key and the oldest

committee member holds the other. When the voting is over, if the keys are missing, the ballot box must be opened by any means and the incident noted down in the report.

Vote counting

When the voting is over, ballot counting will proceed as follows:

The committee in charge of the polling station will designate a number of ballot counters from among the voters present who can read and write. These ballot counters, sitting in groups of four at separate tables, work under the direct supervision of the candidates' observers.

The committee chairman opens the ballot box and orders the count of envelopes. If the number of envelopes exceeds or is less than the number of voters who actually cast the ballots, it must be so recorded in the report. The number of actual voters is the number of corners cut from the voting cards.

The committee chairman gives each table a number of ballots for counting. At each table, the first ballot counter opens the envelope and hands the ballot over to the second ballot counter who reads aloud the names printed on the ballot. This ballot is then handed over to two other ballot counters who check it separately and note it on the tally sheet. When counting ballots, the first and second ballot counters are not allowed to hold anything in their hands which might make the ballots invalid.

Ballots will be invalid if: an envelope contains more than one ballot - is different from the one distributed to voters - the envelope is empty or contains something other than the ballot - the ballot bears additional writing or symbol - the ballot is not inside the envelope - the names of the candidates on the ballot are altered or tampered with in any way. These irregularities must be so recorded in the committee report.

Reports prepared by the provinces and municipalities along with invalid ballots and envelopes must be sent to the Secretariat of the Assembly no later than September 10, 1967. At an Assembly session, the Chairman of the Assembly will hand the reports to two Deputies chosen by the Assembly. The Deputies will read the reports aloud while two members of the Secretariat of the Assembly keep a tally of the temporary results. This provisional tally shall be made into four copies, one to be forwarded to the Central Electoral Commission, one to the Special Commissariat for Administration, one to the Secretariat of the National Assembly, and one to the Directorate of the National Archives and Libraries.

Violations, Penalties and Litigations

Various penalties ranging from fines or jail terms to hard labor and loss of citizenship rights are provided for violators of election procedures, namely for:

- Persons convicted of multiple voting and voting without proper credentials;
- Candidates or campaign workers exceeding the prescribed limits of money, time, and facilities;
- Persons convicted of bribery, intimidation, violence, threat of or actual economic reprisals aimed at preventing another person from voting or becoming a candidate, or forcing him to vote or not to vote for a particular candidate;
- Persons carrying weapons into polling stations (except in cases of security emergencies);
- Persons violating or conspiring to violate the secrecy and honesty of the voting;
- Persons disrupting or sabotaging voting procedures and installations;
- Election workers and officials manipulating, altering, rendering invalid ballots in order to change the outcome of the election;
- The destruction of ballot boxes and uncounted ballots.

Complaints about election violations must be filed: a/ By September 4 at local courts, with the right of appeal to the highest court where a ruling must be made by September 28, 1967. b/ By September 9, 1967, at the Secretariat of the Provisional Legislative Assembly which will transmit them to the Central Electoral Commission. The Commission must report its findings to the Assembly which shall meet no later than October 2, 1967, to ratify and proclaim the official results of the election.

Provisions are made for a new election should the voting be declared invalid.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS BY TACTICAL ZONES, CITIES (C) AND PROVINCES

TACTICAL ZONE I

Slate Cities and Provinces	1 Suu/ Dan	2 Ky/ Dinh	3 Binh/ Khinh	4 Dzu/ Chieu	5 Huong/ Truyen	6 Co/ Sinh	7 Ly/ Duong	8 Hiep/ Truyen	9 Thieu/ Ky	10 Khanh/ Dong	11 Quat/ Chan	TOTAL	Regis- tered Voters
Hue (C)	20,394	5,054	368	1,503	1,937	301	389	499	8,162	501	4,227	43,335	54,827
Danang (C)	34,061	5,045	1,258	5,160	4,770	1,284	1,039	2,072	22,496	3,215	9,494	89,894	116,053
Quang Nam	20,716	15,764	3,776	12,779	5,289	3,018	2,381	4,790	28,378	17,187	16,584	130,662	153,393
Quang Ngai	31,468	8,806	4,582	44,323	7,073	2,830	2,491	4,288	41,609	2,911	17,244	167,625	202,664
Quang Tin	10,538	6,538	3,098	7,147	7,827	2,257	1,950	4,503	34,045	3,234	5,971	87,102	94,483
Quang Tri	14,287	16,008	2,197	8,991	2,580	2,020	1,482	2,630	20,911	8,016	9,335	88,457	107,281
Thua Thien	41,203	35,382	2,408	5,168	4,347	1,610	1,311	2,961	33,804	3,710	19,972	151,876	183,160
TOTAL	172,667	92,591	17,687	85,071	33,823	13,320	11,043	21,743	189,405	38,774	82,827	758,951	911,861
TACTICAL ZONE II													
Cam Ranh (C)	4,717	1,287	450	921	978	538	559	1,203	7,324	524	2,642	21,143	24,353
Dalat (C)	2,314	1,672	508	2,846	5,561	497	539	773	9,723	768	1,310	26,511	34,765
Binh Dinh	27,151	17,601	5,522	46,076	10,293	5,809	4,940	13,021	118,232	5,922	15,790	270,357	302,260
Binh Thuan	6,169	4,867	2,006	19,588	7,766	1,992	1,995	3,531	37,924	2,811	5,226	93,835	106,375
Darlac	3,209	2,691	1,550	3,552	6,014	1,344	1,410	2,788	38,554	1,770	2,911	65,793	78,099
Kontum	1,431	1,443	583	5,700	1,427	368	359	1,169	25,707	607	976	39,770	47,998
Khanh Hoa	30,043	7,199	2,732	9,270	7,619	2,929	2,919	4,897	56,192	2,946	14,313	141,059	166,240
Lam Dong	2,312	1,505	540	1,039	979	475	410	880	12,043	825	1,332	22,340	26,839
Ninh Thuan	5,749	3,348	1,909	4,696	5,020	1,569	1,525	2,410	30,502	1,730	4,123	61,981	67,409
Phu Bon	1,197	992	716	1,116	1,248	416	309	2,377	11,717	548	2,376	22,956	27,052
Phu Yen	23,261	5,931	2,827	9,176	3,279	2,320	1,855	3,960	30,067	2,327	13,311	98,314	116,107
Pleiku	3,885	3,528	1,934	7,164	3,507	1,505	1,577	3,592	29,466	1,569	3,030	60,757	77,572
Quang Duc	948	706	333	697	505	424	444	540	8,519	440	733	14,289	15,503
Tuyen Duc	2,124	1,502	718	2,728	2,107	684	590	1,192	21,463	1,049	1,428	35,585	41,696
TOTAL	114,510	54,272	21,728	114,569	56,303	20,870	19,391	42,283	437,433	23,836	69,495	974,690	1,132,268

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS BY TACTICAL ZONES, CITIES (C) AND PROVINCES

TACTICAL ZONE III

Cities and Provinces	Slate	1 Suu/ Dan	2 Ky/ Dinh	3 Binh/ Khinh	4 Dzu/ Chieu	5 Huong/ Truyen	6 Co/ Sinh	7 Ly/ Duong	8 Hiep/ Truyen	9 Thieu/ Ky	10 Khanh/ Dong	11 Quat/ Chan	TOTAL	Registered Voters
Saigon (C)		59,371	34,007	13,995	87,670	137,962	13,159	10,010	14,910	135,527	15,300	23,700	545,611	765,340
Vung Tau (C)		2,227	1,767	646	3,657	4,015	553	469	977	13,456	889	1,083	29,739	35,787
Bien Hoa		7,878	7,102	3,140	31,494	13,546	2,965	2,531	4,343	55,488	3,570	5,991	138,048	179,450
Binh Duong		7,106	6,196	3,062	23,499	8,576	2,529	2,290	3,698	19,275	2,904	5,719	84,854	113,065
Binh Long		1,945	1,396	880	3,936	1,616	1,007	982	1,272	7,732	980	1,454	23,200	28,218
Binh Tuy		761	1,496	499	5,143	639	427	488	1,101	11,237	566	845	23,202	27,068
Con Son		49	21	16	30	85	4	16	25	658	17	19	940	1,019
Gia Dinh		36,472	21,580	9,078	63,934	69,949	7,968	6,774	11,694	171,123	10,422	15,904	424,898	562,190
Hau Nghia		3,044	3,082	1,555	19,430	3,837	1,256	1,175	1,608	10,425	1,483	2,761	49,656	63,439
Long An		4,544	4,235	2,071	15,535	9,220	1,812	1,831	1,879	15,608	2,407	3,485	62,427	75,303
Long Khanh		2,580	3,975	1,159	5,746	3,270	898	823	1,961	25,624	1,403	1,977	49,416	61,155
Phuoc Long		832	802	599	1,008	961	617	556	895	11,004	514	654	18,442	20,981
Phuoc Tuy		2,176	2,170	1,120	12,002	4,268	933	820	1,291	15,705	1,229	1,826	43,534	50,768
Tay Ninh		6,696	5,013	3,607	39,947	6,543	2,284	2,157	3,133	30,830	2,825	4,344	107,379	130,395
TOTAL		135,681	92,482	41,427	312,831	264,487	36,412	30,922	48,787	523,692	44,509	69,756	1,601,346	2,114,178
TACTICAL ZONE IV														
An Giang		11,502	22,456	6,567	43,483	12,215	3,546	3,291	4,737	62,035	4,968	7,752	182,552	224,274
An Xuyen		1,523	1,476	832	6,444	2,491	760	652	3,593	14,326	789	1,131	34,017	42,245
Ba Xuyen		4,601	6,378	2,896	20,574	8,823	3,553	2,662	3,665	21,738	3,878	5,428	84,196	103,280
Bac Lieu		4,241	5,290	1,923	9,729	6,191	1,902	1,555	2,582	15,717	1,954	3,539	54,623	68,780
Chau Doc		9,372	11,023	5,341	40,019	8,043	3,692	3,084	4,336	65,374	4,117	7,136	161,537	184,301
Chuong Thien		2,472	2,423	1,405	7,909	2,018	724	724	824	22,488	997	1,846	43,830	53,298
Dinh Tuong		6,352	6,844	2,977	14,240	15,492	2,479	2,288	3,955	29,732	3,265	4,285	91,909	112,934
Go Cong		1,657	1,726	892	2,879	4,581	798	583	1,543	17,594	1,238	1,294	34,785	38,588
Kien Giang		6,602	6,729	2,975	28,364	8,258	2,567	2,002	3,072	39,130	2,647	5,771	108,117	132,967
Kien Hoa		6,920	6,942	3,509	14,069	9,056	2,815	2,775	4,035	40,845	3,621	6,758	101,345	118,793
Kien Phong		4,850	6,351	3,332	34,160	3,812	1,891	1,750	2,524	28,448	2,301	3,933	93,352	111,110
Kien Tuong		648	557	396	4,283	732	321	283	434	6,126	414	595	14,788	17,200
Phong Dinh		10,772	9,007	5,393	24,103	11,846	2,825	2,697	3,403	28,072	3,336	6,209	107,663	145,332
Sadec		5,200	6,703	3,254	13,246	5,068	1,702	1,765	1,861	43,760	1,934	3,224	87,667	97,662
Vinh Binh		3,572	7,340	2,839	13,745	5,550	2,488	2,066	3,224	32,246	2,726	3,388	79,184	95,791
Vinh Long		10,232	8,523	5,698	27,402	15,311	3,652	3,121	4,189	31,401	3,972	7,351	120,852	148,389
TOTAL		90,516	109,768	50,229	304,649	119,487	35,715	31,248	47,977	499,031	42,157	69,640	1,400,417	1,694,944

VC Poll Drive: Real, Vicious Pattern Of Massive Plot To Mar Elections Bared

By VICENTE G. MARTINEZ

Terrorism, assassinations, kidnappings, military attacks, demonstrations, propaganda, and harassment.

With these standard tools of their calling, the Viet Cong threaten to soar to new heights of malevolence in a massive campaign to sabotage the presidential and senatorial elections in South Vietnam on Sept. 3.

In the desperate and elusive search for the attainment of what they deem fundamental to the success of their effort — political strength — the Viet Cong have directed the main thrust of their activities to the destruction of the Government of Vietnam's political structure and the substitution of their own to insure political control of the population.

Thus, the constitutional development of the GVN into a broadly based, legalized government — most obviously manifested by the forthcoming electoral process — poses a fundamental threat to the VC program.

In these few days preceding the elections, the Viet Cong have served notice of the bloody pattern of things to come. They have shelled objectives with little regard for precise military targets, exacting a death toll over the 300 mark with their victims mostly civilians. They have blown up bridges and busses packed with civilians with reckless abandon, kidnapped and terrorized in the best traditions of their viciousness.

They are undaunted by the failure of the sustained and serious attempts to disrupt the election of the Constituent Assembly on Sept. 11, 1966 and the village and hamlet elections held this year — setbacks caused by their inability to dissuade the people in GVN-controlled areas from voting and the lack of military strength to keep them from voting.

The VC view the Sept. 3 elections more seriously than the two previous

elections. «Whatever gov't is installed, there is a very real danger of major political losses to the VC, who feel that many people many switch their allegiance to the new government,» says one recent VC rallier, a district-level propaganda cadre.

Strategy Shift

A report from Bien Hoa province dated August 18 stating that VC emphasis has temporarily been shifted from anti-pacification activity to anti-election efforts is given emphasis by repeated blarings of VC Liberation Radio broadcasts which have since late July called on their people to «smash the election farce.»

VC anti-election tactics remain basically the same as in the two previous elections with the pattern of activity broken down into three basic phases: pre-election, election day, and post election.

In pursuit of this program, higher echelons have established guidelines and directed province and district party committees to formulate individual plans which take local conditions into account.

The magnitude, thoroughness, comprehensiveness, and reality to the Viet Cong plan to disrupt the elections may be gleaned from the following:

I Corps

1. A document found in the person of a female VC suspected of being a communication cadre, entitled «Smash the Buffonery of the Election,» signed by the VC Assistant Secretary of the Current Affairs section for Da Nang City, dated July 25, 1967 and confiscated on Aug. 18, states:

— «Completely boycott the Sept. 3 elections. Taking part

in the election is letting Americans go on burning houses, destroying religious denominations, increasing cowboys and prostitutes, increasing the cost of living, increasing taxes, and letting our men be pushed into death instead of the Americans; 'Knock down the American Empire which is interfering with Vietnamese internal affairs'; 'Smash the cheating polls'; 'Thieu-Ky should resign and give their positions to a subsequent government'; 'Knock down Thieu-Ky who insist on power and position'; 'Solve unemployment, raise salaries, lower the cost of living, reduce taxes'; 'Release prisoners'; and 'Carry out democracy.'

— «From now to 15 August: ... Create strong public opinion to denounce enemy crimes... Mobilize the public to boycott election propaganda... Popularize folk songs about boycotting the election; exploit such victories in Da Nang and in South Vietnam, as the attacks on the airfield in Ho An (14 July) and Phuoc Tuong earlier, making the public realize that the enemy is safe nowhere...»

'Promote Hatred'

— «15 August to September: Exploit the Vu-Lan All Souls' Day Festival to get many Buddhists to participate in ceremonies for the dead to promote hatred and resentment... If conditions permit, we must organize strikes... On 2 September, organize the people to stop work and go out into the streets to prepare for the 3 September struggle...»

— «On Election Day: Boycott the elections, forcing the enemy to abandon or postpone the elections; if forced to vote, cause fights and create disorder so that the elections cannot be carried out...»

— «After 3 September: If the enemy persists in carrying out the elections in order to form a puppet government, we must immediately influence public opinion and make clear the election deception. By comparing this election to that in South Korea, we must make it clear that the Vietnamese country sellers have submitted to the Americans and thus will lose complete legal validity and fall politically.»

'Kill Enemies'

«Military: Try to make noise on election day, but the chief consideration must be given to the political struggle movement. Actively

prepare sabotage plans. When the situation permits, kill some enemies. The soldiers of the Liberation Front in Quang Nam will not guarantee the lives of persons traveling on Election Day...»

2. A letter obtained from the above VC cadre says: «...the policy of the Front is to incite the masses to push a full-blown political struggle to disrupt the false election of Thieu-Ky and to make the new crisis general.»

3. A regimental or larger size force will be used by the VC in Quang Tri, according to reports from that province where a number of incidents of VC forcing their way into the hamlets and conducting propaganda meetings were disclosed. Between 1 and 6 July 1967 the VC province committee met in Ba Long and discussed plans to disrupt the elections.

4. Reports from Thua Thien reveal armed VC companies spreading anti-election propaganda and threatening the population throughout the province. Recent threats to mortar district headquarters were carried out on 13 August against Huong Dien and Phong Dien. The anti-election preparations include an increase in military training for local forces in support of military action. The VC Province Committee instructed last July district level cadres to increase their activities to disrupt the elections by organizing anti-election meetings, using leaflets, whispering campaigns, and grenades at the polls. Mortar attacks against Hue and Phu Bai were taken up.

Cadres Briefed

5. In Quang Nam, 870 political and economic cadres released by the VC from the Ho An jail on 14 July

have undergone intensive training and assigned to the villages and hamlets to help reestablish control for the VC. They have been ordered to arrange political demonstrations and to obstruct the elections.

In Phu Tho village, Dien Ban District, the VC have trained youths in the use of explosive charges to be placed in polling places. Other reports state that the V-25 and R-20 Local Force Battalions are undergoing sapper training.

In late June, the VC Dien Ban District Committee directed the autonomous administrative sections of Dien Duong and Dien Hai villages to assign hard-core female cadres to go to Hoi An and Da Nang to contact former Communist Party members, former political prisoners of the GVN, and refugees not committed to a political ideology to persuade them to report on the election situation, distribute propaganda, and carry out other anti-election tasks.

6. In Quang Tin the VC organized last early summer indoctrination courses for cadres and guerrillas at Ky An and Phuoc Long villages, Tam Ky district, to explain their anti-election campaign.

Sabotage

7. The VC Quang Ngai Province Committee held a meeting between 6 and 8 August in Mo Duc district to discuss sabotage of the elections. It was decided to:

- Intensify recon-sapper activities by penetrating district towns and Quang Ngai City to plant mines, destroy public buildings, and assassinate government personnel.

- Intensify efforts of district and village units in attacking villages and hamlets.

- Destroy refugee camps to cause confusion among the people.

- Incite the people to demonstrate and march to GVN installations to protest the elections.

- Send VC cadres to mingle with Buddhists and incite Buddhist organizations to demonstrate against the Thieu-Ky ticket.

- Assassinate and kidnap people working to organize the electoral campaign.

- Kidnap civilians in GVN-controlled areas and seize their identification cards and voters cards for modification and use by VC recon-sapper cadres operating in GVN-controlled areas.

(To be continued tomorrow)

VC Poll Drive: Real, Vicious Even After Elections Voters Shall Confront Their Wrath

II Corps

1. In a meeting in Ham Thuan district, Binh Thuan province, last 28 June, the Viet Cong spelled out a three-point plan to disrupt the elections as follows:

a. Preceding election day, cadres of the Ham Thuan District Committee shall assassinate, kidnap or threaten GVN employees, especially those directly involved in the electoral process; organize propaganda meetings and create movements for boycotting the elections; prevent registration of voters either by persuasion or force; and confiscate voter registration cards.

b. On election day the cadres are to set up ambushes to prevent people from going to the polling places; shell or mortar these polling places; and attack polling places with military units and seize ballot boxes.

c. After election day, cadres shall through propaganda cast doubt on the significance of the elections, cast aspersions on the prestige of elected candidates, and appeal to the people to reject the validity of election results.

2. In Thuan Nam district, Pleiku province, the VC met from 2 to 6 August and agreed to execute strong military attacks

on cities, rural areas, assassinate GVN local administrative personnel and physically prevent people from voting on election day.

3. On 17 August, the VC broke into Phu Da hamlet, Hien Xuong district, Phu Yen province, herded the population in a propaganda session, and warned that those who participated in the elections would be sent to a thought reform camp for six months to one year.

4. In Kontum province the VC provincial committee agreed on the following anti-election plan at a meeting on 4 July 1967:

a. In the first stage the VC shall conduct lectures throughout the province against the elections; ambush and assassinate local GVN administrative officials, especially those engaged in census operations; and prevent Montagnards from studying voting procedures.

b. In the second stage the VC shall intensify terrorist attacks and abductions and assassinations of local GVN officials, especially Montagnard village and hamlet cadres; set up ambushes, plant mines and grenade traps to interrupt movement; and create disturbances by continually mortaring district capitals, outposts, New Life hamlets, especially those with polling places.

6. Buon Klat (a Montagnard village) in Darlac province, was penetrated on 20 July 1967 by an armed VC propaganda unit which threatened to kill those who vote. They served notice that from then until 5 Sept., all VC forces in that district, Buon Ho, would

set ambushes on all roads leading to the district capital and arrest or kill people headed for the district capital. VC guerrillas are to combine with provincial local force battalions to attack hamlets and shell Buon Ho towns especially on election day.

III Corps

1. In Bien Hoa province, armed VC propaganda teams are threatening voters and distributing anti-election leaflets. In a hamlet of Duc Tu district, one squad returned repeatedly to distribute anti-election propaganda and to threaten the people against voting. The VC also threatened to blast polling places and burn identification cards.

2. In Ham Tan district, Binh Tuy province, the VC, with the support of VC military forces plan to harass the elections with the use of grenades and explosives. Voters are being threatened with violence and death and prior to the election, voting and identification cards are being seized to prevent voting.

Disorder Plan

3. Pre-election day activities in Gia Dinh province are to be conducted to dissuade voting. During elections, the VC plan to kidnap and assassinate local officials, plant mines and grenades on roads leading to polling places and inside voting booths and ballot boxes. Military attacks are planned to persuade people to remain at home. In general, the VC plan to create anxiety, disorder and confusion among the people.

4. A VC battalion in Gia Dinh province has reportedly moved from Long An province to the Rach Su stream in Tan Thanh village in the Rung Sat area, where its men are stationed in small teams.

The men are to move gradually to areas bordering Saigon and await orders to attack isolated outposts and shell the capital. These activities are to be carried out from now to election day.

Basket Sellers

5. In Hau Nghia province, two sapper squads from Duc Hoa district disguised as bamboo basket sellers will reportedly infiltrate Saigon to begin terrorist and sabotage activities against the elections.

6. The Xuan Loc district committee of Long Khanh province has directed cadres from 12 villages who attended a training course in late June 1967 to penetrate cities, engage in subversive activities against the elections, and prevent rural people from voting.

7. VC plans in Long An province are to assassinate GVN officials in the district and in the province capital, Tan An, prior to election day. In Loi Binh Nhon village, Thu Thua district, the VC are conducting propaganda campaigns to induce villagers to help the VC disrupt the elections. All subordinate echelons are to confiscate ballots and urge the people to strike against the GVN two days before the elections. In Tan Tru the VC district committee has ordered subordinate echelons to confiscate and burn GVN identification cards to prevent people from voting.

Sniper Fire

8. In Long An province the main VC effort is to be directed at the destruction of roads and bridges and waterways.

Traffic along them is to be disrupted with emphasis given highway number 4. VC forces have been directed to remain near action areas and slow down GVN attempts to repair the damage, and harass traffic with sniper fire.

9. Stepped up terrorist actions are planned in Long An province with the GVN's Revolutionary Development program the priority target. Terrorist assassinations and kidnappings are to be employed against village and hamlet chiefs. VC documents also order the random killing of one of two persons the night before the elections to spread terror among the people.

Timetable

10. The basic military timetable laid down for anti-election activity in Long An province follows:

a. 23-24 August — probe GVN-controlled areas to determine reactions.

b. 31 August—launch simultaneous attacks throughout the province.

c. 1 September — stop all military activities.

d. 2-3 September — concentrate all efforts to destroy traffic facilities, GVN troops, GVN cadres and initiate a maximum propaganda effort.

e. After the elections, destruction activities against the lines of communication will continue until at least 7 September.

Tension

11. In Phuoc Long province the VC plan to use subordinate units to create tension by making false propaganda and harassing the district capitals the ineffect to make the people lose confidence in the GVN prior to the elections. The VC have been directed to fire on GVN outposts and concentrate their activities on New Life hamlets near district capitals.

12. In Phuoc Tuy province the VC plan to assassinate GVN officials who do not resign before election. During elections VC plans call for

the mortaring of towns, bombing of voting booths, grenades hurled in voting areas, and intimidation of people on the way to vote. After the elections, people who have voted are to be killed. Other reported planes involve the destruction of roads and bridges, setting up of road blocks on main routes to dissuade voting.

IV Corps

1. In Chuong Thien province special VC propaganda teams are threatening and coercing the people against voting. The VC have also started seizing GVN identification and voting cards.

2. In Sa Dec province, 22 youths here abducted and held for four days during which they were told to oppose the presidential elections.

3. In Bac Lieu province the secretaries of four district committees conducted numerous meetings of village and hamlet committees to discuss disrupt-election plans. People in these districts are to be told not to vote or to incorrectly mark their ballots. In two districts the VC have announced they

will award prizes to people who make the most outstanding efforts to counter the elections.

Sapper Course

4. In Cang Long district, Vinh Binh province, the Military Affairs Section of the provincial committee organized a sapper training section composed of males and females and between the ages of 14 and 17 who are to infiltrate the province capital on election day and create disturbances.

5. In Kien Giang province the VC have bought quantities of old GVN uniforms to disguise themselves as ARVN 9th Division soldiers in preparation for terrorist activity on election day.

6. The U Minh 10 Battalion in Kien Giang province is assigning various elements to work with various district committees to undermine the elections with the following plan of action.

a. Prior to the election prestigious persons and candidates are to be assassinated; election campaigners are to be terrorized; voter cards are to be confiscated; and land and water communication lines are to be sabotaged.

Roadblocks

b. On election day, roads and canals leading to polling areas will be blocked, ballot boxes and sites will be sabotaged.

c. After the elections, winning candidates will be assassinated or kidnapped; and the validity of the election results will be denied.

7. In Chau Thanh district, Phong Dinh province the VC met in July and threatened those who violate the anti-election orders with a two-week re education course to be given by the Province security section.

From the above mentioned evidence gleaned from captured documents, intelligence reports, incidents and prisoner interrogations emerges the clear and cohesive pattern of the Viet Cong's extensive campaign to disrupt the national elections: strange, hideous way into the hearts of a people whose rights they profess to champion.

VIETNAM REPORT
Embassy of Vietnam
2251 R Street, N.W.
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Vietnam Report VIII:

**The Republic of Vietnam
Armed Forces**

*Embassy of the Republic of Vietnam
Washington, D. C.*

Vietnamese soldiers in action



INTRODUCTION

In recent months, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, particularly the Army, has been subjected to increasingly numerous charges in press reports and editorial comments with regard to its combat effectiveness. These reports almost always cited the fact that American losses have exceeded those sustained by the Vietnamese during certain periods as indicative of combat ineffectiveness on the part of the Vietnamese and as evidence that the United States forces are increasingly carrying a greater share of the fighting.

If one wants to look for faults in the Vietnamese Army, one could certainly find them as one would in any army of the world. However, some of the recent critical reports¹ tend to make sweeping generalizations from individual and isolated instances here and there, and thereby give the wrong impression that the whole military establishment is riddled with inefficient, corrupt, and rotten elements.

If the Vietnamese Armed Forces were really as incompetent, as corrupt, and as dispirited as they have been alleged to be, South Vietnam would have been lost long ago, regardless of the amount of help the Allies have put in.

It must be remembered that the Republic of Vietnam only started to build a national army, practically from scratch, in 1954. At that time, North Vietnam had already inherited a seasoned fighting machine of the Vietminh guerrillas. However, since then, the Vietnamese Armed Forces have for many years stood off alone the aggressive attempts of the Communists to take over the country. It was only in 1965, when the increasing tempo of the Communist activities created a more serious threat to our national security, that the U. S. and other Free World Forces were asked to help.

1. Arnett, Peter, "South Vietnam's Army found increasingly ineffective", Washington Sunday Star, September 17, 1967. Martin, Everett G., "Vietnam: Last Chance?" Newsweek, September 25, 1967. Perry, Merton, "Their Lions, Our Rabbits", Newsweek, October 9, 1967.

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The strength of the Vietnamese Armed Forces is currently over 600,000. This represents a substantial portion of able-bodied men out of a total population of about 14 million. An equivalent ratio, if applied to the United States population, would be more than 7,000,000 men under arms rather than 3,000,000 now serving.

The present strength includes the regular forces (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force), as well as the Regional Forces (National Guard) and Popular Forces (Militia).

The Regular Forces, being the major component of the Armed Forces, carry the main burden in combating the communists.

The Regional Forces are organized to provide internal security at the provincial level. They also assist the regular army in restoring and maintaining security throughout the national territory. They are recruited locally and operate under the province chief.

The Popular Forces are organized for offensive and counterattack roles at the village and hamlet levels. They guard against sabotage and terrorist activities and help the local authorities to maintain security and order. They are recruited at the village level, operate under non-commissioned officers responsible to the village chief, and are employed only in the local area.

From an army of roughly 150,000 in 1954-55, the Vietnamese Armed Forces have grown to its present size of over 600,000. During the past few years alone, they have almost doubled in strength, and this accelerated increase has created a serious strain on leadership resources. For about a year now, there has been a slowdown in the creation of new Army units because we need to concentrate our efforts on improving the quality of our forces. Being now in a position to expand further, the Vietnamese Government recently announced plans to increase its Armed Forces by 60,000. The draft age has now been lowered from 20 to 18.

ARMY FIELD COMMAND

For purposes of command and logistics the country is divided territorially into four tactical military zones known as corps areas. Each corps area embraces a number of divisions assigned to it.

The chain of command extends from the Chief of the Joint General Staff through the Chief of Staff to corps commanders. From corps level it passes to division commanders or commanders of specifically designated forces. Corps commanders are responsible for the conduct of all security operations against the communists within their respective areas.

PRESENT ROLE

The Republic of Vietnam is well aware that the struggle against communism is one fought for the people's hearts and minds. It has therefore been giving top priority to the task of rural reconstruction (also called Revolutionary Development) during the past two years.

Even as the war goes on, the effort goes forward to forge a social revolution of hope and progress. Therefore, at the Manila Conference in October 1966, the Republic of Vietnam made known its intent to train and assign a substantial share of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to "clear and hold" operations in order to provide a security shield behind which Revolutionary Development cadres can work to build a new society.

This Revolutionary Development support role has been described by some Western newsmen as a "secondary, guard-duty" role. This is a serious misinterpretation of the new role. For, in reality, the army units which are assigned to provide support for Revolutionary Development must undertake not only the arduous task of suppressing communist combat activities in the country side, but also the task of rooting out the communist infrastructure and taking an active part in civic action projects. On the other hand, in assuming this support role, the Vietnamese Armed Forces have not stopped normal military operations altogether. In fact, only half of the troops are assigned to security tasks in the rural areas while the rest still continue to carry out major "search and destroy" operations, sometimes jointly with the American and/or other Allied troops.



Fight and build

If one looks at the situation realistically, one will see that this assignment is no less important a mission and requires no less courage. In reality, the daily pacification task of fighting the guerillas and communist political cadres at the village and hamlet levels, often is even more arduous and demanding of sacrifice than large engagements. Everyone of these fighting men is constantly being exposed to danger in a war that has no well-defined fronts.

The task of pacification is heavy but often devoid of spectacular victories as would be achieved in purely military situations. Yet, the rate of casualties sustained in this military-psychological effort is often higher than the rate of combat casualties. When the Regional and Popular Forces were alone in charge of providing support to pacification efforts they sustained 79% of the Vietnamese Armed Forces' total casualties in 1963, 72% in 1964, 63% in 1965, and 64% in 1966. These percentages do not include the high number of government cadres who were either murdered or kidnapped every year.


COMBAT PERFORMANCE

In spite of the major contributions of troops from the United States and other Free World countries during the past two years, the war remains a Vietnamese war and the major burden is still borne by the Vietnamese Armed Forces and people.

The Vietnamese Army initiates more than 55% of all operations each week, and there has been a steady increase in the number of enemy contacts compared to last year. In large unit operations defined as involving at least one battalion, the Vietnamese Army contacts with the enemy have risen from 46% during the first half of 1966 to 51% during the corresponding period of 1967. This aggressiveness is clearly reflected in the higher casualties sustained by the Vietnamese Army this year: 5508 killed in action and 14,384 wounded² in action in the first half of 1967 as against 4,796 killed in action and 9,460 wounded in action in the corresponding period of 1966.

Vietnamese forces fight daily against both the guerrillas and the North Vietnamese regulars who infiltrated into South Vietnam. They continue to perform with distinction and have inflicted heavy damage on the enemy but they have also paid a

2. See explanation in "Combat casualties" on p. 16.



Weapons captured

high price. Many of their heroic actions often go unheralded and only a relatively few of them were given coverage by the American press.

In one operation in the vicinity of Quang Ngai city, South Vietnamese paratroopers assisted by air strikes and artillery killed 746 attacking North Vietnamese regulars in a battle raging from dawn to dusk, Sunday, February 19, 1967.³

Only a day after this victory, Vietnamese militiamen and national policemen cordoned off the hamlet of Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai province and arrested 94 guerillas without firing a shot or suffering a single casualty.⁴

In May 1967, a Vietnamese battalion displayed a splendid performance in Operation "Lam Son 54", conducted inside the DMZ along with two U. S. Marine task forces. The Vietnamese battalion was the first unit to reach the objective and was responsible for killing a large number of the nearly 1,400 North Vietnamese who died in the battle.⁵ On June 15, about 1,000 Vietnamese infantrymen including two battalions of the 21st Infantry Division with the support of American helicopters crushed a communist battalion in Phong Dinh province, killing 211 and capturing 17, while suffering only 5 killed and 60 wounded. There were no American casualties.⁶

In early August, American and Vietnamese troops in the Mekong Delta destroyed one communist battalion and mauled two others massing for attack on the Saigon suburbs. Some 350 enemy troops were trapped and killed. The Americans suffered 16 killed and 59 wounded while the South Vietnamese lost 27 killed and 50 wounded.⁷

More recently, on October 21, the government forces downed 197 communists who lay strewn among the burial mounds of a cemetery near Quang Tri after their suicidal ten-hour assault against heavily armed government troops.⁸

3. New York Post, Feb. 20, 1967. Also, Washington Evening Star, New York Times, Washington Post, of Feb. 20 and 21, 1967.

4. New York Times, Feb. 22, 1967.

5. Stars and Stripes, Summer-Fall issue, 1967.

6. New York Times, June 16, 1967.

7. Boston Globe, August 2, 1967.

8. Washington Post, October 22, 1967.



Weapons captured

On October 22, United States Special Forces units and Vietnamese irregular troops took a strongly fortified communist base camp north of Saigon and killed 99 of the enemy after a daylong fighting at close range.⁹

On October 29, South Vietnamese and United States troops successfully withstood a communist attack and killed 107 enemy at Loc Ninh near the Cambodian border.¹⁰ The communists attacked the Special Forces camp but were thrown back by the defending Vietnamese irregular troops and the reinforcements that were rushed to the scene.

On the other hand, our forces continue to capture many more weapons than they are losing to the enemy. In 1966, we captured only twice as many weapons as we lost. In the first three quarters of 1967 the ratio is 4 to 1 in our favor.

In comparing the performance of the U. S. and Vietnamese Armed Forces, a very important, but often neglected aspect needs to be remembered. It is a fact that the Vietnamese have been in an on-and-off war for a quarter of the century now. For the military personnel, some have been engaged in continuous war activities for one decade or more. The majority of soldiers continue to serve in the Armed Forces long after their scheduled demobilization date.

The tour of duty of U. S. military personnel in Vietnam is, on the other hand, limited to a specified period. Then, there are rest-and-recreation periods for troops from combat zones. U. S. troops also benefit from the fact that they can be rotated (500,000 out of 3,000,000), while 100 per cent of the Vietnamese troops are committed all the time to the war.

It must also be remembered that the Vietnamese Armed Forces personnel have access to few of the conveniences and amenities-- due to inadequate logistical and supply facilities -- otherwise taken as daily fare by the U. S. and Allied troops. Furthermore, the American troops usually have more than twice as much artillery and air support as the Vietnamese Army. This shows up in the kill ratios because many enemy casualties inflicted by the American forces are the result of artillery and air strikes.

9. New York Times, October 23, 1967.

10. New York Times, October 30, 1967.

TABLE 1 - FRIENDLY AND ENEMY DEATHS
1960 - 1967

FRIENDLY DEATHS				
PERIOD	SVN	US	THIRD NATION a/	ENEMY DEATHS
1960 <u>Total</u>	<u>2,223</u>	—		<u>5,669</u>
1961 <u>Total</u>	<u>4,004</u>	<u>11</u>		<u>12,133</u>
1962 <u>Total</u>	<u>4,457</u>	<u>31</u>		<u>21,158</u>
1st quarter	1,066	11		3,955
2nd quarter	1,102	5		5,018
3rd quarter	1,180	6		6,033
4th quarter	1,109	9		6,152
1963 <u>Total</u>	<u>5,665</u>	<u>78</u>		<u>20,575</u>
1st quarter	1,242	17		4,279
2nd quarter	1,330	11		5,418
3rd quarter	1,612	12		5,585
4th quarter	1,481	38		5,293
1964 <u>Total</u>	<u>7,457</u>	<u>147</u>	(1)	<u>16,785</u>
1st quarter	1,156	29		3,734
2nd quarter	1,546	30		3,811
3rd quarter	2,440	31		4,063
4th quarter	2,315	57		5,177
1965 <u>Total</u>	<u>11,243</u>	<u>1,369</u>	(31)	<u>35,446</u>
1st quarter	2,535	72		5,789
2nd quarter	2,851	144		6,092
3rd quarter	2,623	261		10,089
4th quarter	3,234	892		13,466
1966 <u>Total</u>	<u>9,469</u>	<u>5,008</u>	566	<u>55,524</u>
1st quarter	2,701	1,224	191	13,060
2nd quarter	2,095	1,287	90	11,872
3rd quarter	2,148	1,250	106	15,616
4th quarter	2,525	1,247	179	14,976
1967 <u>Total</u> b/	<u>7,766</u>	<u>6,990</u>	809	<u>66,232</u>
1st quarter	2,776	2,126	226	22,756
2nd quarter	2,732	2,773	242	23,389
3rd quarter	2,258	2,091	341	20,087

a/ Monthly data for Third Nation casualties not available prior to 1966. Numbers in parentheses are yearly totals.

b/ Through third quarter only.

CHART 1 -- FRIENDLY AND ENEMY DEATHS
(1960 - 67)




TABLE 2 - NON-FATAL CASUALTIES SUSTAINED BY FRIENDLY FORCES
(1960 - 1967)


PERIOD	SVN a/	US		Third Nation b/
		Hospital Care Required	Hospital Care Not Required	
1960 <u>Total</u>	<u>2,788</u>			
1961 <u>Total</u>	<u>5,449</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	—
1962 <u>Total</u>	<u>7,195</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>37</u>	—
1st quarter	1,512	1		
2nd quarter	1,654	10	9	
3rd quarter	1,958	13	13	
4th quarter	2,071	17	15	
1963 <u>Total</u>	<u>11,488</u>	<u>218</u>	<u>193</u>	—
1st quarter	2,415	33	31	
2nd quarter	2,539	36	35	
3rd quarter	3,030	61	51	
4th quarter	3,504	88	76	
1964 <u>Total</u>	<u>17,017</u>	<u>522</u>	<u>517</u>	—
1st quarter	3,078	124	123	
2nd quarter	3,716	118	106	
3rd quarter	5,183	104	99	
4th quarter	5,040	176	189	
1965 <u>Total</u>	<u>23,118</u>	<u>3,308</u>	<u>2,806</u>	(139)
1st quarter	5,411	229	213	
2nd quarter	5,713	297	273	
3rd quarter	5,260	802	637	
4th quarter	6,734	1,980	1,683	
1966 <u>Total</u>	<u>20,975</u>	<u>16,526</u>	<u>13,567</u>	<u>1,591</u>
1st quarter	5,613	3,791	3,111	541
2nd quarter	4,776	4,436	3,695	235
3rd quarter	4,684	4,134	3,315	304
4th quarter	5,902	4,165	3,446	511
1967 <u>Total</u> c/	<u>21,016</u>	<u>25,016</u>	<u>23,881</u>	<u>1,781</u>
1st quarter	6,946	7,155	6,468	550
2nd quarter	7,438	9,545	8,745	552
3rd quarter	6,632	8,316	8,668	679

a/ The South Vietnamese report only the seriously wounded, while the U. S. report all wounds, including minor ones, that require attention by medical personnel.

b/ Monthly data for Third Nation casualties not available prior to 1966. Numbers in parentheses are yearly totals.

c/ Through third quarter only.

CHART 2 - NON-FATAL CASUALTIES SUSTAINED BY FRIENDLY FORCES
(1960 - 67)



COMBAT CASUALTIES

From the above summary of the major achievements of the Vietnamese Armed Forces on the battlefield, one can readily see that the Vietnamese continue to carry a large share of the fighting against communist aggression. The casualties sustained by them amply testify to their courage and determination in a long and hard struggle. Since 1960 to date, almost 53,000 government troops have died in battle. In addition to military casualties, we have suffered thousands of civilian deaths each year from communist terrorist incidents.

Many reports often compared the level of casualties sustained by American and Vietnamese forces and any weekly decline in Vietnamese combat deaths almost always gave rise to criticisms against the performance of the Vietnamese. It is true that weekly casualty rates do vary depending on where the war activities take place and on the degree of contacts made with the enemy. In a war that has no well defined fronts, one has to seek the enemy out and engage him. Oftentimes, he refuses to engage unless he can be reasonably certain that things would be to his advantage. While the success of a military operation is often measured by the number of enemy contacts and enemy losses, we believe that operations which keep the enemy on the run or which provide basic village security must also be counted as contributing to ultimate success.

If we look at weekly casualties, we will find that American casualties may occasionally exceed Vietnamese casualties in some single weeks. But if we look at the yearly or even monthly totals, we will immediately see that the Vietnamese take far heavier losses overall (Table 1). In 1966, the Vietnamese suffered 9,469 troops killed and the Americans suffered 5,008. In the first 9 months of 1967, the figures are 7,766 and 6,990 respectively.

Comparison of statistics of the wounded in action can be especially misleading and may lend itself to harmful generalizations. For the South Vietnamese report only the seriously wounded requiring hospital care while the United States authorities report all wounds, including minor ones, that require attention by medical personnel (Table 2).

It often seems that there has been a good deal of confusion in the mind of many people concerning the price that

we South Vietnamese have been paying to remain free. The significance of our blood sacrifice becomes much more meaningful when we consider the number of combat dead on a percentage population basis.¹¹ The Vietnamese combat dead total of 53,000 would be equivalent to more than 600,000 combat dead for the United States. And this does not in any way include the many thousand innocent civilians who died from communist terrorist incidents.

PROBLEM AREAS

Due to difficult historical circumstances, the Vietnamese military establishment has been subjected to a challenge that finds no parallel in the history of any young nation. The Vietnamese Armed Forces have to both fight and build at the same time.

We readily acknowledge that there are problems confronting us all the time, though they are not unusual for an emerging nation in the midst of a long and hard war. The Vietnamese Government recognizes the need to correct whatever weaknesses which may be found in the military system and is in fact already embarked upon a vigorous program of major reforms.

We have seen many reports about the problem of "desertions" in the Vietnamese Army. It is true that at one time "desertions" were running at a relatively high rate, but nowhere as high as press reports alleged them to be.¹² However, our military authorities do not often make distinction in the record between "desertion" and "AWOL".

11. Brig. Gen. James D. Hittle. "Saigon's Combat Toll High Based on Vietnamese Population," The San Diego Union, September 18, 1967.

12. For example, Peter Arnett of the Associated Press in his article "South Vietnam's Army Found Increasingly Ineffective" wrote: "Desertions from the South Vietnamese Army are running at the rate of 10,000 a month and are expected to total more than 400,000 by the end of the year". (The Washington Evening Star, Sept. 17, 1967). The reader needs only to be reminded that there are only more than 300,000 persons in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to see how totally fantastic and imaginary this claim is.

According to present regulations of the Armed Forces, any military personnel not reporting to their unit within two weeks after the expiration of their leave is declared a "deserter". But many of those so listed failed to show up at their units for a number of reasons:

(1) Some drop out of their own unit and re-enlist in specialized forces to receive enlistment bonus.

(2) Some who were drafted into the regular army go home to re-enlist in Regional or Popular Forces to be near their families, probably feeling that they are still serving the common cause. However, due to lack of centralized and fast personnel accounting, these men are, nevertheless, recorded as "deserters" from the regular army.

(3) Others simply showed up late at their units, due to poor transportation and communication conditions. Their status of desertion, nevertheless, was already recorded and reported to headquarters.

Practically none of these "deserters" is ever known to have defected to the communists.

So far, this year, "desertions" have been substantially reduced, thanks to stern disciplinary measures instituted earlier in the year by the Vietnamese Government.

Another problem area often mentioned in the press is that of corruption in military ranks. It must be pointed out that for sometime now, the Vietnamese Government has been waging a serious campaign against corruption and is now pushing the efforts forward with great vigor. Recently measures have been taken to discipline incompetent and corrupt officers.

On October 28, a military court¹³ convicted a Lieutenant Colonel and former province chief of corruption and sentenced him to die by firing squad. Accomplices, of whom five were military officers, were also convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from one year to life.

The Vietnamese Government is determined to combat corruption wherever it exists. In the inaugural speech of October 31, 1967, the President of the Republic of Vietnam said: "...In our broad aims to reform society, the major preoccupation of the Government, having high priority in the first months, is the eradication of corruption in the Governmental machinery and in the Armed Forces. This has to be carried out with justice, impartiality, and in broad daylight."

13. Washington Post, October 29, 1967.

MEASURES TO IMPROVE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

Even though little noticed by the Western press, an extensive program for improving the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces has been going on, aiming at three main areas of training, morale and administration.

(1) A comprehensive training program ranging from officer candidates schools to field staff schools has been revised and strengthened.

The National Military Academy at Dalat where career officers are trained has undergone a complete revision in curriculum. The training program now lasts four years. Some 1,000 officer candidates are expected to complete training from now to 1970.

The Reserve Officers School at Thu-Duc has expanded to provide specialized officer training in infantry, artillery, engineering, ordnance, transportation, and signal communications.

A Command and Staff School is taking in waves of officers for training and retraining at both the company-battalion and the brigade-division levels. Besides, a Higher School of National Defense is being planned for training of higher cadres, both military and civilian, who are in the field of national security.

Parallel to an improvement program for officers, there has been under way a similar program aimed at upgrading the quality of non-commissioned officers. This program is designed to enroll in special NCO classes soldiers who have distinguished themselves in battle, and to allow talented NCO's to undertake special training to become commissioned officers, and to establish promotion criteria based on leadership qualities, seniority, battle experience, and merits.

The training curriculum of all levels is to undergo continuous revision to meet actual and contingent combat situations from jungle to conventional warfare. Officers will also be rotated from battle areas to central planning and vice-versa, and from one type of combat terrain to another.

Besides the above programs, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam also have a program for retraining fighting units. Battalions, after a combat period (usually six months), are brought back to the various training centers for reinforcements and for refresher courses in tactics, discipline, and administration.

(2) The morale of the fighting men at all levels is a prime ingredient of strength in all armed forces. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have therefore paid special attention to this area, and specifically to the questions of welfare, promotion, military ethics and discipline.

In order to alleviate the adverse effects of rising costs of living upon the military families, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have instituted necessary programs to reform and develop Post Exchanges to provide military families with needed commodities at a reasonable price, to upgrade existing housing and to establish new settlements where dwelling units are available to military personnel on long-term loans, to provide special facilities for the rehabilitation of disabled and retired veterans.

In the last two years, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam have gradually regularized promotion practices which are to be based on leadership and command ability, seniority, merits and educational achievement.

On-the-field promotions will be awarded to people having achieved extraordinary feats.

An active campaign within the Armed Forces is being waged in order to instill in officers, love and care for their men; in troops, respect and loyalty for their leaders; and in all military personnel, love and care for the people and an attitude of chivalry toward the enemy.

Violations of the military code are readily reprimanded and punished. Disciplinary councils are established up to the brigade level to hear complaints and render justice.

(3) Personnel administration for the Armed Forces is being modernized with the introduction of electronic computers in 1968, which will help central headquarters to keep track of troops numbers, displacements, supply and logistics.

These are the various aspects of an overall program of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to bring about a modern, effective and humane fighting force for peace and nation building in Vietnam.

FOREIGN PRESS COVERAGE OF THE WAR

We do not believe that there are deliberate and concerted attempts on the part of some newsmen to concoct stories that are damaging to the prestige of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. We are inclined to believe that there is a serious imbalance in the foreign press coverage of war activities as far as the Vietnamese Armed Forces are concerned.

The foreign press corps in South Vietnam number more than 400. Of these, some 80% are American. Most, if not all, are English-speaking. Probably very few can speak some Vietnamese. This fact alone can be significant because it points to the overwhelming preference of foreign newsmen to go on U. S.-conducted operations and to cover battles in which U. S. troops are involved. Even in the case of joint operations, foreign newsmen are more likely to stay with United States or English-speaking Allied units than to go along with Vietnamese units for reasons of communication, and possibly because of food habits and other conveniences.

Another facet of the press coverage of the war has to do with the role of the American press corps in Vietnam. American newsmen have the duty to serve the interests of the American public. Like people everywhere, the American people are naturally more interested in reading about their "home boys" than about other fighting men, be they Vietnamese or Allied. This is not to mention the concern of many American families whose loved ones may presently be somewhere in South Vietnam.

The emphasis in reporting on the American part in the war is unfortunate, even though understandable enough, because it has misled the public into believing that the Americans are now doing most of the fighting and the Vietnamese are not doing their part. So we have instances in which a battle that accounts for twenty American casualties gets more extensive coverage in the press, and often exclusively on television, than a battle resulting in hundreds of Vietnamese casualties. At other times, while relatively unsuccessful operations conducted by U. S. forces are extensively covered, major victories by the Vietnamese Armed Forces are given only a few sentences by the press.

On the other hand, in their preoccupation with the prosecution of the war, the Vietnamese may not have paid enough attention to the briefing of foreign newsmen on the details of their operations.

These problems are understandable in the context of the present war in South Vietnam. They are, however, reality situations that need to be brought out in the open for an appreciation of the role and efforts of the Vietnamese Armed Forces at this juncture in our struggle against communism.

MAP LEGEND

◆◆◆◆◆ *NATIONAL BOUNDARY*

----- *PROVINCE BOUNDARIES*

◆◆◆◆◆ NATIONAL BOUNDARY
----- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES

-17 TH PARALLEL

TACTICAL
ZONE I

TACTICAL
ZONE II

TACTICAL ZONE III

TACTICAL
ZONE IV

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A Viet-Nam soldier
prepares to bury
his infant son,
slain
by the Viet Cong

'liberation' or conquest ?

THE STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM



GUERRILLAS TRAIN IN HANOI: North Vietnamese soldiers learn the tactics of jungle warfare, terrorism, sabotage before infiltrating into south.

'LIBERATION' OR CONQUEST?

According to legend, the ancient Greeks defeated Troy by infiltrating the city with soldiers concealed inside a huge wooden horse. Today, many centuries later, North Viet-Nam has devised a more devious modern equivalent of the famous Greek stratagem for use in its war against neighboring South Viet-Nam.

Hanoi's version of the Trojan Horse is the "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam" (NFLSVN)—a mechanism deliberately created to disguise the real nature and purpose of the communist regime's aggressive activities. And Hanoi's hidden soldiers are the Viet Cong guerrillas whom it has trained, armed, supplied and directed as the spearhead of a massive drive to "liberate" the already free South Vietnamese.

Hanoi's ten-year war against South Viet-Nam, in fact, has become a classic illustration of what the communists actually have in mind when they promise to support "national liberation movements" throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Even the most reckless communist revolutionaries realize that it would be foolhardy to admit openly that they regard the terms "liberation" and "conquest" as interchangeable. Thus, the current campaign against South Viet-Nam—according to communist spokesmen—is not aggression, but merely an unavoidably violent stage in the "liberation" process they stand ready to assist in all developing areas. Moreover, according to communist revolutionary theory, violence is fully justified if those being "liberated" refuse to cooperate.



THE INNOCENT SUFFER: Viet Cong mine blows up a bus—14 die and 15 are injured.



AFTER 1954 AGREEMENT split Viet-Nam, Ho Chi Minh (center, top left) used murder, extortion in attempt to conquer south—often with weapons hidden away (below) at time of signing. Backing came from Mao Tse-tung (glorified in Hanoi by a float, above, right).



Communist China, for example, spoke of "liberation" when it launched a sudden invasion of Tibet in 1950. It then proceeded to colonize and dominate the Tibetan people through the oppressive actions of its occupation forces. Thousands of Tibetans subsequently died in valiant uprisings against the invading Chinese, or fled to neighboring countries. The Chinese Communists are now backing North Viet-Nam's campaign against South Viet-Nam.

Communists in Malaya and the Philippines also attempted "liberation" campaigns in the 1950's, using as their model the guerrilla warfare tactics employed by Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung in subjugating Mainland China. But the Malaysians and the Filipinos exposed and defeated the communist insurgents. And the South Vietnamese today are confident of doing the same.

The record shows that the communist North Vietnamese, led by veteran revolutionist Ho Chi Minh, already were planning the "liberation" of South Viet-Nam when they agreed, at the Geneva Conference of 1954, to end hostilities in Indochina and honor South Viet-Nam's new status as a free and independent nation. Hanoi began small-scale guerrilla warfare operations against South Viet-Nam almost immediately, later expanding the offensive into a massive campaign of aggression, terrorism and subversion.

But South Viet-Nam did not succumb. Instead, the country prospered and undertook impressive economic and social development programs. Despite ever-increasing terrorism and harassment—*The New York Times* reported on April 27, 1965—"there has been an upswing in economic activity in the last few months." The Viet Cong have not succeeded in forcing farmers off their land. About 80 percent of the cultivated land is devoted to rice production, and "South Viet-Nam remains a rice-surplus country," according to *The New York Times* report. Output and acreage of rubber—the second major export product—also have been maintained. Cotton textiles—the traditional base for industrial expansion—have become the fastest-growing industry in the country's developing economy.

While the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam, over the last decade, were working to improve

their own lives, the Hanoi regime has openly pursued its expansionist objectives. Ho Chi Minh, in 1959, declared that the communist "revolution" must be brought to the south. Early in 1960, Vo Nguyen Giap, North Viet-Nam's military commander, described Hanoi as "the revolutionary base for the whole country."

Ho and Giap called for the stepping up of the "revolution in the South" at the Communist (Lao Dong) Party congress in Hanoi in September 1960. Creation of a "broad national united front" in the South was outlined and the congress obediently approved a resolution "to liberate South Viet-Nam." Three months later, on December 20, Radio Hanoi announced formation of the "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam" and claimed it represented "patriotic" South Vietnamese, who would lead the fight against the Saigon government.

The front's first public announcement did not, of course, come from its "Trojan Horse" apparatus in South Viet-Nam. It was broadcast by Radio Hanoi on January 29, 1961, and consisted of a 10-point "manifesto." Its basic goals included the overthrow of the Saigon government and the establishment of a "broad national democratic coalition administration." Afterward, it was hoped, North and South Viet-Nam could be combined into one country under Hanoi's control.

This formal unveiling of Hanoi's "national liberation front" was clearly tantamount to an open declaration of war against the Republic of Viet-Nam. Characteristically, however, an attempt was made, and is still being made, to conceal the front's real purposes behind the deliberate obscurity of communist propaganda language.

In communist terminology, for example, "national liberation" actually amounts to "conquest" and the term "liberation forces" refers to subversive elements such as the Viet Cong guerrillas in South Viet-Nam.

The communist front in South Viet-Nam was to create a facade of legitimacy for the Viet Cong terrorists by camouflaging them as "patriotic" defenders of their homeland. Propaganda along these lines, the communists hoped, would attract support from other extremist elements and serve to beguile public opinion in non-aligned countries.



CHARRED RUINS are all the Viet Cong left after "liberating" this woman's village.

It was also supposed to provide North Viet-Nam, and its Chinese and other communist allies, with a plausible excuse for backing the Viet Cong with arms, equipment, personnel and "revolutionary" guidance.


But no amount of propaganda has been able to disguise the barbaric, unprovoked aggression waged by the communists against the people and government of South Viet-Nam. By attempting to accomplish the impossible, moreover, the communists have re-exposed many of their most cherished techniques.

A standard communist revolutionary maxim, for example, is that one of the quickest ways to power in a target country is to stimulate unrest and violence as a means of undermining that country's existing government. Furthermore, if there is no exploitable resistance movement or organization in the target country, one must be created.

In the case of South Viet-Nam, one of Hanoi's first objectives was to foster the illusion that the South Vietnamese people themselves wanted to be "liberated." This was the rationale behind Hanoi's organization of the "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam" in 1960. Front spokesmen immediately sought to associate their group with genuine national interests and aspirations, a tactic they planned to abandon once the organization had gained sufficient influence.

The genuinely patriotic South Vietnamese people were quick to reject this new interference with their efforts to build a prosperous new life of freedom and independence. Their contempt was expressed by identifying the communist front with the Vietnamese word "ma"—meaning ghost, phantom or demon.

But the communists have persisted in their plot to utilize the NFLSVN as a secret base for their infiltration, guerrilla warfare and subversion. They have tried, among other things, to link the front organization to a variety of professional, social, ethnic and religious groups in South Viet-Nam. One of their creations was the "People's Revolutionary Party"—a supposedly legitimate Marxist organization later exposed in captured documents as a subsidiary of the North Vietnamese Communist Party. The communists had intended to use this organization as a cover device for their agents in the NFLSVN.



*COMMUNIST CHINESE weapons , ammunition make up large share of Viet Cong arsenal.
MOTHER AND CHILD were among 24 children, 17 women slain in Viet Cong attack.*



Recognition and support of the front also is provided by foreign communist parties in an effort to give it legitimacy and importance. Front representatives have been received by top officials in communist capitals and have opened "missions" wherever possible. In addition, the front occasionally holds "congresses" and discusses South-Vietnamese domestic affairs in a manner designed to create the impression that it actually represents legitimate elements of the South Vietnamese population.


In March, 1965, in fact, a Hanoi front representative spoke optimistically of the planned formation of a "government of national unity"—mere words, again, since the communists never share authority or rule with anyone except in temporary coalitions. V. I. Lenin, founder of the Soviet Communist party whose revolutionary precepts are still valid for communists everywhere, taught his followers long ago that all alliances with nationalist groups should be regarded as temporary; in fact, they should not even be attempted unless prospects were favorable for eventual communist domination.

This philosophy has been particularly apparent in the history of Vietnamese communist front movements, going back to 1941 when Ho Chi Minh formed the "Viet-Nam Independence Organization." This was projected as a "united front" for both nationalists and communists, but only the communists survived.

Today, officials of Ho Chi Minh's new front, the NFLSVN, pretend to represent authentic nationalist interests in South Viet-Nam but have been identified, one by one, as communist functionaries.

Even the NFLSVN's most carefully worked out "nationalist" proposals cannot stand close scrutiny.

The "agrarian reform" plans listed in the front's program, for example, failed to impress the South Vietnamese because they knew what had been done in North Viet-Nam under the pretext of agrarian reform. The Hanoi regime, following the pattern already set by Communist China, had first liquidated landlords, then ordered special courts and secret police to execute, torture or imprison ordinary farmers whose only crimes had been to resist the regime's efforts to control their lives. Such policies created chaos in rural areas and a drastic reduction of farm






*THE VILLAGE OF TAN HIEP,
a typical community in
the Mekong River delta area
of South Viet-Nam.*



*A SIMILAR DELTA VILLAGE
after a Viet Cong mortar
attack in which 50 men,
women and children died.*





DRAMATIC CLOSE-UP
of Viet Cong guerrillas
searching for survivors of truck
ambush in South Viet-Nam.
Driver (right) lies dead;
a guerrilla pins
down wounded survivor.

DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOMES
by Viet Cong terrorism, Viet-
namese refugees seek safety
from would-be "liberators."
During early 1965, over 200,000
have chosen to start life anew
rather than face continued
fear, extortion, killings.

output. There was near-starvation in many regions. Land "given" to farmers was reclaimed later for the state's collectivized farms, another trick learned from Peking.

The main job of the NFLSVN is to divert attention from Hanoi's actual control of Viet Cong guerrilla operations in South Viet-Nam. But few have been misled by this transparent device.


It has long been known that the communist party of North Viet-Nam controls and directs the Viet Cong both politically and militarily. The party's central committee, which in any communist-ruled country is the apex of power, directs the Viet Cong politically through its "reunification department." Through this department the committee issues directives to the Viet Cong administrative structure in South Viet-Nam, which is headed by the "Central Office for South Viet-Nam."

The central office relays orders to six regional units and a special zone which includes the Saigon area. In each region there is a committee with sections responsible for subversive activities, propaganda, training, military bases, and other functions. Province and district divisions and individual party cells complete the political structure.

Military operations of the Viet Cong are directed by the North Viet-Nam defense ministry and army, closely supervised by the communist party. Military responsibilities include operational plans, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, assignment of individuals and regular units, military communications, and tactical intelligence. The six military regions in the south are the same as those of the Viet Cong political structure.

Under Hanoi's direction, every facet of the Viet Cong guerrilla forces' operations in the south is guided by this integrated political-military apparatus.

Much of the Viet Cong's so-called "war of liberation" has been aimed with cynical brutality against South Vietnamese civilians—the very people whose liberation the communists pretend to seek. Ambush, torture, murder and destruction are favorite Viet Cong stratagems. Men, women and children are killed as they sleep; village homes and schools are razed; buses and trains are bombed. And in this unrestricted campaign to terrorize and intimidate



VIET CONG TERRORISM IS SELDOM PREDICTABLE AND ALWAYS SHOCKING—IT





MAY BE ARMED ATTACK, A HIDDEN MINE, RIOTS, MURDER IN A QUIET RICE PADDY



a people and a nation the Viet Cong have been encouraged, supplied and directed by North Viet-Nam's President Ho Chi Minh and his militant associates for more than ten years.

There is no doubt of Hanoi's deliberate intent to circumvent the Geneva Conference accords it pledged to support in 1954. The accumulated evidence of North Viet-Nam's guilt is overwhelming and the guilt must be shared by the communists in China and those elsewhere who have aided, abetted and praised Hanoi's actions.

This evidence has been presented in various reports, citing specific examples and documented with facts, dates, and pictures:

1. In 1962, the International Control Commission officially assigned to supervise compliance with the Geneva agreements reported there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and men into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversive activities aimed at the overthrow of that country's legal government. Although repeatedly thwarted by communist refusal to permit impartial inspections, the Commission found Hanoi guilty of specific violations of at least four provisions of the Geneva pact.

2. In July, 1964, the government of South Viet-Nam, in an official "white paper," declared: "Hostilities in Viet-Nam have not ceased at any time since 1954. In fact, the communists have all along maintained a state of clandestine war and now there is open aggression against Free Viet-Nam and its people, very seriously threatening the peace of the area."

Furthermore, the white paper added, "the 'controllers' in Hanoi have fomented, directed and ceaselessly supported an immense campaign of subversion against the Republic of Viet-Nam and its population. In this they have always been aided by the other communist countries, particularly Communist China."

3. In February, 1965, the United States of America issued a heavily documented 64-page "white paper" filled with additional facts about North Viet-Nam's aggression in Southeast Asia.

The communist government of North Viet-Nam, the U.S. white paper charged in an intro-

ductory review of the massive evidence presented, "has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Viet-Nam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army."

Recent evidence now indicates that Hanoi may actually be forced to send regular North Vietnamese army units into the south. On April 26, 1965, the government of South Viet-Nam announced that the Second Battalion of the 101st Regiment of North Viet-Nam's 325th Division had been "positively located" in Kontum province, in the South Vietnamese plateau adjacent to the Lao border. The communist soldiers, in regular uniforms, were well disciplined and heavily armed with automatic weapons.

There have been earlier reports of North Vietnamese units operating as such in the south, but these have not been positively confirmed. And the identification of a single North Vietnamese battalion operating as a unit is insufficient to establish whether Hanoi has changed the pattern of infiltration—and decided to support its Trojan horse forces with a regular invading army.

Whatever pattern of infiltration may be used by North Viet-Nam in the future, however, the key point remains the same. It is men sent down clandestinely from the north who constitute a major, and growing, proportion of the Viet Cong's striking power in South Viet-Nam.

A VIETNAMESE SOLDIER shows his contempt for hurriedly erected sign which proclaims Viet Cong "liberation." Viet-Nam's troops have seen the work of the Viet Cong "liberators"—and they are determined to keep their country free from the Hanoi-led enemy.







ARMED FORCES INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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THE EVIDENCE AT


VUNG RO BAY






100 TONS OF WAR CARGO for Viet Cong were brought by steel craft sunk at Vung Ro.





THE EVIDENCE AT VUNG-RO BAY



The magnitude and significance of North Viet-Nam's support to the Viet Cong are demonstrated clearly by the arms dumps found at the edge of the sparkling blue waters of a narrow cove at Vung Ro, in South Viet-Nam.


At least 100 tons of weapons, ammunition, medicines and other supplies have been uncovered.

Inescapable evidence—markings, documents, the types of weapons themselves, and a ship sunk here while carrying arms—shows that these arms were sent by sea from North Viet-Nam.

This discovery must be considered in the light of the history of communist Viet Cong insurgency in South Viet-Nam and the logistical problems facing the communists.

Five years ago, when the Viet Cong began to step up their effort to destroy orderly government in the Republic of Viet-Nam, their weaponry was relatively simple.

They relied upon weapons which had been



buried in South Viet-Nam before the 1954 Geneva accords, arms which they captured from government forces, and crude weapons which the Viet Cong made in secret workshops.

This level of armament was appropriate to their state of organization and immediate objectives at that time.

Viet Cong units were, for the most part, small, on the classical guerrilla pattern. Their chief mission was to intimidate or assassinate administrators, teachers, and other local officials in the countryside.

The Viet Cong have never ceased terrorism, which is in fact their principal day-to-day effort throughout the Republic of Viet-Nam.

As the insurgency went on, however, the Viet Cong formed increasing numbers of units of battalion size, with command structures, armament and communications to support military operations on a much larger scale than guerrilla actions. Improved equipment sent from North Viet-Nam played an important part.



Such forces were utilized for attacks on government outposts and to engage South Vietnamese units. With rare exceptions, however, the Viet Cong continued to avoid protracted clashes with regular army battalions, dispersing when government forces concentrated against them.

The Viet Cong's problems were magnified when, in response to the request of the Vietnamese government, the United States began in 1961 to provide military assistance on a larger scale—helping to improve the equipment, training, and mobility of the government forces.

In the eyes of the Viet Cong, these improvements must have seemed a critical threat to their long-term strategy.

This strategy, made clear in many Viet Cong pronouncements and documents, is to inflict such damage upon the military and administrative structure of South Viet-Nam that fatigue and weariness would eventually lead to acceptance of a coalition government, which they would hope to dominate. They would then attempt to seize absolute power when the time appeared appropriate.

MADE IN CHINA: many weapons, supplies captured at Vung Ro had abbreviated Chinese characters used only in Communist China.





**INTERNATIONAL
INSPECTION:** *members of the
International Control
Commission appointed by the
1954 Geneva Conference to
police the cease-fire between
North and South Viet-Nam
viewed the findings
at Vung Ro.*



The communist regime in Hanoi has sought to turn the scales in favor of the Viet Cong by a massive infusion of men, equipment and supplies from the north.

This is nothing new. From the outset, the Viet Cong insurgency has been dependent for its leadership and specialists upon cadres sent down from the north. Material support was also provided in considerable and increasing quantities.

The size of the Viet Cong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For example, the Viet Cong at present have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. The main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at more than 32,000 personnel—and it was less than 20,000 in 1961.


Supporting the main force units of the Viet Cong are an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each.

During the past year, Hanoi's support for the Viet Cong has taken on a new dimension. Infiltration of cadres appears to have been stepped up significantly during 1964.

North Viet-Nam has also been sending a large volume of weapons of types which had never been seen in South Viet-Nam before—arms of communist-bloc design, most of them manufactured in Communist China.

These weapons include many advanced types—rapid-fire automatic small-arms of the type now standard in Communist China and other communist-bloc forces, heavy machine guns, and large-caliber recoilless rifles. An increasing number of weapons from external communist sources have been seized by South Vietnamese troops. These include such weapons as 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machine guns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and anti-tank mines.

A new family of Chinese communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in Viet Cong hands. These include the 7.62 semi-automatic carbine, 7.62 light machine guns, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and compatible ammunition—manufactured in Communist China in 1962—were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien province. Similar weapons have since been seized from the Viet Cong in each of



ANTI-TANK ROCKETS manufactured in Communist China following Soviet design were among military supplies shipped by Hanoi to the Viet Cong and captured by Vietnamese forces.

OVER A MILLION ROUNDS
of ammunition were uncovered in
several Viet Cong caches.





SECRET
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the four corps areas of South Viet-Nam. Also captured have been Chinese communist anti-tank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

The communists have also sent down simpler, older weapons for the use of their lower-level guerrilla forces.

None of these arms—except for a few of the heavier weapons which are copies of American models—can use ammunition which the Viet Cong might capture in South Viet-Nam.


Thus, although the Viet Cong have acquired higher fire-power and standardized weapons for the main-force units, they have become even more heavily dependent upon the north for ammunition.

Hanoi's methods to provide the supplies have been shown clearly in Vung Ro Bay. On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored, just offshore, along the coast of Phu Yen province. Fighter planes that approached the vessel met machine-gun fire from the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese air force strike was launched against the vessel and Vietnamese government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Viet Cong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Viet Cong aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Viet-Nam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia, as well as North Viet-Nam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.

Wooden-handled grenades, of the type used by the Chinese communists during the Korean war, bore Chinese communist arsenal markings and dates as late as May 1964.


A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi disclosed the following supplies and weapons:



DOCUMENTS ON SHIP sunk by the Vietnamese Air Force established its origin beyond any reasonable doubt. Among them were these official North Vietnamese Army and Navy documents (above and left).



MORTAR SHELLS, still in packing crates, were destined for Viet Cong terrorists.



SUPPLIES bore labels from Communist China and several other communist countries.

- approximately 1,000,000 rounds of small ammunition
- more than 1,000 stick grenades
- 500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges
- 2,000 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition
- 500 anti-tank grenades
- 500 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle ammunition

- more than 1,000 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition

- one 57mm recoilless rifle

- two heavy machine guns

- 2,000 7.95 Mauser rifles

- more than 100 7.62 carbines

- 1,000 submachine guns

- 15 light machine guns

- 500 rifles

- four tons of medical supplies (with labels from North Viet-Nam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).


The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North Viet-Nam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Viet-Nam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese Army.

Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Viet-Nam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the International Control Commission and representatives of the press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo—a dramatic confirmation of earlier evidence that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering the Republic of Viet-Nam.

The International Control Commission itself had issued a special report as early as June 1962, stating that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and personnel into South Viet-Nam to carry out subversion aimed at overthrowing the government. The Commission found

3,500 RIFLES AND SUBMACHINEGUNS were among the thousands of weapons of advanced design captured at Vung Ro.



Hanoi had specifically violated four provisions of the 1954 Geneva accords.

The full scale of the discovery at Vung Ro Bay is not yet known—11 caches have been discovered so far. There are grounds for speculation that denial to the Viet Cong of such a quantity of arms and ammunition might cause a significant setback to their effort.

The Viet Cong—and the North Vietnamese regime—also have other grounds for concern. During recent months Viet Cong units have chosen on a number of occasions to remain in position for protracted engagements with government forces.

In a few such clashes, the Viet Cong have gained some success. But overall, government units have won the upper hand. During the month of January, for example, eight such large-scale engagements took place, and government forces defeated the Viet Cong in all eight.

Whatever the immediate military effect upon the Viet Cong, the discovery of the arms dumps at Vung Ro Bay has shattered decisively any doubts about the scale and importance of Hanoi's support to the Viet Cong.

As the U.S. State Department pointed out in the documented report, released at the end of February 1965, presenting massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression:

"It establishes beyond question that North Viet-Nam is carrying out a carefully conceived plan of aggression against the South. It shows that North Viet-Nam has intensified its efforts in the years since it was condemned by the International Control Commission. It proves that Hanoi continues to press its systematic program of armed aggression into South Viet-Nam.

"This aggression violates the United Nations Charter. It is directly contrary to the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 to which North Viet-Nam is a party. It shatters the peace of Southeast Asia. It is a fundamental threat to the freedom and security of South Viet-Nam."

The United States has repeatedly stated its readiness to reduce its military involvement in South Viet-Nam—if aggression from Hanoi is checked and peace restored. But Americans will not abandon friends who are fighting for their freedom. It is now up to Hanoi to choose a continued, increasingly destructive war—or peace.







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THE PATH TO VIET-NAM

by William P. Bundy
*Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



THE PATH TO VIET-NAM

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The Path to Viet-Nam: A Lesson in Involvement

by William P. Bundy

*Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*¹

You have asked me to speak this morning on the topic "The Path to Viet-Nam: A Lesson in Involvement." I welcome this opportunity to review the whole history of United States actions with respect to Viet-Nam—speaking personally as to the period up to 1961, during which I had no policy responsibility, and of course necessarily more officially for the period since January of 1961.

Quite apart from the enormous present importance of South Viet-Nam and our actions there, I have often reflected—as one who was tempted to become a professional historian—that the story of Viet-Nam, of Southeast Asia, and of American policy there forms an extraordinarily broad case history involving almost all the major problems that have affected the world as a whole in the past 25 years. For the strands of the Viet-Nam history include the characteristics of French colonial control compared to colonial control elsewhere; the end of the colonial period; the interrelation and competition of nationalism and communism; our relation to the Soviet Union and Communist China and their relationships with each other; our relation to the European colonial power, France; and—at least since 1954—the relation of Viet-Nam to the wider question of national independence and self-determination in Southeast Asia and indeed throughout Asia.

The Viet-Nam story is above all a product

of Vietnamese aspirations and decisions. In the early period French decisions were crucial. But I am sure you want me to focus on the American policy role, how and why we became involved, and how we reached the present position. This should not be a purely historical discussion, of course, and I know that you have natural and valid concerns that focus particularly on the decisions of the last 2 years and on the decisions that confront us now and in the future. So I shall touch briefly on these, fully expecting that your questions will be quite largely in this area.

For our mutual convenience in analysis, I have tried to isolate 10 major American decisions going back to 1945. It is not for me to defend, or necessarily to justify, policy decisions taken before 1961, but it is essential to examine them if one is to understand the present position.

Decisions During French Colonial Era

Our first decisions affecting Viet-Nam were in 1945. President Roosevelt deeply believed that French colonial control in Indochina should not be restored, and this attitude led us in the closing months of the war against militarist Japan to adopt what the French have always considered an obstructive attitude toward their return. Separately, we briefly gave modest assistance to Ho Chi Minh as an asset against the Japanese. This story, like so much else in the whole record, is best told in Robert Shaplen's thoughtful "The Lost Revolution."

Second, when the French had returned, we stood aside. In the critical year 1946, and over the next 3 or 4 years, the French first made the Fontainebleau agreement and then broke it, so

¹ Address prepared for delivery before the 20th annual congress of the National Student Association at College Park, Md., on Aug. 15 (press release 177). Because of time limitations, Mr. Bundy read excerpts from the address, and the complete text was made available to the audience. For additional remarks made by Mr. Bundy on this occasion, see Department of State press release 177-A dated Aug. 15.

that major conflict started. It has often been argued, by Shaplen among others, that we could have exerted greater pressure, perhaps even effective pressure, on the French to go through with the Fontainebleau agreement and to set Viet-Nam on the path to early independence. The failure to exert such pressure may thus be construed as a negative policy decision on our part.

I myself am skeptical that we could conceivably have affected the unfortunate course that the French followed in this period. If it is argued that our overwhelming Marshall Plan aid to France should have given us leverage, then it must be pointed out at the same time that the Marshall Plan became operative only early in 1948 and that by then the die was largely cast. Moreover, I doubt very much if the proud and bruised French nation would have responded even if we had tried to act to end the colonial era, as we did to a major extent with the Dutch in Indonesia.

In a very real sense, the tragedy of Viet-Nam derives from the fall of France in 1940 and all the understandable emotions aroused by that event among French leaders, including notably De Gaulle himself. Restored control in Indochina was a badge, however mistaken, for a France that meant to be once again a world power. Although it may be argued that we should at least have tried, I doubt if this deep French attitude could have been shaken by anything we did or said and least of all by anything said or done in connection with the wise and right policy of helping France to get back on her feet.

The third period of American decision began in 1950, just before our involvement in the defense of Korea against Soviet-inspired aggression. The Communists had just taken control in China and entered into the 1950 alliance with the Soviet Union. Communism did then appear to our policymakers as something approaching a monolith, and we came to see the French stand in Indochina as part of a global attempt to repel Communist military adventures. In essence, we acted on two lines of policy between 1950 and 1954: on the one hand, economic and growing military assistance to the French; on the other hand, steady urging that the French proceed rapidly to grant real independence to Indochina, both for its own sake and as the best means of preventing Communist control.

Here it has been argued that we did too much assisting or at least too little urging. I find myself sympathetic to this point of view, as indeed it was expressed at the time by such wise men as Edmund Gullion, who served in Viet-Nam and much later became our distinguished Ambassador in the Congo from 1961 to 1963.

Yet, again I am not sure whether a different United States policy in this period could have brought about the desired result of a France first successfully waging a costly and bloody war to defend Viet-Nam and then granting it independence. Again, French attitudes and actions had deep roots in the still shaky situation of France and in the combination of a valid concern for the Communist threat and a desire to maintain a major French presence and hold in Indochina. Even if the French had acted wisely in every respect in this period, they might have been able to achieve nothing more than a division of the country into Communist and non-Communist areas. The vital difference might have been that valid non-Communist nationalism in Viet-Nam would have had a chance to stand on its feet and develop respected leaders before 1954; and if this had happened the whole later story might have unfolded in a very different way.

As it was, the spring of 1954 brought French defeat, in spirit if not in military terms, and left non-Communist nationalism in Viet-Nam almost bankrupt.

The Period of the Geneva Conference

The period of the Geneva Conference is the fourth period of American decision. That is a complex story, well told from a relatively detached viewpoint by Anthony Eden, now Lord Avon, in his memoirs.

We played a critical backstage role at Geneva. We maintained the possibility of military intervention, which, many observers at the time believe, played a crucial part in inducing the Soviets and the Communist Chinese alike to urge Hanoi to settle for a temporary division of Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel and for an independent Cambodia and Laos. And we began to lay the groundwork for SEATO, as part of the effort to show strength and to convince Communist China that it would not have a free hand in Southeast Asia.

Yet we were unwilling to participate fully

in the framing of the Geneva accords,² apparently because our policymakers did not wish to associate themselves in any way with a loss of territory to Communist control. So the Geneva accords were framed largely between Hanoi, Communist China, and the Soviet Union on the one side and the French, who were under the urgent time pressure of their domestic politics, on the other. In the end we confined ourselves to saying two things:³

(a) That we would view any aggression in violation of the accords with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

(b) That we took the same position on the reunification of Viet-Nam that we took in other "nations now divided against their will"—meaning, then and now, Germany and Korea—and that we would continue to seek unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations. In effect, we thus interpreted the election provision as providing for a free determination by the people of Viet-Nam as to whether they wished reunification and in that sense endorsed it consistent with the similar positions we had taken in Germany and Korea.

All sorts of things could be said about our decisions in that period. Some are of the view that we should have taken military action and tried to nail down at least a clear military division of Viet-Nam, or even to defeat Ho; I myself think that by the spring of 1954 that course would have been untenable.

It may also be argued—and I do not know the contemporary factors—that, involved as we already were by preceding decisions, we should have participated forthrightly in the making of the accords and lent our weight to them from the outset, declaring right then that we meant to stand—with the French if possible, but alone if necessary—in supporting non-Communist nationalism in South Viet-Nam. We would then have acted as we had done for non-Communist nationalism in Korea, although without its being necessary or desirable for us to put continuing forces on the ground as we had to do in the face of the conventional threat to Korea.

² For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, vol. I. Department of State publication 6446, p. 750.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.

At any rate, in July 1954 a new national entity came into being in South Viet-Nam with what appeared at the time to be extraordinarily small chances of survival. At the very end, the French, with a degree of American pressure, installed the stanchly nationalist Diem as Prime Minister, hardly thinking that he would survive and looking rather to a short period in which the French could exit with some semblance of grace and let nature take its course.

Treaty Commitments in Southeast Asia

The fifth set of American decisions came in this setting and indeed overlapped the period of the Geneva Conference. The first aspect of these decisions was our leading role in the formation of the SEATO treaty,⁴ signed at Manila in September of 1954 and ratified by our Senate in February 1955 by a vote of 82 to 1. In the SEATO treaty South Viet-Nam and its territory were specifically included as a "protocol state"; and the signatories specifically accepted the obligation, if asked by the Government of South Viet-Nam, to take action in response to armed attack against South Viet-Nam and to consult on appropriate measures if South Viet-Nam were subjected to subversive actions. The Geneva accords had, of course, already expressly forbidden aggressive acts from either half of Viet-Nam against the other half, but there had been no obligation for action by the Geneva participating nations. SEATO created a new and serious obligation extending to South Viet-Nam and aimed more widely at the security of the Southeast Asian signatories and the successor states of Indochina.

The second aspect of our decisions at this period was an evolving one. In late 1954 President Eisenhower committed us to furnish economic support for the new regime,⁵ in which Diem was already showing himself tougher and more able than anyone had supposed possible. And in early 1955, without any formal statement, we began to take over the job of military assistance to South Viet-Nam, acting within the numerical and equipment limitations stated in the Geneva accords for foreign military aid.

In short, in the 1954-55 period we moved

⁴ For text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and protocol, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

⁵ For text of President Eisenhower's letter, see *ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 735.

into a major supporting role and undertook a major treaty commitment involving South Viet-Nam.

These decisions, I repeat, are not mine to defend. In the mood of the period, still deeply affected by a not unjustified view of monolithic communism, they were accepted with very wide support in the United States, as the vote and the debate in the Senate abundantly proved. And the Senate documents prove conclusively that there was full understanding of the grave implications of the SEATO obligations, particularly as they related to aggression by means of armed attack.

The important point about these decisions—and a point fervently debated within the administration at the time, according to many participants—is that they reflected a policy not merely toward Viet-Nam but toward the whole of Southeast Asia. In essence, the underlying basic issue was felt, and I think rightly, to be whether the United States should involve itself much more directly in the security of Southeast Asia and the preservation of the largely new nations that had come into being there since World War II.

There could not be the kind of clear-cut policy for Southeast Asia that had by then evolved in Northeast Asia, where we had entered into mutual security treaties individually with Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China. Some of the Southeast Asian countries wished no association with an outside power; others—Malaya, Singapore, and the northern areas of Borneo, which were not then independent—continued to rely on the British and the Commonwealth. So the directly affected area in which policy could operate comprised only Thailand, the Philippines, and the non-Communist successor states of Indochina—South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Yet it was felt at the time that unless the United States participated in a major way in preserving the independence and security of these nations, they would be subject to progressive pressures by the parallel efforts of North Viet-Nam and Communist China.

The judgment that this threat of aggression was real and valid was the first basis of the policy adopted. Two other judgments that lay behind the policy were:

(a) That a successful takeover by North Viet-Nam or Communist China of any of the directly affected nations would not only be seri-

ous in itself but would drastically weaken and in a short time destroy the capacity of the other nations of Southeast Asia, whatever their international postures, to maintain their own independence.

(b) That while we ourselves had no wish for a special position in Southeast Asia, the transfer of the area, or large parts of it, to Communist control achieved by subversion and aggression would mean a major addition to the power status of hostile and aggressive Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese regimes. It was believed that such a situation would not only doom the peoples of the area to conditions of domination and virtual servitude over an indefinite period but would create the very kind of aggressive domination of much of Asia that we had already fought the militarist leaders of Japan to prevent. It was widely and deeply believed that such a situation was profoundly contrary to our national interests.

But there was still a third supporting judgment that, like the others, ran through the calculations of the period. This was that the largely new nations of Southeast Asia were in fact valid national entities and that while their progress might be halting and imperfect both politically and economically, this progress was worth backing. To put it another way, there was a constructive vision of the kind of Southeast Asia that could evolve and a sense that this constructive purpose was worth pursuing as a matter of our own ideals, as a matter of our national interest, and as a realistic hope of the possibilities of progress if external aggression and subversion could be held at bay.

These I believe to have been the bedrock reasons for the position we took in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia at this time. They were overlaid by what may appear to have been emotional factors in our attitude toward communism in China and Asia. But the degree of support that this major policy undertaking received at the time went far beyond those who held these emotions. And this is why I for one believe that the bedrock reasons I have given were the true and decisive ones.

So the United States became deeply involved in the security of Southeast Asia and, wherever it was welcomed, in the effort to achieve economic progress as well. And the undertaking to support South Viet-Nam economically and militarily and through the protocol to the SEATO treaty must be seen as a part of the wide

view that the choice was between fairly deep involvement in Southeast Asia or standing aside in the face of an estimate that to do so would cause Communist Chinese and North Vietnamese power and domination to flow throughout the area.

The Issue of Free Elections

The unfolding of this policy between 1954 and 1961 is a tangled and difficult story. Mistakes, even serious mistakes, were undoubtedly made then and later. Some of these, many believe, were in our economic and particularly in our military assistance policies in Viet-Nam: and it has been argued—to me persuasively—that we should have at least tried harder to counter the growing authoritarian trends of the Diem regime in the political sphere.

What was not a mistake, but the logical corollary of the basic policy, was the handling of the provision in the Geneva accords that called for free elections in 1956. It has been argued that this provision, which was certainly badly drafted, called for a single nationwide election, with reunification assumed. Our interpretation—that what was meant was in effect a plebiscite as to whether reunification was desired—has strong support in reason and the recollections of Geneva participants. What cannot be disputed is that the determination was to be free; the word appears three times in the article of the accords.

Much hindsight nonsense has been written about what took place in 1956 on this issue, and if any of you are planning a thesis subject. I commend to you the examination of the *contemporary* sources and discussion. You will, I think, find clear confirmation that by 1956 two propositions were accepted: first, that South Viet-Nam, contrary to most expectations in 1954, was standing on its own feet and had demonstrated that the makings of a valid non-Communist nationalism existed there; and, second, that North Viet-Nam—which had gone through a period of harsh repression in 1955 and 1956 in which Bernard Fall estimates that nearly 50,000 political opponents were killed outright—would not conceivably have permitted any supervision or any determination that could remotely have been called free.

In the face of these facts, Diem refused to go through with the elections, and we supported him in that refusal. Incidentally, I am told that we urged that he put the monkey on Hanoi's

back and force them to refuse supervision or free conditions—as they would surely have done. Diem proudly rejected this advice, which did not change what would have happened but did leave the elements of a propaganda argument that still rages. It is, I repeat, hindsight nonsense, and I would only quote two contemporary statements—one by the then junior Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, the other by Professor Hans Morgenthau.

Kennedy categorically rejected “an election obviously stacked and subverted in advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken their own pledges under the agreement they now seek to enforce.”

And Morgenthau referred to the tremendous change between 1954 and 1956 and the “miracle” of what had been accomplished in South Viet-Nam. He went on to say that the conditions for free elections did not exist in either North or South Viet-Nam and concluded:

Actually, the provision for free elections which would solve ultimately the problem of Viet-Nam was a device to hide the incompatibility of the Communist and Western positions, neither of which can admit the domination of all of Viet Nam by the other side. It was a device to disguise the fact that the line of military demarcation was bound to be a line of political division as well.

Unfortunately, the promise of South Viet-Nam in 1956 was not realized in the next 5 years. In the face of Diem's policies, discontent grew—much as it grew in the same period in Korea under Rhee. As in Korea, that discontent might well have led to an internal revolution in a more or less traditional Asian manner. This is not what happened. Despite all that romantics like [Jean] Lacouture may say, what happened was that Hanoi moved in, from at least 1959 onward (Bernard Fall would say from 1957), and provided a cutting edge of direction, trained men from the North, and supplies that transformed internal discontent into a massive subversive effort guided and supported from the outside in crucial ways.

The realistic view, then and later, has been well summarized by Roger Hilsman in his recent book (with which, incidentally, I have serious factual differences on the period after 1963). Hilsman puts it thus (page 471 of his book):⁶

⁶ *To Move a Nation* (Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1967).

Vietnam, in truth, was in the midst of two struggles, not one. The guerrilla warfare was not a spontaneous revolution, as Communist propaganda would have it, but a contrived, deliberate campaign directed and managed from Hanoi. But Vietnam was also in the throes of a true revolution, a social and nationalistic revolution very much akin to the "new nationalisms" that pervaded both the Congo crisis and Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia. Even while the struggle went on against the Viet Cong, power was in the process of passing from the French-educated mandarin class to representatives of the new nationalism, the Buddhists, the students, and the "young Turks" in the military.

Continued Engagement in Southeast Asia

This, then, was the situation as it confronted the Kennedy administration in January of 1961. All this is history. Reasonable men can and do differ about what was done. But those who believe that serious mistakes were made, or even that the basic policy was wrong, cannot escape the fact that by 1961 we were, as a practical matter, deeply engaged in Southeast Asia and specifically in the preservation of the independence of South Viet-Nam.

President Kennedy came to office with a subversive effort against South Viet-Nam well underway and with the situation in Laos deteriorating rapidly. And for a time the decisions on Laos overshadowed Viet-Nam, although of course the two were always intimately related.

In Laos, President Kennedy in the spring of 1961 rejected the idea of strong military action in favor of seeking a settlement that would install a neutralist government under Souvanna Phouma, a solution uniquely appropriate to Laos. Under Governor [W. Averell] Harriman's astute handling, the negotiations finally led to the Geneva accords of 1962 for Laos;⁷ and the process—a point not adequately noticed—led the United States to a much more explicit and affirmative endorsement of the Geneva accords of 1954, a position we have since consistently maintained as the best basis for peace in Viet-Nam.

In Viet-Nam, the situation at first appeared less critical, and the initial actions of the Kennedy administration were confined to an increase in our military aid and a small increase of a few hundred men in our military training personnel, a breach—it may be argued—to this extent of the limits of the Geneva accords but fully justified in response to the scale of North

Vietnamese violation of the basic noninterference provisions.

Although the details somewhat obscured the broad pattern, I think any fair historian of the future must conclude that as early as the spring of 1961 President Kennedy had in effect taken a seventh United States policy decision: that we would continue to be deeply engaged in Southeast Asia, in South Viet-Nam, and under new ground rules, in Laos as well.

This was *not*—despite the hindsight strawman recently erected by Professor [John Kenneth] Galbraith—because President Kennedy believed at all in a monolithic communism. Professor Galbraith forgets a good deal, and notably the Vienna meeting of June 1961 in which President Kennedy set out deliberately to work with the Soviet Union for the Laos settlement—even as at the very same time he dispatched Vice President Johnson to visit Viet-Nam and Thailand and in effect to reaffirm our courses of action there. The total pattern of United States policy toward Communist countries under both President Johnson and President Kennedy belies the Galbraith thesis.

No, neither President Kennedy nor any senior policymaker, then or later, believed the Soviet Union was still united with Communist China and North Viet-Nam in a single sweeping Communist threat to the world. But President Kennedy did believe two other things that had, and still have, a vital bearing on our policy.

First, he believed that a weakening in our basic resolve to help in Southeast Asia would tend to encourage separate Soviet pressures in other areas.

James Reston has stated, on the basis of contemporary conversations with the President, that this concern specifically related to Khrushchev's aggressive designs on Berlin, which were pushed hard all through 1961 and not laid to rest till after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. At any rate, President Kennedy clearly did believe that failure to keep the high degree of commitment we had in Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia had a bearing on the validity of our commitments elsewhere. As Theodore Sorensen has summarized it (page 651 of *Kennedy*): "... this nation's commitment (in South Viet-Nam) in January, 1961 . . . was not one that President Kennedy felt he could abandon without undesirable consequences throughout Asia and the world."

Secondly, President Kennedy believed that the Communist Chinese *were* a major threat

⁷ For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

to dominate Southeast Asia and specifically that a United States "withdrawal in the case of Viet-Nam and in the case of Thailand might mean a collapse in the entire area."⁸ Indeed, President Kennedy in one statement expressly supported the "domino theory."⁹

My own view, based on participation and subsequent discussion with others, is that the underlying view of the relation between Viet-Nam and the threat to Southeast Asia was clear and strongly believed throughout the top levels of the Kennedy administration. We knew, as we have always known, that the action against South Viet-Nam reflected deeply held ambitions by Hanoi to unify Viet-Nam under Communist control and that Hanoi needed and wanted only Chinese aid to this end and wished to be its own master. And we knew, as again we always have, that North Viet-Nam would resist any Communist Chinese trespassing on areas it controlled. But these two propositions were not then, as they are not now, inconsistent with the belief that the aggressive ambitions of Communist China and North Viet-Nam—largely North Vietnamese in old Indochina, overlapping in Thailand, Chinese in the rest of Southeast Asia—would surely feed on each other. In the eyes of the rest of Southeast Asia, certainly, they were part of a common and parallel threat.

So, in effect, the policy of 1954-61 was reaffirmed in the early months of 1961 by the Kennedy administration. Let me say right here I do not mean to make this a personal analysis of President Kennedy nor to imply any view whatever as to what he might or might not have done had he lived beyond November of 1963. But some untrue things have been said about the 1961 period, and I believe the record totally supports the account of policy, and the reasons for it, that I have given.

Stemming the North Vietnamese Threat

We then come to the eighth period of decision—the fall of 1961. By then, the "guerrilla aggression" (Hilsman's phrase) had assumed truly serious proportions, and morale in South Viet-Nam had been shaken. It seemed highly doubtful that without major additional United States actions the North Vietnamese threat could be stemmed.

President Kennedy took the decision to raise the ante, through a system of advisers, pilots, and supporting military personnel that rose

gradually to the level of 25,000 in the next 3 years.

I do not think it is appropriate for me to go into the detail of the discussions that accompanied this decision. Fairly full, but still incomplete, accounts have been given in various of the books on the period. What can be seen, without going into such detail, is that the course of action that was chosen considered and rejected, at least for the time being, the direct introduction of ground combat troops or the bombing of North Viet-Nam, although there was no doubt even then—as Hilsman again makes clear—that the bombing of North Viet-Nam could have been sustained under any reasonable legal view in the face of what North Viet-Nam was doing. Rather, the course of action which was adopted rightly stressed that the South Vietnamese role must remain crucial and primary.

In effect, it was decided that the United States would take those additional actions that appeared clearly required to meet the situation, not knowing for sure whether these actions would in fact prove to be adequate, trying—despite the obvious and always recognized effect of momentum and inertia—not to cross the bridge of still further action, and hoping strongly that what was being undertaken would prove sufficient.

Political Change in South Viet-Nam

This was the policy followed from early 1962 right up to February of 1965. Within this period, however, political deterioration in South Viet-Nam compelled, in the fall of 1963, decisions that I think must be counted as the ninth critical point of United States policy-making. It was decided at that time that while the United States would do everything necessary to support the war, it would no longer adhere to its posture of all-out support of the Diem regime unless that regime made sweeping changes in its method of operation. The record of this period has been described by Robert Shaplen and now by Hilsman. Undoubtedly, our new posture contributed to the overthrow of Diem in November 1963.

I do not myself think that we could in the

⁸ A reply by President Kennedy during his press conference on June 14, 1962.

⁹ For transcript of an NBC interview with President Kennedy on Sept. 9, 1963, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1963, p. 499.

end have done otherwise, but the important historical point is that our actions tended to deepen our involvement in South Viet-Nam and our commitment to the evolution of non-Communist nationalism, always foreseen to be difficult, that would follow the overthrow of Diem.

Unfortunately, the fall of Diem, while it had overwhelming popular support in South Viet-Nam, failed to produce an effective new government. For a year and a half South Viet-Nam wallowed in political confusion; and power finally passed, with the agreement of civilian political leaders, to the Thieu-Ky military-led government of June 1965.

This political confusion was disheartening, but it was not surprising. For South Viet-Nam had never been trained by the French to govern itself, and above all, it was faced with steadily rising North Vietnamese and Viet Cong terrorist and military action. Intensification of that action began almost at once after the overthrow of Diem and demonstrated—if it needed demonstrating—that the struggle was not over Diem, despite Communist claims and honest liberal qualms, but was an attempt to destroy non-Communist nationalism of any sort in South Viet-Nam.

In early 1964 President Johnson expressly reaffirmed all the essential elements of the Kennedy administration policies publicly through every action and through firm internal directives. It is simply not true to say that there was any change in policy in this period toward greater military emphasis, much less major new military actions. Further actions were not excluded—as they had not been in 1954 or 1961—but President Johnson's firm object right up to February 1965 was to make the policy adopted in late 1961 work if it could possibly be done, including the fullest possible emphasis on pacification and the whole political and civilian aspect.

The summer of 1964 did bring a new phase, though not a change in policy. The situation was continuing to decline, and North Viet-Nam may have been emboldened by the trend. Certainly, infiltration was rising steadily and, as we now know more clearly, began to include substantial numbers of native North Vietnamese. But, more dramatically, American naval ships on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin were attacked, and there were two responding United States attacks on North Vietnamese naval bases.

This led President Johnson to seek, and the Congress to approve overwhelmingly on Au-

gust 7, 1964, a resolution¹⁰—drafted in collaboration with congressional leaders—that not only approved such retaliatory attacks but added that:

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

U.S. Decisions Based on Overall View

So things stood through the election period. But as 1964 drew to a close, the situation was moving steadily downward in every respect, both military and political. A review of policy was undertaken, analyzing three basic choices: to continue the existing policy with every improvement that could be devised within its limits; to take new and major military measures, while adhering to the same basic objectives that had been followed all along; or to move toward withdrawal.

From late November onward, these choices were intensively examined, even as the military threat grew, the political confusion in Saigon deepened, and all the indicators recorded increasingly shaky morale and confidence not only in South Viet-Nam but throughout the deeply concerned countries of Southeast Asia. By late January, it was the clear judgment of all those concerned with policy and familiar with the situation that the first choice was rapidly becoming no choice at all—and not, to use the phrase of one commentator, a “constructive alternative.” To “muddle through” (that commentator's phrase) was almost certainly to muddle out and to accept that South Viet-Nam would be turned over to Communist control achieved through externally backed subversion and aggression.

This was a straight practical judgment. It ran against the grain of every desire of the President and his advisers. But I myself am sure it was a right judgment—accepted at the time by most sophisticated observers and, in the light of reflective examination, now accepted, I be-

¹⁰ Public Law 88-408; for text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964. p. 268.

lieve, by virtually everyone who knows the situation at all at first hand.

There were, in short, only two choices: to move toward withdrawal or to do a lot more, both for its military impact and, at the outset, to prevent a collapse of South Vietnamese morale and will to continue.

And as the deliberations continued within the administration, the matter was brought to a head by a series of sharp attacks on American installations in particular. These attacks were serious in themselves, but above all, they confirmed the overall analysis that North Viet-Nam was supremely confident and was moving for the kill. And as they thus moved, it seemed clear that they would in fact succeed and perhaps in a matter of months.

Let me pause here to clear up another current historical inaccuracy. The basis for the successive decisions—in February to start bombing; in March to introduce small numbers of combat forces; and in July to move to major United States combat forces—was as I have stated it. It depended on an overall view of the situation and on an overall view that what had been going on for years was for all practical purposes aggression—and indeed this term dates from late 1961 or early 1962 in the statements of senior administration spokesmen.

But there is a separate point whether, as has sometimes been asserted, it was the United States alone which unilaterally changed the character of the war in the direction of a conventional conflict. It is alleged that Hanoi was adhering to a tacit agreement that, so long as we did not bomb North Viet-Nam, Hanoi would not send in its regulars, at least in units.

Multiple and conclusive evidence which became available from the spring of 1965 onward seems to me to refute these contentions. As has been repeatedly made public over the past 2 years, we know that one North Vietnamese regiment entered South Viet-Nam by December 1964, and we know that several other regiments entered in the spring of 1965 on timetables of infiltration that can only have reflected command decisions taken in Hanoi prior to the beginning of the bombing.

From the standpoint of the basis for U.S. decisions, this evidence simply reinforces the February picture that Hanoi was moving for the kill. Native North Vietnamese, alone or in regular units, were in themselves no more and no less aggressive than the earlier native South Vietnamese who had gone north and become

North Vietnamese nationals. The point is that Hanoi, as we suspected then and later proved, had taken major steps to raise the level of the war before the bombing began.

As to any tacit agreement, these facts alone seem to disprove that there ever was one. Moreover, students of North Vietnamese behavior, and especially of the recent major captured North Vietnamese documents, would in any event find such an allegation hard to credit. Is it not far more reasonable to conclude that Hanoi preferred to conceal its hand but was prepared at all times to put in whatever was necessary to bring about military victory—and that the regular units were simply a part of that policy, introduced after they had run out of native southerners and wanted to maintain and step up the pressure?

But this historical point is less important than the fundamental elements of the situation as it stood at the time. On the one hand, all of what I have earlier described as the bedrock elements still remained: a strong Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese threat to Southeast Asia, a crucial link between the defense of South Viet-Nam and the realization of that threat, and the validity of non-Communist nationalism, whatever its imperfections, in South Viet-Nam and in the other nations of Southeast Asia.

Moreover, the wider implications for our commitments elsewhere appeared no less valid than they had ever been. Viet-Nam still constituted a major, perhaps even a decisive, test case of whether the Communist strategy of "wars of national liberation" or "people's wars" could be met and countered even in the extraordinarily difficult circumstances of South Viet-Nam. Then as now, it has been, I think, rightly judged that a success for Hanoi in South Viet-Nam could only encourage the use of this technique by Hanoi, and over time by the Communist Chinese, and might well have the effect of drawing the Soviets into competition with Peking and Hanoi and away from the otherwise promising trends that have developed in Soviet policy in the past 10 years.

Finally, it was judged from the outset that stronger action by us in Viet-Nam would not operate to bring the Soviet Union and Communist China closer together and that the possibility of major Chinese Communist intervention could be kept to a minimum so long as we made it clear at all times, both by word and deed, that our objective was confined solely to freeing South Viet-Nam from external inter-

ference and that we did not threaten Communist China but rather looked to the ultimate hope of what the Manila Declaration,¹¹ of last fall, called "reconciliation and peace throughout Asia."

On the other hand, it was recognized from the outset that the taking of these new major military measures involved heavy costs and hazards. The South Vietnamese still had to play the crucial role in military security and, above all, in political and economic development and stability. A greater American role was bound to complicate South Vietnamese evolution. It was bound to increase the scale of the war and to cost significantly in lives and very heavily in resources. Even though the casualties and damage of the war remain far below what was suffered in Korea, war is never anything but ugly and brutal.

The balance was struck, after the most careful deliberation, in favor of the course that has since been followed. The key elements in the policy were stated in President Johnson's Baltimore speech of April 1965,¹² and the major combat-force commitment was explained in the President's statement of July 28, 1965.¹³ These have been the cornerstones of policy, and they have been elaborated and explained repeatedly and at length by all senior administration spokesmen.

Cornerstones of U.S. Policy

In essence:

(a) Our objective remained solely that of protecting the independence of South Viet-Nam from external interference and force. We declined, and still decline, to threaten the regime in North Viet-Nam itself or the territory and regime of Communist China.

(b) We indicated in April of 1965 that we were prepared for discussions or negotiations without condition, and we have relentlessly pursued our own efforts to enter into meaningful discussions as well as following up on a host of peace initiatives by others. Unfortunately, Hanoi has clung firmly to the objective of insuring a Communist takeover of South Viet-Nam and has refused to enter into any fruitful discussions. Indeed, Hanoi has rejected any discussions whatever—initially unless its basic objective was accepted in advance through the so-called "third point," more recently unless we agreed to a complete cessation of the

bombing without any responsive action on their part. Hanoi's philosophy toward negotiation has now become authoritatively available, particularly in the section on "fighting while negotiating" in the captured remarks of one of the North Vietnamese leaders, Comrade Vinh.

(c) We continued to place every possible emphasis on the crucial nonmilitary aspects of the conflict, greatly strengthening our own contribution to the essentially South Vietnamese task of restoring stability and control in the countryside and working for the welfare of the people.

(d) Militarily, our actions were directed to proving to North Viet-Nam that its effort to take over the South by military force must fail and to extending and enlarging the areas in which the vital business of bringing real security and peace to the countryside could go forward with all the strength we could hope to give it. The total effort in the South remained primary, even as the bombing of military targets in the North was carried on—initially to demonstrate resolve but always and basically to make Hanoi's infiltration far more difficult and costly and to prevent levels of new men and equipment that could only, in the arithmetic of guerrilla warfare, multiply many times over, for each addition from North Viet-Nam, the requirement for forces in the South.

(e) We encouraged the South Vietnamese in their own resolve to move to a constitutional basis of government, a process set underway formally by Prime Minister Ky in January of 1966 and followed since that time in the face of all the difficulties and dangers of attempting to create such a basis in a country without political experience and ravaged by terrorism and by guerrilla and conventional military action.

(f) We encouraged the South Vietnamese at the same time to proceed on the track that has now become reconciliation, the holding out to members of the Viet Cong of the possibility of reentering the political life of their country under peaceful conditions. In essence, we seek and would accept a fair determination of the will of the people of South Viet-Nam along the lines well summarized by Ambassador Goldberg's Chicago speech of May 12, 1967.¹⁴

¹¹ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 734.

¹² For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

¹³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 264.

¹⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, June 5, 1967, p. 838.

These were the South Vietnamese aspects of our policy. But then, as previously, the policy was seen in the wider context of the future of Southeast Asia. So it was that President Johnson lent our strong support in April of 1965 to the development of regional cooperation and of economic projects created through Asian initiative. By this vital element in our policy, we made clear again that our underlying objective was to do what we could to assist in the constructive task of bringing about a Southeast Asia of cooperative and independent nations, whatever their international postures might be.

We had a security job to do in Viet-Nam and were joined over time by five other area nations in supplying military forces to do that job. And we are assisting Thailand against a concerted Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese effort at external subversion, an effort begun—to keep the record straight—as early as 1962 and clearly and definitively by December 1964, before our major decisions in Viet-Nam. Our SEATO and ANZUS undertakings remain firm.

But we looked beyond these, and we must still look beyond these, to the whole question of the future of Southeast Asia and to the role that we can play in assisting the nations of the area to consolidate their national independence and to improve the welfare of their people.

This, then, is a barebones account of "The Path to Viet-Nam." Even within its own terms, it may omit what others would include. And, long as it may seem, it is still incomplete in two respects that it would take far too much time to cover.

First, it is plainly inadequate to focus solely on our policies toward Viet-Nam or even toward Southeast Asia as a whole. Those policies are intimately related to the rest of Asia; to the implications of Asian developments for other areas and, in the last analysis, for our own national security; and to our central world purpose—the creation of an international order of independent states.

Secondly, I have tried to isolate what I consider to have been the major policy decisions. Obviously, policy is not just a matter of single decisions, however fully considered. A vast number of lesser policy decisions have accompanied these basic ones, and the way in which a basic policy is carried out in the end affects its substance. I have not tried to cover, for example, decisions on the balance of effort within South

Viet-Nam, decisions on particular negotiating proposals, decisions on the pace and nature of the bombing of North Viet-Nam, or the subtle and difficult problem, over the years, of United States influence toward political progress in the South. I know full well that these are areas in which many of you undoubtedly hold strong views. I welcome discussion of them.

"The Lesson in Involvement"

What, then, is "the lesson in involvement"?

—Is it that we have been trapped into a difficult situation by a series of lesser decisions taken with no clear view of their implications?

—Is it that we should never have become engaged in Southeast Asia?

—Is it that we should never have attempted to support South Viet-Nam?

—Is it that, having supported South Viet-Nam in certain respects (including a treaty) and having become deeply engaged in Southeast Asia, we should nonetheless have decided—or should now decide—to limit the actions we take or even to withdraw entirely?

The first question seems to me both separate and difficult. At some point in the history I have recited we became committed, deliberately and by formal constitutional process, to the support of the freedom of South Viet-Nam from external interference. That commitment included a strong treaty obligation, and that is a clear part of the story. But what is perhaps more to the point is that great powers must face two central points:

(a) As Irving Kristol has pointed out in his recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, the very definition of a great power is that not only its actions but the cases in which it declines to act have major consequences. At every stage in the Viet-Nam story, it has seemed clear to the leaders of this country that not to act would have the gravest effects. This is the way that successive choices have appeared to four successive Presidents.

(b) The second point that a great power cannot escape is that its actions in themselves affect the stakes. When great powers commit themselves, by treaty and by a total course of conduct extending over many years, an element of reliance comes into being, both within the area and within other areas in which commitments have also been undertaken.

Yet, all this being said, I do not think one

can conclude that because we said or did *a*, we must necessarily say or do *b*—in an old phrase of Bismarck's. So I, for one, do not believe that the "lesson in involvement" is that we are the prisoners of history.

Rather, I think we should be focusing on the second, third, and fourth questions I have listed above.

These are big questions, and if I have tried to do anything today it is to stress that the matter has really been looked at for at least the last 13 years in this kind of larger framework. The policies followed today are, as they must be, the policies of this administration. No one can say whether another administration would have done the same. What can be said is that the underlying viewpoint and analysis of factors have been largely similar throughout the last 13 years, if not longer.

This does not prove, of course, that this analysis has been correct. The United States has no divine dispensation from error, and the most that your leaders at any time can do is to exert the best human judgment and moral sense of which they are capable. I, for one, am convinced that this has been done at all stages.

In essence, the question is not capable of geometric proof. Like all policy, it is a judgment. Our bet with history has been that Southeast Asia does matter, that the independence of South Viet-Nam crucially affects Southeast Asia, and that non-Communist nationalism in Southeast Asia and in Viet-Nam has in it the seeds of a peaceful, progressive, and stable area that can take its place in a world at peace.

Independence of Southeast Asia

Other factors enter in, as I have tried to summarize, and despite their variations from time to time remain of major general importance. But it is primarily from the standpoint of Southeast Asia that I would like to close my remarks today. How do the bets I have described look today?

Southeast Asia surely matters more than ever. A region which may have held as few as 30 million inhabitants in 1800—and which is carried under the heading of "peripheral areas" in some textbooks on East Asia—now holds more than 250 million people, more than Latin America and almost as much as the population of Western Europe. The resources of this area are large, and its people, while not yet

capable of the kind of dramatic progress we have seen in the northern parts of Asia, have great talent, intelligence, and industry. Its geographical location, while it should not be in the path of great-power collisions, is crucial for trade routes and in other respects.

From the standpoint of our own security and the kind of world in which we wish to live, I believe we must continue to be deeply concerned to do what we can to keep Southeast Asia from falling under external domination and aggression that would contribute to such domination. And I believe also that we have a wider concern in doing what we can, and as we are wanted, to assist sound programs on an individual country or regional basis and to improve the welfare of the peoples of the area. And I do not think that you can do the latter unless the former is achieved.

The second part of our bet is that the independence of South Viet-Nam critically affects Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam and its 15 million people are important in themselves, but they assume an additional importance if the judgment is accepted that a success for aggression there would drastically weaken the situation in Southeast Asia and indeed beyond. That judgment cannot be defended solely by reference to the dynamics of major aggressive powers and their prospective victims in the past. I myself believe that those parallels have validity, but the question is always what Justice Holmes called "concrete cases." In this concrete case I think the underlying judgment has been valid and remains valid today.

None of us can say categorically that the Communist Chinese would in due course move—if opportunity offered—to dominate wide areas of Southeast Asia through pressure and subversion. But that is what the Chinese and their maps say, and their Communist doctrine appears to add vital additional emphasis. It is what they are doing in Thailand today and, through local Communist allies, in Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore. And it is what they would like to do in Indonesia again.

Surely Adlai Stevenson was right that the threat of Communist China is not so fanciful that it should not serve as a valid assumption of policy. And we can be more categorical that Hanoi intends to dominate at least the successor states of Indochina and would move rapidly to this end if it were to get practical control of South Viet-Nam.

Perhaps the hardest point for some to grasp is the psychological impact of a development such as the fall of South Viet-Nam in this setting. As to Hanoi and Peking, judgment and past experience point to the conclusion that it would greatly encourage them to push further. As to the threatened nations, the view of their leaders is a matter of record. All over Southeast Asia, whatever the posture of the individual nation, the great body of responsible opinion—and I invite you to check this against any firsthand account—accepts the judgment stated only the other day by the independent and nonaligned Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew: “I feel the fate of Asia—South and Southeast Asia—will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Viet-Nam.”

I could multiply that quotation 10 times over in public statements and 10 times more in private statements. As Drew Middleton of the New York Times reported last June after a trip in the area:

Despite some misgivings, non-Communist leaders from Tokyo to Tehran largely support United States policies in South and Southeast Asia.

This does not mean that every nation accepts our choice of military actions. Some would have us do more, some less. But it does lead to the clear conclusion that our own view accords with the deep sense in Southeast Asia, and indeed elsewhere in Asia, that the struggle in South Viet-Nam is crucial to the independence and continued ability to work for its people of each and every nation for a wide area.

Lastly, there is the question whether a new Southeast Asia is in fact being built and can be developed. On this point, surely the developments of the last 5 years, and particularly the last 2 years, have been vastly encouraging. Where Indonesia in 1965 was drifting rapidly to Communist control and practical alinement

with Peking, it now stands on a staunchly nationalist basis, abandoning the threat to its neighbors and seeking to work out the chaotic economic problems left by Sukarno—with the multilateral help of ourselves and others. Regional cooperation within Southeast Asia, and among Asian nations as a whole, has taken great and historic strides. And it is the widely accepted view in the area—which I share—that these developments would have been far less likely if we had not acted as we did in 1965 and if Communist force had thus taken over in South Viet-Nam.

So all over Southeast Asia there is today a sense of confidence—to which Drew Middleton again testified from his trip. Time has been bought and used. But that confidence is not solid or secure for the future. It would surely be disrupted if we were, in President Johnson's words, to permit a Communist takeover in South Viet-Nam either through withdrawal or “under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.”¹⁵ If, on the contrary, we proceed on our present course—with measured military actions and with every possible nonmilitary measure and searching always for an avenue to peace—the prospects for a peaceful and secure Southeast Asia now appear brighter than they have been at any time since the nations of the area were established on an independent basis.

In short, I think the stakes are very grave indeed. The costs are large, and it is clear that we must steel our national capacity and resolve to continue in a tough struggle and still do those things that we must do to meet our problems at home. I find it impossible to believe that we do not have the national capacity and resolve to do both.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

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FACT SHEET: VIETNAM

Questions and Answers

Most American servicemen on duty in Vietnam understand clearly why they are there. To them the issue is as simple as this—the Communists must be stopped somewhere, and that “somewhere” is in Vietnam. As Captain J. P. Spruill, U.S. Army, expressed it in a letter to his wife

from Vietnam, where he later died, “We have drawn the line here and the America we all know and love best is not one to back away.”

To assist in your understanding of our involvement in the Vietnam war, here are some questions widely asked, with brief and factual answers.

1. Why is the United States involved in the distant struggle going on in Vietnam?

Vietnam isn't the first distant place where Americans have fought. In two World Wars and in the Korean conflict, Americans went to far lands overseas to help other peoples fighting for their freedom and independence. President Johnson, in reaffirming the pledges of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to help defend “this small and valiant nation,” has stressed that American military forces are in South Vietnam because “the United States is determined to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression.”

Incidentally, many foreigners crossed the Atlantic to help us in our own struggle for independence—men such as Marquis de Lafayette, Baron von Steuben, and Tadeusz Kosciuszko. France supplied almost half the troops and a fleet for the final major battle at Yorktown.

2. Isn't the war in Vietnam really a civil war?

It is true that the fighting involves the Vietnamese primarily. But the war in Vietnam is no civil war. A 14-nation conference at Geneva in 1954 agreed that newly-independent Vietnam should be divided into two parts—North Vietnam for followers of Communist leaders and South Vietnam for the other Vietnamese. North Vietnam has since gone its own way—the way of a typical Communist dictatorship. South Vietnam became a republic.

From Hanoi, the capital of Communist North Vietnam, the Communist regime directs, controls, and supplies the war against South Vietnam, which is carried on by Communist guerrillas called the Viet Cong. South Vietnam is not in a state of rebellion; it is merely struggling to defend itself against the aggression from North Vietnam.

3. How did the Vietnamese people react to the division of their country in 1954?

Under the terms of the armistice agreement, the people were allowed to move north or south, whichever they preferred. Some 90,000 Vietnamese chose to go north to live under communism. Ten times as many—almost one million—fled to South Vietnam to escape the Communist dictatorship.

4. Was the division of Vietnam in 1954 intended to be permanent?

No. The immediate concern of the Geneva delegates was to stop the fighting. This was accomplished. The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference states: "The military demarcation line [at the 17th parallel] is provisional and should not in any way be considered as constituting a political or territorial boundary." The Declaration also called for "free general elections by secret ballot" in July 1956 to allow the Vietnamese people to decide for themselves their political future and thus reunify the country.

5. Why weren't the elections held?

Using force and terrorism, the Communist regime in Hanoi quickly liquidated those in the North who opposed it. Because the people of the more populous northern half of the country had no choice but to vote as Hanoi dictated, the "free general elections" called for by the Geneva accords were obviously impossible. Consequently, South Vietnam refused to participate in the reunification referendum. Explaining this stand on 16 July 1955, President Diem pointed out that his country was pledged to the goal of "unity in freedom and not in slavery. . . . We do not reject the principle of free elections as peaceful and democratic means to achieve that unity. However, if elections constitute one of the bases of true democracy, they will be meaningful only on the condition that they are absolutely free. Now, faced with a regime of oppression as practiced by the Viet Minh [originally a national independence force, this was under Communist control], we remain skeptical concerning the possibility of fulfilling the conditions of free elections in the North."

Hanoi has subsequently made it increasingly clear that it has no interest in elections or other reunification arrangements it cannot control. It would like to see the country reunited—but only under Communist control. That is why it launched its campaign of military aggression and political subversion to subjugate the free South Vietnamese people.

6. Is the United States a party to the 1954 Geneva accords?

The United States withheld its formal approval of the accords because of certain reservations, in particular the lack of a provision that the United Nations supervise the free elections throughout Vietnam. The American representative, however, stated that the United States would

do nothing to disturb the agreements and that it would regard "any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern as seriously threatening international peace and security."

7. Why do the Communists call the war in Vietnam a "war of national liberation"?

For strategic and propaganda purposes. The Communists have pledged their support for "national liberation movements" throughout the world in order to disguise their aggressive activities and thus avoid arousing widespread opposition and censure. They try to exploit existing national revolutionary movements and to create one where none exists, as it suits their purposes.

Vietnam is a classic example. The Communists joined and eventually gained control of the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), which overthrew French rule after World War II. In 1960 the Hanoi regime deliberately created the "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" as a cover for its aggression and to create the illusion that the Viet Cong campaign was truly local in character and not directed by the Communists in the North.

Communist attempts to "liberate" Malaya and the Philippines after World War II failed, but they conquered Tibet in 1950 under the guise of "liberating" that unfortunate country.

8. Has South Vietnam held any free elections?

Yes. A referendum on 23 October 1955 allowed the people to choose their form of government. The country became the Republic of Vietnam. On a number of occasions since then the South Vietnamese people have voted in national elections. As recently as 30 May 1965, elections by secret ballot were held throughout South Vietnam for provincial and municipal councils.

9. On what grounds are North Vietnam and Communist China blamed for the aggression in South Vietnam?

When Vietnam was partitioned in 1954, thousands of trained Communist insurgents were ordered to remain in South Vietnam, where Communist arms and ammunition were hidden, and await orders from Hanoi. These men formed the hard core of the guerrilla forces recruited from all parts of the country. The orders from Hanoi soon came, and the aggression of North against South began.

As the struggle went on, in varying degrees of intensity, more and more evidence of Hanoi's and Peking's involvement piled up—captured weapons made in Communist China, documents identifying units of the North Vietnamese army fighting with the guerrillas, letters found on captive Viet Cong telling how they had infiltrated into South Vietnam from the North.

Hanoi tried to make the guerrilla fighting appear to be a genuine insurrection in the early years but now takes

full responsibility for the Viet Cong. The Chinese Communists are not officially connected with the war, but they talk very much like partners in it.

10. Has Hanoi admitted sending troops into South Vietnam?

Yes, but they claim that their army units are "volunteers," just as Communist China called the troops it sent into Korea by the million to fight U.N. forces "volunteers."

11. In what ways has the United States assisted South Vietnam?

The people of South Vietnam have had the sympathy and support of the American people since 1954. The first U.S. aid was provided to resettle the hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Communist North, and economic aid and advice have continued to flow from the United States. When South Vietnam's national survival was threatened by the invading Communist guerrillas, the United States also provided military equipment and advisers. As Hanoi's aggression has increased, so has U.S. military support for South Vietnam, which now includes American combat forces.

The United States and the Republic of Vietnam, in the Declaration of Honolulu issued jointly on 8 February 1966, pledged to work for "a true social revolution" in Vietnam, a revolution to wipe out injustice and privation. The United States "will give special support to the work of the people of that country to build even while they fight. We have helped and we will help them—to stabilize the economy—to increase the production of food—to spread the light of education—to stamp out disease." Thus the United States is committed to an expanded program of nonmilitary aid, training assistance, and advice to South Vietnam.

12. If Vietnam is as important to the free world as people say, why don't other free nations share the burden of the fighting there?

The United States is not the only supporter and defender of South Vietnam. More than 40 nations are providing or have pledged military, economic, and technical assistance. Another divided Asian country—South Korea—is contributing substantially, knowing from experience how important it is to stop Communist aggression. Australia and New Zealand have sent military forces.

13. How much of South Vietnam is under Viet Cong control?

This question cannot be answered precisely, but the Viet Cong control far smaller proportions of the land and the population than they claim. Controlling an area and holding it are two different things. At the approach of Government forces, the Viet Cong can simply melt away into the jungle from areas they claim to control. The Viet Cong have failed to generate much popular support

in the towns and cities. They are more successful in the thinly populated countryside where intimidation is relatively simpler. Defections and voluntary surrenders by members of the Viet Cong have taken place during 1966 at a substantially higher rate than during 1965.

14. How do the Viet Cong manage to establish their control?

By force and terror—by assassination, torture, and kidnapping. In 1964 alone, at least 1,500 local officials who resisted Viet Cong demands were kidnapped or murdered.

15. Do the Viet Cong attack only South Vietnamese soldiers and civilian officials?

By no means. They also attack teachers, agricultural technicians, health teams—anybody, in fact, who is working to improve social and economic conditions in South Vietnam. About 11,000 civilians were killed, wounded, or kidnapped by the Viet Cong in 1964 alone. Total civilian casualties in South Vietnam now stand at well over 60,000.

16. Is anything being done to lessen the influence of the Viet Cong in rural areas?

The Government of South Vietnam is taking the social revolution to the countryside, where 85% of the people live, in order to better the life of the villagers and peasants and win their confidence and support. Revolutionary Development Cadres of young Vietnamese are trained and sent into villages and hamlets for a period of several months. They help organize the defenses against the Viet Cong and provide medical, educational, and agricultural assistance.

17. Why is the United States so deeply involved in the war in Vietnam?

The United States has increased its military support of South Vietnam only as Hanoi has increased its aggression. The United States is in South Vietnam to carry out a promise made in 1954 to help that country build and develop in peace and freedom, as the Geneva agreements provided. Although a substantial part of South Vietnam's resources and manpower had to be used in fighting off the Viet Cong, the country's peaceful development went forward steadily. Then tens of thousands of North Vietnamese Communists entered the Viet Cong struggle and the picture changed. The Communists made their objective plain: to drive the United States out of South Vietnam, and then to conquer the country for communism. It was then that President Johnson reaffirmed the solemn commitment of the United States to support the people of South Vietnam against aggression from the North.

18. Does that mean that the United States is out to destroy North Vietnam?

No. President Johnson put it this way: "We do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet

a foot of any territory. But we insist, and we will always insist, that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South, or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision. And they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it."

19. What about U.S. bombing in North Vietnam?

Limited air attacks by the South Vietnamese and U.S. Air Forces on military targets in North Vietnam hamper the large-scale infiltration from the North. Also, they are a warning and a reminder that—as Secretary of State Dean Rusk said—"there are no longer sanctuaries for aggression."

20. Why is South Vietnam so unstable politically?

Modern representative government as we know it is still in the process of being developed in South Vietnam. The people are sharply divided on the basis of religion, culture, and region, and these divisions—between Buddhists, Catholics, Montagnards, and others—are reflected in the political thinking. Despite political friction and rivalries, the South Vietnamese have a strong sense of national unity and are, on the whole, united in their opposition to communism as a solution to their political problems.

21. Is it our goal to establish an American-type state in South Vietnam?

No. The United States supports free elections in South Vietnam to give the South Vietnamese a government of their own choice. We will abide by whatever choice they make freely at the polls.

22. Will the war continue until one side or the other achieves a clear-cut military victory?

This is up to Hanoi and its supporters in Peking. The war was started by the North and could be ended by the North at any time. All that is necessary is for Hanoi to withdraw its forces and order a halt to the guerrilla warfare and subversion being carried on by its Viet Cong agents. Secretary of State Rusk expressed it in these words: "We ask only that they cease their aggressions, that they leave their neighbors alone."

23. What stands in the way of a negotiated peace?

This is a question that can only be answered by Hanoi. President Johnson has repeatedly proclaimed that the

United States is ready to begin unconditional peace discussions "at any place, at any time," and with any government.

As a step toward peace, the United States suspended its air attacks on military installations in North Vietnam for a brief period in May 1965 and from the Christmas season of the same year until the end of January 1966. During the latter period the United States made an unprecedented diplomatic effort to find a peaceful settlement. Hanoi's response to this was "tragically negative," in the words of Secretary of State Rusk.

"Shortly after Christmas," Secretary Rusk continued, "we were in touch with all the governments of the world, more than 115 of them, as well as with his Holiness the Pope, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council of NATO, the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Six special Presidential envoys visited 34 capitals, and personal communications from the President went to the chiefs of government of many more." When this massive effort at quiet diplomacy failed as a result of the scornful rejection by the Communist leaders of North Vietnam, the United States placed the matter before the United Nations Security Council for open debate.

24. Does this mean that hopes for peace in southeast Asia must be abandoned?

Not at all, so far as the United States is concerned. Nor is it the intention of South Vietnam and its other allies. The processes of diplomacy, said Secretary Rusk, "will continue in full operation, publicly and privately, directly and indirectly, in order that any possibility of peace can be explored and tested."

However, the United States and South Vietnam are determined that Communist aggression shall not succeed. It is hoped that once Hanoi is convinced of this, the way to a peaceful solution will be cleared. "I pray every night," President Johnson said, that "the day will come when others will be willing to accept our proposals and join us in our hope of satisfying these problems and dealing with these differences by talking instead of fighting."

25. When can we expect the war in Vietnam to end?

That is up to Hanoi. As President Johnson told the Congress, "the days may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as long as aggression commands us to battle." Commenting on this statement, Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson said, "In this I feel that the President has the support of the overwhelming mass of the American people. If this is clearly understood by Hanoi, peace can quickly come. If it is not yet understood, the struggle will be longer and harder, but nevertheless peace inevitably will come."

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ARMED FORCES INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FACT SHEET:

WHY VIETNAM

New Armed Forces Film Outlines U.S. Policy

Why Vietnam, a 32-minute, 16mm sound film in black and white, has been produced by Armed Forces Information and Education for U.S. military personnel. The film has also been cleared for public non-profit showing, when Service needs have been met.

The motion picture opens with President Johnson addressing the American people and the world at large on 28 July 1965 and elaborates on the basic points he set forth. Scenes showing the struggle in Vietnam illustrate and explain the U.S. position as set forth by the President.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk explains the numerous attempts on the part of the United States and other nations to bring about a cease-fire in Vietnam. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara gives assurance that the United States seeks no wider war.

Answering the question so widely asked, WHY VIETNAM?, the film makes these basic points:

- U.S. forces in South Vietnam are there to fulfill a solemn pledge of assistance against Communist aggression.
- We will not surrender and we will not retreat.
- We have learned from bitter experience that appeasement is an invitation to further aggression.
- We are ready at all times to negotiate a peaceful and honorable settlement.

Prints will be ready for distribution from Armed Forces Film libraries on and after the following dates:

Army (Continental and Overseas)	10 December 1965
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Navy (Regular Use)	1 February 1966
Air Force (Commanders Call)	1 February 1966
Marine Corps	1 December 1965

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A civilian or Reserve organization may borrow a print of *Why Vietnam* for public non-profit showing from one of the Armed Forces Film libraries serving the state or

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No civilian requests can be honored by Air Force sources prior to 1 March 1966, when Air Force showings will have been largely completed. On and after that date, requests for all states should be sent to:

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Prints of *Why Vietnam* may be purchased from DU-ART Film Laboratories, Inc., 245 W. 55th Street, New York, for approximately \$40.00 per copy.

ARMED FORCES PAMPHLETS GIVE FACTS ABOUT THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM

Following are current publications issued by Armed Forces Information and Education, which pertain to the current struggle in Vietnam:

DoD Gen-14 Aggression from the North

DoD Gen-16
DoD Gen-18
DoD FS-19
DoD FS-21

The Evidence at Vung Ro Bay
Vietnam: Four Steps to Peace
U.S. Policy on Vietnam
The U.S. Commitment to Freedom

FOR COMMANDERS

Vol. 4, No. 21 "Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia." President Johnson's Address at John Hopkins University. Baltimore, Maryland, 7 April 1965

Vol. 4, No. 23 "The Most Important Battle of All," an address by President Johnson to

the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists, at the White House, 13 May 1965

Vol. 5, No. 3

"The U.S. Commitment to South Vietnam," a Statement by President Johnson at his news conference at the White House, 28 July 1965



ARMED FORCES INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FACT SHEET:

U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

This fact sheet quotes recent significant statements by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara regarding Viet-Nam. U.S. policy on Viet-Nam, as shown in these excerpts, is completely consistent with our basic foreign policy since World War II.

We Americans believe in the right of peoples everywhere to determine their own destinies, and we are ready to support any nation that asks our aid in repelling Communist aggression. This explains our aid to Greece and Turkey in the years following World War II; it explains our role in the Korean war, as well as our involvement in Viet-Nam.

PRESIDENT REAFFIRMS U.S. COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIET-NAM

In a televised press conference on July 28, 1965, President Johnson reaffirmed our position on Viet-Nam. Extracted here are basic points from his statement:

Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one. But it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime—in two World Wars and in Korea—Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring

safety, and weakness does not bring peace.

And it is this lesson that has brought us to Viet-Nam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Viet-Nam—at times with understandable grievances—have joined in the attack on their own Government. But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Viet-Nam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic domination of communism.

And there are great stakes in the balance.

Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves alone, resist the growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism. Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection. In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened. And an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

* * * * *

What are our goals in that war-stained land?

First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power.

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.

We are ready now, as we have always been to move from the battlefield to the conference table. . . .

And in this pursuit we welcome and we ask for the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. And if the

United Nations and its officials or any one of its 114 members can, by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and gratitude of the United States of America.

* * * * *

And as battle rages, we will continue, as best we can, to help the good people of South Viet-Nam enrich the condition of their life—to feed the hungry, and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase his crops and the worker to find a job.

It is an ancient but still terrible irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are really united in the simple, elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil. . . . I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire . . . not as the price of peace, for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost—but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

* * * * *

And let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units. But I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets of a hundred towns in every state in this Union, working and laughing and building and filled with hope and life. And I think I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow. And this is the most ago-

nizing and the most painful duty of your President.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy we must have the courage to resist or we'll see it all—all

that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams of freedom, all—all will be swept away on the flood of conquest.

So, too, this shall not happen. We will stand in Viet-Nam.

SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK CITES 4 STEPS TO PEACE IN VIET-NAM

In authorizing combat missions for our ground forces in Viet-Nam, the President acted to meet his constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief. He has recognized the obligations of this nation under the Southeast Asia Treaty, which the Senate approved by a vote of 82-1. He has acted under the joint resolution of August 1964, which passed the Senate by a vote of 88-2—and passed the House with no opposing vote. This resolution expresses our national readiness—as the President determines—“to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States” and “all necessary steps, including the use of armed force” to help Viet-Nam and Southeast Asian members of the SEATO who ask for help to preserve their freedom.

The President has acted on the unanimous advice of the American leaders in Saigon and his senior civil and military advisers in Washington.

He has acted in full consultation with the Government of South Viet-Nam.

And he has acted on his own considered judgment of what is necessary at this time to stop aggression.

This decision—like all of our decisions in Viet-Nam—is open to review by Members of the Congress and open to reversal if it does not have their support. But the leaders of the Congress have been

kept in close touch with the situation, and no such prospect should stimulate the hopes of enemies or the fears of friends.

Our friends in Viet-Nam know, and we know, that our people and our troops must work and fight together. Neither of us can do the work of the other. And the main responsibility must always be with, and is fully accepted by, the South Vietnamese.

* * * * *

The people of Viet-Nam long for peace. And the way to peace is clear. Yesterday the Foreign Minister of South Viet-Nam set forth the fundamental principles that can provide a “just and enduring peace.” Those principles, in summary, are:

- An end to aggression and subversion.

- Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny “in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources.”

- As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the Government of South Viet-Nam and the nations that have come to its aid to defend South Viet-Nam; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam.

● And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam.

* * * * *

And even while these hopes of peace are blocked for now by aggression, we on our side and other nations have reaffirmed our deep commitment to the peaceful progress of Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia as a whole. In April the President proposed to the nations of Asia and to the United Nations that there be constructed a new program of support for Asian efforts. . . .

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE McNAMARA OUTLINES ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN VIET-NAM

Following is an excerpt from a statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, August 4, 1965, before the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations:

The Government of South Viet-Nam's strategy with which we concur, is to achieve the initiative, to expand gradually its area of control by breaking up major concentrations of enemy forces, using to the maximum our preponderance of air power, both land and sea-based.

The number of "fixed-wing" attack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Viet-Nam will increase many fold by the end of the year. Armed helicopter sorties will also increase dramatically over the same period, and extensive use will be made of heavy artillery, both land-based and sea-based. At the same time our air and naval forces will continue to interdict the Viet Cong supply lines from North Viet-Nam, both land and sea.

Although our tactics have changed, our

So let us call again on other nations—including the Soviet Union—to join in turning this great region of the world away from the waste and violence of a brutal war. . . .

Beyond the terror of the aggressor and the firmness of our defense, we must, nevertheless, look to the day in which many new dams will be built, and many new schools opened, and fresh opportunities opened to the peoples of Southeast Asia. For we must look beyond the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and over the hard path of resistance to the broad plain of progress which must lie ahead for the peoples of Southeast Asia.

objective remains the same. We have no desire to widen the war. We have no desire to overthrow the North Vietnamese regime, seize its territory or achieve the unification of North and South Viet-Nam by force of arms. We have no need for permanent military bases in South Viet-Nam or for special privileges of any kind.

What we are seeking through the planned military buildup is to block the Viet Cong offensive, to give the people of South Viet-Nam and their armed forces some relief from the unrelenting Communist pressures—to give them time to strengthen their government, to re-establish law and order, and to revive their economic life which has been seriously disrupted by Viet Cong harassment and attack in recent months.

We have no illusions that success will be achieved quickly, but we are confident that it will be achieved much more surely by the plan I have outlined.