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Congressman George Bush's
Vietnam Christmas Party
1967



RICE HOTEL
GRAND BALLROOM
DECEMBER 23, 1967



A
Message
from the
Congressman

I want to thank each family attending this Christmas party. It is somewhat sad for you — and for me also — that your loved one cannot be home for this holiday season. But we want to honor these men by making their children and brothers and sisters happy here this afternoon.

One of the most important aspects I have learned about Vietnam during my first session of Congress in Washington is the tremendous dedication and professionalism of the American marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen now serving the cause of freedom.

The day after Christmas I will be leaving for a short visit to Vietnam and the combat zone. I hope to see many of the men whose families are here today.


Much time and effort on the parts of many people — individual volunteers, local businessmen and merchants, and entertainers — has been expended to make this party a real success. There is plenty of food for all and gifts for the children. And Santa Claus is waiting to see every youngster.

A Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to each of you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Aug. Baker". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

ENTERTAINMENT



Arabia Shrine Temple Clown Jewels

Houston Astros Rusty Staub

Jimmy Wynn

Joe Morgan

Don Wilson



HOUSTON HIGHLANDERS



Pete and Steve Landry Balancing Act

SING-OUT HOUSTON

WEST FAMILY Y.M.C.A. Tumbling Act

CONTRIBUTORS

American Bank and Trust Company	Houston Astros Baseball Club
American Cryogenics, Incorporated	Houston Highlanders
The Ant and the Grasshopper	Houston Novelty Company
Arabia Shrine Temple Clown Jewels	Humble Oil and Refining Company
Associated Transfer & Storage Company	Joske's of Houston
Bank of the Southwest	Pete and Steve Landry
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Cargo Houston, Incorporated	Mayflower Transit Company
Carnation Company	Morton Foods
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— ACKNOWLEDGEMENT —

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BẢN ĐỒ ĐÔ-THÀNH

SAIGON

1:25,000

BẢN ĐỒ THỰC DỤNG
GỒM NHIỀU ĐƯỜNG MỚI TRONG ĐÔ-THÀNH
VỚI ĐỊA-CHỈ CÁC BỘ, NHÀ, SỞ, SỞ QUÂN,
CƠ SỞ VĂN HÓA, TRƯỜNG HỌC, BỆNH VIỆN,
KHÁCH SẠN, TIỆM ĂN, NGÂN HÀNG, QUÂN
CẢNH SÁT, TÒA HÀNH CHANH, BẾN XE, ĐƯỜNG
MỘT-CHIỀU, BẢNG CHỈ ĐƯỜNG BỘ

MAP

OF

SAIGON

ĐỊA CHỈ CẦN BIẾT

CÁC BỘ

Cảnh-Nông,	58 Nguyễn-bình-Khiêm
Công-Chánh,	91 Công-Lý
Giáo-Dục,	70 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Kinh-Tế,	59 Gia-Long
Lao-Động,	459 Trần-hưng-Đạo
Ngoại-Giao,	6 Alexandre de Rhodes
Nội-Vụ,	164 Tự-Do
Quốc-Phòng,	63 Gia-Long
Tài-Chánh,	158 Hồng-thập-Tự
Tâm-lý-Chiến,	79-81-170 Phan-đình-Phùng
Thanh-Niên-Thể-Thao,	272 Hiền-Vương
Tư-Pháp,	47 Thông-Nhất
Xây-Dựng Nông-Thôn,	111 Công-Trường
	Lam-Son
Xã-Hội,	64 Nguyễn-Du
Y-Tế,	59 Hồng-thập-Tự

CÁC NHÀ, SỐ

Biện lý cuộc,	131 Công-Lý
Bưu điện,	Công trường Hòa-Bình
Cải cách Điền địa,	72 Mạc-đĩnh-Chi
Cựu chiến binh,	129 Đoàn-thị-Điễm
Chiêu hồi,	20 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Chữa lửa,	258 Trần-hưng-Đạo
Chương khế,	92 Nguyễn-Du
Du lịch,	25 Bến Bạch-Đặng
Điền Địa,	86 Hai Bà Trưng
Địa phương quân,	126 Hồng-Bàng
Động viên,	38 Gia-Long
Điện lực Việt-Nam,	12 Hồng-thập-Tự
Hàng không dân sự,	175 Hiền-Vương
Hỏa xa,	2 Công Trường Hòa-Bình
Hối đoái,	7 Bến Chương-Dương
Hồng-thập-tự V.N.,	201 Hồng-thập-Tự
Khí tượng,	8 Mạc-đĩnh-Chi
Kiến thiết,	29bis Phan-đình-Phùng
Lâm vụ,	29ter Phan-đình-Phùng
Mãi dịch,	163 Chi-Lăng (Gia-định)
Mô than Nông Sơn,	31 Hàn-Thuyền
Mực súc,	29 Phan-đình-Phùng
Nông vụ,	283 Mạc-đĩnh-Chi
Ngư nghiệp,	116 Phan-đình-Phùng

Ngân khố Saigon,	37 Nguyễn-Huệ
Nguyên tử lực cuộc,	291 Phan-thanh-Giản
Phòng Thương mại,	36 Nguyễn-Huệ
Quan thuế,	21 Bạch-Đặng
Quản thủ Điền địa,	141 Yên-Đỗ
Quý Bà trừ P.C.G.Đ.,	14 Phan-văn-Đạt
Tân Đảo,	115 Võ-di-Nguy
Tòa án Saigon,	131 Công-Lý
Tòa phá án,	76 Hồng-thập-Tự
Tòa hòa giải,	115 Nguyễn-Huệ
Tòa án Hành chánh,	76 Hồng-thập-Tự
Tòa án Lao động,	150 Pasteur
Thủy Cục (Saigon),	86 Nguyễn-Thông
Thủy Nông,	11 Hiền-Vương (Thị-Nghê)
Thương cảng,	1 Hàm-Nghi
Thuế vụ,	85 Hàm-Nghi
Thủy điện Saigon,	72 Hai Bà Trưng
Thủy văn,	94 Công-Lý
Trước bạ,	229 Tự-Do
Trung Tâm Điện Ảnh,	15 Thi-Sách
Trung Tâm khuếch trương kỹ nghệ,	40 Nguyễn-Huệ
Trung Tâm Tiểu công nghệ,	90 Tự-Do
Viện Dục Anh,	185 Võ-Tánh
Việt Tân Xã,	118 Hồng-thập-Tự
Xổ số kiến thiết,	17 Thông-Nhất

ĐƯỜNG MỘT CHIỀU

Trong khoản và theo chiều

An-Điễm,	Tân-Đà — Ngô-Quyên
An-Bình,	Hàm-Tử — Nguyễn-Hoàng
Bãi-hữu-Nghĩa,	Đào-Tân — Nguyễn-Trái
Bà Huyện Thanh-Quan,	Kỳ-Đồng — Hồng-thập-Tự
Cao-bá-Quát,	Đồn Đất — Hai Bà Trưng
Châu-văn-Tiếp,	Đồng-Khánh — Nguyễn-Trái
Chu-văn-An,	Trương-tấn-Bữu — Nguyễn-văn-Thành
Cố Bắc,	Huỳnh-quang-Tiên — Nguyễn-thái-Học
Cố Giang,	Nguyễn-thái-Học — Huỳnh-quang-Tiên
Colmette,	Hồ-văn-Ngà — Bến Chương-Dương
Công-Lý,	Hiền-Vương — Bến Chương-Dương
Đinh-tiên-Hoàng,	Thông-Nhất — Hiền-Vương
Đoàn-thị-Điễm,	Hồng-thập-Tự — Kỳ-Đồng
Đồng-Khánh,	Nguyễn-tri-Phương — Học-Lạc
Đỗ-văn-Sưu,	Lương-nhữ-Học — Vạn-Kiếp
Gia-Long,	Lê-văn-Duyệt — Cường-Đề
Hiền-Vương,	Đinh-tiên-Hoàng — C.T. Dân-chủ
Hồng-Bàng,	Ngô-Quyên — Nguyễn-tri-Phương
Học-Lạc,	Trang-Tử — Hồng-Bàng

CƠ-SỞ VĂN-HÓA

Bộ Giáo-Dục,	78 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Nha Học-Vụ,	7 Nguyễn-bình-Khiêm
Nha Trung-Học,	7 Nguyễn-bình-Khiêm
Nha Tiểu-Học,	7 Nguyễn-bình-Khiêm
Nha Kỹ-Thuật,	48 Phan-đình-Phùng
Nha Mỹ-Thuật,	35 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Nha Văn-Hóa,	89 Lê-văn-Duyệt
Nha Văn-Khố,	64 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Sở Học-Liệu,	240 Trần-bình-Trọng
Thư-Viện Quốc-Gia,	34 Gia-Long
Tổng Thư-Viện	Trần-bình-Trọng
Viện Khảo-Cổ,	66 Lê-thánh-Tôn
Viện Bảo-Tàng, tại Thảo-cầm-Viên (Sở-thú)	

TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC

Dược-Khoa,	41 Cường-Đề
Khoa-Học,	227 Cộng-Hòa
Luật-Khoa,	17 Duy-Tân
Nha-Khoa,	Phan-thanh-Giản
Sư-Phạm,	229 Cộng-Hòa
Văn-Khoa, Gốc	Gia-Long Nguyễn-trung-Trực
Y Khoa,	28 Trần-quý-Cáp
Viện Đại-Học,	3 Công-Trường Chiến-Sĩ


TRƯỜNG CHUYÊN KHOA


Âm-Nhạc (Quốc-Gia),	112 Nguyễn-Du
Bách-Công Phú-Thọ,	Nguyễn-văn-Thoại
Bưu-Điện (Quốc-Gia),	48 Phan-đình-Phùng
Cao-Đẳng Công-Chánh,	Nguyễn-văn-Thoại
— Điện-Học,	—
— Kiến-Trúc,	6bis Phan-đình-Phùng
Dạy người mù,	1 Nguyễn-Trái
Học-Viện Quốc-Gia	
Hành-Chánh,	10 Trần-quốc-Toàn
Kỹ-Sư Công-Nghệ (Quốc-Gia),	
	Nguyễn-văn-Thoại

Nữ Học-Sinh (Quốc-Gia),	
	284, Công-Quỳnh
Phụ-Tá Thi-Nghiệm Y-Khoa,	167 Pasteur
Sinh-Học Y-Khoa,	Tại viện Pasteur
Sư-Phạm (Quốc-Gia),	4 Thành-Thái
Việt-Nam Hàng-Hải,	Nguyễn-văn-Thoại

TRƯỜNG TRUNG-HỌC

Gia-Long (Nữ),	275 Phan-thanh-Giản
Hồ-ngọc-Cần,	2 Chi-Lăng (Gia-Định)
Kỹ-Thuật Cao.Thắng	65 Huỳnh-thúc-Kháng
Kỹ-Thuật Nguyễn-trường-Tô,	
	25 kếp Hồng-thập-Tự
Lê-văn-Duyệt, (Nữ) đại lộ	Lê-văn-Duyệt
	(Gia-Định)
Mạc-đĩnh-Chi,	đường Lục-Tĩnh
Nguyễn-Trái,	25 đường Xóm-Chiếu (Khánh
	Hội)
Trang-Trí Mỹ-Thuật,	119 Chi-Lăng (Gia
	Định)
Trương-Vương (Nữ)	3 Nguyễn-bình-Khiêm
Trương-vinh-Ký,	235 Cộng-Hòa
Võ-trường-Toàn,	11 Nguyễn-bình-Khiêm





MAP of SAIGON

Đường : Street (Đường Tự do: Tự do Street)
Đại lộ : Avenue (Đại lộ Lê Lợi: Lê Lợi Avenue)
Bến : Quay (Bến Bạch Đằng: Bạch Đằng Quay)
Công trường : Square (Công trường Lam Sơn: Lam Sơn Square)
Tỉnh : Province (Tỉnh Gia Định: Gia Định Province)
Xã : Village (Xã An-Khánh: An-Khánh Village)

TO FIND A STREET

The map is divided into squares. Each side of these squares is designated by a letter for the height and a figure for the width. The indicator determines the square into which one can find a street. In fact, each street name is followed by a letter and a figure.

For instance: Tự do - The indicator give B 5 situation of the square into which is the street.

CÁCH TÌM MỘT CON ĐƯỜNG

Bản đồ này được chia ra từng ô vuông.
Mỗi ô vuông có ghi số (1 - 2...) và chữ cái (A - B...).

Mỗi tên đường ghi theo thứ tự A.B.C... ở phía dưới đầu có chữ và số. Chữ và số tức là ô vuông mà trong ấy có tên đường đó.

Thí dụ : Muốn tìm đường Lê Lợi.

Trong bản tìm đường đã B5, ô vuông năm ngay theo chữ và số mà trong đó có tên đường.

- 2 -

SAIGON

BACKGROUND

Saigon, the charming political and cultural capital of the Republic of Viet Nam, is among the most attractive cities in the Orient formed by Hong Kong, Manila, Bangkok and Singapore. This « Pearl of the East », as often called by sea merchants from the Occident, is now growing and moving forward.

Also, Saigon is the cleanest, most fascinating city among Oriental capitals, with wide streets shaded by tall trees. There are numerous public parks and impressive public buildings. Tu Do, the city's main boulevard, runs from the river-front past blocks of fashionable shops and sidewalk cafes to the Catholic Cathedral, facing the Kennedy Square. The city boasts numerous Vietnamese and Chinese pagodas, a fabulous flower market, botanical gardens with one of the world's richest collections of orchids and equatorial plants, and the National Museum, containing ancient Indochinese masterpieces.

People who, for the first time, visit Saigon would doubtless be struck by numerous rather curious practices and customs which have not even the faintest resemblance with those in Western countries and always charmed by the friendliness and gaiety of the Vietnamese people, the loveliness of nice girls, the delicious and almost overabundant food, the fairytale atmosphere of the surrounding countryside, etc...

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Saigon's history dates back only 200 years when it was just a cluster of thatched huts of fishermen. Now, this growing city is well developed and has become the heart of the country and the hub of its industry and commerce as well.

CHOLON

Only three miles from the center of Saigon is the city of Cholon or the « Chinatown », a separate city, but forming part of the Metropolitan area of Saigon. One is hardly aware of the subtle changes as you ride along the main street, Tran Hung Dao, into Cholon. It is only when you reach the center of Cholon that you realize you are truly in a « Chinatown ». The residents of Cholon are primarily from Southern China, and the primary dialect used is Cantonese, although Mandarin, the official Chinese dialect, is usually understood, as are the Fukkien, Hokien and Hakka dialects.

Cholon must be visited at night to see the crowd overflowing the streets and the multitude of dazzling neon signs.

PEOPLE

The city of Saigon, including Cholon, covers an estimated area of 51 square kilometers and has an estimated population of about two million to date.

Of Saigon's these two million people, one and a quarter million are Vietnamese ; more than half a

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million are of Chinese origins ; and the remainder represent races from East and West (Europeans, Americans, Indians, Cambodians, etc...).

CLIMATE

The climate here is pleasant with two main seasons : the rainy and the dry seasons. The average temperature in Saigon is 75°F. low and 90°F. high with alternate rain and sunshine from May to October. From November through April, the climate in Saigon is much milder than that in Manila, Bangkok, Singapore or Djakarta, with a cool day whenever there is a depression in nearby area.

THE BOTANICAL GARDENS

At the east end of the Thong Nhut boulevard, the Botanical Gardens are particularly interesting. They possess one of the most important collections of orchids and of equatorial plants, besides a wide variety of game.

THE NATIONAL MUSEUM

Located in the left-hand side of the entrance of the Botanical Gardens, the National Museum, inaugurated on January 1, 1929, is now a best organized among the five museums throughout the country. Objects found from this National Museum are, for the most part, antiques donated by the Society for Indochinese Studies, created in 1897, which has its library within the Museum itself.

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AIRLINES

Air Viet-Nam,	116 Nguyễn-Huệ
Japan Airlines,	—
Royal Air Cambodge,	—
Northwest Airline,	—
Air India,	—
Air France,	130 Tự-Do
Royal Air Laos,	10 Ngô-đức-Kế
Civil Air Transport,	16 Tự-Do
Pan American,	23 Ngô-đức-Kế
S. A. S.,	100 Tự-Do
Swissair,	—
Thai International,	—
K. L. M.,	140 Tự-Do

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BANKS

Bank of China,	11 Chương-Dương
Bank of Communications,	87 Hàm-Nghị
B. F. A.	21 Chương-Dương
B. F. C.	32 Hàm-Nghị
Bank of East Asia,	6 Võ-Di-Nguy
B. N. C. I.	36 Tôn-Thất-Đạm
Chartered Bank,	3 Võ-Di-Nguy
Viet-Nam Commercial Credit Bank,	17 Chương-Dương
Commercial & Industrial Bank of Viet-Nam,	93 Hàm-Nghị
Hong-Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation,	9 Chương-Dương
National Bank of Viet-Nam,	17 Chương-Dương
Tokyo Bank,	12 . 22 Hàm-Nghị
Việt-Nam Ngân-Hàng,	117 Nguyễn-Huệ

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EMBASSIES-CONSULATES

American Embassy,	39 Hàm-Nghị
Australian Embassy,	Lam-Sơn Square
British Embassy,	25 Thống-Nhứt
Belgian Embassy,	26 Gia-Long
Chinese Embassy,	47 Pasteur
Danish Consulate,	15 Nguyễn-công-Trứ
French Consulate,	216 Phan-đình-Phùng
German Embassy,	106 Nguyễn-Huệ
Greek Consulate,	3 Võ-di-Nguy
Italian Embassy,	135 Pasteur
Indian Consulate,	213 Tự-Do
Japanese Embassy,	13-17 Nguyễn-Huệ
Korean Embassy,	109 Nguyễn-Du
Laotian Embassy,	93 Pasteur
Malaysian Embassy,	141 bis Công-Lý

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Netherlands Embassy,	147 Phan - đình - Phùng
New-Zeland Embassy,	Lam-Sơn Square
Norwegian Consulate,	7 Hàn-Thuyền
Philippines Embassy,	42 Đoàn-thị-Điền
Portuguese Consulate,	35A Chương-Dương
Swedish Consulate,	35 Chương-Dương
Swiss Consulate,	26 Gia-Long
Thai Embassy,	77 Trương-minh-Giang

HOTELS

Astor Hotel,	70 Tự-Do
Caravelle Hotel,	23 Lam-Sơn Square
Catinat Hotel,	69 Tự-Do
Continental Hotel,	Lam-Sơn Square
Embassy Hotel,	35 Nguyễn-trung-Trực
Grand Hotel Des Nations,	70 Nguyễn-Huệ
Majestic Hotel,	1 Tự-Do
Royal Saigon,	72 Nguyễn-Huệ

Documents and objects relating to the history and evolution of Viet Nam as well as of a number of such Asian countries as Japan, China, Tibet, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia and Malaya, are now exhibited in the Museum to make it one of the most attractive spots in Saigon.

THE SAIGON RIVER

Saigon is one of the rare sea-ports in the world where oceanliners have to travel some 40 miles up river in order to reach the docks offering to the traveller the most fascinating three-hour sightseeing in his life. All ships up to 10,000 tons are apt to pass between banks lined with mangroves or areas covered with luxurious vegetation, water-palm-trees and ricelands. Sampans and river junks, filled with rice, fish, sand or wood, glide by, guided by men using poles or oars.

The Bach Dang Quay on the Saigon River is not only a wonderful place where have-nots of all ages can enjoy its beautiful view and fresh breeze, but also a rendez-vous spot for young couples or wind-lovers and even an interesting place for gourmets to taste some unusual snacks.

To its habitual visitors, Bach Dang Quay is above all a relaxing place. The most frequented sections of the quay stretch from the end of Tu Do Street to the « Pointe des Blagueurs » (Bullslingers' Point) near the National Bank of Viet Nam.

Between the two entertainment sites, numerous concrete benches shaded by vine-covered bowers dot the riverside. The lights from ships tied up at the port in Khanh Hoi sprinkle the river with reflections and give a carnival note.

In the darkness, the faint lights from the opposite bank and the lamps of motorboats slowly breathing the current inevitably induce a reverie in the sentimental.

SHOPPING

Shopping in Saigon is fascinating, too. The main shopping area in Saigon are the following boulevards or streets: Tu Do, Le Loi, Nguyen Hue, Le Thanh Ton, and Dong Khanh in Cholon, and of course, the Saigon Central Market.

Vietnamese handicraft articles, specially souvenirs, such as tortoise shell and ivory goods, pottery, blinds, windcreens, conical hats... are available at the Handicraft Development Center, 86 Tu Do St... Lacquerware and objects of art can be purchased at Thanh Le, 159 Tu Do St.; Thanh My, 82 Nguyen Hue Boulevard; Nguyen Oanh, 86 Nguyen Van Thinh St.. Stylish shoes are sold at the shops along Le Thanh Ton St.. Chic Tailors, shirtmakers and jewellers can be found along Tu Do St., and in the Eden arcade. But the Saigon Central Market is a most interesting shopping place where everything is sold. Visitors could

find here a well laid-out covered-in building, that houses a maze of crowded stalls and alleyways that sell every conceivable article under the sun. Here is truly everything from a candlestick to sealing-wax via an over-ripe Durian to possibly a King. It is all this that makes Saigon a shopping center that is little known, and rich in bargains.

THE WORLD FAMOUS DRESS OF THE VIETNAMESE WOMEN

Perhaps the first thing that strikes foreign visitors at time when they set foot on this country is the loveliness of Vietnamese women in their « áo dài », or Vietnamese women's dress. According to many tourists, the áo dài is something unique in the world that it is sexy without being in the least vulgar. Some find the áo dài very becoming. Here again is a grand opportunity to buy the traditional áo dài, with its close fitting bodice, and long flowing slit-sided tunic, worn with the pantaloons, which today are regrettably getting tighter in the leg and losing their inherent allure and grace that is the charm of the Vietnamese feminine attire.

LANGUAGE

English and Chinese are spoken in particular in all hotels, stores and travel agencies while French is common among the Vietnamese aristocracy and in many luxury shops. You will find interpreters available from all the travel agencies.

TRANSPORTATION

Since Saigon is situated at the crossroads of main air routes in Southeast Asia, a stopover can be arranged at no extra fare if you are travelling through Tokyo, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, Jakarta, Bangkok, Calcutta or Rangoon. Many steamship lines calling at these ports also stop at Saigon.

In the city of Saigon, common transportation facilities include taxis, buses, push-bikes (cyclos) and Cyclo máy, a 3-wheel motor driven vehicle.

Taxis are painted by distinctive light blue and cream in Saigon, and are all licenced. All carry meters and the minimum legal fare payable is VN\$6, and thereafter the fare increases by fifty per cents for every hundred yards. And fares are increased by fifty per cents between 10 PM to 6 AM. For long rides outside town, including Tan Son Nhut Airport, the driver should be given the return fare back to town.

Taxis are not generally used or recommended for sightseeing trips. Travel agents suggest the hire of a chauffeured limousine for independent sightseeing. U-drive cars are also available. Visitors should consult their travel agents or The Careville Hotel.

RESTAURANTS

FRENCH

Caruso, 125 Võ-di-Nguy
Crazy Cow, 44 Đinh-tiên-Hoàng
Guillaume Tell, 32 Trịnh-minh-Thế
Koutiki, 20 Phan-thanh-Giản
La Cigale, 18 Đinh-tiên-Hoàng

VIETNAMESE

Le Calypso, 67 Pasteur

CHINESE

Văn Canh, 184 Calmette

ITALIAN

Pizzeria, 76c Lê-thánh-Tôn

SPANISH

Paprika, 136bis Building A Yên-Đỗ

JAPANESE

Fuji, 96 Hùng-Vương

ENTERTAINMENT

VIETNAMESE THEATER

HUNG-ĐẠO, 130 Trần-hưng-Đạo
QUỐC-THANH, 271 Võ-Tánh
OLYMPIC, Hồng-thập-Tự

MOVIES

REX, 147 Nguyễn-Huệ
EDEN, 183 Tự-Do
ĐẠI-NAM, 79 - 91 Trần-hưng-Đạo
CASINO, Lê-Lợi - Pasteur

NIGHT CLUBS

Arc en ciel, 52 Tân-Đà
Bông-Lai, 1 Nguyễn-trung-Trực
Baccara, 165 Trần-quý-Cáp
Caravelle, 23 Lam-Sơn Square
International, 91 Công-Lý
Kim-Sơn, 2 Trần-hưng-Đạo
Mỹ-Phụng, 5 Mê-Linh Square
Ma Cabane, 108 Trương-công-Định
Tour d'Ivoire, 12 Trần-hưng-Đạo
Tự-Do, 80 Tự-Do

HOSPITALS

Grall Hospital, 14 Gia-Long
Saint Paul Clinic, 280 Phan-thanh-Giản
Adventist Hospital 120 Võ-Tánh Phú-nhận
Duy Tân Clinic, 51 Duy-Tân

PHARMACIES

La Thành, 195 Tự-do
Pharmacie Normale, 119 Tự-do
Pharmacie de Saigon, 120 Lê-Lợi

AFTER HOURS PHARMACIES

Nguyễn-thị-Hai, 35 Lê-Lợi

BARBER SHOPS

Lê-Lợi, 59 Lê-Lợi street
Việt Anh, 47 Lê-Lợi
Matignon Royal, 213 Tự-do

BOOK STORES

Khải-Tri, 62 Lê-Lợi
Bookshop, 33 Passage Eden
Xuân Thu, 185 Tự-do

USEFUL BOOKS ON VIETNAM

DÕ-VĂN-MINH

VIETNAM Where East and West Meet.

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These can be obtained from

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Mạnh-Tử, Trần-hoàng-Quân — Trang-Tử
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Ngô-đức-Kể, Võ-di-Nguy — Nguyễn-Huệ
Nguyễn-công-Trứ, Tôn-thất-Đạm — Nguyễn-thái-Học
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Phan-thanh-Giản, Lý-thái-Tô — Đinh-tiên-Hoàng
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Phạm-đăng-Hưng, Nguyễn-v-Giai — Phan-đình-Phùng
Phó-đức-Chính, Bến Chương Dương — Hồ-văn-Ngà

Pasteur, Bến Chương Dương — Hiền-Vương
Phạm-phú-Tiên, Hàm-Tử — Đông-Khánh
Phạm-Đôn, Đông-Khánh — Hàm-Tử
Phan-huy-Chú, Lê-quang-Liêm — Trần-quang-Phục
Phùng-Hưng, Hồng-Bàng — Lê-quang-Liêm
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Phú-Giáo, Trang-Tử — Hồng-Bàng
Phú-Hữu, Hồng-Bàng — Trang-Tử
Phạm-đình-Hồ, Trương-tấn-Bữu — Lục-Tinh
Trần-quý-Cáp, C. T. Chiến-sĩ — Cao-Thắng
Thái-lập-Thành, Tự-Do — Thị-Sách
Tôn-thất-Thiệp, Nguyễn-Huệ — Pasteur
Tôn-thất-Đạm, Tôn-thất-Thiệp — Hàm-Nghĩ
Triệu-quang-Phục, Lê-quang-Liêm — Hồng-Bàng
Tân-Đà, Nguyễn-Trải — Hàm-Tử
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Trần-tướng-Công, Triệu-q. Phục — Lương-nhữ-Học
Võ-Tánh, Cộng-Hòa — Lê-văn-Duyệt
Võ-di-Nguy, Hàm-Nghĩ — Tôn-thất-Thiệp
Võ-Tánh, Cộng-Hòa — Lê-văn-Duyệt
Xóm Voi, Hồng-Bàng — Trang-Tử
Yết-Kiều, Hồng-Bàng — Hùng-Vương

BẾN XE SAIGON

ĐI MIỀN ĐÔNG

Bến NGUYỄN-CU-TRINH, xe đi :
Biên-Hòa, Long-Thành, Phước-Lê, Vũng-
Tàu, Long-Điền, Long-Hải, Xuyên-Mộc.

Bến PHAN-VĂN-HÙM — LÊ-LAI,
xe đi : Thủ-Đức, Di-An, Biên-Hòa, Xuân-
Lộc, Long-Khánh, Bình-Tuy, Hàm-Tân,
Lái-Thiêu, Bình-Dương, Bình-Long,
Phước Long, Gò-Dầu, Trảng-Bàng, Tây-
Ninh.

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Nhà-Bè, Phú-Xuân.

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Bến PÉTRUS KÝ : Cà-Mau, Cần-
Thơ, Bạc-Liêu, Trà-Vinh, Long-Xuyên,
Châu-Đốc, Vĩnh-Long, Tân-An, Cái-Bè,
Sa-Đéc, Mỹ-Tho, Gò-Công, Bến-Tre,
Rạch-Giá, Hà-Tiên.

ĐI TRUNG-VIỆT

Bến PÉTRUS KÝ : Phan-Thiết, Nha-
Trang, Bảo-Lộc, Đà-Lạt, Banmethuot.

BẢNG CHỈ ĐƯỜNG BỘ TỪ SAIGON

Ang Kor	560	cs	Long-Thành	88	cs
Bà-Rịa	99	»	Lộc-Ninh	135	»
Bạc-Liêu	276	»	Mỹ-Tho	71	»
Banmethuot	353	»	Nam-Vang	240	»
Bến-Tre	86	»	Nha-Trang	446	»
Biên-Hòa	30	»	Phan-Thiết	196	»
Bình-Tuy	172	»	Phan-Rang	319	»
Cà-Mau	344	»	Pleiku	536	»
Cần-Thơ	169	»	Qui-Nhon	675	»
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Gò-Công	58	»	Trà-Vinh	198	»
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— Thụy-Điền, 35 Bến Chương-Dương 22.695

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— Bình-Dân, 371 Phan-thanh-Giản
— Chợ-Rẫy, 42 Thuận-Kiều
— Nhi-Đông, 2 Sư-vạn-Hạnh
— Hồng-Bàng, 32 Hùng-Vương
— Saigon, 125 Lê-Lợi
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— Hùng-Vương, 36 Hùng-Vương
Bệnh-viện Grall, 14 Gia-Long
— Saint Paul, 280 Phan-thanh-Giản

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— II, 73 Bác-sĩ Yersin
— III, 243 Lê-văn-Duyệt
— IV, 14 Đoàn-nhữ-Hải
— V, 359 Đông-Khánh
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— VII, 184 Bến Nguyễn-Duy
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— VI, 107 Bến Lê-quang-Hiền
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— VIII, 144 Tùng-thiện-Vương

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ANNUAL REPORT
COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1967

ANNUAL REPORT
COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1967

WITH BY-LAWS AND LIST OF MEMBERS

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE
FIFTY-EIGHT EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET
NEW YORK

1967



Photo by G. D. Hackett

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Executive Director, 1927-1959

Editor, Political Handbook and Atlas of the World, 1928-1967

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SUMMARY OF COUNCIL WORK

DURING THE TWELVE MONTHS covered by this report, the Council continued to pursue its four basic objectives—aiding its members to deepen their understanding of international affairs; seeking new insights into American foreign policy; disseminating knowledge about America's foreign relations through its publications; and providing a meeting place for leaders in international affairs from the United States and abroad. As the number of institutions concerned with international affairs grows, including many with specialized interests, the Council is increasingly finding its particular role less in individual country studies or analyses of one aspect of national policy and more in those studies and activities which relate the problems of various regions and broad segments of policy one to another.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FELLOWSHIP

A most significant development at the Council this year was a grant by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to enable the Council to launch a new fellowship program offering outstanding younger men and women—four to eight a year—an opportunity to broaden their experience and develop their thinking in the field of international affairs. The program will be directed, on the one hand, to giving a small group of the most able younger scholars an opportunity to test their thinking in a policy-oriented environment, perhaps a government or international agency, while, on the other hand, providing a few of the more promising younger government officials with the possibility of thinking through some of their problems in a scholarly environment free from the pressure of day-to-day decisions. It is hoped that this program will make a continuing contribution to that small reservoir of leaders of diverse experience and multiple talents who will play a critical part in directing the nation's energies in the future. The Council itself expects to benefit from the infusion of new ideas which this group should bring.

Fellowships will be awarded, ordinarily for a year, on the advice of a high-level Advisory Committee. One or two Fellows will be in residence each year at the Council while the others will be working elsewhere. John Temple Swing,

Associate Executive Director, will be in charge of the program. Although the program will not be fully in operation until the fall of 1968, the first International Affairs Fellowship was awarded for the coming year to Ernest Preeg. He has been granted a year's leave by the Foreign Service upon returning from Geneva, where he participated in the Kennedy Round negotiations, and he plans to devote his fellowship to writing a history of the negotiations.

THE WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON SENIOR FELLOWSHIP

The many friends of Whitney H. Shepardson will be gratified that his memory and his tremendous contribution to the Council—Mr. Armstrong has written that he "can be called in many respects 'the' founder"—will be perpetuated by the establishment of a Senior Fellowship in his name. It was made possible by the creation of a \$500,000 fund, which was initiated by a gift of \$250,000 from one of Mr. Shepardson's warm friends and admirers. The first holder of the new Fellowship will be Willard Thorp, who will be making an appraisal of the United States foreign aid program. In the vast experience, academic and governmental, which he brings to his project, Mr. Thorp was most recently the Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.

"FOREIGN AFFAIRS"

The influence of *Foreign Affairs* continues to increase with its expanding circulation, which has now reached 70,000. The widespread use of *Foreign Affairs* articles for teaching and similar purposes has been a source of special satisfaction. The articles in Volume 45 covered a wide range of issues facing the United States, with notable attention being devoted to the problems of East and Southeast Asia.

THE CHINA AND ATLANTIC STUDIES

The two most ambitious study projects ever undertaken by the Council were The United States and China in World Affairs and the Atlantic Policies Studies, both of which were begun in 1962 with the aid of a \$900,000 grant from the Ford Foundation. Each of the projects was intended to bring together a group of specialists who would produce a series of studies together covering the key

elements of concern to American foreign policy in its relations with China and in its relations with the other nations of the North Atlantic. Each project was directed by its own steering committee. Alan W. Dulles was the chairman of the Steering Committee for the China project and Charles M. Spofford for the Atlantic Studies. Each had its own full-time director: Harold van B. Cleveland, for the Atlantic Studies and Robert Blum, until his death, for the China project, which Lucian W. Pye then directed on a part-time basis during its final year.

The first books published in the Atlantic Policy Studies were *The Troubled Partnership*, by Henry A. Kissinger, and *Alternative to Partition*, by Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of which appeared in 1965. These were followed by John O. Coppock's *Atlantic Agricultural Unity* in 1966.

During the year of this report the remaining manuscripts for the Atlantic project were completed and by June 30, 1967, all but two were in print. During the year the following were published: *The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals*, by Harold van B. Cleveland; *European Unification in the Sixties: From the Veto to the Crisis*, by Miriam Camps; *The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa and Latin America*, by Theodore Geiger; *Trade, Aid and Development: The Rich and Poor Nations*, by John Pincus; and *Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries: Objectives and Alternatives*, by Bela Balassa. At the printer are Stanley Hoffmann's volume, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* and Richard N. Cooper's study, *The Economics of Interdependence: National Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community*.

During the winter and spring of 1966 the first of the volumes in The United States and China in World Affairs series appeared. They were: *The American People and China*, by A. T. Steele; *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents*, edited by A. M. Halpern; and *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, by Alexander Eckstein.

Three more volumes in the series were published during 1966-67: *The United States and China in World Affairs*, by Robert Blum, edited by A. Doak Barnett; *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, by Samuel B. Griffith; and *The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia*, by Lea A. Williams. During the year of this report Kenneth T. Young finished his study which will appear under the title, *Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The U.S. Experience* and Fred Greene's volume, *U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia* was also sent to the printer. Two final studies are still in preparation.

STUDIES AND PUBLICATIONS

Two study groups and four discussion groups held meetings during the year. In addition, there were special review meetings for two other volumes and two review meetings for short Policy Books. Basic reappraisals of American foreign policy from two different perspectives were underway. Hans J. Morgenthau, Visiting Senior Fellow, continued his re-examination of American foreign policy, working with a study group of which Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was chairman. Charles W. Yost completed his study of foreign policy, and this was reviewed at a special meeting with Henry M. Wriston serving as chairman. Louis Henkin completed a manuscript on the influence of law on the behavior of nations, which was reviewed at a special meeting over which Philip C. Jessup presided. William J. Barnds, aided by a study group with Kenneth T. Young as chairman, pursued a study of South Asia as a new arena for world politics. The Council had review meetings for John W. Evan's Policy Book on U.S. trade policy and for John S. Badeau's volume on U.S. policy toward the Arab states; the chairmen were Alfred C. Neal and Richard Nolte, respectively. Other books in process during the year were a reappraisal of American foreign economic policy by William Diebold, Jr., a study of the role of the military in the Middle East by J. C. Hurewitz, a volume on the changing nature of Soviet society, of which Allen Kasso is the editor, and an analysis of divided Germany by Hans Speier.

During the year, there were the following discussion groups: The Politics of Private Investment with Walter B. Wriston as chairman and William Diebold, Jr., as secretary; Military Stability and Political Evolution in Europe with Marshall Shulman as chairman and Harry Boardman as secretary; Foreign Aid Policy Reconsidered with Carl Kaysen as chairman and Kenneth M. Kauffman as secretary; and two meetings on African issues over which Waldemar M. Nielsen presided. The latter two meetings were oriented to a subsequent conference held in conjunction with Chatham House at Ditchley Park in England.

In addition to the eight China and Atlantic books previously mentioned as having been published in 1966-67, eight others were published during the year as follows:

Walter H. Mallory (Editor)

Political Handbook and Atlas of the World,
1966

Richard P. Stebbins	<i>The United States in World Affairs, 1965</i>
Richard P. Stebbins (Editor)	<i>Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1965</i>
Henry Aubrey	<i>Atlantic Economic Cooperation: The Case of the OECD</i>
John C. Campbell	<i>Tito's Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics</i>
John W. Evans	<i>U.S. Trade Policy: New Legislation and the Next Round</i>
John Hohenberg	<i>Between Two Worlds: Policy, Press and Public Opinion on Asian-American Relations</i>
James Reston	<i>The Artillery of the Press: Its Influence on American Foreign Policy</i>

Seven of the sixteen books published in 1966-67 also appeared in paperback editions.

Of particular note was the Fortieth Anniversary edition of *The Political Handbook*, the forerunner of which was *The Political Handbook of Europe, 1927*, edited by Malcolm W. Davis. The reception for this initial effort was encouraging, and led the following year to the first *Political Handbook of the World*, edited by Mr. Davis and Walter H. Mallory. Beginning with 60 countries in 192 pages, the volume has grown with the international community to include reference information on 134 countries and the United Nations in a volume of 366 pages.

Walter Mallory, as Executive Director from 1927 to 1959, made an invaluable contribution to the Council's growth and development. After his retirement he continued his service as Editor of *The Political Handbook and Atlas of the World*, which has been so particularly his own creation and which has been over the years the Council's best-selling volume. His coming retirement as Editor of *The Political Handbook* is a source of deep regret to his colleagues and his many friends.

THE THOMAS J. WATSON MEETINGS

Endowed by the splendid gift of the children of Thomas J. Watson, the program of *ad hoc* meetings provided a panorama of the important issues facing the United States in the past year. It also provided the members with an opportunity to meet with a group of leading statesmen and foreign affairs experts from this and other countries.

During the year, 108 meetings were held, and the effort to encourage more intense discussion through smaller meetings was continued.

The problems of Southeast Asia were considered in a number of meetings, including those for General Harold Johnson, General William C. Westmoreland, Harrison Salisbury, and the Foreign Minister of Viet Nam. Developments in Europe and their significance to the United States were discussed authoritatively by men such as the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Ministers of Britain and France, and the newly-elected Chairman of the Commission of the European Economic Community.

African affairs were covered in a number of meetings, including those for the Emperor of Ethiopia, the President of Zambia, Sir W. Arthur Lewis, and Charles Burton Marshall. Those who spoke on problems in the Middle East included the President of Turkey, while the Argentine Foreign Minister was among those who addressed the Council on Latin American affairs. The relations of the United States with the Soviet Union were considered at a number of meetings, and the speakers included Foy Kohler and Nikolai Inozemtsev.

ELIHU ROOT LECTURES

Francis T. P. Plimpton delivered the Elihu Root Lectures in May 1967 on the subject of peace-keeping through the United Nations. Since the Middle East crisis had just become critical and the United Nations was being severely tested, he departed from his prepared text to give the members an analysis of the existing situation.

COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The past year was the most active ever in the history of the associated Committees on Foreign Relations. Together they held 257 meetings, of which the Council arranged, or played a part in arranging, about seventy per cent. American experts on foreign affairs addressed 140 of the meetings, whereas

the remainder were addressed by foreign nationals. Council members led 45 of the meetings.

Southeast Asia and China figured very prominently in the Committees' program of meetings, accounting for 73 of them during the year. Fifty-four meetings dealt with Western Europe, and from 15 to 20 meetings each were devoted to Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Among the prominent individuals addressing the Committees were Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, General Harold Johnson, Harrison Salisbury, Ambassadors Edwin Reischauer and John K. Galbraith, Chief A. S. O. Adebo, General Sir John Glubb, and Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan in Washington.

On June 2 and 3, the Twenty-ninth Annual Conference of the Committees was held on the theme, "The Problems of Southern Africa and their Significance to the United States." The evening session on June 2 was addressed by Joseph Palmer, II, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

MILITARY FELLOWSHIPS

In 1966-67 for the first time the Council had two Military Fellows since the Army has now joined the program. The first Army Fellow was Colonel Michael J. L. Greene, who had recently returned from a tour of duty in Viet Nam and who had previously had experience with the U. N. assistance program in the Congo. The Air Force Fellow in 1966-67 was Colonel Frederick C. Thayer, Jr., whose immediately prior service had been in the Directorate of Plans of the Air Force Headquarters. Both Military Fellows were members of study and discussion groups and participated actively in other Council activities.

EDWARD R. MURROW FELLOWSHIP

The first Edward R. Murrow Fellow in the program for foreign correspondents recently endowed by the CBS Foundation was Malcolm W. Browne. Prior to undertaking the Fellowship, Mr. Browne had spent five years reporting from Viet Nam for the Associated Press and as a free-lance correspondent, and he had been awarded a Pulitzer Prize for his work there. During his year at the Council he devoted himself primarily to the study of China and the Chinese language.

SUMMARY

CORPORATION SERVICE

This past year, as before, two series of meetings were offered to the nominees of the corporations which participate in the Corporation Service. The first series dealt with the problems of Europe, West and East; the second considered economic development and American foreign aid.

Richard M. Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, addressed the annual dinner for corporation presidents and board chairmen on the subject, "Intelligence in the American Society."

CAPITAL FUND PROGRAM

During the past year the Capital Fund drive, which is seeking to raise a \$5,000,000 endowment for the Council, was brought close to completion, due in great part to the unstinting and most effective efforts of its General Chairman, Malcolm Muir. As a result of the income derived from the new funds, the Council was enabled to end the fiscal year with a surplus.

* * *

As always, the strength and value of the Council has rested heavily on the dedicated support of its officers, directors and members. The Council is a unique community of leaders in many different fields of national life, united by their common interest in international affairs. The active participation of many members gives the organization its special quality as an institution which combines a practical orientation to foreign affairs with a scholarly probing for greater understanding.

George S. Franklin, Jr.
Executive Director

David W. MacEachron
Deputy Executive Director

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THE CIRCULATION of *Foreign Affairs* has continued its upward trend during the past year despite an increase in the subscription rate from \$6.00 to \$8.00, effective with the January 1967 issue. With the close of Volume 45, our circulation was about 70,000.

Because of the American commitment in Viet Nam, *Foreign Affairs* has given special attention in the past year to the situation in East and Southeast Asia. The list of contributors in that field includes the late Bernard B. Fall, whose article was one of the last things he wrote, as also, many think, one of the best; Kenneth T. Young, who gave for the first time a comprehensive picture of the U.S.-Chinese talks that have continued, off and on, for more than a decade; former Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, who on his return from Tokyo reported on U.S.-Japanese relations; Father L. La Dany, who for many years has analyzed Chinese events from the vantage point of Hong Kong; and Roderick MacFarquhar, Lucian W. Pye, Raul S. Manglapus, Mark Gayn, Guy J. Pauker, and C. P. Fitzgerald.

Among other articles which attracted special attention were Charles Yost's appraisal of the United Nations, which he observed at close hand as a member of the U.S. delegation for five years; McGeorge Bundy's balanced examination of American obligations both abroad and at home; Secretary Freeman's striking picture of the power and responsibilities of the United States as the world's main agricultural producer; and Irving Kristol's controversial critique of the role of American intellectuals in formulating foreign policy.

The use of *Foreign Affairs* articles for teaching purposes appears to be increasing steadily. As one example, The National War College alone reproduced for class-room use no less than 48 *Foreign Affairs* articles during the academic year 1966-67.

To our great regret, Henry M. Wriston has resigned from the Editorial Advisory Board of *Foreign Affairs*, after having been a stimulating and most valued member for over 24 years.

With the last issue of the current volume, Professor Henry L. Roberts, who for seventeen years has edited the *Foreign Affairs* quarterly bibliography, "Recent Books on International Relations," concluded his outstanding service in that capacity. For all but the last few years of that term he annotated the current books unaided; only recently was he assisted by a group of area and functional experts. Mr. Roberts, whose resignation is necessitated by a move

from Columbia to Dartmouth, is being succeeded by John Stoessinger, Professor of International Relations at Hunter College and a member of the U.N. Secretariat, who among other books has written *The Might of Nations*, which won the Bancroft Prize in 1963.

Richard H. Brown, formerly Advertising Manager of *Foreign Affairs*, and afterward Business Manager of the *Herald Tribune's* "Book Week," has returned as Business Manager and Director of Advertising of *Foreign Affairs*. He is assisted by MacLean Hoggson as Advertising Manager. Jennifer Seymour replaced Carolyn Kelley as Editorial Assistant.

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Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Editor
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THE STUDIES PROGRAM

IN A YEAR in which the United States has been engaged in large-scale military operations in Southeast Asia, in reassessment of its relationship with Europe and the Soviet Union, and in a crisis of unknown dimensions in the Middle East, questions of foreign relations have been in the forefront of American concern. Indeed, the directions and structure of America's foreign policy over the past years, the extent of its commitments and means of meeting them, and the allocations of resources among international and domestic interests have been subject to exceptionally much debate. A nonpartisan, private organization engaged in the study of international affairs has a responsibility to devote its energies to sober investigation and discussion of these problems, making what contribution it can to consideration of them by both government and the informed public.

The Council, from its beginnings, has seen the function of its studies program and publications in that light. In the past year it has continued its pattern of combining the research and analysis of experts with the thinking and advice of members of the Council from the business, official, and academic communities. Most timely among the products of this process have been the principal volumes of the Council's recently completed major projects on the Atlantic community and on the United States and China in world politics, especially the books written by the respective directors of the two projects: *The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals* by Harold Van B. Cleveland, and *The United States and China in World Affairs* by Robert Blum, completed and edited by A. Doak Barnett. To carry on from these two projects following a joint meeting of their steering committees, the Council will organize a special discussion group this coming year to re-examine the basic approaches of American foreign policy under the changing world conditions of the coming decade. Charles W. Yost will have charge of the work of this group.

The studies program, as it develops from year to year, is intended to provide a balanced coverage of the major problems of American foreign policy without specializing in any area or topic. The undertaking of a study for publication, with a visiting scholar or permanent staff member as author, generally involves some time for advance planning, a year of concentrated work at the Council during which meetings are held with an advisory study group, and a final period

for revision of the manuscript and publication. The aim is to fit together significant subjects and the best obtainable authors, in order to produce over the years a flow of books of high quality and, equally important, to stimulate the thinking of the able men who comprise the advisory groups. In addition to these projects with study groups, the Council organizes each year some half dozen discussion groups to explore current international problems thoroughly and to consider topics which may be suitable for further study.

Through its Policy Books series and the published Elihu Root Lectures, the Council has sought more flexibility and timeliness in its publications by bringing out in a relatively short time books in which recognized authorities present the fruits of their own experience and thinking in brief and readable form. The twelve Policy Books published since the series was begun in 1962 include broad general subjects in their relation to American interests and policy (e.g., Ernest A. Gross on the United Nations, Adolf A. Berle on Latin America, Arthur H. Dean on disarmament) and special topics of current interest (e.g., Waldemar A. Nielsen on U.S. policy in southern Africa, John W. Evans on new legislation to follow the Kennedy Round). The most recent volume of Elihu Root Lectures was that of James Reston on the relations between the press and the government in the field of foreign policy.

In any given year there will be in residence at the Council a visiting Senior Fellow, two visiting fellows from the Air Force and the Army respectively, a foreign correspondent holding the Edward R. Murrow Fellowship, and a number of research fellows on leave from positions in universities, government, business or journalism. All take part in the study and discussion groups and other activities of the Council in close association with members of the permanent staff. The new International Affairs Fellowship Program, endowed by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, will also associate several outstanding younger people with the Council's program. Thus, on the professional side, as well as among the membership of the Council, there is a continuing infusion of varied experience and fresh points of view.

The following pages describe the work completed or in progress in 1966-67 under a number of headings chosen to show the scope of the studies program, the interrelationship of its different projects, and the continuity of its work from one year to another. Each section mentions, in addition to current study and discussion groups, the books published in the past two years as well as studies that are in the intermediate stages prior to publication.

John C. Campbell
William Diebold, Jr.

Kenneth M. Kauffman
Charles W. Yost

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER

The crucial position of the United States in international affairs has been painfully driven home in the past two decades. This country no longer has the luxury of abstaining from the central world struggles since inaction by the United States can be just as decisive in determining the course of events as action, and America finds itself importuned to take sides in disputes, large and small, in all parts of the world. Illustrative of the profound influence of the United States on the rest of the world and the acute interest of others in this country is the extensive reporting on America in the press abroad which is documented in a recent volume published by the Council, *International Political Communication* by W. Philips Davison. Events of recent years have also raised with increasing insistency the question of whether or not the United States has overextended itself in the world.

Considerations such as these have caused the Council to welcome opportunities to have several basic reappraisals of American foreign policy undertaken from different points of view. During 1966-67 Hans J. Morgenthau, on leave from his position as Director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, held meetings with a study group of which Joseph E. Johnson was the chairman. Professor Morgenthau is completing his book for publication sometime in 1968. In his study he probes the underlying assumptions on which American foreign policy has functioned for the past twenty years. The very success of that policy has created conditions which demand a new response in his view. In particular, he is concerned with what he considers an excessive and anachronistic American propensity for equating all revolutions with threats to this nation.

Another examination of American foreign policy was carried on during the year by Charles Yost. Written from the point of view of a practitioner of many years standing, Mr. Yost's study, *The Insecurity of Nations*, was discussed with a special review group with Henry M. Wriston presiding. Mr. Yost relates foreign policy to the nature of man and modern society and contrasts the dark tragedies into which humanity could fall with the bright promise which is possible if men will exercise more reason and restraint.

Still another approach to the problem of world order was reflected in a volume prepared by Louis Henkin, Professor at the Columbia Law School. This manuscript was also considered by a special review group of which Philip C. Jessup

THE STUDIES PROGRAM

was the chairman. It will be published in 1968 under the title, *How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy*. In this study Mr. Henkin demonstrates that international law exercises a much more profound influence over the behavior of nations than is generally recognized and examines the effect of international law in several specific crises.

VISITING SENIOR FELLOW

Hans J. Morgenthau

A Re-examination of American Foreign Policy

Chairman of Study Group: Joseph E. Johnson

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

THE ARTILLERY OF THE PRESS, by James Reston (1966)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, by W.

Phillips Davison (1965)

AMERICA AND EUROPE

Though the Atlantic Policy Studies are formally over, two of the Council's principal publications during the past year are fruits from that orchard.

The Director, Harold van Buren Cleveland, drew on all the work done for the Atlantic Studies—including several studies not yet published—for a book that in short compass makes a comprehensive re-examination of American policy toward Europe. He takes a hard look at the changes in American-European relations from the late 1940s when the Marshall Plan and NATO were in the center of the stage, to the early 1960s marked by strains on the Alliance and a shifting balance of economic and political power. Translating trade, finance and other specific issues into the terms of broad power relations, Mr. Cleveland suggests the lines of future American policy that will take account of these changes and permit the United States to pursue its major aims whichever way they develop.

In another Atlantic Policy Study, Miriam Camps looks back to the crisis in the European Community that set the French government, the other five and the Commission at odds over agriculture, money and the distribution of power. Examining critically the compromises that were reached, she assesses the limited possibilities of further integration in the next few years, distinguishing between the probability of completion of the customs union and the taking of other related steps, and unlikely further major cessions of national sovereignty. Optimistic about Britain's entry into the Community in the long run, Mrs. Camps recommends continued American support for Western European integration accompanied by a realization that American policy will not be a major factor influencing its course in the next few years.

Outside the Atlantic Studies but closely related in subject matter is Henry Aubrey's pioneer work on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the one body that brings together the Common Market Six, the EFTA Seven, other Western European countries, the United States, Canada, and Japan. What these industrial nations can and cannot accomplish through the OECD, and how its work influences national policies and how OECD relates to other international organizations are key elements in Mr. Aubrey's analysis. Not an organizational study, the book emphasizes the substance of financial, trade, aid and other policies.

Picking up, in a sense, where the Atlantic Policy Studies left off, a discussion group under the chairmanship of Professor Marshall Shulman of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy explored the relation between military stability and political evolution in Europe. Recent developments, such as the negotiations about a nonproliferation treaty and changes in Germany, were looked at in a

THE STUDIES PROGRAM

perspective that took account of the evolution of the cold war, changes in the balance of forces in the world, and political alterations within the Eastern and Western groupings of countries. At three of the four meetings the discussion focused on ideas put forward by the Chairman and other members of the group while at one session the discussion leader was Max Kohnstamm, Vice Chairman of the Committee for a United States of Europe, who assessed the state of European integration and the relation of its future to the possibilities of *détente*, within Europe and between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

DISCUSSION GROUP

Military Stability and Political Evolution in Europe

Chairman: Marshall Shulman

Secretary: Harry Boardman

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

ATLANTIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: The Case of the OECD, by Henry G. Aubrey (1967)

THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS EUROPEAN RIVALS, by Harold van B. Cleveland (1966)

EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN THE SIXTIES: From the Veto to the Crisis, by Miriam Camps (1966)

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, by Henry A. Kissinger (1965)

NATO IN TRANSITION: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance, by Timothy W. Stanley (1965)

STRENGTHENING THE WORLD ECONOMY

In a year that saw the culmination of the hard negotiations of the Kennedy Round, trade was in the forefront of attention. Two quite different but neatly complementary books make up the Council's most recent contributions to a subject in which it has had an old and sustained interest.

One of the Atlantic Policy Studies, Bela Balassa's *Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries* is the culmination of extensive investigation both by the author and by a number of other economists who were commissioned to prepare special studies for him. At the core of the book is Mr. Balassa's statement of the results of elaborate statistical analysis of the probable effects on products and countries of the removal of tariffs, while other chapters deal with related matters such as investment. To draw the policy implications of his analysis, Mr. Balassa puts the trade issues in the perspective of political relations between the United States and Western Europe.

Writing, as did Mr. Balassa, before the Kennedy Round was over, John W. Evans explored the possible next steps for the United States in one of the Council's short Policy Books. Tracing clearly the basic issues with which future trade policy will have to deal—such as the remaining tariffs, nontariff barriers, the special problems of agriculture, and the claims for preferential treatment for the exports of less developed countries—Mr. Evans outlines alternatives and shows why he favors one approach rather than another. He takes full account of the lessons of the Kennedy Round, in which he participated before leaving the Foreign Service at the end of the a long career of work on trade problems that included a number of years as head of the U.S. delegation to GATT.

Private foreign investment, another staple of Council discussion was looked at from a fresh angle during the year by a group under the chairmanship of Walter B. Wriston, who, just after the series closed, was named President of the First National City Bank. The discussions focused on the political problems arising from the relation of American-owned companies abroad to foreign governments. The issues were looked at from the point of view of business and government. Running through much of the inquiry were such basic questions as: Who owes what obligation to whom? Is an American company abroad better off calling on the United States government for help or handling matters by itself? Where does the protection of business interests come in the gamut of things the United States government has to pursue abroad?

At the first meeting several members of the group sketched the experience of their companies: Charles F. Barber of the American Smelting and Refining

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Company, Emilio G. Collado of Standard Oil Company (N.J.), and Hart Perry of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. At the second meeting Anthony Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, spoke of how these problems appeared from his vantage point. The third meeting was devoted to a discussion of the difficulties involved in the application of United States laws to the conduct of American-owned companies abroad. The discussion leaders were Alexander Aranyos of the Fruehauf Corporation and Milan C. Miskovsky, Assistant General Counsel of the U.S. Treasury. At the final session, Professor Raymond Vernon of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration raised a series of questions about whether the emergence of multinational corporations would not alter the role and scope of national sovereignties and future government-business relations as well.

DISCUSSION GROUPS

The Politics of Private Investment

Chairman: Walter B. Wriston

Secretary: William Diebold, Jr.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AMONG INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES:

Objectives and Alternatives, by Bela Balassa (1967)

U.S. TRADE POLICY: New Legislation for the Next Round, by John W. Evans (1967)

ATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL UNITY: Is It Possible?, by John O. Coppock (1966)

MONETARY REFORM FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY, by Robert V. Roosa (1965)

ASIAN UPHEAVALS AND ENIGMAS

Recent years have brought a series of violent upheavals that have affected Asia from the China Sea to the Mediterranean. The list of such events is long and varied and includes the Chinese Great Cultural Revolution, the war in Vietnam, the Indonesian struggle, the Indo-Pakistan war, the Yemen imbroglio and the related struggle in Aden, and the third Arab-Israeli war. These events have overshadowed but not obscured the area's economic problems; they have forced the United States to re-examine and sometimes to revise its policies toward Asia in the light of unexpected changes. The American people are again in a period of intense debate about our foreign policies in general and toward Asia in particular, and the Council has devoted considerable attention recently to Asia.

The most dramatic and enigmatic of the many upheavals is the Great Cultural Revolution which currently dominates Chinese life. The origins and implications of this revolution are still far from clear to Western observers and will require further study and reflection. Fortunately, the volume of studies on China has increased substantially in recent years, and the Council has played a prominent role in this development. Its project on the United States and China in World Affairs has already led to the publication of three books in 1965-66 and three more during the past year. The volume by Professor Lea Williams of Brown University, *The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia*, analyzed the position of the overseas Chinese in the various Southeast Asian countries, their relationship to the Chinese Communist and Nationalist governments and their significance to U.S. policy. Robert Blum's book, *The United States and China in World Affairs*, which was completed by Professor A. Doak Barnett after Dr. Blum's untimely death, was widely praised as setting forth a coherent long-range plan for U.S. policy toward China. *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.), a man with long experience in analyzing Chinese military doctrine, was immediately hailed as providing much needed understanding of Chinese military affairs and thought at a time when the military are assuming a key political role in China. A study by Kenneth T. Young, Jr., on the lengthy bilateral negotiation between the United States and Communist China will soon be published, as will the study by Professor Fred Greene of Williams College on American security interests and arrangements in Asia. The China project has contributed greatly to public thinking at a time when an understanding of China is of paramount importance.

There are few if any regions of the world in which all of the major powers are as deeply involved as they are in South Asia. The evolving relationships

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between India, Pakistan, and the great powers have become increasingly complex over the years, and the problems the United States has encountered in trying to further its national interests in a changing environment have been extremely difficult. During the past year a Council study group with Kenneth T. Young, Jr., as chairman and William J. Barnds as research secretary examined these problems in a series of meetings, and Mr. Barnds is preparing a study that focuses on the changing pattern of such relationships and the issues facing the United States in South Asia.

The recent conflict between the Arab states and Israel not only demonstrated the extent of Israel's military superiority, but also raised questions about future developments in the Arab states and their relations with outside powers. With decision-making power concentrated in the hands of military officers, the study being prepared by Professor J. C. Hurewitz of Columbia University will be especially useful. His study examines the political role of the military in each Middle Eastern country, and relates this to the national policies of the countries and to the policies and military aid programs of outside powers.

STUDY GROUP

South Asia in World Politics

Chairman: Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

Study Director: William J. Barnds

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY by Samuel B. Griffith, II, (1967)

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: Policy, Press and Public Opinion in Asian-American Relations, by John Hohenberg (1967)

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN WORLD AFFAIRS, by Robert Blum; edited by A. Doak Barnett (1966)

THE FUTURE OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Lea E. Williams (1966)

COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE, by Alexander Eckstein (1966)

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CHINA, by A. T. Steele (1966)

POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: Views from Six Continents, edited by A. M. Halpern (1965)

NORTH-SOUTH TENSIONS: THE AFRICAN CASE

The disparities between the rich, industrialized nations and the poor, traditional societies appear not only as economic differences with which foreign aid programs attempt to cope, but also as racial and political tensions. The Council has regularly given attention to these problems since the publication in 1954 of Eugene Staley's *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*. One of the volumes in the Atlantic Policy Studies published during the year, Theodore Geiger's *The Conflicted Relationships*, reviewed in historical depth the encounter of Western civilization with Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the present implications of this transforming relationship for the policies of the western countries.

During 1966-67 that portion of the Council's attention which was directed to relationships between developed and less developed *per se* was largely given to Africa where the racial conflict is particularly acute and the potential for political disorder appears great. In April 1967 the Council and the Royal Institute of International Affairs held at Ditchley Park in Oxfordshire the third in a series of Anglo-American dialogues on the problems of Southern Africa with Kenneth Younger of Chatham House and Waldemar A. Nielsen of the African-American Institute serving as co-chairmen. As were the earlier conferences, this one was financed by a special grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The most recent conference concentrated on the policy issues presented by the situation in Rhodesia and on the probable repercussions of that crisis on the several adjacent countries. The frank exchanges produced a vivid awareness of the political and emotional obstacles to effective action by either Britain or the United States.

Two evening discussions were organized at the Council in advance of the conference to consider issues which were discussed there. At the first of these William B. Buffum, Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations, and Thomas McElhiney, State Department, led a discussion of the status of southern African problems at the United Nations and the effects of U.N. sanctions on Rhodesia. The second meeting explored the position of southern African issues in American foreign policy priorities, with Mr. Nielsen and James T. Harris as discussion leaders. The annual conference of the Committees on Foreign Relations was also devoted to the problems of southern Africa.

During the year arrangements were made for Mr. Nielsen to take part-time leave from his position as President of the African-American Institute in order to devote much of his time during 1967-68 as Visiting Senior Fellow to stimulating and leading the Council's work on Africa. This extends a relationship that has included the Council's publication in 1965 of Mr. Nielsen's book, *African Battle-*

line, and two earlier discussion groups on Africa over which he presided. It is expected that the level of Council attention to African problems in the coming year will be markedly increased.

DISCUSSION GROUP

Southern Africa and the United States

Chairman: Waldemar A. Nielsen

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

THE CONFLICTED RELATIONSHIP: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa, and Latin America by Theodore Geiger (1966)

AFRICAN BATTLELINE: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa, by Waldemar A. Nielsen (1965)

REMNANTS OF EMPIRE: The End of Colonialism, by David W. Wainhouse (1965)

ECONOMIC AID

For more than two decades economic assistance has been an important element of American foreign policy. At the same time U.S. aid policy has undergone a continual evolution. As a consequence, the criteria used to determine aid levels and recipients, the institutional arrangements for dispensing aid, and the countries receiving assistance have changed. Twenty years ago the Marshall Plan spurred European recovery. Today aid is directed to the poorer nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America and increasingly has been designed to promote their economic development. While European recovery was easily linked with U.S. economic and security interest as well as humanitarian ideals, the relationship between the economic development of the less-developed countries and U.S. vital interests is more difficult to establish. Since economic development for most of these countries is a long and tortuous process, frequently it is difficult to establish even the connection between foreign aid and economic betterment. This is unquestionably the basis for a considerable part of the widespread dissatisfaction with U.S. aid programs. But the aid programs remain the primary means available for addressing the problem of extreme economic inequalities among nations.

Because of aid's importance in U.S. foreign policy and because the problems associated with aid are again being widely debated, the Council's program and publications during the year naturally gave attention to this topic. One principal activity was a discussion group on foreign aid policy, of which Carl Kaysen, Director of the Institute for Advanced Study and a former Presidential Assistant, was chairman. John Pincus of the RAND Corporation led one meeting of the group in which the rationale for aid was explored. David E. Bell, Vice President of the Ford Foundation and formerly Administrator of the Agency for International Development, served as discussion leader for a session on the role of aid in the economic development of India, Pakistan, and Taiwan. The following session, led by Hollis Chenery, Professor of Economics at Harvard and formerly an Assistant Administrator of the A.I.D., continued and developed the theme of aid's role in the economic development of the poor nations. The final meetings of the group were led respectively by Charles S. Dennison of the International Minerals & Chemicals Corporation and Abram Chayes, Professor of Law at Harvard and formerly Legal Counsel of the State Department. These sessions explored possible new modes for participation of private enterprise in the developmental process.

The Corporation Seminar in June also dealt with the role of aid as well as that of private enterprise in the economic development process.

In the spring of 1967 the Council published *Trade, Aid and Development:*

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The Rich and Poor Nations, one of the Atlantic Policy Studies. Written by John Pincus, a RAND Corporation economist, this work is a significant contribution to the literature. It examines critically the interests of the developed nations in the economic advance of the poor nations, reviews theories of trade and development, explores commercial policy issues, and weaves these strands into a proposed set of policies for the developed countries.

DISCUSSION GROUP

Foreign Aid Policy

Chairman: Carl Kaysen

Secretary: Kenneth M. Kauffman

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: *The Rich and Poor Nations*, by John Pincus (1967)

THE CONSCIENCE OF THE RICH NATIONS: *The Development Assistance Committee and the Common Aid Effort*, by Seymour J. Rubin (1966)

AMERICA AND THE COMMUNIST WORLD

This is a time of continuing reassessment of the West's relations with Communist China, with the Soviet Union, and with the Communist states of Eastern Europe. The completion of the Council's major project on the United States and China provides no reason to discontinue even temporarily the attention it has given to this general subject, although the degree of concentrated effort must inevitably diminish. The triangular relationship involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and mainland China will undoubtedly loom large in the future. The study currently being undertaken by William Barnds on South Asia as a focus of world politics pays particular attention to the interaction of Chinese, Soviet and American policies in that area.

As to the possible evolution of Soviet policy, the volume in which several expert authors consider the prospects for Soviet society is now being completed under the editorship of Professor Allen Kassof of Princeton. Covering the whole range of Soviet politics and life, it will be not a series of unrelated essays but a well-knit and ordered volume unique among surveys of the Soviet scene.

The states of Eastern Europe continue to go each in its own way; their relations with each other, with the Soviet Union, and with the West have been subject to continuing and sometimes surprising change. A discussion group devoted to military strategy and security in Europe, with Marshall D. Shulman as chairman, took up some of the problems involving Eastern Europe. Two recent Council books, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski's *Alternative to Partition* and John C. Campbell's *Tito's Separate Road*, a Policy Book, examine different aspects of the present and future role of those states.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

TITO'S SEPARATE ROAD: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics, by John C. Campbell (1967)

TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT: The Path of Negotiation, by Arthur H. Dean (1966)

ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITION: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe, by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (1966)

SERIAL PUBLICATIONS

The three Council annuals for a number of years have served as basic reference documents for those concerned with American foreign policy. In April the fortieth edition of the *Political Handbook and Atlas of the World*, 1967 was published. As with all previous editions of this work, the editor was Walter H. Mallory. Walter Mallory was for thirty-two years the executive director of the Council, and this useful handbook, begun in the first year of his term of office, has been his responsibility ever since.

Richard P. Stebbins wrote his sixteenth volume of the series *United States in World Affairs*, 1966 which was published during the summer of 1967. Mr. Stebbins has again produced an account which is outstanding in its historical balance although published only a few months following the events described. The supplementary volume, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, 1966, edited by Mr. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam, conveniently assembles the principal international agreements, treaties, diplomatic notes, policy statements and speeches relating to the events of the year. The two volumes, carefully cross-referenced and annotated, provide a concise record of America's foreign relations in 1966.

As an outgrowth of the extensive bibliographical notes in *Foreign Affairs* the Council has published *Foreign Affairs Bibliography* every ten years, which compiles annotated entries of the important writings on international affairs.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1967, edited by Walter H. Mallory (1967)

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1966, by Richard Stebbins (1967)

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1966, edited by Richard P. Stebbins with the assistance of Elaine P. Adam (1967)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY, 1952-62, by Henry L. Roberts (1964)

SPECIAL FELLOWSHIPS

EDWARD R. MURROW FELLOWSHIP

THE EDWARD R. MURROW FELLOWSHIP, endowed by a generous grant from the CBS Foundation, enables a foreign correspondent to combine participation in the Council program with study at a nearby university. During 1966-67 the fellowship was held by Malcolm W. Browne, who had served previously for several years with the Associated Press and on a free-lance basis in Viet Nam where his reporting earned him a Pulitzer Prize in 1964. He was selected on a competitive basis by an Advisory Committee composed of Edward W. Barrett, Gardner Cowles, Emanuel R. Freedman, Frank Stanton, and Theodore H. White. During the year Mr. Browne studied at Columbia and also took intensive instruction in Chinese. Upon completion of his fellowship he went to the Middle East as a correspondent for *The New York Times*.

The Edward R. Murrow Fellow for 1967-68 is Sol Sanders, Southeast Asian correspondent for *U.S. News and World Report*.

MILITARY FELLOWSHIPS

THIS WAS THE first year in which the Army as well as the Air Force had a Fellow at the Council. Colonel Michael Greene, USA, who had recently returned from a tour of duty in Viet Nam which included service as an advisor to Vietnamese forces and as Secretary of the Joint Staff, U.S. Military Assistance Command Headquarters in Viet Nam, participated in many meetings and spoke to eleven Committees on Foreign Relations. He has been assigned as an aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after his year at the Council.

The sixth Air Force Fellow was Colonel Frederick C. Thayer, Jr., who had served just prior to coming to the Council in the Directorate of Plans of the Air Force Headquarters. Colonel Thayer holds a Ph.D. from the University of Denver. He likewise participated actively in the Council's program. His next assignment is with the Air Transport Wing stationed in Hawaii.

The Army Fellow in 1967-68 will be Colonel Sidney B. Berry, Jr., and the Air Force Fellow will be Colonel Kemper W. Baker.

THE THOMAS J. WATSON MEETINGS

ENDOWED by a magnificent gift from the children of Thomas J. Watson, the program of meetings continues to be one of the most important activities of the Council. Inevitably Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, received substantial attention, but European affairs also were discussed in many meetings reflecting the importance of the region and the significance to this country of efforts to find a new balance and organization in Europe. All the major foreign problems of the United States and all regions of the world were considered during the course of the year.

Council members were again provided an authoritative review of the developments in Viet Nam and United States policies there. General William C. Westmoreland and General Victor Krulak, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, reported directly upon the military progress and problems. Earlier in the year, the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold Johnson, returned to the Council to review the military prospects at a general meeting and afterwards, at a small dinner, engaged in further discussion with a group of members most particularly concerned with United States conduct and policies in Viet Nam. Harrison Salisbury, whose articles in *The New York Times* on North Viet Nam drew world-wide attention, spoke on the conclusions he reached as a result of his trip there. The Foreign Minister of Viet Nam, His Excellency Tran Van Do, provided rewarding insights into Vietnamese thinking on the political and social issues of the war. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, following the Manila Conference, analyzed significant factors in Southeast Asia which provide the larger context for policies in Viet Nam. Concern for the issues of the war in Viet Nam affected other meetings, for example those with the Prime Minister of Australia, the President of the Philippines, and the Foreign Minister of Thailand.

Council members continued to be deeply concerned with the changing political and economic conditions in Europe and with the appropriate United States response to these developments. The dramatic reshaping of relations among the nations of Europe—east and west—was the theme of contrasting analyses provided Council members by a wide range of pre-eminent European government

and political leaders. While the identity of national interests was under renewed scrutiny, the interaction of the national state with the European institutions remained clearly vital; British entry into the European Economic Community and the contribution this would make to strengthening the European institutions was frequently discussed. Notable among these meetings were those for the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany; the Finance Ministers of Britain and of France and the Minister of Economics of Germany; the newly elected Chairman of the Commission of the European Communities, Jean Rey; the leader of the Conservative Party in Great Britain, Edward Heath; and the leader of the French Independent Republican Party, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. American perspectives on these developments were provided by, among others, Ambassadors Bohlen, Schaetzel, and Tyler.

Implicit in many discussions of developments in Europe and of relations with the United States, and explicit in a number, was the ambiguous state of affairs between the Soviet Union and the United States. Council members met on several occasions during the year with members of the Soviet government and intellectual community, and benefited by the analysis of current Soviet attitudes by both Ambassador Foy Kohler, immediately upon conclusion of his tour of duty in Moscow, and by Marshall Shulman, shortly after a visit to the Soviet Union.

The Elihu Root Lectures this year were delivered by the Honorable Francis T. P. Plimpton. Mr. Plimpton's second lecture occurred on the day of the Egyptian request for the removal of the United Nations troops in Egypt, and the third lecture occurred shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. On both occasions, Ambassador Plimpton abandoned much of his prepared text in order to talk, with great benefit for those present, upon the developing crisis in the Middle East and its implication for the United Nations.

During the year 108 meetings were held. The listing below is, of course, arbitrary in the rubrics used. There were 32 general afternoon meetings, and following 11 of these there were small dinners for groups of members who had indicated a special interest in the subject being discussed. There were 11 large dinners and 1 large luncheon, and 29 roundtable luncheons and dinners. In addition to these meetings there were 35 smaller meetings on subjects of more specialized interest.

Harry Boardman
Director of Meetings

THE ELIHU ROOT LECTURES, 1966-67

THE HONORABLE FRANCIS T. P. PLIMPTON
*Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States
to the United Nations, 1961-65*

Douglas Dillon
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
The Honorable John J. McCloy
Presiding

"REFLECTIONS ON A GLASS HOUSE"

"The United Nations and Peace:
Producing It, Preserving It,
and Paying for It"

- | | |
|--|--------------|
| I. "Reflections on Peace and the Past" | May 11, 1967 |
| II. "Reflections on Peace and its Price" | May 18, 1967 |
| III. "Reflections on Peace and the Future" | May 24, 1967 |

AFRICA

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

DR. K. A. BUSIA
*Vice-Chairman, Political Committee of the
National Liberation Council, Ghana*
"Ghana After Nkrumah"

Waldemar A. Nielsen
October 5, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

□
DAVID PIETER DE VILLIERS
Senior Counsel, Republic of South Africa
"Aspects of the South West Africa Case"

George S. Franklin, Jr.
June 20, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

□
WILLIAM R. DUGGAN
Member, Policy Planning Council
"Alternatives for U.S. Policy in Southern Africa"

Philip W. Quigg
June 14, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

AFRICA (CONTINUED)

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

ROBERT C. GOOD
United States Ambassador to Zambia
"Zambia: Its Prospects—and the Price of
Confronting Rhodesian U.D.I."

□
HAROLD K. HOCHSCHILD
Honorary Chairman, American Metal Climax, Inc.
"Perspectives on Zambia and Rhodesia"

□
SIMON M. KAPWEPWE
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Zambia
"Zambia and Rhodesia"

□
KENNETH D. KAUNDA
President of the Republic of Zambia
"Zambia and Rhodesia"

□
EDWARD KORRY
United States Ambassador to Ethiopia
"Ethiopia and Tropical Africa"

□
SIR W. ARTHUR LEWIS
*Professor of Economics and International Affairs,
Woodrow Wilson School*
"Nigeria"

□
CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL
*Professor of International Politics
School for Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University*
"An Appraisal of the Realities in Southern Africa
and their Implication for United States Policy"

□
FRANCIS NWOKEDI
*Unofficial Representative
The Government of Enugu (Biafra)*
"A Case for Eastern Nigeria"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

Waldemar A. Nielsen
June 6, 1967
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

Waldemar A. Nielsen
February 9, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

Ernest A. Gross
November 4, 1966
Roundtable Luncheon

Charles W. Yost
November 16, 1966
General Meeting

Charles W. Yost
February 20, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

Philip W. Quigg
April 4, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

William A. Hance
January 26, 1967
General Meeting

William Diebold, Jr.
June 19, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

MEETINGS

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

David Rockefeller
June 2, 1967
General Dinner

Arthur J. Goldberg
February 15, 1967
General Meeting

Waldemar A. Nielsen
April 6, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

William Diebold, Jr.
December 19, 1966
Roundtable Luncheon

Ernest A. Gross
November 22, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

Charles W. Cole
December 28, 1966
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

John W. Tuthill
February 7, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

JOSEPH PALMER, 2ND
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
"The United States and Southern Africa"

□
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY HAILE SELASSIE I
Emperor of Ethiopia
"The Modern Role of Ethiopia"

□
GUENNADI S. STACHEVSKI
*First Secretary, Permanent Mission
of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations
and*

VALENTIN N. BEREZOVSKY
*Attaché, Permanent Mission
of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations*
"Problems of Southern Africa: A Russian View"

□
HELEN SUZMAN
*Member of Parliament, Progressive Party,
South Africa*
"South African Developments"

□
FRANKLIN H. WILLIAMS
United States Ambassador to Ghana
"Prospects in Ghana"

THE AMERICAS

RALPH A. DUNGAN
United States Ambassador to Chile
"Prospects in Chile and an Appraisal
of the Last Two Years"

□
PAULO EGYDIO MARTINS
Minister of Commerce and Industry, Brazil
"Economic Problems and Progress in Brazil"

THE AMERICAS (CONTINUED)

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

ERIC KIERANS
Minister of Revenue,
Province of Quebec, 1963-65
"Canadian Economic Nationalism"

□
ISRAEL KLabin
Head, Klabin, Rimaos and Company, Brazil
"Aspects of Political and Economic
Progress in Latin America"

□
NICANOR COSTA MENDEZ
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Argentina
"Political Structure and National Objectives
of Argentina Today"

□
LT. GEN. BRUCE PALMER
Commanding General,
XVIII United States Army Airborne Corps
"Lessons to be Learned from the Dominican Republic"

□
ANASTASIO SOMOZA DEBAYLE
President-elect of Nicaragua
"Political and Economic Prospects in Nicaragua"

□
JOHN W. TUTHILL
United States Ambassador to Brazil
"Brazil and the Road to Monticello"

□
MIGUEL S. WIONCZEK
Head, Information Department,
Center for Latin America Monetary Studies
"The Present and Future of Economic
Integration in Latin America"

MIDDLE EAST

JAMSHID AMUZEGAR
Minister of Finance, Iran
"Economic and Social Prospects in Iran"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

August Maffry
May 15, 1967
General Meeting

G. A. Costanzo
December 1, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

Francis T. P. Plimpton
September 26, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

Edmund A. Gullion
October 26, 1966
Roundtable Dinner

George S. Franklin, Jr.
March 22, 1967
General Meeting

Adolf A. Berle
June 1, 1967
General Meeting

William Diebold, Jr.
May 31, 1967
Roundtable Meeting
and Dinner

David E. Lilienthal
September 22, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

MEETINGS

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

J. C. Hurewitz
December 12, 1966
General Meeting

David E. Lilienthal
May 4, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

Joseph E. Johnson
January 9, 1967
General Dinner

Grayson Kirk
April 13, 1967
General Luncheon

Hamilton Fish Armstrong
June 13, 1967
General Meeting

George W. Ball
June 22, 1967
Roundtable Meeting
and Dinner

Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
November 21, 1966
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

Hamilton Fish Armstrong
October 3, 1966
General Meeting

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

MORDECHAI M. BAR-ON
Chief of Education, The Israel Defense Forces
"Israel and Its Arab Neighbors:
The Security Outlook"

□
KHODADAD FARMANFARMAIAN
Deputy Director, Central Bank of Iran
"Economic Conditions and Development in Iran"

□
RAYMOND A. HARE
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, 1965-66
"Trends and Problems in the Middle East"

□
CEVDET SUNAY
President of Turkey
"Turkey and the West"

□
CHARLES W. YOST
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
"The Middle East Crisis"

□
MIDDLE EAST SEMINAR
"The Middle East Crisis"

ASIA

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs
"Perspectives on the Manila Conference"

□
MARSHALL GREEN
United States Ambassador to Indonesia
"Prospects in Indonesia"

ASIA (CONTINUED)

MEETINGS

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING

JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
*Deputy Director, Office of Research and Analysis
for Far East, State Department*
and

A. Doak Barnett
May 1, 1967
General Meeting

PAUL H. KREISBERG
*Officer in Charge for Mainland China Affairs,
State Department*
"Perspectives on the Chinese Cultural Revolution:
Events on the Mainland and Their Impact Upon
U.S. and Soviet Interests"

□
HAROLD E. HOLT
Prime Minister of Australia
"Australia and Its Role In World Affairs,
With Special Reference to Southeast Asia"

George S. Moore
June 9, 1967
General Meeting

□
THANAT KHOMAN
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
"New Asian Steps Toward Security"

Grayson Kirk
October 11, 1966
General Dinner

□
NOBUSUKE KISHI
Prime Minister of Japan, 1957-60
"A Conversation about Developments in
Japan, China, and Asia"

Thomas E. Dewey
March 21, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

□
LEONID NIKOLAEVICH KUTAKOV
*Senior Advisor to the Mission of the
U.S.S.R. to the United Nations*
"Problems of East Asia"

A. Doak Barnett
March 6, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

□
MOHAMMAD HASHIM MAIWANDWAL
Prime Minister of Afghanistan
"Political and Social Transformation in Afghanistan"

Fowler Hamilton
April 6, 1967
Roundtable Dinner

□
RAUL S. MANGLAPUS
Senator, Republic of the Philippines
"Reflections on the Problems of the
Philippines and Southeast Asia"

Philip W. Quigg
November 17, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

PRESIDER, DATE AND
TYPE OF MEETING

FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Republic of the Philippines
"The Philippines and the Prospects for the Continuing
Evolution of National States in Southeast Asia"

John D. Rockefeller, 3rd
September 21, 1966
General Meeting

□
GRAHAM A. MARTIN
United States Ambassador to Thailand
"Thailand and Southeast Asia"

George F. Gant
May 2, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

□
NOBUMOTO OHAMA
President, Southern Nationals Assistance Association
"The Status and Welfare of Okinawa"

Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
April 19, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

□
HARRISON E. SALISBURY
Assistant Managing Editor, The New York Times
"A Report from Viet Nam"

Lucian W. Pye
February 14, 1967
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

□
SOEDJATMOKO
*Deputy Permanent Representative of Indonesia
to the United Nations*
"Recent Developments in Indonesia"

Walter J. Levy
December 15, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

□
TRAN VAN DO
Foreign Minister of Viet Nam
"Viet Nam"

Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
April 25, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

□
EIJI WAJIMA
*Executive Director,
Kajima Institute of International Peace*
"Japan's International Role"

Douglas W. Overton
October 18, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

□
C. K. YEN
*Vice President and Premier
The Government of the Republic of China*
"Taiwan and the Mainland of China"

Lucian W. Pye
May 16, 1967
Roundtable Dinner

ASIA (CONTINUED)

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

BARRY ZORTHIAN
United States Counselor of Embassy
for Public Affairs, Viet Nam
"The Problem of Communicating about Viet Nam"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

William Attwood
July 20, 1966
General Meeting

WESTERN EUROPE

ROBERT ANDERSON
Country Director, France and Benelux, Bureau
of European Affairs, Department of State
"The Significance of French Legislative Elections"

Ben T. Moore
February 20, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

GEORGES BERTHOIN
Deputy Chief, Delegation of the High Authority
of the Coal and Steel Community in the
United Kingdom
"The Politics of Britain and the Community"

Ben T. Moore
April 27, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

ERIK BLUMENFELD
Chairman, Christian Democratic Union, Hamburg
"Political Issues in Germany"

Shepard Stone
February 28, 1967
Roundtable Dinner

CHARLES E. BOHLEN
United States Ambassador to France
"France and Its European and Atlantic Relations"

Douglas Dillon
February 7, 1967
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

WILLY BRANDT
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chancellor,
Federal Republic of Germany
"Germany, Europe and the Atlantic Community"

John J. McCloy
February 9, 1967
General Dinner

MEETINGS

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

JAMES CALLAGHAN
Chancellor of the Exchequer, United Kingdom
"The British Economy: Present and Future Prospects"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

John J. McCloy
September 23, 1966
General Meeting

MICHEL DEBRE
Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, France
"French Economic Development: Its Prospects and
Role in Europe"

William A. M. Burden
September 27, 1966
General Dinner

VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING
Minister of Finance, France, 1962-66
Deputy and Leader, Republicain-Indépendant
"France: Its Politics and Its Relations in the Alliance"

David Rockefeller
December 8, 1966
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

DESMOND DONNELLY
Labour Member of Parliament for Pembroke, Wales
"A Perspective on the Politics of West Europe"

Shepard Stone
April 13, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

JACQUES DUHAMEL
Deputy and Member, Council of State, France,
Representing the Department of Jura and Member,
Central Committee, Centre Démocratique Party
"The Political Evolution in France Since the
Presidential Election"

August Heckscher
July 25, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

PIERRE EMANUELLI
Executive Director, The French Association
for the Atlantic Community
"The French Public and Europe"

Harold van B. Cleveland
November 9, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

HENRI FAYAT
Minister of European Affairs, Belgium, 1961-66
"The European Community: Prospects in the
Near Future"

Ben T. Moore
November 7, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

PIERRE-EUGENE GILBERT
Candidate for Parliament,
Centre Démocratique Party, France
"A Perspective on the Future for France and Europe"

Philip E. Mosely
January 19, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

WESTERN EUROPE (CONTINUED)

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

KARL GRUBER
Staatssekretär, Federal Chancellery, Austria
"Austria: Between East and West"

□

LOUIS J. HALLE
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
"De Gaulle and the Future of Europe"

□

EDWARD HEATH
Leader of the Opposition, United Kingdom
"Britain and Europe"

□

ROY JENKINS
The Secretary of State for the Home Department, United Kingdom

□

MAX KOHNSTAMM
Vice President, Action Committee for a United States of Europe
"Germany and Europe"

□

ROBERT MARJOLIN
Vice President, Commission of the European Economic Community
"A Conversation About the European Community"

□

ROBERT MARJOLIN
Vice President, Commission of the European Economic Community
"The European Community: Accomplishments and Prospects"

□

REGINALD MAUDLING
Deputy Chairman, Consultative Committee of the Leader of the Opposition United Kingdom
"Foreign Policy Issues for the West"

□

ROBERT MITTERRAND
Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste
"Politics in France"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

Robert D. Murphy
April 18, 1967
Roundtable Dinner

Charles W. Yost
October 19, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

John J. McCloy
March 20, 1967
General Dinner

Robert R. Bowie
September 29, 1966
Roundtable Dinner

Henry A. Kissinger
December 6, 1966
Roundtable Dinner

Alfred C. Neal
September 30, 1966
Roundtable Luncheon

George W. Ball
June 13, 1967
Roundtable Dinner

Robert V. Roosa
June 22, 1967
Roundtable Dinner

Shepard Stone
October 24, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

MEETINGS

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

GUSTAV PETREN
Secretary General, Swedish Delegation to the Nordic Council
"The Dilemma of the Nordic Nations Regarding European Integration"

□

JEAN REY
Member of the Commission of the European Economic Community
"The Current State of European Problems"

□

J. ROBERT SCHAEZEL
United States Ambassador to the European Communities
"The Common Market: After the Kennedy Round and into British Negotiations"

□

KARL SCHILLER
Minister for Economics, Federal Republic of Germany
"The Problems and Prospects of the West German Economy"

□

HELMUT SCHMIDT
Leader of the Parliamentary Faction, Social Democratic Party, Federal Republic of Germany
"Profile of the German Détente Policy"

□

JEAN-LOUIS TIXIER-VIGNANCOUR
President, Alliance Républicaine, France
"Political Prospects in France"

□

LUJO TONCIC-SORINJ
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Austria
"Europe: Towards Diversity or Unity?"

□

WILLIAM R. TYLER
United States Ambassador to the Netherlands
"A Conversation About Political Issues in Europe"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

Harold van B. Cleveland
June 15, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

Robert R. Bowie
June 8, 1967
General Meeting and Roundtable Dinner

Philip E. Mosely
June 5, 1967
General Meeting

Gabriel Hauge
June 16, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

Shepard Stone
May 15, 1967
Roundtable Dinner

August Heckscher
January 24, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

Philip E. Mosely
October 3, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

Waldemar A. Nielsen
May 5, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

WESTERN EUROPE (CONTINUED)

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

ERNST VAN DER BEUGEL
Honorary Secretary of The Bilderberg Meetings
"A Conversation About Europe"

□

PETER E. WALKER
Conservative Member of Parliament,
Spokesman on Transport
"Britain's Economy and Labour's
New Wage/Price Legislation"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

Harold van B. Cleveland
June 6, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

Charles M. Spofford
September 13, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE

JOHN C. CAMPBELL
Senior Research Fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations
"Report on Yugoslavia"

□

LASZLO HAMBURGER
Director General, MEDIMPEX, Hungary
"East-West Trade and Hungary"

□

NIKOLAI NIKOLAIEVICH INOZEMTSEV
Director, The Institute of World Economy
and International Relations, Moscow
"A Russian Perspective on International Affairs"

□

FOY D. KOHLER
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
United States Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., 1962-66
"Current Soviet Attitudes in Perspective"

□

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Professor of International Politics,
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
"A Report on Attitudes Perceived in the
Soviet Union on Foreign Policy Issues"

John Richardson, Jr.
January 10, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

Antonie T. Knoppers
September 27, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

Joseph E. Johnson
November 14, 1966
Roundtable Dinner

Hamilton Fish Armstrong
January 17, 1967
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

Charles W. Yost
December 13, 1966
General Meeting and
Roundtable Dinner

MEETINGS

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

SHEPARD STONE
Advisor to the President of the Ford Foundation
on International Activities
"Impressions in Eastern Europe"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

Emilio G. Collado
April 26, 1967
Roundtable Meeting

ECONOMIC

OTTINO CARACCILO DI FORINO
Director, Field Liaison Division, OECD, Paris
"The Evolution of Economic Relations Among
Atlantic Nations"

William Diebold, Jr.
November 2, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

□

ORVILLE L. FREEMAN
Secretary of Agriculture
"American Agriculture and World Economic Change"

Carroll L. Wilson
February 15, 1967
General Dinner

□

WILLIAM S. GAUD
Administrator, United States Agency
for International Development
"New Developments in AID"

Hart Perry
June 12, 1967
General Dinner

□

CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON
Foreign Editor, The Financial Times, London
"Britain and Europe: Political and Economic Issues"

William Diebold, Jr.
March 27, 1967
Roundtable Luncheon

□

AUBREY JONES
Chairman, The National Board for
Incomes and Prices
"The Wage and Price Freeze and the British Economy"

Robert V. Roosa
November 3, 1966
Roundtable Meeting

□

PIERRE-PAUL SCHWEITZER
Managing Director, International Monetary Fund
"International Monetary Reform"

John J. McCloy
May 22, 1967
General Dinner

ECONOMIC (CONTINUED)

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

ANDREW SHONFIELD
*Director of Studies, Royal Institute of
 International Affairs*
 "The British Economy and the World Economy"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

Robert V. Roosa
 September 20, 1966
 Roundtable Meeting
 and Dinner

MILITARY

GEN. HAROLD K. JOHNSON, USA
Chief of Staff, United States Army
 "Viet Nam"

Lucian W. Pye
 November 15, 1966
 General Meeting and
 Roundtable Dinner

□
 GEN. VICTOR H. KRULAK, USMC
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
 "The Many Faces of the Viet Nam War"

Arthur H. Dean
 January 30, 1967
 General Meeting

□
 GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, USA
*Commander, United States Military Assistance
 Command, Viet Nam*
 "Viet Nam"

John J. McCloy
 April 24, 1967
 General Meeting

POLITICAL

LEONARD BEATON
Editor, The Round Table
 "Nonproliferation: Treaty Prospects
 and Related Issues"

John G. Palfrey
 November 10, 1966
 General Meeting and
 Roundtable Dinner

□
 THE LORD CHALFONT
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom
 "Obstacles to, Arguments and Prospects
 for a Nonproliferation Treaty"

Henry M. Wriston
 December 15, 1966
 General Dinner

MEETINGS

SPEAKER AND TOPIC

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG
*United States Permanent Representative to
 the United Nations*
 "Issues Before the Twenty-first General Assembly"

PRESIDER, DATE AND TYPE OF MEETING

John J. McCloy
 January 26, 1967
 General Dinner

□
 PAUL G. HOFFMAN
Administrator, United Nations Development Program
 "Peace Building: Stepchild in Foreign Policy"

Marshall D. Shulman
 June 7, 1967
 Roundtable Luncheon

□
 VLADIMIR P. PAVLICHENKO
*Deputy Director, External Relations Division,
 United Nations Office of Public Information*
 "A Conversation about Nuclear Proliferation"

William C. Foster
 October 5, 1966
 Roundtable Dinner

□
 DUNCAN SANDYS
Member of Parliament, United Kingdom
 "Nuclear Proliferation"

Hans J. Morgenthau
 November 22, 1966
 Roundtable Meeting

□
 SWIDBERT SCHNIPPENKOETTER
*Permanent Delegate of the
 Federal Republic of Germany
 to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference*
 "German Perspectives on the
 Disarmament Negotiations"

Philip W. Quigg
 April 14, 1967
 Roundtable Luncheon

COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

NATIONAL concern about the continued war in Viet Nam and the role of China in East Asia were reflected in the high proportion of Committee meetings devoted to these and related subjects during the season. Thus 62 meetings focused on Southeast Asia, including Viet Nam, and China was the theme at 11 meetings. Eight meetings centered on India, 3 on Japan, and 1 on the South Pacific territories. "Asia After Britain" was the topic of 3 meetings.

Interest in Eastern Europe and East-West relations was also high, and 19 meetings were held on these topics. Soviet foreign policy, Sino-Soviet relations, and Yugoslavia were discussed at 7, 4, and 5 meetings, respectively.

Multinational European organizations and European unity were discussed at 15 meetings and the Atlantic Alliance at 2. Sixteen meetings centered upon the closely related matter of French foreign policy. The conditions and international attitudes in other European countries were taken up at 21 meetings.

Twenty-one meetings were devoted to different countries or parts of Africa, 16 to various developments in Latin America, and 14 to Israel and the Middle East. In addition, 12 meetings focused on technical and economic assistance and related economic matters involving the developing countries.

Meetings were also held to discuss such varied matters as international monetary problems and reform proposals (4), food and population problems (2), labor in international affairs (2), strategy, propaganda, nationalism, world revolution, neutralism, arms control, the United Nations and the Antarctic.

The Committees held 257 meetings during the season, a record number, at which the over-all average attendance was 28. The Council arranged or played a part in arranging about 70 per cent of these meetings, while the Committees secured the speakers for the remainder. Meetings were addressed by a total of 144 statesmen or other experts on foreign affairs, of whom 91 were Americans who spoke at 140 meetings. The remaining 53 were of other nationalities, and spoke at 117 meetings. Current Committee membership is 2,325.

Forty-five meetings were led by Council members: namely, A. Doak Barnett; Frank R. Barnett; Whitman Bassow; William P. Bundy; Col. Donald S. Bussey, USA; Robert Byrnes; John C. Campbell; L. Gray Cowan; William B. Dale; Douglas Dillon; Thomas L. Farmer; Fulton Freeman; Roswell L. Gilpatric;

Ernest A. Gross; Raymond A. Hare; Gabriel Hauge; Gen. Harold K. Johnson, USA; Hans Kohn; George Loft; Edwin O. Reischauer; Roger Revelle; Arnold Rivkin; Robert V. Roosa; Harrison Salisbury; John Scott; Francis X. Sutton; Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, USA (Ret.); George L-P Weaver; Clifton R. Wharton, Jr.; and Charles W. Yost.

Other Americans who met with the Committees included: John Hans Adler; Ward P. Allen; Arnold C. Brackman; Miriam Camps; Raul H. Castro; Ransom Cook; Philip Davidson; Olcott H. Deming; Alex N. Dragnich; Donald A. Dumont; Francis J. Galbraith; Marshall Green; Col. Michael J. L. Greene, USA; Immanuel C. Y. Hsu; William Leonhart; Covey T. Oliver; Juan de Onis; Joseph Palmer, 2nd; I. Milton Sacks; John Scali; C. Hart Schaaf; Neil Sheehan; Carlton Skinner; William H. Sullivan; Seymour Topping; and T. Graydon Upton.

Experts and statesmen of other nationalities who led Committee discussions included: Chief S. O. Adebó, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations; Jean Beliard, Director, Press and Information Division, French Cultural Services, French Embassy; Max Beloff, Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration, All Souls College, Oxford University; Sigismund von Braun, Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations; Count Ottino Caracciolo di Forino, Head, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Information Service, Paris; Jan Chowaniec, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of the Polish People's Republic, Washington, D.C.; William Clark, Director, Overseas Development Institute, London; Henri Fayat, Minister for European Affairs (1965-66), Brussels; José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica; Héctor García Godoy, Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, Washington, D.C.; Gen. Sir John Glubb, former Commander, Jordan Legion; J. M. Greenfield, former Minister of Home Affairs, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Alfred Grosser, Director, Studies and Research, National Foundation of Science and Politics, Paris; Karl Gruber, State Secretary, Federal Chancellery, Vienna; Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel, Washington, D.C.; Georgiy F. Kalinkin, Assistant Legal Counsel, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Secretariat; Ernst Lemberger, Ambassador of Austria, Washington, D.C.; Chief Michael Lukumbuzya, Ambassador of the United Republic of Tanzania, Washington, D.C.; Lord Nathan, 2nd Baron, F.R.S.A., F.R.G.S., London; Hans Nord, Secretary General, European Parliament; Peter Parker, M.V.O., Chairman, Bookers Engineering and Industrial Holdings, Ltd., London; Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, United Kingdom (1964-66); Andrew Shonfield, Director of

Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs; Vojislav Stanovcic, Editor, *Socialism*, Belgrade; Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan; Barbara Ward, Assistant Editor, *The Economist*; S. Y. Wu, former Cabinet Minister, Republic of China; and Shunichi Yamanaka, Counselor, Embassy of Japan.

On June 2 and 3 the Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference of Committees was held at the Council. The theme was "The Problems of Southern Africa and Their Significance to the United States." Together with a number of experts on the subject, Committee Representatives and other members considered the immediate and long-term issues facing the United States in southern Africa, and the possible effects upon the American interest—interpreted broadly—of the various alternatives that have been urged upon United States policy-makers.

A number of Council members took leading roles in the daytime sessions on June 2. John T. Ryan, Jr., and William Diebold, Jr., were chairmen, and Ernest A. Gross, John Davenport, George Loft, James T. Harris, Jr., and Waldemar A. Nielsen spoke on various aspects of the subject. Gwendolen M. Carter of Northwestern University discussed the situation in South Africa.

The speaker at the dinner meeting of the Conference the same day, which was attended by a substantial number of Council members in addition to those mentioned above, was Joseph Palmer, 2nd, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. David Rockefeller was chairman. On June 3, Committee Representatives met in regional groups to exchange ideas on ways of strengthening the programs of their Committees. After this, Waldemar Nielsen moderated a discussion of the major policy problems relating to southern Africa.

Roland H. Bushner
Director, Committees on Foreign Relations

AFFILIATED COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ALBUQUERQUE • ATLANTA • AUSTIN • BILLINGS • BIRMINGHAM
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DES MOINES • DETROIT • HOUSTON • INDIANAPOLIS • LITTLE ROCK
• LOS ANGELES • LOUISVILLE • NASHVILLE • OMAHA • PHILADELPHIA
• PORTLAND, Me. • PORTLAND, Ore. • PROVIDENCE • ROCHESTER •
ST. LOUIS • ST. PAUL-MINNEAPOLIS • SALT LAKE CITY • SAN
FRANCISCO • SANTA BARBARA • SEATTLE • TUCSON • TULSA •
WICHITA • WORCESTER

CORPORATION SERVICE

THE CORPORATION SERVICE has become one of the Council's more important activities since it was instituted fourteen years ago. The number of participating and contributing companies now taking part in the program is 114. Subscribers, who pay \$1,000 or more annually, receive the following benefits:

1. Invitations to name an executive to participate in the Council's Seminars for Business Executives, held twice yearly.
2. An annual off-the-record dinner limited to chairmen and presidents of member companies.
3. Free consultations with members of the Council's staff on international political and economic affairs relating to activities of the member company.
4. Use of the Council's outstanding specialized library on international affairs.
5. Six subscriptions to *Foreign Affairs* for company executives and copies of all other Council publications.

This year's Corporation Service Dinner on April 17 was addressed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard M. Helms, who spoke on "Intelligence in the American Society." Fifty-six board chairmen, presidents and senior partners of member firms attended.

The first of this year's Seminars was held on February 6 and 7, and was successfully completed in spite of disrupted travel as a result of heavy snows. It followed the two-day format established a year ago, to make participation easier for companies located at a distance from New York. There were six formal meetings in all, plus a discussion session. The subject was "Europe and the United States, 1967." The program concluded with the participation of various corporate representatives at a regular Council dinner for the Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Willy Brandt.

The spring Seminar was held on June 12 and 13. The program dealt with "New Developments in Aid" and consisted of six formal meetings and two divided discussion sessions.

A breakdown of the topics and speakers presented in the two Seminar programs held this past year is listed on the following pages.

Richard H. Brown
Director, Corporation Service

WINTER 1967 SEMINAR

"EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 1967"

I. "The U.S.S.R. and the Atlantic Community"

Speaker: Marshall D. Shulman, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

II. "The United States and Europe 1967"

Speaker: Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State

III. "Political Issues Inside Europe"

Speaker: Henry A. Kissinger, Professor of Government, Center for International Affairs, Harvard

IV. "The European Communities"

Speaker: J. Robert Schaetzel, United States Ambassador to the European Communities

V. "East-West Relations"

Speaker: John C. Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations

VI. Discussion Group on "European Communities"

Discussion Leader: Mrs. Miriam Camps, Policy Planning Council, Department of State

VII. "France and its European and Atlantic Relations"

Speaker: Charles E. Bohlen, United States Ambassador to France

SPRING 1967 SEMINAR

"NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN AID"

I. "A Case for Aid"

Speaker: David Rockefeller, President, Chase Manhattan Bank

II. "International Approaches to Aid"

Speaker: Michael L. Lejeune, Director of Administration, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

III. Discussion Groups:

Discussion Leaders: William Diebold, Jr., Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
David W. MacEachron, Deputy Executive Director, Council on Foreign Relations

IV. "The United States and Aid"

Speaker: William S. Gaud, Administrator, United States Agency for International Development

V. Discussion Groups:

Discussion Leaders: Thomas Farmer, General Counsel, United States Agency for International Development
John Burnett, Executive Vice President, Development and Resources Corporation

VI. "World Population and Food"

Speaker: Lester R. Brown, Administrator, International Agricultural Development Service; U.S. Department of Agriculture

VII. "Aid as an Instrument for Development"

Speaker: David Bell, Vice President, The Ford Foundation

VIII. "Aid and the Private Sector"

Speaker: Carl Kaysen, Director, The Institute for Advanced Studies

FOREIGN RELATIONS LIBRARY

ON DECEMBER 1, 1966, the Council Library began operations as the Foreign Relations Library, a separate corporation under a charter granted by the Regents of the University of the State of New York. Affiliated with the Council, the Library continues to function as it has before, with much the same policies and staff. Since members continue to be interested in the work of the Library, the officers of the Council have included this description of the Foreign Relations Library's activities for the period ending June 30, 1967. Officers of the new corporation are: President, Grayson Kirk; Executive Vice-President, George S. Franklin, Jr.; Vice-Presidents, David W. MacEachron and John Temple Swing; Treasurer, Ruth Witherspoon; Secretary, Donald Wasson.

Reference use of the Library during the period covered by this report continued at the same high level as in the previous two years, with circulation up slightly over the past year. Since the Atlantic and China projects had added significantly to the Library's work load, the continuing rise in use after the completion of these projects shows a strong upward trend in the demand for the Library's services.

The total number of bound volumes, including books, documents and periodicals, now stands at 48,500, an increase over last year. The collection of United Nations documents increased to a total of more than 116,000. Documents of the European Communities and other international organizations continue to form an important part of the collections. Increased purchases of new books, revised editions of older works and new periodicals have enhanced the value of the resources of the Library and kept them thoroughly up-to-date. Attention is being given to purchase of multiple copies of certain periodicals which are in heavy demand.

The filing of clippings rose slightly over last year, with about 31,000 pieces having been added to this unique collection.

A start has been made on micro-filming the clipping file with a first shipment to the processor, and completion is expected in about six months. Although the original intention was to cover only the period from 1946-1956, it has now been decided to put the files on microfilm from their beginning in the 1930s through 1956.

File space is expected to be reduced by one-half because of the microfilming.

As a result, plans are being made to enlarge stack space by introducing new shelving equipment in vacated areas and by replacing older equipment.

Now that the task of sorting and arranging the Council archives has been almost completed, the Foreign Relations Library will assume responsibility for their continuing indexing and maintenance.

Cooperation with other libraries and other organizations continued actively in a number of ways. Advice was given to a number of organizations on administrative matters and collections policies, and the Foreign Relations Library has become a supporter of METRO, a system of Greater New York libraries which are discussing various means of coordinating services and acquisitions. Seven hundred and fifty-two copies of Council publications were sent to institutions with which the Library maintains exchange relations, and in return a large quantity of valuable material was received.

Donald Wasson
Librarian, Foreign Relations Library

FINANCES

THE MOST IMPORTANT financial event of the Council year just ended was the virtual completion, under Malcolm Muir's leadership, of the Council's drive to raise a \$5,000,000 endowment fund from individual members. This brings almost to a close the first phase in raising the funds necessary to finance the Council's ten-year plan approved by the Board in 1963. During the year, more than \$1,000,000 dollars in new gifts and pledges was received, bringing the total to \$4,972,700 by June 30. Of these, perhaps the most welcome was the pledge of \$250,000 by a close friend of Whitney H. Shepardson, not himself a Council member, which, in conjunction with other gifts from Mr. Shepardson's friends, made it possible for the Council to endow its Senior Fellowship in his name. Another gift of special meaning for the Council was received from Mr. and Mrs. Edward Pulling and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company to endow a series of lectures similar to the Elihu Root Lectures, to be delivered approximately every two years by a distinguished citizen of a foreign country.

Contributions and grants to the capital fund received in cash or its equivalent rose by \$1,773,100. Income received from funds in hand rose to \$119,000, compared to \$60,800 for the fiscal year 1966 and \$18,000 for 1965. With roughly \$1,000,000 still to be paid in on pledges made to the drive, the income can be expected to increase steadily during the next few years before leveling out at approximately \$200,000. This important new and continuing source of income not only helped make it possible for the Council to maintain a balanced budget for the fourth consecutive year, but also permitted it to spend \$30,000 less of the Ford Foundation ten-year grant than in the previous fiscal year. Thus, the unexpended balances built up in this fund will be available to defray the larger expenses projected for the later years of the Council's ten-year program because of increases in costs due to expected inflation.

Special note should also be taken of the receipt during the year of the first \$100,000 of a generous \$300,000 grant made by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to enable the Council to undertake a program of annual fellowships for a select group of younger scholars and government officials. This project is described on p. 10.

General fund income during the year increased in several categories, with both corporate subscriptions and contributions and *Foreign Affairs* subscriptions and sales reaching new highs. The latter was due in part to an increase in the regular subscription rate of *Foreign Affairs* from \$6.00 to \$8.00 a year (the first increase in sixteen years), which was made necessary in turn by steadily

increasing production and promotion costs. The decline in income from the sale of books is primarily in the gross figure rather than the net, even though the number of books published was one of the largest in the Council's history. Direct book production expenses declined by nearly the same amount as gross income from books, reflecting the transition to having the Council's publishers rather than the Council itself produce the books, with the Council receiving royalties while bearing none of the direct production costs.

Expenses during the year for the most part remained relatively stable. In the area of regular program expenses, an increase in the studies program of nearly \$70,000, due in large part to the addition of Charles W. Yost and Kenneth Kauffman and their secretaries to the permanent studies staff, was largely offset by the incorporation under a Regent's Charter of the Council library as the Foreign Relations Library, which in turn assumed all direct library expenses, beginning December 1, 1966. Increased costs of *Foreign Affairs* production and promotion also were more than offset by the decline of special project expenses through the virtual completion of the United States and China in World Affairs and the Atlantic Policy Studies.

Several figures included under the heading, Transfers from other funds, are worthy of note. The decline under the heading of Special Purpose Funds is due entirely to the expenditure during 1965-66 of the last \$140,200 remaining in the Ford Foundation grant for the Atlantic and China projects. The figure of \$40,000 listed under Special Purpose Funds in 1966-67 represents the first transfer of funds from the Rockefeller Foundation grant to defray the expenses incurred during the year in maintaining the Senior Research Fellowship in the economics of the developing countries, and from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund grant for the new International Affairs Fellowship Program, mentioned above.

The Council's financial statements, as audited by Price Waterhouse & Co., follow. More detailed information is available to any member on request.

John Temple Swing
Associate Executive Director

OPINION OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

PRICE WATERHOUSE & Co.

60 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 10004
AUGUST 9, 1967

To the Board of Directors of
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and the related statements of income, expenses and changes in General Fund and other fund balances present fairly the financial position of Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., at June 30, 1967, and its income, expenses and changes in funds for the year, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year. Our examination of these statements was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. It was impracticable for us to extend our examination of contributions and grants received beyond accounting for amounts so recorded.

Price Waterhouse Co.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC. STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES AND CHANGES IN GENERAL FUND BALANCE

	For the year ended June 30,	
	1967	1966
Income:		
Membership dues	\$ 154,800	\$ 153,600
Contributions from members	101,900	97,000
Corporate subscriptions and contributions	194,100	177,600
Foundation grants	42,600	50,000
Investment income, net	145,300	137,500
Foreign Affairs subscriptions and sales	349,200	317,800
Foreign Affairs advertising	76,600	69,900
Sales of books and royalty income	84,800	130,700
Total income	<u>1,149,300</u>	<u>1,134,100</u>

FINANCES

STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES AND CHANGES IN GENERAL FUND BALANCE (continued)

	1967	1966
Expenses:		
General administrative expenses:		
Executive Director's office	107,300	94,100
Business office	117,500	121,100
Maintenance of house	76,000	69,100
Staff medical, disability and life insurance	10,900	11,700
Less: Charges to Foreign Relations Library (Note 1)	(5,600)	—
	<u>306,100</u>	<u>296,000</u>
Regular program expenses:		
Studies program	316,900	248,500
Meetings programs for members and corporations	79,700	87,000
Serial publications—editorial	38,300	39,300
Book production and promotion	80,300	123,300
Committees on Foreign Relations	47,700	43,600
Library (Note 1)	34,600	76,700
Reproduction and mail	26,600	23,700
International Affairs Fellowship program	12,000	—
Donation to Foreign Relations Library (Note 1)	1,200	—
	<u>637,300</u>	<u>642,100</u>
Foreign Affairs	<u>481,700</u>	<u>427,500</u>
Special projects:		
Atlantic Policy Studies	11,900	92,300
United States and China in World Affairs	17,600	60,300
Chatham House Conference	7,600	—
	<u>37,100</u>	<u>152,600</u>
Total expenses	<u>1,462,200</u>	<u>1,518,200</u>
Excess of expenses prior to transfers from other funds	<u>312,900</u>	<u>384,100</u>
Transfers from other funds:		
Capital Drive Fund	119,000	60,800
Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation Funds	157,300	187,300
Special Purpose Funds	40,000	140,200
Restricted Investment Funds	1,200	—
	<u>317,500</u>	<u>388,300</u>
Excess of income and transfers over expenses	<u>4,600</u>	<u>4,200</u>
Fund balance, beginning of year	2,228,400	2,165,300
Realized gain on sales of securities	25,700	58,900
Fund balance, end of year	<u>\$2,258,700</u>	<u>\$2,228,400</u>

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.
BALANCE SHEET

	June 30,	
	1967	1966
<u>Assets</u>		
General Fund:		
Cash	\$ 75,600	\$ 98,600
Deposits in savings banks	70,800	64,000
Investments at cost or market value when donated (approximate market value: 1967—\$3,449,000; 1966—\$3,458,000)	2,240,700	2,192,400
Accounts receivable	84,900	79,300
Inventories, at lower of cost or market	66,400	67,800
Prepaid expenses	8,500	11,000
Land, building and equipment, at nominal amount	100	100
	<u>2,547,000</u>	<u>2,513,200</u>
Other funds:		
Deposits in savings banks	216,200	145,500
Investments at cost or market value when donated (approximate market value: 1967—\$5,548,100; 1966—\$3,637,490)	5,498,400	3,777,200
Due from General Fund	—	58,600
	<u>5,714,600</u>	<u>3,981,300</u>
	<u>\$8,261,600</u>	<u>\$6,494,500</u>
<u>Liabilities and fund balances</u>		
General Fund:		
Accounts payable and accrued expenses	\$ 26,900	\$ 28,200
Due to other funds	—	58,600
Deferred subscription income and other	261,400	198,000
Fund balance	2,258,700	2,228,400
	<u>2,547,000</u>	<u>2,513,200</u>
Other fund balances:		
Capital Drive Fund	3,959,200	2,273,100
Restricted Investment Fund	182,300	106,800
Special Purpose Funds	610,300	526,500
Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation Funds	962,800	1,074,900
	<u>5,714,600</u>	<u>3,981,300</u>
	<u>\$8,261,600</u>	<u>\$6,494,500</u>

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES AND
CHANGES IN OTHER FUND BALANCES
For the year ended June 30, 1967

	Capital Drive Fund (Note 2)	Restricted Investment Fund (Note 3)	Special Purpose Funds (Note 4)	Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation Funds (Note 5)
Income:				
Contributions and grants	\$1,773,100		\$100,000	
Investment income	119,000	\$ 1,700	23,100	\$ 43,700
	<u>1,892,100</u>	<u>1,700</u>	<u>123,100</u>	<u>43,700</u>
Expenses:				
Fund-raising expense	2,800			
	<u>1,889,300</u>	<u>1,700</u>	<u>123,100</u>	<u>43,700</u>
Transfers to General Fund	119,000	1,200	40,000	157,300
Transfers between other funds	75,000	(75,000)		
	<u>194,000</u>	<u>(73,800)</u>	<u>40,000</u>	<u>157,300</u>
Excess (deficit) of income and transfers in, over expenses and transfers out	1,695,300	75,500	83,100	(113,600)
Fund balance, beginning of year	2,273,100	106,800	526,500	1,074,900
Realized gain (loss) on sales of securities	(9,200)		700	1,500
Fund balance, end of year	<u>\$3,959,200</u>	<u>\$182,300</u>	<u>\$610,300</u>	<u>\$ 962,800</u>

Note 1:

On December 1, 1966, the library of the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. commenced operations as a separate corporation and the Council donated its library books carried at no value on the Council's records to the new corporation, Foreign Relations Library. Since that date all direct costs of the Library have been borne by the Foreign Relations Library and are not included in the accompanying financial statements. The Foreign Relations Library is charged its pro rata share of occupancy costs and a fee for administrative services. During the year ended June 30, 1967, the Council received an endowment fund of \$50,000 (included in the restricted investment fund), the income on which can only be used to purchase library books. Accordingly, the income earned on this fund has been donated to the Foreign Relations Library.

Note 2:

Contributions to the Capital Drive Fund, created in 1964, may be used at the discretion of the Council. The present intention of the Council is to use only the income earned from Capital Drive Fund investments to help meet operating expenses.

Note 3:

The Restricted Investment Fund is an endowment fund consisting of four funds. Income from two of these funds is restricted as to use, while income from the remaining two funds is available for general operations of the Council and is included in investment income in the general fund.

Note 4:

Special Purpose Funds consist of two funds of which one is restricted to financing the International Affairs Fellowship and the other may be used to support program studies in Asian, African and Latin American affairs up to a maximum of \$75,000 per year.

Note 5:

Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation funds can be used for general purposes over fixed periods of time.

MEMBERSHIP

THE COUNCIL's membership has been virtually at its limit in recent years, despite several changes in the By-Laws to raise the ceiling on the number of members permitted in both the resident and non-resident groups. Recognizing that further increases in the existing membership would not only be infeasible with the Council's present facilities and staff, but might also tend to dilute the quality of membership and limit the activities available to individual members, the Board of Directors felt that a study should be made of the over-all membership situation to be sure that the criteria for election to membership are appropriate, the procedures for election effective, and membership participation satisfactory. A subcommittee of the Board was appointed this winter to consider these problems, and its recommendations will serve as guidelines in the future.

The need to maintain a diverse membership with a balance among the various relevant occupational groups was reaffirmed by the subcommittee. The finding that was of the most immediate concern was the fact that the average age of the Council's membership is higher than is desirable. It recommended that *in general* no new member should be elected who is over the age of 60 and that during the course of each year the average age of newly elected members, insofar as this is possible, should not exceed 45. This subcommittee also recommended that the Membership Committee appoint a small committee of Council members under 40 years of age to seek out and suggest especially promising candidates under 40, and to advise on all candidates under 40 who are coming up for consideration before the Membership Committee. Such an advisory committee has been formed and will begin its work in the fall.

Membership figures at the end of this fiscal year as compared with last year's are as follows:

	July 1, 1967	July 1, 1966
Resident	721	717
Non-Resident	744	728
TOTAL	1,465	1,445

Lorna Brennan
Membership Secretary

RESIDENT MEMBERS as of 9/1/67

A

ABRAM, MORRIS B.
AKERS, ANTHONY B.
ALDRICH, WINTHROP W.
ALEXANDER, HENRY C.
ALEXANDER, ROBERT J.
ALLEN, CHARLES E.
ALLEN, PHILIP E.
ALLEY, JAMES B.
ALLPORT, ALEXANDER W.
ALPERN, ALAN N.
ALTSCHUL, ARTHUR G.
ALTSCHUL, FRANK
AMES, AMYAS
AMMIDON, HOYT
ANDERSON, ROBERT B.
ANGELL, JAMES W.
ARMOUR, NORMAN
ARMSTRONG,
HAMILTON FISH
ASCOLI, MAX
ATTWOOD, WILLIAM
AUBREY, HENRY G.
AULT, BROMWELL

B

BACKER, GEORGE
BADEAU, JOHN S.
BAKER, EDGAR R.
BALDWIN, HANSON W.
BANCROFT, HARDING F.
BARBER, CHARLES F.
BARBER, JOSEPH
BARKER, ROBERT R.
BARLOW, WILLIAM E.
BARNES, JOSEPH
BARNETT, FRANK R.
BARRETT, EDWARD W.
BARZUN, JACQUES
BASTEDO, PHILIP
BEAL, GERALD F.
BECKER, LOFTUS E.
BEDARD, PIERRE
BEEBE, FREDERICK S.

BELL, DANIEL
BELL, DAVID E.
BELL, ELLIOTT V.
BENJAMIN, ROBERT S.
BENNETT, JOHN C.
BENTON, WILLIAM
BEPLAT, TRISTAN E.
BERLE, ADOLF A.
BESSIE, SIMON MICHAEL
BEVIS, HERMAN W.
BIENSTOCK, ABRAHAM L.
BINGHAM, JONATHAN B.
BLACK, JOSEPH E.
BLACK, PETER
BLAKE, NORMAN P.
BLOUGH, ROGER M.
BLOUGH, ROY
BLUM, JOHN A.
BLUMENTHAL, W. MICHAEL
BOARDMAN, HARRY
BOGDAN, NORBERT A.
BOLTE, CHARLES G.
BONSAL, DUDLEY B.
BOORMAN, HOWARD L.
BOWERS, JOHN Z.
BOWLES, FRANK
BOYD, HUGH N.
BRADEN, SPRUILLE
BRAXTON, CARTER M.
BRECK, HENRY C.
BRINCKERHOFF, CHARLES M.
BRITTENHAM, RAYMOND L.
BRONK, DETLEV W.
BROWN, COURTNEY C.
BROWN, FRANCIS
BROWN, IRVING
BROWN, JOHN MASON
BROWN, WALTER L.
BROWNELL, GEORGE A.
BRUCE, JAMES
BULLOCK, HUGH
BUNCHE, RALPH J.
BUNDY, McGEORGE
BURDEN, WILLIAM A. M.
BURGESS, CARTER L.

BURKHARDT, FREDERICK
BURNETT, JOHN G.
BURNS, ARTHUR F.
BUSH, DONALD F.
BUSHNER, ROLLAND H.
BUTLER, WILLIAM F.
BUTTENWIESER, BENJAMIN J.

C

CABELL, RICHARD A.
CAIN, CHARLES, JR.
CALDER, ALEXANDER, JR.
CALHOUN, ALEXANDER D.
CAMP, HUGH D.
CAMPBELL, H. DONALD
CANFIELD, CASS
CANFIELD, FRANKLIN O.
CAREY, ANDREW G.
CARROLL, MITCHELL B.
CARSON, RALPH M.
CARY, WILLIAM L.
CASE, EVERETT N.
CASE, JOHN C.
CATES, JOHN M., JR.
CATTIER, JEAN
CHAMPION, GEORGE
CHASE, W. HOWARD
CHEEVER, DANIEL S.
CHITTENDEN, GEORGE H.
CHUBB, HENDON, 2ND
CHUBB, PERCY, 2ND
CHURCH, EDGAR M.
CLAY, GEN. LUCIUS D.
CLEVELAND,
HAROLD VAN B.
CLINCHY, EVERETT R.
COFFIN, EDMUND
COHEN, JEROME B.
COLLADO, EMILIO G.
COLLINGS, L. V.
COLWELL, KENT G.
CONANT, JAMES B.
CONANT, MELVIN
CONNOR, JOHN T.
COOK, HOWARD A.

COOLIDGE, NICHOLAS J.
COOMBS, CHARLES A.
COOPER, FRANKLIN S.
CORDIER, ANDREW W.
COSTANZO, G. A.
COUGHRAN, TOM B.
COUSINS, NORMAN
COWAN, LOUIS G.
COWLES, GARDNER
CREEL, DANA S.
CUMMINGS, ROBERT L.
CUSICK, PETER

D

DALLIN, ALEXANDER
DARLINGTON, CHARLES F.
DARRELL, NORRIS
DAUM, EARL C.
DAVENPORT, JOHN
DAVIS, JOHN A.
DAVISON, DANIEL P.
DAVISON, W. PHILLIPS
DEAN, ARTHUR H.
DEAVER, JOHN V.
DEBEVOISE, ELI WHITNEY
DE CUBAS, JOSE
DE LIMA, OSCAR A.
DE ROSSO, ALPHONSE
DE VRIES, HENRY P.
DEWEY, THOMAS E.
D'HARNONCOURT, RENE
DICKSON,
R. RUSSELL, JR.
DIEBOLD, JOHN
DIEBOLD, WILLIAM, JR.
DILLON, CLARENCE
DILLON, DOUGLAS
DILWORTH, J. RICHARDSON
DODGE, CLEVELAND E.
DONNER, FREDERIC G.
DONOVAN, HEDLEY
DORR, GOLDTHWAITE H.
DORWIN, OSCAR JOHN
DOUGLAS, LEWIS W.

DOUGLAS, PAUL W.
DUBINSKY, DAVID
DUBOIS, J. DELAFIELD

E

EAGLE, VERNON A.
EATON, FREDRICK M.
EBERLE, W. D.
EBERSTADT, FERDINAND
EDELMAN, ALBERT I.
EDELSTEIN, JULIUS C. C.
EDER, PHANOR J.
EICHELBERGER, CLARK M.
ELLIOTT, L. W.
ELLIOTT, OSBORN
ELSON, ROBERT T.
EMMET, CHRISTOPHER
ENGEL, IRVING M.
ERPF, ARMAND G.
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EVERTON, JOHN SCOTT
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EWING, WILLIAM, JR.
EXTER, JOHN

F

FENN, WILLIAM P.
FIELD,
WILLIAM OSGOOD, JR.
FINLAY, LUKE W.
FINLETTER, THOMAS K.
FINNEY, PAUL B.
FISCHER, JOHN
FISK, JAMES B.
FLECK, G. PETER
FLEISCHMANN, MANLY
FORD, NEVIL
FORKNER, CLAUDE E.
FORRESTAL, MICHAEL V.
FOX, JOSEPH C.
FOX, WILLIAM T. R.
FOYE, ARTHUR B.
FRANKLIN,
GEORGE S., JR.

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GATES, THOMAS S.
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GERHARDT, MAJ. GEN. H. A.
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GILLESPIE, S. HAZARD
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GOLDBERG, ARTHUR J.
GOLDEN, WILLIAM T.
GOLDSTONE, HARMON H.
GOODRICH, LELAND M.
GORDON, ALBERT H.
GRACE, J. P., JR.
GRAFF, ROBERT D.
GRAZIER, JOSEPH A.
GRIFFITH, THOMAS
GRIMM, PETER
GRONDAHL, TEG C.
GROSS, ERNEST A.
GROVER, ALLEN

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HAGER, ERIC H.
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HALABY, NAJEEB E.
HAMILTON, FOWLER
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HAYES, SAMUEL P.
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HEATH, DONALD R.
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HELM, HAROLD H.
HENDERSON, WILLIAM
HENKIN, LOUIS
HEROD, W. ROGERS
HERRING, PENDLETON
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HERZOG, PAUL M.
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HICKEY, WILLIAM M.
HILL, FORREST F.
HILL, JAMES T., JR.
HILL, JOHN A.
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HOCHSCHILD, HAROLD K.
HOCHSCHILD, WALTER
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HOLMES, ALAN R.
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HOTTELET, RICHARD C.
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ARTHUR A., JR.
HOUSTON, FRANK K.
HOWARD, JOHN B.
HOWELL, JOHN I.
HUGHES, JOHN CHAMBERS
HUREWITZ, J. C.
HYDE, HENRY B.
HYDE, JAMES N.

I

INGLIS, JOHN B.
IRWIN, JOHN N., 2ND
ISELIN, O'DONNELL
ISSAWI, CHARLES

J

JACKSON, ELMORE
JACKSON, WILLIAM E.
JAMES, GEORGE F.
JAMIESON, J. K.
JARETZKI, ALFRED, JR.
JASTROW, ROBERT
JAVITS, JACOB K.
JAY, NELSON DEAN
JESSUP, ALPHEUS W.
JESSUP, JOHN K.
JOHNSON, EDWARD F.
JOHNSON, HOWARD C.
JOHNSON, JOSEPH E.
JOHNSON, LESTER B.
JONES, DAVID J.

K

KAHN, HERMAN
KALINSKI, FELIX A.
KAMINER, PETER H.

KANE, R. KEITH
KEEZER, DEXTER M.
KEISER, DAVID M.
KEMPNER, MAXIMILIAN W.
KENEN, PETER B.
KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
KENNEY, F. DONALD
KERN, HARRY F.
KEITANEH, FRANCIS A.
KEYSER, PAUL V., JR.
KIAER, HERMAN S.
KING, FREDERIC R.
KIRK, GRAYSON
KLEIMAN, ROBERT
KNIGHT,
ROBERT HUNTINGTON
KNOKE, L. WERNER
KNOPPERS, ANTONIE T.
KNOX, WILLIAM E.
KOENIG, ROBERT P.

L

LABOUISSSE, HENRY R.
LACY, DAN B.
LA FARGE, FRANCIS W.
LAMB, HORACE R.
LAMONT, PETER T.
LARMON, SIGURD S.
LAROCHE, CHESTER J.
LARY, HAL B.
LAUKHUFF, PERRY
LEBARON, EUGENE
LEE, ELLIOTT H.
LEHMAN, JOHN R.
LEHMAN, ORIN
LEHMAN, ROBERT
LEHRMAN, HAL
LEONARD, JAMES G.
LEROY, NORBERT G.
LESLIE, JOHN C.
LEVY, WALTER J.
LEWIS, ROGER
LIEBERMAN, HENRY R.
LIGHTNER, MILTON C.

LILIENTHAL, DAVID E.
LILLEY, A. N.
LINDQUIST, WARREN T.
LINDSAY, GEORGE N.
LINDSAY, JOHN V.
LISSITZYN, OLIVER J.
LOCKWOOD, JOHN E.
LOCKWOOD,
MANICE DEF., 3RD
LOEB, JOHN L.
LOFT, GEORGE
LOOMIS, ALFRED L.
LOOS, REV. A. WILLIAM
LOUCKS, HAROLD H.
LOUNSBURY, ROBERT H.
LUBAR, ROBERT A.
LUBIN, ISADOR
LUDT, R. E.
LUKE, DAVID L., 3RD
LUNT, SAMUEL D.

M

McCANCE, THOMAS
McCARTHY, JOHN G.
McCLOY, JOHN J.
McCLOY, JOHN J., 2ND
McDANIEL, JOSEPH M., JR.
McDERMOTT, WALSH
McGRAW, JAMES H., JR.
McKEEVER, PORTER
MacEachron, DAVID W.
MacGREGOR, IAN K.
MacIntyre, MALCOLM A.
MacIVER, MURDOCH
MADDOX, WILLIAM P.
MALLORY, WALTER H.
MARK, REV. JULIUS
MARKEL, LESTER
MARSHALL, CLIFFORD B.
MARTINO, JOSEPH A.
MARVEL, WILLIAM W.
MASTEN, JOHN E.
MATHEWS, EDWARD J.
MATTISON, GRAHAM D.

MAY, A. WILFRED
MAYER, GERALD M., JR.
MEAGHER, ROBERT F.
MENKE, JOHN R.
MERZ, CHARLES
METZGER, HERMAN A.
MEYER, JOHN M., JR.
MICKELSON, SIG
MIDTBO, HAROLD
MILLAR, D. G.
MILLARD, MARK J.
MILLER, EDWARD G., JR.
MILLER, PAUL R., JR.
MILLIS, WALTER
MILLS, BRADFORD
MODEL, LEO
MOE, SHERWOOD G.
MONAGHAN, THOMAS E.
MOORE, BEN T.
MOORE, EDWARD F.
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MARCY, CARL
MARSHALL,
CHARLES BURTON
MARTIN, EDWIN M.
MARTIN,
WILLIAM MCC., JR.
MASLAND, JOHN W.
MASON, EDWARD S.
MATHEWS, WILLIAM R.
MAY, ERNEST R.
MAY, OLIVER
MAY, STACY
MAYER, FERDINAND L.
MAYER, GERALD M.
MECK, JOHN F.
MERCHANT,
LIVINGSTON T.

NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS

NON-RESIDENT MEMBERS

MERRILLAT, H. C. L.
MERRIWETHER, DUNCAN
METCALF, GEORGE R.
MEYER, ALBERT J.
MEYER, CHARLES A.
MEYER, CORD, JR.
MILBANK, ROBBINS
MILLER,
COL. FRANCIS P.
MILLER, J. IRWIN
MILLER, WILLIAM J.
MILLIKAN, MAX F.
MILLIS, JOHN S.
MINOR, HAROLD B.
MLADEK, JAN V.
MOLINA, EDGAR R.
MONTIAS, JOHN M.
MOORE, HUGH
MORAN, WILLIAM E., JR.
MORGAN, CECIL
MORGAN, GEORGE A.
MORGENSTERN, OSKAR
MORGENTHAU, HANS J.
MORLEY, JAMES WILLIAM
MORSE, DAVID A.
MORTON, LOUIS
MUDD, HENRY T.
MULLER, STEVEN
MUNGER, EDWIN S.
MUNOZ MARIN, LUIS
MUNRO, DANA G.
MURPHY, FRANKLIN D.
MURPHY, ROBERT
MYERS, DENYS P.

N

NASON, JOHN W.
NATHAN, ROBERT R.
NATHAN, FRED M.
NELSON, MERLIN E.
NEUSTADT, RICHARD E.
NEWMAN, RICHARD T.
NICHOLS, CALVIN J.
NITZE, PAUL H.

NOLTE, RICHARD H.
NOLTING, FREDERICK E., JR.
NOVER, BARNET
NOYES, W. ALBERT, JR.
NUVEEN, JOHN

O

OELMAN, R. S.
OPPENHEIMER, FRITZ E.
OSBORNE, LITHGOW
OSGOOD, ROBERT E.
OWEN, GARRY
OWEN, HENRY

P

PAFFRATH, LESLIE
PALMER, NORMAN D.
PANTZER, KURT F.
PARK, RICHARD L.
PARKER, BARRETT
PARKHURST, GEORGE L.
PARSONS, JOHN C.
PATTERSON, GARDNER
PAUL, NORMAN S.
PAUL, ROLAND A.
PEARSON, THOMAS P.
PELL, CLAIBORNE
PELZER, KARL J.
PENFIELD, JAMES K.
PERERA, GUIDO R.
PERETZ, DON
PERKINS, COURTLAND D.
PERKINS, JAMES A.
PETERSEN, HOWARD C.
PHILLIPS, WILLIAM
PHLEGER, HERMAN
PIEROTTI, ROLAND
PIQUET, HOWARD S.
PLANK, JOHN N.
PLATIG, E. RAYMOND
PLIMPTON, CALVIN H.
POGUE, L. WELCH
POLETTI, CHARLES
POLK, WILLIAM R.

POOL, ITHIEL DeSOLA
POOR, J. SHEPPARD
POSVAR, WESLEY W.
POWER, THOMAS F., JR.
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PRICE, DON K.
PRIZER, JOHN B.
PROCHNOW, HERBERT V.
PUSEY, NATHAN M.
PUTZELL, EDWIN J., JR.
PYE, LUCIAN W.

R

RADWAY, LAURENCE I.
RAVENHOLT, ALBERT
RAY, GEORGE W., JR.
REEVES, JAY B. L.
REINHARDT, G. FREDERICK
REISCHAUER, EDWIN O.
REITZEL, WILLIAM
RENNIE, WESLEY F.
RESOR, STANLEY R.
RESTON, JAMES B.
REUSS, HENRY S.
REUTHER, WALTER
REVELLE, ROGER
REYNOLDS, LLOYD G.
RICH, JOHN H., JR.
RICHARDSON, DAVID B.
RICHARDSON, DORSEY
RIDGWAY,
GEN. MATTHEW B.
RIEFER, WINFIELD W.
RIES, HANS A.
RIPLEY, S. DILLON, 2ND
RIVKIN, ARNOLD
ROBERTS, HENRY L.
ROGERS, JAMES GRAFTON
ROMUALDI, SERAFINO
ROOSEVELT, KERMIT
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ROSENGARTEN,
ADOLPH G., JR.
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ROSTOW, WALT W.
ROWEN, HENRY S.
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RUINA, J. P.
RUSK, DEAN
RYAN, JOHN T., JR.

S

SALOMON, IRVING
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JOSEPH C.
SAWIN, MELVIN E.
SAWYER, JOHN E.
SCALAPINO, ROBERT A.
SCHAETZEL, J. ROBERT
SCHELLING, THOMAS C.
SCHIFF, FRANK W.
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SCHWEBEL, STEPHEN M.
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SEYMOUR, FORREST W.
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SONTAG,
RAYMOND JAMES
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SPROUT, HAROLD
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STANLEY, TIMOTHY W.
STANTON, EDWIN F.
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STASSEN, HAROLD E.
STEIN, ERIC
STEPHENS, CLAUDE O.
STERLING, J. E. WALLACE
STEVENSON, WILLIAM E.
STEWART,
ROBERT BURGESS
STILWELL,
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SULZBERGER, C. L.
SUNDERLAND, THOMAS E.
SURREY,
WALTER STERLING
SWEETSER, ARTHUR
SWIHART, JAMES W.
SYMINGTON, W. STUART

T

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TANHAM, GEORGE K.

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THEODORE, JR.
TAYLOR, GEORGE E.
TAYLOR,
GEN. MAXWELL D.
TAYLOR,
WAYNE CHATFIELD
TELLER, EDWARD
TEMPLETON, RICHARD H.
TENNYSON, LEONARD B.
THAYER, CHARLES W.
THAYER, ROBERT H.
THOMPSON,
LLEWELLYN E.
THORP, WILLARD L.
TIMBERLAKE, CLARE H.
TREZISE, PHILIP H.
TRIFFIN, ROBERT
TROWBRIDGE,
ALEXANDER B.
TURKEVICH, JOHN
TUTHILL, JOHN W.
TYLER, WILLIAM R.

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UPGREN, ARTHUR R.

V

VALENTINE, ALAN
VANCLEVE, THOMAS C.
VAN DUSEN,
REV. HENRY P.
VAN SLYCK, DeFOREST
VAN STIRUM, JOHN
VERNON, RAYMOND
VINER, JACOB
VON MEHREN, ROBERT B.

W

WAIT, RICHARD
WALKER, GEORGE R.
WALLICH, HENRY C.
WALMSLEY, WALTER N.
WANGER, WALTER

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REAR ADM. CHESTER
WARREN, SHIELDS
WASHBURN, ABBOTT M.
WASSON, R. GORDON
WATKINS, RALPH J.
WEAVER, GEORGE L. P.
WEEKS, EDWARD
WEISSKOPF, VICTOR F.
WELLBORN,
VICE ADM. CHARLES, JR.
WELLS, HERMAN B.
WEST, ROBERT LeROY
WESTMORELAND,
GEN. W. C.
WESTPHAL, ALBERT C. F.
WHEELER, OLIVER P.
WHIPPLE,
BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM
WHITAKER, ARTHUR P.
WHITE, GILBERT F.
WHITEFORD, WILLIAM K.
WHITING, ALLEN S.
WIESNER, JEROME B.
WILBUR, C. MARTIN
WILCOX, FRANCIS O.
WILCOX, ROBERT B.
WILD, PAYSON S.
WILDE, FRAZAR B.
WILDS, WALTER W.
WILLIAMS, HAYDN
WILLIAMS, JOHN H.
WILLITS, JOSEPH H.
WILMERDING, LUCIUS, JR.
WILSON, CARROLL L.
WIMPFHEIMER, JACQUES
WINTON, DAVID J.
WOHL, ELMER P.
WOHLSTETTER, ALBERT
WOLF, CHARLES, JR.
WOLFERS, ARNOLD
WOOD, HARLESTON R.
WOODBIDGE, HENRY S.
WRIGHT, ADM. JERARD
WRIGHT, QUINCY

WRIGHT, THEODORE P.
WYZANSKI,
CHARLES E., JR.

Y
YARMOLINSKY, ADAM
YNTEMA, THEODORE O..
YOUNG, T. CUYLER
YUDKIN,
BRIG. GEN. RICHARD A.

Z
ZIMMERMAN, EDWIN M.

BY-LAWS

- I The membership shall be divided into resident, non-resident, and honorary. All members shall be elected by the Board of Directors.
Resident members shall be limited to seven hundred and fifty in number, who shall have their residences or places of business within fifty miles of City Hall, in the Borough of Manhattan, City of New York, and who shall be citizens of the U.S.A.
Non-resident members shall be limited to seven hundred and fifty, who shall neither reside nor have places of business within the said specified distance from City Hall, and who shall be citizens of the U.S.A.
The Board of Directors in its discretion may elect honorary members.
A member may be dropped or suspended from membership by a unanimous vote of those attending a regular meeting of the Board of Directors at which a quorum is present and voting, for any violation of the By-Laws or rules or regulations of the Board of Directors, or for any conduct even though not in actual violation of a By-Law or rule which, in the opinion of the Board, is nevertheless prejudicial to the best interests, reputation and proper functioning of the Council.
- II It is an express condition of membership in the Council, to which condition every member accedes by virtue of his membership, that unless expressly stated by an Officer of the Council to the contrary, all proceedings at the Council's afternoon and dinner meetings as well as study and discussion groups are confidential; and any disclosure or publication of statements made at such meetings or attribution to the Council of information, even though otherwise available, is contrary to the best interests of the Council and may be regarded by the Board of Directors in its sole discretion as ground for termination or suspension of membership pursuant to Article I of the By-Laws.
- III Resident members shall pay \$250 per annum, except that those members who are thirty-five years of age and under shall pay \$125 per annum, and that those who are regular members of the faculty of any university or college, who are in the public service, who are on the staff of voluntary organizations or who are accredited writers or newspapermen may pay \$50 per annum (any member not in one of these occupations who had not reached forty-one years of age on May 27, 1964, and who had thus been entitled to pay at the rate of \$100 per annum shall be entitled to continue to pay at this rate until he shall have attained the age of forty-one); non-resident members shall pay \$75 per annum, except that those members who are regular members of the faculty of any university or college, or accredited writers or newspapermen, may pay \$20 per annum. All dues shall be paid semi-annually—in equal installments—in advance. Default in the payment of any dues for a period of sixty days shall be equivalent to resignation.

IV There shall be a Board of not more than twenty-four Directors, divided into three classes, each class to serve for three-year terms and until their successors are elected. At each annual meeting of the Council, Directors shall be elected to replace the outgoing class. The Board shall have power to fill any vacancy in its own body. A Director absent from meetings of the Board for a period of two successive years shall be considered to have submitted his resignation from the Board.

V The Annual General Meeting of the Council shall be held in New York City on the second Wednesday of October. At this meeting the Board of Directors shall present a report of the activities of the Council during the past year; candidates shall be elected to fill vacancies on the Board of Directors of the Council in accordance with regulations laid down by the Board; and such other business shall be considered as shall be brought forward by or with the sanction of the Board of Directors, and which shall have been stated in the notice convening the meeting.

A majority of the members of the Council shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. Members may be represented by proxy.

VI The Board shall constitute such committees of the Council as may from time to time be required, including an Executive Committee, a Finance and Budget Committee, a Membership Committee, a Nominating Committee, and a Committee on Studies.

The Finance and Budget Committee shall be composed of five members of the Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. It shall have general supervision of the investment of the funds of the Council and of its financial affairs, and shall present the budget at the annual meeting of the Board. In connection with the preparation of the budget, it shall be the duty of this Committee to allocate charges to the various departments and activities of the Council.

The Membership Committee shall be composed of five members of the Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. The Committee shall have power to co-opt not to exceed four additional members who need not necessarily be members of the Board of Directors. It shall report at each regular meeting of the Board on all nominations for membership.

The Nominating Committee shall be composed of three members of the Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. It shall present names for directors, officers and committee members.

The Committee on Studies shall be composed of five members of the Board of Directors elected at the annual meeting of the Board. The Committee shall have power to co-opt not to exceed five additional members, who need not necessarily be members of the Board of Directors. All suggestions relating to matters of research shall be referred to it, and it shall

be responsible for the initiation of research projects. The Committee on Studies shall submit a report of its activities in writing at the annual meeting of the Board.

VII The officers of the corporation shall be a Chairman of the Board, a President, one or more Vice-Presidents, a Secretary, and a Treasurer, who shall be elected annually by the Board of Directors.

The Chairman of the Board, or in his absence the President, shall preside at all meetings of the Board of Directors.

The President may call meetings of the Board, and shall have general executive direction of the corporation.

The Vice-Presidents in order of seniority shall discharge the duties of the President in his absence, and shall perform such other duties as from time to time shall be assigned them by the Board of Directors.

The Treasurer shall have custody of the funds of the corporation.

The Secretary shall conduct the correspondence of the corporation, and shall keep its records.

VIII The Board shall annually appoint an Executive Director and such other staff officers as in its judgment may be required. The Board shall fix the compensation and assign the duties of these officers.

IX The funds of the corporation and of *Foreign Affairs* shall be invested by the Finance and Budget Committee or shall be deposited with trust companies or banking institutions designated by either the Board of Directors or the Finance and Budget Committee. Disbursements shall be made only upon checks or vouchers approved by the Treasurer or the Comptroller and any one of the following: the Executive Director, the Editor of *Foreign Affairs*, the Deputy Executive Director, or the Associate Executive Director; and in the absence of both the Treasurer and the Comptroller, by any two of these officers.

X The annual meeting of the Board of Directors shall be held after the annual meeting of the Council and not later than November 15th. One-third of the number of Directors authorized in By-Law IV, above, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors.

XI These By-Laws may be amended at any meeting of the Board of Directors, provided notice of the proposed amendment shall have been given at a previous meeting or circulated in writing to the members of the Board not less than five days in advance.

DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

Original Board of Directors

ISAIAH BOWMAN	1921-1950	DAVID F. HOUSTON	1921-1927
ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE	1921-1928	OTTO H. KAHN	1921-1934
PAUL D. CRAVATH	1921-1940	FRANK L. POLK	1921-1943
JOHN W. DAVIS	1921-1955	WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON	1921-1966
NORMAN H. DAVIS	1921-1944	WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD	1921-1927
STEPHEN P. DUGGAN	1921-1950	PAUL M. WARBURG	1921-1932
JOHN H. FINLEY	1921-1929	GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM	1921-1936
EDWIN F. GAY	1921-1945		

Succeeding Directors According to Beginning of Term of Office

ALLEN W. DULLES	1927	WINFIELD W. RIEFLER	1945-1950
R. C. LEFFINGWELL	1927-1960	DAVID ROCKEFELLER	1949
GEORGE O. MAY	1927-1953	W. AVERELL HARRIMAN	1950-1955
WESLEY C. MITCHELL	1927-1934	JOSEPH E. JOHNSON	1950
OWEN D. YOUNG	1927-1940	GRAYSON KIRK	1950
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG	1928	DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS	1951-1958
CHARLES P. HOWLAND	1929-1931	ELLIOTT V. BELL*	1953-1966
WALTER LIPPMANN	1932-1937	JOHN J. MCCLOY	1953
CLARENCE M. WOOLLEY	1932-1935	ARTHUR H. DEAN	1955
FRANK ALTSCHUL	1934	CHARLES M. SPOFFORD	1955
PHILIP C. JESSUP	1934-1942	ADLAI E. STEVENSON	1958-1962
HAROLD W. DODDS	1935-1943	WILLIAM C. FOSTER	1959
LEON FRASER	1936-1945	CARYL P. HASKINS	1961
JOHN H. WILLIAMS*	1937-1964	JAMES A. PERKINS	1963
LEWIS W. DOUGLAS*	1940-1964	WILLIAM P. BUNDY	1964
EDWARD WARNER	1940-1945	GABRIEL HAUGE	1964
CLARENCE E. HUNTER	1942-1953	CARROLL L. WILSON	1964
MYRON C. TAYLOR	1943-1959	DOUGLAS DILLON	1965
HENRY M. WRISTON*	1943-1967	HENRY R. LABOUISSIE	1965
THOMAS K. FINLETTER*	1944-1967	ROBERT V. ROOSA	1966
WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN	1945	LUCIAN W. PYE	1966
WALTER H. MALLORY	1945	ALFRED C. NEAL	1967
PHILIP D. REED	1945	BILL D. MOYERS	1967

*Directors Emeriti

-FROM FOUNDING TO PRESENT

Honorary Presidents

ELIHU ROOT	1921-1937	HENRY M. WRISTON	1964
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Chairman of the Board

R. C. LEFFINGWELL	1946-1953	JOHN J. MCCLOY	1953
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Presidents

JOHN W. DAVIS	1921-1933	ALLEN W. DULLES	1946-1950
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM	1933-1936	HENRY M. WRISTON	1951-1964
NORMAN H. DAVIS	1936-1944	GRAYSON KIRK	1964
R. C. LEFFINGWELL	1944-1946		

Vice Presidents

PAUL D. CRAVATH	1921-1933	ISAIAH BOWMAN	1945-1949
NORMAN H. DAVIS	1933-1936	HENRY M. WRISTON	1950-1951
EDWIN F. GAY	1933-1940	DAVID ROCKEFELLER	1950
FRANK L. POLK	1940-1943	FRANK ALTSCHUL	1951
R. C. LEFFINGWELL	1943-1944	DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS	1951-1952
ALLEN W. DULLES	1944-1946		

Secretaries

EDWIN F. GAY	1921-1933	FRANK ALTSCHUL	1944
ALLEN W. DULLES	1933-1944		

Treasurers

EDWIN F. GAY	1921-1933	DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS	1951-1952
WHITNEY H. SHEPARDSON	1933-1942	ELLIOTT V. BELL	1952-1964
CLARENCE E. HUNTER	1942-1951	GABRIEL HAUGE	1964

Executive Directors

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG	1922-1928	WALTER H. MALLORY	1927-1959
MALCOLM W. DAVIS	1925-1927	GEORGE S. FRANKLIN, JR.	1953

PUBLICATIONS

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (quarterly), edited by Hamilton Fish Armstrong.

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS (annual). Volumes for 1931, 1932 and 1933, by Walter Lippmann and William O. Scroggs; for 1934-1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940, by Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs; for 1945-1947, 1947-1948 and 1948-1949, by John C. Campbell; for 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954, by Richard P. Stebbins; for 1955, by Hollis W. Barber; for 1956, 1957, 1958, *1959, *1960, *1961, *1962 and *1963, by Richard P. Stebbins; for *1964, by Jules Davids; for 1965 and 1966, by Richard P. Stebbins.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (annual). Volume for 1952 edited by Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins; for 1953 and 1954, edited by Peter V. Curl; for 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959, edited by Paul E. Zinner; for 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, edited by Richard P. Stebbins; for 1964, edited by Jules Davids; for 1965 and 1966, edited by Richard P. Stebbins.

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ATLANTIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION: The Case of the OECD, by Henry G. Aubrey (1967).

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TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: The Rich and the Poor Nations, by John A. Pincus (1967).

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AMONG INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES: Objectives and Alternatives, by Bela Balassa (1967).

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*THE ATLANTIC IDEA AND ITS EUROPEAN RIVALS, by Harold van B. Cleveland (1966).

*EUROPEAN UNIFICATION IN THE SIXTIES: From the Veto to the Crisis, by Miriam Camps (1966).

*THE CONSCIENCE OF THE RICH NATIONS: The Development Assistance Committee and the Common Aid Effort, by Seymour J. Rubin (1966).

ATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL UNITY: Is It Possible? by John O. Coppock (1966).

*TEST BAN AND DISARMAMENT: The Path of Negotiation, by Arthur H. Dean (1966).

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- *THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN TRADE: A Study in Atlantic Economics and Policy, by Randall Hinshaw (1964).
- *THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY: Educational and Cultural Affairs, by Philip H. Coombs (1964).
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- *THESE ARE THE COMMITTEES, by Joseph Barber (1964).
- *ON DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD, by George F. Kennan (1964).
- *FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY, by Edward S. Mason (1964).
- *THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS, by Caryl P. Haskins (1964).
- *AFRICA: A Foreign Affairs Reader, edited by Philip W. Quigg (1964).
- THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES: Problems of Partnership, by George E. Taylor (1964).
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- *THE UNITED NATIONS: Structure for Peace, by Ernest A. Gross (1962).
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**SECOND CONFERENCE
ON
THE UNITED NATIONS
OF 1975**



Sponsored by the **STANLEY FOUNDATION**

**SECOND CONFERENCE
ON THE UNITED NATIONS
OF 1975**

July 24-28, 1967
Bürgenstock, Switzerland

Sponsored by the STANLEY FOUNDATION

FOREWORD

By C. Maxwell Stanley

The Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975 is a continuation of an examination that was started in San Francisco in 1965. We held a conference there on the eve of the Symbolic Session of the United Nations which commemorated the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Charter. It was called to study the United Nations' Role in the Next Decade.

The 1965 conference came to one specific conclusion and made several general recommendations regarding the United Nations. The primary conclusion was that the United Nations, while rendering many useful and valuable services, was not equipped under its present Charter to deal effectively with the continuing arms race, the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, the growing danger of accidental war, and the pressures of population and poverty.

The recommendations of the 1965 conference, adopted unanimously, called for changes that could be accomplished only by Charter revision. These changes were major ones, giving the United Nations the ability to achieve complete and enforced disarmament in carefully controlled stages and with effective safeguards, a permanent peace force, changes in the General Assembly and the Security Council so that the United Nations would have legislative capability, a strengthened International Court of Justice with systems of regional courts, a sizeable world development program, a reliable and adequate revenue system, safeguards to prevent abuse of power by such a strengthened United Nations, and eligibility for all nations for membership. (See page 13)

As one looks back over two years and evaluates the proposals of the 1965 conference, one can only say that they were bold and substantial ones. Many people would term them unrealistic. Many would say that the United Nations was not in jeopardy, and the changes proposed were too visionary, too far down the line. Nevertheless, the conference considered that nothing else would succeed.

With each new crisis crowding on the heels of its predecessor, these two years reinforce the major conclusions of the FIRST CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975: that there is urgency and that the United Nations must be made more effective.

Our concern at the Second Conference was to look at the world's needs, to select the roles the United Nations should discharge in

meeting those needs, to determine its competence to discharge them, and finally to recommend steps which would enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations.

We came forward with proposals to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations. We considered several approaches which the conference of two years ago did not recommend. It centered its attention on Charter revision. We considered also the better use of the United Nations as it is. What capabilities have the Secretariat, the Security Council, the General Assembly or the specialized agencies that are not adequately utilized? What changes can come about by an evolutionary process? Are Certain Charter changes desirable — and possible — perhaps less extensive than those proposed in the 1965 conference? Two Charter changes have been made regarding the membership of the Economic and Social Council.

We considered the attitudes of nations. Is the United Nations to be a major element of foreign policy for more countries, including mine, or is it a crutch to be used when other efforts fail?

We followed a very unique format with an unstructured conference. We were not there to listen to speeches. We were not there to dissect papers. We were not there to vote aye and nay on specific proposals. We met as individuals, not governments. Our mission was to think and brainstorm. We wanted to explore new ideas and exchange views. We confirmed sound concepts with respect to the United Nations, but we proposed some new ones. We were not concerned with complete agreement. Where consensus was evident, the rapporteur so indicated. Otherwise he indicated opposing views. Attribution to individuals was not made in the conference statement.

My charge to the participants was: "As we approach the task, I urge that we be practical, but also visionary; predictive, but also prescriptive; cautious, but with a sense of urgency; and responsible, but bold and courageous. Let us be fully aware of the differences separating nations. Let us be even more aware of the broad interests and needs, the service of which will unite people if given a chance. May we together chart a route to a more effective United Nations. May we issue a challenge to thinking men. Thus hopefully may we contribute to those universal desires of men throughout this world for peace, security, and a fuller life."

C. Maxwell Stanley
President, The Stanley Foundation

**MESSAGE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED NATIONS TO THE SECOND CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975**

**Bürgenstock, Switzerland
July 24 - 28, 1967**

I am glad to see that the Stanley Foundation has organized the "Second Conference on the United Nations of 1975." The subject is an important one, and the list of participants includes several distinguished statesmen and students of international affairs. I have no doubt that this Conference will lead to a better understanding of the problems which the United Nations faces and the prospects for peace and progress in the coming years. I wish the Conference every success.

U THANT

Secretary-General of the United Nations

(Delivered personally on the Secretary-General's behalf by the Honorable Gabriel M. d'Arboussier, Executive Director of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, on July 25, 1967.)

**STATEMENT by MEMBERS
of the
SECOND CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS OF 1975**

Bürgenstock, Switzerland

July 28, 1967

We continue the work begun by the Conference on the United Nations of 1975, held in June 1965, which called for major changes in the United Nations to make it capable of maintaining peace and freedom under law.

This is a time of growing danger and great opportunity. There is a trend toward more centers of power in the world. The threat of nuclear war grows as the armaments race enters a new round and nuclear weapons spread to more nations. Too often the nations fail to use the United Nations to solve international disputes, and rely instead on force and intervention. Painfully slow development and rapid population growth in developing countries lead to increased violence and non-democratic regimes.

The United Nations is caught in a vicious circle. Lack of confidence in the United Nations discourages its use and limits its performance. This makes it difficult to achieve the support of nations for the basic changes in the United Nations which are necessary. Yet only a strengthened United Nations can provide the successful performance which is needed to build confidence.

We propose that this vicious circle be broken by taking specific steps toward a more effective United Nations. These steps will strengthen the ability of the United Nations to achieve its purposes. Speaking solely as individuals, we propose these steps:

1. In order to make any major progress toward general and complete disarmament, the United Nations security system must be strengthened so that all nations can rely on it, and means for the just settlement of international disputes must be provided and used. The armaments race should be stopped as soon as possible. Specifically, it is in the self-interest of all nations to make realistic agreements (including necessary safeguards) to prohibit all nuclear weapons tests, to limit the quantities of both nuclear and conventional weapons, to require that all transfers of weapons from one nation to another

be reported to and published by the United Nations and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. In the important field of peacekeeping, the United Nations must be given the capacity to act promptly, rather than having to improvise after trouble begins. All nations should be invited to earmark and train units of their national armed forces and police forces for United Nations duty when needed. United Nations capability should also be strengthened by creating a permanent United Nations staff for peacekeeping operations and by adopting clear but flexible rules for peacekeeping. It is further essential that agreement be reached as soon as possible to create a permanent United Nations peace force, recruited by and for the United Nations and effectively backed by its members. In particular, the United Nations needs without delay its own units to perform specialized tasks such as communications, logistics and police duty.

3. The Security Council has primary responsibilities for peacekeeping, but the General Assembly should be able to act when there is no reasonable possibility of Security Council action.

4. A determined effort should be made to implement Chapter VII of the Charter to enable United Nations peace enforcement action by the Security Council. The Military Staff Committee should be reactivated. Member nations should make agreements to provide forces on call of the Security Council. Organization and planning for effective economic sanctions under Article 41 is needed, including creation of a staff to administer economic sanctions.

5. Parallel to the United Nations peacekeeping activities, the United Nations and its members should make more determined and unrelenting efforts to find solutions to international conflicts and to persuade the parties to accept reasonable solutions in conformity with the principles of the Charter. The conflict resolution role of the United Nations is vitally important, and the mediation services of the Secretary-General and his staff should be supported and expanded.

6. All nations should voluntarily accept without reservation the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the kinds of international disputes listed in Article 36 of the Statute. All treaties which do not specify other methods of settlement should provide

that disputes arising under the treaty shall be determined by the International Court. The judicial independence of the International Court, free from national or other interference, must be assured by all suitable means. Increased efforts to develop and codify contemporary international law are needed. All these efforts should tend to strengthen the authority of the United Nations to maintain a just peace under law.

7. The critical situation of the developing countries is a growing threat to peace. This great and urgent challenge requires a vastly expanded and dynamic effort under United Nations leadership to attack the problem on many fronts. The developing countries have the primary responsibility for their own development, including the full mobilization of their human and natural resources and the economic, social and structural changes which are necessary for growth. But in order to allow the developing countries to assume full responsibility for their development, it is the duty of the world community to remove obstacles to development and promote an expanding world economy which will benefit all peoples regardless of their present degree of development. Among the measures required are these: increased financial and technical assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, on terms which will encourage development; trade policies, including temporary trade preferences, which will enable the developing countries to build their own economies through increased exports; a serious attack on the population problem, including aid to nations willing to accept it; and better coordination of all United Nations development and trade programs.

8. It is imperative that the United Nations should move toward universal membership. In the opinion of most but not all the participants, the People's Republic of China should promptly be seated. The presence of France and China in disarmament negotiations is essential.

9. A comprehensive study should be made of all factors involved in granting greater authority to the United Nations General Assembly, including the process of decision-making.

10. A start should be made toward giving the United Nations reliable sources of revenue independent of national contributions. For example, the United Nations might be authorized to col-


lect fees for the use of international communications, outer space, and resources in or under the international seas.

Many other steps would be helpful. We stress the need for all member nations to honor their Charter commitments and make greater use of the United Nations to solve international problems. More research is needed on the hard problems of war and peace and on the effectiveness of existing United Nations programs.

The steps listed above can be taken by 1975 if the peoples of the world and their governments will contribute enough leadership, imagination and hard work.

This is a time for realism and boldness. The task of strengthening the United Nations is difficult and demanding.

We must build a more effective United Nations in the interest of survival.



CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975 July 24-28, 1967 Bürgenstock, Switzerland

Left to right: Manton (Director); D. Stanley (Rapporteur); Boyd, Great Britain; Morse, U.S.A.; d'Arbousier, Senegal; Burns, Canada; Bhutto, Pakistan; Swai, Tanzania; Romulo, Philippines; C. M. Stanley (Chairman); Rossides, Cyprus; Fraser, U.S.A.; Haekkerup, Denmark; Nehru, India; Nielsen, Norway; Stambuk, Yugoslavia; Mayobre, Venezuela. Not pictured: Rahnama, Iran.

PARTICIPANTS
SECOND CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975
Bürgenstock, Switzerland July 24-28, 1967

The Honorable Gabriel M. d'Arboussier of Senegal, Executive Director of United Nations Institute for Training and Research
The Honorable Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Mr. Andrew Boyd of Great Britain, Foreign Affairs Editor of "The Economist"
General E. L. M. Burns, Adviser to the Government of Canada on Disarmament
The Honorable Donald M. Fraser, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, U.S.A.
The Honorable Per Hækkerup, Leader of the Social Democratic Party (Government Party) in the Danish Parliament and former Foreign Minister of Denmark
The Honorable Jose A. Mayobre of Venezuela, Minister of Mines and Petroleum
The Honorable F. Bradford Morse, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, U.S.A.
His Excellency B. K. Nehru, Ambassador of India to the United States
The Honorable Sivert A. Nielsen, President of Bergens Privatbank, former Ambassador of Norway to the United Nations
His Excellency Dr. Majid Rahnema, Ambassador of Iran to Switzerland and Vice President of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1967
General Carlos P. Romulo, President, University of the Philippines, and President of Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
His Excellency Zenon Rossides, Ambassador of Cyprus to the United Nations
The Honorable Zdenko Stambuk of Yugoslavia, Chief Editor of "Review of International Affairs" and Member of the Federal Parliament
The Honorable A. Z. N. Swai of Tanzania, Minister of Economic Affairs and Development Planning
Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley, Chairman, President of the Stanley Foundation
Mr. David M. Stanley, Rapporteur, Iowa State Senator and Candidate for the United States Senate
Dr. Thomas B. Manton, Conference Director, Executive Director of the Stanley Foundation

NOTE ON THE SEMINAR

In preparation for the Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975, a seminar was held in May. It discussed and refined background papers for the Conference. The subjects and authors of these papers are listed on the following page. These papers, compiled under the title THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE 1970's, were distributed in advance to the Bürgenstock participants.

The participants agreed that study on the United Nations in the 1970's must be made within the framework of a projection of present trends in the international system. These trends indicate a lessening of the dominant position of the two super-powers which have controlled the world scene since World War II. The seminar participants did not agree as to whether this trend was decentralization, polycentrism or multipolarism. They did agree that the trend would create greater need and opportunity for the United Nations to be more useful in coping with international political, economic, and social problems.

The seminar participants judged that future United Nations political operations will be more varied than the past. Pragmatic attempts at solutions will be the pattern in the political field. Growth will not be systematic but sporadic until national interests of the members demand a more ordered development of the United Nations political arena.

In the economic and social areas there seem to be greater prospects for more orderly growth of United Nations involvement. The United Nations is now playing a crucial role in the formulation of development plans in many of the developing countries. The United Nations development program could act as a catalytic agent around which and through which the progressive forces within the developing countries can mobilize their power and influence.

THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE 1970's

Compiled by Dr. Thomas B. Manton

Foreword

By C. Maxwell Stanley, President, The Stanley Foundation

The United Nations and the International System

By Dr. Oran R. Young, Assistant Professor of Politics
Princeton University

United Nations Political Action in the 1970's

By Dr. Urban Whitaker, Professor of International Relations
San Francisco State College

Arms Control and the United Nations in the 1970's

By Dr. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Associate Professor of
Government, Boston University

Development Assistance and the United Nations

By Mr. William I. Jones, Former Editor of
DEVELOPMENT DIGEST

The View from the Third World

By Dr. Noel J. Brown, Political Affairs Officer
United Nations

The View from Africa

By Dr. James O. C. Jonah, Political Affairs Officer
United Nations

The View from Asia

By Mr. Ejaz Husain, Special Correspondent
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan

(These papers are available from The Stanley
Foundation upon request.)

Statement by members of FIRST CONFERENCE on the UNITED NATIONS of 1975

June 19, 1965

Twenty years after the signing of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, we have come together as friends of the United Nations who are deeply concerned about its future. Our conference includes citizens of 13 nations from four continents, who speak solely as individuals.

We have studied the changes in the UN which are needed in the next ten years, rather than concentrate on immediate crises or utopian proposals.

We have unanimously reached the following conclusions, and have also discussed and noted many detailed steps which will be necessary to implement these conclusions.

Need for a Strengthened United Nations. The UN is rendering many useful and valuable services. However, under its present Charter the UN is not equipped to deal effectively with the continuing armaments race, the spread of nuclear weapons to more nations, the growing danger of accidental war, and the pressures of population and poverty.

Peace and freedom depend upon law and law enforcement. No city or nation could survive without laws, police, and courts. The UN and the world community cannot survive without enforceable world law, world police, and world courts for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Unless drastic changes are made in the UN Charter, there is grave danger that the UN may not survive the next ten years. Like an individual who delays needed surgery until his condition becomes desperate, the world has delayed the major operation which is essential to save the UN. If the surgery waits too long, the patient will die.

THE STANLEY FOUNDATION

The Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975 at Bürgenstock was sponsored by The Stanley Foundation. A primary interest of The Foundation is to further study and research in the field of foreign relations toward the achievement of a secure peace with freedom.

In addition to the First and Second CONFERENCE ON THE UNITED NATIONS OF 1975, The Foundation sponsors annually a discussion on United States foreign policy through the STRATEGY FOR PEACE CONFERENCE. This "Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace" explores off-the-record and in depth urgent foreign policy concerns of the United States. It brings together over one hundred leaders from the professions, business, universities and government to exchange ideas and make recommendations. The Strategy for Peace Conference attracts individuals from a wide spectrum of opinion and belief.

For three years The Foundation has sponsored the GRENVILLE CLARK EDITORIAL PAGE AWARD, given in "recognition to the publication of vigorous and thought-provoking editorial opinion in articles and cartoons on international affairs as to the effect of law and order on the achievement of a secure peace in freedom." A new and related project is the UNITED NATIONS SEMINAR FOR EDITORS AND EDITORIAL WRITERS to be held in November, 1967, in New York. This Seminar will bring together a limited number of editorial page writers from throughout the United States to learn first-hand about the work of the United Nations.

The Stanley Foundation is a tax exempt organization, and contributions to it are deductible for income tax purposes. The Foundation welcomes contributions to its several programs.

THE STANLEY FOUNDATION

Stanley Building, Muscatine, Iowa 52761

Necessary Changes in the United Nations. The UN must be greatly strengthened to provide these essential requirements for peace:

1. Complete and enforced disarmament of all nations, in carefully controlled stages. When the disarmament process is complete, each nation would retain only strictly limited and lightly armed police forces for internal order. Significant progress in disarmament will not be possible without parallel progress toward the provision of international security through the United Nations.

2. A permanent UN peace force to maintain international peace and security; and an effective UN inspection system to supervise disarmament.

3. A General Assembly empowered to adopt binding rules and regulations in respect to the peace-keeping functions of the strengthened UN and implementing the disarmament plan; a revised Security Council, responsible to the General Assembly; and, in the opinion of most but not all of the conferees, a revised voting system appropriate to the strengthened UN, including abolition of the present "veto power" in the Security Council.

4. A strengthened International Court of Justice empowered to interpret the UN Charter and decide all international legal disputes; a system of regional courts; and other tribunals and agencies to settle international disputes which are not capable of decision upon legal principles. Membership in the UN should carry with it the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court in all international disputes.

5. A world development program. As a matter of human survival, the world must use a substantially larger share of its resources to promote the economic and social advancement of the less-developed nations. Expansion and better coordination of existing development programs are urgently needed. A major part of the savings from disarmament should be used for a large-scale development program administered by the UN.

6. A reliable and adequate revenue system for the strengthened UN.

7. Safeguards to prevent abuse of power by the strengthened UN,

and a clear reservation to the member states and their peoples of all powers not granted to the UN under the revised Charter.

8. Eligibility of all nations for membership in the United Nations. Disarmament will not be possible unless all nations are subject to the enforcement system.

Charter Review Imperative. Because most of these changes require Charter revision, a United Nations Charter Review Conference must be called at the earliest possible date under Article 109 of the Charter, to adopt the necessary Charter amendments for submission to the member nations.

Human Rights. The draft UN covenants on human rights, including necessary implementation provisions, should promptly be adopted by the General Assembly and ratified by all nations.

Appeal for Action. We appeal to the peoples and governments of the world to face the present crisis and act while there is still time. Every citizen and every nation should press for a Charter Review Conference until the demand becomes irresistible. The smaller nations now have the opportunity to lead the way. National governments, private organizations, and individuals should immediately begin intensive study of UN Charter revision and formulation of proposed changes.

Nothing Less Will Succeed. We confine our recommendations to the minimum essentials for peace. Nothing less than enforceable world law can succeed. The strengthened United Nations which we advocate will not change the nature of man or solve all the world's problems, but it will keep the human race from committing suicide.

It Must Be Done! The difficulties of building enforceable world law are great, but the hazards of a world without enforceable law are greater. We have heard all the reasons why it cannot be done, but we know that it must be done. We speak for an idea whose time has come.


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THE VIET CONG



ARMED FORCES INFORMATION AND EDUCATION • DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE





Viet Cong Means Trouble

Literally translated, the phrase Viet Cong (VC) means Vietnamese Communist, and those who are Viet Cong employ the whole Communist arsenal of deceit and violence. A Viet Cong is a man, woman, or child—a tough fighter, with words or weapons, for what he is taught to call the “liberation” of South Vietnam—the Republic of Vietnam. Viet Cong also applies to the military and civilian components of the “Front” (the

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, or NFLSVN). To its deluded followers the Front is the government they serve—but to the vast majority of South Vietnamese it is an instrument of terror and oppression manipulated by the Communists of North Vietnam.

The Viet Cong, the Communist “Liberation Army” within the Republic of Vietnam, has expanded its





numbers enormously, despite increasingly heavy casualties. Its so-called main force has grown from about 10,000 men in 1960 to over 65,000. Several regiments of the North Vietnamese Army have been sent by Hanoi into South Vietnam as part of the Communist buildup of forces in the south. As befits "regulars," many are armed with late-model imported weapons and wear uniforms, helmets of wicker or steel, and even scarves for unit identification. From isolated companies their formations have grown to battalions and regiments.

The strength of the Viet Cong guerrillas has not increased as rapidly. The estimated more than 100,000 guerrillas and militia, mostly based in the vicinity of their home villages and hamlets, are essential to the success of the main force and to the whole Viet Cong effort. Better armed and trained than before, the irregulars still wear the "calico noir," the traditional black pajamas of the Vietnamese peasant (worn also by the regulars as fatigue uniforms). They guide, support, reinforce, and provide recruits for the "liberation" movement. They also make possible the rule of the Communist Party in the countryside, enforcing the dictates of the local puppet Front organizations.

There are substantial areas in which the Front is the only effective government. It operates schools and hospitals, clothing factories and arsenals. Millions of Vietnamese support the Front out of friendship or fear, most often the latter. Due largely to the militia and the secret agents of the Party, an estimated one-fourth of the people of South Vietnam pay taxes to the Front, even though they may also pay taxes to the legitimate Government. This is an impressive record for a shadow government.

Initial Resources

What makes the Viet Cong and their way of warfare so significant is that they started with so little in material assets, although they had a belief in a well-proven doctrine (of subversion), a thorough knowledge of its tactics, and the moral support of their fellow Communists throughout the world. They had no industrial capacity. They had no substantial armed forces, only a few thousand experienced guerrillas, and perhaps 100,000 supporters—mostly in remote areas seldom visited by Government representatives.

On the other hand, the Viet Cong had hidden stores of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. They had many trained and dedicated Communists to provide leadership, and access to the resources of the Communist regime in the North.







Finally, the Vietnamese Communists—North and South—were united in their determination to use whatever means were necessary to bring the whole country under Communist domination. Without massive U.S. and free world support, South Vietnam might already have been added to the list of lost countries.

As in conventional wars, each side expanded its armed might after the war had started. When it became obvious that the Republic of Vietnam in the South could not be taken without military force, Hanoi began sending a growing stream of infiltrators, arms, and supplies into South Vietnam by land and sea. The infiltrators were trained in the North to assume key positions of leadership. Communist China and other Communist countries have supplied weapons and ammunition, primarily through North Vietnam, the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), whose fight for freedom we support, have increased their numbers and improved their equipment at a pace far greater than have the Viet Cong. However, while the Front was experiencing its greatest growth, in 1963 and 1964, the free Government of South Vietnam was undergoing great political stress and frequent changes of administration. These factors have undoubtedly facilitated the growth of the Front, but they have not stunted the growth of the RVNAF, nor shaken their determination to resist Communist aggression and preserve the freedom and independence of the country.

The success of an unconventional army and a shadow government build up by Communist direction, largely from the people and the resources of a state they seek to destroy, is cause for concern. We must understand the reasons for this, and learn how to defeat such attacks, or they will be repeated again and again. The Viet Cong fighting man is not "10 feet tall," either figuratively or literally, being actually on the average only five feet three inches in height. Nor is he an incredible fanatic—many thousands of Viet Cong desert or go over to the side of the Government every year. His effectiveness cannot be attributed entirely to the outside support he receives—the RVNAF have received far more assistance from abroad.

Yet the Viet Cong has developed into a kind of fighting man who is capable of waging an unconventional war under conditions that would seem hopeless to the average orthodox soldier. To understand the Viet Cong and his way of warfare one must first know something of his country and his background.

The Growth of the Viet Cong

Roughly 40 years ago, the Communists under Ho Chi Minh, now president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North, began planning their campaign to take over Southeast Asia. Their first step in Vietnam was to seek to seize the leadership in the opposition to French rule. Vietnam was a part of French Indochina at the time. When the Japanese moved in after the fall of France in 1940, dominating the French and occupying all of Indochina, Communists and nationalists alike believed that the time for Vietnamese independence was near. Under Communist leadership and later Communist control, a coalition independence force was formed. This was the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), which launched an eight-year struggle against the French soon after they returned in 1945.

Like the later Viet Cong, the Viet Minh grew from a modest start—but they became larger and much more formidable than the Viet Cong are today. By mid-1954 the Viet Minh had nearly 160,000 regulars and perhaps an equal number of militia. The French, stunned by defeats in conventional battles such as that at Dien Bien Phu and unable to solve the problems of the



new kind of war waged by the Viet Minh, were ready to negotiate. At an international conference in Geneva in the summer of 1954, presided over by representatives of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, war-torn Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel. The northern half, controlled by Communists, became the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam; the free southern half became the independent Republic of Vietnam.

Under the terms of the armistice agreement, Communists and anti-Communists were given an opportunity to move to whichever half of the divided country they preferred. Nearly a million from the North were able to move south to freedom during the brief period allowed. Some 90,000 people, mostly men and boys of the Viet Minh army, or future recruits, went north. Tens of thousands of Communists and sizable stocks of arms and ammunition were left in the South to assure an ultimate Communist takeover.



The 17th parallel was not intended to be a permanent "political or territorial boundary." The delegates at Geneva agreed on a "free general election by secret ballot" to be held throughout Vietnam at the end of two years. This would allow the people to decide for themselves their political future, and it would reunify the country. The Communists in the more populous North, with their police state control, were confident of winning the election. The election was not held because the South doubted the possibility of an honest vote in the North and because the election would not have been held under proper international supervision.

Hanoi Adopts Stronger Measures

After 1956 the Communists began to prepare for a stronger effort in the South. This meant reorganizing and expanding their personnel there, both military and

political, for the struggle to achieve a "political solution." Such a solution, which the Communists would still welcome, means replacing the strongly anti-Communist Government with a controlled neutralist coalition. Occasional assassinations and other acts of terrorism seemed necessary and proper, but initially the main emphasis had been on a campaign of subversion and propaganda to undermine the legal Government. It is difficult to say how much their decision to act more vigorously and openly was influenced by the impatient Communists in the South and how much by their comrades in the North who were alarmed and embarrassed by the obvious contrast between the prosperity of the South and their own impoverished dictatorship.

Viet Cong terrorism was intensified in 1958, and by the end of that year the Viet Cong had an armed force of more than 2,000 regulars supplemented by militia. In 1959 it was decided that the political struggle

must be aided by a major armed effort. Open warfare began in 1960, with the overrunning of an RVNAF regimental headquarters at Trang Sup on 20 January.

Hanoi Creates a Screen

The Lao Dong (Communist) Party of Vietnam held its Third Congress in Hanoi in September 1960. Attended by Party representatives from all over Vietnam, the Congress acted to establish the appearance of a local rebellion in the South, while at the same time simplifying and formalizing control of it.

To give the whole Viet Cong operation the necessary appearance of being a true struggle for liberation by an oppressed people, to impart the illusion of legitimacy to actions taken and about to be taken, and to represent the movement in public activities, the Communists decided to set up a "National Liberation Front."

In December 1960, a group of individuals claiming to represent virtually all walks of life and all major ethnic and religious groups of South Vietnam met in the forest northwest of Saigon. There they announced the formation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, a shadow government, which faithfully issued the manifestoes already decreed by the Communist Party Congress in September.

Another act of Communist deception was the creation of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) in the South. The object of this was to screen the extent of Communist domination of the Front and make it appear that the Front is composed of several organizations. The original members of the PRP were all Communists, but qualifications for admission were made less strict than for the PRP's counterpart in the North, the Lao Dong Party.

Hanoi's Political-Military Machine

The Communist regime in Hanoi directs, controls, and supplies the entire Viet Cong political and military effort to conquer the Republic of Vietnam. All control—political and military—comes ultimately from the Central Committee of North Vietnam's Lao Dong (Communist) Party, which maps out broad strategy. The Reunification Commission of the Northern government controls the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, and the Military High Command in the North is responsible for the military training of the men who infiltrate into the South. In addition, a central Intelligence organization in Hanoi—the Central Research Agency—maintains an elaborate intelligence network in South Vietnam and directs the extensive undercover activities of the Viet Cong.

The two Communist administrative headquarters in the South, inherited from the Viet Minh, have been merged into the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). This central "brain" coordinates all Communist activity in the South and all relations with the highest Communist Party and government echelons in North Vietnam.

In South Vietnam itself, the Communists have created a show of legitimacy through the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. At the national headquarters level, the Front has a central committee and presidium, which take their orders from the control committee of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)—the Communist Party in South Vietnam.

The Front's national central committee sets policy and also is responsible for planning and organization building. The next level in the Communist-dominated Front hierarchy consists of the 3 interzone headquarters, which determine *agitprop* (persuasion and propaganda) policy guidance and which are responsible for political indoctrination and training. Under the interzone headquarters are 7 zone headquarters, which are their sub-offices.

Next in the Front's structure are the approximately 30 provincial committees—its chief operating units.



These committees direct the "liberation associations" the Communists use to spread their indoctrination and propaganda and to gain the often-unwitting support of the South Vietnamese people. The committees, of course, also transmit to subordinate levels the orders sent down from the central committee. In addition—and this is a major role for the provincial-level Communists—they assign military duties to the Viet Cong units operating in their provinces.

The Front's committees and cells in South Vietnam's districts, towns, and villages make up the largest part of the Communist spiderweb spread like an evil shadow over the land. In the "liberated," or Viet Cong-dominated areas of South Vietnam, they are in the open, free of Government interference as they carry out their so-called political struggle, recruit and train men for their local Viet Cong units, and carry out the military or guerrilla tasks they are assigned.

In the areas controlled by the legitimate Government, of course, the Communists and grass-level front members must remain under cover and work in secret in their efforts to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Since the Communists are using the National Liberation Front to camouflage their anti-Government activities, their People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party organization parallels the Front structure, and that Communist apparatus keeps a tight control on the Front from the top-level central committee to at least the provincial level.

The military arm is completely integrated into the Front structure from the very top to the lowest level, with military representatives found at all organizational levels of the Front. Since the Vietnamese Communists consider the war in South Vietnam to be primarily a political struggle, the primary duty of the Viet Cong military forces is to support that political aggression being conducted by the Communists in the name of the National Movement to Liberate South Vietnam.

A 64-page Front indoctrination booklet on the organization of its armed forces declared that organization must conform to political lines; that the Liberation Army (Viet Cong) is a fighting army and therefore must be highly centralized with inferiors obeying superiors—there must be discipline; and that the army's political tasks are fundamental, maintaining unity between cadres and men, and between the army and the people.

The booklet pointed out that these three principles insure that military action is subordinated to political




action, that the army is united, and that the people are closely united with the army.

To insure continuous political orientation of the army and maintain political control over the army's officer corps, political officers, or commissars, are assigned to all Viet Cong units. They are the political watchdogs and indoctrinators of the Front's Liberation Army.

The Viet Cong, the so-called Liberation Army, in South Vietnam is about one half of the total Communist armed forces in all Vietnam. The other half comprises North Vietnam's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).

The Viet Cong forces consist of two basic elements, the paramilitary, and the full military. The paramilitary Viet Cong is generally a local civilian who is a part-time soldier or guerrilla, whose military duties do not take him far from his community. In addition, he is not highly indoctrinated politically.

The Front's name for its paramilitary force was originally the Popular Army. However, since this force is engaged almost exclusively in guerrilla warfare, the name has been expanded to Guerrilla Popular Army (GPA). At the hamlet level, the GPA unit is either



guerrilla units also serve as manpower pools for the Viet Cong's full military units.

The Viet Cong's full military element also is divided into two types—the Regional Forces and the Main Force. They are not set up or operated like orthodox army units. Their units are self-contained, not uni-

formed, and rely primarily on guerrilla tactics. Since they are dependent for much of their logistical support on local populations, their commanders can't simply forward supply requisitions to a depot. Instead, when they need weapons, ammunition, or other military hardware they attack a Government base or unit and try to capture what they want.

The Regional Forces, also called Territorials or Regionals, are units established by Front district committees, which provide their leadership and direct their activities. A Regional Force operates pretty much in one general area.

The elite units of the so-called Liberation Army are the battalions of the Main Force. They have acquired the name of "Hard Hats" because of the metal or fiberboard helmets that distinguish them from the Regional Forces and the paramilitary guerrillas. These battalions are directed by the Front committees at the provincial level and range farther afield in their military operations than do the units of the Regional Forces. As members of the Main Force, the "Hard Hat" Viet Cong don't have to perform non-military work, such as producing food or transporting supplies. By the end of 1965 there were over 65,000 of these Hard Hats fighting in South Vietnam.

This organization seems cumbersome and the chain of command indirect and slow, in contrast to orthodox military practice of establishing a direct military chain of command from top to bottom. However, the Viet Cong's political and military structure conforms to the classic Communist pattern of strong central authority at the top and operations at lower level decentralized, with Communist Party control over the government at all levels, and political control over the military at all levels.

The Cadre—How He Operates

Although few, except those immediately affected, realized the war was on in the late 1950's and early 1960's, those who were the victims of the savage campaigns of terrorism, assassination, and kidnapping in rural Vietnam were well aware of it. So too were the thousands of cadres—trained, dedicated, hard-core Communist leaders and military officers—who fanned out in the countryside to win support for the insurgent forces. A cadre's role can be described as a combination priest, policeman, and propagandist. He is the Party and the Front in the countryside hamlets and villages. How they operate is graphically described by one of them, Captain Lam.



People - People School, Vietnam

17/2/68
Vietnam

"We seek to do three things. The first is to drive a wedge between the people and their government—to make the people hate their government, and the Americans. Our second objective is to get people to join our (VC) armed forces. The third is to persuade them to increase their production of food, and give the increase to us.

"Our cadre go into each village to study the situation and the people. Once they know the people and their problems, our cadre can explain how these problems are the fault of the government, and how the people can achieve their ambitions by following us. In this way we make the people hate their government, and can destroy the government in their village. Then we guide them in forming their own government (under our control) and in organizing their own armed forces, which of course are our auxiliaries.

"Of course we cannot do this right away in those villages and districts where the government is strong. There we concentrate on educating people politically to hate their government, and on forming both open and secret organizations which can support us, or embarrass the government. Every little bit helps. Any voluntary action of the people, from organized protests to simply slowing down on work ordered by the government, is a clear gain for us.

"Our cadre live in the village, or, if this is not safe, very close by. They appeal to the ideals, the patriotism, and the emotions of each individual according to his situation, and try to recruit him for the cause. If a person is arrested by government forces we try to contact him as soon as he is released, sympathize with him, arouse his hatred of the government, and recruit him. Many times we bring hungry, tired troops into a village so that the people may see how we are suffering for them, and arouse their sympathy. We try in every possible way to create hatred for the government and the Americans, to separate the people from the government and to make them see that we are their only hope."

Today, with the increase in Viet Cong forces, more emphasis is placed on terror and murder ("destroying the village government") and less on persuasion. Organizing and involving everyone possible in a maximum effort, coupled with incessant propaganda, is still emphasized as essential to Viet Cong success.

The Diversity of the Viet Cong

The nearly half million men and women who make up the civil and military components of the Viet Cong army and its shadow government, the National Front, are as diverse and divergent in origin and in motivation as those of any army and government anywhere. Perhaps the most important thing that sets them apart from their fellow Vietnamese is the way in which they are incessantly told, and caused to repeat, the reasons for everything they do, including supporting the Viet Cong. The best illustrations of their diversity, and their common knowledge, is found in some of their own statements.

Consider the story of Captain Lam. One of the real "hard core," the backbone of the movement, he took advantage of the Government's Chieu Hoi program which welcomes the return to loyalty of those misled by the Communists.

"I left my village in Central Vietnam in 1947, when I was eighteen years old, to join the Viet Minh. Two years later, because they said that all leaders in the struggle against the French should, I joined the Communist Party. As its Political Officer, I went North with my company in 1954, after the division of the country.

"In 1960, I was promoted to Senior Captain, and

ordered to go to help liberate the South. After nearly six months' travelling I reached my destination and became at first a political member of the Province Committee and later a District Commissar [Secretary of the District Committee]. We were very successful in organizing and expanding the Viet Cong, but after two years, and the change in governments, I began to see the real difference between the way the people live in the North and the way they would live in the South if it were not for this war. I lost my faith in the Communist claim that we were fighting for the people, and decided that the only right thing was to join the forces of the Republic of Vietnam, so I did."

By way of contrast, consider the words of Sergeant Vo Anh Long, a 31-year-old squad leader in a main force battalion: "I was a farmer until May 1960. The Government controlled my village, but the Viet Cong used to come at night and collect taxes. They would tell us, and we believed them, that they were good men who loved and wanted to defend the poor people like us, that they struggled and sacrificed even their lives to give rights to the poor people.

"Finally they told me, and five other young men, that if we stayed in the village the Government would take us away for the army, but that if we came with

VIET CONG OATH OF HONOR

1. I swear I am prepared to sacrifice all for Vietnam. I will fight to my last breath against imperialism, colonialism, Vietnamese traitors, and aggression in order to make Vietnam independent, democratic and united.
2. I swear to obey absolutely all orders from my commanders, executing them wholeheartedly, promptly, and accurately.
3. I swear to fight firmly for the people without complaint and without becoming discouraged even if life is hard or dangerous. I will go forward in combat without fear, will never retreat regardless of suffering involved.
4. I swear to learn to fight better and shape myself into a true revolutionary soldier battling the invading American imperialists and their servants, seeking to make Vietnam democratic, wealthy, and strong.
5. I swear to preserve organizational secrecy, and to keep secret my unit's plans, the name of my unit commander, and all secrets of other revolutionary units.

6. I swear if taken by the enemy I will not reveal any information even under inhuman torture. I will remain faithful to the Revolution and not be bribed by the enemy.
7. I swear in the name of unity to love my friends in my unit as myself, to work cooperatively with them in combat and at all other times.
8. I swear to maintain and protect my weapons, ensuring they are never damaged or captured by the enemy.
9. I swear that in my relationships with the people I will do three things and eschew three things. I will respect, protect, and help the people; I will not steal from, threaten, nor inconvenience the people. I will do all things to win their confidence.
10. I swear to indulge in self-criticism, to be a model soldier of the Revolution, and never to harm either the Liberation Army or Vietnam.

them for a week of training we could become local guerrillas and defend our village. We went with them, but then they told me that because of my ability I must go to a long training course. We marched for months to reach the training camp, where I studied for six months and then was graduated as a squad leader.

"I soon realized that the life of a Viet Cong was hard, but the cadre kept emphasizing that we were living gloriously, that we must be prepared to die splendidly. Although I knew that I had been fooled, I accepted this. We studied and had self-criticism sessions almost every day. Each of us belonged to a three-man cell, so that every man was watched by two others.

"I stayed with them for four years, fighting in many battles. Eventually I could no longer stand being away from my family, and so I ran away and joined the Government side."

A few more statements further illustrate the diversity.

"My uncle told me that I must join the district force, because otherwise the Viet Cong might burn down my mother's house."

"I was farming in the North, but last year when I was 20 the PAVN [People's Army of (North) Vietnam] drafted me, gave me six weeks' training, asked my group if it would not help to liberate the South, and marched us down here. Now I am in a transportation unit and have to carry 32 kilos of rice for 12 miles every day. I want to go home."

"I did not want to become a soldier but the Viet Cong came and took me. Then I was ashamed to desert, because it would disgrace my comrades in the cell. But I used to get drunk and sleep too late, and after I was criticized several times and did not reform I was banished from my unit."

"I am from North Vietnam. I was an officer of the PAVN. I was ordered to come to the South, so of course I came."

"I was a village guerrilla. The Viet Cong hamlet chief told me I must watch for the Government troops. One night the district force came and attacked the Government outpost. I had to help them. After the battle they gave me a gun, and said that now I must fight to save my life. When a RVNAF company came I tried to hide but they found me."

Viet Cong Discipline

Scholar or street urchin, professional officer or farm boy, they all tell the same story of relentless indoctrination—of discipline playing on every human emotion, constantly applied. The soldier is required to memorize basic codes of conduct (a 10-point oath of honor and a 12-point code of discipline) which put him in the position of a hero, a patriot, a friend, and protector of the people. He is never allowed to forget this role. Perhaps the most effective reminder is his unit's daily indoctrination and self-criticism session. In this, his indoctrination is continued and reinforced, his supposed motives are reviewed and discussed by the group, and he is told by his leader what his future actions will be. After this, he must explain his reactions, and he must publicly confess and criticize his own shortcomings and weaknesses in thought and deed.

After every fight there is an almost immediate critique, with no holds barred, which gives every man a chance to let off steam. It also lets the cadre know what his men are thinking. This contributes to the effectiveness of the constant surveillance program, maintained primarily through the cell system (usually three-man) which is applied to every possible unit.

Appeals to the mind and the heart are the principal

VIET CONG CODE OF DISCIPLINE

1. I will obey the orders from my superiors under all circumstances.
2. I will never take anything from the people, not even a needle or thread.
3. I will not put group property to my own use.
4. I will return that which is borrowed, make restitution for things damaged.
5. I will be polite to people, respect and love them.
6. I will be fair and just in buying and selling.
7. When staying in people's houses I will treat them as I would my own house.

8. I will follow the slogan: All things of the people and for the people.
9. I will keep unit secrets absolutely and will never disclose information even to closest friends or relatives.
10. I will encourage the people to struggle and support the Revolution.
11. I will be alert to spies and will report all suspicious persons to my superiors.
12. I will remain close to the people and maintain their affection and love.

way in which the Viet Cong seeks to control its members. Regular units employ standard forms of military courtesy, and strict obedience is always expected, but emphasis is placed on making compliance with regulations appear to be voluntary. For those who fail in their duty, if such normal punishments as public criticism,

extra duty, and brief confinement do not bring reform, the penalty is often discharge, in terms that make the man feel a traitor and an outcast from the human race. The fear of corporal punishment or death seems to be of less importance although either may be visited on the individual or his relatives.





Tactical Planning and Doctrine

It has been said that the Viet Cong soldier probably is told the reason for everything that he does more frequently and in greater detail than any other soldier in the world. Almost certainly he is required to explain the reasons for his actions more than any other soldier. Every proposed action is discussed from all angles before it is taken—and by everyone concerned except the targets and the innocent bystanders. Concerning the bystanders, one Viet Cong commented on the bombing of the U. S. Embassy, "If a few people get killed from a blast it is a risk of the war. . . . The Front is the benefactor of all the people."

Captain Lam's description of what happens after action against an RVNAF outpost is recommended

shows the almost incredible effort to make sure that everyone "gets the word" and performs his assigned duties.

"After studying the proposal, I report it to the head of the Provincial Military Affairs Committee. He then studies it from all points of view, considering especially the political effects, and the relative capabilities of our forces and those of the RVNAF. If he approves of the proposed operation he presents it to the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Party. The Secretary studies it and if he thinks it sound he calls a meeting of the whole Party Committee to study, discuss, and perhaps approve the proposal.

"Once the proposal is approved by the Party Com-

Freedom) Supply (Secret) crime -



mittee, the Military Affairs Committee divides the preliminary tasks among its three staffs. The Military Staff sends a reconnaissance unit to study the objective from a military point of view, and to prepare a sandtable mock-up. The Political Staff sends a cadre to contact the civilians in the area, to learn their reaction to the [proposed] attack. It also studies the morale of the troops to see if they are mentally and emotionally prepared. If they are not, the Political Staff must take the necessary measures to prepare them. The Rear Services [logistics] Staff finds out if the civilians can furnish the necessary food and labor, including that needed for removal of the dead and of any booty.

"When all this is done, the Military Affairs Committee holds another meeting. This will be attended by the leaders of all the units that will be involved in the attack. If the majority of the Committee believes that the attack should be made, they report to another meeting of the Provincial Party Committee, which again reviews the proposed problem and the solution and per-

haps directs some additional action. The Party Committee will approve the attack only if all conditions—political, military, and logistic—appear favorable.

"After this is accomplished all units begin practicing for the attack, either on a sandtable or an actual stake-and-string replica of the target. This practice will take from five days to a month, depending on the difficulty of the target, until every man knows just what he is supposed to do, how he is supposed to do it, and when. Every detail of the action will be planned out, including when and where the main force units will meet the local force and militia units. The militia are always necessary to guide the troops and to provide laborers to carry supplies, to carry off the booty and our dead, if any. We always try to carry away all our dead, to give them proper burial, which will comfort their families and strengthen the morale of the rest."

Such detailed preparation seems fantastic, but account after account bears it out. Any planned operation, whether an attack, an ambush, or a raid on a hamlet, is planned and rehearsed in great detail—and then often called off at the last moment when some factor has changed.

Viet Cong tactical doctrine is explicit. It is summarized in four words: Four Fast, One Slow. This means Fast Advance, Fast Assault, Fast Clearance of the Battlefield, and Fast Withdrawal—all based on Slow Preparation.

There it little that is new or unusual in Viet Cong tactical doctrine, once the basic principle of careful, thorough preparation for any contingency, followed by swift action, is grasped. Attacks on strongpoints almost always feature maximum use of explosives on a primary and a secondary objective, usually mutually supporting, and a careful deployment of forces to intercept or ambush any reinforcements that may be brought in. In several recent battles there have been indications of deliberate efforts to entice and ambush helicopter-borne troops.

In the past the Viet Cong have usually sought to avoid defensive combat unless they had the battlefield so organized that it was essentially an ambush. Nevertheless they carefully prepare for defense, with alternate and switch positions, in case they do decide to make a stand. Frequently these positions are incorporated into existing dikes separating rice fields so that emplacements seem to be merely breaks in the walls, and even trenches look like canals. Where the water level will permit, especially in the so-called secret base areas,

elaborate tunnels are often constructed, both for cover and for concealment from ground and air forces. Like the Japanese in World War II, the Viet Cong are tireless diggers.

Controlled land mines, buried in highways and detonated when a Government target is over them, have long been a favorite and an economical Viet Cong method of destroying or at least discouraging their opponents. Occasionally nonmilitary targets are mined, usually by mistake or for some specific political or psychological purpose, such as warning uncooperative civilians. Homemade booby traps, ranging from simple deadfalls and "spike-boards" to explosive foot-mines are often used in preparing for a battle or an ambush, being placed in the covered areas the ambushes would naturally seek.

Like the elaborate trench-works often seen, the hundreds of booby traps around "liberated," meaning Viet-Cong-controlled, villages have some value if a Viet Cong unit decides to fight there. Their most important function, really, is to implicate the civilians in anti-Government actions. Government forces are likely to treat them as Viet Cong. The villagers fully anticipate this, so they feel forced to support the Viet Cong as their only hope. Secondly, the trenches and the dugouts do provide protection for the civilians if the community is bombed or shelled by Government forces. Even though these attacks are provoked by the Viet Cong, the people are often grateful to these same provocateurs for "helping us to protect ourselves."

The Viet Cong's emphasis on carefully planned, discussed, and rehearsed actions has its disadvantages. If such an action fails, if losses are heavier than expected or not in proportion to benefits achieved, there is a corresponding drop in morale and combat effectiveness. An unexpected serious attack by Republic of Vietnam forces, especially when the resistance is unsuccessful, indicates poor planning by Viet Cong leaders and seriously impairs effectiveness for weeks or months, longer than the actual damage inflicted would warrant. Only a quick, successful counteraction can overcome this effect.

Viet Cong "Persuasion"

Much is said about the Viet Cong use of terror, which seems to be increasing. This is natural as the pace of the war steps up and support requirements grow faster than voluntary contributions. Taxes have been raised repeatedly in some areas. "Draftees" must fill in as voluntary recruiting proves inadequate. Terror-punishment

seems to produce the fastest results, but it eventually reacts against those who use it unless they succeed in seizing complete power. Today, in many areas, the Viet Cong are faced with the administrative problems that afflict any government in time of war—and are losing voluntary support as a result.

The Viet Cong have, from the beginning, made every effort to secure the support of members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as well as the support of the civilians. Generally similar tactics have been used, emphasizing always the benefits to the individual and the high moral and patriotic worth of such a shift in allegiance. "Serve your country against the American imperialists," they say. "Don't be fooled because the Americans are more clever than the French; the Americans' motives are the same, but they use you as puppets."

The general preference for the "soft-sell" does not keep the Communists from killing, often by torture, whole garrisons of small posts they overwhelm when it seems appropriate to punish determined resistance or to frighten others in the area. Not infrequently one or two leaders will be brutally murdered as an example to the others. The dependents of the men may meet the same fate. Threats of reprisals against families are sometimes used as well.

Within the last 6 years the Viet Cong's *Binh Van* program—"proselyting," as they call it—has become a major program. A favored practice is the use of girls and women, speaking as sisters or mothers, to serenade small garrisons, calling to them to save their precious lives for their families' sake, and imploring them to have mercy on civilians. None of these programs has had noticeable success. Homesickness has been a major cause of desertion in the RVNAF, and this has plagued the Viet Cong as well.

Prisoners, to the Viet Cong, are objects to be exploited, primarily for political and psychological purposes. Thus, prisoners are often held—and treated as well as could be expected by the standards of an Asian guerrilla army—for two or three months' reeducation and then, if not notoriously anti-Communist or brutal, released. There have been instances in which American prisoners were held for some six months, exhibited in villages and hamlets, put under pressure to get them to sign documents that could be used for worldwide propaganda, and then released. One American prisoner was reported executed in June 1965 in reprisal for the execution of a Viet Cong terrorist.



Viet Cong Capabilities and Liabilities

In little more than five years the Viet Cong armed forces have grown from an essentially guerrilla army to one that includes regiments of uniformed, well-equipped, highly foot-mobile regulars capable of engaging in conventional operations of limited duration. Concurrently, their civil organization has grown from a mere shadow to one of considerable substance, which in some provinces collects almost four times as much taxes as does the Republic of South Vietnam. The Communist Party, under its cover name of the People's Revolutionary Party, has expanded the control it exercises on behalf of North Vietnam—the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Substantial quantities of portable war materials have been brought into South

Vietnam by land and sea, as well as 8,000 to 10,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in the year 1964 alone. The Communist buildup in the South is continuing.

As Viet Cong resources and capabilities have grown, so have their liabilities. They have been forced to draft teenagers directly into their regular units. They have felt obliged to redouble their rates of taxation and increase their other demands on the civilians in areas under their influence. Logistics requirements for food as well as weapons have greatly increased. Even regular units spent much of their time in producing their own food until 1964, a practice which increased air surveillance may render unprofitable.

Most significant, and most dangerous for both sides,

the Viet Cong pretense of being truly a South Vietnam "people's army" is rapidly being destroyed by the introduction on a growing scale of North Vietnamese forces and equipment—and by their own stepped-up actions as well. If this effort to achieve a quick victory fails, as our increasing support of the free Vietnamese is intended to assure, they say they are quite prepared to continue for 10 or 20 years if necessary and possible.

The war in Vietnam "is a different kind of war," said President Johnson on July 28, 1965. "There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Vietnam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own Government. But we must not let this mask the central

fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Vietnam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism."

The Viet Cong is a tough enemy, but no tougher than his opponents. He is not a superman, nor is he invincible. It is impossible to predict how long it will take, but the Republic of Vietnam and the United States are committed to stopping his aggression.

Our military effort in Vietnam is an essential element in achieving the objectives of freedom, peace, and progress in that war-torn country which has fought so long and valiantly for those goals.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington

March 8, 1966

KNOW YOUR ENEMY: THE VIET CONG (DoD Gen-20)—
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
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THE 'PEOPLE'S WAR'



Armed Forces Information and Education • Department of Defense

FOREWORD

Time has not dulled the message of Lin Piao's article, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," which was published in *Peking Review* on 3 September 1965.

Lin Piao, Vice Premier and Minister of Defense of Communist China, wrote his article ostensibly commemorating the 20th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in World War II. Actually, it sums up and reaffirms Red Chinese strategy for Communist conquest of the free world.

This article is considered a significant statement of Red Chinese policy and is based on the writings of Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Abhorrent as these ideas may be, we ignore them at our own peril. Members of the U.S. Armed Forces especially need to know what Lin Piao said, to see how he has distorted U. S. aims and policies, and to comprehend the long-range plan for Communist domination of the world.

This pamphlet includes a digest of Lin Piao's article, followed by an analysis of the article by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance. The full text of the Lin Piao article is available at your Armed Forces library under the title, *Red Chinese Blueprint* (DoD GEN-17).

We *would not* ignore the buzz of a rattlesnake! . . . We *must not* ignore the roar of the dragon!

Long Live the Victory of the People's War



THIS IS THE CHINESE COMMUNIST BATTLE PLAN

This is a condensation of the 18,000-word manifesto as expounded by Lin Piao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and Communist China's Vice Premier and Minister of Defense, in September 1965.

All peoples suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression, unite! Hold aloft the banner of people's war and fight for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democracy, and socialism! Victory will certainly go to the people of the world!

War and Violence Are Essential

"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Comrade Mao Tse-tung has declared. The seizure of state power by armed force, he clearly pointed out, is the central task and the highest form of proletarian revolution.

We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice, and suffering to the people. But the sacrifice of a small number of people in revolutionary wars is repaid by security for whole nations and even for the whole of mankind. War can temper people and push history forward. In this sense war is a great school.

The Soviet leaders have tried to revise these Marxist-Leninist principles. They peddle a line called "peaceful co-existence." They claim that if people compete peacefully the oppressed will be liberated and a world without weapons and wars will come into being. Rubbish! The oppressed peoples and countries which have won independence might just as well lay down their arms and place themselves at the mercy of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys!

People's War Is the Road to Victory

How did China, weak and semi-colonial, defeat Japan, a powerful imperialist country? By a people's war led by the Communist Party of China, Comrade Mao has explained.

Mao pointed out that the war, a long, *protracted war*, would pass through three stages: the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate, and the strategic offensive. The *protracted war* was also to be a process of mobilizing, organizing, and arming the people. It was only by mobilizing the entire people to fight a people's war that the struggle could continue and Japanese aggression be defeated.

The Strategy and Tactics of People's War

During the war against Japan, Mao developed his strategy of the encirclement of the cities from revolutionary bases in the countryside. While the Russian October Revolution began with armed uprisings in the *cities* and then spread to the countryside, the Chinese revolution succeeded through the *surrounding of the cities from the rural areas*.

Mao's strategy is tried and true. *It can be applied today by the oppressed peoples of the world.* If North America and Western Europe can be considered "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa, and Latin America make up "the rural areas." And the cause of world revolution today hinges on the struggle of the "rural" Asian, African, and Latin American people against the "imperialism" of the "cities."

Simultaneous struggles by different peoples against U.S. imperialism can reinforce each other in a worldwide tide of opposition. When the people in a country are awakened and armed they can overthrow the reactionary rule. And we Communists who have won a people's war are duty bound to help others in their revolutions.

Using the tactics of *guerrilla warfare*, we mobilize and expand the people's army, weakening the enemy. Whenever we gain a clear superiority of forces we switch to a *mobile warfare*. In either tactic, the goal of the people's army is complete *annihilation of the enemy*. "Injuring all of a man's fingers is not as effective as chopping off one," Mao has pointed out, "and routing ten divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them."

You rely on modern weapons and we rely on highly conscious revolutionary people—an army based solidly on the politics of the proletarian revolution. You fight your way and we fight our way—land mine warfare, tunnel warfare, sabotage warfare. We fight when we can win and move away when we can't. When you want to fight us, we don't let you and you can't even find us. But when we want to fight you, we wipe you out!

The Politics of People's War

In fighting imperialism, *the Communist Party must lead the masses in a United Front*, rallying the patriotic—Communist and non-Communist alike—to the support of national and anti-imperialist causes. Within the Front, and within the people's army, our Party maintains political independence. We of the Party lead the people in the tortuous national-democratic struggle against imperialism and its lackeys. Thus the way is paved for the socialist revolution of the proletariat which must logically follow.

Imperialists and Revisionists Cannot Prevent the People's War

"Imperialists and reactionaries are paper tigers," Comrade Mao has assured us. Though we must take full account of the enemy's capabilities if we are to wage people's war, we need not hesitate.

U.S. imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to intimidate people. But nuclear weapons cannot be used lightly. And if the U.S. were to use them again, it would become isolated in the extreme and would expose its own people to the same threat.

Moreover, no matter how modern his weapons and equipment may be, the imperialist cannot defeat an indomitable people fighting at close quarters with courage and the spirit of sacrifice.

The Soviet revisionists worry that a single spark might touch off a world nuclear conflagration. But has a single one of the wars of national liberation in the years since World War II developed into a world war? No!

Yet the Soviet leadership and the U.S. imperialists are working together to extinguish the revolutionary flames of people's war. They cannot do it. There are bound to be people's wars and the revolutionaries of the world will sweep aside everything that stands in their way!

Vietnam Is a Test Case

The struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression is *now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. aggression*. No matter what U.S. imperialism may do to expand its war adventure, the Chinese people will support the Vietnamese people until every single one of the U.S. aggressors is driven out of Vietnam. The U.S. leaders are deeply worried that their defeat in Vietnam will lead to a chain reaction. But the more they expand the war, the greater will be the chain reaction and the more disastrous their defeat. The people in other parts of the world will see still more clearly that U.S. imperialism can be defeated and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.

Long live the victory of people's war!

So ends Communist China's blueprint for aggression as expounded by Lin Piao, deputy to Red China's Mao Tse-tung.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS

on LIN PIAO DOCTRINE*

Lin Piao sees a major crisis in human society in the second half of the 20th century; he sees it taking place on the perimeter of the industrialized world — in Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America.

I think we can agree on that.

Let us examine why.

We can begin by reminding ourselves that the Communist mind is a curious combination of ideological rigidity — and tactical suppleness.

The Communist mind is, at one and the same time, philosophically closed — and pragmatically open.

In the past half century we have witnessed an imaginative display of aggressive Communist tactics.

The goal has always been the same: political domination. But the path to that goal has often switched direction.

In our own lifetime, Communist tactics have ranged through a broad and brutal spectrum: everything from outright occupation by the Red Army in Eastern Europe . . . through conventional aggression in Korea . . . to the guerrilla operations in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, and now in Vietnam.

Communist tactics have sometimes fomented revolutions, and at other times have captured those initiated by others.

Communist tactics have learned to be as much at home with legal means, as with illegal means; with sophisticated societies, as with primitive ones; with rightist dictators, as with leftist demagogues.

Thus, if one surveys the total Communist movement of the past half-century, one cannot fail to be struck with a pro-

found bit of irony; that the Communists in their ultimate view of history are almost insufferably dogmatic and doctrinaire. But in their efforts to manipulate that history, they are almost incredibly pragmatic and practical.

What, then, is our answer to the Communist manifesto of Mao Tse-tung, as written by Lin Piao?

First, our answer is that we agree that the "focus" of the challenge lies, at the moment, in Vietnam.

But the Government of Vietnam and the United States will not be defeated by Communist aggression from the North. We will continue our support of the people of South Vietnam until a just and reasonable settlement is reached—whether by agreement at a conference table or by a cessation of the aggression, as in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Greece.

Secondly, we agree with Mao that the lands arching across the southern half of the globe—Asia, Africa, and Latin America—are to play a decisive role in the future of humanity.

But we disagree that their role is to be hapless victims of Communist externally directed so-called "wars of national liberation." On the contrary, we believe that these nations desire to remain fully and freely themselves—uncoerced by subversion stage-managed and supplied from without. We believe that these nations desire, with wisdom and dignity, to seek their own national progress in their own national way. And we stand ready to assist them to do precisely that.

Thirdly, we agree that Mao's clear

intent is that his brand of communism should eventually surround, encircle, and finally cut off and defeat Western Europe and the United States.

But we disagree that that is going to happen. Our defenses are strong, and we remain alert and ready for whatever the future may bring. But more important is the fact that the free nations of the world offer a better future for the individual, and a peaceful path to that future.

Finally, we agree with Mao that just as there are cities and countryside *within* nations, so the world at large—in its current uneven rate of technological advance—can be viewed as a series of industrialized centers, surrounded by a less-developed countryside.

But we disagree that the historical process suggests that the global countryside will storm these centers, and put them to the torch of Communist insurgency.

On the contrary, we believe that the historical process will be precisely the reverse; that the industrialized centers—the fortunate nations of the world—will increasingly seek to bring to the countryside—to the poorer nations of the world—the very assistance and skill that will help these nations to close the poverty-gap. And the rich nations will do this by measures that will share talents and resources—by measures that will increase the self-confidence and self-reliance of the poorer nations to achieve their *own* self-sustaining political and economic growth.

In the United States we issue no global manifestos.

But we do indulge in one dream. We

* This text was taken from a speech by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance.



Young Indonesian foes of communism weakened the grip of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) with mass demonstrations.

do entertain one grand vision. We do look to one great goal.

We are dedicated to continuing the dialogue with the rest of the world that began in an obscure hall in Philadelphia on July 4, 1776.

The men in that hall were revolutionaries.

The men in that hall did not believe that *true* political power can grow out of the barrel of a gun. They believed that true political power *can grow only out of the people themselves* — for that is precisely where it is: within each individual human being.

Those men did not rant about class struggle. They said bluntly *that all men are created equal*.

Those men did not theorize about a dictatorship of the proletariat. They proposed something far more explosive than that. They declared *that all men had an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the*

pursuit of happiness.

Those men in 1776 fused, primed, and set off a political explosion that has had more ultimate effect on society than all the dictators of history rolled into one.

The fires of that revolution still burn in this country; and the sparks of that revolution still fly, igniting the tinder of human aspiration all over the globe.

One of the greatest challenges to this generation of Americans is to refine the formulas

- for creating the driving sparks,
- for cultivating the leadership talent,
- for unleashing and organizing the earth's bountiful natural resources,

- for breaking down the out-of-date barriers to progress, throughout the world.

We have an enormous challenge to perfect the formulas to do all of these things to permit what Lin Piao calls "the countryside" to find their way up the rocky path.

We must meet that challenge.

We must offer the more durable stuff of true, creative revolution.

Lin Piao's statement of Communist China's goals for the world is 18,000 words long.

President Johnson has summed up *our* goals for the world in three simple sentences:

Our own freedom and growth have never been the final goal of the American dream. We were never meant to be an oasis of liberty and abundance in a world-wide desert of disappointed dreams. Our nation was created to help strike away the chains of ignorance and misery and tyranny wherever they keep man less than God means him to be.


It is for you and me — and all of us on this small, whirling planet — to ensure that this forecast will prevail.

Hundreds of thousands of people in Latin America have demonstrated in the streets against the threats of communism to their peace and freedom.



Students, favorite Communist targets, are rejecting the Moscow and Peking Pied Pipers. These students in Ghana support their army's coup against the Communist influenced Nkrumah dictatorship.

Ecuador



Brazil



Bolivia



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington

31 May 1966

Blueprint For Aggression: The "People's War"

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THE REALITIES OF VIETNAM

A Ripon Research Paper
The Ripon FORUM
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An Alternative for Republicans

Better is a poor and wise youth than an old and foolish king who will no longer take advice . . .
(Ecclesiastes 4:13)

With one eye fixed on remote posterity and the other on the Gallup polls, President Johnson has had little vision to spare for the real constituency of his Vietnam policy: the generation of men who are expected to fight the war and live with the results.

As members of that generation, we have sought the advice of experienced men; we are conscious of the informed and responsible counsel that is available to the makers of American foreign policy. But even seasoned observers agree that on the subject of Vietnam *rigor mortis* has set in. A bureaucratic coalition within the administration has reached a rigid consensus that repels knowledgeable advice. It has set its own terms of discussion, enshrined its own version of the facts and has for the most part succeeded in imposing its internal verities on public debate as a whole.

FLURRY OF DIPLOMACY

Thus, the American people have been asking whether more bombing, more troops, more diplomacy, more refugee relief, better elections, or more economic aid hold the key to our difficulties in Vietnam. And the administration has graciously suffered "dissent" on these questions. Small wonder, when dissent on tactical issues is easily preempted by bureaucrats who have the power to act: when "hawks" have the public ear, the administration can intensify military activity; when "doves" seem ascendant, it can treat them to a flurry of diplomacy. But the basic structure of administration policy remains untouched by these fluctuations. The larger questions of our involvement in Vietnam remain to be asked.

Why has a conflict which has been repeatedly defined as "political" and "essentially Vietnamese" become a largely military, largely American undertaking? Why, after six years of "limited" war, punctuated by glowing predictions of success, has no upper limit yet been reached on American troops or expenditure? Why, despite American talk about bringing peace and democracy to South Vietnam, has American policy led to the further entrenchment of a regime of generals, who are dependent for their power on the continuation of the war?

PRIDEFUL COMMITMENT

Answers exist to these questions, answers that demand an unflinching reappraisal both of the structure of our Vietnam policy and of the conduct of our foreign affairs as a whole. The Johnson administration is incapable of carrying out this reappraisal. It is motivated, as the President and his advisors assure us, by a sense of commitment. A commitment to a brave little nation? To the cause of freedom and democracy? To the containment of aggressive Communism? No, these broader goals have been obscured behind commitments of a different sort: a prideful commitment to continuing a misconceived policy, an

ignoble commitment to covering over mistakes, an imprudent commitment to the unlimited use of American resources and moral energy in a dubious cause.

The time has come for simple commitments to reality and the national interest. Vietnam is the place to begin. The course of this war may well shape American thinking on foreign policy for a generation to come, just as the bitter neutrality controversy of the 'Thirties dominates the thinking of many officials responsible for our present position. It is important, therefore, that the proper lessons be drawn early. And it is appropriate that they be drawn by young men who will have to build from the pieces that the Johnson administration leaves behind.

AGENDA FOR ACTION

The Ripon Society proposes a thorough reorientation of American foreign policy in Vietnam and new departures in our conduct of foreign policy as a whole. It calls for frank discussion of American goals in Vietnam, the costs of fulfilling them, and their place in a larger context of priorities for global foreign policy and domestic spending. It proposes the following agenda for debate and action.

1. There must be an examination of present policies in the light of the facts of Vietnamese political life. It is the conclusion of the Ripon Society that the present structure of policy is built on an expensive fiction about what South Vietnam is and what it can become. The American people should know how much it will cost to make this fiction into a reality.

2. New concepts are needed for Vietnam. Instead of our present military, centralized, "nation-building" approach, the Ripon Society calls for a flexible, political approach to the problem that will reduce American troop commitments in the long run and take cognizance of the strong ethnic and religious rivalries that divide many non-Communist South Vietnamese from the Saigon government.

3. The conflict in Vietnam has increased certain imbalances in American political institutions: the imbalance between our ability to wage war and our administrative capacity to seek peace; the imbalance between Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign policy. These imbalances as well as the present administration's failures in foreign policy, provide both an opportunity and a duty for the Republican Party. The Ripon Society calls on the Republican Party to bring the issues of foreign policy to the people in the 1968 elections.

I. The Costs of Implementing a Fiction

Visiting Congressmen and journalists who ask to see the success of pacification programs in South Vietnam are often taken to An Giang province. There they are treated to the spectacle of orderly village life directed by respected local leaders who have a long history

of resistance to Communist control. These villages, stable and secure from attack, have been electrified; aerial land surveys have been carried out; American-sponsored improvements in sanitary, educational, and medical facilities have been made. To extend similar benefits to all the villages in all the provinces of South Vietnam is the American goal, and it is a noble goal.

But there is another remarkable feature about the model villages of An Giang province. They are under the sway of the Hoa Hao sect, which as recently as 1963 was declared by the Saigon government to be part of the Viet Cong. American officials in nearby provinces and in Saigon fully accepted this interpretation, and U.S. equipment and support enabled Premier Diem to carry out a program aimed at the destruction of Hoa Hao power. Had Diem succeeded, there would be no model villages in An Giang province today. There would be refugee camps, large numbers of U.S. troops, and fragmented settlements that would be easy prey for the Viet Cong.

LOCAL AUTONOMY

Happily, the Hoa Hao were able to hold out against their enemies both in Saigon and in the Viet Cong until Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown. In 1964 they negotiated an agreement with the new central government: Hoa Hao areas, considerably reduced by Diem's attacks, were grouped within the newly drawn boundaries of An Giang province; the autonomy of local leaders was assured; and, in return for allegiance to the Saigon government, the new province was guaranteed immunity from harassment by the Army of South Vietnam. Almost overnight, An Giang became a "pacified" area, and U.S. teams were able to enter to improve the lives of the villagers and to help them in their long-standing effort to defend themselves against Viet Cong infiltration. Thus, the most successful example of "pacification" is an area that has never had the advantage of occupation by American or Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) troops. It is a region in which a local group has been "redefined" from pro-Communist to anti-Communist status and which has been allowed a measure of autonomy in return for allegiance to Saigon.

Other local leaders have not been so lucky as the Hoa Hao. They have been defeated by the combined efforts of the Viet Cong, the Saigon government, and American policy. But since particularism runs deep in Vietnam, local leadership may reemerge, just as the Hoa Hao resurfaced after American officials proclaimed them to have been "for all purposes eliminated as a powerful political and military force."

The tenacity of local loyalties is a product of the ethnic and religious diversity of South Vietnam. South Vietnam is a fragmented country; it is the product of several waves of conquest and a long history of ethnic, religious and geographical rivalries that have left divisive hatreds. Even before the arrival of nearly a million refugees from the North, it was rent by localism in the rural areas and factionalism in the cities. A realistic approach to the country must build from this legacy. It must recognize that there are many non-Communists who, like the Hoa Hao, hate the mandarins and the army of Saigon just as much as they hate the Communists.

THREE REGIONS

As a first simplification, the real South Vietnam may be divided into three regions, each of which has a distinctive political culture: first, the north-

ern Coastal Strip, an area which is characterized by an imperial tradition and deep-seated contempt for the government of Saigon and where the militant Buddhists are the most important non-Communist faction; second, the Central Highlands, populated by mountain tribesmen who are not ethnically Vietnamese and who are willing to ally themselves with any force that will protect them from Vietnamese cultural domination; third, the southern part of the country (old Cochinchina), which is divided among important religious groups (Catholic, Buddhist, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao), each of which has strong political interests. The presence of ethnic Cambodians adds an element of racial diversity to the southern part of the country.

Finally, in all these areas are the Viet Cong, whose cadres control fully one-fourth of the rural population. They have developed an intricate network of front organizations that include youth groups, women's clubs, and civic action groups in villages which, taken together, contain three-fourths of the rural population. For many villages the cadre's authority is inseparable from village life, and indeed, the cadres have become a new social class in rural Vietnam.

CENTRALIZED DEMOCRACY

To build a stable coalition from the non-Communist fragments is an ambitious undertaking that might be accomplished by skillful bargaining. But the American aim in Vietnam is more than ambitious. Under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the United States has been the partisan of a policy of centralized government in South Vietnam. Instead of seeking to foster a political system built upon grass-roots support, American policy has been preoccupied with a dream of centralized democracy radiating out from Saigon, much as communism is thought to radiate from Hanoi. (In actuality, the North allows some local autonomy to ethnic minorities, a fact which the Viet Cong use to good effect in their propaganda campaign among the mountain tribesmen of the Central Highlands.) The American mission in Saigon has accordingly been engaged in a search for a "national leader" capable of carrying out a program of "nation building," a sort of man on a white horse who will be the South Vietnamese counterpart of Ho Chi Minh.

In the beginning this national leader was Premier Diem, and we acquiesced while he persecuted the Hoa Hao and made political prisoners of more than 40,000 of his non-Communist enemies. Later he was Premier Ky, and we supported him in smashing the Buddhists in the northern provinces and in sending lowland Vietnamese with American troops to organize the mountain tribesmen of the Central Highlands. Now our candidate for national leadership is General Thieu, who has been chosen president in an election from which all "neutralists" (including a former Cabinet minister) were excluded.

GOVERNMENT BY ARMY

But whoever the man, there must also be a white horse, and unfortunately only one group in South Vietnam has even a remote possibility of being ridden to power over the factions and fragments of political life. This is the army, most of whose top officers were born in the North or fought for the French. The American dream of making South Vietnam into a centralized, unified state thus inevitably means military government. From the experience of other underdeveloped countries, no reason exists to hope that a military regime will turn itself quickly into a consti-

tutional democracy or that it will be responsive to the interests of the rural population. "Nation-building" as it is now conceived in U. S. policy means nothing if not military rule in South Vietnam, and indeed within the State Department the military regime of South Korea is given as a model for South Vietnam. It would be enough if we could hope for a military ruler who was capable simply of administering the countryside.

But even here there are enormous difficulties. The army does not have sufficient contact with the rural areas to understand peasant problems or to administer them effectively. The army of South Vietnam has had only one top-ranking general of peasant origin, General Thi, and Premier Ky relieved him of his command of the I corps area soon after the Honolulu Conference. The social distance between officers and enlisted men is great. Officers despise their troops with the traditional contempt of the high-born for the manual laborer. Enlisted men are rarely promoted into the officer corps; in the last three years only one field grade officer in the army of South Vietnam has been wounded leading his men into battle. The pruning out of ethnic Southerners and former members of the Viet Minh in favor of Northerners has further divorced the officer corps from the country.

BAD BET

The army of South Vietnam is thus not to be compared with the popularly-based armies of some other underdeveloped countries. It lacks their social base and political skills. What is more, the generals cannot even command the respect of the mandarin class, the traditional rulers of the country, who have always asserted the superiority of civilian to military authority.

On its own merits, the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam is not, then, a good bet for unifying the country on a centralized model. But with the thrust of American policy behind it, it is an even worse bet. Just as U.S. military support relieves the ARVN from going into the swamps, so U.S. political support relieves the Saigon generals from the need to bargain with civilian factions. Indeed, the one ruling general whom the United States Mission publicly criticized, General Khanh (now stripped of power), was also the only one to bring the militant Buddhists into a ruling coalition. But American policy has become fixed around the idea that a nation-building war must be carried out on all political and military fronts at once, against Communist, neutralist, and anti-Communist rivals alike.

EXPENSIVE PROJECT

Can such a war, carried on without regard to the political terrain, aimed at imposing central government in a country with decentralized bases of power, dependent on the administrative capabilities of a narrowly based and politically unskilled military elite, can such a war be successful? Probably it can. Implementing a fiction is not impossible, merely expensive. It is now costing the United States, according to reputable estimates, upward of 24 billion dollars a year and casualties of 7000 a month. The budgetary figure represents three times the total of American overseas investment for the current fiscal year and about seven times the total foreign aid budget. The monthly casualty figure equals the total number of Peace Corps volunteers who went abroad last year. The troop commitments to Vietnam represent an almost total investment of our available troops for flexible response to unanticipated crises in other parts of the world. If unexpected trouble should occur abroad or in American

cities, the U.S. strategic reserve would be inadequate to respond. To ask whether this represents a prudent investment of American resources, manpower, and moral energy is now academic. The question is whether we can hope for any substantial reduction of cost if present policies continue.

INSTALLMENT PLAN

The costs of Vietnam have been built up on an installment plan. First a little more bombing, then a few more troops for conventional operations, then a few more for counter-insurgency warfare, then more investments in the "other war." With these four major elements — and with well-advertised elections and peace offensives to legitimize its operations — the Administration has attempted to implement the fiction of unified central government in Vietnam and to protect this government against external aggression. The Administration clearly believes that more installment plan increases hold the best prospect for a long-run reduction in the costs of the war. But what are the likely results of intensification of the four major elements of present policy? What are the prospects for success of the two legitimizing devices?

1. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

Many impatient strategists who apply a simple-minded interpretation of the lessons of World War II to the Vietnam situation insist that the quickest solution is to intensify the bombing of the enemy, assumed in this case to be North Vietnam.

A. INTERDICTIONARY

The first kind of bombing, mostly south of the 18.5° parallel, aims at interdicting infiltration. It has not, however, prevented the North Vietnamese from installing missile launching sites and storage depots, nor from surfacing a road within South Vietnam.

And the fact is that even if North Vietnam is bombed to rubble, the war in the South will continue. For although North Vietnam unquestionably aids and guides the Viet Cong, the conflict in the South is not a result of simple aggression. Unlike World War II, and unlike the Korean engagement, the Vietnamese conflict is largely a counter-insurgency war. Right now, the larger part of American troops is employed in securing the South from guerilla activities, while the smaller part is employed in checking infiltration from the North. Many military and civilian leaders whose ideas were formed by the two previous American engagements have been unable to come to terms with this fact. They have continually tried to define the war as a simple question of stopping aggression and have maintained that air power provides the most economical way of doing this. Now, the insurgency in the South is supported by a kind of aggression from Hanoi, but it is not one that can be stopped by bombing. The Northerners have trained guerilla cadres who operate in the South and bring isolated villages under the control of a centralized Communist hierarchy. To try to eliminate these cadres with airplanes is an admission of failure.

B. PUNITIVE

Bombing north of the 18.5° parallel is usually punitive, designed to "raise the cost of aggression to Hanoi," without directly reducing infiltration. But Hanoi's "costs" are calculated not by the monetary value of the installations destroyed but by the alternative uses for the labor and capital needed to replace bombed facilities; i.e., by the "opportunity costs." The Hanoi regime presides over a largely peasant economy in one of the most densely

populated agricultural areas of the world. The regime thus has a more comfortable supply of underemployed labor than most underdeveloped countries. If the Russians and Chinese supply heavy equipment and technicians, the opportunity cost to the North Vietnamese of diverting labor to repair damaged facilities is low.

True?
Bad?
The only way to overtax the North Vietnamese labor supply is by systematic bombing in civilian areas. The administration denies any intention of doing this. But according to reputable non-Communist sources, American planes began punitive bombing against dikes in the Red River Delta of North Vietnam when the waters were at a seasonal high this summer. Further bombing of the dikes will flood the best rice-producing area of North Vietnam just before the October-November harvest, creating conditions rivalling those of 1946, when a famine caused the death of one million North Vietnamese.

CHINESE INTERVENTION

Proponents of punitive bombing may also want to humiliate Communist China by destroying the Chinese railway line that cuts through North Vietnam. They claim that the Chinese railway brings supplies to Hanoi, and this is part of the truth. But no Administration spokesman has ever mentioned that the railway also has strategic importance within China: it is a major means for transporting raw materials between Yunnan Province and the rest of China. A measure of its value to the Chinese is that even before the extension of U. S. bombing, 40,000 Chinese paramilitary technicians were assigned to repairing the part of the link that passed through North Vietnam. The intensified bombing of the railway thus represents a calculated risk of bringing China into the war. Will internal difficulties prevent the Chinese from intervening or will they postpone their quarrels in the face of external humiliation?

Some within the administration may not care whether we do provoke a Chinese response. They believe that a war with China is inevitable and that it is better fought now than in the 1970's, when the Chinese will be able to deliver nuclear weapons. When this view is stated in explicit terms, it is easily countered by those knowledgeable in the pattern of Chinese hostility. But it is more often held implicitly. Many leading policy-makers who publicly discount the possibility of Chinese intervention are also those who believe in the inevitability of a war with China.

Bombing also involves a calculated risk of escalation by the Russians, who are committed to preventing the collapse of the government of North Vietnam and to protecting the integrity of shipping to Hanoi. The costs to the Russians in prestige should not be underestimated at a time when they are taunted by the Chinese for collaboration with the West. Finally, the North Vietnamese themselves can escalate the war in response to bombing. North Vietnamese and Communist Pathet Lao troops already hold sway over large parts of Laos. Ho Chi Minh could reactivate the war there at will in the hope that an expansion of the ground war into Laos might take some of the pressure off Vietnamese soil. Nor is this the only possible response by the North Vietnamese.

2. CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES

Despite U. S. bombing, the North Vietnamese now have the initiative for escalating the conventional ground war. They hold in reserve eighty per cent of their regular army (some 400,000) men and during recent months have been concentrating forces near the demilitarized zone. Constant U. S. bombing by B-52's has not been able to prevent them from building a surfaced road through the A-Shau valley within South Vietnam, nor has it stopped them from storing in the caves near A-Shau supplies sufficient to support several divisions. They have also received six-inch rockets from the Russians that have been installed and are being used inside South Vietnam. During the past six months Communist troops already in South Vietnam have occupied for short periods four of the five provincial capitals in the I Corps region without any protest from the local population. If the Northerners are convinced that the United States means to destroy their country from the air, they might very well try to make this occupation permanent by sending new troops to hold Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Guerilla activities within both of these provinces have already been shifted from Viet Cong to North Vietnamese Army command. Such action might easily tip the balance in Washington in favor of a plan previously set aside for invading North Vietnam up to the narrow neck of the country.

It should be noted that no increase in bombing is likely to avert an invasion from the North. The more new targets that are bombed, the less deterrent effect the threat of future bombing will have on Hanoi to hold back its ground forces. In effect, the more hostages we destroy, the fewer we have to bargain with. The American public was not made aware of these facts earlier this year when General Westmoreland bargained for 45,000 more troops. They were not informed that any increase of conventional American forces up to 300,000 men can probably be matched by North Vietnam. And any increase above that number is likely to be the result of a full-scale, conventional, Korean-style conflict that has hitherto been avoided.

3. COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Regardless of what happens in the conventional war against main force units of the Viet Cong and the army of North Vietnam, the counter-insurgency war will continue, and the prospect is for stalemate unless allied forces are vastly increased. The Pentagon's declared ratio for success is ten counter-insurgency troops to one guerilla.

The reason for a high ratio is that counter-insurgency warfare is essentially a local policing operation. The Viet Cong operate by calculated acts of assassination and terror that can be carried out by small bands of lightly armed men. To protect against such harassment requires a day and night policing function and an intimate knowledge of the political terrain. Guerillas can harass villages on a rotating basis, but counter-insurgency forces must stay put. The ten-to-one ratio, moreover, is based on the experience of the British in Malaya and other long-term professional counter-insurgency operations. To get a counter-insurgency operation in motion takes more than the standard ratio. Only when once established can the ratio decrease as the perimeter of effective control spreads out. For American troops in Vietnam who are rotated annually, the ratio may be much higher than the standard esti-

mates. Counter-insurgency cannot be carried out effectively on a short-term basis, and the yearly rotation of American troops makes almost impossible the establishment of necessary relations with translators, spies, and local contacts. What is more, the northern coastal strip of the country does not permit economies of scale. The strip is broken into isolated valleys so narrow that a counter-insurgency operation has no room to spread out. In any case, even the standard ratio would imply a total allied force of more than two million men, as the Viet Cong now have upwards of two hundred thousand native Southerners in the field.

As for the South Vietnamese army, the ARVN will not be much more effective in counter-insurgency than it has been to date. Half of its total of 700,000 is composed of police, local, and regional forces who have been poorly paid and badly treated. They are not an efficient policing force, and in many areas they have a tacit agreement to coexist with the Viet Cong. The regular army, just over 300,000 men, has been an overly centralized force, with too much authority concentrated in too many generals, ever since it was reorganized under American advisers in the mid-1950's. A return to a decentralized force, giving more authority to lower-ranking officers commanding smaller units, more appropriate to counter-insurgency operations, would eliminate the work of half of the ARVN's present generals. Corrupt recruiting procedures and the lack of Vietnamese interest in joining the army so long as American troops are still available means that the ARVN cannot provide forces for a larger counter-insurgency operation.

The fact remains that with more than a million allied troops now in the country, counter-insurgency cannot be carried against all areas contested by the Viet Cong. The area south of the Mekong River has not yet been entered by American troops. The ARVN troops stationed there engage in little fighting, as a result of a tacit agreement to coexist with the Viet Cong. If under American pressure, this area should be opened to active counter-insurgency operations, the level of U. S. involvement would rise. Thus, if present policies continue, the aim of pacifying all sections of the country by counter-insurgency methods would result in a serious and long-term drain on American manpower. And if the Viet Cong recruit an additional one hundred thousand men in the next year, the American manpower requirement for counter-insurgency will skyrocket, regardless of what happens south of the Mekong River.

4. THE "OTHER WAR" Because the counter-insurgency and conventional efforts have reached the point where only a massive infusion of troops can change the balance, many spokesmen including Generals Thieu and Westmoreland have spoken of a long war of attrition, lasting perhaps ten to fifteen years. But there is no need to be so pessimistic. Within the structure of present policy a solution could be found within three to five years that would make possible a modified form of central government. It is, we feel, an unconscionable solution, but the only way in which centralized control can be imposed upon South Vietnam.

Suppose for a moment that the rice supply of a Communist-held area were destroyed and the population made dependent on imported food distributed in refugee camps administered by the Saigon government. Such a refugee camp solution would give the central

government a sure hold on areas that have been impervious to its influence. It might be seen as part of the "other war," the war for the hearts and minds of the people of South Vietnam. It wins the minds of Viet Cong sympathizers by disorienting them; it forces simple villages off their lands, erodes their independence, and destroys the social order in which Viet Cong cadres thrive.

A refugee camp solution to the problem of insurgency is, perhaps inadvertently, well underway. As a result of the war, South Vietnam must now import rice for the first time in its history. "Search and destroy" operations on the ground and bombing from the air have drastically reduced local rice supplies.

Meanwhile, under the U. S.-sponsored Chieu Hoi program Communists everywhere are encouraged to defect on an individual basis, villages are given the chance to flee communist domination, but there is no way in which a Viet Cong cadre can agree to defect and bring his village with him. Thus, regardless of how many defections are recorded, the rice must be destroyed and the villagers removed to "deprive" those hard-core elements that remain of both food and troops. The effect is that sections of Vietnam are being devastated and refugees generated at a high rate.

Between late 1964 and mid-1967, 1.8 million South Vietnamese peasants were made homeless by the war. The present rate is probably greater than one million a year. If refugee generation continues at its present rates — and any intensification of the ground war would make the rates higher — one-third of the rural population of South Vietnam, some 4.5 million people, will be in refugee camps or relocation settlements within three years. Since no estimates put Viet Cong control, total or partial, at higher than 4.5 million people, the gathering of that many peasants into refugee camps could go far to eradicate from the countryside the settlements that supply the Viet Cong with their food and troops. Peasants would then be domiciled in manageable units; a central government in Saigon would distribute American aid to one-third of its population; and the dream of nation-building in South Vietnam would become a reality, even if the reality were, as one anti-Communist editor (now deprived of his right to publish) has put it, "a nation of thieves and beggars."

It should be emphasized that though the refugee camp solution is a likely one if present policies are extended south of the Mekong, there are obstacles to the success of even this inhuman course of action. So far, the Saigon government has been incapable of securing the allegiance of even its homeless population. There are not less than 1.8 million refugees of South Vietnamese origin, yet not more than 500,000 of the rural population are under total control of the Saigon government. Indeed, after six years of war, Saigon can claim total or partial control of only 3.6 million of the total rural population of 13.4 million. This number is less than the total of groups who should be rock-bottom allies of the government, namely, the Southern refugees dependent upon it and traditional anti-Communist groups like the Hoa Hao, Catholics, farming refugees from the North, and ethnic Cambodians (See Tables I and II.) The Saigon government, then, has barely held its ground, despite massive American support. And because of American support it has felt free to alienate actively "neutral" groups like the militant Buddhists and mountain highlanders.

Even so, since it would be easier to convert the ARVN into a refugee police force than into an effective counter-insurgency force, the refugee camp solution is the cheapest way to "win" the war. For refugee relief, though prolonged, is much less costly than conventional and counter-insurgency warfare, and in strictly military terms, it may also be much more effective. Bombing and conventional warfare cannot solve the problem of insurgency; counter-insurgency warfare requires close knowledge of the political terrain and upwards of two million men. Refugee generation, on the other hand, requires no more troops and no costly escalation, it can be accomplished without knowing the language and without making difficult distinctions between friend and enemy. It is accordingly the path of least resistance for American policy; it represents the lower limit of cost to the United States under present policies. The cost to South Vietnam in human terms is of course intolerable, but it is fully consistent with the declared aim of the Saigon government to eliminate Communist influence from the countryside.

5. PEACE OFFENSIVES

To placate domestic critics the Johnson administration has periodically made public appeals to Hanoi to negotiate. Energy expended on these peace offensives is likely to be wasted. Hanoi remains committed to the Mao-Giap theory of guerilla warfare: captured documents provide ample evidence that the North Vietnamese leaders believe Viet Cong cadres can keep the United States from winning the countryside and then can induce it to abandon the cities as well. Only an alteration in the balance of factions in North Vietnam, including the demise of the "bitter ender" First Party Secretary, Le Duan, would mark a change in this attitude. During the coming election year, Hanoi will no doubt try to influence American public opinion with diplomatic overtures. But the American effort at negotiations is much better directed at cadres within South Vietnam who are independent of aid from the North. For though Hanoi and the Viet Cong hierarchy remain ideologically opposed to any sincere negotiation with the United States or the Saigon government, the best American sources agree that a large proportion of Viet Cong cadres are not indoctrinated in Communist ideology. What is more, local cadres, who see the scale of American commitment, are much more likely than their leaders to become convinced of the permanency of the American presence in South Vietnam, to admit the hopelessness of taking the cities, and to be willing to make deals with the Americans. Only negotiations which seek local rather than national solutions to the problem of insurgency have even a moderate chance of success during the coming year. Only piecemeal negotiations which bid away their cadres will convince Communist leaders to come to the bargaining table for a total solution. Yet these are precisely the kinds of negotiations that are actively discouraged by both the Saigon regime and the Johnson administration, both of which prefer to polarize the alternatives between all (a capitulation by Hanoi) or nothing.

6. ELECTIONS

There is, of course, a widely publicized political element amidst the overwhelmingly military devices by which the United States is trying to build a nation in South Vietnam: the September elections. They occupy in American policy much the same symbolic function that

the fort at Dien Bien Phu held for the French: they are yet another turning point in the war; they are a promise of lasting order; they are a glimpse of the new vision that the United States is bringing to the people of South Vietnam. And they would not have been held had it not been for the insistence of the American Mission in Saigon for a sign of national regeneration.

It should be recalled that it was not the military consequence of the defeat of Dien Bien Phu that caused French withdrawal, but rather the public reaction within France to the collapse of a symbol that had been trumpeted by the military as a new approach to the Indo-chinese war. The Johnson administration has broadcast similar hopes about the September elections, which were its fortress against the realities of Vietnam. These elections were structured not to draw non-Communist factions into a new ruling coalition, but to lend an air of legitimacy to the nation-building war. South Vietnamese political leaders who could challenge the military junta or who favor negotiating with local Viet Cong groups were and have been systematically excluded from running. To speak of local negotiations was to admit that the problem of insurgency exists, and this Saigon (and until late August the Johnson Administration) has been unwilling to do. Political processes which are open only to those who reject reality are not likely to work wonders. And now in the aftermath of the Saigon elections, as it becomes increasingly apparent that central democracy is spurious, it is time to reassess the costs of American support.

UPPER AND LOWER LIMITS

The assessment should be made not by talking of "escalation" and "withdrawal," but by comparing the likely upper and lower limits of present policies with those of alternative approaches.

Within the structure of present policy, the best one can hope for is a refugee-camp solution to the problem of insurgency in South Vietnam. It can be reached, without mentioning the word "refugee," by emphasizing current programs to relocate villagers in secure areas, to promote individual defections, and to deprive the Viet Cong of their rice supply. It would probably require a continuation of expenditures at their present levels for three years, followed by a period in which American troops would be withdrawn and an expensive program of refugee relief and rural reconstruction would be expanded in accordance with the humanitarian aims of the "other war." Such a solution represents the lower limit of cost under present policies. But to win the temporary allegiance of a people by starving them into one's camp is short-sighted and self-defeating.

As for the upper limit to the American commitment, there is none. A different mix of elements — more emphasis on bombing or conventional warfare — could lead to an invasion of North Vietnam, an extension of the war into Laos and China, a confrontation with the Russians.

So long as it is conducted in accordance with the aims of the Johnson Administration, the war will, in sum, get worse before it gets better. It is of course possible that both President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh may flinch and open negotiations. But they are both stubborn men and their terms for bargaining are very far apart.

SKewed PRIORITIES

What should the upper and lower limits to the American commitment be? The Ripon Society believes that the proper upper limit of the American commitment has already been exceeded. A prudent policy would demand that the level of present involvement be taken as a ceiling and that steps be taken to reduce the drain on American resources. To do otherwise is to further distort our sense of priorities away from other, strategically more important parts of the world and away from necessary expenditures of money and idealism at home.

But President Johnson's policy, however unrealistic and costly, has also created obligations that put a lower limit on the American involvement. The United States has a moral commitment to the one million refugees from the North who have been resettled in South Vietnam with our aid. It has an obligation to the 1.8 million refugees generated in the South during the past two years of heavy fighting. It cannot lightly abandon these people and the others of South Vietnam who are not Communists to the vengeance of the Viet Cong and their Northern supporters. Nor can we accept a solution that would pose a military threat to Thailand, which, unlike South Vietnam, is a signatory member of SEATO.

REDUCED COMMITMENTS

The Ripon Society believes that an honorable approach to Vietnam can be found that will work within these new upper and lower limits, i.e., an approach that will reduce American troop commitments in the long run and minimize the destruction of Vietnamese society. It is an approach that does not demand precipitant withdrawal or imprudent escalation; its effectiveness does not depend on the panacea of immediate negotiation. It does demand something perhaps more difficult at this late date: a patient, realistic, flexible, and humane vision of what can reasonably be achieved in South Vietnam.

II. The Need for a Confederal Strategy

At selected moments in the unfolding of its Vietnam policies, the Johnson Administration has challenged its critics to provide alternatives. After Hanoi failed to respond to the bombing pause, for instance, the Administration asked whether there was any choice but to resume bombing. When intelligence reports showed increases in Viet Cong troop strength, the Administration paused to ask whether it could do anything but increase American troop commitments. And so it has been. By posing stacked questions sequentially, the administration has proven to its own satisfaction that its critics are naive and incapable of posing feasible proposals for a change in policy.

Now the real basis for a responsible alternative in Vietnam is not to be found by manipulating elements within the present structure of policy. The alternative to policy based on a fiction is policy based on reality. In reassessing the American undertaking in Vietnam, two central realities must be confronted.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTS

The first reality is the fragmentation of the traditionally anti-Communist forces in South Vietnamese political life. In addition to the regional, religious, and ethnic rivalries traced in the Appendix to this paper, there is a wide gulf between the French-educated urban middle classes and the rural population.

The former have a typically French faith in centralized government, to which the United States Mission has somehow been converted under the conviction that it represents "nation-building." Non-Communist peasants, on the other hand, have fought to resist centralized control, whether from Hanoi or Saigon. If both urban and rural sources of support are to be drawn into a stable non-Communist government, it will have to be on the basis of decentralized rule. Regardless of the protests of the French-educated centralists, local leaders will have to have a greater degree of autonomy than they have yet been granted. If they are not, if local leadership, however ignorant and unsavory it may appear to city folk, is further undermined and destroyed, the result will not be a democratic government from Saigon. The result will be no government from Saigon, save for refugee camps and American troops to carry out the policing functions normally performed by local leadership. American troops would then be the objects not merely of Communist hostility but of opposition from all traditional groups seeking to protect their social order from alien interference.

THE VC CADRE

The second reality is the political and social innovation that is the basis of Viet Cong strength throughout South Vietnam: the local cadre. Viet Cong cadres are the only effective link between many Vietnamese villages and centralized commands, and they are the strongest such link in Vietnamese history. The cadre member is trained to live with the people of his village, to seek out those with grievances against Saigon-appointed officials and local notables, and to provoke incidents which mobilize the peasantry against the government. He is instructed in the techniques of organizing front groups, engaging in the selective use of terror to intimidate his opponents, accumulating intelligence from children and village spies, and co-existing with potentially hostile groups until he is ready to overthrow them. Very often "coexistence villages" that are well-infiltrated by cadres admit U.S. medical teams, vote in elections, and listen to Saigon-trained propagandists by day, while the Viet Cong maintains control by night. Cadres are an important new part of the village social structure in three-fourths of the rural population of South Vietnam, although only one-fourth of the rural population is under their total control. Careful analyses of their training and internal messages indicates that they have taken on a new social role that is more important to most of them than adherence to Communist ideology. Hence, recent American usage of the term "cadre" does not recognize the Communists' claim to mechanical control. In our usage, "cadre" is not a collective noun denoting a well-disciplined group of men; it denotes an individual, professional agitator.

If the cadres are to be dealt with realistically, both the Saigon government and the American mission will have to abandon the goal of extirpating them from village life. And the United States will have to recognize the futility of a Chieu Hoy program designed to encourage individual defections from cadres without guaranteeing a continuation of their social role. Viet Cong cadres are presently tying down nearly all the ARVN troops and more than half the American troops in the country. To destroy them means either the destruction of a large part of rural South Vietnam or an enormous drain on American manpower. A means must be found to allow them to hold their social function, while neutralizing their military threat.

A confederal strategy would deal with these two realities in a way that both Americans and Vietnamese could understand.

FIRST PHASE

In its first phase, a confederal strategy would aim at developing an effective and stable non-Communist coalition between the cities and the twenty-seven per cent of the rural population that is subject to government control. In cases of conflict among factions, American support would go to those which have effective control of rural areas, since their loyalty and local policing efforts are alone able to free American troops for their proper function of checking infiltration from the North.

The concept of a coalition based on a confederal approach requires the concession to local leaders of formal guarantees of autonomy in the following ways:

- * Control over local police and militia.
- * Election of provincial and district officials who are now centrally appointed. (Provincial and district chiefs, most of them military men, now approve candidates for hamlet and village elections and make the major civilian decisions affecting their areas.)
- * Government officials of local origin. (This is crucial in Vietnam where administrative rules are traditionally loose, allowing for wide discretion.)
- * Local rule in formulation of land tenure regulations and reforms.
- * Redrawing of provincial boundaries to correspond to the realities of political control.
- * Cultural guarantees to ethnic minorities (e.g., preservation of customary law, use of ethnic languages for primary school instruction).
- * Right to collect local taxes, supplemented where necessary by direct access to U.S. aid. (A recent amendment to Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 permits the United States to find local channels for the distribution of aid.)

In other countries similar measures for decentralization might be accomplished by informal understandings, without written guarantees. But the time for that has passed in Vietnam. Too many promises have been made and broken for regional groups to trust any authority in Saigon. Nor can the United States serve as guarantor of informal bargains, for our Mission, too, has found it convenient to forget pledges made to minority groups in South Vietnam. National elections may give the regional minorities temporary leverage because of their ability to deliver bloc votes, but in a national legislature overwhelmingly dominated by urban Vietnamese the ethnic minorities have no continuing means of enforcing their interests. They will be restive whenever they are not actively courted by the ruling faction in Saigon.

In the September presidential elections, for example, the Thieu-Ky ticket actively sought the support of the Hoa Hao in An Giang province, of the Cambodian minority in Ba Xuyen province, and of the Highland tribesmen. If Thieu is able to deliver on his promises of financial aid and autonomy, these ethnic minorities will no doubt continue to hold anti-government feelings in abeyance. But their loyalty is not to the constitution of South Vietnam, which provides no guarantee of their rights, but to the military faction. Should it break its word or be replaced by a rival coalition (e.g., one composed of Coastal Buddhists, Southern army officers, and Mekong Delta Vietnamese), the ethnic minorities would again feel isolated. Thus, be-

fore any form of parliamentary coalition politics can be stable, prior confederal steps must be taken to give all important non-Communist groups a stake in the idea of national government.

A first, obvious step is to make formal and public the arrangements already in force with the Hoa Hao in An Giang province and to ratify similar arrangements for the enclaves of Cham peoples in Binh Thuan province.

Second, the government of South Vietnam should fulfill promises already made to the mountain tribesmen to draft guarantees of cultural autonomy when the National Legislature meets this fall.

Third, confederal decentralization and redrawing of boundaries should be carried out to give other strong local groups authority over their own regional affairs: the Buddhists in the northern coastal provinces; the Cao Dai and the settlements of Catholics and Northern refugees in the lowlands; and, the ethnic Cambodians in Kieng Giang, Ba Xuyen, and Vinh Binh provinces. Measures of this sort, which could be adopted almost immediately, would give non-Communist groups a stake in the South Vietnamese government and constitution regardless of which faction happened to hold the reins in Saigon. There is no other way to deal with the problem of fragmentation of the non-Communist groups.

SECOND PHASE

Once the rock-bottom non-Communist groups are consolidated the same confederal framework can be offered to "co-existence" villages, which comprise much of the contested half of rural South Vietnam. Local Viet Cong cadres and ARVN troops who have developed a relationship of tacit collaboration would be encouraged to formalize their relationships in exchange for regional autonomy from Saigon. Provincial boundaries can be redrawn for such areas, just as they were redrawn for An Giang province in October 1965.

These agreements might require the marketing of all surplus rice through Saigon, the payment of nominal taxes, and other signs of allegiance in exchange for separate access to U.S. aid to repair the devastation of war. The second phase would provide an alternative to the ravages of war that does not now exist for these villages. There is at present no way in which a Viet Cong cadre operating in contested villages can submit to popular war-weariness without losing his social function. And villagers have no incentive to denounce cadres so long as the alternative is not local control but administration by a Saigon-appointed military governor.

It is, of course, likely that the Viet Cong cadres would receive orders from above not to participate in confederal bargains, in which case a clear conflict of interest would be established within the Viet Cong ranks. Cadres who are not ideological Communists or not dependent on the North for supplies would perceive differing interests from those trapped in the Communist hierarchy. This would put pressure on the Viet Cong where it is economically most vulnerable, for those cadres who are independent of Northern supplies currently provide surplus rice for the Viet Cong efforts in weaker areas. Bidding away independent villages would begin the process of crippling the Communist movement by alienating cadres whose local social role is more important to them than the ultimate Viet Cong aim of winning the cities.

THIRD PHASE

In its third phase, a confederal strategy would be offered to villages under the full control of the Viet Cong, which now hold approximately one-fourth of the total rural population. Such hard-core villages would face increasing isolation as the earlier phases of the confederal approach progressed. At this point the Viet Cong hierarchy would face three alternatives: 1) remaining in the South while their villages are losing food and manpower; 2) fleeing to the North; or, 3) retaining much of their local power in Communist enclaves and participating in the confederal framework. Once their prospects for taking over the entire country are cut off by a consolidation of non-Communist groups, it is likely that the Viet Cong high command would negotiate for the third alternative.

POSSIBLE OUTCOME

A confederal strategy provides a vision of a feasible outcome that South Vietnamese and Americans both lack. Urban Vietnamese can now envisage only a French-style solution, with the urban classes playing the role of colonial administrators and the army securing the countryside. The American Mission, on the other hand, seems infatuated with the model of South Korea, where a military junta has taken steps toward democratization. Both of these models fail to cope with the fragmentation of South Vietnamese political life and the new social role of village cadres. A decentralized solution, by contrast, would permit both local leaders and rural cadres to keep a stable base of power now denied to them under the slogan of nation-building.

The minimal result of a confederal approach would be a consolidation of non-Communist groups, whose territory the United States could then defend with conventional forces. The maximal application of the confederal framework to the rest of the countryside would make possible a political system that accommodates sharp political differences (as does Italy) and deep cultural diversity (as does Switzerland).

REASONABLE COSTS

A confederal strategy is designed to reduce the American commitment in installments much as the present policy seems destined to escalate it by installments. Barring massive invasion by North Vietnam, a confederal strategy would operate well within the present troop commitment.

It would save manpower almost immediately by winning the cooperation of the local population in the northern provinces of the Coastal Strip and Central Highlands. It would prevent vast numbers of American troops from being sent for new counter-insurgency operations south of the Mekong River. Saigon can no more surely lose its influence in this area than by permitting the entry of U.S. forces, which Communist propaganda convincingly identifies with the French, to enter.

Finally, by lowering the level of violence in selected "coexistence villages," it would put steady political pressure on the Communists, who would be faced with possible defections by their non-ideological cadres. The present policy of Saigon to root out all cadres gives them no choice but to continue obeying orders from the Communist hierarchy. A confederal strategy would promote factionalism in the Viet Cong and unity among non-Communists; the present policy does the reverse.

It should be emphasized that the confederal con-

cept is a strategy, not a rigid blueprint. It is designed to keep the costs of the war below the upper limit recommended in the previous section. It permits a rethinking of Vietnam policy that provides not merely an alternative vision to that of the Administration but alternative emphases at every step of the way. This can be best illustrated by showing how the major elements of present policy will fit into a new pattern under a confederal strategy, how such an orientation cuts across some of the well-known "hawk-dove" distinctions.

1. BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

Even if bombing some day leads Hanoi to nominal capitulation and negotiation, the Viet Cong can still conduct intensive guerilla activities, and they will do so unless they have an alternative that permits popular southern Viet Cong leaders to retain political power. A confederal strategy encourages the formulation of such alternatives. It can be adopted regardless of one's attitude to the effectiveness of bombing in inhibiting infiltration.

But we would claim as an advantage for confederalism the fact that it will allow for a de-emphasis on bombing. The effect of bombing in fulfilling its two major purposes has been very much overrated by the administration.

Punitive bombing north of the 18.5° parallel simply does not save American lives. It risks conditions under which more lives, American and civilian Vietnamese, will be lost. And it is irrelevant to the insurgency in the South, which is the major drain on American fighting forces. *For these reasons, a confederal strategy would heavily de-emphasize bombing the North. Interdictory bombing south of the 18.5° parallel would continue as long as it was necessary to cut infiltration and troop buildups.*

2. CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES

Invasion and insurgency are the two major military problems the United States faces. A confederal approach would employ conventional ground forces to defend areas where the Saigon government had won the loyalty of the people. It would also use them along the demilitarized zone and at crucial mountain passes to prevent an invasion of the northern I corps area.

While military leaders have been debating over bombing, barriers, and infiltration, they have failed to remind the American public that the North Vietnamese seem to be preparing an invasion of the I corps area, where American troops are already stretched dangerously thin. A confederal strategy would release troops from policing and counter-insurgency operations to counter a conventional thrust by the North Vietnamese. South Vietnam is not worth the millions of troops needed to counter both invasion and insurgency. Hence a confederal strategy provides a political framework in which present troops could be deployed against the invasion of areas in which the local population ceases anti-government activity.

A BARRIER

The approval of a limited barrier by Secretary of Defense McNamara is a half-way measure that has more meaning for the bureaucratic struggle over punitive bombing in Washington than for the realities of the Vietnamese situation.

The original purpose of the barrier concept was to threaten the North Vietnamese with interdiction of their supply lines to the South. In the years of its building the barrier would cost more lives than bombing

would but afterwards it would be a permanent structure that would reshape politics in Southeast Asia. Supporters of the concept argued that if the Administration made known its firm intention to build a barrier clear across Laos, the only way to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail, the North Vietnamese might have been led to negotiate before the barrier was even completed.

The Administration, however, has committed itself only to a very limited barrier, which does not include Laos. The major hindrance to going into Laos is not the Geneva agreements, for the North Vietnamese army has been operating in Laos for years. Nor is it the "giving away" of Northern Laos to the Communists, since most of it is in Communist hands already. The hard-core objection is that the North Vietnamese might support a conventional military operation in Laos and they would probably receive Soviet aid.

The major function of the *limited* barrier is to demonstrate publicly that there is an alternative to bombing, even if that alternative is no more effective at attacking the main problems of insurgency and invasion. Both punitive bombing and a limited barrier would receive low priority in a confederal strategy.

3. COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The United States can win the counter-insurgency war, but the standard ten-to-one ratio of conventional to guerilla forces is not worth the price. Under a confederal strategy counter-insurgency operations would not be extended to new areas of the country. Plans for an offensive south of the Mekong River and based in the town of Can Tho would be permanently abandoned. In areas where counter-insurgency operations are now underway, the promise of selective withdrawal of American forces would be used to increase the attractiveness of piecemeal negotiations under a confederal framework. With counter-insurgency as with bombing and conventional warfare, military action is used in a confederal strategy to advance feasible political goals.

4. THE "OTHER WAR"

Under present policy the "other war" is too often the camp follower of military initiatives. After bombing, search and destroy operations, and refugee generation have taken their toll, American teams offer food, medical aid, and refugee relief. The confederal strategy would use the economic, psychological, and social programs of the "other war" independently to fulfill political objectives.

A. CHIEU HOY

The Chieu Hoy program, which encourages individual defections of Viet Cong cadres, would operate in a wider context. Defections would still be welcomed, but primary emphasis would be placed on negotiation that permits cadres to retain their social role. Under present policies, defections among high-level units are virtually impossible. The favorable statistics on Chieu Hoy defections trumpeted by the Administration make no careful distinction between political defectors and simple refugees.

B. LAND REFORM

Having ignored for some time the pledges for land reform made in Honolulu in February of 1966, the Johnson Administration is considering putting new pressures on Saigon. Now that it has declared the election a success, the American Mission may demand a centralized land reform program which is designed to win peasant loyalty for the central government.

But a centralized program of land reform is unrealistic. In many areas where land records have been destroyed, the attempt to resolve tenure disputes from Saigon can only be capricious and corrupt. Local administration of reforms is needed, not more centralization.

A confederal approach would subordinate land reform to the political goal of developing local leadership. Saigon might limit the size of family plots; it might provide surveying teams and keep a central record of land transactions. But the administration of reforms and the settling of disputes — a powerful source of patronage — would be left to local leaders. The power to implement land reforms would provide an added incentive for local leadership in coexistence villages to participate in a confederal framework.

C. ECONOMIC AID

To make a confederal strategy credible the United States will have to demonstrate its willingness to aid areas that are not under direct American military control. In principle, President Johnson has committed himself to such a course, and indeed An Giang province provides an isolated example of the purity of American intentions. The most dramatic symbol of American aims, however, was the proposed project for a Mekong Dam to aid people of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam who are not under American military occupation. After publicizing the project and engaging in preliminary studies, the Johnson Administration dropped it without explanation. There is perhaps no single act that would better symbolize the American commitment to the long-term interests of Southeast Asians than the revival of this project. Because it would take years to complete, it would make Communists and non-Communists alike believe that the United States has a permanent concern for the welfare of Southeast Asia and that, unlike the French, Americans will not leave when they grow tired of the war.

A confederal strategy will also implement the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, which stipulates that "emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of people of the developing countries through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions." (Title IX, Sec. 281.) This would depart from present policies which emphasize channeling aid through the Saigon regime, which regularly tries to deny American funds to its non-Communist opponents.

5. PEACE OFFENSIVE

A confederal strategy will steadily improve the negotiating position of the South Vietnamese government by consolidating its support and enabling it to bid away Communist cadres. It will create a basis for national negotiations that cannot presently exist so long as the Communists perceive that the government of Saigon is inherently unstable. Should Hanoi and the Viet Cong hierarchy become reconciled to the impossibility of a conventional military victory, they will still have the choice of reverting to guerilla warfare or of trying to bargain for partial control of their enclaves in the countryside in general negotiations. A confederal approach will then make possible a stable solution. It should be emphasized that as long as all efforts for limiting American costs are directed at securing general negotiations, military escalation will go unchecked. A confederal approach, by coordinating military and political initiatives, will assure a lessening of the conflict

until such time as peace talks become feasible.

6. ELECTIONS

A confederal strategy would attack the endemic cause of instability in an overly centralized system by conceding a measure of power to local leaders. Instead of placing preponderant emphasis on village and national elections, it would promise elections on the district and provincial level. Under present policies almost all provincial and district chiefs are military officers and all middle-level officials are appointed and promoted from Saigon; under a confederal strategy many of these administrators will be elected.

Vietnam's local leaders need something to fight for. An increase in their own authority is a more plausible incentive than the imposition of corrupt officials from Saigon. A confederal strategy would accordingly urge that provincial and district elections be offered to all areas that are able to maintain internal security.

POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

Elements of the French-educated middle class of Saigon and perhaps all the refugees from the North may greet a confederal strategy without enthusiasm, and even with outright hostility. Thirteen years of American support have accustomed many Saigon residents to the illusion that they themselves have ruled the provincial towns and the countryside. French intellectual habits have made them see Saigon as the Paris of South Vietnam, as an administrative capital of a thoroughly centralized regime. Northern refugees, for their part, are likely to oppose bitterly any scheme emphasizing regional bases of power and implicitly denying their right to return.

But Vietnamese political and military leaders, however adamantly they may oppose a change in their comfortable assumptions, have also shown a remarkable ability to adapt to political realities when they are not protected from them by American troops and economic aid. The confederal strategy will remind recalcitrant Vietnamese leaders that the illusion of centralized rule was possible in the past only because of massive American support and that such support will henceforth go to a vision of government that is more consistent with democratic ideals and more appropriate to Vietnamese political realities. The United States can begin distributing its aid in a decentralized fashion even during the period of readjustment to the new idea.

A second possible objection is that thanks to thirteen years of suppression of local leadership, there may be no popular regional and ethnic leaders with which to bargain on a confederal basis. The Appendix to this paper should satisfy doubts on this matter. It demonstrates the tenacity of particularistic loyalties in South Vietnam. American officials and Vietnamese politicians who deny these loyalties should spend more time outside Saigon.

Finally, must not areas be pacified militarily before they can participate in a confederal framework? An Giang province suggests not, as do the repeated demands by northern Buddhists and mountain tribesmen for a measure of self-rule. In a counter-insurgency war the loyalty of the population is invaluable for reporting and resisting Viet Cong infiltrators. Wherever such loyalty can be won by the mere extension of local democracy, massive military pacification is neither necessary nor right.

CLOSED OPTIONS

One cannot, of course, reduce the costs of the Vietnamese undertaking without eliminating certain options now open to American policy-makers; and it is only fair to list two options that a confederal strategy forecloses. The first is the possibility of ridding the countryside of all Communist influence. This has been the expressed aim of a few Saigon army officers, but no reputable American official has ever publicly favored sending the millions of counter-insurgency troops required.

The second option is that of destroying North Vietnam and thereby provoking the Chinese into a war in which their nuclear capacity would be destroyed. This would presumably be done by creating a situation in Vietnam analogous to that in Korea. If the Chinese were convinced that the United States had extended its original war aims to include heavy punishment and possible invasion of the North, they might intervene and provide an excuse for pre-emptive war.

A confederal strategy assumes that the United States can contain the Chinese without destroying neighboring states, much as it contained the Russians in Europe. Those who disagree with this assumption will of course find the cost of this strategy too high. They will find it intolerable that the United States adhere to its declared war aims, which include a preservation of the South but not the destruction of the North.

FOUR AIMS

A confederal strategy is designed to:

I. *Reduce American costs without sacrificing America's moral obligations to its Southeast Asian allies.* In contrast to present policies which increase the level of United States military involvement in installments, a confederal strategy aims at a decrease from the present troop levels. It accepts as a lower limit any troops necessary to defend from conventional attack those areas in which the local population is loyal to the government and constitution of South Vietnam and able to maintain internal stability.

II. *To confront the significant a) political, b) military, and c) diplomatic realities of the Vietnamese situation.* These are: a) the fragmentation of non-Communist political groups and the social role of the cadre; b) the primacy of insurgency and the possibility of large-scale invasion; and, c) the unlikelihood of any diplomatic resolution of the conflict until there is a stable government in Saigon with a framework that will permit the Viet Cong to retain power in the countryside.

III. *Provide a direction for change and a vision of a feasible outcome.*

IV. *Coordinate military and political initiatives so that they are mutually reinforcing.*

A confederal strategy offers a coherent overview of the Vietnamese conflict that specifies operational political goals for every province and district of South Vietnam. The present goal of centralized government is unprecedented in Vietnamese history and is accordingly incapable of inspiring any real comprehension or loyalty in the countryside. A confederal strategy reasserts the primacy of the political element in limited warfare and does so on a level where political guidelines can save American lives.

For these reasons the Ripon Society endorses a confederal strategy. If great obstacles to its implemen-

tation exist, they are not to be found on the terrain of South Vietnam. They are to be found in Washington.

III. The Republican Responsibility

It is not necessary to blame the entire structure of present policy on any one man or party, or any small group of officials. For although President Johnson and his advisers seem stubbornly committed to an imprudent and costly course of action, and although they will continue to use every available form of political leverage to avoid being confronted with their mistakes, the fault is not entirely theirs. Their misconceived policies could not have developed unchecked were it not for deeper malfunctions in our political institutions.

BUREAUCRATIC MOMENTUM

There has been, to begin with, an administrative imbalance between our ability to take military risks and our ability to take political risks. The Department of Defense, reformed under unified civilian control, has been able to offer flexible responses to world problems. It has adopted a method of planning and budgeting that enables it to see clearly the costs, interrelations, and long-range military implications of its programs. And it engages in planning for contingencies so that it will be prepared for crises.

No comparable comprehensive effort in cost analysis, coordination, and contingency planning has been undertaken among the cluster of civilian agencies charged with economic and political elements of foreign policy. As a result, the relations between military and non-military instruments of foreign policy have often been determined by blind bureaucratic momentum, which naturally favors the better-prepared agencies. Because the Department of Defense is unified, massive and engaged in stand-by operations, while civilian agencies are fragmented and devoted to day-to-day details, American policy has a built-in tendency to drift toward military measures in times of stress.

South Vietnam provides a tragic example. America's power to wage war in that country is enormous. But we have been unable to wage peace, to formulate a political strategy that would limit the loss of life and build a basis for a negotiated settlement. American forces destroy entire villages on less hard intelligence than the Viet Cong use in assassinating a single village chief. Military contingency plans exist for invasion of North Vietnam, for bombing of Haiphong, for bombing of dikes, for counter-insurgency operations south of the Mekong River and doubtless even for use of nuclear weapons. But do similar plans exist for a confederal initiative or for any realistic settlement? Perhaps in a sub-basement of the State Department. But so long as there is no public indication of them American talk of negotiation lacks credibility. Political preparedness, like military preparedness, has to be publicized to be believed. It is meaningless for officials to talk of America's desire for peace and for a "political solution" so long as the administrative means to implement these hopes are not known to exist.

CONGRESSIONAL WEAKNESS

A second imbalance, between Congress and the Executive branch, has permitted bureaucratic mistakes to go unchecked. The Legislative branch faces long-term problems in adapting its procedures to the growth of executive power. In recent years it has

begun laying plans for such adaptation: plans for Congressional reorganization, for improved staffing, for proper access to information and expert advice. But the Vietnamese conflict came before any innovations could be made and although it has forced many responsible legislators to revise their own roles in the making of foreign policy, it has caught Congress as a whole off guard.

Congress has neither the staffing nor the machinery to assert its prerogatives in the making of Vietnam policy. Its right to be consulted has been compromised into a right to ratify. Bureaucrats come before its inquiries in a contrived atmosphere of crisis with answers which are predetermined by carefully controlled information. Congress' right to know has been reduced to the right to be briefed. Legislators have been informed promptly of the results of policy in Vietnam, but no body of Congress has had continuing access to the political intelligence and strategic plans from which decisions are really made. Even Congress' right to set broad aims has been undermined by executive decisions which, although apparently "tactical," have altered the character of the war. Congress, in sum, has been unable to check the bureaucracy from without. Since significant checks are also absent from within, the pattern of Vietnam can easily be repeated: American policy can drift toward military solutions where political ones will suffice; American youth can die because its elders lack decisive civilian leadership.

PRESIDENTIAL STYLE

President Johnson did not create the imbalances in our political institutions, but neither has he tried to correct them. If anything, his personal style of administration has accentuated the difficulties. His is a style of secrecy and silence. He has been willing to consider only proposals that filter noiselessly through bureaucratic channels. He is famous for rejecting out of hand programs that originate outside his administration and for cancelling plans that are leaked prematurely to the press. He has been criticized for this, and he has also been praised for relying more than any recent president on career civil servants.

But the Johnson style has more important consequences than its occasional outbursts of pique or its encouragement of career service. Its charm for the President lies in its ability to stifle effective criticism. By keeping programs secret until the moment of their release, the President gives opponents no time to prepare alternatives. He subjects legislators to a blitz of proposals that overwhelms their meager staffs. The President's practice of withdrawing nominations and programs that receive advance publicity also keeps dissidents within the administration from taking their case to the public. Since a public row means the sure rejection of a proposal, civil servants seldom dare to express their preferences outside official channels. The president's style thus excludes the public (and Congress) from bureaucratic debate and in so doing leaves the natural momentum of the bureaucracy uncorrected by external pressures. In foreign affairs this means that however many skirmishes may be won by proponents of political initiatives, the main thrust of American policy remains in the hands of the strongest agency, the Pentagon. Even if the President should reorient his Vietnam policy, his administration is unlikely to overcome its dependence on military plans and its habituation to military risks. It presents a classic example of self-entrenching bureau-

cracy that cannot be reformed from within.

LESSONS FOR THE GOP

If foreign policy is to change, if the serious imbalances in our institutions are to be corrected, if the lessons of Vietnam are to teach anything, a new administration must be elected. An alternative in foreign policy will have to be Republican.

Not any Republican alternative will do. A Republican administration must be committed to reducing the costs of the American undertaking in Vietnam. We have described a general approach to Vietnam that eschews escalation, that can succeed without the good will of the North Vietnamese, that keeps the cost below an acceptable upper limit, and that can lead to an honorable outcome. It remains for a new administration, undeluded and free to act, to adopt a confederal strategy.

A Republican president must also commit himself to long-range reforms in the administration of foreign policy. Future involvements should be shaped by realities abroad rather than bureaucratic inertia in Washington. Numerous analyses and proposals for administrative reform already exist. It is time to review these materials and to lay plans for a change. Here is one area in which the appointment of a Presidential Commission could be more than a publicity stunt.

A Republican Congress (or at least a Republican House) must adapt Congressional machinery to the demands of global foreign policy. Congress should consider establishing a joint committee on intelligence and strategic planning which would require the Executive Branch to report periodically on America's international position, much as the Joint Economic Committee requires it to report on budgetary policies. Such a new Committee should have access to the on-going informa-

tion) has been unwilling to do. Political processes the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

NEW DEPARTURES

The need for changes in foreign policy imposes a responsibility on the Republican Party. On all fronts the Johnson Administration has failed to provide prudent, realistic leadership. Its political policies, which remain open-ended, will require many more American troops unless a hard decision is made between countering invasion and countering insurgency. Its diplomatic policies, which ignore local negotiations, have no prospect for success during the coming year. Its failure to take steps for long-term administrative reform assures that these deficiencies will persist, that American policies will drift by installments toward an ever wider, ever more senseless war. The Republican Party can provide a way out of this fiasco. It can grasp the realities of local politics in Vietnam; it can reassert the limited nature of American aims; it can reduce the costs in human life; it can bring into Government men from our universities, our professions, our business community who are better qualified to run this country's foreign policy than the self-deluded men who try to make reality out of fiction from their desks in Washington. The best men, the best minds in this country are not making American foreign policy.

The Ripon Society calls on Republicans to undertake new departures in foreign affairs. Though the issues are complex, their essentials can be brought to the people. In 1952 the Republican Party demonstrated that it could extricate America from a war on the Asian mainland. The issue now is whether the American people think our present course in Vietnam is worth more deception, more resources, more lives.

If they do not, there is an alternative.

This paper was written for the Ripon Society by Josiah Lee Auspitz and approved by the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society, Inc. The Appendix was written by Christopher W. Beal, who also prepared supporting research for the main body of the paper. A fully footnoted version of the paper and Appendix will be published separately by the Ripon Society, along with a transcript of its Vietnam symposium and several studies on specific aspects of the Vietnamese war.

The map on page 17 is reprinted by courtesy of

the United States Government. The Society would also like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of several of its members and the number of non-members who are intimately acquainted with the materials covered.

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SAIGON'S POOR CONTROL OVER THE RURAL POPULATION

The most important conclusions of the following tables are:

1. While the Viet Cong's control over its rural areas is almost always "total," Saigon's is usually only "partial."
2. Viet Cong cadres operate regularly among almost three-fourths of the rural population — the 25% controlled and the 47% contested.
3. The Saigon government has little positive attraction for rural areas, for it controls no more people (3.6 million) than the number who have been alienated by the Viet Cong (3.0 to 4.0 million).
4. Over one-fifth of the rural population north of the Saigon area have become refugees since 1964.
5. While the government probably relies on recent refugees for most of its controlled areas north of

Saigon, one-fourth of the rural population in the Southern Lowlands traditionally has opposed the Communists.

The numbers behind these discouraging comparisons are very conservative. The "rural" population under Saigon's control is greatly exaggerated, because it includes district town (and probably also most provincial capitals) which are not really rural and which can be protected by artillery and airpower without control over their inhabitants. The anti-Communist groups are estimated by increasing past numbers with a 2.8% annual population growth, U.S. AID's official figure; but since 1960, the year of Diem's most reliable census, the population has grown even faster. The number of refugees since 1964 is underestimated, because many rural people who have fled to the cities and are now scratching out a living on their own have never been registered with the Saigon government.

TABLE I: Saigon's and the Viet Cong's Control over the Population of South Vietnam

	Number	Percentage of Total Population	Percentage of Rural Population
NON-URBAN POPULATION			
Saigon's Control	3,618,400	21%	27%
"Total" Control	489,300	3%	4%
"Partial" Control	3,129,100	18%	23%
Contested Population	6,336,700	37%	47%
"Government-leaning"	4,360,600	25%	32%
"Viet Cong-leaning"	1,976,100	12%	15%
Viet Cong's Control	3,325,400	19%	25%
"Partial" Control	402,200	2%	3%
"Total" Control	2,923,200	17%	22%
Unclassified	152,300	1%	1%
URBAN POPULATION	3,732,500	22%	
TOTALS:			
Non-urban Population	13,432,800	78%	100%
Total Population	17,165,300	100%	
N.B.: The number of voters registered for the Presidential election			
	5,853,251	69%	60%*
Total Eligible Population over 18			
	8,500,000		

The registered total corresponds almost exactly to one-half the sum of the urban population, plus the rural areas under total and partial control and the "Government-leaning" portion of the contested areas.

*Percentage for rural areas registered assumes one-half of the urban population to be eligible and entirely registered.


**TABLE II: Rural Groups that Should Support the Saigon Government
Compared to Population Actually Controlled**

	RURAL POPULATION GROUPS			CONTROL STATISTICS (For comparison with Rural Group Totals for All of South Vietnam)
	Northern Half of South Vietnam (I and II Corps)	Southern Half of South Vietnam (III and IV Corps)	All of South Vietnam	
Most Secure Province (excluding provincial capital)				
AN GIANG PROVINCE (Hoa Hao sect)		440,000	440,000	489,300 (Population under total control of Saigon Government)
Two Fairly Secure Provinces (excluding provincial capital)				
KIEN GIANG PROVINCE (Assumed one-half Cam- bodian)		339,000	339,000	
22M farmer refugees, de- scendants of 1954 farmer refugees				
NINH THUAN PROVINCE	128,000		128,000	
2M descendants of 1954 farmer refugees				
Traditional Anti-Communist Groups				
CAMBODIANS		374,000	374,000	
(170M already counted in Kien Giang Province)		to 624,000	to 624,000	
DESCENDANTS OF 1954, I	76,000	80,000	156,000	
Farmer refugees resettled through Land Development Program (24M already counted)				
DESCENDANTS OF 1954, II		765,000	765,000	
Farmer refugees <i>not</i> resettled through Land Development Program and hence still near Saigon or now refugees in Saigon				
SOUTHERN CATHOLICS	89,000	140,000	229,000	
Descendants of Catholics living south of the 17th parallel in 1954 and out- side of the main cities (33% of total)				
DOUBLE COUNTING		194,000	194,000	
(Item to be subtracted before totaling)				

RURAL POPULATION GROUPS

CONTROL
STATISTICS(For comparison with
Rural Group Totals for
All of South Vietnam)

	Northern Half of South Vietnam (I and II Corps)	Southern Half of South Vietnam (III and IV Corps)	All of South Vietnam	
on's Natural Support:	293,000	1,944,000	2,237,000	3,618,000
Three most secure provinces and other traditional anti- communist groups)		to 2,194,000	to 2,487,000	(Population under total or partial control of Saigon Government)
REFUGEES SINCE 1964 (In refugee camps, returned to home villages, resettled elsewhere, registered and receiving "limited assist- ance")	1,080,000	720,000	1,800,000	
MINIMUM ADDITIONAL REFUGEES (Assumes recent refugees include as many as possible traditional anti-Communists)	787,000		787,000	
MAXIMUM ADDITIONAL REFUGEES (Assumes same proportion of traditional anti-Com- munists among refugees as in general population)	1,018,000	552,000 to 531,000	1,570,000 to 1,549,000	
on's Minimum Potential Control	1,080,000	1,944,000	3,024,000	3,618,000
RANGE: Group closest to Saigon Government Control Traditional Anti-Communists, Three Secure Provinces, 1954 (Refugees)	to 1,311,000	to 2,725,000	to 4,036,000	(Population under total or partial control of Saigon Government) (Repeated for another comparison)
TOTAL RURAL POPULATION	5,080,000	8,350,000	13,432,800	13,432,800
PERCENTAGE: Saigon's Natural Support as Share of Rural Population	5.8%	23.3%-26.3%	16.7%-18.5%	
PERCENTAGE: Refugees as Share of Rural Population Minimum Comparison, for Rural Base does not include in Reported and Unreported Refugees now in Cities)	21.3%	8.6%	13.4%	
RANGE: Percentage of Group Closest to Saigon Government Control	21.3%-25.8%	23.3%-32.6%	22.4%-29.8%	27% (Total and partial control of rural population claimed by Saigon Government)



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estimate is closer, for it includes the Hue vicariate,
"most" of whom were south of the 17th parallel.

APPENDIX: THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR A CONFEDERAL STRATEGY

The Three Regions of South Vietnam

The following appendix reviews the different political histories of the three basic regions of South Vietnam: the Coast, the Highlands, and the Southern Lowlands. The historic roots and modern survival of crucial regional differences are traced through five periods: pre-French and French (up to 1945); Viet Minh activities (1945 - 54); the Diem regime (1954 - 63); the Start of the Insurgency (1957 - 63); and, Recent Events and U.S. Policy. Because of their greater importance for one region, Diem and the Viet Cong are discussed most fully in the appropriate sections under the Southern Lowlands, and the Buddhists are treated in the last section on the Coast.

Any stable solution in South Vietnam other than complete Communist control will have to respond much better to local differences than is now possible. Even the Communists in the North, with much smaller minority populations, grant more cultural autonomy than the government in Saigon. It is too late simply to make informal concessions to local leaders within a centralized legal structure, because such concessions have been made and betrayed by past Saigon governments, sometimes with American assistance.

Our purpose is not to discredit the desire for centralized unity held by many urban Vietnamese nor to recriminate against American officials who often had to make decisions within incorrect policy assumptions. It is necessary, however, for anyone who wants to avoid the refugee camp "solution" to appreciate the views of the different rural areas, cut off from Saigon and from each other. It is also necessary to realize that past mistakes in American policy cannot be dismissed by well-informed Vietnamese as simply unfortunate decisions by a previous rotation of Americans, because, unlike the French, the American government has great power to change reality to fit its myths.

The United States has great moral responsibilities for South Vietnam's present difficulties, not only for millions of refugees and for military officers and civilian officials with poor prospects under a Communist regime. The United States has steadily supported, in the name of "freedom" for South Vietnam, a great degree of centralization and has ignored political repression. Americans would never accept these actions at home. South Vietnam's fragmented urban political groups and confused countryside are partly the result of thirteen years of independence without reform under Saigon governments able to rely on American aid instead of taxes. Americans should hesitate before being patronizing about South Vietnam's lack of democracy.

A Vietnamese businessman summed it up to an American reporter last month: "You Americans think we are stupid and backward people, but we are progressive, and we will not be given a chance in this election." He had half a chance, and 65% of the country took it to show that they did not like the generals. But, because of military pressure on the Constituent Assembly last summer the South Vietnamese did not have a chance to vote in a run-off between the generals and their closest civilian rivals. Now our government is touting the generals as the first ticket in a "fair" election, but American officials will not mention at home that the generals did not dare enter a run-off. And neither will they mention that the generals, with the encouragement of American policy, are

ignoring the persistent regional differences of South Vietnam.

The Highlands: Pre-French Tradition and French Rule

The Highlands — comprising well over half of the territory and within an hour's drive of most of the rest of South Vietnam — have always been unattractive to lowland Vietnamese. Malaria, infertile soil, tigers, and hostile tribesmen kept out Vietnamese settlements during a thousand years of Vietnamese migration in adjacent areas.

The tribesmen living in the Highlands are of at least two races, speak many languages, live in settlements of only a few thousand, and have no generally recognized political institutions or tradition of common action. But the tribesmen have one thing in common — fear and hatred of the lowlanders, first of the Cham who drove them from the fertile lowlands into the malarial hills and then of the Vietnamese who kept them there and who sometimes tried to impose upon them the Vietnamese way of life.

Another thing most tribesmen have in common is a slash-and-burn technique of rice growing. Most land is left to weeds, small brush, and trees. Every few years an area is cleared, burned over, and cultivated until the soil's temporary fertility is exhausted. The slash-and-burn technique imposes a low population density and small, scattered settlements on the tribes because most of the land is left to grow wild.

The French did not rule the Highlands with consistent policies. Sometimes they used tribesmen as local administrators, sometimes Frenchmen, and sometimes the hated Vietnamese. The French started schools, invented scripts for tribal languages, and established some modern medical facilities. At the same time, the French brought new products to the lowlands which replaced the cash crops of the tribesmen, reducing their ability to support themselves. The French also impressed tribesmen to work on roads and plantations.

Although the French record in the Highlands was certainly a dubious one — and provoked widespread tribal revolts in the 1930's — the tribesmen south of the 17th parallel can compare them favorably to the last Vietnamese dynasty and to the Diem regime, both of which seized tribal lands, established Vietnamese settlements in the Highlands, and tried to impose Vietnamese customs on the tribesmen.

The Highlands: Viet Minh Activities

The Viet Minh success was based on an unprecedented adjustment by lowland Vietnamese to the Highland environment and to tribal customs. The anti-malarial pill, which the Viet Minh secretly purchased in large quantities from French merchants, was generally regarded within the Viet Minh as the greatest physical factor (aside from captured weapons and ammunition) behind their success. Viet Minh cadres who worked among the tribes learned their languages, adopted their dress (even break-

ing their front teeth if local custom demanded), and married tribal women. Able tribesmen were given leadership posts within the Viet Minh, and the most loyal tribe (the Tho) was even represented by a Brigadier General.

Unlike earlier rebels against the French, the Viet Minh were able to use the Highlands for base camps and rest areas and to recruit tribesmen for coolies and soldiers. In the North, the Viet Minh had already advanced into Laos when the French decided to fortify Dien Bien Phu in a vain effort to keep the loyalty of the Tai tribes and to defend Laos (whose French-supported government was the only one in Indochina satisfied with its limited degree of independence) against further invasions.

South of the 17th parallel, the Viet Minh effort came later but with as much success. By 1954, the Viet Minh had infiltrated the Highlands, opened the Ho Chi Minh Trail, defeated the elite French Groupe Mobile 100, and gained a position to cut through to the sea coast if the French refused a cease-fire after Dien Bien Phu. In the post-Geneva regroupment, some 25,000 tribesmen left the area south of the 17th parallel — over twice as many proportionally as the number of lowland regrouppees to the North.

The Highlands: Diem and Early U.S. Policy

Diem was the first lowland Vietnamese ever to rule the Highlands directly, and his policies basically reflected lowland contempt of the tribesmen. He regarded tribal lands as the public domain and granted the choicest valleys to ethnic Vietnamese in order to facilitate direct Vietnamese physical control over the Highlands, to settle refugees from the North, and to relieve population pressure along the crowded Coast. Diem abolished the customary tribal courts established by the French and made Vietnamese the language of instruction in the schools.

Many of Diem's important American supporters approved of his approach to the tribesmen. An Associate Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations and one of the Council's Far Eastern specialists dismissed other approaches (presumably the autonomous zones of the French and of North Vietnam) as "reservations." Under Diem, the tribes were to be "made more subject to civil administration" and "ultimately assimilated" into "the surrounding civilization." Another early supporter, the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Friends of Vietnam, wrote:

The tribesmen, unused to Vietnamese friendliness, grew more suspicious with every official assurance of concern; the more they were told that the government would at last do something to remove the causes of their plight, the more opposed they seemed to every new administrative measure.*

Not surprisingly, Diem's policies provoked a widespread revolt in the Highlands. In the revolt were the two tribes which the French had given important administrative posts and hence contacts beyond their villages. The leader, Y Bham, a Rhade tribesman, is now the leader of FULRO, the leading tribal organization.

Early American policy in the Highlands was different from, but no better than Diem's. The French disbanded their commando force, the GMCA, and the American Military Mission did not pick up French contacts for commando or intelligence operations. When two members of the Michigan State Advisory Group in Vietnam returned from field trips with reports of tribesmen cadres from North Vietnam organizing groups in the Highlands, the U.S. Mission ignored them. When even Diem himself, in a visit to Washington described below, warned of infiltration in the Highlands and asked for American aid

*The latter and probably also the former later changed their views on Diem. These passages are not cited to reflect discredit on these men, but to illustrate the general approval given by Americans to even Diem's cultural imperialism. (Pages 125 and 105 of *Problems of Freedom*, edited by Wesley R. Fishel, Michigan State University Press, 1961.)

to counter it he was refused. When the American Mission eventually opposed Diem's project for resettling ethnic Vietnamese in the Highlands, the reason given was the infertility of the soil in the strategic places Diem chose, not the hostility such settlements were arousing among the tribes.

Diem had taken office without a clear idea of the Viet Minh path to victory, but by 1957, when the infiltration began from the North, he was very sensitive to the unprecedented danger posed by enemy control of the Highlands. In addition to intensifying his unfortunate cultural imperialism, Diem wanted to build access roads through the Highlands and to turn his Civil Guard into a paramilitary force to combat the infiltration by North Vietnam. In Saigon, the American Embassy and the U.S. Mission preferred more conspicuous roads, between the cities. U.S. officials in Saigon also opposed giving military training to the Civil Guard because it was grouped in Diem's Interior Department instead of Defense! When Diem made a special State Visit to Washington to ask for bulldozers for the roads and for financial and training support for a paramilitary force, he was again refused.

The Highlands: Start of the Insurgency

In 1957, just as Diem's repressive policies were taking effect, tribesmen who had gone north in 1954 and who had been trained as cadres in Hanoi began returning and starting cells in their home villages. Since the Viet Minh had earlier taken over the area from the French and since Diem had a much worse record among the tribes (around Kontum, Communist propaganda even promised to bring back a popular French administrator once the South Vietnamese were driven from the Highlands), the newly trained cadres moved easily through the Highlands.

The Communist propaganda emphasized the autonomous zones (on the Soviet and Communist Chinese models) recently created for the tribes in North Vietnam. In the North, tribesmen were given administrative posts within their areas, the Tho general cited earlier was made chairman of his zone, tribal languages were kept in the schools, tribesmen were given higher education in Hanoi and elsewhere in the Communist bloc, and there was no land-grabbing by ethnic Vietnamese, although population pressure was much greater in the North than along Diem's Coast. Supporting the cadres were radio programs in tribal languages broadcast from Hanoi, while Diem's government had discontinued such broadcasts after the regroupment period, 1954 - 1955.

The Highlands: Recent Events and U.S. Policy

A crucial recent development has been the disillusionment of the tribesmen with the Viet Cong. Harsh taxation and impressment of coolies for increased Viet Cong operations over the past few years have destroyed the advantage the Viet Cong once had in the region. While taxes and recruitment have always been great burdens on Viet Minh and Viet Cong hard-core villages, the Communists have generally used political techniques which prevent effective opposition. Short-sighted exactions in the Highlands may have been undertaken consciously, in the hope that victory over all of South Vietnam would come too swiftly for the tribesmen to resist.

Unfortunately, the post-Diem Saigon governments have not moved strongly enough in the Highlands to make up for Diem's mistakes. The first steps have been taken, and many good promises have been made. In February 1964, Y Bham, the leader of the 1958 revolt, was released from jail; in March a Bureau for Montagnard Affairs was established. In October 1964, the Saigon government held a conference for tribal leaders to present their grievances. The tribesmen now have national representation, access to universities through lower admissions test scores than are required of the better-educated

Vietnamese, places in noncommissioned officers' schools, a greater hand in local administration, and a promise of a fair system of land titles.

Yet the confidence of the tribesmen has not yet been gained. The conference of October 1964 was held only after a revolt in September, and that revolt was caused by the assumption of command over tribal military units by ethnic Vietnamese ARVN officers. There have been two revolts since, in October and December 1965. The latter revolt was well-organized, being staged simultaneously in five of the seven provincial capitals. Armed tribesmen serving under Vietnamese officers have expressed the intent to throw out the South Vietnamese by force when the Viet Cong are defeated.

A Tribal Revolt this Fall?

This fall there may be still yet another revolt in the Highlands. When the Constituent Assembly was writing the present South Vietnamese Constitution, the tribesmen demanded explicit guarantees of autonomy. The Assembly, largely composed of urban Vietnamese, refused to include such guarantees, though they wrote a long and detailed document with over one hundred articles. A tribal revolt was averted this spring only by promises from Saigon and American officials that similar guarantees of autonomy will be passed by statute when the new House and Senate convene this fall. If the newly elected legislators refuse to honor promises made by the military government and U.S. officials (quite possible for civilian politicians who hate the military government and who fear permanent American domination), then another tribal revolt seems likely. It is important to note that the previous revolts have occurred in the fall, when the rainy season hampers the transport of Vietnamese and American troops into the Highlands.

Y Bham, now living in Cambodia, heads the only tribal political group (FULRO) and claims to have organized the three revolts of 1964-5. In their negotiations with FULRO representatives, the Saigon government and the U.S. Mission have recognized FULRO leadership of past revolts and taken seriously FULRO threats of revolts in the future. FULRO and the Cambodian government have agreed on a common propaganda line, that all the Montagnards of South Vietnam are of the same racial stock as the Cambodians in South Vietnam and Cambodia. While based on false history (at least two racial groups live in the Highlands), FULRO-Cambodian cooperation corresponds to joint self-interest. FULRO gains a safe headquarters on the Cambodian side of the border and access to the outside world. Cambodia gains contacts in the strategic Highlands of South Vietnam which may help less populous Cambodia to restrain any future expansionist ethnic Vietnamese government in Saigon, whether Communist or not.

The United States has always been in a difficult position in the Highlands. In 1961, the sending of the Special Forces (similar to the previously disbanded French commandos) was an implicit repudiation of Diem's tribal policies and aroused Vietnamese suspicions. In 1964, after Diem's fall, the Special Forces were transferred from the CIA to the U.S. Army. Vietnamese ARVN officers replaced Americans commanding tribal units and American officers became "advisers," as in the Lowlands. In the revolt and negotiations that have followed this shift, Americans have played a crucial role in mediating between the tribes and the ARVN. (The only Vietnamese officer the tribes respected in 1964 was jailed as a "neutralist.") But the unremitting hostility between most Vietnamese and the tribesmen (and Cambodians) and repeated decisions by the U.S. Mission in Saigon in favor of the Vietnamese will eventually undermine the prestige of Americans on the spot. The U.S. cannot expect to keep tribal loyalties by giving out medical care and T-shirts emblazoned with the South Vietnamese flag, because the Saigon government is not yet trusted. The only stable solution is a full recognition of tribal autonomy by urban Vietnamese. The U.S. cannot simultaneously mollify the tribes by implying a long American presence and placate the Vietnamese by promising to leave as soon as Hanoi negotiates. Tribal minorities are a general post-colonial problem, for most anti-colonial revolutions were led by well-educated lowlanders insisting that a highly centralized unity was the

only way to eliminate foreign domination. In South Vietnam, the U.S. must show that this is not true.

The Coast: Pre-French Tradition and French Rule

Coastal Vietnam differs from the Southern Lowlands in several important respects: it has a longer pre-French history; more extensive pre-French social cohesion, smaller change under French colonial rule; and, most important, a far longer history of Communist influence. Because he is more traditional, is less Westernized, and probably has Communist relatives, even the most anti-Communist Coastal Vietnamese is more difficult for Americans to understand than a Vietnamese from Saigon or the Mekong Delta.

The Coastal Region of South Vietnam extends down through the present I Corps, the northernmost military region. But south of the next province, Binh Dinh, the land narrows even further and is disrupted by sand dunes. Many villages (Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa) depend upon fishing instead of upon rice-farming. Still farther south, there is a half-settled area (Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan) which was once fully cultivated by the Cham people but which the Vietnamese did not maintain or revive.

Vietnam's traditional civilization began in the Red River Delta in North Vietnam. Because the Coastal Lowland are too narrow to attract quick settlement, the Vietnamese moved down the coast only quite slowly, less than a thousand miles in about a thousand years. Their migration, spurred by internal political disputes and population pressure, was necessarily southward; movement was blocked to the North by the stronger Chinese and to the West by the even less hospitable mountains.

Poor communications made a centralized state impossible, but migration was slow enough that the same structure of village life existed all the way down the Coast when the French arrived in the mid-1800's. These villages were the basis of Vietnamese tradition. Much of the land, averaging 25% and sometimes as much as 70%, was redistributed every few years among the households. Except for trade with neighboring villages specializing in certain handicrafts, the rice-growing villages were self-sufficient communities, independent of outside influence. Anyone from beyond the ring of immediately surrounding villages was regarded as a "foreigner." Except for levying taxes and occasionally recruiting troops, the power of the Emperor stopped at the village gate.

In the traditional village the mandarin class provided the best tie to the outside world. Most mandarins lived in the villages, renting land, lending money, and serving on the village Councils of Notables. Some obtained, through examination or purchase, appointments from the Emperor to provincial and district posts.

Fortunately, the Emperor was not a dictator in the modern sense. Though the Confucian ethic supported his powers over the mandarins in theory, the Emperor was restrained by the mandarins' partial independence of their salaries provided by their rents, interest, and bribes and by the general expectation of all office-purchasers that they would not be removed until they had gained a fair return on their investment. The power of the mandarins over the villagers was restrained by several factors: the large proportion of communal land; the lack of absentee landowners; a consciousness of extended families, all of whose members, rich and poor, worshipped the same ancestors; and a tradition of compromise and adjustment in interpersonal relations.

Even before the arrival of French officials, this village tradition was challenged by Catholic missionaries in the North and along much of the Coast. The Buddhists had not established a centralized hierarchy extending down into the villages that could compete with the influence of the mandarin class. The Catholics not only set up such a hierarchy, they also developed a village daily routine — mass every morning and regular prayers in the fields at the ringing of the Angelus — which defied the tradition of compromise and forced villages to convert as whole units. Catholic villages were persecuted regularly by their neighbors, often with the encouragement of the

Emperor, for their competing hierarchy and foreign way of life.

But despite the Catholic problem, when French officials arrived in the late 1800's, they found a relatively stable social and political system, which they chose to preserve along the Coast. Unlike the Southern Lowlands, the Highlands, and the Red River Delta, the Coast had no minerals or lands appropriate for rice or rubber plantations whose exploitation would require and pay for direct French rule. The French therefore gave the Vietnamese Emperor in Hue nominal authority, maintained a small French staff for the Coast, and controlled the Emperor through the Resident, ostensibly just an "adviser." The French even preserved the traditional civil service examination based on the Confucian Classics until 1917, twelve years after the Chinese themselves had abandoned them.

While they had lost some power, Coastal mandarins, unlike those of the North and South, were not closely tied to French officials and businessmen. The French presence along the Coast did not bring great economic changes or disrupt traditional village life. Therefore, Coastal Vietnamese of all social classes, no matter how well they spoke the French language, always regarded the French presence as an insulting, alien intrusion which would eventually be expelled.

The Coast: Viet Minh Activities

From the outset of the anti-French revolt, the Viet Minh controlled most of the Coastal region. The situation was so severe for the French that they did not even attempt population estimates for most of the Coastal provinces — indispensable for taxation and recruitment. These estimates were made even for hostile provinces to the North and South.

Viet Minh influence along the Coast was assisted by the fact that the only political groups active in the region were those the Viet Minh were already defeating in the Red River Delta through better organization, superior tactics and assassination of crucial leaders.

With the exception of the Catholic Bishoprics, and the Emperor Bao Dai, political groups could be started only in exile in China, Hong Kong, and Japan. When Northern and Coastal students conspired in exile for unity, their rivalries were not so much regional as personal or ideological, except to the extent of excluding Southerners, whom the French were more confident of controlling and who therefore were allowed some political activity. When the Communists were able to limit the power of rival exile groups in the North, the power of anti-Communist groups was simultaneously limited along the Coast.

By 1949, according to Lucien Boddard's insurgency map, the Viet Minh controlled all of the Coast north of Dong Hoi, a city just north of the 17th parallel. The French then had a thin strip of four cities down to the 16th parallel: Dong Noi, Quang Tri, Hue, and Danang.

Farther south, the Viet Minh controlled between the 16th and 14th parallels in 1949. During the next four years, according to the May 1953 insurgency map of the French General Henri Navarre, the Viet Minh extended their control down to the 11th parallel, around Phan Thiet. Only two isolated French controlled cities in this area, Nha Trang and Phan Rang, were outside of Viet Minh control in this period. Bernard Fall's insurgency maps for 1954 (the first presumably for January or February, published in March; the second for July) credit the French with regaining control of the countryside between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet, but Fall still conceded the Viet Minh control of the Coast between the 16th and 12th parallels when the war ended. Yet these estimates are clearly biased against the Viet Minh. They include French urban enclaves, but omit at least one prominent rural enclave controlled by the Viet Minh — the famous "Street Without Joy," a strip of villages between Quang Tri and Hue.

Fall revealed the extent of Navarre's bias against acknowledging Viet Minh control in the Red River Delta. The French military map conceded only five small, isolated areas to the Viet Minh in May 1953. On the other hand, the map of the French civilian officials who had

to estimate probable tax returns and decide to travel without military escorts was quite different from Navarre's. According to the civilians, France controlled only four isolated areas: the Hanoi-Haiphong area (where many French troops were stationed) and the Catholic Bishoprics of Phat Diem and Bui Chu, where an anti-French Vietnamese clergy, not Frenchmen, enjoyed the support of the populace.

Along the Coast, in 1954 it was not even Frenchmen who were in charge of the non-Viet Minh enclaves. The decisive political figures under Emperor Bao Dai, the French "alternative" to Ho Chi Minh, were Coastal mandarins and adventurers. By the end of the war, these men had finally bargained from the French the financial support for a "Vietnamese" army, predominantly led by French officers. During the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Bao Dai's followers were even able to obtain a major separate operation along the Coast with troops that might have been better used in the undermanned French fortress to the North.

After the settlement in Geneva just as the French were allowed to occupy Hanoi and Haiphong for 300 days to regroup their forces, the Viet Minh received full legal authority over Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh, a longtime Coastal stronghold between the 16th and 14th parallels. In the two provinces, the Viet Minh established a long-term political base by ordering several hundred of their regular soldiers to marry local girls and leave them behind when they were withdrawn to the North in accord with the Geneva agreements.

In most provinces, the Viet Minh ordered specific members to stay behind, and in many areas, they maintained an intelligence network. The Hanoi government itself produced convincing evidence for such a network when it described in detail to the International Control Commission reprisals by the Diem government in South Vietnam against former members of the Viet Minh between July 1954 and July 1957. According to Bernard Fall's map of Communist Complaints, this intelligence network was especially active in the Quang Tri-Hue-Danang area, which produced over one-third of the descriptions of reprisals.

The Coast: Diem Family's Rule

Diem's family, the Ngo Dinh's, was a leading Catholic mandarin clan centered on Hue. Diem and his older brother Khoi served as provincial governors under French indirect rule in Binh Dinh and Quang Tri Provinces, both along the Coast. When Diem took power in Saigon, his authority along the Coast was exercised by two men whose names did not appear in official government documents: his brothers Thuc and Can. (Diem himself is therefore discussed later, under the Southern Lowlands.)

Thuc played a crucial role in the family and in the regime because he was the eldest surviving brother in the clan (Khoi was buried alive by the Viet Minh) and the leading Vietnamese Catholic prelate. He frequently mediated among the other brothers, especially at the clan's annual meetings in Hue. Thuc also provided a discreet channel between the clan and important foreign Catholics. (He was a former classmate of Francis Cardinal Spellman in the Vatican.) Thuc also provided access to the regime for prominent Vietnamese, many of them non-Catholic, who had complaints or suggestions but who feared Diem and his brother Nhu too much to approach them directly. This mediating role for non-Catholic Vietnamese was crucial for Thuc, because it protected him from criticism against his ideological role in the regime.

The ideology of the regime was "Personalism," an intellectually respectable doctrine originally developed by liberal Catholics in the 1930's. Many non-Catholic Vietnamese, however, regarded it as simply a new political terminology which the Ngo Dinh family could use to communicate with Vietnamese Catholics without encouraging comparisons to the Catholic role under the French. Thuc had started an institute to train people in Personalism during the war against the French, when he was Bishop of Vinh Long. About the time Diem took power, Thuc was elevated to the Archbishopric of Hue. He moved his institute to Dalat and (with Cardinal Spellman's financial assistance) he simultaneously founded

the Catholic University of Dalat. Under Diem, Thuc's institute for Personalism was the training school for members of the Can Lao, a secret political group whose members held administrative posts in the provinces and who reported directly to Diem's brother Nhu on the behavior of non-Can Lao (hence mostly non-Catholic) officials.

Diem's brother Can was a complete contrast to the rest of the clan. He did not speak a foreign language and hence had almost no contact with foreigners. Nor did he have much contact with Vietnamese, rarely appearing in public and usually speaking only to his own followers. He ran a skeleton network of secret agents for Diem to watch Nhu and his supporters in the South, predominantly refugee Catholics from the North. Otherwise, Can confined his activities to the Coast. He was a traditional, consistent warlord in the region, promoting his supporters and punishing his opponents with political prisons and tortures that eventually shocked even old Asia hands; he controlled nominations to the National Assembly and provincial and district appointments. After 1956, when Diem abolished traditional Vietnamese village elections, Can replaced doubtful village and hamlet officials as well. Before the elections of March 1956, Can had almost fifteen thousand people arrested, a far larger number than any estimate of Viet Minh agents left south of the 17th parallel and an average of three people per hamlet.

In Western terms, both Thuc and Can were "corrupt." They exploited their public influence to assist their operations in Saigon real estate, forest concessions in the Highlands, and the shipping business. But their system of rule was inherently more stable than that of Diem and Nhu in the Southern Lowlands. Can was predictable in his repressions, so people who never spoke against him in private did not feel threatened; Thuc provided access and an incentive for respected non-Personalists to remain discreet. Both brothers maintained loyal followings through careful promotions.

The Coast: Start of the Insurgency

The present Viet Cong strength along the Coast is the natural result of the past twenty years. The Viet Minh controlled most of the rural areas against the French and eliminated their nationalist rivals in the region. When almost all of the Viet Minh had gone north in 1954-55, Ngo Dinh Can imposed a repressive rule mostly through Catholics which, like that of the earlier French, prevented all political activity along the Coast except for secret activity. As under the French, exile groups formed (in Paris instead of South China), but no new indigenous organizations could be started.

People hostile to Can had few alternatives. They could remain silent and do nothing, although this was impossible under Vietnamese custom for anyone with a friend or relative imprisoned or tortured. If they were rich enough, they could go to Paris. Anyone who stayed and wanted to resist had to join the Viet Cong, the successor to the Viet Minh and the only organization with the clandestine techniques sufficient to survive Can's secret police.

The Viet Cong were therefore able to regain the position held by the Viet Minh along the Coast without nearly as many demonstrations and assassinations as in the Southern Lowlands. In the first period of Viet Cong violence tabulated by Bernard Fall, April 1957 to April 1958, there were only two assassinations along the Coast, compared with more than fifty to the south. When Fall made his second analysis, April 1959 to April 1960, he did not even survey most of the Coast. Douglas Pike's list of "struggle movements" publicized by the Viet Cong between December 1960 (founding of NLF) and September 1964 credits (aside from eleven places whose region cannot be identified) only sixteen movements to specific places along the Coast and one hundred seven to places in the Southern Lowlands.

At the same time, in the years after 1956, surviving Viet Minh agents along the Coast were supplemented by the return of Viet Minh members who had gone north for further training in 1954. While the word "insurgency"

is used here to describe the Viet Cong, it is not meant to imply a spontaneous rebellion. The tragedy of South Vietnam, especially along the Coast, is that the only form of resistance available on the spot was a Communist movement already repudiated, at least implicitly, by the urban elite that had not already joined the Viet Minh. This tragedy was the responsibility of Ngo Dinh Can along the Coast. The role of North Vietnam was clear: retaining an intelligence network after the partition of 1954, supplementing that network with well-trained local men who had been picked to go north in 1954; and, supplying the Viet Cong with limited arms and ammunition, in addition to those captured and secretly manufactured. Though not "aggression" in a conventional military sense, these acts were unequivocally aggressive.

When Can realized the growing Viet Cong strength in his region, he responded, not by shelling and relocating villages as Diem and Nhu did to the south, but by training cadres to live with the villagers as the Viet Cong do. Can's cadres minimized the level of violence by firing only at individuals only when fired upon, and they kept the struggle on a political basis which did not force the villagers to choose sides. Can's cadres, some of whom were even being trained for the Mekong Delta when Diem fell, were the direct antecedent of the present "Revolutionary Development" cadres now gaining much attention.

The Coast: Recent Events and U.S. Policy

Only an extraordinary group of men could have organized a new political group without succumbing to the secret agents of Can and the Viet Cong. Fortunately for Vietnam, such men appeared, inspiring millions of Vietnamese along the Coast and in Saigon. They were the militant Buddhists, based in the imperial city of Hue. While their successes were wholly unexpected, they were not without their weaknesses, the simple products of their past.

In addition to arousing Vietnamese and foreigners to the hopelessness of the Diem regime and bringing down several post-Diem governments, the militant Buddhists negotiated two coalitions which promised them dominant influence around Hue and some national representation in Saigon. The first coalition was suppressed by force, the second was betrayed by Ky. Both the suppression and the betrayal had U.S. support. The refusal of other non-Communist Vietnamese and of American policy-makers to develop a coalition with these men was a mistake which may have been irrevocable.

The militant Buddhists' leader, Thich ("Reverend") Tri Quang, is completely different from the urban Vietnamese politicians and ARVN officers Americans prefer to deal with. He lacks both a mandarin education and foreign contacts, both of which are now in disrepute along the traditionalist Coast. Originally respected for his knowledge of Buddhist scripture and self-denying asceticism, Thich Tri Quang has been out of Vietnam only once, for a short visit to Japan. His sudden popularity was both a reflection of his intense, inflammatory speaking style and a repudiation of first the Diem regime and then successive Saigon governments as hopeless alternatives to the Viet Cong along the Coast.

The first political effort of the Buddhists was against the Diem regime, beginning publicly in May 1963 with an incident at the Buddha's birthday celebration. According to Ngo Dinh Nhu, Tri Quang had actually started the movement in Hue in 1961 by tricking Ngo Dinh Can into paying subsidies for an inner group to prevent Communist infiltration of the Buddhist organization around Hue. Even if he did plan extensively in advance, Tri Quang was by no means in a position to overthrow Can when at the celebration his police prevented the normal flying of the Buddhist flag without the simultaneous display of the South Vietnamese flag. After several celebrators were killed, the Buddhist leadership tried to prolong the ensuing tension. When Diem met their demands for assistance to the victims' survivors, they insisted that the aid be described as "compensation," thus trying to force an implicit admission of police guilt.

Two great strokes of luck turned the Buddhist leadership from a conspiracy seeking a cause into a factor in world politics. On June 11, when the Buddhist leadership was straining to keep resentment alive, an old monk burned himself to death in Saigon. While the Buddhist tradition respects such suicides, nothing like it had ever been done before in Vietnam. Instead of gaining simply a mild boost, the Buddhists found a transformed population. In Saigon the popular response was extended by memorial services and the display of a heart, said to have survived the monk's immolation and a final cremation. As a Saigon official told a Time reporter, "We have been living under a regime of terrorism, but after Quang Duc [the immolated monk] I no longer feel fear."

The second event occurred in August, when Nhu sent the police into the pagoda used as the Buddhists' Saigon headquarters. The United States had already urged Diem to mollify the Buddhists, and in other Buddhist countries Asians were blaming the Catholic President Kennedy for the supposed repressions of Buddhism by the Catholic President Diem. After the pagoda raid, President Kennedy hinted that Nhu's overthrow was necessary and made his famous remark "they [the Vietnamese] have to win it." The coup that followed two months later was the result of complex military intrigues and complicity by United States officials. Though the Buddhist leaders did not play a direct role in the coup itself, they emerged from Diem's fall with immense prestige throughout all of South Vietnam, far beyond the reach of their small organization.

Factionalism after Diem

Unfortunately, in 1964-65 the Buddhists lost much of their general popularity and, after an initial effort at unity, the militant Buddhists from Hue split from the Saigon groups, composed of refugees from the North and unorganized Southerners. The Buddhist loss of popularity and internal division occurred during the post-Diem "decompression" period of fierce factional infighting in Saigon. With almost fifty thousand political prisoners freed from the jails, a generation of exiles returning from abroad, and an internally divided army suddenly freed from Diem's security agents, too many people wanted to rule South Vietnam. Since the civilian politicians had no organizations, their powers for good or ill, were confined to teahouse intrigues, to deciding which group of civilians would provide external respectability and internal political skills for the rulers of the day in the army. Shifts within the army caused most of the ten changes of government in nineteen months, but most of the troop movements were swift and bloodless.

Since the Buddhists were the only group able to summon mass support, their factional efforts were the most conspicuous and the bloodiest. Their mass support frightened Vietnamese Catholics and urban politicians. It seems probable from later events that U.S. officials in Saigon and Washington gave up forever on the Hue Buddhists in this period. Since then, when they have acted constructively within the implicit rules of the political system, the United States has given Ky and the Saigon politicians full approval to repress the Hue Buddhists by military force and to change the rules against them. When the Hue Buddhists have been powerful within their region, U.S. officials have publicly criticized them; when the Hue Buddhists have tried to resist being double-crossed, U.S. officials have called for "unity" and for letting "the Vietnamese" decide the matter "by themselves."

At first all Buddhist leaders, not just the ones from Hue, frightened the Catholic groups. The Diem regime, it must be remembered, had not persecuted Buddhists for their religion. Buddhism did not have a hierarchy or a doctrinal unity transferable to political affairs which could have been persecuted even if Diem had so wished. Diem went so far as to dedicate all of South Vietnam to the Immaculate Heart of Mary in 1959, but neither religious persecution nor forcible conversion were attempted.

In politics, the Diem regime had simply favored Catholics and other Can Lao members and then imprisoned and tortured its opponents. These opponents differed in many respects, but by the process of elimination they were almost all Buddhists. In 1964, many

Buddhists leaders tried to whip up an anti-Catholic sentiment as a means of strengthening their own position with the vast non-Catholic majority.

At the same time, all Buddhist leaders were agreed that only an ideology based on Buddhism could save Vietnam from Communism, that an empty anti-Communism led by Catholics could not win in the villages. Immediately after Diem's fall, the Buddhist leaders planned a national Buddhist organization parallel to the South Vietnamese government and reaching down into the villages, as exists in Thailand and Cambodia. Thich Tri Quang became the symbolic leader of the new organization, corresponding to the head of state. Thich Tam Chau, a milder refugee from the North who had led Buddhists against the Viet Minh in the autonomous Catholic Bishopric of Phat Diem, was made premier and placed over a cabinet of ministers. At the same time, many Buddhist monks were made chaplains to ARVN units.

Naturally, Vietnamese Catholic leaders were opposed to the Buddhists riding to power on a wave of anti-Catholic feeling and then assuming exactly the same political role the Catholics had enjoyed first under the French and then under Diem. Since the native Southern Catholics were a disproportionately large portion of the urban middle class and since most of the Northern Catholic refugees remained in the Saigon area, Catholic leaders were also able to produce favorable demonstrations in Saigon.

At the same time, most Can Lao members were able to regain posts in the bureaucracy. Although they were removed from their provincial and district posts in late 1963, not enough others had the training and experience to compete with them, and after several months of confusion, most former Diem officials were simply assigned to different posts. Since the training of Buddhist monks concentrates entirely on scripture and omits both mandarin and foreign education, the Buddhist leaders could do no more than obtain a temporary preference for non-Can Lao officials. Though temporarily embarrassed and weakened, a Diemist recovery was inevitable after the fall of Diem himself.

Just as frightened of the Buddhists as the Catholics were the traditional urban politicians who had no organization, no mass following in the cities, and no tie to the countryside (except sometimes the dubious one of absentee landownership). Since they could not quickly make up for lost time, their only hope for power was for the military to eliminate the Buddhists as a national factor. Then civilian rule would mean rule by old men who had been jailed by Diem instead of by monks and students who had demonstrated against him.

Neutralization under Tri Quang?

A tragic element to the Buddhist defeat was their emphasis on being the only group who could gain a sufficient mass following in the villages to deal with the Viet Cong. Especially along the Coast, where people had never had an open alternative to the Communists and the mandarins, the appeal of a negotiated settlement, a coalition government, and neutralization of South Vietnam was very powerful. Although Thich Tam Chau was more cautious about the Viet Cong (as befitted a leader of Northern refugees, whatever the merits of the case), Thich Tri Quang cultivated an air of mystery, encouraging Vietnamese to feel that given sufficient power he could bring a stable settlement. Although this behavior is universal among politicians, the more Thich Tri Quang pursued this line with non-Catholic Vietnamese, the more Americans mistrusted him.

In Saigon, Vietnamese fearful of Tri Quang's domestic appeal quickly found that the best way to oppose him at the U.S. Mission was to exploit his claim to be able to bargain with the Viet Cong. Refugee leaders from the North used their Communist relatives and old friends as proof of a painful break, of an abiding feud with the Communists. The Northern ties of the Hue Buddhists, however, provided innuendos of Communist influence. (Of course the Americans given these innuendos never were told that Tri Quang's mother and elder brother died in a Communist prison camp in the North after partition.) Even Tri Quang's mass support from city people and from villagers who were trucked in for demonstrations was used as evidence of Viet Cong in-

fluence! It was permissible for the Viet Cong not to stop villagers from benefitting from U.S. medical teams, but when the Viet Cong did not stop villagers who wanted to demonstrate for Vietnam's first non-Communist charismatic leader, then Americans in Saigon and Washington became suspicious.

Not surprisingly, the Buddhists' most ambitious plans for separate organizations failed. Tam Chau, the Northerner who was supposed to head the hierarchy, lost interest. After he received no cabinet appointments and Tri Quang got three, Tam Chau tried to regain his power by allying with Northern Catholic leaders instead of working within the Buddhist coalition. Along the Coast, the Hue Buddhists tried to strengthen their organization with "People's Councils for National Salvation," but when their student leaders led demonstrations in the cities (which the Viet Cong had never been able to do), more experienced Viet Cong cadres took the crowds away from them and discredited the movement (a hostile action which was often regarded as proof of cooperation).

The I Corps Coalition: Tri Quang and General Thi

By early 1966, the Hue Buddhists had turned their attention to another coalition, with ARVN officers and civilian officials in the I Corps, the military region comprising the five Coastal provinces around Hue. The ARVN commander was Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi. He was a native of Hue and the only important ARVN general born of a peasant family. He led the first coup attempt against Diem, in November 1960, with elite paratrooper units who were disgusted with Diem's inability to contend with the Viet Cong's first massive wave of terror. After Diem's fall, General Thi took command of the I Corps, his home area.

The I Corps coalition also included one of South Vietnam's two civilian province chiefs, an able, former exile civilian as Mayor of Danang, officials and professors at the University of Hue, and many civilian politicians who made up for the Buddhists' lack of administrative training. None of these men was a Communist. Some were suspicious of Americans conducting separate military operations and taking power more directly than the French had done in their area, and they became positively hostile when American policy gave Ky full support in trying to break up their coalition. The Honolulu Conference of February 1966 probably finished the Hue Buddhists under the Johnson Administration. Although its timing may have been planned to turn public attention away from the critical testimony of General Gavin and Ambassador Kennan, the Administration had prepared a series of demands on Ky. One demand, agreed to then and now practically forgotten, was "social revolution, including land reform," for which the Administration promised its "full support" (the U.S. had refused to help Diem pay for even his mild land reform). Also agreed upon was "a democratic constitution," "its ratification by secret ballot," and "elections rooted in that constitution." In his first announcement of the elections, Ky said that he would not himself be a candidate. President Johnson emerged from the Conference saying, "We talked of very specific things," and after the Conference Vice President Humphrey and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Health, Education and Welfare visited Vietnam.

Ky and U.S. Oppose Coalition

Ky's first "specific thing" after the Conference was to maneuver against General Thi in I Corps. In early March, the National Leadership Council unanimously deposed Thi, calling him a "war lord." The U.S. Mission in Saigon agreed immediately, calling the deposition of a popular general from his native area a "step toward political stability" and "a defeat for warlordism." It was perfectly clear that the U.S. would not continue to assist Thi, whose command corresponded to that of the U.S. Marines (also confined to I Corps), no matter how popular he was with his troops and the surrounding population.

Two days later the Hue Buddhists issued a demand for the return of Thi and the maintenance of all Corps commanders until the elections. When demonstrations began, General Thi appeared in person to ask them to stop, and they stopped. Fierce negotiations began in Saigon, with Ky, the Northerner Thich Tam Chau, and the Hue representative in Saigon meeting on March 12,

13, and 17. By the end of the month, Father Quynh, leader of the Northern Catholics from Phat Diem and an impeccable anti-Communist, was also criticizing Ky.

In the first half of April, a compromise was developed and General Thieu signed a decree promising elections within five months, informally understood to be on August 15. The Buddhists asked for a definite agreement that the Constituent Assembly would replace the military government as soon as the new Constitution was ratified, and to everyone's surprise, a commission of politicians appointed by the generals to oppose the Buddhists agreed with them. On April 17, Tri Quang flew back to Hue and stopped demonstrations against Ky. This compromise definitely was influenced by the U.S. On April 5, Ambassador Lodge had personally ordered American aircraft to help fly to Danang ARVN troops loyal to Ky in a show of force; the troops were kept on the airbase and then later flown back to Saigon. On April 8, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, William P. Bundy, publicly criticized the Buddhists for refusing to compromise, ignoring the fact that the dispute began by disrupting a Buddhist compromise, the I Corps coalition.

Ky Doublecrosses Tri Quang

Once he had Tri Quang satisfied, Ky betrayed him. On May 7 over a paper cup of Jim Beam bourbon he suddenly revealed to a group of American reporters that he would continue in office and that the Constituent Assembly would be disbanded when the Constitution was ratified. This news was censored in the Vietnamese press, and Ky surprised his enemies by sending ARVN troops and a third replacement for General Thi back to Danang, just as the current I Corps commander was about to start a solidarity party of Catholics and Buddhists to demonstrate to American officials and reporters their agreement. In Washington, Secretary Rusk and then a State Department spokesman disassociated themselves from Ky's alcoholic revelation and his second dispatch of troops to Danang, but an American helicopter was supplied to take the new I Corps commander from Danang to the hostile city of Hue. This man, Ky's final replacement for General Thi, was a notorious favorite of Diem (now head of an extremist Catholic ticket in the Senate). His appointment was a clear indication that the coalition which the Buddhists had developed with General Thi and which had survived his first two replacements was shattered. The Diemist appointment was also a calculated insult to the Hue Buddhists. As the American helicopter flew the new commander away after his speech, a young ARVN officer tried to shoot him down. The American gunner in the helicopter fired a burst of machine gun bullets into the crowd, killing the officer and wounding others.

U.S. Ignores Double Cross

In the next ten days, Tri Quang tried to gain a reversal of American policy. He stopped a demonstration after the helicopter incident and withheld the news that an American (rather than an ARVN) soldier had fired into the crowd. Three meetings with U.S. consular officials and a cable to President Johnson produced a "leave it to the Vietnamese themselves" style remark by Secretary Rusk and a non-committal reply from the President.

Ky made many conciliatory statements, but he did not explain how he expected to be trusted. On May 26, the point of no return was reached in Hue: the helicopter gunner was identified as an American at the funeral procession for the dead ARVN officer, and Tri Quang's students led a crowd to burn the USIA library in Hue. ARVN troops were sent into Hue; the Buddhist leaders were cornered and then captured after a three-week siege.

American experts on the Viet Cong are rightly quick to point out that the Viet Cong does not attract the South Vietnamese elite and that even Tri Quang in his most anti-Saigon and anti-American moments did not threaten to seek Viet Cong support. When defeated, he still did not flee to the Viet Cong; instead he risked house arrest under a hostile government in circumstances similar to those that killed Diem and Nhu. If American experts emphasize this point, then they should also emphasize the desirability of reversing American policy and giving Tri Quang and General Thi (now in Washington,

trying to learn English) a chance to reform their coalition.

Ky agreed to hold elections, and he has. The Hue Buddhists were excluded from the Constituent Assembly and from the Senate for the sin of "neutrality." Tri Quang's group would have had a very good chance in the Senate contest, because the multiplicity of candidates disproportionately favored a well-educated block vote. This advantage was reaped by Catholic groups, who may control over fifty percent of the Senate with less than ten percent of the population and whose most popular Senate ticket received less than fifteen percent of the Presidential vote.

The Southern Lowlands: Pre-French Tradition and French Rule

The Southern Lowlands were completely changed by the French. In the 1860's, a small Vietnamese population lived in villages less than one hundred years old and cultivated about 500,000 acres of land, mostly between Saigon and My Tho. As the Vietnamese Emperor had ordered all his mandarins to leave the southern area first ceded to the French, the French had to rely upon themselves and the only inhabitants who knew any Western languages, the Vietnamese Catholics. Saigon became the base of French activities in Indochina and the Southern Catholics (unlike Northern and Coastal Catholics, mostly living in their own villages) became the basis for an urban middle class, working under French officials, businessmen, and customers.

Great canals were dug to drain the vast areas flooded annually by the Mekong and bi-monthly by salt water from unusually high tides. By 1880 the cultivated area had more than doubled to almost 1.3 million acres; by 1937 it had quadrupled again, reaching 5.5 million. In those 57 years the population almost tripled, from 1.7 million to 4.5 million.

The great expansion in rice fields produced two new Vietnamese social classes: the absentee landlord, with vast holdings supervised by managers, and what a colonial report of 1931 emphasized as a "very important rural proletariat" of tenants and migrant workers. Physically, there was plenty of land for all in the South, now almost four times as much per villager. But the expense of opening new areas, even when they had already been drained, and the competition for large plots completely disqualified most of the rural population from potential ownership. Along the Coast 65% of the households owned at least a small plot, and everyone could rent communal land.

But in the South only 28% owned any land at all, and the landless had no communal land to speak of (only 3% of the total rice area, as contrasted with 25% along the Coast). Coastal landholdings were generally worked by their owner or his sons and only 10% of the plots were worked entirely by tenants. In the South 35% of the plots were owned by absentees, and, assuming their plots were the largest, these men owned 85% of the rice land.

The new villages in the South were connected to Can Tho and Saigon by cheap, fast water transport. Most of their inhabitants immigrated; everyone depended on a good price for exporting rice all over Asia. Some fields (80% in Bac Lieu Province, from which the present An Xuyen Province was separated) were worked entirely by migrant workers who would follow transplantings and harvests up and down the Mekong. Some did not even live in villages—they simply lived on the bank of a canal without a government or community. In some areas, no effective government ruled at all; the landlord ruled without challenge from either established communities or from the French administration.

The result, of course, was a society in the South whose relations were monetary and impersonal and hence materialistic and individualistic by traditional Vietnamese standards, but the peasants were not Europeanized. The traditional responsibility of the landlord and creditor to be easy on the tenant and debtor after a bad harvest could not hold if the landlord lived in Saigon or Can Tho, de-

pended solely on his rents and interest to live a gay urban life and conducted his business through a middleman. Even today, after a generation of warfare in the South, Vietnamese families are strong enough that orphans are taken in by relatives of the fourth and fifth degrees, rather than be left homeless. Pearl Buck's foundation for orphans and abandoned children of American soldiers recently found that even compared with Japan and Korea Vietnam has few deserted children.

Cao Dai and Hoa Hao

Instead of forming political parties and trade unions along Western lines, Southerners found escape, unity, and resistance to the French in two new Buddhist sects. The first, Cao Daim, founded by a group of Vietnamese in 1926, was not exclusively Buddhist, but a combination of the world's religions plus hero worship. (Winston Churchill and Victor Hugo, for example, are Cao Dai saints.) Its organization was consciously patterned on that of the Catholic Church, and it spread so rapidly among peasants as well as government officials that the French banned its advocacy from the Coast and in the North. The Cao Dai "Pope" had close ties with reformist political parties and with the Japanese. In fact, when the latter took over Indochina, the French deported the Cao Dai Pope to Madagascar. After World War II, the Cao Dai claimed a total of twelve sub-sects, totaling between one and four million members, a large proportion of the population in the South.

Hoa Haoism, the second sect, was started not by a committee, but by a charismatic leader, the twenty-year-old son of a minor notable. After developing a very attractive Protestant version of Buddhism (better to have a pure heart than a rich altar—and debts to pay for the altar), the Hoa Hao prophet predicted a Japanese attack on Indochina as soon as France fell to Germany. With more than one hundred thousand followers in less than a year of preaching, Huynh Phu So was soon a potent force. When the French exiled him to another part of the South, So converted the surrounding population. When the French committed him to a Saigon hospital, So converted his psychiatrist. A second exile became a place of pilgrimage; only Japanese intervention prevented a third exile, this one to be outside Vietnam.

The area between the Mekong and the Bassac (the southernmost branch of the Mekong) rivers was more fully developed by the French than the land farther to the southwest, the Transbassac. There drainage canals were still being dug when the Depression and World War II disrupted the French pattern of colonial development. The Transbassac contained the largest landholdings, with landlords whose word was law throughout their domains. Fiercely militant Cambodian villages, survivors of the original Cambodian occupants of the Mekong Delta driven south by the invading Vietnamese, were (and are) also found in the Transbassac.

To the north of the Saigon-Tay Ninh line the lands were inhospitable all the way to the sandy and abandoned areas on the Coast mentioned above. The major river in this barren area, the Dong Nai, was overgrown with mangroves and the high ground beyond the river was cursed by malaria, a complete barrier to Vietnamese settlement. In the 1900's the French began developing the malarial high ground; its red and grey soils were good for rubber, whose rising price made cultivation very profitable. The rubber plantations soon became more valuable than the French rice holdings (most large riceland owners were Vietnamese) and the rubber plantations have become even more important to Americans today, because the undeveloped surrounding swamps and forest provide cover for guerillas and because rubber trees are vulnerable (they must grow seven years before producing) and easily taxed.

As far as most peasants were concerned, the South was essentially a French creation. The Vietnamese and Cambodians had dug some canals, and, if the French had never taken over, large indigenous landowners and a rural proletariat might have arisen anyway. But everywhere Frenchmen held critical positions: officials granting land concessions and businessmen importing foreign manufacturers in exchange for rice. While Coastal Vietnamese could hate the French from a position of self-confidence because of a memory of pre-French stability, Vietnamese in the South could hate the French only from a position of subjugation. For the United States today

this legacy has meant that while the suspicious Coastal Vietnamese feel that "We don't need you — except to supplement our army," the suspicious Southerners say, "We don't want you running things on any terms, French or American." Therefore, no matter how terrible the Viet Cong may seem, it is very difficult for Americans to appear to offer a constructive alternative.

The Southern Lowlands: Viet Minh Activities

Unlike the North and the Coast, the South had several active indigenous organizations in addition to the Viet Minh working against the French. The French had permitted some urban political parties and had not suppressed the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, so none of these groups were vulnerable to the Communists' mastery of exile politics. During World War II the Viet Minh controlled only a few villages and a forested enclave in the North; it started operations in the South too hastily at the end of the War to take over all anti-French activity.

Even before the War Southern Marxists were divided. A strong Trotskyite organization, led by the lower-class Ta Thu Thau, had badly defeated the predominately middle-class, orthodox Communists in the elections of 1938. In 1940 the orthodox Communists had tried to lead a peasant rebellion, but a security leak alerted the French, the rebellion was crushed, and the Communist organization was destroyed.

The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao had improved their positions during the War as the result of a less hostile administration. A new group, improperly called a "sect," had also formed: the Binh Xuyen, a coalition of robber bands around Saigon. Southwest of the Mekong Delta and in Vinh Binh Province the Cambodian minority, armed by the French, fought all Vietnamese. In Kien Hoa Province the Catholics organized a militia to defend themselves against the Viet Minh. At first the various factions in the South fought as much among themselves as they did against the French and the Viet Minh. Only the consistent hostility of the Viet Minh and the eventual French recognition that these factions could be bargained with more easily than they could be "pacified" permitted a loose anti-Communist coalition. Among the factions two great surprises came during the war against the Viet Minh. The Hoa Hao, regarded as a loose, one-man organization, recovered after the assassination by the Viet Minh of their charismatic founder. And the larger Cao Dai failed to establish a secure rural power base; not even a small one could be set up around their Pope's residence in Tay Ninh.

The large number of indigenous factions make it even harder to estimate the extent of Viet Minh activities and control in the South than along the Coast. Village land records, for example, were destroyed throughout most of Vinh Binh Province. The French of course blamed the Viet Minh. The Viet Cong, claiming always to be their successors (but also careful since then to have a Cambodian representative on the National Liberation Front's Central Committee), have also given full credit to the Viet Minh. But it is impossible to verify today who destroyed which records, the Viet Minh rebels or the anti-Vietnamese Cambodians armed by the French. It is clear, however, that unlike in the North and on the Coast the Viet Minh were not the only organization fighting the French and terrorizing landlords.

The Communists Fail in the South

The Communist party, moreover, revealed more factionalism in the South than in the North and along the Coast. The first Communist leader, Tran Van Giau, shortly after World War II tried to establish a tractable popular front in the South which would correspond to the Viet Minh. When, in 1946, it was clear that he had failed, he was repudiated in the South and assigned overseas. Then Nguyen Binh, an ex-member of the VNQDD (the Communists' mortal rival in the North), was appointed leader of the Viet Minh in the South. By 1949, according to Lucien Bodard, Nguyen Binh controlled almost all of the South except for the vital roads connecting Saigon and Quan Long; most of the Transbassac; the seaward tips of the Mekong Delta provinces; and, both sides of the "Duck's Bill" — from beyond Tay Ninh in the North to

beyond Sa Dec, across the Mekong, to the south. In 1950 Nguyen Binh directed a conventional military campaign, similar to many of Giap's in the North, in an attempt to seize the large cities from the French, but apparently without having consolidated his control over many rural areas.

When this effort failed, Nguyen Binh was killed, not by simple execution, for he was too popular in the South. He was sent, without any rest, with a small party of troops loyal to Le Duan into the worst Cambodian jungle, supposedly to find a new infiltration route. When surprised by a unit of the Cambodian army, Binh's nominal subordinates killed him before fleeing into the jungle.

In 1951 after Nguyen Binh came Le Duan, the present First Secretary of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, and Le Duc Tho, present head of the party's Organizational Bureau, as rival leaders in the South. While the origins and meaning of their rivalry are not clear, it certainly dates back to a dispute over the conduct of the war in the South, which had to be resolved by Ho Chi Minh himself.

In 1954 three short-term regroupment areas were established for the Viet Minh in the South: the tip of the Camau peninsula, an area somewhat larger than the present An Xuyen Province; the Plain of Reeds, somewhat larger than the present Kien Tuong Province; and, the Xuyen Moc-Ham Tan area, which then straddled the border between Cochinchina and Annam and now overlaps Binh Tuy and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. At that time the Viet Minh probably had two other base camps. First was the present "Zone C," around Tay Ninh and easily connected to the Plain of Reeds regroupment area. Second was the present "Zone D," until recently corresponding to the Phuoc Thanh Province and now the area where four provinces meet northeast of Saigon and are easily connected to the Xuyen Moc-Ham regroupment area.

In the Southern Lowlands the Communist Party did not hold the monopoly on effective, tested political organization it enjoyed elsewhere in Vietnam. It could not claim, simply as director of the Viet Minh, as much respect as it could command farther north. When Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel in 1954 to give the anti-Communists a second chance, the best opportunities for an indigenous anti-Communist coalition were in the Southern Lowlands.

The Southern Lowlands: Diem

Since Diem had delegated most of his power along the Coast to his brothers Can and Thuc, the Southern Lowlands tested his own abilities. His personality, like his political support, had two complementary elements: the traditional Vietnamese mandarin of Hue and the devout, medieval Catholic of the North and the Coast. He worked long into the night in the tradition of the self-sacrificing mandarin or prelate, but he had neither administrative skills nor charismatic powers. Though he was impressive in small meetings with Western diplomats and journalists, he came to rely on his brother Nhu to decide which Vietnamese leaders and official papers were to be sent to his office and to rely on the semi-secret Can Lao to control the population.

When Diem became premier in 1954, he was manifestly the representative of the American policy of a second chance south of the 17th parallel for the anti-Communist nationalists of Vietnam. The initial French policy after Dien Bien Phu was to preserve as many plantations and as much cultural influence as possible by sending an old friend of Ho Chi Minh's (Jean Sainteny) to Hanoi and by not trying to develop an anti-Communist coalition for the elections scheduled for 1956. The French still had close ties to the major opponents of the Viet Minh in the South: Emperor Bao Dai, the recently created army, the Binh Xuyen, the Cao Dai, and the Hoa Hao.

Diem's first cabinet was unimpressive; it was composed almost entirely of blood relatives and in-laws. But the end of 1954 saw a much broader cabinet, in which a majority (8 of 14) was held by the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. Both of these groups had long feared the Communists and had interests which no longer corresponded to those of the French. Diem secured his position by gaining control over the army — with substantial American help. The crucial subordinates of General Hinh, the army's commander,

were lured away on a visit to the much-admired President Magsaysay of the Philippines and General Hinh was told bluntly that no military aid would be given until the army was under complete civilian control (i.e., Diem's). Though he later claimed he could have started a coup against Diem with a telephone call, General Hinh yielded and soon left for France, where he was given a military appointment.

Diem then began to fragment the sects represented within his cabinet, paying several Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders over \$10 million from American military aid for "back pay." At the same time, in early 1954, Western representatives sympathetic to the sects (and hence their only hope of getting the U.S. to moderate Diem's hostility toward them) were withdrawn from South Vietnam. When they realized Diem's intention to destroy their groups, most Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders joined the Binh Xuyen leader on March 5, 1955 in demanding a greater role in the cabinet. Of course this was denied them.

Although the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao held political control over the Tay Ninh area northwest of Saigon and over many areas south of the Mekong River, they had no conventional force to match the 250,000-man army under Diem, and their local exactions could not compete with the \$250 million annual American aid given Diem. Even their claims to conventional military forces never reached 50,000. The generally accepted total of 15,000 to 20,000 for the Cao Dai forces grossly exceeded the 4,916 regular troops actually subsidized by the French at the end of 1953. While the details of Diem's negotiations with the sects are still obscure, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao leaders who had fought the French and the Viet Minh only when necessary could hardly have expected to defeat Diem's army in conventional warfare. Their resistance must have been a desperate last resort, and they were defeated within a few months. The only surviving units were four Hoa Hao battalions which fled up the Mekong beyond Long Xuyen and preserved themselves only by adopting guerrilla tactics and hiding amidst the loyal Hoa Hao population.

With the defeat of the Binh Xuyen and the sects, Diem had a chance to offer a non-Communist, non-sectarian alternative to rural areas of the Southern Lowlands, but he failed to make good on this opportunity. Large areas of land around Saigon (Binh Xuyen) and south of the Mekong River (Cao Dai and Hoa Hao), abandoned during the war against the French, were taken for the settlement of refugees from the North (most of whom were tightly-knit Catholic villagers) without the permission of local inhabitants. Improved security in rural areas, especially those formerly terrorized by the aggressive and intolerant Hoa Hao bands, led to some economic improvement. But the new rural security also permitted Saigon landlords who had not received rents for years to return to the countryside on the heels of the army and to make exactions in the form of "back rents," much as Diem had paid bribes in the form of "back pay." Even refugee Catholic villagers, a basis of Diem's support and able to publicize their complaints, were preyed upon by national and provincial officials until they were stopped by a national scandal and the dismissal by Diem of a cooperative cabinet minister.

Diem Misrules the Hoa Hao

Hoa Hao areas associated with the surviving four battalions were repeatedly attacked by ARVN units, and the one peaceful Hoa Hao area for which information is available was badly treated. As late as 1960, a Michigan State University group found that Diem's government had taken over all Hoa Hao buildings without payment and had appointed all non-Hoa Hao officials in My Thuan, a former Hoa Hao headquarters in a part of Vinh Long Province where 85 - 90% of the population belonged to the Hoa Hao sect. The Americans then saw the suppression of a Hoa Hao ceremony on the Buddha's birthday, initially approved to honor Hoa Hao soldiers killed fighting the French and the Viet Minh. There were only 250 Catholics in the area, but they included crucial local officials, like the district chief, the district "information" officer, and the canton chief. Catholics were allowed to build a church instead of working on the local forced-labor construction projects (agrovilles) against the Viet Cong. Under prodding

from a priest from Vinh Long, the seat of the area's Bishopric, the district "information" officer was reluctantly starting an organization to propagate Catholicism among the hostile local populace. Threatening letters to and assassinations of local officials were an increasing problem. Diem's officials blamed the Hoa Hao, and the latter blamed the Viet Cong, claiming that the local ARVN units were infiltrated and useless. Since Americans made only a few short visits outside of Saigon between 1955 and 1962, it is impossible to say if My Thuan's plight was unusual. It should be emphasized, however, that the Americans reported no embarrassment by Diem's officials at seeing their behavior observed and recorded.

Even the Binh Xuyen — the gangland alliance which had controlled the roads into Saigon, the city's rackets, and the French secret police — were not replaced by superior institutions. Brother Nhu ran most of these activities, not for personal profit, but to finance the Can Lao and his family's political activities independently of U.S. aid. Nhu controlled the opium trade and the lotteries, manipulated the foreign exchange market, and extorted Saigon businessmen. The only Binh Xuyen activities Nhu did not take over were those that were banned by his puritanical wife, the famous Mme. Nhu.

Mistakes by the U.S. Mission had a great influence on South Vietnam's increasing difficulties. United States military "advisers" made no effort to anticipate a resumption of Viet Minh guerrilla activities and converted the new Vietnamese army, originally created by the French for decentralized, small-unit, counter-insurgency operations, into a highly centralized conventional force, consciously imitating the South Korean army and preparing for a conventional invasion from the North. The refusal to finance Diem's plans for a paramilitary force has already been mentioned. In the Mekong Delta, the United States refused to continue the French-developed naval units used to patrol the hundreds of miles of rivers and canals (compared with only one major road south of Saigon). These military mistakes are being reversed today, but without the slightest hint that present improvements are more a return to French methods than American invention. United States Navy activities in the Mekong, for instance, are being publicized as having been inspired by the Montitor and the Merrimac, two American ships of a completely different war a century ago, rather than by methods successful in the same place against the Viet Minh within the past generation.

U.S. Ignores Assassinations

When evidence increased of a systematic insurgency, as in reports of Hanoi-trained cadres in the Highlands and of assassinations and kidnappings concentrated in strategic provinces south of the Mekong where the Viet Minh had not been strong, the U.S. Mission maintained that the country was too prosperous for an insurgency to survive. United States aid was mostly in the form of consumer goods sold to merchants by the Saigon government, which then spent the proceeds instead of relying on local taxes. The merchants sold the consumer goods in the provinces and peasants bought them, without feeling the slightest gratitude to the United States for not being taxed harder. There was no way of knowing whether the peasantry had gained more from larger peacetime harvests and Diem's mild land reform and rent control laws than had to be paid in rents to absentee landlords. Since no prolonged American contact with rural areas existed until 1962, it was surely cavalier to ignore totally signs of trouble and bury them under claims of South Vietnamese rural "prosperity." The present Administration line, that the North began the insurgency because it was afraid of Diem's popularity, similarly lacks supporting evidence and is grossly deceptive.

The most grotesque American mistake was to conclude that there was "no alternative" to Diem and his family. The original reason for favoring Diem was a sound one: Diem was the best man to lead an anti-Communist coalition. Bao Dai had been discredited by years of association with the French and of high living in Vietnamese and European resorts. Diem had stayed clear of both the French and the Viet Minh, had good connections in the United States, and was a hard worker. In 1953, in a "neutralist" campaign that would be banned today in South Vietnam, brother Nhu organized a party that performed well in the elections held by the French. Unfor-

tunately, Diem did not try to lead a coalition. He established an inefficient dictatorship based on his family and the Can Lao, preventing legal opposition but not providing reforms and local competition against the Viet Cong.

In 1960, eighteen leading civilian politicians, including Suu and Huong, the best-known recent civilian Presidential candidates, signed a long manifesto against Diem. ARVN officers, disgusted by Diem's preoccupation with dividing the army rather than by fighting the Viet Cong, attempted coups in 1960 and 1962. Diem's jails were full of political prisoners, many of whom were brutally tortured; 46,000 survivors were released in 1963 and 1964.

Yet U.S. policy decided to reinforce Diem and the Can Lao instead of letting their domestic opponents replace them before Diem could fragment his opposition even further. But after visits by Vice President Johnson (May 1961) and General Taylor (October 1961) and a major speech (June 1962) by Senator Mansfield, one of Diem's original American supporters, calling for a reappraisal, the United States started an approach similar to the use of the Can Lao. Instead of trying to pressure Diem or to allow his enemies to combine him, American civilians and military officers were sent to crucial provinces to "advise" Vietnamese civil servants and ARVN officers, trying to persuade them to work against the system being buttressed by American aid in Saigon by taking precisely those local initiatives which would yield local popularity and which Diem's family would not reward if the individual's full loyalty was doubted in secret Can Lao reports. The hypocrisy and foolishness of such provincial activities in support of a hopeless central government may be symbolized by the American AID official in Quang Nam Province who unknowingly rented his house from a notorious (to Vietnamese neighbors) participant in local torture sessions.

The Southern Lowlands: Start of the Insurgency and the Viet Cong Cadre

The survival of at least one Hoa Hao unit and of elements of the Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen forces, coupled with the weak initial strength provided the Viet Cong by the Viet Minh, make it impossible to be sure of the degree of North Vietnamese control of the insurgency in its early stages. The National Liberation Front (NLF) was not started until December 1960, but even so, according to a May 1966 memo issued by the U.S. Mission in Saigon, survivors of the sects "made up the bulk of the early NLF support, although the alliance was at all times an uneasy one." Yet the December 1961 State Department booklet meant to "inform" Americans and foreigners of "A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet-Nam" referred to the NLF as "Hanoi's creation" (p. 15) and did not even hint at the participation of non-Communists in their own groups, let alone at their ever having provided "the bulk of early NLF support." The return of Communist cadres to the Highlands in 1957 proves that North Vietnam was involved in the insurgency from its beginnings, but the original degree of Hanoi's control will remain in doubt until a wider range of evidence is publicly available.

The violent start of the insurgency was traced by Bernard Fall from contemporary newspaper reports of assassinations, ambushes, raids, and cells of dissidents. The campaign of violence began in the Mekong Delta, where the Communists were disproportionately weak. The first concentrations of violence (April 1957 to April 1958) were in the areas around Chau Phu and My Tho, presumably establishing a position on the Mekong River where the Cambodian border would provide a convenient sanctuary and preparing to cut off the only roads bringing rice from the Delta and Transbassac to Saigon.

The next pair of Viet Cong targets was immediately to the north and to the south of My Tho, further isolating Saigon from the Delta. In the period between April 1959 and April 1960 Long An Province had about one assassination per month, and there were other deaths in the

adjacent parts of Hau Ngia and Kien Tuong Provinces.

South of My Tho, Kien Hoa Province was a crucial target, and captured documents indicated Viet Cong intention to make Kien Hoa its model province for the Delta. Kien Hoa is a cluster of three islands, and their inlets offer many good places for concealed depots, hospitals, and rest camps at the opposite end of the Mekong Delta from Chau Phu. At the same time, like the strip of rubber plantations circling Saigon to the north, Kien Hoa offers an easily taxed cash crop, coconuts. The Catholic militia of the Vinh Long Bishopric had cleared out most of the Viet Minh, but some agents survived and went north in 1954. In early 1958, in areas where the Saigon government had not gained control, some of these agents started returning to their native villages. There was as much violence in Kien Hoa as in Long An in 1959 - 60, about ten assassinations over twelve months. But when an honest military officer was sent by Diem to clean up Kien Hoa, he found far more (1,200) political prisoners in the provincial jail whom the former provincial governor had been trying to extort for their release. This military officer, a former chief of counter-intelligence on the Viet Minh in all of the Southern Lowlands, reopened the road to Saigon. This man's successor also did well until he was transferred in May 1963, but thereafter the situation deteriorated and proved difficult to retrieve after Diem's fall. Today much of Kien Hoa is controlled by the Viet Cong, and parts of it are being bombed.

The Southern Lowlands: Recent Events and U. S. Policy

The Southern Lowlands have been divided since 1964 by the fact that major military operations have been concentrated north of the Mekong River. Few American ground troops, and even fewer North Vietnamese troops or cadres, have been operating south of the Mekong. Most North Vietnamese units have been fighting in the Highlands and along the Coast. Until they drew away American troops from the Saigon area this spring, American operations were concentrated on "search and destroy" missions in Viet Cong base areas in the sparsely populated Plain of Reeds (Kien Tuong Province) and rubber plantation area circling Saigon to the north (Tay Ninh to Phuoc Tuy Province).

Yet the only large secure rural area is south of the Mekong, the Hoa Hao stronghold of An Giang Province. After Diem's fall, the survivors of the four Hoa Hao battalions managed to negotiate with Saigon an agreement whose terms have not been publicized. It is clear, however, that Hoa Hao leaders remain in charge of their province, that the population quickly turns in Viet Cong agitators trying to establish a foothold, and that the province is receiving types of American aid which are possible only when full security is assured, such as electrification and a land survey. Unfortunately, the present An Giang Province (redefined on October 1, 1964, around the time of the agreement) is much smaller than the areas controlled by the Hoa Hao before their conventional defeat and steady harassment by Diem's forces.

In addition to the Hoa Hao, the Cambodian minority is a traditional enemy of the Viet Cong. Kien Giang Province, south of An Giang, has a substantial Cambodian minority and the most successful resettlement of Northern refugees in all of South Vietnam. Not surprisingly, Kien Giang is often mentioned as being more secure than most areas. Two other provinces with large Cambodian minorities are Ba Xuyen and Vinh Binh. Cao Dai and Catholic groups, who once maintained order around Quan Long and in most of the Delta (Vinh Long, Kien Hoa, and Vinh Binh), are no longer mentioned for their local control.

Most of the populous area south of the Mekong River appears to be involved in "live and let live" arrangements. Local holders of power, Viet Cong cadres controlling the villages (there being few local notables because of the predominance of absentee ownership) and ARVN units stationed in the district town (there being few civilian district chiefs), do not challenge each other openly or with violence. The Viet Cong cadres do not

expect to take over the district towns from the ARVN, especially when these towns are protected by artillery and airpower. At the same time, the local ARVN officers, whether in civilian or military posts, do not expect to challenge the Viet Cong seriously in the villages.

The Viet Cong: The Cadre, his Social Role and his Misleading Tactics

Since most violence and struggle movements occurred in the Southern Lowlands, eventually entirely under Viet Cong direction, it is vital to treat separately the basis of Viet Cong activity. This basis is a Communist political and social innovation, the local cadre, and subtle political tactics which make detection of his activity and a response by the legal government very difficult. The Viet Cong cadres are the only effective link between many Vietnamese villages and centralized commands, and they are the strongest such link in Vietnamese history.

The Viet Cong cadre is almost always an ambitious local person who has been trained to live with the people of his village, to seek out those with grievances against Saigon-appointed local officials and against local notables and to provoke incidents which mobilize the peasantry against the government. Land reform, for instance, is not an abstract goal for the cadre and his followers — instead it provides patronage for political power. Landless tenants who join the cause are given plots of absentee landlords and owners of medium-sized plots still living in the village often join the Viet Cong to protect their holdings.

In each village, the Viet Cong cadre starts a series of front organizations which eventually should include every villager. There are Liberation Fronts for farmers, for their wives, for their children, and for old villagers. At first, only a nominal membership fee is requested, but enthusiastic members recruit their neighbors and eventually social pressure forces everyone to join and to participate actively. If a village is hesitant or hostile toward the Viet Cong, the cadre mobilizes greater hostility toward the Saigon government by calling in a Viet Cong military unit from another area and provoking air strikes or artillery fire from nearby ARVN or U.S. forces.

Even in contested villages, the Viet Cong cadre is the most knowledgeable about local affairs. He deputizes children to report on who enters and leaves the village and on what newspapers are read and what radio stations are listened to. As the cadre's control increases, he announces more rules, "requests contributions" (taxes), and recruits troops, and villagers are increasingly careful to obey him.

Thorough investigation of their training and internal messages, together with lengthy interviews with cadres who have come over as individuals through the Chieu Hoi amnesty program, have shown that the Viet Cong cadres assigned below the provincial or district level are not usually ideologically motivated. Just as many Vietnamese learned to speak French as a path to power, without necessarily liking Frenchmen, so many low-level cadres seem to have learned and applied new political methods to take over their native villages without necessarily liking the Communists who trained them. Cadres from middle class backgrounds, who are better educated and perform vital skilled functions, as in propaganda and medicine, may even become inwardly hostile to the Viet Cong command because it mechanically gives preferential promotions to their lower class rivals. The cadre's chief concern is with his new social and political role, as the promoter of non-family social ties and as a new bureaucratic link between the village and the outside world, interpreting commands from the center and communicating village grievances back to it.

Two tactics are crucial to a cadre-based insurgency. The first is the use of terror, which is directed not simply at eliminating enemies but more at manipulating the survivors. Before a man is assassinated or kidnapped, he

usually receives a threatening letter listing grievances against him and warning him to change his ways. At the time of an assassination or kidnapping, a list of the offenses for which he is being punished is pinned to his clothing, or posted on a building, or read off to his frightened family and neighbors.

Until the last few years, the Viet Cong had a "Robin Hood" image, gained by killing and publicizing many obviously corrupt officials. As a result, assassinations on false charges of honest and able officials, the insurgency's worst enemies, were sometimes believed and did not provoke the local hostility toward the Viet Cong that an airstrike does against Saigon. Furthermore, not only are Viet Cong methods of violence inherently more selective than those of ARVN and U.S. forces, but the political intelligence of a Viet Cong cadre is much better than that of the typical Vietnamese or American local official on rapid rotation. Because of his better information, the Viet Cong cadre gets more political leverage from his carrots and sticks than our side does. Attacks on the most able men as well as on the most corrupt clearly indicates that Viet Cong cadres are seeking power in their villages and not simply reforms.

The second crucial tactic is that of the "coexistence" village, where the Viet Cong cadre, the village notables, the Saigon-appointed district chief, and local ARVN officer "won't fight" and "live and let live," jockeying for political position without open resort to violence. Once a village's front organizations have started up, a Viet Cong cadre is not supposed to provoke attacks for fear of being shown as unable to defend his people. By day, such villages are supposed to admit joint teams of American medical personnel and Saigon-trained propagandists. These villages all use Saigon government identity cards. In such villages, Viet Cong cadres would encourage participation in Saigon's elections in order to keep all identity cards in good standing, and the cadres would also oppose mutilating ballots which could be traced to their districts.

While this balance of local power is stable, neither the Viet Cong cadres nor the ARVN officers can formalize their tacit arrangement. Viet Cong cadres can get amnesty only as individuals through the Chieu Hoi program, and if a cadre were to bring over his small military force with him, it would be imprisoned for treason or placed under the district ARVN officer, outside of the control of the amnestied cadre and his village. "Coexistence" ARVN officers have enough trouble avoiding taunts that they "won't fight" without trying to suggest to Saigon that power be shared locally. In short, while the cadres and the officers can forestall disruption from their commands by reporting back that all is quiet (but not yet quiet enough to become a Viet Cong base camp or for landlords to return for their rents) and by avoiding violence which would attract attention to their area, they can do nothing constructive to promote their common interests and those of the populations they rule.

Unfortunately, the introduction of foreign troops or advisers disrupts the tacit peace and brings on violent incidents without being able to change the basic division of authority. North Vietnamese units can not capture district towns, and American forces, short of a full counter-insurgency operation, cannot capture the villages. Americans usually cannot provide a direct alternative to the Viet Cong, even if a village's cadre has become unpopular, because mistrust of a return to colonialism is stronger than dislike of the Viet Cong. Under Diem, villagers south of Saigon openly referred to the government as the "My-Diem" regime, the "American-Diem" regime. In one Mekong Delta village where the peasants disliked the Viet Cong, a young ARVN officer began to make good impression last year, and he was warned in time to leave each time the Viet Cong assassination squad visited the village. But when an American was assigned to advise him, the villagers changed their minds, decided that the Viet Cong were right in opposing even good officials from Saigon because they would bring American control, and allowed the next assassination squad to kill the young ARVN officer.

Background Notes

LAOS



Population: 2.5 million (est.)
Capital: Vientiane (Administrative)
Luang Prabang (Royal)

Strategically situated in the heart of the Southeast Asian peninsula, the landlocked Kingdom of Laos shares common borders with six other nations, two of which are under Communist regimes: on the north with Communist China (264 miles); on the east along frontier with North Viet-Nam (1,018 miles), and with the Republic of Viet-Nam (301 miles); on the south with Cambodia (366 miles); on the south and east with Thailand (1,090 miles, of which more than 500 are formed by the Mekong River); and on the west with Burma (147 miles).

Total area is approximately 91,000 square miles, or slightly more than Idaho or Great Britain. A large part of the terrain, particularly in the north, is covered by dense jungle and rugged mountains, the latter sometimes rising over 9,000 feet.

The climate of Laos is monsoonal, with three seasons. There are 5 months of heavy rainfall, from May through September. When the rains start tapering off in October, a cool season begins that lasts through January. February through April is hot and humid. In April, the warmest month, the temperature in Vientiane normally ranges between 72° and 93° F., and in January, the coolest month, between 57° and 83° F. However, temperatures of 103° F. have been recorded in April, and 39° F. in January. Humidity is high most of the year.

The flag of Laos consists of a three-headed white elephant, standing on five steps under a white parasol, against a red field. The elephant exemplifies the historic kingdom—Land of a Million Elephants—and the three heads represent the three principalities. The parasol symbolizes monarchy. The five steps represent Buddhism's five commandments against murder, theft, falsehood, adultery, and alcoholism.

THE PEOPLE

The population is about 2.5 million—an estimate, since no accurate census ever has been taken. This sparse population is spread unevenly, with the greatest concentration in the Mekong Valley. The people lack homogeneity. About 49 percent are Lao, a people of Thai stock who are believed to have migrated originally from southwestern China, principally in the 13th century. Mountain tribes of Sinitic, Tibeto-Burman, and Thai language families are found in northern Laos. Many of these same tribes, as well


as others of Indonesian or proto-Malay background, inhabit central and southern Laos. The lack of common origin, customs, language, traditions, and beliefs among the various minorities poses a serious obstacle to the political unification of the Kingdom. There are influential minorities of Vietnamese and Chinese, and smaller groups of Cambodians, Indians, and Pakistani. In addition, there are more than a thousand French and other Europeans and Americans in the country, few of whom are permanent residents.

Lao is a tonal language like others of the Sino-Thai family. The Vientiane dialect has six tones, only three of which transfer directly to Bangkok Thai. Vientiane Lao and Bangkok Thai have areas of mutual comprehension only to educated speakers. As with English and French, abstract words tend to be cognate more frequently than everyday vocabulary. Written Lao and Thai both use scripts of Indian origin, but Lao letters are rounded rather than angular, and Lao uses fewer consonants. The Lao spelling system is much more representative of the spoken word than Thai, which tends to include unpronounced letters, particularly at the end of a word, that display Sanskrit origin. Since textbooks have been developed only through sixth grade in Lao, French remains the principal language of secondary education. French thus serves as the second official language, and is used commonly in government and commerce. Probably not more than 15 percent of the population is literate. Furthermore, the numerous ethnic groups possess their own languages or dialects, and the Vietnamese and Chinese retain their own school systems as well.

HISTORY

In the mid-14th century King Fa Ngoun united Laos, established his capital at Luang Prabang, and ruled an area that would today encompass not only Laos but also much of northeast Thailand and the southernmost part of the Yunnan Province of China. In the following century the Vietnamese began their periodic incursions, which persist to this day. By the 18th century Thailand and Viet-Nam had begun their competition for Lao soil.

In the early 19th century the Thai of Siam obtained ascendancy over much of what is now Laos and retained their hold for the most part until France made Laos a protectorate in 1893. The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 defined the boundaries of Laos as they exist today. Under the French, the three kingdoms of Laos—Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak—were unified in 1946 under the dynasty of Luang Prabang. The country gained independence within the French Union in 1949.



During World War II Japan did not fully take over control of Laos until March 1945, and just prior to their defeat the Japanese persuaded the King of Luang Prabang to declare his kingdom independent. In September 1945 the Prime Minister of the "independent" Government proclaimed the creation of the Kingdom of Laos, including the areas of Vientiane and Champassak, under the King of Luang Prabang. In October a provincial Government formed by the "Lao Issara" (Free Lao) leaders "dethroned" the King because of his alleged loyalty to the French. In May 1946 French troops occupied Laos and recognized the sovereignty of the King of Luang Prabang over the entire country.

In a series of successive steps, France gradually accorded Laos its independence and, in October 1953, recognized the Kingdom as a fully sovereign state, although Laos reaffirmed its adherence to the French Union. This relationship was dissolved upon the conclusion of the Geneva agreements of 1954, which terminated the Indochina War. Laos became a member of the United Nations in 1955.

From 1954 to 1960 pro-Western or conservative Governments held power, except for the brief interval in 1957-58 of a coalition Government which included Communist ministers.

A Communist movement, originally called the Pathet Lao (Land of Lao) (PL) and later renamed the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS), was formed under Viet Minh auspices in Communist territory in North Vietnam in 1950 under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong. As a result of the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao invasions and occupation of parts of Laos in 1953 and 1954, the PL was permitted by the terms of the 1954 Geneva agreements to retain control of two northern Provinces (Phong Saly and Sam Neua), pending reintegration of the PL into the national community. Prolonged attempts to integrate the PL into the Government and the armed forces failed and, supported by the North Vietnamese, the PL returned to insurgency in 1959. The presence of a United Nations investigatory subcommittee in late 1959 restored an uneasy peace which existed until mid-1960.

In August 1960 a young paratroop commander in Vientiane, Captain Kong Le, seized the capital in a coup. In an attempt to avert civil war among the non-Communist elements, Prince Souvanna Phouma, a former Prime Minister, was again called upon to form a Government. General Phoumi Nosavan, a leader of the conservative, anti-Communist faction, at first agreed to serve in the Government, but soon reversed his decision and established a military headquarters in southern Laos from which he mounted a campaign to retake Vientiane. He recaptured Vientiane in December 1960, and Kong Le retreated with his troops to the northeast and joined forces with the PL.

In early January 1961 Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces, supplied by the Soviet Union and advised and encadred by the North Vietnamese, seized the strategic Plain of Jars, where they established headquarters. By the spring of 1961 the Pathet Lao appeared to be in a position to take over the entire country.

Geneva Conference 1961-62

The United States was faced with three alternatives: the total loss of Laos to the Communists; military intervention, involving U.S. troops and other outside forces; or settlement of the crisis through peaceful international and internal negotiations to achieve a neutral status for the Kingdom that would permit it to survive as a nation. The decision was reached that a peaceful settlement transferring the struggle from the military to the political domain was the most desirable of the possible alternatives. The congressional leadership on a bipartisan basis was consulted on this decision. It was thus that the United States accepted participation in the 14-nation conference convened at Geneva in May 1961 which, after long and difficult negotiations, resulted in the signing of new Geneva agreements on July 23, 1962, providing certain international guarantees for the independence and neutral status of Laos.

On the internal level the three Lao factions—conservative, neutralist, and Pathet Lao—reached agreement in June 1962 on the formation of a Government of National Union under the premiership of Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Of immediate importance under the 1962 Geneva agreements was the requirement that all foreign military personnel leave the country within 75 days of the signing. Under the supervision of the International Control Commission (ICC), consisting of political and military representatives of India (Chairman), Canada, and Poland, all 666 U.S. military advisory personnel (no U.S. combat troops were in Laos) departed from Laos before the October 7, 1962, deadline. However, only 40 North Vietnamese troops were withdrawn through ICC checkpoints. In his letter of June 20, 1963, to the Co-chairmen (the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) of the Geneva conference, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma charged that a substantial number of North Vietnamese cadres and combat troops remained in Laos, and the Prime Minister has repeated this charge on a number of occasions since, including sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.

After the Conference

Within a few months of the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreements, the Pathet Lao, supported by the North Vietnamese, began maneuvering to subvert or eliminate Kong Le's neutralist military forces, which constituted Souvanna's principal military strength. Minor skirmishing broke into open hostilities by April 1963, when the PL attacked Kong Le's troops in positions they had held jointly with the PL. These aggressive tactics by the PL not only failed to destroy the neutralist forces but resulted, rather, in much closer cooperation than before between the neutralists and the conservatives in the political, as well as the military, field.

With the outbreak of fighting in April 1963, the two PL ministers withdrew from Vientiane, leaving PL representation in the Government in the hands of the two PL secretaries of state of cabinet rank.

By late 1964 the PL secretaries of state also had withdrawn to Khang Khay on the Plain of Jars. Negotiations to effect a ceasefire and to restore the governing coalition have taken place intermittently ever since.

On April 19, 1964, following the failure of tripartite negotiations on the Plain of Jars between the leaders of the three factions, disgruntled military elements led by Generals Kouprasith Abhay and Siho Lanphouthacoul attempted to take over the Government by force. The United States and other foreign representatives, however, encouraged the Prime Minister to continue in office and resist the efforts to displace him. By April 23, the coup leaders had agreed to restore the Prime Minister and his Government. Since that time, there has been no further attempt to overthrow the tripartite arrangement that is part of the 1962 Geneva settlement.

In mid-May 1964 the PL, supported by the North Vietnamese, took advantage of some dissidence within neutralist ranks and attacked in great strength Kong Le's forces on the Plain of Jars. This deliberate and open onslaught prompted the Prime Minister to seek additional military assistance. The United States responded within the framework of the Geneva agreements by supplying hardware in terms of military equipment and supplies for the Lao Armed Forces.

On May 26 the British, at the request of the Prime Minister, invited the signatories of the Geneva accords to begin consultations in Vientiane on means of restoring peace. The United States and several other signatories accepted the invitation, which the Communist states spurned. At the close of consultations in June, the representatives concluded that the Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese support, had initiated the attacks against the neutralists, and that the deteriorating military situation in Laos presented a grave threat to the peace of Southeast Asia. They recommended that, in conformity with the Prime Minister's views, all parties should abide by the ceasefire and withdraw, under ICC verification, to positions held before the most recent fighting.

Efforts on the part of the three Lao factions to resolve their difficulties, in meetings in Paris during August and September 1964, likewise produced no basic concessions except a general agreement to continue talking. Talks have continued sporadically in Vientiane since then. Their main topic has been to discuss a place for the eventual meeting of the leaders of the three factions—Souvanna for the neutralists, Boun Oum for the conservatives, and Souphanouvong for the Communists.

With world awareness of the serious threat to the peace posed by continued Communist aggression, there have been various proposals for a new Geneva-type meeting of the 14 nations that took part in the 1962 conference. The United States had indicated its willingness to join some form of discussion to restore peace, provided the Prime Minister's preconditions—a ceasefire and Pathet Lao withdrawal to positions held before May 16, 1964—were met. The United States also has pointed out that there already have been two high-level conferences on Southeast Asia and two formal agreements in 1954 and 1962—

neither of which the Communists have carried out. Up to now, failure to achieve peace has not been due to lack of conferences, but to failure on the part of Communist states to honor agreements already made.

Events 1965-67

In 1965 the 5-year mandate of the National Assembly elected in 1960 came to an end, and the Government concluded, somewhat reluctantly, that regular elections could not be held because of internal warfare. Accordingly, a National Congress amended the Constitution, giving the King three options for choosing deputies during times of crisis. A new Assembly was selected, and the Fifth Legislature entered into session August 18, 1965.

The Pathet Lao was invited to participate in the selection process, but it predictably refused and denounced the process as a farce. The Pathet Lao also has continued to claim that its Cabinet members, along with a dissident neutralist minister and a secretary of state, have been excluded from the Government. From its so-called "liberated" areas it continues to affirm that these absent ministers remain the true representatives of the original coalition Government, and it continues to denounce the "authorities of Vientiane" as American reactionaries. In the international sphere the Pathet Lao generally continues unqualified support of the Peiping and Hanoi line.

On the military scene the North Vietnamese, with decreasing assistance from the Pathet Lao, have made strong attacks against Government positions in Sam Neua Province during each dry season for the last 3 years. In Savannakhet Province, in March 1965, the Vietnamese launched a daring attack against the Reserve Officers' training school at Dong Hene, along Route 9 some 50 kilometers east of Savannakhet city. About 60 students and some officers successfully withstood the Vietnamese assault, and, together with the Lao Air Force, accounted for a locally unprecedented 200 enemy dead.

To conform with other Communist-instigated insurgency movements in Southeast Asia, the Pathet Lao was renamed the Lao People's Liberation Army in October 1965.

On the Government side, a significant area in northern Vientiane Province was regained from Communist control during Operation Triangle in the summer of 1964. Towns like Vang Vieng and Kassy, and villages like Nong Peth, Ban Done, and Muong Met, were returned to Government control. In August 1966 the rich Nam Bac Valley in northern Luang Prabang Province was recovered after more than 6 years under Communist control. In south Laos a concerted social, economic, and security program had cleared much of the Sedone Valley by the spring of 1967.

In January and again in June 1966 the National Assembly mounted separate interpellations of the Government, the second series continuing into September. A motion of censure against the Government was introduced at the end of August, and the Assembly

rejected the Government's budget on September 16. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma asked the King to dissolve the Assembly, and, after consulting his Council, the King so ordered as of October 7. Elections for the Sixth Legislature were held on January 1, 1967, and 142 non-Communist candidates competed for the Assembly's 59 seats. The new assembly, elected under normal constitutional provisions rather than the special ones that brought the Fifth Legislature into being, has a full 5-year mandate.

GOVERNMENT

Laos is a constitutional parliamentary monarchy. Under the December 1957 revision of the Constitution, originally promulgated by the King in May 1947, the hitherto exclusively male franchise was extended to women. General elections normally are held every 5 years. Constitutional amendments passed in 1965 give the King other options during times of crisis.

The bicameral legislature is composed of a National Assembly of 59 members which wields the real legislative power of the country, and a less active King's Council of 12 elder statesmen, all of whom are appointed directly by the King, six upon the recommendation of the Assembly. An absolute majority of deputies present is required to uphold bills returned by the King's Council for Assembly reconsideration. This Council privilege has been rarely, if ever, exercised.

The Prime Minister is designated by the King in consultation with political leaders. The Prime Minister submits his proposed Cabinet to the National Assembly for approval, a favorable two-thirds majority of deputies present being required for investiture. Deputies who are candidates for ministerial posts may not participate in the vote of confidence for a new Government. Members of the Cabinet need not be Assemblymen. The Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat), the Communist faction, recognizes neither the present nor the previous two legislatures and refused to participate in the national elections of July 1965 and January 1967.

The Constitution provides that the judicial power shall be separate and independent of the executive and legislative powers. In practice, the judiciary is the least vigorous branch of the Government.

Because of extreme factional strife and open fighting in Laos, the three principal Lao groupings—conservative, neutralist, and Communist—agreed in June 1962 to form a tripartite Government of National Union under the premiership of Prince Souvanna Phouma, with carefully balanced participation by the three factions. The relationship of this Government to the Constitution remains undefined. Although in 1963 Communist ministers withdrew from Vientiane and from active participation in the Government of National Union, and other ministers have been designated to carry on their work, the Communist ministers retain their portfolios in name, the door has been left open for their return, and the tripartite Government remains undisturbed at least in form.

The Prime Minister has attempted without success to persuade the Communist ministers to resume active participation in the Government.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

After 14 years of independence, the Kingdom of Laos remains largely underdeveloped. The intrinsic barriers to unity and a sense of nationhood described earlier have been increased by the internal and external Communist threat. Efforts to bridge the gulf between the central Government and the people in the countryside have been handicapped further by the lack of communications, particularly roads. Only a few thousand individuals, most of them French-educated, participate in government and politics; the bulk of the population is illiterate and politically passive. Popular identification with the country, the Government, and the Crown—though stronger than in the past—is very limited, and regional and family loyalties continue to play a predominant role in domestic politics.

The Lao political situation is further complicated by two decades of international contention in the Indochina area. A formula was devised by the 14-nation Geneva conference in 1962 to bring peace to Laos by making the country a neutral state with a coalition Government. But this design for national reconciliation and territorial unification has been unworkable so far because of the intransigence of the Pathet Lao. The internal struggles persist. Today the Communists occupy perhaps a third of the area and control about 20 percent of the population of Laos, generally tribal groups inhabiting the rugged and sparsely-populated uplands bordering Communist China and the two Viet-Nams. The populous Mekong lowlands are under Government control and there is considerable support for the central Lao authority among many of the upland ethnic minority groups, notably the Meo and Yao.

The departure of the Pathet Lao from the tripartite Government in 1963 reduced it to a neutralist-conservative coalition, with the latter faction numerically predominant. The result has been the achievement of a substantial degree of political stability. Neutralist-conservative cooperation has grown and in policy terms there is little distinction between the two. Political groupings in Laos generally consist of rather loose coalitions around personalities, frequently along lines of clan loyalties.

The sixth National Assembly, elected on January 1, 1967, has been more disciplined and orderly than its predecessor. Although there are no sharply defined party alignments, a firm majority of the deputies have undertaken to support the policies and programs of the present Government.

The Lao Communist political organization—the Neo Lao Hak Sat or Pathet Lao—is neither strong nor deeply rooted in Laos; it is almost completely a creature of the North Vietnamese on whose support and direction it has become increasingly dependent. Although the Pathet Lao abandoned its role in the national Government in early 1963, it continues to hold to the tripartite concept as a source of legitimacy at home and overseas, a framework within

which to reenter the Government should the overall situation in Indochina once again warrant the suspension of hostilities and the adoption of political tactics. Assisted by the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao has retained firm control over the areas it occupies and has allowed only a few outsiders to enter on conducted visits.

The three-member International Control Commission (ICC) plays an important role in the current political situation. Originally created to supervise the implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements, the ICC was given additional duties by the 1962 agreements to supervise the neutralization of Laos and preserve the peace. Despite obstructionism by the Polish member, who has always sided with the Pathet Lao, the ICC under its Indian chairman has taken significant steps to preserve the 1962 agreements and to help stabilize the political-military situation. In 1965 and in 1966, the ICC conducted investigations into and issued reports on the presence of regular North Vietnamese troops in Laos. Of the more than 40 North Vietnamese soldiers captured in Laos, the ICC has interrogated about 25. Although the Polish Commissioner refused to participate in these investigations, ICC reports were prepared, sent to the Geneva Co-chairmen, and subsequently made public.

ECONOMY

An undeveloped country with most of its natural resources unexploited or unsurveyed, Laos is handicapped further by its geographic isolation. Almost 85 percent of the people engage in subsistence agriculture, supplying the bulk of their own needs, including cloth. Per capita income is less than \$70, and fiscal year 1966 gross national product was estimated slightly in excess of \$173 million. Local industry is quite limited. A few transport undertakings, a tin mining operation, about 50 saw mills, a soft-drink bottling plant, three cigarette factories, and a few other small-scale local manufacturing plants constitute the present industrial enterprises in Laos. Consequently, a serious balance-of-payments deficit exists as almost all manufactured products must be imported. Official imports were valued at slightly more than 27 times the \$1 million worth of official exports. Being landlocked, Laos must depend on its neighbors, principally Thailand, to facilitate transshipment of goods.

Annual production of rice (about nine-tenths of which is the glutinous variety) has averaged between 500 and 550 thousand metric tons. Formerly self-sufficient in rice, Laos now must import 10 to 15 percent of its needs. Corn, tobacco, and tea have long been grown in small quantities and cultivation now is expanding steadily. Although curtailed sharply by disease in the past few years, coffee production in the south of Laos has been similarly reinvigorated with the bulk of the small surplus exported to Singapore. A pre-World War II export trade in cattle hides and skins, drastically reduced by war losses and more recently by rinderpest, is being redeveloped with foreign assistance. As a primary development target the United States and the

Laos Governments have undertaken to increase Lao rice production, first to self-sufficiency, and then to enter the relatively assured rice export market as soon as possible.

Forests cover about two-thirds of Laos. About 50 percent of the forest land is considered of commercial interest. Of the exploitable timber lands roughly one-third is now in secure or readily accessible areas. Although much finished lumber still is imported, forest products (timber, sticklac, and benzoin) form a substantial portion of Lao exports. Mineral output is limited to tin and rock salt. Geological surveys, however, indicate deposits of iron, magnesium, coal, tin, and petroleum. Reserves of high-grade iron ore are sufficient for commercial exploitation but located in an area that presently is insecure. The difficulties of internal transport pose a serious obstacle to economic development. There are no railroads in Laos; and the Mekong River, while navigable by small craft and a potentially important transport link, is interrupted by falls and rapids which prevent effective commercial usage of several sections of the river. With United States assistance a substantial road construction and maintenance program has been undertaken.

As part of the Indochina complex, Laos had economic ties to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and France until 1954 when it assumed control of its own central banking, foreign exchange, and tariffs. Since that time, its economic relations have been bilateral in nature although the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF) has multilateral aspects. The Lao currency is pegged to the dollar at an official rate of 240 kip to one. Contributions from Australia, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States make foreign exchange freely available to the banks at a rate near 500 kip to the dollar. This system, recommended by the International Monetary Fund, has stabilized the Lao currency and solved foreign exchange needs without creating an illegal currency market or requiring unenforceable administrative controls.

Because of the multinational program for the development of the Mekong Valley, Laos, along with other Southeast Asian states, will experience in coming years a massive influx of investment capital. The first major project of this multinational program, a \$24 million hydroelectric dam on the Nam Ngum River, is in fact located in Laos. The nine contributing countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, and the United States.

The key to economic development for Laos is regional cooperation, of which from the standpoint of Laos the Nam Ngum dam is the best example. As the least developed country in Southeast Asia, Laos has much to gain from a quickened pace of development in the region. Landlocked Laos has no access route to the sea and fully endorses a policy of regional cooperation in order to help raise its economy above the subsistence level. In those areas where Lao businessmen may be able to compete effectively, they will need to market part of

their production in neighboring countries, particularly Thailand. This is also true of the country's agricultural and forest products.

For the immediate future, Lao efforts to develop rapidly will be limited severely as in past years by the country's task of coping with the dislocation caused by foreign invasion. About 500,000 persons have fled from areas occupied by Communist forces. Presently, 250,000 people, or approximately 10 percent of the population, are still in refugee status. Another 4 percent of the population serve in the army or civil administration. Because of the large standing army, an estimated 20 percent of the active labor force is not available for productive activity. There can be few countries in the world facing such problems; and the result is that both the Lao and friendly governments assisting it must direct their attention toward the pressing problems of survival and stability. A solid base for development, however, has been laid and, barring dramatic reversals, significant progress toward economic viability can be expected in the coming years.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The foreign policy of the Lao Government derives from the 1962 Geneva agreements. Laos undertook to establish diplomatic relations with all nations (its neighbors first) on the basis of equality and respect for the independence and sovereignty of Laos. Renouncing any intention of the use or threat of force that might impair the peace of other countries, as well as any interference in their internal affairs, the Lao Government simultaneously declared that it was the will of the Lao people to protect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos. It therefore appealed to all states to respect Lao sovereignty, independence, and neutrality and to refrain from any actions inconsistent with these principles.

In pursuit of its stated desire for friendly relations with all states, the Lao Government established and maintains diplomatic relations with its neighbors and all other signatories of the 1962 Geneva agreements. Laos is a member of the United Nations and participates in several regional and international organizations of a non-military nature.

In accordance with its continued policy of neutrality and independence the Lao Government has formally and publicly denounced the aggression from North Viet-Nam and, consistent with the provisions of the 1962 agreements, has sought military supplies for self-defense as well as economic assistance for self-development.

U. S. POLICY

The United States firmly endorses the efforts of the Lao Government to preserve its independence and neutrality and considers that the full implementation of the 1962 Geneva agreements offers the best method to obtain these objectives.

Since 1955 the United States has substantially assisted Laos in maintaining its independence in the face of external and internal Communist pressure. From 1955 to the present the United States has contributed over \$460 million in economic assistance alone, the greater part of which has been for budgetary support and a lesser but still considerable amount for development projects. The American program has three general objectives: stabilization of the Lao currency, humanitarian relief, and development of a viable economy.

Stabilization assistance includes the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund (FEOF) and a commodities import program. The commodities import program, which provides petroleum products and a few other items deemed critical to Lao development plans at a favorable rate of exchange (i.e., 240 kip to \$1), further reduces the inflationary pressures on the Lao economy while promoting essential development activities. Australia and the United Kingdom also furnish assistance of this type by means of separate but similar commodity import programs. For the present, Laos only earns part of the foreign exchange needed to support its vital expenditures overseas. The United States and France make up in approximately equal parts this foreign exchange deficit.

Communist violence in the past several years has caused the Government of Laos to become responsible for about 250,000 refugees from Pathet Lao-occupied areas. In addition to providing food for these refugees, the United States is working with the Government of Laos in the public health field to provide medical care for these refugees as well as for thousands of other Lao citizens. The United States has assisted in building, equipping, and staffing an important hospital in the north as well as over 100 dispensaries and infirmaries throughout the country. In cooperation with Operation Brotherhood of the Philippines, the United States helps support Filipino medical personnel in hospitals and dispensaries throughout Laos.

United States developmental assistance is aimed principally at improving the lives of the rural population. A major United States-Laos objective is self-sufficiency in rice production. Early and effective accomplishment of this joint project and establishment of a rice export market in place of the current deficit require a combination of closely coordinated programs. Better seed, improved techniques, and widespread use of irrigation, fertilizer, and pesticides are the keys to increasing the amounts of rice grown by each farmer. A stable market, credit facilities, and a distribution system for improved seeds and implements will assure that the farmer will benefit from his efforts. Improved main routes and feeder roads also are required to enable the rice to move to urban centers for consumption or export.

The United States is a major contributor to regional projects benefiting Laos. The \$24-million Nam Ngum dam on a tributary of the Mekong River will provide not only hydroelectric power for small-scale local industries and the capital city of Vientiane but also supply water for irrigating 80,000

acres and by flood control bring another 25,000 acres back into productive use.

PRINCIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Chief of State—King Sri Savang Vatthana
Inspector General of the Kingdom—Prince BOUN OUM na Champassak
Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Veterans' Affairs, and Rural Affairs—Prince SOUVANNA PHOUMA
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Economy, and Minister of Planning—Prince SOUPHANOUVONG (in absentia)
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Education, Fine Arts, Sports, and Youth—LEUAM Insisiengmay
Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of National Economy—SISOUK na Champassak
Minister of Information, Propaganda, and Tourism—PHOUMI VONGVICHIT (in absentia)
Minister of Interior and Social Welfare—PHENG Phongsavan
Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Planning—INPENG Suryadhay
Minister of Post and Telecommunications, Public Health, and Acting Minister of Information, Propaganda, and Tourism—Prince SISOUANG Sisaleumsak
Minister of Public Works and Transport—NGON Sananikone
Commander-in-Chief, Lao Armed Forces—Maj. Gen. OUAN Rathikoun
Ambassador to the United States, and to the United Nations—Khamking SOUVANLASI

Laos maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2222 S Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008.

PRINCIPAL U.S. OFFICIALS

Ambassador—William Healy Sullivan
Deputy Chief of Mission—Robert Arnold Hurwitch

Counselor for Economic Affairs and Director AID Mission—Joseph A. Mendenhall
Public Affairs Officer (U.S.I.S.)—David P. Sheppard
Army Attaché—Col. Kurtz Miller
Air Force Attaché—Col. Paul A. Pettigrew

The United States maintains an Embassy in Vientiane at Rue Bartholomie.

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