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NOV 4 1975

Millionaire Is Graceful Amid Disasters

By ROBERT E. TAYLOR

Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington — George H. W. Bush is a millionaire politician who has made a successful public career out of presiding gracefully over disasters.

Bush, 51, has displayed a folksy attractiveness and unbounded energy that has caused the last two presidents to seek him out repeatedly for public office.

But he has been hounded by failures, many not of his own creation.

Through them all, he demonstrated an ability to smile through catastrophe — a quality he may need if confirmed as director of the embattled Central Intelligence Agency.

Thankless Job

Last year, Bush sweated through the thankless job of Republican na-

Profile . . . George H. W. Bush

tional chairman in a disastrous election year for the GOP.

As the party was rocked repeatedly by new Watergate disclosures, Bush toured the country trying to disassociate the scandal from the party. Toward the end, he insisted that economic issues would dominate the election, not Watergate.

"Any Democrat who runs against any Republican opponent on Watergate will get a real backlash from his voters," Bush claimed. Of course, the election results proved the backlash was aimed at Republicans, and clearly traceable to Watergate.

President Ford named Bush to be

the first U.S. liaison officer to mainland China in 1974. Since then, U.S. Peking relations have lost momentum toward reconciliation.

Earlier, Bush was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

He ran for Senate in Texas in 1964 and 1970, the second time at Mr. Nixon's urging, only to lose both times. In between, he won two terms in the House of Representatives from a district including part of Houston.

Son of a Senator

A tall, rangy, good-looking man, Bush is the son of the late Sen. Prescott Bush (R-Conn). He attended the Phillips Academy in Andover, Mass. and graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Yale University with a degree in economics.

Bush moved to Texas and made his fortune in offshore oil drilling.

He has no known experience with

the intelligence community. In World War II as a Navy pilot in the Pacific, he was shot down at sea and rescued by a submarine.

The Rockefeller Commission report on the CIA last June recommended that the top job of the CIA be given to a political appointee from outside the agency, who would leave the nuts and bolts of management to agency assistants, somewhat like the operation of the Defense Department.

William Colby, the man Bush is due to replace, is a CIA veteran who rose through the ranks. He combines the polish of an Ivy League background — he is a Princeton graduate — with the toughness of experience behind enemy lines in World War II and running the counterinsurgency Phoenix program in Vietnam.

Fond of Politics

Bush is a politician who seems likely to remain one. He has repeatedly stated he might be interested in running for Congress again.

The CIA is under attack from Congress. Its leaders complain that agency morale is at an all-time low. Congressmen and senators want more information about its unpopular or illegal operations.

Mr. Ford, as Vice President was reportedly impressed when Bush worked with him to minimize the damage of Watergate to the GOP. His nomination of Bush to the CIA job appears to be a call for an encore.

Bush is married to the former Barbara Pierce of Rye, N.Y. They have four sons and one daughter.

Bush is right for the CIA

Now that President Ford has removed George Bush from consideration as a possible running-mate in 1976, there is no reason the senate should not confirm Mr. Bush as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a matter of fact, we did not think that Mr. Bush's possible candidacy, iffy at best, was itself much of a reason for not confirming him anyway.

True, Mr. Bush, now envoy to China, does have a partisan political background. He has been a Republican congressman from Texas and served as chairman of the Republican National Committee. And true also, the directorship of the CIA is a sensitive position.

Yet why, as some senators seemed to think, should having a political past or a political future be some kind of bar sinister to serving in it? If that's the lesson they've learned from Watergate, it is the wrong lesson.

Be it remembered that Richard Helms, who as CIA director permitted the agency to be abused by the Nixon White House, was not a politician. He was a career professional. And none

of his predecessors had any political pasts or futures, either. Yet it was under them that the agency perpetrated all those other abuses which congressional investigations have been revealing in their sordid detail.

As Mr. Bush put it during his testimony at hearings on his nomination, "Some of the difficulties the CIA has encountered might have been avoided if more political judgment had been brought to bear. I am not talking about narrow political partisanship. I am talking about the respect for the people and their sensitivities that most politicians understand."

The issue is the integrity of the man, and be it also noted that none of the senators who expressed opposition to Mr. Bush's nomination questioned his integrity. Indeed, his willingness to take on a job which may well lead to political nowhere is a demonstration of it. The CIA is now in a kind of limbo, with William E. Colby on his way out but still serving as director until his successor is confirmed. The Senate should promptly approve Mr. Bush when it reconvenes in January.



Associated Press Wirephoto.

Bush bids farewell

Former Chief of U.S. Liaison Mission in Peking George Bush, left, is escorted to his plane by Lin Ping, Chinese director of the Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, right, and Chu Chuan-hsion, Chinese director of protocol. Bush is returning to the U.S. after being nominated as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

NOV 1 1975



FELIX R. MCKNIGHT

Citizen Bush, available . . .

GEORGE BUSH is the unsullied American, who, once again, emerges as the most trusted, respected — and mobile — figure in the Republican party.

To President Ford and the GOP he is the trustworthy, loyal and totally acceptable man to folks around the country and all the ships at sea.

The man who can be anywhere, at anytime, the party or country beckons. But by now George Bush must be wondering if life is all this good.

Mr. Ford now has lifted the tall Texan from his pioneering post in Peking as the American liaison to China and tossed him into his latest adventure—the extremely sensitive position as Director of a Central Intelligence Agency treading water in finger pointing and low morale.

— It is the fourth "vote of confidence" bestowed upon the former Texas Congressman who was the man Richard Nixon passed over to choose Spiro T. Agnew on the most ill-fated ticket of all time. And later ignored as Ford choose Nelson Rockefeller.

To multiple thousands, undoubtedly including Nixon, there is this clinging belief that if the brilliant and impeccable Texan had ridden in as Vice President on the GOP '70 landslide, there would never have been a Watergate with its wrecking ripples.

To know George Bush is to know that he would not for an instant have countenanced the tawdry operations of the Nixon inner sanctum. He not only would have quit, he would have exposed.

His judgment and integrity was what the White House needed—not the Teutonic arrogance of the Haldemans and Ehrlichmans, et al, operating in political knavery.

But it didn't happen. It was Agnew, not Bush, in the clutch decision pre-dawn hours at Miami Beach in '70.

Since that day he has been through a wringer of twists and turns that would be incredible to anyone except those practicing the art of political expediency. He has been the "used" good guy. The image man.

He is the man Democrat National Committee chairman Bob Strauss teamed with in a golf game at Preston Trail simply because "He's a helluva nice guy."

ON THE SAME Dallas golf course months later George Bush was the man Gerald R. Ford identified, between booming tee shots and fluffed short pitches, to this writer as "one of the strongest of men."

So why, this fate that seems inexorably to come to George Bush?

Why should he willingly walk into a CIA situation that could keep exploding—until the very presence of George Bush would quiet it? He must know, as hinted by others, that there are additional layers of potential dynamite secretly stashed in CIA's deepest cellars. That this urgently needed intelligence agency has been misused, perhaps, by conniving hands.

Well, again, to know George Bush is to know the answer. He believes in the torch of enlightenment and if there are skeletons to be rattled in the CIA

he will rattle hell out of 'em to the nearest exit and get on with the business of giving the United States international intelligence clothed in credibility and recaptured morale.

The old Princeton football player is competitive. He believes in the rules, and he lives by them. He doesn't yield too much, as delegates to the United Nations learned when he served there as U.S. Ambassador—another job thrust upon him. It was not the tastiest morsel they could hand him in lieu of the Vice Presidency, but he took it and chewed on it in forthrightness in bitter UN times.

He became a resolute figure the friendly and unfriendly nations held in high respect. His iron jaw and piercing eyes stilled the chatter when he spoke the U.S. position.

The same qualifications got him into another job and abruptly ended the rising UN career when Nixon called him to chairmanship of a shepherdless GOP national committee. He loathed and denounced, never covered or defended, the evils of Watergate.

And then came the third call—the first American to represent this country in the tedious warming process with China. It has been a lonely and demanding job. He has performed without a fumble.

Now, CIA. If you look back over the score card, it has not been the best of worlds for 52-year-old soldier George Bush, who just might have been President of the United States.

(Felix R. McKnight is vice chairman of The Times Herald.)

3 1975

Friends fear CIA post to blight Bush's future



George Bush ...

... may get Colby's job

By MARGARET MAYER
Times Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—"He's too nice a guy," a friend said today of George Bush and his apparent future as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

If he accepts—and no one questioned he would do President Ford's bidding—the former Houston congressman is headed for what is regarded as a political graveyard.

Reports that Bush was being tapped by the President to replace William E. Colby as head of the embattled super-sleuth agency came as a shock to Bush partisans.

"It's like being head of the Republican National Committee during Watergate. It's like being in Peking—only in the United States instead," said one friend of the political liabilities in the expected assignment.

At age 52 the onetime Houston oilman has twice been seriously considered for vice president—first when Richard Nixon chose Spiro Agnew as

See BUSH on Page 6

★ BUSH

Continued From Page 1

his running mate in 1968 and, more recently, when President Ford selected Nelson Rockefeller in 1974. He was once again being mentioned, along with White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld, as likely choice for running mate in 1976 if Rockefeller became a liability to the Republican ticket.

Meanwhile, certain high-ranking Texas Republicans wanted to back Bush as a candidate for the Senate seat he lost to Democrat Lloyd Bentsen in 1970 in Bentsen's race for re-election next year.

Bush showed no interest in the race when he was last in the United States in mid-September. He also talked with President Ford at the time and told friends only that there was nothing conclusive discussed about the future.

If he received personal word of the President's desire to name him head of CIA, it was likely relayed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on his trip to Peking two weeks ago.

Whatever knowledge Bush has of foreign intelligence work has been gained from his service as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1971, and as chief of the country's most secluded foreign outpost in Peking for the past year.

His strength in the CIA position would be the respect he enjoys from former colleagues in the House and in the Senate, where his father, the late Sen. Prescott Bush of Connecticut, was highly regarded.

NOV 1975

Political Defeat Seems to Enhance Bush's Reputation and Prospects

BY ALAN EHRENHALT
Congressional Quarterly

Washington — George Bush of Houston is one of the rare politicians whose reputations seem to improve with defeat.

Things have not always gone right for him since he entered public life more than a decade ago. But his resilience has been remarkable.

He ran for the Senate in 1964 and 1970, and lost both times, but President Nixon decided after the second defeat to make him U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. He lost his year-long argument to keep Nationalist China in the United Nations, but was impressive enough in debate to silence those who said he was ignorant about foreign policy.

In 1973 and 1974, Bush was chairman of the Republican National Committee during a near disastrous decline in the party's fortunes and the disgrace of a Republican president to whom he remained scrupulously loyal. But under President Ford, he rebounded again to become the first permanent U.S. envoy to the People's Republic of China. Now he has been nominated to head the CIA.

People who know George Herbert Walker Bush ascribe much of his success to his personality rather than his politics. He is a cheerful, witty, casual man, one who often has been able to convince diverse segments of the Republican party that he is on their side.

Bush's allies have come from both ends of the party, including conservatives such as Sen. John G. Tower, R-Texas, and moderates such as Rep. William A. Steiger, R-Wis. A look at the background indicates it is difficult to place him in any ideological mold. "I want conservatism to be sensitive and dynamic," Bush said several years ago, "not scared and reactionary."

Bush, 51, was born in Connecticut, the son of the late Prescott Bush, a wealthy banker who represented the state as a Republican in the Senate from 1952 to 1963. George Bush went to Phillips Academy and Yale, and when he graduated from college in 1948 he moved to Texas to enter the oil business.

"I had the old-fashioned urge to strike out on my own," he said. "What I knew I didn't want to do was to live in the



AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH
Nominated to Head the CIA

shadow of a most beloved and industrious father."

Bush became an oil supplies salesman, founded his own drilling firm in 1954, and built it into a multimillion-dollar operation. By 1964 he was Houston Republican chairman, and decided to run for the U.S. Senate against Democratic incumbent Ralph W. Yarborough. He lost by 329,000 votes. Two years later he ran for the House and won.

In his campaign against Yarborough, Bush endorsed Barry Goldwater for president, assailed Yarborough's "left-wing radicalism" and supported the idea

of an all-Asian Vietnam peace conference. "I see no point in gaining victory by stacking up bodies," he said. Bush rejected the support of the John Birch Society and said he was embarrassed that he hadn't rejected it sooner.

As a member of the House, Bush voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the open-housing requirements it contained. "I do not want it on my conscience," Bush said, "that I have voted against legislation that would permit a Negro serviceman returning from Vietnam;

(See BUSH, Page 8)

Bush Strong Backer Of Nixon Programs

FROM PAGE 1

where he has been fighting for the ideals of his country, to buy or rent a home of his choosing if he has the money." He was the only one of the three Texas Republicans then in Congress to support the bill.

Bush was a strong advocate of environmental cleanup and population control. He introduced legislation in the House to transform the Interior Department into a Department of Resources, Environment and Population.

During his last two years in the House, while Nixon was president, Bush was a vigorous advocate of the president's programs. But as often as not, it was the progressive Nixon programs that he emphasized.

In a 1969 letter to his constituents, Bush singled out six Nixon policies he especially liked: They were tax reform, welfare reform, elimination of draft deferments, elimination of politics from the Postal Service and a war on hunger. He was especially concerned about hunger.

"This is one war the President has pledged to win," Bush wrote, "primarily by making free food stamps available to our lowest income families. . . . It's unthinkable that anyone living in the United States today ever has to go hungry."

Bush also called for full disclosure by House members of assets, liabilities and sources of income. He disclosed his own finances and urged open committee meetings in the House, congressional access to data processing for the federal budget and strict regulation of lobbyists.

Despite a record that gave such evidence of progressive leanings, Bush managed to avoid displeasing the far right. Campaigning for re-election in 1968, he

won the support of the very conservative Americans for Constitutional Action: "Congressman Bush has repeatedly stood for fiscal responsibility," the ACA explained, "for law and order and for firm and responsible foreign policy."

And the ACA was correct, because there were strong elements of conservative thinking in much of what Bush did in Congress. Despite his backing for the 1968 Civil Rights bill, for example, he was appalled at what he saw during the Poor Peoples' March on Washington later that year.

"I think the behavior of many of the marchers in Washington did great harm to the legitimate aims of the Negro people," Bush said. "Quite simply, the really poor people were used. They went home early while the militants and the leaders remained."

Bush's fiscal conservatism, however, was consistent. Many of the domestic reforms he suggested would reduce the involvement of the federal government in social welfare matters. In 1967, he co-sponsored the Human Investment Act, designed to strike at poverty through tax incentives rather than categorical grant programs. It failed to pass.

Bush has made it clear repeatedly that his idea of tax reform did not necessarily mean collecting more from the rich.

As a House member, Bush frequently encountered questions about his loyalties to the oil business. In 1969, columnist Jack Anderson wrote that Bush was lobbying the Nixon administration to retain strict limits on imported oil. "He unloaded his oil stock," wrote Anderson, "but could not unload a heart that remained with oil."

When Bush ran for the Senate again in 1970, it was with the strong support of the White House and party leaders.

Bush did not make it to the Senate. But

he was not out of a job for long. On Dec. 11, 1970, the President named him to the post of ambassador to the United Nations. It was not a popular choice with many who thought the job should go to someone experienced in foreign affairs.

Bush spent much of his two years at the United Nations dealing with the orderly admission of Red China to that body, and while he lost his argument that Nationalist China need not be expelled, he won general praise as a rational, tolerant spokesman for the American point of view.

"The U.N. is a totally political body," Bush said halfway through his tenure there, "and probably that's why I feel at home there. It is a good place to begin—the only ready-made place to begin building a more orderly, less dangerous world system."

After the 1972 election, Nixon asked Bush to move back into politics as head of the Republican National Committee.

Bush spent much of 1973 traveling the country in an attempt to keep the party's hopes alive in a Watergate-dominated year. He visited 40 states during his first year as chairman, and made 118 speeches. "We've struggled mightily," he said at the end of the year, "to make it clear that the party is separate from Watergate. But I don't know that I've been overly successful."

To the end of the Nixon presidency, however, Bush was publicly loyal to Nixon. Even after the White House released tapes showing Nixon to have been in on the Watergate coverup from mid-1972, Bush declined to call for resignation or impeachment.

"I don't feel inhibited from criticizing Watergate," he told Congressional Quarterly in early 1974. "But I do believe in supporting the President. I don't think that's contradictory."

Wash. Post 11/12/75

Anti-Bush

Drive

Pressed

By George Lardner Jr.

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate intelligence committee Chairman Frank Church (D-Idaho) charged yesterday that appointment of former Republican National Chairman George Bush as director of the Central Intelligence Agency would seriously undercut all the efforts to reform it.

Sounding the start of a determined Senate campaign to defeat the nomination, Church denounced President Ford's choice of Bush as "astonishing," especially in light of attempts that have come to light as a result of the Watergate scandal to use the CIA for political purposes.

"The Senate and the people we represent have the right to insist upon a Central Intelligence Agency which is politically neutral and totally professional," Church declared in a floor speech. He said he could not envision "so partisan a man" as Bush standing up to the President in an election year and counseling against some politically opportune but ill-advised action.

"How would it have looked if a Democratic President had nominated (former Democratic national chairman) Larry O'Brien?" as CIA director, Church asked. "There would have been an uproar."

Church told reporters before delivering the speech that he didn't know whether there was much chance of blocking Senate confirmation of Bush's appointment, but he said, "I'm going to do my best."

The nomination will be considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee, where Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) has indicated he also may oppose Bush.

Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.), who is Senate Republican policy chairman and the vicechairman of the Church Committee, said the opposition to Bush was "fairly vocal" but not widespread as far as he could see, at least now. He told reporters he saw nothing wrong with Bush's credentials.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

...And Overlooked Political Realities

The wholly predictable storm over President Ford's nomination of former Republican National Chairman George Bush to head the CIA has forced the White House into a dangerously overdue calculation of political realities, with withdrawal of the nomination now a possibility.

The political realities, apparently never considered by the President or the very few top aides privy to his secret plans to replace Central Intelligence Director William Colby with Bush, boil down to this essential: to avoid possible refusal of the strongly Democratic Senate to confirm Bush, he or President Ford must absolutely rule out any possibility of Bush winding up as Mr. Ford's Vice Presidential running mate.

Such a condition has now reached the stage of gospel inside the Democratic Senate establishment, and particularly with Democrats on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Although Sen. John Stennis, conservative chairman of the Committee, has said nothing at all, intimates of the highly influential Mississippian fully agree that all Vice Presidential doors must be closed to Bush to avoid an inflammatory confirmation battle.

Failure of the President to consider this aspect of his appointment of Bush, a highly regarded and extremely popular politician, was further exacerbated during Mr. Ford's appearance on Meet the Press last Sunday. Instead of seeking to calm the roiled waters when asked if he should not eliminate both Bush and Secretary of Defense-designate Donald Rumsfeld from all consideration for second place on the 1976 Republican ticket, Mr. Ford bristled.

"I don't think people with talent...ought to be excluded from any further public service," he replied coolly.

Thus, the President's gravely mistaken reading of the political impact of the Sunday Morning Massacre continues in his failure to perceive that to the controlling Democrats on Capitol Hill (and many Republicans as well), the Director of CIA must be above political suspicion.

But some Presidential aides are more keenly tuned in to Congressional frequencies. It is no accident that even though Bush's nomination has been formally sent to the Senate for confirmation hearings, no hearings are now scheduled for several weeks at best—and possibly not until next year.

That raises the question of a deliberate stall, based on the President's suddenly-expressed desire to keep Bush at his present post in Peking at least until Mr. Ford's China trip. If, as presently assumed, Mr. Ford goes to China within the next month, Bush would not be available for his confirmation hearing until well into December.

With Congress eyeing either December 12 or December 19 for the start of the Christmas recess, it now looks doubtful that Bush could be confirmed before next year. By then, with far deeper understanding of the anti-Bush sentiment, the President could make another mid-course correction, giving Bush a different post that would keep him available for a possible Vice Presidential nomination next summer (the job Mr. Ford came within a whisker of giving Bush instead of Nelson Rockefeller last year) and naming some one else to succeed Colby.

Precisely that probability was instantly perceived by Capitol Hill operatives when Mr. Ford summoned Colby back to the White House last week and asked him to stay at the CIA until a successor had been confirmed by the Senate. Earlier, when Colby left Mr. Ford's oval office on the morning of Sunday, Nov. 2, he was preparing to pack out of the CIA instantly.

Still, one of Washington's darker mysteries is why the President chose to put the long-suffering Bush through such a wringer without understanding the political realities. White House aides normally involved with CIA affairs, including the Congressional probes, knew nothing of Colby's sudden sacking or his replacement by Bush until too late.

Indeed, on top of the CIA's long misery is the grip of Congressional investigations and press exposés, the Bush nomination is regarded by some intelligence experts as another grave morale deflator. They reason that any identified politician, no matter how resolved to be politically pure, would aggravate the CIA's credibility gap. Instead of an identified politician, like Bush—former Member of the House, twice-defeated Senate nominee from Texas and Vice Presidential aspirant—what is needed they feel, is a respected non-politician, perhaps from business or the academic world.

Not all experts agree. One former CIA official wants the CIA placed under political leadership capable of working closely with Congress. But even that distinctly minority position rebels against any Presidential scenario that looks to the CIA as possible stepping-stone to the Vice Presidential nomination.

George F. Will

George Bush: Political Ambitions...

When nominated to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Bush said he did not think that being Director would forever prevent him from seeking political office. Obviously he hopes it will not, and his hope was stroked by President Ford's declaration that Bush is not excluded from consideration as his 1976 running mate.

Bush may not have to worry about a CIA attachment becoming a political handicap. The Senate may refuse to confirm him.

Like some other ex-Congressmen (he served two terms), Bush is one of Mr. Ford's guys, which is fine. But at the CIA he would be the wrong kind of guy at the wrong place at the worst possible time.

The CIA is under a cloud of dark suspicion based on proven misdeeds. The suspicion is that the CIA is a threat to civil liberties, and perhaps to tranquillity, because it is insubordinate or otherwise immune to proper control.

But lack of control over the CIA is no longer the gravest problem. Congress, awakened from its long sleep, is alert to its oversight duties. And the executive branch, having been reminded of the law, can keep the CIA operating this side of criminality.

Today the most pressing problem is not to prevent the CIA from doing what is forbidden. Rather, the problem is to see that it does what it is supposed to do, which is gather and report accurate information.

But gathering and reporting are different operations. And it is possible to imagine situations in which the CIA would be pressured to suppress inconvenient information, or to report things convenient to the political purposes of an administration.

Imagine an administration looking to the next election and determined to celebrate detente as its finest achievement. Imagine that the administration is excessively anxious to achieve another strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

Suppose the administration triumphantly signed an agreement limiting the number of strategic vehicles—missiles and bombers—on each side. Critics might say the limit is a false ceiling. Critics might charge that the limit is as high as the Soviet Union can or wants to go during the term of the agreement. Therefore, the agreement is an empty exercise, a limit that does not limit. (That is what Senator Henry Jackson said about the 2,400-vehicle limit agreed to at Vladivostok.)

Then the administration would appreciate a CIA report arguing that the



Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

Soviet Union has the ability to surpass the limit in the near future, and would do so if there were no agreement.

Or suppose the administration wanted an intelligence report minimizing this or that verification problem—say, the difficulty of verifying Soviet compliance with range limits on cruise missiles.

Or suppose the administration could get a CIA report supporting the hitherto unsupported Soviet contention that the Soviet Backfire bomber—which can deliver nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances—nevertheless lacks the strategic significance, and should not count against the Soviet total of 2,400 strategic vehicles permitted by the Vladivostok agreement. Such a CIA report would concede a Soviet point without seeming to be a concession, and could grease the skids for a pre-election agreement.

Recent events have made it wise to worry about the possibility that the CIA will become compliant to political pressures in reporting intelligence information, especially information that might tarnish the image of detente.

Defense Secretary Schlesinger, an apolitical man, was the foremost critic within the administration of Secretary Kissinger's policy in negotiating with the Soviet Union—sometimes called "the policy of preemptive concession." Mr. Ford wants to replace Schlesinger with Donald Rumsfeld, another vice presidential aspirant. Thus it is all the more imperative that the CIA be run by a man not susceptible to political considerations or pressures.

The problem with Bush is less that he has a political past than that he so obviously and avidly wants to have a political future.

As chairman of the Republican National Committee during Watergate Bush was very considerate about the man who appointed him. In spite of all the available evidence, he never expressed independent judgments inconvenient to Richard Nixon.

It might be rash to expect Bush to display at the CIA a capacity for politically inconvenient independence in judging intelligence. That is why the Senate may ask Mr. Ford for another nominee.

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— UPI Telephoto

George Bush, CIA director

George Herbert Walker Bush, 51, chosen as the next Central Intelligence Agency director, has spent the last few years trying to unravel the mysteries of China as President Ford's representative to Peking.

Mr. Ford sent the gregarious, youthful-looking Bush to China in 1974 after he had served briefly as ambassador to the United Nations in 1970 and later as chairman of the Republican National Committee.

Bush represented Texas' 7th Congressional District in the 90th and 91st Congresses where he knew Mr. Ford as House minority leader. He is the son of former Republican Sen. Prescott Bush of Connecticut.

"Let George do it" has become an increasingly popular solution to Republican Party problems, and the call has once again gone out to George Bush and his characteristic optimism.

Shuffle puts 3 in line as V-P choices

By RICHARD A. RYAN
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — President Ford lost one vice-presidential candidate during the past 48 hours of high-level firings, resignations and appointments, but gained at least three other potential running mates in the process:

1. Donald Rumsfeld.
2. George Bush.
3. Elliot Richardson.

As some semblance of normalcy returned to Washington today after the hectic developments of the past two days, the question of who will become the President's partner on the national ticket next year, should he win the Republican presidential nomination, has become the subject of much speculation.

The President is giving no hint of his preference, if indeed he has one now.

"We have a long time, many months to discuss and to think about that matter," Mr. Ford said at his press conference last night. "I will give it (my running mate) my closest attention, but we have got lots of time."

Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller eliminated himself from the field yesterday when he told Mr. Ford that he did not wish to be considered as a vice-presidential nominee. He made his decision, Rockefeller told Mr. Ford, in order to permit the President the widest range of options in planning his campaign, both in the primaries and general election.

While Mr. Ford declines to reveal who he favors to replace Rockefeller on the ticket next year, his new Cabinet-level appointments announced at his press conference give some hint as to the possibilities.

One man who is certain to be mentioned in any speculation is Donald Rumsfeld, the former Illinois congressman whom Mr. Ford named to replace the fired James Schlesinger as secretary of defense.

Rumsfeld, who has served as the President's chief of staff since shortly after he assumed the presidency in August, 1974, is a special favorite of Mr. Ford's.


A former assistant to Sen. Robert P. Griffin, R-Mich., Rumsfeld held a number of high positions in the Nixon administration, including ambassador to NATO. He emerged unscathed

Concluded on Page 9A

NOV 4 1975

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Shake-up creates 3 new contenders for Ford V-P



the Watergate scandal and surfaced as Mr.

rd's top aide.

Rumsfeld will be more visible as a secretary

defense than as a White House aide. A num-

ber of key congressmen noted that it would be

ster for Mr. Ford to select Rumsfeld as a vice-

presidential candidate from a Cabinet post than

would be if he remained on his personal staff.

George Bush, who is being recalled by Mr.

rd from his post as chief of the liaison office

the People's Republic of China to take over as

ector of the CIA from the ousted William

Bush also served in the Nixon administration

ly, is another vice-presidential possibility.

a number of high-level positions, including

airman of the Republican National Commit-

; and as U.S. ambassador to the United Na-

ns.

He also was Mr. Ford's second choice to be-

me vice-president last year, losing out to

ckefeller.

There are some Republican congressmen,

head the highly sensitive CIA eliminates him

future elective office.

asked specifically if Rumsfeld and Bush

id now be considered as possible running

tes, Mr. Ford replied:

"I wouldn't be surprised," he said, "that after

the President is renominated he asks Rocky to

reconsider his decision not to run."

presidential candidate.

suggested the possibility of even another vice-

can from Luther who is chairman of the Na-

Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, the Michigan Republi-

he can from London.

from the Commerce Department Building than

tion, either as a candidate or as an adviser,

can play a much greater role in the 1976 elec-

that he is interested in presidential politics. He

Richardson has made no secret of the fact

first of the year to return to private life.

the President that he wanted to retire after the

Morton as secretary of commerce. Morton told

son was being recalled from his post as ambas-

Mr. Ford announced last night that Richard-

Saturday Night Massacre of 1973.

administration before being fired in the famous

two days is Elliot L. Richardson, the man who

emerged from the dramatic changes of the past

A third vice-presidential possibility who

self." — the delegates to the convention or my-

body — they are eliminated from consideration by any-

have important responsibilities. I don't think

"They are first-class public officials. They

Donald Rumsfeld



George Bush



Elliot Richardson



DETROIT, MICH.
NEWS
D. 667,809—S. 843,539
DETROIT METROPOLITAN AREA

NOV 7 1975

'I knew Ford would fire me,' Colby says

From UPI and AP Dispatches.

WASHINGTON — CIA Director William E. Colby said yesterday he knew President Ford would fire him and he described his successor, George Bush, as "a very fine man . . . a highly qualified fellow."

Colby made his first public comments on the firing when he chatted with reporters during an intermission in his public appearance before the House Intelligence Committee.

Committee members praised him for giving forthright testimony throughout their investi-

gation of the CIA and some came to the witness table to shake his hand.

"I knew it was going to happen, that a new face was needed in the agency to meet a new stage," he told reporters who asked about his firing.

Colby was dismissed by Mr. Ford at a weekend White House meeting and then persuaded by the President Wednesday to stay at his post until the Senate confirms Bush, the U.S. representative in Peking, to succeed him.

However, Rep. Otis Pike,

chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, yesterday spoke out against Mr. Ford's nomination of Bush.

Pike described Bush as a "political person."

"The whole concept of putting a political person in charge of the CIA is, to me, terribly wrong; terribly offensive and I think it represents a real threat to the American democracy and the American system," he said in an address to the Washington Press Club.

"More than that, I think it represents a real threat to the CIA."

NOV 17 1973

The Case Against Mr. Bush

THE CASE that Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, Rep. Lucien Nedzi and others are making against the appointment of George Bush as director of the Central Intelligence Agency is substantive, and it deserves to be taken seriously by Congress.

Sen. Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, says that he believes it wrong to appoint a political type—a former chairman of the Republican National Committee, yet—to this sensitive job. Moreover, Mr. Bush is plainly ambitious and potentially even a vice presidential candidate next year.

Is this the way to rebuild the reputation of the CIA for detached and non-partisan intelligence-gathering? We doubt it. Indeed, it seems a good way to insure that continuing controversy will surround the agency over the next year and that the leadership of the CIA will continue to be subject to change and instability.

The hearings on the Bush nomination need to be much more than pro forma. At the very least, the appropriate committees need to exact from Mr. Bush an assurance that he is really committed to the CIA for the long

term. The worst thing possible for the agency would be for its director to be using the agency as a platform for seeking elective office. The thought of such a prospect is abhorrent.

Mr. Bush may be the noblest Republican of them all, but the president has imposed on the CIA a terrible burden by his thoughtless choice of a patently political figure for this difficult job. Congress will have to make up the deficiency by taking seriously its duty to advise and consent to such nominations.

NOV 10 1975

Mansfield backs Bush, Rumsfeld

WASHINGTON (UPI) — Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) plans to vote for the confirmation of George Bush to head the Central Intelligence Agency and Donald H. Rumsfeld as secretary of defense despite opposition from some Democratic senators, he said in a weekend interview.

"As far as I'm concerned, it is my intention at this time to vote for confirmation of both Rumsfeld and Bush," Mansfield said.

"I think they're both good men, replacing good men, and I'm sure that any questions which are on the minds of any senators will be brought up at the confirmation hearings."

Sen. Frank Church, (D-Ida.) said he may lead a Senate fight against confirmation of Bush, and said there was a remote chance President Ford would withdraw Bush's nomination. Church, who heads the Senate intelligence committee investigating the CIA, said: "I think there could not be a poorer choice than to take a past chairman of the Republican Party and put him in as director of an agency that's supposed to be nonpartisan."

NOV 6 1975

CIA's Colby to stay until successor OK'd

WASHINGTON (UPI) — CIA Director William Colby resumed his shuttle missions to Capitol Hill Thursday on a business-as-usual basis after President Ford asked him to carry on with "full authority" until his successor is approved.

The 55-year-old intelligence veteran, fired by Ford in a weekend shakeup, agreed to the President's request Wednesday that he stay on the job until Ambassador George Bush returns from his post in Peking and is confirmed as the new director by the Senate.

Since Bush is remaining in Peking for Ford's China visit around the end of this month and no exact date has been set

for the confirmation hearings — which may be protracted — Colby probably will continue running the agency through the end of the year and perhaps beyond.

FORD WAS believed to have had second thoughts on his summary dismissal of Colby, leaving the agency rudderless at a time when Colby's knowledge is needed not only for day-to-day operations but to assist in congressional hearings.

With Colby's stewardship extended, legislators quickly rescheduled him for Thursday hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House intelligence committee.

NOV 5 1974

Shift in CIA chiefs stirs suspicion of Ford 'plots'



Frank Church

By Peter Lisagor
Our Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The change in the CIA leadership has led invariably to suspicions of a plot — in fact, several plots.

The intelligence community suspects President Ford may be "politicizing" an agency that prides itself on its elite professionalism, as CIA types put it, by replacing director William E. Colby with George Bush, a former GOP national chairman.

Chairman Frank Church (D-Ida.), of the Senate intelligence committee, who shares the suspicion, also suspects that Ford's appointment of a new director as the committee enters its final stages was an attempt to disrupt the investigation.

Church lumped Ford's choice of Bush with a White House effort to suppress publication of a committee report on assassinations into what he called "a pattern of obstruction."

Church said at a news conference Tuesday that he would not vote to confirm Bush because of his political background.

THE WHITE HOUSE immediately dismissed the charge that the President was either injecting politics into the CIA with the Bush appointment or attempting to impede the congressional investigations.

"Bush has been a congressman, an ambassador to the United Nations, and a representative to the Peoples Republic of China," presidential press secretary Ronald Nessen said. "He is obviously ex-

perienced in diplomacy and national security affairs."

Nessen added that Ford has been shown a calendar of the Church committee's hearings and fully intends to continue to co-operate with the investigation.

Church called Bush "a nice guy," but questioned his qualifications to head the embattled CIA. The senator noted that Presidents "used to appoint former chairmen of political parties to head the Post Office, because it was the least sensitive and most political department. Now this President names a former chairman to head the CIA, the most sensitive and least political agency."

A FORMER CIA official said it would take Bush at least a year to "get on top of the agency if he's a quick learner."

Church, who has regarded Colby as co-operative and eager to cleanse the CIA of past sins, said his ouster "represents an impediment, an obstruction, a difficulty."

Inasmuch as Bush would not

be aware of past CIA activities, Church said, the committee would have to work with CIA deputy director Vernon (Dick) Walters in completing its investigation.

Colby was reported by associates to be "in limbo" on his responsibilities to the Church committee. Nessen said that Colby was on the verge of a decision as to whether to turn the agency's affairs over to Walters at once.

Colby, who was reported to be his "usual circumspect and disciplined self," was packing up and telling associates that he's mad at nobody. Other CIA people were said to feel that they were not going to let the agency's morale sag out of a strong sense of professionalism.

IN HIS NEWS conference, Church dismissed a demand by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), a member of the select committee, for an immediate halt to both the Senate and House investigations, declaring that no new material was being turned up and charging that the inquiries have become "counter-productive."

NOV 6 1975

Bush challenge 'serious'

By William J. Eaton
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — President Ford's nomination of George Bush to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency is in serious trouble in the Senate.

Democrats and Republicans are concerned that Ford regards the U.S. envoy to Peking as a possible running mate in 1976, although the CIA traditionally has been kept free of partisan politics.

Bush's service as chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1973-74 during the Watergate scandals, and his observation in Peking that he did not think the CIA post would end his political career, also have stirred controversy.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.) has announced he will vote against confirmation of the former Texas congressman, and several other senators are leaning that way.

"The agency (CIA) is in serious trouble and it should not be involved in politics," said Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.). "If he (Bush) is going to run for office next year, he should not become director of the CIA."

SEN. CHARLES H. Percy (R-Ill.) expressed similar reservations while declaring his confidence in Bush's integrity and competence.

"It would almost be a condition" for Bush's confirmation that he renounce a political career, Percy said in an interview.

"He (Bush) is subjecting himself and the President is subjecting him to continued debate at the very time when we ought to take personalities out of the situation," Percy added. "It raises more questions in my mind than I have answers."



George Bush

SEN. WILLIAM O. Proxmire (D-Wis.) also was critical of Ford's choice of Bush, whom the President described as one of "my guys" in a Monday news conference.

"The CIA director should not be a team player, a yes man, a political confidant," said Proxmire. "We must be extremely careful not to allow any kind of partisan politics to intrude into this province."

Proxmire predicted a Senate floor battle over Bush's appointment.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen Wednesday defended Ford's choice of Bush, saying the fact that he was once a congressman will make him "more sensitive to the people's desire" in his new job.

SEN. LOWELL Weicker (R-Conn.) said he would take a "long, hard look" at the nomination of Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, White House chief of staff who was nominated to be defense secretary.

As a member of the Senate Watergate committee, Weicker was an outspoken critic of political favoritism in the Internal Revenue Service and other federal agencies.

There was cloakroom discussion of asking Bush to declare, as a condition of confirmation, that he would bow out of politics once he took over the CIA.

"It makes no sense to confirm him as director of the CIA if he's going to quit six-months later and run as Ford's vice-presidential nominee," one Senate aide said.

THE SENATE Armed Services Committee will conduct hearings on Bush's nomination. Its members have been extremely concerned about the damage to the CIA's reputa-

tion by the disclosures that its agents have engaged in mail opening, spying on American citizens and antiwar organizations and other misconduct.

Bush's support of President Nixon in 1974 also may be challenged at the hearings. Even after Nixon disclosed that he had ordered the CIA to halt the FBI investigation of the Watergate break-in, Bush declined to be critical, saying: "Resignation is something the President alone must decide."

Bush has one thing going for him in the Senate — nearly every senator regards him as a "nice guy," and he served as a member of the House from Texas before losing a Senate race to Sen. Lloyd M. Bentsen (D-Tex.) in 1970. Congressional committees rarely reject a member of "the club."

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES
D. 567,617—S. 717,922
CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA

NOV 6 1975

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CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Thurs., Nov. 6, 1975

Colby agrees to stay at CIA until Bush confirmed

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Ford asked William E. Colby Wednesday to stay on as director of the Central Intelligence Agency until George Bush, whose appointment is encountering congressional opposition, takes over. The President's spokesman said Colby agreed.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen said Ford met with Colby, whom he fired as CIA director on Sunday, for 15 minutes. Nessen said Colby's authority would remain complete during the interim. No date was set for Bush's take-over.

Nessen did not deny reports that Colby had planned to move out of the CIA later this week and that the administration suddenly concluded his presence was needed to help handle Congress' continuing investigation of the agency.

It also was learned Wednesday that William G. Hyland, the State Department's intelligence chief, is moving over to the National Security Council as deputy director.

Hyland's appointment as deputy to Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft means the two top men at the council are proteges of Sec. of State Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger relinquished the council job in Ford's shake-up.

Hyland, 46, is a former chief of staff for Soviet affairs in the Central Intelligence Agency and was with the council from 1969 to 1973.

Bush nomination seen in "deep trouble,"
Page 36.

Bush must prove himself — an editorial,
Page 75.

Nessen declined to confirm reports that ousted Defense Sec. James R. Schlesinger was ordered by Ford to clean out his desk at the Pentagon by the end of the week. Rather, he said, it was Schlesinger who had asked to be relieved immediately.

Nessen's statements came after Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, said by Republican sources to have withdrawn as Ford's possible running mate because of widening disagreements on policy, called a press conference for Thursday.

Rockefeller's spokesman, John Mulliken, gave no details about any statement the vice president might make. Mulliken said Rockefeller would answer questions in the Executive Office Building conference room the President frequently uses for his press conferences.

Mulliken said Rockefeller's press conference would begin at 9 a.m. Chicago time.

ABC, CBS and NBC networks said they would provide live radio and television coverage.

Nessen said he did not know whether Rockefeller had consulted with Ford before an-

nouncing the press conference.

Wednesday evening, the President and Mrs. Ford, daughter Susan and son Jack dined with the Rockefellers in their home.

Meanwhile Kissinger said he has had no discussion with Ford or anyone in the administration about giving up his job as secretary of state.

Asked to respond to reports that Ambassador Elliot Richardson is being groomed to succeed him, Kissinger said with a chuckle: "Certainly nobody has told me."

Growing serious, Kissinger added: "I have had no discussion of any kind about leaving, with the President or with anyone in the administration. I can't answer for anyone else, but at least I can assure you that certainly nobody has told me that."

At the White House, deputy press secretary William Greener denied the reports that Richardson was being brought back to the United States in a move that eventually would put him in the State Department job.

Nessen said Ford did not consult Kissinger

in his decision to fire Schlesinger and nominate White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld as Schlesinger's successor.

"Nobody, including Sec. Kissinger, had any role in the decision," Nessen declared.

Asked how the Schlesinger-Colby firings had leaked to reporters if Ford acted alone, Nessen said the President had informed some of those involved in the shake-up as early as Oct. 25. He would not say specifically who got the word, but did say the list included some of both the fired and their successors.

Bush is a former Republican national chairman and has been mentioned by several persons, including Ford, as a potential 1976 vice presidential nominee.

Nessen said Ford believes Bush will be "overwhelmingly confirmed" by the Senate and argued that if previous service as a party official was enough to "disqualify a man for higher public service," perhaps the status of Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), a former Democratic national chairman, ought to be reviewed.

NOV 7 1975

George Bush's credentials

Chairman Frank Church of the Senate Intelligence Committee is trying to make the nomination of George Bush as chief of the Central Intelligence Agency look like a political ploy by President Ford. We would doubt, at this stage, that any President including Richard Nixon would have the gall to try to re-politicize the CIA, and there just might be a tincture of politics in Democrat Church's tirade.

Nevertheless, we welcome the assurance that the Senate will put Bush through an intensive examination on the way to confirmation. In this anxious post-Watergate season the public needs the strongest assurance that the chief of the CIA understands and respects that agency's role.

Contrary to Church's criticism, we do not think Bush's shortage of specific intelligence experience disqualifies him. True, he has been chairman of the Republican National Committee and will be the first CIA director with a really partisan political background. But he has also been through the mill as a congressman, as ambassador to the United Nations and as informal ambassador to the People's Republic of China, and has earned praise from administration adversary Sen. William Proxmire as "capable," "intelligent," and "hard-working." The CIA is full of careerists who can handle the professional end. The director has other responsibilities.

What needs to be examined is Bush's attitude toward his new command, and his understanding of what it should and should not be.

"I believe in the importance of a

sound and strong intelligence capability," he says.

But to do his job for the American people, he will also have to believe that an intelligence agency wholly insulated from public control is a menace to the republic; that an intelligence agency that can be converted into the personal instrument of a President is unaffordable; and that an intelligence agency that exceeds its lawful mission by engaging in domestic espionage has acquired some of the habits of a Gestapo.

In the execution of its mission of foreign intelligence the CIA is bound to face some close and delicate decisions. And that is exactly why the new head of the CIA must be established, to the Senate's satisfaction, as a man of judgment and integrity, beyond any taint of political leaning that could sway a professional decision. By the same token we trust that the Senate will subordinate its own political instincts and make an honest appraisal.

NOV 8 1975

Henry J. Taylor Says:

The Prince's Second Thoughts

Able American diplomatic representative to China George H. Bush told Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during Kissinger's recent visit to Peking that pro-Communist Prince Norodom Sihanouk, bitterly critical of the United States throughout the Vietnam war, has had second thoughts about our country on returning to his native Cambodia.

BUSH SAID THAT Sihanouk is now in Pyongyang, North Korea. The Prince fled to Peking and has lived there grandly since 1970. With the termination of the Vietnam war he returned to Phnom Penh, his capital. There Sihanouk was double-crossed by Cambodia's Communist rulers.

It is the same old story. The closer you get to Communist control the clearer it is that Communists do not govern a country — they debauch it in the age-old system of tyranny, the oldest political system in the world.

Cambodia, the size of Oklahoma, has 7.6 million people. With Vietnam and Laos, it comprised the former associated states of French Indochina. Sihanouk's country is about half virgin forest, but rice, the chief staple of southeast Asia, is its chief product. Until 1970 Cambodia was a rice exporter, but on Sihanouk's return he found a rice shortage.

THERE HAD BEEN 60,000 North Vietnamese in Cambodia. The United States incursion into Cambodia was a spoiling action covering our rear guard in Vietnam during the U.S. pull-out from there. The Cambodian army had only 35,000 men. The capital of Phnom Penh was cut off, except for a single uncertain road, and the enemy completely controlled strategic Tonle Sap, the great lake of Cambodia. Premier Lon Nol was pressed toward a cease-fire.

Bush told Kissinger that while Sihanouk was in Peking, ready to return to Cambodia, Sihanouk had heard disturbing rumors through the Chinese grapevine.

Bush stated that, in fact, the prince told his family and his waiting entourage: "You can come back with me in my special plane, but I cannot assure you of your destiny. The Red

Khmers may not even let you out of Cambodia."

HEEDING THIS, Sihanouk's eldest of five sons, Prince Norodom Yuvaneuth, 30, his successor and favorite, did not return to Phnom Penh. He entered Hong Kong secretly and is working today at a menial job in a Kowloon factory in the British Crown Colony. He lives, said Mr. Bush, in a small rented flat in the Laichikok district near a refugee resettlement station.

When Sihanouk returned, Cambodia's Red conquerors put on a great show at the airport. But even on the way to his Royal Palace, the shocks began. Sihanouk found his capital denuded of people; grass growing in the streets, shops shuttered or looted, automobiles rusting and abandoned at roadsides.

Bush said that Sihanouk was so appalled by conditions in Phnom Penh that he actually wept in the privacy of his palace.

THE KHMER ROUGE conquerors immediately convened a council of ministers meeting and Sihanouk thought he was presiding over it. But he found himself not allowed to question the proceedings. He was also forbidden to travel more than nine miles outside the capital.

Bush told Dr. Kissinger that the old Royal Palace had been tidied up for the Prince's return, but that Sihanouk found himself heavily guarded. He and entourage members who tried to walk outside discovered that they were actually prisoners. Communist "guides" saw that they never strayed from sight.

★

PRO-SIHANOUK guerrillas who had fought alongside the Communists had vanished without a trace. Leaders of the former Lon Nol regime, including the former president's brother, Gen. Lon Non, had been shot out of hand.

Sihanouk was able to reach fabulous Angkor Wat, the greatest and world-famous temple in the vast Angkor complex of temples. He found the entire complex now fortified, Angkor Wat included.

Bush told Kissinger that Sihanouk spent only 20 days in Phnom Penh. Those 20 days were all that he could take. He returned to Peking, sadder and wiser for his first-hand experience with a Communist takeover.

(United Feature Syndicate)



Taylor

N 5 1975

Clements to serve as defense chief during interim

By BARBARA STRONG
Washington Bureau of The News

WASHINGTON—A White

House spokesman said Tuesday Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements of Dallas will take charge of the Department of Defense until Donald Rumsfeld, now White House chief of staff, is confirmed as the new secretary of Defense.

White House press secretary Ronald Nessen said Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger will retain his position in name only, but that he "will take whatever leave time he has" starting some time later this week.

This is the second time Clements has served as acting Defense Secretary between the departure of one Defense secretary and the arrival of another.

THE TEXAN served in that position for several weeks in 1973 after Elliot Richardson resigned to become attorney general, and before Schlesinger took office.

Nessen said he did not know whether Clements was considered for the top Defense Department position before Rumsfeld was nominated.

Asked whether Schlesinger refused to carry on with his duties during the interim period, Nessen said that "it was his preference to go on a leave period."

He did not know whether the President had asked Schlesinger to stay.

George Bush of Houston, currently the U.S. representative to Peking, will return to Washington after President Ford's trip to China sometime this month, Nessen said.

BUSH, NOMINATED to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will replace current CIA Director William E. Colby.

"The President would like him (Colby) to stay" until Bush's nomination is confirmed, Nessen said.

But he said that he had talked to Colby Tuesday afternoon and that Colby had not decided when he will leave his position.

Nessen said the President called Bush in Peking late last week to inform Bush of his plans.

Bush had reportedly said that he expected to return to Washington sometime after the President's China trip but before the end of the year.

BUT NESSEN said he did not think Bush was aware of the President's intentions until he spoke with Ford by telephone last week.

Sen. John Tower said Tuesday that Bush "might not have too much difficulties in his confirmation



Associated Press Wirephoto.

William P. Clements . . . to take charge of Defense Department.

hearings" before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

"Looking at that committee, I don't see much hostility toward him."

Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, criticized the appointment and said he would not vote to confirm Bush.

"ALTHOUGH George Bush is a nice guy, I know of no particular reason why he is qualified for this post," Church was quoted.

Tower, during a press conference following a leadership meeting at the White House, said the committee might "bear down" on Rumsfeld to draw him out on the issues. Tower said some Republicans were concerned about the removal of Schlesinger.

"Rumsfeld has as much understanding of the danger of the euphoria of detente as anybody," Tower said in defense of the nominee.

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.
STAR
D. 231,118—S. 374,569
INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN AREA

NOV 10 1975

Church Calls Bush 'Poor Choice'

Washington (UPI) — Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) yesterday called George Bush a poor choice to head the CIA but wasn't sure if he will oppose the nomination.

Church, chairman of the Senate committee investigating the CIA, said the agency should not be headed by a politician.

"George Bush heading the agency

couldn't be a poorer choice," he said. "What is needed is a man of independence who will stand up to the pressures of the job — Elliot Richardson, for example."

Bush is presently the President's diplomatic envoy to China. He has served as a congressman, national Republican Party chairman and ambassador to the United Nations.

CLEVELAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER
D. 403,339 — S. 500,090
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN AREA

NOV 10 1975

THE PI

Church may oppose Bush confirmation

WASHINGTON (AP) — Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said yesterday he may lead a Senate fight against confirmation of George H.W. Bush as new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director. He also said there was a remote chance President Ford would withdraw Bush's nomination.

Church heads the Senate Intelligence Committee investigating the CIA.

"I think there could not be a poorer choice than to take a past chairman of the Republican party and put him in as director of an agency that's supposed to be non-partisan," Church said.

Asked on CBS' "Face the Nation" if he would lead a Senate move to block the nomination, Church replied:

"I'm thinking of doing it. But I

haven't decided whether it would be entirely fitting in my position to head up the opposition to him."

Meanwhile, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, D-Mont., said he will support the nominations of Bush and Donald H. Rumsfeld, named by Ford to replace Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger.

Church said that, with an elec-

tion year coming, the CIA should be run by someone with no political ambitions who can "stand up to the President and fight for the facts as his agency sees them."

Church was bitter over Ford's firing of CIA Director William E. Colby.

"I think he was the fall guy," Church said. "The wrong-doing we're exposing happened before he became director."

NOV 5 1975

Bush called too political to be director of CIA

L.A. Times/Washington Post Service

WASHINGTON — Warnings that the appointment of George Bush could lead to election year manipulation of the Central Intelligence Agency were sounded yesterday on Capitol Hill and within the intelligence community.

Indicative of the reaction was the comment of Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho: "Once they used to give former national party chairman postmaster generalships — the most political and least sensitive jobs in government. Now they have given this former party chairman the most sensitive and least political agency."

Church, chairman of the Senate CIA investigating committee, said he would be obliged to vote against the confirmation of Bush, who was GOP national chairman during the 1972 presidential campaign, "based on my present knowledge of his background and experience in this field."

He said Bush's appointment could well "compromise the independence of the CIA."

Bush, interviewed in Peking by Reuters, inadvertently may have added fuel to the controversy with the observation he was not sure the CIA appointment meant his political career was over.

President Ford in his press conference Monday night also fed the concern with the observation he did not think either Bush or Donald Rumsfeld, his nominee as defense secretary, could be eliminated from "consideration by anybody" for the vice presidency.

An illustration of the specific sort of worry the appointment has generated was provided by one Senate intelligence investigator.

"Richard Helms (former CIA director) kept

saying 'no' to overtures from the White House in June 1973 that the CIA assist in the coverup in the Watergate case. Whatever else you may say about him, Helms refused: What do you suppose George Bush would have said to the President?"

The agency has always been uneasy with directors appointed from outside the intelligence field but as one experienced CIA man said yesterday, "We thought they would have gone outside the political arena, at least until after the election."

NOV 9 1975

Why Bush Is Good Choice To Head CIA

By SAUL KOHLER

WASHINGTON — "I'm going to recommend that the CIA take over the Post Office," said a speaker at this city's Alfalfa Club. "So long as they're opening the mail, they might as well deliver it too."

The amateur stand-up comedian was George Bush, who at the time was wearing the striped pants of ambassador to the United Nations, and who might not have said it had he dreamed that some day he would be nominated as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

On the other hand, he might have said it anyway, because you'd have to go a long way to find a man with less guile than George Bush.

And now, President Ford is catching all sorts of heat from a lot of people for appointing Bush to the non-political, sensitive CIA because Bush once served as chairman of the Republican National Committee (RNC).

Thank Heaven that Americans have the privilege of criticizing the President — and in some quarters the practice is considered fun. But in this case, the flak is misdirected. For of all the appointments Ford made last weekend, the nomination of Bush was the best.

His stewardship of the GOP came during the Watergate period, and Bush managed to keep the RNC away from the expletive deleted of that dark chapter in American political history. Not only did he keep the party apparatus clean, he kept his own image clean, and when Robert Strauss of the Democratic National Committee offers to testify in Bush's behalf, the Connecticut Yankee from Texas must be some kind of person.

The criticism is that no political party chairman should later be appointed to a sensitive and non-political job.

Was Cordell Hull less distinguished a secretary of state because he had headed the Democratic National Committee? Was Homer Cummings less distinguished an attorney general because he, too, had been chairman of the DNC?

And Rogers C. B. Morton, who went from the RNC to the Dept. of the Interior and then to Commerce? Or even Dean Burch, whose appointment as chairman of the Federal Communications Commission raised a few eyebrows but whose performance there caused them to be lowered?

Did service as national chairman make Scoop Jackson and Fred Harris

less eligible as 1976 Democratic possibilities? And is Bob Dole less of a senator because of his experience as GOP chairman?

There is little that is more political than being president or candidate for president or vice president. Yet, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes and Earl Warren each went from the political arena to become the chief justice of the United States — and did the job with style.

Because it is the man and not the office which must be scrutinized and examined, the selection of George Bush is a good one. He was in Congress (which appears to be almost a required course for service in the Ford administration) and he did a good job at the United Nations.

After his stint at the RNC, Bush went to Peking as head of the American mission to the People's Republic of China.

"They say that all of George Bush's appointive posts have been 'graveyard jobs,'" a White House aide said. "Well, nothing George touches is a 'graveyard.' In every instance, every job he has held has been better for his service."

"The gag line around here ever since the Boss announced George for the CIA is that spying is going to be a bore from now on because George is such a clean guy."

The Central Intelligence Agency is an embattled bureaucracy which needs an uplift in the eyes of the American people, who perceive their telephones as bugged and their letters as steamed open because of the politicizing which has occurred.

This is the reason Ford cast about for a man with impeccable credentials: He could have selected others—Supreme Court Justice Byron White is the first name that comes to mind — but Ford wanted George Bush, and George Bush wanted to come home.

Does he want to run for vice president, or president, some day? Probably. Is the CIA a good launching pad for national candidacy? Probably not.

But there are those in Washington who believe fervently that Bush will run a clean shop at the CIA, that he will forget his political days with the RNC and look to the task at hand rather than possible future ambitions.

Matter of fact, maybe it's a good thing that a president occasionally appoints a former national chairman to something other than postmaster general, as used to be the practice in both parties.

If there is an opportunity for further, and presumably higher, public service, they might even get better men to head the parties.

Saul Kohler covers the President for Newhouse News Service.

NOV 13, 1975



George Bush

His political past

Bush is the wrong man for the CIA...

By GEORGE F. WILL

WASHINGTON—When nominated to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Bush said he did not think that being director would forever prevent him from seeking political office. Obviously he hopes it will not, and his hope was stroked by President Ford's declaration that Bush is not excluded from consideration as his 1976 running mate.

Bush may not have to worry about a CIA attachment becoming a political handicap. The Senate may refuse to confirm him.

Like some other ex-congressmen (he served two terms), Bush is one of Mr. Ford's guys, which is fine. But

at the CIA he would be the wrong kind of guy at the wrong place at the worst possible time.

The CIA is under a cloud of dark suspicion based on proven misdeeds. The suspicion is that the CIA is a threat to civil liberties, and perhaps to tranquility, because it is insubordinate or otherwise immune to proper control.

But lack of control over the CIA is no longer the gravest problem. Congress, awakened from its long sleep, is alert to its oversight duties.

Today the most pressing problem is not to prevent the CIA from doing what is forbidden. Rather, the problem is to see that it does what it is supposed to do, which is gather and

report accurate information.

But gathering and reporting are different operations. And it is possible to imagine situations in which the CIA would be pressured to suppress inconvenient information, or to report things convenient to the political purposes of an administration.

Imagine an administration looking to the next election and determined to celebrate detente as its finest achievement. Imagine that the administration is excessively anxious to achieve another strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

Suppose the administration triumphantly signed an agreement limiting the number of strategic vehicles—missiles and bombers—on each side.

Critics might say the limit is a false ceiling. Critics might charge that the limit is as high as the Soviet Union can or wants to go during the term of the agreement. Therefore the agreement is an empty exercise, a limit that does not limit.

Then the administration would appreciate a CIA report arguing that the Soviet Union has the ability to surpass the limit in the near future, and would do so if there were no agreement.

Or suppose the administration could get a CIA report supporting the hitherto unsupported Soviet contention that the Soviet Backfire bomber—which can deliver nuclear weapons over intercontinental distances—nevertheless lacks strategic significance, and should not count against the Soviet total of 2,400 strategic vehicles permitted by the Vladivostok agreement.

Such a CIA report would concede a Soviet point without seeming to be a concession, and could grease the skids for a pre-election agreement.

Defense Secretary Schlesinger, an apolitical man, was the foremost critic within the administration of Secretary Kissinger's policy in negotiating with the Soviet Union—sometimes called "the policy of preemptive concession." Mr. Ford wants to replace Schlesinger with Donald



... the Senate will decide

Rumsfeld, another vice presidential aspirant. Thus it is all the more imperative that the CIA be run by a man not susceptible to political considerations or pressures.

The problem with Bush is less that he has a political past than that he so obviously and avidly wants to have a political future.

It might be rash to expect Bush to display at the CIA a capacity for politically inconvenient independence in judging intelligence. That is why the Senate may ask Mr. Ford for another nominee.

Rebuilding the image

...or is he just perfect for the job

By CHARLES BARTLETT

WASHINGTON — It is ironic to hear Democrats say George Bush is too political to head the CIA after their abusive use of the agency as a political punching bag.

President Ford's abrupt decision to bring Bush back from China, where he is ably performing an important job, is wholly hinged to an urgent need to rebuild the nation's intelligence capacity from the risky tatters in which congressional investigators have left it. If it were not for these probes, the present director, an able professional, would have more than sufficed.

The CIA, after 28 years of operating in isolation, needed outside scrutiny, but the Senate and House inquiries have utilized the Watergate atmosphere and the candor of the director, William Colby, to stage running horror shows. Sen. Frank Church (D., Idaho) has amassed a staff of 120 people working to point public attention at mistakes which were fully corrected two years ago.

The best hope that these horror

shows will end in early winter lies in the prospect that Church and the House chairman, Otis Pike (D. N.Y.), will drift off to run for higher offices on the strength of the fame they acquired from these hearings.

Meanwhile, the public's view of the CIA has been so soured that those senators and representatives regularly briefed through the years on CIA activities feel disinclined to speak up. Barry Goldwater is almost alone in attempting to keep the agency's work in perspective.

The political tenor of these inquiries is illustrated by the Senate committee's probe into the assassination plots. Church leapt on the issue after Nelson Rockefeller reported that his commission had lacked time to explore it fully.

Avowing "We won't duck it" and describing the CIA as "a rogue elephant," Church set off to prove that some bad little fellows conspired on their own to kill off foreign leaders.

He promised a full report by Aug. 1, but it is nowhere in sight because Church's researchers found that the little fellows' conspiracies were sanc-

tioned by Democratic and Republican Presidents. Goldwater is accurate in saying that the Church committee is "locked in a tug-of-war between those who want to tell the truth and those who want to protect the Kennedys."

No intelligence professional can manage the huge repair job so long as bitter political winds are blowing. The hostile climate may make the repair job impossible for any director. But Democrats who oppose Bush can combine to block the best chance to get a fast, effective start on a crucial task.

Bush has made no political race for five years. The respect and affection he kindled in Congress have lifted him into a series of demanding tasks. The grace and character with which he presided over the Republican National Committee through the agonies of Watergate cannot be counted a liability in facing the shambles left by the Church-Pike probes.

Bush's readiness to take on the task is a certain assurance that he does not have in mind any imminent bid for elective office.

Instead, of indulging in further showmanship, the CIA probers should seize upon the Bush nomination as a chance to build character and good sense into a revived intelligence system. It is time to put aside the punching bag.

Give Light And The People Will Find Their Own Way



El Paso Herald-Post

A SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWSPAPER

ROBERT W. LEE, Editor

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Phone 532-1661

SECTION B, PAGE 2

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1975

Thanksgiving

During the 1930s, which opened with the Great Depression and ended with the outbreak of World War II, a sorely troubled decade that saw the beginning of the New Deal and Adolf Hitler's assumption of power in Germany, many unexpected people were drawn into public office in the United States.

One such was Dr. Wilbur Lucius Cross, author, editor and professor of English, who served eight years as governor of Connecticut. And, as one might expect in the light of his background, some of Gov. Cross' state papers were minor literary gems — although they have been sadly forgotten with the passing of the years.

Among these was his Thanksgiving proclamation for 1936, a time of mingled hopes and forebodings, perhaps not entirely unlike the one in which we live today.

Here is the text of that proclamation: "Time but of mind at this turn of the seasons when the hardy oak leaves rustle in the wind and the frost gives a tang to the air and the dusk falls early, and the friendly evenings lengthen under the heel of Orion, it has seemed

good to our people to join together in praising the Creator and Preserver, who has brought us by a way that we did not know to the end of another year.

"In observance of this custom, I appoint Thursday as a day of Public Thanksgiving for the blessings that have been our common lot and have placed our beloved state with the favored regions of earth — for all the creature comforts, the yield of the soil that has fed us and the richer yield from labor of every kind that has sustained our lives — and for all those things, as dear as breath to the body, that quicken man's faith in his manhood, that nourish and strengthen his spirit to do the great works still before him; for the brotherly word and act; for honor held above price, for steadfast courage and zeal in the long, long search after truth; for liberty and justice freely granted by each to his fellow and so as freely enjoyed; and for the crowning glory and mercy of peace upon our land — that we may humbly take heart of these blessings as we gather once again with solemn and festive rites to keep our Harvest Home."

Bush and the CIA

When President Ford recently nominated George Bush to head the CIA, it didn't take long for both well meaning and political opposition to surface.

Several major newspapers and at least two senators, Democrats Frank Church and William Proxmire, came out against Bush, now U.S. envoy to China, long before he could come home and testify on his own behalf.

The objections to Bush boil down to two: He is a former chairman of the Republican National Committee, and he has no professional background in intelligence work.

To be facetious for a moment, one could say that a head of the national committee under Richard Nixon who didn't get indicted must be very honorable or very stealthy, both useful qualities in a CIA boss.

More seriously, however, Bush's detractors assume that because of his GOP background he would "politicize" the CIA and would not refuse if a Republican President asked him to do something dirty on behalf of the party.

Such suspicions are most unfair to

Bush, who has a record of integrity, and to the trade of politician, which is often followed by decent people.

As to Bush's not being an intelligence insider, all one can say is bravo. For most of its history the CIA was led by professionals, such as Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, and the country is still reeling about disclosures about the agency's illegal domestic snooping and its bizarre plots to kill foreign leaders.

If the CIA is to be reformed, live under the charter and give up stunts like trying to make Fidel Castro's beard fall out, it will take the efforts of a talented outsider, not one with close links to the spook network which brought the agency into disrepute.

Bush has been a naval aviator, successful businessman, two-term congressman from Texas, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, head of the U.S. mission in Peking, as well as chairman of the GOP's national committee.

That varied background should entitle him to a fair hearing on his qualifications to head the CIA — not the premature cloak and dagger job some are trying to do on his nomination.

New York Post

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Nursing Homes Report (Part I)

Possibly the best way of illustrating the Moreland Act Commission's first official report on nursing home regulation by New York State health officials is to recall the familiar atmosphere found in many a facility undergoing a short-notice inspection. The place has been hastily cleaned up, the meals have improved and the records have been somewhat straightened. But the aroma of recently applied disinfectant is suspiciously strong and there is no real assurance of lasting professional administration and quality care in these institutions.

Thus the Commission notes the "sharp contrast" between the "extraordinarily lax" enforcement record of the state's Health Department prior to this year and the strikingly vigorous

regulatory effort pursued lately—with essentially the same legal powers and personnel. Yet "the task of developing meaningful, explicit and enforceable minimum standards of care remains to be accomplished." And "inadequate patient care" remains persistent and acute.

It is the Commission's urgent and carefully documented conclusion that some 90,000 patients in 625 nursing homes and related facilities deserve much better—and that relentless, rigorous government enforcement is indispensable. Chairman Abram and his associates have made an exemplary effort to help assure that goal. Their final recommendations will presumably contribute much more to the drive for reform.

Bush and the CIA

It is dismaying enough that the Central Intelligence Agency has been deeply engaged over the years in trying to manipulate governments abroad. It could be even more damaging if the agency were openly exposed to further charges of meddling in American domestic politics.

That prospect has rapidly become a matter of intense concern to Chairman Church (D-Idaho) of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence since President Ford's designation of George Bush to be head of the CIA. Bush, a former Republican National Chairman, is one of his party's most prominent national figures.

Church, who regards Bush as a "personal friend," has nevertheless appealed to the Senate to withhold support for the nomination on the ground that "we need a CIA that can resist all the partisan pressures which may be brought to bear by various groups in and out of government." But it is by no means clear that this argument will prevail.

The nomination of the able, appeal-

ing Bush, now special U. S. representative to Peking, has been endorsed by such conservatives as Sens. Buckley (R-N.Y.), Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Tower (R-Tex.), and Majority Leader Mansfield (D-Mont.), long an admirer, has added his warm endorsement.

In Mansfield's opinion, all concern would be allayed if Bush would renounce any ambition for the GOP's 1976 Vice Presidential nomination—for which he has been mentioned since the Rockefeller withdrawal. But that is not the principal point. The issue is whether a man who has been so actively steeped in partisan politics should serve as head of an agency that demands a strictly nonpartisan, independent, objective and professionally skilled administration. On the evidence, the answer must be negative.

Bush's abilities are many. They surely warrant further federal employment in a responsible post. They do not embody the essential qualifications of detachment required in the office of Director of Central Intelligence.

Maybe CIA needs politician

BY WALTER T. RIDDER
Ridder News Service

WASHINGTON — The projected appointment of George Bush, presently U.S. emissary to the People's Republic of China, to the post of director of Central Intelligence Agency has met with a certain frostiness on Capitol Hill.

Some believe, or at least say they believe, that head of the CIA is not a job which befits a man (Bush) who was once chairman of the Republican National Committee or a man (Bush) who is mentioned as a possible vice-presidential candidate on next year's GOP national ticket or a man (Bush) who has little or no experience in the field of intelligence.

Proceeding from the specific to the general, those opposing Bush are maintaining that a politician should not be appointed to the CIA directorship. The argument goes that the CIA has potentially too much power and too much ability to do harm for it to be en-

trusted into the hands of a politician. The argument is sometimes refined to "ambitious politician," meaning, one supposes, that no man appointed to the CIA should ever wish to better his position in life.

I want to state that I do not know George Bush. I may at one time or another have met him or have casually shaken his hand, but that would about be the extent of our acquaintanceship. Whether or not Mr. Bush is confirmed to his projected new post is not a matter of personal interest to me nor do I have feelings about him one way or another.

The U.S. Senate has given ample indication that it expects to have rather thorough hearings on his nomination and during the course of those hearings his qualifications to direct the CIA will be publicly discussed and publicly weighed. One hopes that the issue at hand will be the competence of Mr. Bush, not whether he is, has been or may in the future be a politician.

Simply to rule out as potential head of the CIA a politician — any politician — on the ground that he is a politician seems to me to be absurd. In the first place, it would be almost impossible to reach any agreement on what constitutes a politician. Is it a person who once ran for public office? Is it one who might wish to do so? Is it someone who gets along with people? Someone who has served in the public arena?

Leaving aside for the moment the definition of the word politician, one is tempted to argue that perhaps someone who has served in a position in which he was accountable directly to the public might by the very nature of that experience be more responsive as head of the CIA. He might also be more sensitive to the nuances of public opinion and might be able through a politician's antennae to know instinctively what might appall the public if it ever found out what was being undertaken.

There are no other jobs in the public

sector from which we automatically exclude politicians. The most sensitive job in the United States is the presidency from which, heaven knows, we do not bar politicians. While we may not like politics and politicians, the facts are that we can't get along without them and on the whole they do reasonably well at the jobs to which they are elected or appointed.

It has been argued that the CIA is a highly technical operation that can be mastered only by those with a technical background. If current make-up and activities of the CIA are any guide, the answer to that argument is "balderdash." Whether it should or should not, the CIA has insinuated itself into the political bodies of other countries. It would be just as well, if the CIA's operations are to remain as at present, to have someone at the top who has some idea of and some experience in politics either here or abroad.

I am not stating that the CIA necessarily needs a politician at its head. I am simply stating that it would be silly to state the converse — that no politician should direct the agency. Congress at one point passed a law that no military man could head the CIA. That law has on occasion been waived, demonstrating that arbitrary bans imposed upon broad segments of our society cannot with any consistency be long enforced. A military man is at least reasonably easy to define, but a politician? It would take some Solomonian judgments to determine who isn't a politician.

As long as the CIA continues its current operations or reasonably exact facsimiles thereof, I can see no reason why a man with a political background should automatically be barred from its directorship. Much can be said in favor of taking another look at the CIA's functions and perhaps getting it back exclusively into the intelligence gathering business which was, after all, its original mission. Under strong directors, not one of whom ever was elected to anything, the agency branched out into areas which make dull reading of pulp magazine spy thrillers.

If the record of the CIA as it now stands reflects no great credit on the non-politicians who have run it, what's so wrong about letting a politician have a go at it?

PRO - GB

...A political ace for CIA

In naming George Bush as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, President Ford has evidently decided to accept some political risks for an institution that is in the throes of deep reexamination, both internally and externally.

George Bush's competence is not an issue. Democrats as well as Republicans have praised his personal qualities. He has showed great energy, imagination and a certain flair for the unexpected in his present job as chief US representative in Peking. His personal integrity stood up commendably during his tenure as national chairman for the Republican Party in the year of Watergate. And he has a proven background as a hard-headed businessman and fine Congressman from Texas.

It is probably unfair that some Democrats have singled out his partisan past as the grounds for categorical opposition to his confirmation as head of the CIA. But that is a fact which the President will have to think about, exactly because of the reorganization crisis facing the agency. There is a danger that departmental nominations may be unduly scrutinized for their partisan content —

and that partisan content may be seen where none exists.

There are distinct plusses in Bush's background. Reorganization will mean compromise and Bush, the political figure, is familiar with that kind of give and take. Morale at the CIA is low because the agency is under attack. But a politician, highly tuned to public accountability, could help bridge the confidence gap between the agency and the public. Twice defeated as a candidate for the US Senate, George Bush has the reputation of being able to play the role of loser with grace and resilience. These are qualities that could be very useful in rebuilding the nation's intelligence agency.

In acting on the confirmation, the Senate ought not assume that Bush's political background automatically disqualifies him for the post. The Senate has every right to explore the question and it should do so in the course of confirmation hearings. That process should help both Congress and the Administration understand just what is expected from Bush in a CIA role. If that happens, the confirmation process will have served a creative purpose.

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12

Wednesday, November 12, 1975

Transparent Travesty

OPPONENTS of the nomination of Ambassador George Bush as head of the beleaguered Central Intelligence Agency are digging deep for ostensible reasons for their efforts to block the appointment.

Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, chairman of the Senate intelligence subcommittee, said Tuesday that confirmation of Bush would make "a travesty" of agency reform, and threaten the CIA's ability to stand up to the White House and the Pentagon.

Church also warned against excessive criticism of the intelligence agency, saying that its role as a counterbalance to the "frightening forecasts" sometimes made by the Pentagon in an effort to justify larger military budgets or new weapons systems could be destroyed.

Foremost of the really irresponsible critics of the CIA is the same Frank Church. He has refused to concede that the revelations he has ordered of information supplied his committee in confidence, about CIA operations and methods, could destroy some of the sources of vital information. He has continued to be the sole judge of what should be published to the world, including information from closed system societies, where everything from dietary data to subway schedules is considered state secrets. Such revelations serve no purpose except sensationalism in this country. Abroad, they frighten former sources into silence, or result in arrests, imprisonment, and even death for informants.

The Church assumption that the CIA must stand up to the White House and the Pentagon as the sole

purveyor of revealed truth is nonsense. The CIA exists to coordinate our intelligence activities and serve the executive departments, including the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. Its estimates do not always coincide in detail, or even in major premise, with theirs. Sometimes that is because it has more complete data, and can see the bigger picture. And sometimes it is because the agency most directly familiar with the situation has better insight into the meaning of developments than have the CIA's specialists.

The real travesty may not be appointment of a political executive of international reputation to head the CIA. Instead, it may be the transparent act of trotting out facetious objections in order to force the nomination of a director who will be more tractable for those demanding "soft" estimates of Soviet and other socialist state intentions.

Our system of government relies on the direction of major executive agencies by those with political responsibility to the people—that is, to the voters. Today there is a large and cohesive element in Washington determined to reverse the verdict of the voters any time it expresses distrust of the massive federal bureaucracy. There are also some who find anti-socialism a threat to their future plans. Intelligence estimates which reveal socialist plans for world domination, as one example, are unacceptable to these people.

A realist, with political and business experience and proved executive talents, combined with a reputation for integrity, can be a threat to such coteries. Bush is such a man.

Protecting the CIA

Richmond Times Dispatch 11-16-75

Democratic Sen. Frank Church of Idaho has launched a campaign to block the confirmation of George Bush as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, charging that his appointment would contaminate the agency with politics. Bush is a former congressman and former national chairman of the Republican party.

"The Senate and the people we represent," Church sermonized on the floor of the Senate Tuesday, "have the right to insist upon a Central Intelligence Agency which is politically neutral and totally professional."

Church is absolutely right about the desired qualities of the CIA, of course, but his sanctimonious admonition was misdirected. He should have aimed it at himself and at one of his colleagues at the other end of the Capitol, New York Rep. Otis Pike. Together, these two men pose a far more serious threat to the neutrality and professionalism of the CIA than George Bush poses.

Since early this year, committees headed by Church and Pike have been investigating the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence agencies, ostensibly to determine what new safeguards Congress needs to erect to prevent the agencies from abusing their powers. This is a laudable objective, and properly conducted inquiries could be highly beneficial to the nation. But the two committees, as *Time* magazine recently reported, have strayed afield and have "spent too much time battling the administration or grabbing for headlines by concentrating on flashy issues." Both Church and Pike seem to have taken great delight in not only exposing the misdeeds and alleged misdeeds of the agencies but also in magnifying some of them outrageously and in dwelling upon them morbidly and excessively, as if the nation needed to purify itself by constantly chanting a Maoist confession of unmitigated guilt.

Many of the CIA "misdeeds" that Church and Pike have flaunted to the world, it is important to note, were mere proposals that never moved beyond the talking stage. Often these men, or members of their staffs, have fed the news media unsubstantiated reports that many people, unfortunately, surely have accepted as established facts. On Thursday, for example, Church confirmed, according to a news story, that his

staff is "investigating the possibility that the CIA arranged for a hit-and-run murder in New Orleans in the late 1950s or early 1960s." Supposedly, the Church committee was "informed" of this heinous crime by an unidentified former Jesuit priest who said he learned about it from a CIA official. Even if the Church investigation proves this report to be false, many people who read that story are likely to believe forever that the CIA committed a murder in New Orleans.

There is no mystery about the conduct of Church and Pike. Both hope to capitalize politically upon what they perceive to be a post-Watergate attitude of suspicion toward intelligence operations, and they consider headlines and flashy issues to be excellent propellants for their ambitions. Church would like to be the Democratic presidential nominee, and Pike is eager to run for the Senate.

Church's complaints about Bush's political background, then, are ludicrous. The investigations of the Church and Pike committees already have injected politics into intelligence matters and marred the professionalism of the CIA. Essentially, the CIA's mission is to gather information that would assist this nation in the preparation of effective defenses against foreign threats. It must conduct most of its operations secretly, and at times it must engage in distasteful practices abhorrent to polite society. No "professional" intelligence agency could operate effectively in any other manner. But by demoralizing and intimidating the CIA, by exposing its tactics and some of its sensitive projects, by alienating many of its friends and closing many of its sources, the two congressional committees have seriously weakened this agency.

And having contributed to the damage, Church now piously pretends that he is the CIA's great protector. How gullible does he think the American people are?

From what we know about him at the moment, George Bush should make a good CIA director. The skills he has shown as a politician and as a diplomat may be precisely the skills needed to repair the damage to the CIA and restore it to its respected and professional state.

Jerald terHorst

The scenario that didn't work

Chas. T. J. 11-9-75



WASHINGTON—Admonished by critics and implored by friends to be more "presidential," President Ford intended that the shakeup of his administration would demonstrate convincingly that he is the man in charge and fully worthy of four more years in office. But instead of accolades, he has only reaped a whirlwind.

Ford supporters remain troubled. Political opponents alternately are furious or amused. The press is skeptical. Friends and foes abroad are nervous about the meaning of it all. Hardly anyone accepts the President's explanation that he is revamping the top echelons of government in order to install a total Ford team in the area of foreign policy.

And it had been a carefully crafted scenario—at least as it germinated in Ford's mind.

STUNNED BY the frank comments of his "transition team" a few weeks ago, as reported in this space, Ford retired to his private quarters in the White House to ponder the judgment that he simply had to exhibit more forceful leadership if he wished to be perceived as President, and not as a Nixon caretaker. With pad and pen, Ford juggled the names around, and, as he said at his press conference Monday night, the results pleased him.

He first took into his confidence Donald Rumsfeld, White House staff chief, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Later, the circle of confidantes was enlarged until finally he broke the news of their ouster to James Schlesinger, secretary of Defense—who had not expected it—and to William Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency—who had.

Originally, Vice President Rockefeller's decision to bow out of next year's campaign was not part of the script. But it fell beautifully into place, at least

as far as Ford was concerned, and he quickly agreed when Rockefeller offered to step aside as his running mate.

The White House plan called for a series of announcements during the week, starting with the Rockefeller decision. It was supposed to be a stunning blow to Ronald Reagan's presidential challenge in the Republican primaries next year. With Rockefeller out of the way, Ford aides assumed that there would be little reason for conservatives to continue the campaign against the President. They apparently are due for a disappointment.

A day or two later, Ford planned to announce the removal of Schlesinger and Colby, and reveal his decision to take the National Security Council's directorship away from Kissinger. But the carefully laid plan was blown sky-high by a series of leaks to the press over the weekend. By the time Ford returned to the capital from his Florida meeting with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Washington was seething with reports of wholesale firings, a "Sunday massacre."

What was intended to be a display of Ford leadership and skill had turned instead into a scene of disarray and confusion within the Oval Office.

Ford now will have to salvage the operation as best he can, certainly in a more adroit fashion than he did at his news conference. He was correct in saying that the dispute between Kissinger and Schlesinger was not the primary reason for replacing Schlesinger with Rumsfeld.

Ford should have added that it was a personally clash between himself and Schlesinger. On defense policy, the Ford and Schlesinger views are almost identical. Neither trusts the Russians much. But the President, as an old congressman hand, did not like his Pentagon

chief telling him how to get along on Capitol Hill. Nor could Ford abide Schlesinger's intellectual detachment from the problems of the presidency. That apparently is one mistake that Henry Kissinger has never made.

Ford also will have his work cut out for him in establishing that Kissinger, for all of his prowess in foreign affairs, has likewise suffered a wing-clipping. Kissinger gives up his handy White House office and his precious "daily four" with the President. From now on, Kissinger will have to share Ford's time with Rumsfeld and with George Bush, the new director of the CIA who, if he can handle it, could become the senior Ford adviser on all intelligence or

The Kissinger ego will have to a little bruising if Ford is to continue the nation and the world that Americans foreign policy is being determined in the Oval Office.

WITH RUMSFELD in the Pentagon, Bush at the CIA, and Elliot Richardson replacing Rogers Morton at the Commerce Department, the President has installed three politically ambitious men in Cabinet-level positions, each of them interested in becoming his running mate next year and, eventually, seeking the presidency.

Keeping their rivetries in check will not be the only part of his problem. Potentially more serious for the country is whether Ford is going to permit partisan politics to dominate decisions at the Defense Department and the CIA.

Hardly anyone would begrudge a President's right to pick the players on his team. But after the disavowal of the last week, it seems he will must prove that he is the quarterback, not the center.

Universal Press Syndicate

Charles Bartlett

Irony in democratic slaps at George Bush

It is ironic to hear Democrats say George Bush is too political to head the CIA after their abusive use of the agency as a political punching bag.

President Ford's abrupt decision to bring Bush back from China, where he is ably performing an important job, was wholly hinged to an urgent need to rebuild the nation's intelligence capacity from the risky fatters in which congressional investigators have left it. If it were not for these probes, the present director, an able professional, would have more than sufficed.

The CIA, after 28 years of operating in isolation, needed outside scrutiny, but the Senate and House inquiries have utilized the Watergate atmosphere and the candor of the director, William Colby, to stage running horror shows. Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, has amassed a staff of 120 people working to point public attention at mistakes which were fully corrected two years ago.

Meanwhile, the public's view of the CIA has been so soured that those senators and representatives regularly briefed through the years on CIA activities feel disinclined to speak up. Barry Goldwater is almost alone in attempting to keep the agency's work in perspective.

The political tenor of these inquiries is illustrated by the Senate committee's probe into the assassination plots. Church leapt on the issue after Nelson Rockefeller reported that his commission had lacked time to explore it fully. Avowing "We won't duck it" and describing the CIA as "a rogue elephant," Church set off to prove that some bad little fellows conspired on their own to kill off foreign leaders.

He promised a full report by Aug. 1, but it is nowhere in sight because Church's researchers found that the little fellows' conspiracies were sanctioned by Democratic and Republican presidents. Goldwater is accurate in saying that the Church committee is "locked in a tug-of-war between those who want to tell the truth and those who want to protect the Kennedys." The Democrats are maneuvering to use their dominance to focus the disclosures on Nixon plots against Chile's Salvador Allende.

Church and Rep. Otis Pike, D-N.Y., are catering to purists who insist that the cleansing effect of disclosure justifies a national humiliation. But the disclosures and leaks are eating away the good along with the bad. They have chewed up Colby's career. They have dried up intelligence

sources, exploded some sensitive situations, and caused foreign governments, private companies and even U.S. agencies to shrink from collaboration with American intelligence.

No intelligence professional can manage the huge repair job so long as bitter political winds are blowing. The hostile climate may make the repair job impossible for any director. But Democrats who oppose Bush can combine to block the best chance to get a fast, effective start on a crucial task.

Bush has made no political race for five years. The respect and affection he kindled in Congress have lifted him into a series of demanding tasks. The grace and character with which he presided over the Republican National Committee through the agonies of Watergate cannot be counted a liability in facing the shambles left by the Church-Pike probes. Bush's readiness to take on the task is a certain assurance that he does not have in mind any imminent bid for elective office.

Instead of indulging in further showmanship, the CIA probers should seize upon the Bush nomination as a chance to build character and good sense into a revived intelligence system. It is time to put aside the punching bag.

Mapping Out The 'Sunday Massacre'

By WILLIAM SAFIRE

New York Times News Service

WASHINGTON

My campaign organization is in a shambles, there's all this bickering going on in the Cabinet, and nobody thinks I'm really a President.

So I better do something before Reagan announces his candidacy, or else it will look like I'm responding to that.

Rocky's got to go, that's first. I gave him his chance and he blew it, now he's dragging us all down. I'll let him know he can get out with dignity now, because he's too proud a man to want to be dumped later.

That'll satisfy the right for a while, and give me a chance to get rid of Jim Schlesinger. He won't get on the team and cut the defense budget the way I want him to, and he took a shot at George Mahon. That means defense won't have a chance on the Hill. Besides, I never liked Jim from the start. He patronizes me and that's got to stop. Remember Truman and MacArthur.

I have to take Henry down a peg, too, but still keep him on. He's always insisted he would never give up his NSC hat, that it would ruin his prestige. He's bluffing though — he wants to stay. But I can't have it look like I'm just Henry's puppet anymore.

So I'll tell Henry he can obscure the blow to his ego with Schlesinger's scalp. I'll tell him I want Jack Marsh for the NSC job, and let him talk me into General Scowcroft — everybody thinks he's Henry's boy. Actually Scowcroft was the Joint Chiefs' boy — he came to the White House originally after the brass was caught stealing secrets from the White House, and Nixon wanted to tell the Chiefs he still trusted them.

After a couple of months in that big corner office, of course, General Scowcroft will be my guy, not the Chiefs', not Henry's. But putting him there will cool the Joint Chiefs off about Schlesinger, a nice added benefit. I'd better get the staff to stop calling him 'General' — it's really wrong for a military man to be in charge of civilians in that job. Call him 'Brent'. No more uniforms.

Funny how these problems, which are so hard to solve one by one, can be easy when you put 'em all in a bag.

The big thing, as soon as Rocky steps down, is for me to put some vice presidential candidates in the field. Rummy is dying to move, and I can't ask him to sacrifice his career running my campaign, so I'll slot him at Defense. He can use the money raise, too. He'll be good on the Hill, which is what the job needs and hasn't had since Mel Laird.

George Bush is another good prospect for a running mate. I'll make him take the CIA. George Shultz and Larry Silberman wouldn't touch it, and who can blame them? But Bush needs to come home from Peking, otherwise he can't be a factor for VP. And I've got to have a man I trust at the CIA.

Rumsfeld, Bush, what about Elliot Roosevelt? Richardson! Watch that. Gotta get well on Watergate, take the sting out of the pardon. I'll get ol' Rog Morton to step down at Commerce, he wants out anyway, and lean on him to run my campaign. Be the first Commerce Department with its own foreign policy.

Hey, this is fun. I can even give Peking to Hugh Scott, which he wants; he collects Chinese porcelain. But that would mean Shapp in Pennsylvania would appoint a Democrat to the seat. Better go slow on that. Not so much fun.

Okay, now how is this going to look? The pundits are going to make a big deal out of the victory of Kis-

singer over Schlesinger, and Henry will pretend he was really Jim's buddy, but not much of that is going to bother the folks.

What counts with the people is that I'm in charge. I hire 'em and fire 'em, and move 'em around. They'll be my team now, not a bunch of leftovers, even though nobody's new.

The decision will be seen to be mine, all mine, which is what presidents do. Oh, there'll be the usual Henry-staged-this, Rummy-engineered-that, but the impression in the

country will be — here's a president who's his own boss, who can dominate the headlines whenever he wants.

The other impression it will make is this: Here's a whole bunch of bright guys to talk about for vice president. If necessary, they can all run for president and hold their delegations — Illinois, Texas, Massachusetts — away from Reagan. Rocky may cross me up and jump in for the top job at the end, but what little support he has will be used to stop Reagan.

So I'll give the old pot a stir. Get 'em all talking about us, not the Democrats. And if everything goes to hell in a barrel next spring, I can pull out and toss the nomination up for grabs — at least there'll be a lot of good guys around to fight for it, the nomination.

Okay. It's vital for the Rockefeller announcement to come first. Then the reshuffle. If the hiring and firing starts to leak out first, then nobody will ever be able to figure out what I had in mind.

11-7-75

Joseph C. Harsch

More cautious pace for detente

America's friends (and unfriends) overseas should not expect any early or major change in American foreign or defense policy to result from U.S. President Gerald Ford's Cabinet reshuffle.

On the contrary, the changes clearly mean that President Ford himself remains committed to the search for a second-stage (SALT II) agreement with the Soviets, which also means a continuing commitment to detente.

But, the pace is likely to be slower and more cautious.

Along the road there will be less visible disagreement about these matters between the State and Defense Departments. But behind the scenes it seems probable that Pentagon doubts about detente will receive more patient and thoughtful consideration.

These are the principal conclusions which emerge from the various changes in the future location of people in Washington and their present and future personal relations with the President himself.

Perhaps the most important single change is that the Pentagon is to be headed by Donald Rumsfeld who has been the closest man to the President in the White House hierarchy and is the President's present first choice as future vice-presidential running mate.

This means that the Pentagon will have a leader who is a personal and trusted friend of the President and can get equal access to him with Secretary of State Kissinger.

So the Pentagon gains a more effective ambassador to the White House who will enjoy equality of access to the President with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

The corollary of the rise of Mr. Rumsfeld is the inevitable decline in Dr. Kissinger's power. His policies are confirmed, but his ability to push them forward to the President without scrutiny by others is much reduced.

In the past Dr. Kissinger was Director of the National Security Council and the President's assistant for all national security matters. This means that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency reported to the President through Dr. Kissinger. And that in turn meant that their views were presented to the President through Dr. Kissinger's eyes and with his gloss put upon them.

Dr. Kissinger in the future will be Secretary of State, and only Secretary of State. As such he is the senior Cabinet officer and sits on the right hand of the President at Cabinet meetings. But he also is only one among equals. He will no longer see the President alone for an hour each morning. Instead, he, and the Secretary of Defense, and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secretary of the Treasury and others will all together see the President — once a week.

Equal footing

Then add the third facet of the new equation in the person of George Bush. He also is on Mr. Ford's list of possible vice-presidential running mates. He has been in Peking and is presumably familiar with the Chinese disapproval of the Kissinger policy of detente. He will take over the CIA from William Colby. Mr. Colby has been in effect, the damage-control officer at CIA.

Mr. Bush has had no past association with the CIA. He is not responsible for past mistakes. There is no reason for Congress to want to take up most of his time as it has been doing with Mr. Colby. Once Mr. Bush is confirmed by the Senate he should be able to start operating as the President's principal source of intelligence. And the CIA, like the Defense Department, will have a leader who is a personal friend of the President and who can have the same access to him as Mr. Rumsfeld at Defense or Dr. Kissinger at State.

Collective process

So the prospect is not for any break in basic American foreign policy, but for a decided change in the process of foreign policy formulation. It will no longer be a one-man (Kissinger) show.

It will probably make for slower and more cautious foreign policy action. The Chinese point of view is likely to get more attention, through Mr. Bush. The NATO, West European, and Arab points of view may get more attention through Mr. Rumsfeld.

The collective process in foreign-policy-making is slower than the one-man process which Dr. Kissinger has been practicing. But it should be sounder.

PATTERN
OF
DIPLOMACY

The Grand Rapids Press
EDITORIAL PAGE

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1975

10-A

The Shakeup

Two assumptions were dramatically reinforced by Monday's high-level shakeup in the Ford Administration: 1. The President considers detente with the Soviet Union the keystone of his foreign policy; and 2. The economic necessity of keeping defense expenditures in check is a political imperative for the Republican incumbent, particularly as the 1976 election nears.

Given these considerations, James Schlesinger's continuation in the Cabinet was not in President Ford's best interests. By his outspoken public criticism of defense spending cuts by the Congress and his on-going power struggle with Secretary of State Kissinger, the defense secretary was undermining the very policies which Mr. Ford believes will assure "peace and prosperity" — and therefore his remaining in the White House through 1980.

Also involved in President Ford's effort to place "my guys" where he wants them are the following personalities:

— White House chief of staff (and former naval aviator, no less!) Donald Rumsfeld to be secretary of defense, replacing Mr. Schlesinger.

— Elliott Richardson, ambassador to the Court of St. James, to be secretary of commerce, replacing the ailing Rogers C. B. Morton.

— George Bush, U.S. representative to Peking, to be director of the Central Intelligence Agency, replacing William Colby.

— Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, to be the President's assistant for National Security Affairs, replacing Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. Schlesinger's dumping may have been pending for some time, but, of all the personnel changes, this last mentioned one was especially long overdue. The special arrangement by which Mr. Kissinger served simultaneously as secretary of state and national security adviser under Presidents Ford and Nixon precluded divergent opinions and placed inordinate power in one man.

The shortcomings of such a relationship were spelled out in last June's report to the President and the Congress from the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. But, apparently capitulating to the secretary of state's renowned charms, the commission was unable to bring itself to recommending that Mr. Kissinger be relieved of his duties in the area of national security. He should be the exception, it declared.

Even though that change has now been accomplished, one wonders if Secretary of State Kissinger should not have joined Mr. Schlesinger in departing the Cabinet altogether. With the Church and Pike committees deep into the investigation of this nation's intelligence community, Mr. Kissinger's involvement in the wiretapping of National Security Council members Morton Belzer, Martin, William Lake and others in 1969-70 stands a good chance of being looked at again. The secretary of state's role in that unfortunate incident was never sufficiently explored by his friendly interlocutors on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

This being so, there remains a potential for embarrassment which could be devastating as President Ford gears up for his re-election campaign.

THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD EDITORIALS

2-B*** Tues., Nov. 4, 1976

Ford's own team

THE ISSUE: Changes in President Ford's policy and political teams.

PRESIDENT FORD acted Monday to create his "own team" in the fields of foreign policy and national security, firing Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and Central Intelligence Director William E. Colby.

White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld will be nominated to succeed Schlesinger and George Bush, now chief U.S. envoy to Peking, will be named as the new CIA chief. Although the President refused, in his Monday night press conference, to criticize Schlesinger, it was common knowledge that the defense secretary has had strong differences of opinion with Secretary of State Kissinger about detente and strategic arms limitation talks.

Dr. Kissinger will continue to play the dominant role in formulating and carrying out foreign policies, the President announced, but Kissinger's wings were clipped slightly. He lost his second job as special assistant for national security affairs and will be succeeded by a close friend, Gen. Brent Scowcroft.

The President said he had delayed in making any changes in the foreign policy and national security fields until he was certain that our allies and potential adversaries understood that his elevation to the presidency to succeed Richard Nixon did not signal any change in United States' policies.

Having moved firmly to complete his own team, selecting able men he feels comfortable in working with President Ford was

simultaneously given complete freedom to name someone other than Nelson Rockefeller as his vice presidential running mate in 1976.

Rockefeller on Monday announced that he does not want to be Ford's partner in the upcoming campaign. Long the target of the conservative wing of the Republican party, Rockefeller removed himself from consideration. President Ford said he made no effort to dissuade Rockefeller from his withdrawal but added that the vice president will support Ford in 1976.

In giving new offices to Rumsfeld and Bush and in naming Elliott Richardson, now ambassador to Britain, to be the next secretary of commerce, Ford puts the spotlight on three men who could be considered as vice presidential nominees. With Rockefeller out of the picture, the field is also open to other Republicans, including many GOP senators.

Since President Ford has leaned heavily on Kissinger's foreign policy and security advice in the past, there is no reason to believe that Schlesinger's departure will signal any significant change in basic policies.

The "personnel changes," as the President described them, strengthen Ford's image as a forceful chief executive who is now ready to make his own decisions in policy areas. And Rockefeller's withdrawal as a possible candidate makes it easier for Ford to choose the most widely acceptable running mate for his political team.

Chicago Tribune

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8 Section 1 ▽ Wednesday, November 5, 1975

THE NEWSPAPER is an institution developed by modern civilization to present the news of the day, to foster commerce and industry, to inform and lead public opinion, and to furnish that check upon government which no constitution has ever been able to provide.

—THE TRIBUNE CREDO

The President's new team

In print, over the air, and in conversation, there has already been voluminous comment on President Ford's revised executive team consisting of his "guys" more than before. The President's press conference Monday did little to restrict or channel speculation about the causes and effects of the numerous changes. He was clearly committed to reticence, determined to lift no lids over the bubbling interplay between influential men that inevitably surrounds the President.

This interplay will continue. The cast changes. But the play goes on. The rolling boil at the apex of government never boils over into hard news once and for all, for the last time. If old tensions are resolved, new ones inevitably form.

The biggest gap is that left by James Schlesinger, no longer secretary of defense. But too much can be read into his replacement. Far back, President Ford indicated that Mr. Schlesinger's tenure in his cabinet might not be long. His replacement, Donald Rumsfeld, offers the President such telling advantages over his predecessor as congressional experience and political sure-footedness, in addition to being one of Mr. Ford's guys. Though Mr. Rumsfeld lacks Mr. Schlesinger's emphatic record as a hard liner, he has no record as a soft liner, either. He already is mentioned as a likely new principal rival of Secretary of State Kissinger for White House influence. There is no necessity to read into this shift any deliberate revision of policies or priorities.

Replacement of Dr. Kissinger as the President's national security adviser by Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft satisfied a valid criticism of having one man in two positions of great responsibility. There is enough work there for any two men. Two heads can be better than one, especially if they cooperate readily. As Mr. Kissinger's deputy and alternate during his frequent absences from Washington, Gen. Scowcroft is an experienced teammate. His promotion into a position of

his own removes a wrinkle without a suggestion of any disruption.

Elliot Richardson's return from London to be secretary of commerce brings back, close to the apex, one of the Republicans most attractive to liberals. Himself a victim of President Nixon's "massacre" two years ago, his presence in the cabinet will be some consolation to those who deplore Vice President Rockefeller's step towards the background. Mr. Richardson is both attractive enough and unobjectionable enough to be talked about as a possibility for Vice President. His predecessor, Rogers C. B. Morton [who has served in Interior as well as Commerce] deserves the lighter load he seeks, and may be counted on to work further for Mr. Ford's team.

The Central Intelligence Agency has had far more and more unfavorable publicity of late than the executive branch could wish, and departing director William Colby may have been too responsive to questioning to please, say, Dr. Kissinger. Besides, the agency has fence building to do, and that usually means new faces. The inexperience in the intelligence field of George Bush, brought back from Peking, may under present circumstances be a positive advantage. He means a fresh start, at least at the top.

At the White House, Mr. Rumsfeld's successor, Richard Cheney, has never worked in government for anyone but his predecessor and sponsor. Yet there is quite a distance in function and mood between the White House and the Pentagon. What Mr. Cheney will do once on his own cannot be inferred from his record in Mr. Rumsfeld's shadow. But he means continuity, as Gen. Scowcroft does.

Whether or not this new team will serve the President and the country as well as or better than the team retiring from the field remains to be seen. Every patriot hopes it will equal or, even better, surpass the generally admirable record of those leaving office.

Minneapolis Tribune



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6A

Tuesday, November 4, 1975

Rockefeller, Colby, Kissinger, Schlesinger

Domestic politics and foreign policy are cause as well as effect in the shakeup of top positions in the Ford administration. Without slighting the significance of the changes in terms of politics — internal White House politics as well as the presidential-election variety — we think it important to pay at least equal attention to the foreign-policy consequences.

Vice President Rockefeller's decision to remove himself from consideration as President Ford's running mate next year, if Ford wins the Republican nomination, opens the presidential campaign to a variety of new considerations. As last night's press conference indicated, they will be the subject of lively discussion in the coming weeks, but deserve at least this initial observation:

Rockefeller's duties in Washington and his earlier responsibilities as governor of New York have focused primary attention on his domestic political views. In particular, his past role inevitably gave him a share of the burden for New York City's current fiscal crisis. But this tends to eclipse the fact that Rockefeller brought to the vice presidency unusual experience and understanding in foreign affairs. That aspect of qualifications is something to keep in mind during the speculation about Republican vice-presidential candidates.

The foreign-policy consequences of the shifts in leading figures in the national-security establishment are more evident. George Bush, named to succeed William Colby as head of the CIA, seems to have performed competently heading U.S. missions to the United Nations and to China. There's no reason to think he would do otherwise as director of central intelligence. Also, in view of the changes coming in the intelligence establishment, there's much to be said for replacing an intelligence insider like Colby with an outsider like Bush.

A secretary of commerce is as much concerned with domestic as with foreign economic policy, and Elliot Richardson brings to Ford's new team impressive experience in both. Replacing Rogers Morton, who is leaving government, Richardson in the past seven years has held senior or top positions at State, Health, Education and Welfare;

Defense, and Justice Departments before his present post as ambassador to Britain. He should be a valuable addition to the Cabinet.

The change involving the State Department and the National Security Council is overdue. Until the advent of Henry Kissinger, the job of secretary of state was not considered a condition of underemployment that required additional duties as national-security adviser to the president. It makes sense to limit Kissinger's assignment to that of secretary of state. We are less sure about the wisdom of naming Kissinger's security-council deputy, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the new security adviser. Our reservation is not because of doubts about Scowcroft's abilities, but because of questions about the independence he will have from Kissinger. Those questions remain despite the president's praise last night for Scowcroft's "independent mind;" they can be answered only by observing what happens in the months ahead.

The president's firing of James Schlesinger was unexpected, even though Ford as vice president had once indicated he might look for a new defense secretary if he became president. We agree with Sen. Jackson's characterization of Schlesinger as "a man of courage, integrity and honor." But none of those qualities is at issue. The defense secretary has demonstrated an unusual grasp of his subject and has presented his case well; no one questions his dedication. Interestingly, his arguments against cuts in military expenditures are consistent with Ford's views — and, as the president said at his press conference, are consistent with the views of White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld, Ford's choice for a replacement.

But Schlesinger's position on negotiations with the Soviet Union is at variance with Kissinger's. The secretary of state sees an urgent need to bring the current phase of strategic-arms talks to fruition; the secretary of defense wants more concessions from the Russians than Kissinger believes are possible or essential. In that situation the president may have felt he had to make a choice between his two leading advisers on security and defense matters. It is no slight to Schlesinger to say that we hope the president's choice was sound and a limit on nuclear weapons will be the result.

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Page 6

Wednesday, November 5, 1975

'These Are My Guys'

PRESIDENT FORD has exercised what he says is the right of every president, the right to have his own men running his administration.

What does it mean?

First, it means that a sort of palace warfare which has been going on within the administration for several months has come to an end.

It has been no secret that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger were at odds over foreign policy.

Kissinger has had his sails trimmed, and Schlesinger is out. Instead we now have Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon and Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft as the chief of national security in the White House.

How much Kissinger's sails were trimmed remains to be seen. Certainly it was a good idea to end the dual role he has been playing so long that some began to question whether the President or Kissinger was running the country. Nobody, not even a person of Kissinger's remarkable abilities, can do for long the many things he has been trying to do. He has done a fine job on such critical items as dealing with Moscow, Peking and the Mideast. But he surely has neglected a lot of the rest of the world. And there are trouble spots in Latin America and in Africa which could become crisis centers in the future and so should be getting more attention now.

But Kissinger still has his own man in the White House, for Scowcroft was his No. 2 man there. If Scowcroft thought as Kissinger did about matters, Kissinger now has two voices instead of just one in the morning sessions with the President.

Kissinger thus becomes No. 1 among equals in the new arrangement.

Rumsfeld comes to the Pentagon after several tough assignments in the Nixon administration and after being Ford's White House chief of staff. The only question about this change is whether he can master the technicalities of the military quickly enough to swing weight there.

Schlesinger had many supporters because of his concerns about detente and his insistence upon superiority in arms for the United States in the SALT agreements. But Kissinger argued Schlesinger was carrying his opposition too far. Toward the end it was a highly technical argument over what kind of bombers and missiles were to be included in the SALT II agreements.

Kissinger argued that Schlesinger's nit-picking was making impossible the progress that was needed to get the new agreement to signatures. His view obviously prevailed with the President. The new agreement now likely will be signed before long. The question is whether dumping Schlesinger will make it harder to get congressional approval of that agreement.

But the differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger went beyond the SALT and detente issues. Schlesinger also was miffed about Kissinger making military promises abroad without consulting the Pentagon. This issue came to a head in the dispute about Pershing missiles for Israel.

That sort of squabbling could not continue. And the President's way of ending it was to dismiss Schlesinger, probably because he thought he still needs Kissinger.

THE OTHER CHANGES in this "my-own-team" maneuver involved sending George Bush in to replace William Colby as chief of the Central Intelligence Agency and bringing Ambassador Elliot Richardson back from England to become secretary of commerce. Both of them have become sort of utility outfielders in the administration. As someone has said, Richardson is building up to become the first winner of the decathlon of the Cabinet.

Finding a replacement for Bush in Peking may prove a bit difficult. The Chinese are not at all pleased with detente because of the confrontation they continue to have with the Soviet Union. Every easing of U.S.-Soviet relations, they feel, makes their own problem more acute.

Richardson not only has proved durable but also effective and honorable. Commerce is a somewhat obscure post, but Richardson needed to come home if he was to have a political future. His appointment may prove to be the "sleeper" play. The President could have him in mind as a possible running mate in 1976, and he would be a popular one.

SO POLITICS has played a strong part in these changes, no matter what the President says.

The President surely felt he had to demonstrate his own capacity to make decisions. And he had to end the pickering which had kept the country at a year before the election. In one weekend he has accomplished both objectives.

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The Globe-Democrat is an independent newspaper printing the news impartially, supporting what it believes to be right and opposing what it believes to be wrong without regard to party politics.

EARTHQUAKE IN WASHINGTON

The political earthquake triggered by President Ford's dismissal of Defense Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director Colby had not been felt fully before Vice President Rockefeller announced he was withdrawing from consideration for the second spot on the Republican ticket next year.

Rockefeller's departure can be considered as addition by subtraction. President Ford is spared the embarrassment of having to maneuver into position to dump Rockefeller in an effort to appease conservative Republicans. While Mr. Ford had maintained that he was satisfied with Rockefeller, the President's campaign manager long ago had put out the word that Rocky was a handicap.

Far more important than political futures is the state of the nation's security. In sacking Schlesinger to satisfy Secretary of State Kissinger, the President has committed a grave disservice to the nation. Colby's dismissal, while anticipated, is unwarranted. He has been made the scapegoat for any real or imagined sins committed by his predecessors in the CIA.

AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Schlesinger has been more than competent. He has been a bastion of strength against the coalition in Congress that has set the country on a course of weakness through injudicious spending for unessentials, at the expense of national defense. It is distressing that President Ford appears willing to accommodate Congress in this misdirection.

CIA Director Colby's assessments of Soviet military expenditures and forces have been the same as Schlesinger's.

Schlesinger has taken his duties seriously and with patriotic fervor. He has not been timid about speaking out against the policy of detente pursued by Secretary Kissinger, nor has he hesitated to oppose the concessions for Soviet superiority being made by Kissinger in the SALT talks.

It could be calamitous for the country that Kissinger has had his way. The Secretary of State has a reputation for being a negotiator of consummate skill but there is ample evidence that in dealings with the Soviets he

is vastly over-rated. It is easy to be regarded as a great negotiator by the other side if one gives everything away.

★ ★ ★

PRESIDENT FORD'S CHOICE of Donald H. Rumsfeld to succeed Schlesinger cannot excite enthusiasm. Rumsfeld, a confidante of the President who has been serving as his chief of staff, is a former Illinois congressman who served as head of the Office of Economic Opportunity. His performance in that role showed he was an opportunist. Rumsfeld twice overruled former Gov. Warren E. Hearnes' vetoes of funding for improper Legal Aid services. Rumsfeld's brief tenure as Ambassador to NATO does not especially qualify him to be Defense Secretary. His claim to the appointment is purely political because of his closeness to Ford.

George H. Bush, who will be nominated to succeed Colby at CIA, is also a former congressman. A wealthy New Englander who became a transplanted Texan, he headed the United States delegation to the United Nations and served as chairman of the Republican National Committee before being assigned to Peking as American liaison officer to Communist China. Bush appears to have the knowledge, ability and integrity to serve as CIA director, though Colby should have been retained in fairness to a man who has performed admirably under great stress.

The cabinet shakeup should widen the opening for Ronald Reagan to make his anticipated move against Ford. But Reagan expressed shock and surprise at Rockefeller's withdrawal and there is speculation the former California governor's position may be weakened now that the New Yorker is out of the picture as a target of conservative criticism.

Time will be needed to assess the impact in all its ramifications. For now it is appalling that a man of Secretary Schlesinger's character and ability should be sacrificed to satisfy Kissinger's thirst for power. The nation is the loser in this unsavory bloodletting.

entalists

Piffiab to the Rescue

By William Safire

WASHINGTON—For the fun of publicly examining the spy system, we have called in from the cold, a blown-cover charge must be paid: America's much-needed intelligence community is rattled and depressed, and finds it difficult to function.

In White House offices, the word "Piffiab" is heard in connection with rebuilding the morale as well as the control structure of our intelligence system. It is an extruded acronym of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board: PFIAB.

For years, this has been the most blue-ribbon of all the boards and commissions that abound in Washington. Its monthly sessions are regularly attended by a dozen of the nation's most respected citizens, including inventor Edward Land, scientist Edward Teller, publisher Gordon Gray, lawyer Leo Cherne, writer Clare Booth Luce and ex-everything George Shultz.

Unfortunately, Piffiab in the past six years has been dominated by Henry Kissinger through Nelson Rockefeller, a member before becoming Vice President; its staff and budget are small, its oversight capability thereby limited.

The idea now is to change all that by bringing in a few more prestigious people and giving the board much more to do. A few weeks ago, President Ford intended to expand the board to fifteen members, including:

¶ Lane Kirkland, secretary-treasurer of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., the number two man in organized labor and well-versed in C.I.A. affairs after his service on the C.I.A. investigative panel.

¶ John Connally, who had served on Piffiab twice before, resigning when he was indicted; in fairness, acquittal ought to be followed by reinstatement.

¶ Edward Bennett Williams, whose representation of unpopular clients and ownership of the embattled injury-ridden Washington Redskins uniquely qualified him for C.I.A. involvement; like Kirkland, Williams is a Democrat—in fact, treasurer of the party.

¶ William J. Casey, retiring president of the Export-Import Bank, ex-S.E.C. head who was one of the organizers of allied intelligence in World War II.

White House aides went over this list with Henry Kissinger, who will not be criticized in this space on a national holiday. The Secretary of State had no objection to Williams, in whose box he sits to cheer the Redskins on, or to Connally, whose use of power he had come to respect in years past, but Kirkland and Casey were anathema.

Mr. Kirkland's sin was in his fierce denunciation of appeasement in the name of détente, and his warm approval of some of Senator Scoop Jackson's speeches, worst of all—in State's

eyes—when Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn came to Washington, the Soviet writer was the house guest of Lane Kirkland and his wife, Elena, who is also unashamedly pro-Israel.

Secretary Kissinger gave no special reason for opposing Mr. Casey, but House aides assumed that he remembered the work of the Murphy Commission: On that panel, Bill Casey was one who insisted that the National Security Adviser not also wear the hat of a Cabinet officer.

President Ford yielded to Kissinger on Kirkland, but not on Casey, who had also been slated for Piffiab's chairmanship to replace George W. Anderson, the former Chief of Naval Operations. The President decided to appoint Casey as a member but to keep Admiral Anderson on as chairman; after the firing of James Schlesinger, it suddenly seemed a good idea to keep aboard a man suspicious of Soviet SALT intentions.

These appointments are scheduled to be made "between Peking and Vail," in the travel-marked White House calendar, and will dovetail with some far-reaching structural recommendations about the scope of Director of Central Intelligence's job and the degree of intelligence oversight to be exercised within the executive branch.

An Office of Management and Budget task force is now working on options about the nature of the assignment. George Bush has been nominated for. This is known as the "Option Three routine": Option One will be to leave everything the way it is, with the Director of Intelligence trying to play the dual role of C.I.A. chief and overall intelligence-community defender (which is now impossible); Option Two will be to appoint a White House intelligence czar (which would frighten everyone and raise an uproar); and Option Three (which is the one usually chosen), to ask Congress to separate the job of director from the job of administrator of C.I.A.

That's not all. Plans call for Piffiab's staff to be beefed up so as to handle an important new source of information: copies of all reports by the Inspectors General of the various intelligence agencies. Every spook knows how significant that would be: The Inspector General's report of May 21, 1973, was the basis for almost all the information brought out by all the subsequent committees and commissions.

With such changes, and despite the separate pressures of church and State, America's intelligence system can come out of its bunker. We will better be able to know what our opponents are doing and how strong we need to be. On this weekend, the prospect of having our intelligence community again doing its job—and only its job—is no small matter to be thankful for.



Fritz Scholder

significantly, the hosts at the meet- will be Montana Indian leaders, as l as the Northern Rockies Action up, a Helena-based environmental ization that has worked closely i both Indians and whites.

he conference may not end all fric- . But if it dispels some of the mis- rmation and distrust now blighting tions between Indians and environ- talists, it may start them happily t) ath that many believe they al- naturally be following together.

n M. Josephy Jr., who is a senior or of American Heritage and has ten many articles and books on ans, is active in national environ- tal organizations.

Letters to the Editor

C.I.A.: The Case for George Bush

To the Editor:

The C.I.A. has been under attack for allegedly violating its charter, which restricts it to foreign intelligence operations; for alleged assassination plots against foreign heads of state and for other peccadillos. Senator Frank Church, Idaho Democrat, heads one committee which is investigating the C.I.A. President Ford has nominated George Bush as the new director of the C.I.A. The Times, The Baltimore Sun, Senator Church and Senator Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, have indicated preimature opposition to Bush even before he has testified. Let us look at the record.

If confirmed, Bush will bring a Phi Beta Kappa from Yale, considerable experience as an administrator in the business world, experience as a naval aviator in World War II, experience as a two-term Congressman and experience gained in two most delicate, sensitive and high positions in diplomacy, chief of the U.S. mission to mainland China and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. In other words, he brings intelligence, proven executive capacity and a thorough grounding in foreign affairs. The objections to him are that he also served as chairman of the Republican National Committee and that he is not a professional spook and is an "outsider" to the intelligence community.

Consider that the C.I.A. is under attack for acts allegedly performed

under the direction of "insiders," or professionals. Do we, at this time, want another "insider" or do we want a fresh, inquisitive "outsider"? Is Bush the first "outsider"? No, John McCone served as C.I.A. director. He was not a professional spook. More recently, James R. Schlesinger served as C.I.A. director. What were Schlesinger's credentials? He came from the academic world in 1969 to serve first as an assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget and then as head of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1972, when he became C.I.A. director. Not a professional and not an "insider."

J.F.K. selected brother Bobby Kennedy to be Attorney General of the United States. R.F.K. had no previous experience as a prosecutor but did have terrific partisan experience as J.F.K.'s campaign manager. The Attorney General is over the F.B.I., the domestic intelligence gathering agency in this country. Did Senators Church and Proxmire vote to confirm partisan, nonprofessional "outsider" R.F.K. to that sensitive job? Did The Times and The Sun approve? Some say R.F.K. worked out well. Does Bush deserve the same opportunity? Can confirmation and approval of Bobby Kennedy, McCone and Schlesinger square with the a priori attempted knifing of George Bush? I think not.

ANTHONY J. P. FARRIS
Houston, Nov. 11, 1975

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To the Editor:

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Brouhaha over Bush nomination ignores sins of Watergate, CIA

By Creed C. Black

Knight News Wire

George Bush is a friend of mine, a fact which no doubt colors my reaction to his nomination to head the Central Intelligence Agency. Even so, it seems to me there is a lot of nonsense in the opposition to him on the grounds that he is a political figure.

Many people wonder whether the voters really learned anything from Watergate. The building brouhaha over the Bush nomination leads me to wonder if his critics in Congress learned anything.

It was not, please recall, career politicians who were the architects of Watergate. Most of the principal figures in that sorry chapter in our national life — except Nixon himself — had never run for office. They were appointed to the jobs they ultimately disgraced, and they brought to them a sense of elitism which often reflected little understanding or respect for the democratic process.

Why, then, all this hand-wringing because President Ford wants to bring George Bush home from Peking to take over the CIA? Listening to some of the critics, anyone familiar with the recent history of the CIA would think that it is an agency with an unblemished record, achieved under the direction of non-po-

litical professionals, which now is threatened with all kinds of dire consequences because the President wants one of "my guys" in charge.

In fact, however, the CIA's record is anything but unblemished. Newsweek magazine capsuled it well. I thought, when it wrote that "during several months of nearly non-stop hearings, a dozen congressional committees have un-cloaked the agency's darkest secrets and revealed a tale of assassination plots, links to organized crime, illegal spying on U.S. citizens and downright incompetence."

All that, it should be remembered, occurred under the leadership of the so-called intelligence "professionals." It has now been 11 years since Tom Ross and Dave Wise wrote their definitive study of the American intelligence community entitled — aptly and frighteningly — "The Invisible Government." The intelligence apparatus, they wrote, had achieved "a quasi-independent status and a power of its own," and they argued that "the public, the President and the Congress must support steps to control the intelligence establishment, to place checks on its power and to make it truly accountable."

One thing that has become obvious in the current spate of investigations is that

Congress has neglected its own responsibility to keep the CIA in line. There is some question, too, about just how effective and vigilant presidents have been.

"No president since Dwight Eisenhower," a Washington correspondent of the New York Times wrote recently, "has been entirely comfortable with his director of intelligence. The last two Presidents have been downright wary."

Mr. Ford is breaking that pattern by choosing someone with whom he does feel comfortable — and in whom he has confidence. He is choosing a man who is intelligent, who made his mark and his millions in private industry before entering public life, who has served with distinction in both elective and non-elective positions and who has come through a difficult time in our political history with his integrity untarnished.

In the final analysis, I suppose, it comes down to the question of whether one trusts Gerald Ford and George Bush. Is it their aim to reform the CIA and bring it back under control, or is it their aim to implement still further excesses of its awesome power for partisan advantage?

I come down on the side of the integrity and decency of both men and welcome what seems to me to be an attempt by the President to take charge of that invisible government which has been left on its own too long.

Post Nov. 23
Ed. PG.

New York Times
11/5/75

THE NEW

JAWORSKI SAYS HE CLEARED BUSH

Defends C.I.A. Nominee in
1970 Fund-Raising Issue

By JAMES P. STERBA

Special to The New York Times

HOUSTON, Nov. 7—George Bush was found to have had "no involvement" in illegal political fund-raising activities and was given a clean bill of health by the Watergate special prosecutor, said here today. Mr. Bush, investigated for having received funds from an illegal Republican committee, was nominated by President Ford this week to head the Central Intelligence Agency. He is currently serving as head of the United States mission in Peking.

In a speech today, Mr. Jaworski strongly defended Mr. Bush, saying, "I read that the Honorable George Bush recently nominated to head the C.I.A. is being mentioned in news columns as being under suspicion and perhaps even accusation of having violating the campaign fund laws in years past.

"Well, it so happens that this was investigated by me

when I served as Watergate special prosecutor, and I found no involvement of Mr. Bush and gave him full clearance. I hope that, in the interest of fairness, the matter will not be bandied about unless something new appears on the horizon."

In his unsuccessful senatorial campaign against Lloyd Bentsen in 1970, Mr. Bush received \$106,000 from an illegal and unregistered committee set up under White House direction to channel money to about 100 candidates for the House and Senate whom President Nixon wanted to see elected, according to evidence given to the special prosecutor.

Recipients Not Charged

Of that amount, \$56,000 was reportedly channeled through legitimate committees to the Bush campaign and reported under campaign finance laws. But \$40,000 was wired on Oct. 16, 1970, to a Houston advertising agency employed by Mr. Bush, and was not reported, according to evidence submitted to the special prosecutor.

The dispensers of money from the fund, including Herbert W. Kalmbach, who was then President Nixon's personal attorney, were charged with campaign finance violations and pleaded guilty. However, none of the recipients of money from the fund were charged.

Mr. Jaworski spoke at a con-

Jewish Leader Says Inflation Is Threat For Congregations

Special to The New York Times

DALLAS, Nov. 7—A lay leader of American Reform Judaism said today that the gap between the nation's inflation and the income from congregational dues posed a serious threat to the development of 715 Reform congregations in this country and Canada.

Matthew H. Ross of New York, chairman of the board

of former agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

He told the former agents that he had been urged to investigate the possibility that the C.I.A. and E. Howard Hunt Jr., a convicted Watergate conspirator and former C.I.A. agent and White House consultant, were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy after someone said they thought they had recognized Mr. Hunt in a photograph taken in Dallas on Nov. 22, 1963, when Mr. Kennedy was killed.

Mr. Jaworski said he had the photograph enlarged and that the man "did not even remotely resemble Howard Hunt."

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THE DALLAS TIMES HERALD

EDITORIALS

2—D* **Wed., May. 5, 1975

Stability for CIA

THE ISSUE: The appointment of Texan George Bush as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

IF PRESIDENT FORD'S lightning move in nominating George Bush to directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency is intended to stabilize the shell-pocked body, it is wise and timely.

If it is a political musical chairs arrangement, it is a disservice to a country already wracked by too much shaking and rattling of high governmental levels.

Now under a constant drumfire from congressional committee investigators, the once respected and effective American intelligence apparatus needs, desperately, reestablishment of an atmosphere of confidence.

If we are successfully to stay abreast of international complexities in a world that knows little trust between nations, the CIA must have professional guidance that is two cuts above suspicion and reproach.

George Bush can do that—if he is placed there to do just that and not perform as a political puppet.

The former Texas Congressman who has been recalled from the isolation of his post as American liaison to China, knows full well that his CIA appointment could

mean dropping from political sight — if he does his job properly. And he will.

If we are to halt the procession of servants who have been in and out of the CIA directorship these past few years, George Bush could be an excellent terminal point. He will learn his trade because he is a skilled, highly intelligent man who long since has given his life to service.

It is dangerous to establish a dynasty, such as a J. Edgar Hoover era in the FBI that was fruitful but just lasted too long. But it also is shortsighted and dangerous to run four men through the CIA directorship since 1973.

We have known Richard Helms, 1966-73; James Schlesinger, 1973; William Colby, 1973-75; and now George Bush. It can only make for the confusion and distrust now charged to the agency. Different men set different policies and the real work of intelligence is being buried under the shifting winds of power and policy.

Now we face the further very possible prospect of having Texan Bush installed and then lifted again if Gerald Ford decides to put the popular young figure on his ticket. It is not the way to run an intelligence railroad.

NOTE TO EDITOR: This copy is OCR ready and was done with a Courier 12 element.

THE NICK THIMMESCH COLUMN

RELEASE DATE: Tuesday, November 18, 1975

SEN. CHURCH, ALL POLITICIANS AREN'T UNTRUSTWORTHY

by Nick Thimmesch

(c) 1975, Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON--It's hard to buy Sen. Frank Church's (D-Ida.) argument that George Bush, our man in Peking, should not become CIA director simply because he's a politician and can't be trusted to perform with true independence.

Sen. Church, a politician, is in charge of the investigation of the CIA and loudly proclaims (ital) his (unital) independence. Moreover, Church has ambitions to become President, and in that office, as a politician, he would have final authority over the CIA. Therefore, could Church be trusted by his own standard?

The question about Bush should be whether he is qualified to run our nation's top intelligence agency, and whether he has the character and reputation to perform independent of political considerations.

(Paragraph continues)

Page Two...NICK THIMMESCH...November 18...considerations.

Is Bush a good man for the job, no matter whether he is politician, diplomat, businessman, lawyer or apple farmer?

Now Church started this fuss about politicians being trustworthy enough to preside over our intelligence campus at Langley, Va., on Face the Nation last week, when he said Bush "could not be a poorer choice."

Church's reasoning is that Bush, as past chairman of the Republican Party and personal veteran of several political campaigns, has been smitten fatally with politics. Church would not rule out people who have served in government, or those worthy ones who haven't, and he would even make an exception to his "no politicians" rule for Elliot Richardson because he stood up to the White House during the "Saturday Night Massacre."

Since George Bush was never put to that test, we don't know how he would have stood up, or even how Church might stand up. And we really don't know if he truly is running the CIA investigation in a nonpartisan manner, do we?

Anyway, Church had scarcely unburdened himself of his judgment on Bush when he was on the Senate floor (Nov. 11) essaying on CIA professionalism, free of politics, and how his

(Sentence continues)

'Page Three...NICK THIMMESCH...November 18...how his

own investigation has been fair and nonpartisan. Again, he rejected Bush as an "ill-advised" appointment to the CIA and laid down what we can call Church's High Standard for the CIA Directorship, a man who could say:

"No, Mr. President (of the U.S.A.), I believe you are wrong. According to our best information, the policy you propose will fail. It is based upon incorrect assumptions, which are contradicted by the underlying facts."

Well, I suppose each nominee for the CIA post could memorize this lofty pronouncement and thus pass Church's test. But then someone would come up with another test, and yet another, and before you know it the old Washington paper mill would be whirring as usual.

Now it's abundantly clear that former CIA Director Richard Helms, still our ambassador to Iran, left his fingerprints over all sorts of questionable CIA projects before burning and otherwise destroying his papers, memos and tapes during the Watergate furor. Helms is from a gentlemanly background, like Bush, and is not a politician.

Still, two inveterate politicians, Melvin Laird and Donald Rumsfeld, resisted questionable Nixon Administration pressures when they held important positions. (MORE)

Page Four...NICK THIMMESCH...November 18...positions.

It was David Young, co-chief of the White House "plumbers," who in the name of President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger tried to get information on Daniel Ellsberg from the Pentagon but failed, because Laird knew how to protect himself. Same with Rumsfeld, whose eager beavers in the Nixon campaign took soundings at the Cost of Living Council on getting favors for campaign contributors. Rumsfeld instructed staffers to shut off any such inquiries. Laird and Rumsfeld did this because of their political experience.

As for Bush, he certainly was nonpartisan when he served as our ambassador to the United Nations, and he is regarded as doing a good job as head of the U.S. liaison mission in Peking. While he has been discreet in not discussing his present nomination, Bush is criticized for saying, in all honesty, that he wasn't sure that he had ended his political career forever. He also observed that "if anybody can perceive this job as a springboard to political fortune, well, he's been hallucinating."

The White House is being quiet about the Bush nomination, especially since it is under fire in the Senate.

(Paragraph continues)

Page Five...NICK THIMMESCH...November 18...Senate.

Hearings on the nomination will be held in January by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman.

Bush will probably get cleared by that committee, but there will likely be a ruckus on the Senate floor where he is given an odds-on chance of being confirmed.

Meanwhile, Bush would be smart to heed the recommendation of Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield who says Bush should publicly renounce any intention to seek the Republican vice-presidential nomination in 1976.

(c) 1975, Los Angeles Times

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LOS ANGELES TIMES SYNDICATE/Times Mirror Square, Los Angeles,

Calif. 90053

6 A The Dallas Morning News Tuesday, November 4, 1975

Bush's CIA appointment fraught with career dangers

By JOHN GEDDIE

Washington Bureau of The News

WASHINGTON—Many politicians feel that the return of George Bush may lead to the White House—but others insist his appointment to head the Central Intelligence Agency may be the end of the road.

A close friend of Bush conceded that as of the time he spoke—before any elaboration by the President—that the best point in Bush's favor is that the CIA job brings him physically back to the United States and before the public.

The acquaintance—and



GEORGE
BUSH

Nominated
for CIA
head.

several other Washington sources—had predicted that Bush would return from China in time to lend his party popularity to the President's re-election campaign.

But none had foreseen that Bush would return to head the CIA—a position which in addition to its current stigma would allow Bush little or no forum to speak out on various issues in support of Ford.

ONE CLOSE supporter, caught by surprise by the developments of the day, could only speculate that the appointment might be temporary—freeing Bush for campaign work and possibly as the vice-presidential candidate.

Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., apparently thought politics when he heard Bush was returning.

"I think a lot of Bush," he said. "Bringing Bush back from China is a logical step . . . I've always advocated a man like George Bush. I think he'd be an excellent vice-president."

As a Republican and a possible candidate, however, Bush does not enjoy acceptance from all Democrats, even fellow Texans.

"I had thought Bush had been appointed everything he could be appointed to by the Republicans," said Rep. Charles Wilson, D-Lulkin. "But I had forgotten the CIA."

HE SUGGESTED that Bush's qualifications for CIA director are "about the same as for going to China."

"I'm sure Bush will be his old personable self and won't offend anybody," Wilson added.

Wilson relayed the rumor that Bush was brought back so that Sen. Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the minority leader, could have the China job.

Democrat Olin Teague, D-College Station, said flatly that he wants Bush in the CIA.

"George Bush will do a good job," Teague said. "He has had the experience with the U.N."

Rep. Jim Collins, R-Dallas, would be happy to sup-

port Bush on the ticket, although the conservative apparently leans first toward John Connally and Ronald Reagan.


"HE CAME THROUGH clean and straight from the Republican chairmanship and went to China "and still maintained his equilibrium," Collins said. "George must be the most capable administrator in Washington."

However, Collins questioned the politics involved in Bush's return. He said that Donald Rumsfeld, the

White House chief of staff to be sent to the Defense department in the shift, may be in a stronger position from the Pentagon power base.

Pete Rousell, a native Texan long associated with Bush, but now an aide to Rumsfeld at the White House, declined to comment on any possible rivalry.

"I'm sure that George Bush, no matter what job he is selected to do, will show the outstanding qualities he has shown in all his previous assignments," he said.




"Golly, Mr. Bush, we feel we already know you. ... We've been reading your mail for years!"

Chico Trut 11-9-95

Balt. Sun


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"MR. BUSH WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOUR OFFICE,
MR. RUMSFELD WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOUR OFFICE,
MR. RICHARDSON WOULD --- "

As Dobbin Sees It...

"THIS IS MY TEAM!"



NEGATIVE - CB

Garry Wills

March Stan 12/4/75

Shabby appointment may help

Sen. Church says he's afraid that the choice of a partisan like George Bush to head the CIA will undermine the professional spirit of that agency. Odd, isn't it? Church has been pretending to fight that spirit in his intelligence hearings, and how he wants to restore it.

That tends to confirm the general opinion in Washington that, between the two intelligence hearings going on, Sen. Church's committee has the staff but not the will and Rep. Pike's committee has the will but not the staff.

Church went on to say that he had no objection to a good Republican in the CIA post, just so long as he has not been a national chairman for his party — and he gave Elliot Richardson's name as an example. That's pretty odd, too.

Mr. Richardson came out of the Watergate scandal like a white knight. But those of us who had seen him run errands for Nixon in Cabinet post after Cabinet post wondered, even then, whether his reputation was earned. Nixon did not choose his attorney general lightly, in that period of turmoil.

Now we can read, in the special prosecutor's final report, that Richardson tried to hem in Archibald Cox, and only when Cox stood firm did Richardson realize he would have to fall honorably with Cox or he would fall farther down, and dishonorably, with Nixon himself.

That is not much of a recommendation for the CIA

post — or for any other post. Richardson lent his appearance of rectitude to Nixon in every way he could, before saving his own skin at the last minute. Those who talk about Donald Rumsfeld's ambition have not begun to plumb that quality's depth until they see Richardson in action.

But what about Bush? His brief service as national chairman during Watergate involved nothing nearly as compromising as Richardson's aborted efforts to help Nixon from the Justice Department. Indeed, the stress on Bush's chairmanship is entirely misplaced. A more revealing episode was his service as U.N. ambassador during the time of Nixon's opening to China.

The right wing was never on solid ground than in charging that Nixon betrayed a thousand promises to Taiwan, to Chiang Kai-shek, and to the old China lobby. To deflate this charge, Nixon sent Bush to vociferate against Taiwan's expulsion from the U.N.

Bush acted too well to keep his reputation among sharp observers. If he really felt as deeply for Taiwan as he pretended, he would not have lent himself to a charade that advanced Nixon's wooing of the People's Republic. He was not there to help Chiang. He was sent on a diversion to block some of the right wing's early criticism of détente.

The ploy worked as well as could be expected. When Bush, mission accomplish-

ed, was moved from the U.N. to the national committee, William F. Buckley (the educated man's Howard Cosell) wrote: "It crossed the mind fleetingly that Bush was being punished, rather belatedly in the last weeks of 1972, for having failed to achieve the desired result in the General Assembly in the fall of 1971 on the China debate."

Mr. Buckley rejected the fleeting thought, but on irrelevant grounds; he never hints to his readers that Bush accomplished exactly the desired result — which was to blunt in some measure the protests of men like Mr. Buckley, who could swallow the Bush effort as a sincere one.

Sen. Church regrets that a known partisan should become head of the CIA. He misses the point, at several levels. Bush's offense is not that he served honorably as Republican national chairman, but that he served cynically as part of Nixon's trickiest move at the U.N. Thus it is true that Bush has no claim to nonpartisan professionalism — and that is why I hope he gets confirmed as head of the CIA. The CIA's ethos of gentlemen freelancers needs to be undermined, and a shabby appointment will help.

Rep. Michael Harrington told me, when we discussed the Church and Pike committees: "They cannot bring down the CIA. Those guys will have to bring themselves down." Perhaps President Ford, without knowing it, has begun that process with his nomination of Bush.

Birmingham
News 11/5

Viewpoint

Analysis, comment and opinion

Shakeup a disaster for Ford

BY ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

WASHINGTON — While the sacking of Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and retirement of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller were intended to reinvigorate politically a failing President Ford, incompetent execution of an ill-conceived project has further undermined his prospects for the Republican nomination.

Congenital bungling at the Ford White House botched up plans to announce Rockefeller's exit from the 1976 ticket several days before Schlesinger was handed his head. Even so, the White House grossly overestimated political benefits from Rockefeller's exit and underestimated Schlesinger's esteem among conservative Republicans.

Moreover, the events of Sunday and Monday gave the nation a picture of Byzantine intrigue and ruthless personal treatment supposedly alien to the friendly, decent presidency of Jerry Ford. Only Richard M. Nixon's Saturday night massacre of 1973 has so dismayed high administration officials, senior bureaucrats and Republican politicians. Their reading is nearly unanimous: A disaster for Mr. Ford.

The plan

THE WHITE HOUSE intended to stop the President's accelerating decline with this plan: On Monday, Rockefeller would announce his unavailability for vice president — a headline event placating the Republican Party's dominant right wing. At midweek, Mr. Ford would fire Schlesinger — a secondary event that would demonstrate the President's decisive control of foreign affairs.

At Schlesinger's request, the secretary of defense met with the President Saturday from 11:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. in a cordial discussion of defense matters. Although Mr. Ford days before had decided to fire him, he did not want to tip his hand before Rockefeller bowed out. So, contrary to his image of openness and candor, Mr. Ford gave Schlesinger no clue to his fate.

Unfortunately for the President's plans, however, Newsweek's reporters found out. With Schlesinger alerted by them, he was summoned to see the President at 8:30 a.m. Sunday (encountering William Colby leaving Mr. Ford's of-

fice after having been fired as CIA director). The President added insult to injury by offering to name Schlesinger head of the Export-Import Bank or ambassador to London. Dr. Schlesinger declined.

Even at this late hour, the White House hoped to hold back the news until Rockefeller's letter to the President was made public. But Pentagon sources leaked out news of the Sunday morning massacre.

What was worse for Mr. Ford, the impression was not decisive presidential leadership but supremacy for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his long, bitter feud with Schlesinger. It was believed throughout Washington Kissinger had solidified his mastery over foreign policy by forcing out his one effective rival while only nominally surrendering his national security adviser's role to a trusted protege, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft.

On Monday morning, Dr. Kissinger heatedly protested to a colleague that he was being misjudged. "Believe me," said Kissinger, whose word is not always believed, "This was done over my dead body." Kissinger and others in the administration point to a different manipulator of these events: White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld, arch-enemy of Rockefeller who will succeed Schlesinger at the Pentagon.

Undervalued standing

APART FROM Byzantine palace politics, the White House undervalued Schlesinger's standing with conservatives in and out of Congress, who consider him the one hard-line anti-Communist voice inside the administration. Although Schlesinger may have pressed too hard in recent attempts to restore defense cuts in Congress, he is highly regarded among congressional Republicans — far more highly than either Kissinger or ex-Congressman Rumsfeld.

Mr. Ford never has cared for Schlesinger's professorial style, and their lack of personal rapport was aggravated recently by a budget dispute: Schlesinger's adamant refusal to cut back Pentagon spending in conformity with the President's election year tax cut. Rumsfeld at the Pentagon will offer no such opposition, which deeply worries conservative congressmen.

Chic. Trib.

11-8-75

Bill Anderson

Senators will try to dig out Rumsfeld's arms attitude

WASHINGTON — There's little doubt that Donald Rumsfeld will emerge from the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings as secretary of Defense and will do so personally unscathed.

But there will be sharp questioning about where the 43-year-old native of Illinois really stands on arms parity between the United States and Russia.

The clever Rumsfeld has already headed off some of the potential problems of a confirmation hearing by making visits to the members in their offices.

His private reassurances of cooperation have not, however, dampened the prospects of hard cross-examination to determine where he differs with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on how firm to be with the Soviets.

Sen. Strom Thurmond [S. C.] will lead the Republican side in the challenge while Sen. Henry M. Jackson [D., Wash.] is equally prepared to quiz the "whiz kid" of the G. O. P. Jackson indicates he may not vote for confirmation.

Although Rumsfeld first came to Washington in 1962 as a G. O. P. congressman from the North Shore of Chicago, little is known to the committee staff about his current defense views.

Rumsfeld muffled his position as President Ford's chief of staff (although he sat in on the key policy-making decisions) and received little public attention in his short stint as ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

However, Rumsfeld has been briefed twice at the White House by Gen. Alexander Haig, NATO commander, in recent weeks. The nominee will be questioned about the shock waves of concern in NATO circles because of the sacking of Dr. James Schlesinger as Pentagon boss.

Some NATO allies, especially Germany, believe Ford pulled the rug out from underneath them by the way he handled the dismissal. Schlesinger was in Europe only last month to negotiate new agreements.

Sen. Gary Hart [D., Colo.], a freshman member of the panel, is expected to charge the administration is playing "politics" in the shakeup. His focus, however, will be more on George Bush, the former chairman of the Republican National Committee, who has been nominated as chief of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It was initially suggested that Thurmond might not vote for Rumsfeld, but

he has given private assurances to President Ford he will—unless Rumsfeld makes an unexpectedly poor showing.

There remain conflicting stories of

why Rogers C. B. Morton stepped out as secretary of Commerce. One story planted here is that an operation for cancer was unsuccessful. Morton's physicians say this isn't true, adding he is in good health.


Although a final decision hasn't been made, the more probable reason is that Morton will become the real director of President Ford's political campaign—without the title.

Morton will remain at Commerce until the end of this year and then expects to move to the White House. Ford is personally fond of the Maryland former congressman (as are most members of Congress) and feels comfortable planning strategy with him.

Ford made a point of embracing Morton in his Monday night television performance. Later, the President invited the secretary to his living quarters in the White House for a drink and a lengthy political discussion.

Not all the news there was good, even though the removal of Vice President Rockefeller as a candidate next year is perceived as a neutralizer of Ronald Reagan. Example of the bad news for Ford: Reagan is doing exceptionally well in Texas.

DUNAGIN'S PEOPLE



"The new cars have progressed to the point that they're getting as good gas mileage as models 20 years ago."

Wash Staff 11-10-75

Mary McGroary

How William Colby Won Huzzas

One of the more bizarre visible consequences of Gerald Ford's Sabbath putsch has been the rehabilitation of William E. Colby, the still-director of the CIA.

Colby's sacking on a Sunday made him a martyr in some circles. His acceptance of reinstatement the following Wednesday gave him points for sainthood.

At CIA headquarters, his cautious confidences to two congressional investigating committees had caused fanatics to regard him as a traitor. But last Wednesday, when he appeared at an awards ceremony at Langley, Colby received a standing ovation of five minutes — surely the first in a long career of frosty, spooky professionalism.

The next day, Chairman Otis Pike of the House Select Intelligence Committee, who has been quizzing Colby for months, to limited avail, felt obliged to answer White House whippers that Colby was a flap-lip who had to be fitted with cement shoes for the good of the agency.

He gave Colby a character recommendation of sorts, one of several that have come Colby's way in recent days.

"... IF YOU ARE asked precisely the right question, you will give an honest answer," Pike told Colby. "You do not lead us to those areas which would help us to know what the right question was to ask. You do not make it easy for us to ask the right question... You have done a very responsible job for your agency at a time when your agency had a great problem."

The applause at Langley would seem delayed endorsement of the Colby approach.

Whatever he had in mind when he put the black mark beside Colby's name, Gerald Ford, a "fly-now-pay-later" type executive, obviously did not intend to make him a sentimental figure.

Exactly what he expected to accomplish — beyond inviting Congress to accuse him of cover-up — is as mysterious as anything ever done by Colby's agency. Congress plainly did

Point of View

not figure in his calculations. Neither Ford's counsel, Philip Buchen, nor congressional liaison John Marsh, who are monitoring the investigations for the White House, were consulted before the star witness was relieved of his portfolio.

Colby was, in any case, slated for "elimination," as the agency puts it, in a reformed and reorganized CIA.

His firing does not fit in with Ford's notorious solicitude for the agency. The CIA has weathered the worst.

Said one Democratic congressman, "Congress was not about to abolish the agency, not even the concept of covert operations."

THIS HAD LED TO conjecture that if the agency is out of danger, two favored Ford officials, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former CIA Director Richard Helms, are not. The theory, which is not without gangland flavor, is that Helms knows a lot about Kissinger and that Colby, who knows a lot about them both, was better off the scene.

Colby won Helms' enmity by taking the minimal step of submitting to the Justice Department the record of Helms' contradictory statements about outrageous secret activities undertaken during his tenure. Justice has not acted. Helms is still ambassador to Iran.

Another, less sinister, more global theory is also advanced. It was done for the benefit of the Russians and the Chinese. Once hard-liner James Schlesinger was dumped to appease Moscow in preparation for SALT II, Colby had to go, so he could be replaced by George Bush, our man in Peking, who is one of Ford's guys.

Supposedly, the Chinese would be soothed by the presence of Bush, one of Ford's guys, in the secret agency, knowing, it is said, he would give the proper slant to his analysis of incoming intelligence.

THE NAMING OF Bush has sent the demoralized spooks into new furies. He is a pleasant man, whose life has been devoted to the practice of partisan Republican politics. The fact that the President offered him as a vice presidential prospect makes it even more galling.

"Why didn't he name Agnew?" growled one infuriated Langleyite. "He's already been vice president."

The simplest explanation of the big shake-up was that Gerald Ford was just lining things up for a repetition of Richard Nixon's triumphant 1972 campaign tableau with one arm around Mao and the other around Brezhnev. He wasn't even thinking of Colby when he set about arranging it.

Colby cannot be entirely dismayed. A hard-eyed professional who has blinked at nothing in line of duty, he doubtless never expected to hear huzzas. He has Gerald Ford to thank for that.



WILLIAM E. COLBY
His first ovation?

Balt. Sun 11-10-75

Mary McGrory

Palace Guard Is Brought Back

Washington.

Say what you will about Gerald Ford's coup against his own administration, it has done wonders for Washington. The town's two great cottage industries, gossip and plot-charting, have decisively recovered from their long, post-Watergate slump.

The boredom under Mr. Ford, that of a rainy weekend at a poorly insulated lakeside cottage, has been abruptly ended by the sight of the President as bouncer. Dinner parties that have been listlessly pushing Democratic candidates around their plates are now digging into a feast of conspiracy and intrigue so rich and varied as to be indigestible.

Nothing is known for an absolute fact except that Gerald Ford has a cold. And that

hardly seems sufficient to explain why James R. Schlesinger, the Defense Secretary, was hauled to the White House at the ungodly hour of 8.30 A.M. on a Sunday to be sacked like an errant file clerk. On his way in, Mr. Schlesinger passed the Central Intelligence Agency director, William E. Colby, who was coming out with his head tucked under his arm.

Mr. Colby had to be temporarily rehired Wednesday, which suggests that Mr. Ford's cold didn't last long enough for advance planning.

Both of them, the President said at his incredible news conference, had done "a superb job." Nor were there any policy differences, he insisted. It is just that at Jerry's pub, only regulars are welcome now.

The President said it was all his idea. Its chaotic nature—it bears a strong family resemblance to his clownish campaign wanderings—is persuasive, but a look at the winners, Donald H. Rumsfeld and Henry A. Kissinger, suggests that the President may have been as much plotted against as plotting.

Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Kissinger, long-time enemies, are the popular choices for the ringleaders. What brought them together was Mr. Kissinger's desire for Mr. Schlesinger's scalp and Mr. Rumsfeld's craving for Mr. Schlesinger's job.

Mr. Kissinger, typically, tried to have it both ways, as victor and victim. At first, he was a winner, his "loss" of his national security post to his worshipful subordinate, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, had to be put in perspective. But as the reviews started coming in, Mr. Kissinger abruptly reversed course. His press lackeys dutifully painted him as an innocent bystander, stricken at the violence, bewailing his lot as a prime suspect.

As in the days of the Nixon decline, the most outlandish theories were entertained. When Nelson Rockefeller suddenly strode on to eliminate himself, the stunned populace began to whisper that the President fell on his sword untimely to protest the "humiliation" of his old friend, the secretary of state.

The recall of Elliot L. Ri-

chardson from England was the most easily absorbed shock of the week. It is a White House reflex, these five years past, when skulduggery is in progress, to summon Mr. Richardson to lend a high Yankee gloss to the enterprise.

Our erstwhile representative in China also has been called back for the same reason. George W. Bush's credentials for the job of CIA director are invisible. He was Richard Nixon's national committee chairman during the 1972 campaign.

Most of the evidence so far suggests that if the President had a bad cold, he had a worse case of Ronald Reagan. As the corpses piled up on the stage, he called Barry M. Goldwater to remark what he had wrought. Senator Goldwater obligingly counseled Mr. Reagan to cease and desist. Mr. Reagan, however, quite sensibly noted that he thought the White House was coming apart at the seams and forbore to withdraw.

What the brutal extravaganza did for the country is nothing except perhaps to reduce still further its trust in its princes. What it did for Gerald Ford was to make him look remarkably like Lenny of "Of Mice and Men." As he sees Henry Kissinger shipping off to the SALT sessions and Donald Rumsfeld skipping off to the Pentagon, he's left with a pile of crumpled Kleenex and the tatters of his reputation as a nice guy.



*Gerald R. Ford
Tom Rous
Wicker 11/5*

Ford-Reagan Ticket Now Seems Possible

THE HAND THAT sacrificed Nelson Rockefeller to the right wing of the Republican party — if that is what Gerald Ford has done — also reached out strongly to the moderate Republican center. At first glance, the result seems to strengthen Ford's chances for renomination, and to raise the possibility of a Ford-Ronald Reagan ticket next year.

There is no doubt that the White House takes the possibility of a Reagan challenge seriously. When Howard "Bo" Callaway, Ford's campaign manager, was asked on Sunday which Democrat the President expected to have to run against in 1976, Callaway declined to answer on grounds that to do so could only boost the Democrat he named.

"But there's not one I'm afraid of," he said. "I'll just be glad to get one of them instead of Ronald Reagan."

Callaway had just described Reagan as a formidable Republican primary opponent who would run strongly in two of the earliest primaries, New Hampshire and Florida. These remarks together suggest the extent to which the potential Reagan candidacy is perceived in the Ford camp as the biggest threat to the President's reelection.

But if that strategic judgment was the motivating force behind the high-level shakeup of the Ford Administration, it was immediately apparent only in the withdrawal of Rockefeller. He has been a bad word to the Republican right wing since 1964, and if his pullout proves to have been forced by Ford it might be effective in holding the support of some conservatives against a Reagan challenge. However it came about, Rockefeller's departure opens the way for the vice presidency to be offered to Reagan himself, if necessary.

The rest of the Administration shakeup at first glance appears to be more nearly a compensating bid to Republican moderates. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger does not lose much but a title, since he is replaced as director of the National Security Council by his loyal second banana, Brent Scowcroft. Kissinger may even be strengthened, as he will no longer be vulnerable to the charge of wearing too many hats.

The dismissal of James R. Schlesinger as secretary of defense can hardly be a comfort to conservatives, since Schlesinger was the leading administration skeptic as to Kissinger's version of detente, and one of the few Ford officials with the intellectual stature to stand up to the secretary of state.

Ford filled the opening at the Pentagon with a Republican generally considered a moderate, Donald Rumsfeld; replaced William Colby, an embarrassment as the director of the CIA in its days of disrepute, with another moderate, George Bush; and sent Elliott Richardson, whom many conservatives regard as the man who blew the whistle on Richard Nixon, to the Department of Commerce. It's doubtful that any of these changes amused Barry Goldwater fans.

Callaway, speaking in Florida to a group of businessmen meeting there, developed a non-ideological theme as he waxed lyrical about Ford.

"Even if you don't always agree with this President," Callaway said, in what sounded rather like a slogan, "you've got to admire his courage. He stands up for what he believes." Not bad in this time of political cynicism.

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6-B—Wednesday, November 5, 1975

Ford's new team

Cronies called risk to national security

While reaction to the White House shake-up centers on the political implications, Vice-President Rockefeller's withdrawal from the GOP ticket holds less long-range significance for the United States than President Ford's defense and national security moves.

The fact is that the dismissal of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and CIA Director William E. Colby represents a victory for Secretary of State Kissinger's policy of détente and accommodation with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The moves also are seen as reflecting Mr. Ford's determination to reach a new strategic arms agreement with the USSR, despite foot-dragging by the Pentagon and others concerned about U.S. security.

That reading of the personnel shifts is not made only by The News and other U.S. critics of détente. It is similar to the reaction of critics in Western Europe who are worried that Secretary Kissinger's new predominance in foreign and military policy will weaken NATO.

The London Daily Telegraph, for example, said Schlesinger's firing "could be bad news for the NATO alliance and its position vis-a-vis Russia and the Warsaw Pact countries."

Other observers in Europe expressed concern over the replacement of the knowledgeable Schlesinger by Donald H. Rumsfeld. While the latter did serve briefly as U.S. ambassador to NATO, he was called a question mark in terms of policy and a novice in foreign affairs.

At home, there was further uneasiness about national security when Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates military intelligence, resigned, apparently in protest at the firing of Schlesinger and Colby.

There also were hints that the resignation last week of David Packard, former deputy secretary of defense, as Mr. Ford's chief election campaign fund-raiser, was linked to the firings of Schlesinger and Colby. Packard was

known to be a hard-liner on the Communist issue.

So what the shifts add up to are uncertainty, uneasiness and concern about the nation's future national security and defense posture, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

In appointing Rumsfeld to the defense post and George Bush as CIA director, the President selected handsome, affable and politically ambitious friends for key national security posts. He described them as "guys that I wanted." Others have said he feels "comfortable" with them.

But in jobs so important to the nation the President needs more than old personal friends and "guys" he feels comfortable with. Indeed, the President needs more than old political cronies from Congress.

Protecting national security demands more than affability, ambition and the techniques of winning votes and getting along with Congress. It requires a toughness of mind that recognizes that the USSR, despite all the talk about détente, still poses the major threat to the United States.

Men who assume the responsibility of protecting national security also should have the kind of background and training that make it possible for them to raise questions about Secretary Kissinger's present and future policies, including détente and accommodation with the USSR.

President Ford, to his discredit, claimed that neither personal nor policy differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger contributed to the defense shift. That is nonsense, of course. Their longtime feud over policy was well-known.

But if the President takes that attitude with respect to the differences between those two men over dealing with the USSR, there is little hope that two new men, personal friends of the President and ill-equipped for their new posts, will be able to raise the kind of hard questions and make the kinds of tough decisions that will be required to protect the security of this country in the future.

The Attack

President Ford's summary firing of Defense Secretary James Schlesinger — evidently because the Secretary refused to share in Henry Kissinger's enthusiasm for detente — suggests a crippling unwillingness of the President to tolerate vigorous dissent among his top advisers. If the firing of Schlesinger by our friendliest of Presidents was inexcusable, the firing of CIA Director William Colby was inevitable; for the better part of a year, now, it has been clear that sooner or later, Colby would have to go. But for other reasons, Colby's departure is equally troubling.

The fault is hardly his. It is true that he has exhibited too much alacrity in his dealings with the politicians who are riding the CIA issue in frenzied pretense. For that alacrity alone, he probably should have been replaced. But perhaps more than that, it was his peculiar misfortune to be directing the CIA when the CIA became an explicitly political issue. Most of the "revelations" about the CIA have concerned alleged misdeeds that occurred prior to Colby's tenure. Yet scapegoat hunters never lack prey, and most of the hunting politicians sent their dogs after Colby.

That the dogs have returned with his skin says less about the diligence of the dogs or the failings of Colby, than it says about where the nation currently stands on the hysteria index. The CIA now is the favorite and fashionable target of polemical opportunists. And a large part of the public has submitted to the opportunists' seductions about the menacing dangers posed by the CIA.

Yet in our opinion — and, we believe, in the opinion of a larger part of the public — the CIA remains essentially a suppositional enemy. It remains so particularly when compared with the threats posed by the nation's declared enemy, the Soviet Union — and the Soviet Union's massive intelligence activity here and throughout the Free World. Congress currently has heaven-knows-how-many committees investigating this country's several intelligence agencies. But as far as we know, Congress has not a single committee investigating the intelligence activities of the Soviet Union.



WILLIAM COLBY

Indeed, Congress has just dismantled the two committees which heretofore have done precisely that — the House Committee on Internal Security and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Moreover, the dismantling of those committees — coincident with the attack on the American intelligence community — came at about the same time as astounding reports of (1) Soviet penetration of congressional staffs, and (2) Soviet monitoring of White House telephone calls. Yet few of our politicians have shown much interest in pursuing those reports, so determined are they to pursue the CIA.

If we have our guess, most of the public subscribes to the proposition that it is the legitimate and primary function of government to protect us from others; less justifiable tend to be those government endeavors to protect us from ourselves. Reasoning from that proposition, it follows that the public is more concerned about the depredations of the Soviet Union than about the supposed espionage excesses of the CIA. Oversee the CIA, of course. But in doing so, do not undermine its efforts to counter the intelligence activities of the Soviets. For against the malignant damage the Soviets seek to do to us, the alleged misdeeds of the CIA are like after-school mischief.

It has become one of the largest myths in the American garden of mythical cabbage that our intelligence agencies must be pure. Americans should keep in mind that government learned long ago to be shameless; we should be satisfied with knowing that our government is vastly less shameless than any other. Perhaps the most shameful spectacle on Capitol Hill today is the mounting attack on this nation's intelligence community. The attack has claimed William Colby as a casualty; before it is over, the attack may claim his successor, George Bush, as well. And those who worry about the Free World's rapid disintegration, worry that in the attack on the American intelligence community, a good deal more may be at stake than a few personal reputations.

Wednesday, November 5, 1975

42

~~Omaha World-Herald~~

Editorials

*Unsigned articles below are the opinion of The World-Herald*Did Ford
Help Himself?

President Ford needs to project the image of a man fully in charge of his own administration, a man who gives orders to all who work for him, including Henry Kissinger.

It is necessary for the President to reassure the conservatives in his own party that he has not strayed into liberal pastures.

It is also necessary for him to demonstrate that he holds the middle ground in American politics, for that is where the votes are in a presidential election and where he must find support for the programs he wants to advance in what remains of his present term.

If the planned sequence of events was as columnists Evans and Novak describe them elsewhere on this page, Ford might have projected the desired image and he might have gained some support.

* * *

But there were leaks and faulty timing.

Nelson Rockefeller's decision not to run was to have been the superbomb news that would have made all else seem minor by comparison.

Instead, the first big news was that Defense Secretary James Schlesinger had been fired. And since Schlesinger's stock is high with most conservatives, since he is the staunch advocate of a strong defense, the repercussions were both quick and strong.

When the news of Rockefeller's decision came, it commanded the bigger headlines and it may have soothed conservatives in the Republican Party. But it did not have the impact it would have had if news of Schlesinger's firing had not come first.

* * *

The quickly called Monday evening press conference, the full story of the President's "personal changes" made the best of what, for the President, was a bad situation.

He tried the upbeat approach, arguing that he wanted his own team. The President wanted his good friend,

Donald Rumsfeld, in the Pentagon post. He was keeping Henry Kissinger as head of the State Department but Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger's deputy as presidential adviser on national security affairs would succeed to the adviser post Kissinger was giving up.

Rogers Morton was out, at his own request, as commerce secretary, and Elliot Richardson, now ambassador to Britain would replace him.

* * *

George Bush, now the President's man in China, is to succeed William Colby as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ford will indeed have his own team. To the extent that Schlesinger was a burr under the administration saddle, the irritant will be removed. Presumably, the President will be comfortable with the new men and there will be conformity of viewpoint.

And the political liability that Nelson Rockefeller represented will have been removed.

If the planned announcements, firings and hirings had worked out as scheduled, Ford might have presented himself as the smooth organizer firmly in command.

* * *

They did not go smoothly. Ford and his new people have to show the country this was a wise organizational move. Rumsfeld will be severely tested in his demanding job. Kissinger-watchers will look closely to see whether his influence is increased or diminished by the changes.

Nelson Rockefeller's announcement unblocks President Ford from an uncomfortable political position and may cause Ronald Reagan to reassess his strategy if not his basic decision.

But Ford's basic problem is not what he has done but how strong a candidate he can make himself before the election. As administrator, organizer, decision-maker and leader he needs to do better than he has done in the past three days.

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6A Wednesday, November 5, 1975

The Great Upheaval

President Ford presided Monday over the most dramatic administrative upheaval since the famous "Saturday night massacre" in the Nixon administration. There has been much ensuing excitement in Washington and around the country — possibly more excitement, we might add, than is warranted in basic policy consideration.

Mr. Ford replaced the Secretary of Defense and the director of the CIA, even as he took away Henry Kissinger's long-disputed portfolio on the National Security Council. For good measure, heightening the general effect, he announced that he was bringing back Elliot Richardson from the Court of St. James to make him Secretary of Commerce. The whole scene was climaxed, as it happened, with Nelson Rockefeller's announcement that he was withdrawing from contention as a candidate to succeed himself as Vice President.

It was a day of startling developments, all right, and with so much coming and going in places of power it might be unwise, we suppose, to discount heavily such events. Certainly the dismissal of James R. Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense appears to connote a strengthening of the detente policy as advocated by Secretary of State Kissinger, who was often at odds with Schlesinger, himself something of a hard-liner in the context of detente. The departure of Schlesinger is certainly the most important of the announcements that Ford made, and it set off an angry buzzing on the Republican right.

As for the dismissal of CIA Director William F. Colby, it may be said that he was one of the most eminently expendable figures in the U. S. government, given the dimensions of the trouble that the CIA has been in and continues in. Whether his successor, George Bush, U. S. representative to the Peking government, will perform better is a question to be determined.

The return of Elliot Richardson, out of exile in the Scepter'd Isle, in its turn, is intriguing politically, for Richardson is one of the most respected of Republicans, even if he happens to be one who was instrumental in bringing down former President Richard Nixon. The GOP has a certain ambivalence in its view of Richardson but Ford, in any case, can do his administration no harm by putting Richardson on public view. At the same time, Commerce is just about the safest place that Richardson could be installed.

As for poor Nelson Rockefeller, his humiliation at the hands of his fellow Republicans and at the hands of the Ford administration could hardly have been more complete after the President harshly dismissed the pleas of the city and of the state of New York for help in their financial crisis. Rockefeller, as governor of New York, had helped preside over the buildup toward bankruptcy and he had recommended to Ford that aid be granted. In any event the coup de grace to the political career of Nelson Rockefeller was administered by Ford in the "final answer" to New York which was summed up so admirably by the New York Daily News, in the imperishable headline: "FORD TO CITY: DROP DEAD!"

There is one more factor in interpreting the President's reshuffling of top executive positions. He said with emphasis that he was putting his own men, Donald Rumsfeld and Bush, into the positions at Defense and in the CIA, replacing two men who were not his own close associates. As much as anything else, the great upheaval in Washington may have been an exercise in presidential machismo, with Ford simply telling the world that he was President and meant to run the country's affairs with his own men in his own way.

CIA - GENERAL

Ny Times 12/3/75
**PANEL CLEARS C.I.A.
 OF A DIRECT ROLE
 IN '73 CHILE COUP**

**But Senate Committee Staff
 Finds That U.S. Encouraged
 the Overthrow of Allende**

AID FOR PLOTS TRACED

**Document Says Washington
 Allocated \$13.4 Million to
 an Influence Campaign**

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4—The staff of a Senate intelligence committee said today it had found that the United States had encouraged the overthrow of the "democratically elected" Chilean Government of President Salvador Allende Gossens.

It said, however, that no direct involvement by the Central Intelligence Agency or the American Embassy in the 1973 coup had been established.

These statements were made today in a 62-page report issued by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The document contained relatively little information not made public previously, either in the committee's report of

*Excerpts from report on C.I.A.
 role in Chile, Page 10.*

Nov. 20 on its inquiry into assassination plots against foreign leaders or in accounts published in the press.

Today's report was based upon executive session testimony by C.I.A. officials and other Government officials, including Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. It also reflected information from some secret C.I.A., National Security Council and State Department documents.

Parts of the report, which is titled "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," were read into the record of a public hearing. This action came after the Administration kept officials from testifying in public session on the United States actions in Chile.

The United States Government, the committee staff said, ended a 10-year, \$13.4 million effort to deny Dr. Allende power in Chile by "advocating and encouraging the overthrow"

Continued on Page 10, Column 4

Panel Clears C.I.A. in 1973 Chile Coup

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1
of his democratically elected government.

William Miller, the committee's staff director, told the members that the report on United States activity in Chile was representative of six major covert operations studied during the committee's investigation. The six operations in turn, were representative of "thousands" by the C.I.A., he said.

These were several of the new elements in the committee staff's report.

The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation put \$350,000 of its own money into the Chilean Presidential election of 1970, the committee staff said, adding that it gave \$250,000 to the campaign of former President Jorge Alessandri and \$100,000 to an anti-Allende party. The report said \$350,000 more had come from other United States businesses, which were unnamed.

The C.I.A. was able to affect the content of a Time magazine story in 1970, the report said, through "briefings" requested by Time and provided by the C.I.A. in Washington.

The briefings, the report said, "resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the Time story on Allende's Sept. 4 victory and in the timing of the story."

The report said that after President Richard M. Nixon ordered a stepped-up effort to stop Dr. Allende in September 1970, the C.I.A. covertly channeled \$11.5 million to El Mercurio, the largest daily paper in Chile, to insure anti-Allende

coverage and to keep the paper solvent.

El Mercurio was published, committee spokesmen confirmed, by Augustine Edwards a close friend of Donald M. Kendall, president of Pepsi Cola, Inc.

In the committee's assassination report, it was noted that Mr. Kendall had arranged a breakfast meeting between Mr. Edward, Mr. Kissinger and then Attorney General John N. Mitchell.

While the committee staff reported that it could establish no direct operational involvement by the C.I.A. or United States Embassy in the 1973 coup, the members agreed during a press briefing today that the United States policy had "created the atmosphere" in Chile for Dr. Allende's removal.

The report supported news accounts published in The New York Times and elsewhere in the fall of 1974 that the United States had covertly poured millions of dollars into Chile, first to keep Dr. Allende from becoming president and later to overthrow his Government. The report set the total figure, from 1963 until 1973, at about \$13.4 million and said that between Dr. Allende's inauguration in November 1970 and his ouster, the United States Government spent over \$7 million.

Today's hearing included statements and testimony by Edward M. Korry, who served as United States Ambassador in Santiago during the early Nixon years, and Ralph A. Dungan, the Ambassador between 1964 and 1967.

March Post 12/15/75

Intelligence Network Overhaul Suggested

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

One of the senior members of the American intelligence establishment appeared before a Senate investigating panel yesterday and pronounced the U.S. intelligence apparatus badly in need of overhaul.

Clark M. Clifford, former Secretary of Defense and chairman of the presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, counseled lawmakers, nonetheless, against abolishing covert action operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Clifford, who helped President Truman draw up the 1947 National Security Act establishing the CIA, acknowledged that covert operations around the world "have gotten out-of-hand."

Clifford was one of four experts to testify as the Senate intelligence committee turned from the headline-making disclosures of earlier phases of its inquiry to the business of drafting reform legislation.

He was supported in his position on covert action by two other members of the panel, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance and retired clandestine operations officer David A. Phillips.

The lone dissenter to any form of covert action was Morton H. Halperin, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and a critic of CIA clandestine operations.

Halperin called for the outlawing of covert programs of the CIA with the observation that "the possible benefits . . . are far outweighed by the costs to our society of maintaining a capability for covert operations." Such activities, he said, are "incompatible with our democratic in-

stitutions, with congressional and public control over foreign policy decisions."

The other members of the panel agreed that the agency's excursions into clandestine assassination plots and political espionage, as detailed in reports of the intelligence committee, had gone beyond the bounds of the CIA charter. But they maintained that Presidents should not be precluded by legislation from resorting to traditional cloak-and-dagger operations.

Clifford proposed to the committee that a House-Senate committee be established to oversee CIA operations, a group that the executive department would consult before covert projects are launched.

He also recommended the establishment of a position of director-general of intelligence who would preside over the entire intelligence community and report to the President. An additional proposal was that all decisions on covert action be made by the director-general and the entire National Security Council.

Clifford, testifying in his customary grave and authoritative manner, acknowledged to Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) that he advised President Kennedy in 1961 to strongly resist congressional efforts to investigate the CIA. The veteran presidential adviser said he was trying at the time to prevent members of Congress from moving the CIA's Bay of Pigs fiasco into the "political arena."

Church, who is soon expected to announce his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination, indicated that he would favor preserving some covert action capability to deal with cases such as Portugal, where, he said, the United States would maintain leeway to help in-

sure that the mandate of "85 per cent of the people" is secure from the machinations of a "small and militant Communist minority."

Phillips suggested the creation of a small, separate agency to conduct covert operations — removing the function from the CIA. "All the United States covert action eggs then would be in one basket," he said, "a basket which could be watched very carefully."

It would not employ airlines or mercenaries or exotic paraphernalia, but would need the capability to provide friends with imaginative advice and what British intelligence officers have sometimes called "King George's cavalry" — money.

Church to Oppose Nixon's Conditions

United Press International

Chairman Frank Church of the Senate intelligence committee said yesterday he finds former President Nixon's conditions for giving testimony "unacceptable" and will recommend that the panel reject them.

The Idaho Democrat told reporters following a committee session that under conditions stipulated by Nixon for granting testimony, the former President would have "total control of what he divulged."

In any event, Church said, he believed the committee now had "all the facts we need" concerning Nixon's part in ordering the CIA to intervene in Chilean politics and on the abortive "Huston Plan" devised under his administration but never executed for a massive domestic intelligence operation against American dissidents.

Church said he would ask the committee at a closed session Monday to turn down Nixon's offer.

Mash 5012 12/8/75

Another captive watchdog?

By Les Aspin

The intelligence agencies may yet win their battle with Congress because Senate and House reformers appear ready to get bogged down in a squabble over matters of monumental inconsequence.

There is general agreement in Congress that the Senate and House special intelligence committees — which will die early in the new year — should be succeeded by a permanent committee to keep a watchful eye on the rascals in the intelligence agencies.

Members of Congress have a way of devoting endless time and energy — not to mention words — to their own rules and procedures. And reformers seem prepared now to spend an inordinate amount of effort in a hassle over whether there should be one intelligence committee in each house or a joint committee, how many members should serve, how the membership should be divided between parties and over other issues of little consequence.

The real issues, which may get lost in the verbiage, are: (1) How to banish abuses by the intelligence community such as the opening of private mail; (2) How to keep covert operations under control; and (3) How to help the intelligence community do a better job of producing thoughtful assessments of what's going on in the world.

There are only two sure results of the long investigations into the intelligence community: first, there will be at least one congressional oversight committee approved next year, and, second, the proposers of this reform will soon be sadly disappointed.

The public should be aware that any permanent intelligence committee will begin life with three big weights tied around its neck.

First, many congressional committees have a way of becoming advocates of the programs they are supposed to oversee. The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, for example, is largely the captive of the fishing industry and merchant marine, and the Agriculture Committee largely the captive of farmers and agribusiness.

The Senate and House have each had small subcommittees which for years were supposed to keep an eye on the intelligence community. But in two decades the watchdogs never barked. It has been suggested that rotating members on and off the committee might lessen the likelihood of capture. But then the members would never gain any expertise.

— Les Aspin, a Democratic representative from Racine, Wis., has been in Congress since 1971. He is a member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

The members of an intelligence committee will already be suffering from limited knowledge. That's the second weight. They will be limited largely to what the intelligence agencies tell them. The intelligence committee will be quite different from other committees — much of its work will be done behind closed doors where critics won't be able to point up foibles.

It will be unlike the Education Committee, for example, which hears from teachers, parents and superintendents and doesn't have to rely solely on the Office of Education or HEW to tell it if a program is working or not. Similarly, environmental

groups flock to the Interior Committee when they feel some administration policy is shafting them. Who is going to complain to a congressional intelligence committee? The Russian ambassador?

Third, after all the CIA's skeletons have been exposed, the dust has settled and the CIA is no longer Page One news, many members are likely to lose interest in the subject — including those assigned to an intelligence committee. Closed-door meetings don't allow congressmen to make speeches or issue press releases or titillate their constituents with inside stories.

For these reasons it is unlikely that we can count on an intelligence committee alone to prevent abuses such as interfering with the mail and listening in on telephone calls. To accomplish that we need something more.

We know that many people in the intelligence community knew instinctively that the recently exposed abuses were wrong.

When James R. Schlesinger became head of the CIA in the spring of 1973, he learned of some illegal operations and sent a memorandum to the heads of all the CIA's divisions asking if they knew of any other operations that were illegal or skirted legality. The replies came flooding back, indicating that many men and women in the system were disturbed by what was going on but had never been motivated to speak out or didn't know where to turn.

The mere fact that the abuses have been exposed, and the public reaction to them, should produce considerable motivation to speak out in the future. To give people a place to turn to, we should create an inspector general for intelligence, patterned on the Watergate special prosecutor's office, who would have full authority to monitor the internal workings of all the intelligence agencies. To encourage whistle blowers, it must also be made a criminal offense for employees to fail knowingly to report any violations.

A permanent congressional committee could help here. It can't run the inspector general's office, but it can give him backbone by calling him to testify periodically. If he is having problems because the agencies are evasive, a congressional committee may embarrass the agencies into cooperating.

The toughest problem to handle is covert operations. Some critics would like to bar them outright. But there is simply not enough support for that and there are some cases where covert operations may be needed — the drug traffic and the possibility of terrorist groups getting nuclear weapons are two. So the question is how to control the cloak-and-dagger work.

Many reformers suggest that an intelligence committee be given real teeth and required to pass on all covert operations. But most congressmen are reluctant to act on behalf of their colleagues. It's one thing to cast a vote on the floor of the House as one of 435 members; it's quite something else to be told to operate behind closed doors and make a decision for the rest of your colleagues.

I'm sure there are many in the executive branch who would like to see Congress have veto power — for exactly the same reasons that I'm sure most members of Congress don't want the authority because it would give future administrations an out. If an operation goes awry, the executive can point to Congress and say as it did with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution — "But Congress authorized us to do it." Members also know they could face the reverse charge: a stern administration saying, "The United States is in trouble in Majnoonistan today because Congress wouldn't let us launch a little covert operation."

Such reluctance is not a political forecast; it's political history. For years the CIA has been telling those subcommittees about their covert operations, although usually only after they were begun. The special House Intelligence Committee recently asked CIA Director William Colby what happened when one of the committees objected. Did that halt an operation? Colby was stunned. The question had never come up before. The subcommittees preferred not to get involved. Deniability was not invented by the Nixon administration.

If a committee is to have veto power, then its political composition becomes terribly important. A committee filled with Ron Dellumses and Michael Harringtons probably wouldn't allow CIA agents to do anything more violent than play darts at CIA headquarters. Pack the committee with hawkish conservatives and you're back to square one. So granting Congress a veto over covert operations is a very unpromising idea.

Many reformers also suggest that Congress can control covert operations through the budgetary power. Congress must, of course, have the power of the purse. But in the intelligence field, there is not necessarily a correlation between money and mischief. In Thailand a CIA agent tampered with politics by sending one forged letter. The cost to the U.S. Treasury: one postage stamp. The cost to U.S. foreign policy: continuing embarrassment. Budget control is no panacea.


Covert operations often are carried out in a country without the knowledge of our ambassador there. The system has tended to exclude potential critics who might ask searching questions, point out inconsistencies and explode the premises of a planned operation. Investigations have shown that administrations often have sidestepped the 40 Committee which the White House itself set up to oversee covert operations. If the president likes an idea, the proposal often goes into effect without benefit of any criticisms.

Covert actions must be controlled primarily from within the executive branch. To begin, the 40 Committee should be regulated by law rather than executive whim. Each member should be required individually to assess in writing every proposed covert operation, analyzing the risks involved, the prospective benefits, the dangers of failure and possible alternative ways of accomplishing the objective. Experience shows that when officials are required to write their own reports, they think more clearly of the consequences than if they are simply asked to initial a committee report.

To inject ambassadors back into the policy-making chain, they should also be required by law to write their own assessments for the president.

A congressional committee can supplement these controls. A congressional intel-

See PANEL, F-4



Speaking of turkeys ...

PANEL

Continued from F-3

ligence committee should be told about all planned operations in advance—the entire committee, not just the leaders, as in the past. While no approval or disapproval would be voted on, individual members could send their own assessments to the President.

No doubt a lot of congressmen would simply write a list of reservations to cover themselves in case the operation went wrong. But that is not all bad. It is a good idea to have advice reaching the president from a few people who have a bias for negativism. There is too much me-tooism in the executive branch already.

Tales of abuses and covert operations have provided the "sex" in these congressional investigations, but the committee members are also concerned with the more mundane issue of how to make the intelligence agencies do a better job of disseminating and analyzing intelligence.

There are many problems:

- Too many people are writing day-to-day reports and not enough are doing long-range thinking.
- Analysts all too often give the answers it is believed the policymakers want.
- Policymakers (the president and secretary of state) don't keep the analysts up to date on what they are thinking and what they have done in talks with their counterparts abroad.
- Policymakers make too many demands for information without first considering the time, money and manpower involved.

Congress can't just pass a law saying, "Hey, stop wasting manpower." It can, however, give an executive the position and authority to come to grips with these problems. For years no one has been in charge. The intelligence community is composed of several fiefdoms. The post of director of central intelligence (DCI), now held by William Colby, was set up in 1947 to end the fragmentation of intelligence in separate Army, Navy and State Department fiefdoms. The CIA was set up to provide analyses independent of the other bureaucracies

and the DCI was supposed to coordinate the work of the other intelligence operations.

But it hasn't worked out that way.

The fiefdoms continued, partly because the DCI was made the head of the CIA and thus leads a bureaucratic rival of other intelligence operations.

Perhaps it is now time to clean up the system so that it really reflects President Truman's original intent. We should break the DCI off from the CIA and set him up in his own office as an assistant to the president, charged with overseeing the entire intelligence operation.

The DCI, freed from the responsibilities of running the CIA, could then concentrate on eliminating duplication in intelligence collection and on promoting competition in intelligence analysis.

The new DCI ought to have one new agency to oversee the covert

operations section should be removed from the CIA. The dirty-tricks side of the CIA has dominated the agency over the years and most of the directors have come from that side. Separating covert operations would allow skilled analysts to rise to the top of what would then be solely an analysis agency. Splitting off covert operations would also allow the CIA to attract quality analysts who have been repelled by the agency's reputation. And good intelligence, after all, depends more on people than on organizational structure.

There are no ideal solutions. But improvements can be made. These are a few of the suggestions which could return national respect to the intelligence agencies while tightening up the reins on those agencies.

A congressional committee is not in itself the solution. Congress cannot and should not run the executive. A congressional committee can act as a prod to better management and a brake on poorly thought-out covert operations. But executive decisions must be made in the executive departments, so Congress would be wise to concentrate on how to reform those departments, not get bogged down arguing whether a permanent intelligence committee should have 10 or 12 members.

Nash. STAR 12/5/75

Mary McGrory

Colby Lectures Us On Need for Stealth

Two weeks to the day after the assassination report was published, CIA Director William E. Colby was standing in a public place, boldly speaking for "all of us."

Colby discoursed confidently on what "we Americans" should do to restore the agency he loves to the image he has of it as a force for peace, freedom and democracy in the world.

Colby was the star of a panel on intelligence at the "Pacem in Terris Convocation." The great champion of covert activities was reaping the rewards of openness. His agency's plight has made him a celebrity. He was stormily applauded during the session and afterwards besieged by autograph seekers. In America, to be a celebrity is to be forgiven everything.

He had friends on the platform, too. Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, could not bring himself to advocate the banning of all covert activity. He could think of justifiable instances, said Church, who was on the point of conducting hearings on Chile, which is generally regarded as the most repulsive of these secret interventions. He also is about to become a candidate for the presidency and apparently does not want to be thought rash.

SEN. CLAIBORNE PELL, D-R.I., who suffers from an abiding anxiety not to offend anyone, said that he thought the congressional investigations of the intelligence services, while "entirely proper" and "long overdue," should be terminated.

Ray Cline, a former CIA official, said, he, too, favored covert operations. He went on to destroy his stand by telling of his disapproval of the secret war in Laos, the Bay of Pigs and the misbegotten Chile operation.

As Colby had depicted the CIA as an enclave of efficient elves toiling for peace, Cline pictured it as a kind of university, where scholars diligently studied and sifted information to put at the disposal of presidents.

Pell marveled at the presence of our CIA director right out in public. Only in America, he breathed.

This prompted Charles Morgan of the ACLU, the angry man on the panel, to growl that the only reason Colby was present was because of the horrendous revelations about his agency.

Colby serenely defended everything: the operation in Laos, the Chilean intervention.

THE MENTION OF Chile brought forth from Church a denunciation so impassioned it should have caused him to rescind his previous advocacy of any covert action.

"The Western hemisphere is not a colony of the U.S.," he cried. "It is not the right of the U.S. to decide what kind of governments they should have. We once knew that. We once practiced that. Those were the days when we were the most respected country in the world. Let us get back to that."

But he was tempted, obviously, by the thought of covert activity in Portugal, the one subject on which Colby had nothing to say. One panel member, Morton Halperin, a former NSC official who was tapped by Henry Kissinger, suggested that we do it openly.

But Church dismissed that possibility. Although public opinion would support it and Portugal plainly does not want to become Communist, we cannot show our hand.

AND WHY CAN'T WE? For the simple reason that CIA covert activity has so weakened our moral leadership that our open intervention would spell the destruction of the forces we want to help.

That's what the CIA has done to America. We can only do good by stealth. We are reduced to covert activity because of what covert activity has done to our good name.

That's why Colby is sitting in the catbird seat. That's why he dares to speak for the American people and lecture Congress and blame its negligence for the CIA's "few mistakes." And why he can say that what this country needs is a law punishing former agents for finking on "the company."

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975

Excerpts From C.I.A. Study

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4—Following are excerpts from a report, "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973," prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

Numerous allegations have been made about U. S. covert activities in Chile during 1970-73. Several of these are false; others are half-true. In most instances, the response to the allegation must be qualified:

Was the United States directly involved, covertly, in the 1973 coup in Chile? The committee has found no evidence that it was. However, the United States sought in 1970 to foment a military coup in Chile. After 1970 it adopted a policy both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende, and it remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in coup plotting.

Did the U. S. provide covert support to striking truck owners or other strikers during 1971-73? The 40-man Committee did not approve any such support. However, the U. S. passed money to private sector groups which supported the strikers. And in at least one case, a small amount of C.I.A. money was passed to the strikers by a private sector organization, contrary to C.I.A. ground rules.

Small Amounts of Money

Did the U. S. provide covert support to right-wing terrorist organizations during 1970-73? The C.I.A. gave support in 1970 to one group whose tactics became more violent over time. Through 1971 that group received small sums of American money through third parties for specific purposes. And it is possible that money was passed to these groups on the extreme right from C.I.A.-supported opposition political parties.

The pattern of United States covert action in Chile is striking but not unique. It arose in the context not only of American foreign policy, but also of covert U. S. involvement in other countries within and outside Latin America. The scale of C.I.A. involvement in Chile was unusual but by no means unprecedented.

Preliminary Conclusions

A fundamental question raised by the pattern of U.S.

covert activities persists: Did the threat to vital U.S. national security interests posed by the Presidency of Salvador Allende justify the several major covert attempts to prevent his accession to power? Three American Presidents and their senior advisers evidently thought so.

One rationale for covert intervention in Chilean politics was spelled out by Henry Kissinger in his background briefing to the press on Sept. 16, 1970, the day after Nixon's meeting with Helms. He argued that an Allende victory would be irreversible within Chile, might affect neighboring nations and would pose "massive problems" for the U.S. in Latin America:

"I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende wins, there is likely to be another free election in Chile. . . . Now it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist Government. In that case, we would have one not on an island off the coast [Cuba] which has not a traditional relationship and impact in Latin America, but in a major Latin American country you would have a Communist Government, joining for example, Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. . . . So I don't think we should delude ourselves on an Allende take-over would not present massive problems for us, and for the democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere."

In the hands of Congress rests the responsibility for insuring that the executive branch is held to full political accountability for covert activities. The record on Chile is mixed and muted by its incompleteness.

The record leaves unanswered a number of questions. These pertain both to how forthcoming the agency was and how interested and persistent the Congressional committees were. Were members of Congress, for instance, given the opportunity to object to specific projects before the projects were implemented? Did they want to? There is also an issue of jurisdiction. C.I.A. and State Department officials have taken the position that they are authorized to reveal agency operations only to the appropriate oversight committees. The Chilean experience does

suggest that the committee give serious consideration to the possibility that lodging the responsibility for national estimates and conduct of operational activities with the same person—the Director of Central Intelligence—creates an inherent conflict of interest and judgment.

When covert actions in Chile became public knowledge, the costs were obvious. The United States was seen, by its covert actions to have contradicted not only its official declarations but its treaty commitments and principles of long standing. At the same time it was proclaiming a "low profile" in Latin American relations, the U. S. Government was seeking to foment a coup in Chile.

This report does not attempt to offer a final judgment on the political propriety, the morality, or even the effectiveness of American covert activity in Chile. Did the threat posed by an Allende Presidency justify covert American involvement in Chile? Did it justify the specific and unusual attempt to foment a military coup to deny Allende the Presidency? In 1970, the U. S. sought to foster a military coup in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to power; yet after 1970 the Government—according to the testimony of its officials—did not engage in coup plotting.

Was 1970 a mistake, an aberration? Or was the threat posed to the national security interests of the United States so grave that the Government was remiss in not seeking his downfall directly during 1970-73? What responsibility does the United States bear for the cruelty and political suppression that have become the hallmark of the present regime in Chile?

On these questions committee members may differ. So may American citizens. Yet the committee's mandate is less to judge the past than to recommend for the future. Moving from past cases to future guidelines, what is important to note is that covert action has been perceived as a middle ground between diplomatic representation and the overt use of military force.

In the case of Chile, that middle ground may have been far too broad. Given the costs of covert action, it should be resorted to only to counter severe threats to the national security of the United States. It is far from clear that that was the case in Chile.

CIA Role In Chile Outlined

**\$13 Million
Was Spent on
Covert Work**

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Details of a "massive" campaign of clandestine operations over a 10-year period to block the election and then to overthrow the government of the late Salvador Allende in Chile were revealed yesterday by the Senate intelligence committee.

In a report on what it called an "extensive and continuous" program of covert operations conducted during the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations, the committee report estimated that the United States spent \$13.4 million in Chile between 1963 and 1973.

Of this amount, some \$8 million was allocated to propaganda and support of political parties; \$4.3 million was spent to support and influence the mass media of Chile.

Central Intelligence Agency expenditures to one anti-Allende newspaper, *El Mercurio*, amounted to \$1.5 million from Sept. 9, 1971, to April 11, 1972. The report also said that CIA evaluators had concluded "that *El Mercurio* and other media outlets supported by the Agency had played an important role in setting the stage for the Sept. 11, 1973, military coup."

The owner of *El Mercurio*, wealthy Chilean businessman Augustin Edwards, conferred with top officials of the Nixon administration on the day—Sept. 15, 1970—that President Nixon ordered the CIA to help mount a military coup d'etat as a means of preventing Allende's election.

The report revealed that the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. and other U.S. multinational firms based in Chile funneled some \$700,000 into that country's presidential popular election in 1970 in behalf of conservative candidate Jorge

See CHURCH, A21; Col. 4

CIA Propaganda Work in Chile Told

CHURCH, From A1
Alessandri—Allende's principal opponent.

It previously had been disclosed that ITT had offered through one of its directors, former CIA Director John A. McCone, \$1 million to thwart the Allende election but that the money had been declined by the agency.

The actual contributions of ITT and other American companies, the report disclosed, was given with the CIA's advice on how to "safely channel" the money into the campaign. ITT contributed about \$350,000 of the total amount, according to the committee.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), chairman of the intelligence panel, estimated that the \$3 million pumped into Chile during the 1964 election would be the equivalent to an expenditure of \$60 million in the United States—allowing for differences in population. That, Church noted, was more than twice the reported amount spent by Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater together during the U.S. presidential campaign that year.

In the 1964 Chilean election, the report revealed, more than half of the campaign costs of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei were financed by the United States without Frei's knowledge. That year, as in the previous four elections in Chile, Allende was a candidate. The CIA spent more than \$2.6 million in Frei's behalf in the 1964 presidential race.

The United States did not concern itself with presidential elections in Chile but congressional contests as well. In February, 1965, the

303 Committee, which at that time passed on covert operations, approved \$175,000 to support 22 congressional candidates in Chile selected by the U.S. ambassador and the CIA station chief, according to the report.

In describing the CIA-directed propaganda to influence the outcome of the 1970 election, the report cited the case of a Time magazine article cover story that was changed as the result of a CIA briefing.

"According to CIA documents," the committee said, "the Time correspondent in Chile apparently had accepted Allende's protestations of moderation and constitutionality at face value. Briefings requested by Time and provided by the CIA in Washington resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the Time story" on Allende's Sept. 4 popular victory.

The pattern of covert financing, according to the report, spread through the entire political and economic sector of Chile, encompassing trade unions, business organizations, right-wing extremist groups and farm organizations.

Funds provided by the CIA, the report said, "financed activities covering a broad spectrum from propaganda manipulation of the press to large-scale support for Chile's political parties, from public opinion polls to attempts to foment a military coup.

The report asserted that there was no evidence the United States was "directly involved, covertly" in the 1973 coup against Allende. "However the United States sought, in 1970, to foment a military coup in Chile," the

committee staff concluded. "After 1970 it adopted a policy of both overt and covert opposition to Allende and it remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military, including officers who were participating in the coup plotting."

Similarly, the report said that top U.S. national security advisers opposed American funding of the truckers' strike that precipitated the final economic crisis of the Allende administration, setting the stage for the Sept. 11 coup.

The CIA recommended that the truck owners' strike be supported with a \$25,000 grant, but the proposal was never approved. The CIA did rebuke a Chilean cover organization that passed on \$2,500 to the strikers.

The CIA provided \$38,500 for the controversial right-wing paramilitary organization Fatherland and Liberty "in an effort to create tension and a possible pretext for intervention by the Chilean military." The organization was publicly calling for the armed overthrow of Allende's government.

The report, based on access to national security documents, said that the covert activities carried out in Chile were apparently not made available to the CIA intelligence analysts responsible for preparing National Intelligence estimates on Chile.

This meant that those U.S. officials responsible for preparing national estimates on Chile "appear not to have had access to certain information which could have added to, or substantially revised, their assessments and predictions. That flaw

was telling," the report said.

The committee heard testimony yesterday from two former ambassadors to Chile, Edward M. Korry and Ralph Dungan, as well as former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Charles Meyer.

Korry evoked laughter from the audience when he declared that "under Ambassador Dungan and me, Chile made more social progress than any other country in Latin America."

Korry, in a heavily emotional presentation, accused Church and the committee of conducting a political "pornoflick" rather than an objective inquiry. He was ambassador during the 1970 U.S. intervention.

Dungan, the ambassador from 1964 to 1967, described the intervention "as we now see in hindsight a national disgrace." He added, however, that the excesses occurred under "imprecise congressional mandates, haphazard oversight and money provided by Congress."

The general outlines of the CIA interventions in 1964 and the 1970-1973 period have been reported in the press. What the new committee report provided was precise detail and documentary evidence.

It also demonstrated, through citation of national security documents that were declassified for the committee, that the U.S. policy-making community was split on the 1970 interventions with the State Department taking a dim view of intervention and the Pentagon, White House and the U.S. ambassador to Chile, Korry, supporting it.

In describing the CIA-financed propaganda activity, the report said what it called a "subversion operation" against Allende included production of hundreds of thousands of leaflets; extensive and radio campaigning; painting some 2,000 wall murals; the firing squad slogan "parendon" (your wall conducting a terror car showing large photographs of Soviet tanks in Prague).

In one week during the campaign, the report said, CIA-funded propaganda produced 20 radio spots a day in Santiago and provincial stations; 12 news broadcasts five days on three radio stations; and 24 print outlets; thousands of leaflets and much paid advertising.

Colby Opposes Naming Agents

F 11/20/75

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby made an uncharacteristically public attack yesterday on the prospective release by the Senate intelligence committee of the names of 12 intelligence officials involved in assassination schemes aimed at foreign leaders.

He warned, in a hastily called press conference at CIA headquarters, that the naming of the CIA operatives as well as American citizens and foreigners who worked with the agency could subject them to "extra-legal retaliation" by individuals and "unstable or extremist groups."

Colby said, in response to a question, that he was not acting at the request of the White House, which earlier asked the Senate committee not to make public its assassination report.

The director acknowledged that he already had asked the committee, headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), in testimony and by letter not to divulge the names of agency officials and cooperative private citizens. Colby's intention was now to put himself on record publicly against the committee's plans to release the names.

The Senate intelligence panel has already deleted 20 of

the 32 names the CIA asked it to eliminate from its public report.

Church, upon learning of Colby's statement, said the committee had decided to include only the names of those who were "inseparably involved in the decisions that led to the involvement of our government in assassination attempts." He made it clear he was unswayed by the director's comments.

"We feel we have acted judiciously and properly," said Church.

In past years CIA directors were rarely seen in public, let alone at press conferences. The only other formal press conference in the agency's history, according to CIA spokesmen, was Sept. 12 during the height of the agency's confrontation with the House intelligence committee.

Colby, asked why he was resorting to the extraordinary measure of holding a press conference, said he wanted to make clear publicly that he felt it was "wrong" to release the names.

He said that he and other top-ranking officials of the agency were already subjected to crank calls and

See COLBY, A4, Col. 7

Disclosing of Names Is Opposed by Colby

COLBY, From A1

resorting to the extraordinary measure of holding a press conference, said he wanted to make clear publicly that he felt it was "wrong" to release the names.

He said that he and other top-ranking officials of the agency were already subjected to crank calls and threats. Recently a pipe bomb exploded in the home of the field agent in charge of the Denver office of the CIA's Domestic Collection Division.

Colby said his concern extended to middle-level and senior officials of the agency whose names figure in the report. They are people, he said, who carried out orders that general public attitudes "thought appropriate at the time."

"Exposing our people to hostile retaliation is not in the tradition of our country," said Colby.

Testimony given to the Senate committee, he went on, was provided with the expectation that neither it nor the identity of the CIA witnesses would be made public.

Colby said he had cooperated fully with the Senate committee although he, like the President, stood opposed to any public discussion of details of past assassination activities by the CIA.

Colby noted that the committee had agreed under the pressure of an appellate court battle to delete the name of one CIA official who had challenged the committee's decision to name him.

Intelligence Work Backed By Kissinger

F 11/25/75

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger yesterday strongly defended U.S. intelligence operations and called on the American people to end "the self-flagellation that has done so much harm to this nation's capacity to conduct foreign policy."

"We must resist the myth that government is a gigantic conspiracy," Kissinger said. "We cannot allow the intelligence services of this country to be dismantled."

Speaking in Detroit on what he said "is right with America's foreign policy," Kissinger said that "in a world where totalitarian government can manipulate friendly political parties, there is a gray area between foreign policy and overt intervention which we deny ourselves only at grave risk to our national security."

Kissinger's remark was taken as a defense of U.S. covert intervention in foreign countries and it came in the wake of congressional investigation and criticism of Central Intelligence Agency operations around the globe.

What Kissinger appeared to be advocating was support of political parties and the communications efforts, such as newspapers, of anti-Communist forces.

Kissinger said, "We must discover the excesses of the past, overcome the abuses that are uncovered. . . . But it should be possible to cleanse our institutions without disrupting the conduct of our nation's business abroad and buffeting all the instruments of our policy."

In the text of his speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, copies of which were distributed here, Kissinger called for an end to "the delusion that American intelligence activities are immoral; the suspicion that the confidentiality of diplomacy is

See KISSINGER, A11, Col. 1

Kissinger Defends Intelligence Work

KISSINGER, From A1
a plot to deceive the public, or the illusion that tranquility can be achieved by an abstract purity of motive for which history offers no example."

Kissinger also addressed himself to specific issues of policy. He said the United States envisages "the eventual normalization of relations" with the countries of Southeast Asia provided "those governments show understanding of our concerns."

He said "this will especially be the case if they deal constructively with the anguish of thousands of Americans who ask only an accounting for their loved ones missing in action and the return of the bodies of Americans who died in Indochina."

Kissinger said "that chapter in our history, which occasioned so much anguish, is now closed. As for our relations with the new governments in that region, these will not be determined by the past; we are prepared to look to a more hopeful future. The United States will respond to gestures of goodwill."

Prior to the normalization of relations he said the United States is "prepared to consider practical arrangements of mutual benefit in such fields as travel and trade."

The secretary reaffirmed the American commitment to the Shanghai communique

with China. "We do not challenge the principle of one China," he said, adding that "while time may yet be required to resolve our remaining differences on this issue, the direction of our policy is clear."

While defending the American policy of "relaxation of tension" with the Soviet Union, he said the United States is prepared for "both firm action in crises and willingness to resolve problems on a realistic and fair basis." He said: "The choice rests with our adversaries."

Kissinger said nothing about American or Chinese activities in Angola, but said the United States cannot ignore "the substantial Soviet buildup of weapons in Angola, which has introduced great power rivalry into Africa for the first time in 15 years."

Nor, Kissinger, said, could the United States "ignore the thousands of Cubans sent into an African conflict," meaning Angola.

He said that "we have cooperated with steps to ease the inter-American boycott against Cuba, and to restore a more normal relationship between the nations of the Americas and Cuba. But let there be no illusions: a policy of conciliation will not survive Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate."

Higher Authority Seen Behind CIA Actions

F 11/22/75

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. espionage establishment was carrying out its basic institutional role—though one little understood by most Americans—in the assassination case studies described by the Senate intelligence committee report.

Although in its epilogue the committee described the assassination plots as "aberrations," the mass of evidence in the 347-page report suggests that each of the episodes took place within a firm context of national policy going all the way to the Oval Office.

In one way or another, the five assassination targets were regarded as personages inimical to U.S. national security interests. At the same time, the various administrations in the White House did not want to be saddled with the open responsibility for the downfall of the individual leaders or their governments.

But the testimony of witnesses who were central

he has to resort to secret action to carry out his foreign policies. And the Senate committee, in its unprecedented detailed portrait of the upper levels of the American espionage system, describes an agency that is anything but the "rogue elephant" that the committee chairman, Sen. Frank Church, (D-Idaho) once suggested it was.

Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms, recalling his departure from the White House on Sept. 15, 1970, with President Nixon's orders to prevent the election in Chile of Salvador Allende, a Socialist, later testified: "...If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day."

Despite titillating accounts of exploding seashells, contaminated diving suits and exotic poisons that fill the pages of the report, the underlying truth is that the CIA has functioned as a strongly hierarchical bureaucracy that owes its final allegiance on operational matters to the White House.

William Harvey, the CIA agent put in charge of recruiting underworld figures for the Castro poison schemes, repeatedly followed this line of testimony:

"I was completely convinced during this entire period that this operation had the full authority of the White House, either from the President or from someone authorized and known to be authorized to speak for the President."

The CIA's involvement in covert political warfare got its start in the idiosyncratic relationship between the Dulles brothers during the Eisenhower administration.

John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, according to intelligence veterans of that era, did not trust the State Department bureaucracy on matters of high sensitivity and would call his brother, Allen, the CIA director, who would deploy the clandestine services of the CIA to the task.

The tradition of CIA covert operations with its clubby, swashbuckling, secretive panache, took firm root in the Dulles days. During the 1950's, the clandestine

programs of the CIA were rated within the government as a success, primarily in battling Communist mass organizations in Europe.

The agency survived the humiliating fiasco of the Bay of Pigs in 1961 to entangle itself in a continuing series of misadventures during the 1960's—some of them chronicled in the assassination report.

It had once been a boast of Allen W. Dulles that Americans never heard of the CIA's successes—only its failures. However now that so much of the agency's clandestine history has been laid bare in congressional and executive investigations, the claim does not stand the test of public scrutiny.

The Senate intelligence committee acknowledged that it did not find any smoking guns in the White House. But the report hinted that this may have been because of the elaborate system of bureaucratic obfuscation built into the system for the purpose of affording "plausible deniability" to the President.

In the Chilean intervention, CIA witnesses maintained that Henry A. Kissinger, then President Nixon's national security affairs adviser, was informed throughout of covert U.S. activities targeted against the Allende government.

Kissinger testified, however, that the White House withdrew its support for efforts to intervene in the election on Oct. 15, 1970—a week before the attempted kidnapping and murder of Chilean Army Chief-of-Staff Rene Schneider.

While the "rogue elephant" theory did not survive the hard evidence of CIA excesses in the report, the committee did single out examples in which CIA officials failed to inform their superiors of politically sensitive schemes or obtain authorization before carrying them out.

Helms and Bissell were the chief offenders, the report indicates, in the Bay of Pigs episode.

But the record does not show any serious deception by the agency of the White House, to which it owes its ultimate loyalty.

News Analysis

participants in the events covered by the assassination report tends to push the trail of responsibility to the door of the White House.

Richard Bissell, the Central Intelligence Agency deputy director for plans (head of the dirty tricks division) and a principal Castro assassination plotter, told the committee the schemes were authorized by "highest authority"—by which he meant the President.

As Sen. Howard H. Baker (R-Tenn.) pointed out in a supplementary report, Bissell testified that it would not have been "consonant with the operations of the CIA" to conduct operations of such extreme sensitivity without the President's knowledge and permission.

The recurrent theme in the testimony of the upper-level CIA functionaries was that they were acting within a framework of authority within which all their programs and schemes had an ultimate presidential sanction.

The CIA has been described as a "king's army" at the disposal of the President when

Ford Abhors U.S. Role in Coups, Plots

F 11/22/75

By Stephen Isaacs
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford said yesterday that he "abhors" the thought of American government officials being involved in assassination plots and coups d'etat abroad.

In the wake of the Senate intelligence committee's report Thursday detailing CIA and other official participation in such plots, White House press secretary Ron

Nessen said the President "absolutely abhors government officials" being involved in those kinds of things, and he has forbidden officials in his administration from being involved.

Nessen refused to be more specific than to say that "he has in mind his own plans" for stopping such involvement and "they will be made public when they are ready."

He reminded reporters that files on individuals' involvement in the plots had been turned over to the Justice Department for review.

While Nessen would not detail what plans President Ford is considering, other White House aides have said in recent months they might include reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency, appointment of a CIA inspector general who would be independent of the agency's leadership, and a different form of executive branch panel to watch over the CIA's activities.

While Nessen was briefing reporters, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was himself appearing before a closed session of the intelligence committee.

The committee's report portrayed Kissinger as playing a strong role in a 1970 Nixon administration plot to disrupt Chilean politics and the government of Marxist leader Salvador Allende.

Kissinger appeared before the Senate committee for more than two hours, in what he later told reporters was a review of the "the general problem of control of covert operations."

"I think there can be tighter control by the executive branch," he said, adding that he strongly favors a legislative oversight committee to work closely with the executive branch "as it develops covert operations."

Asked if he felt covert operations should be taken out of the CIA, Kissinger paused, and then said, "I would think not."

Reporters asked Kissinger if he was still trying to deny his and President Nixon's involvement in Chilean politics, in view of the committee's report that they instigated the CIA's activities.

At first he said, "I have testified at great length before the committee and they have the full record of these operations and I don't think it's appropriate for me to go into any public session."

When reminded that he and former President Nixon have disavowed any involvement in Chilean activities, the secretary said, "We have stated repeatedly that the military coup in 1973 was in no way supported by the United States. We had no contact with any of the people that carried out the military coup."

Reporters reminded him then that the committee's report was talking about activities in 1970, not 1973.

"The report is another matter," Kissinger said. "That's all I have to say."

With that, Kissinger turned and walked away.

World Bank president Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense under

See REACT, A1, Col. 1

Ford Abhors U.S. Role in Coups, Plots

REACT, From A1

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, talked briefly with a reporter by telephone.

The report suggests that one participant in a high-level meeting on Aug. 10, 1962, recalls McNamara's suggesting the group "consider the elimination or assassination" of Castro. But most participants, and the minutes, do not recall McNamara as having said that. McNamara refused yesterday to add to his own denials of having made the statement.

He said he has read the conclusions of the committee's report and said he agrees "with the two major conclusions of the committee, first that neither I nor any of my senior associates in the Kennedy or Johnson administrations authorized either the assassination of any political leader or the preparation of plans for any such action."

"Secondly, with hindsight, it appears we should have taken the initiative to investigate whether any such actions were under way in any part of the government, and to issue positive instructions to prohibit them."

"The lesson is that our successors must pursue such investigations."

At the Justice Department, where some 10 names of present or former government officials are said to have been referred for possible prosecution in connection with the coup and assassination plots, no one would comment yesterday on the status of the investigation.

In June, Attorney General Edward H. Levi labeled the department's investigation "high priority" and told reporters "then he was 'shocked'" by some of the material that had been forwarded to him by the Rockefeller Commission, which also reviewed CIA activities.

The Justice investigation is in the hands of the head of the Criminal Division, Assistant Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh, who is said to be leaning strongly toward prosecuting some of the officials.

Marianne Means 11/18/75 S.F. Exam

Persisting CIA questions ^{D/Pres.}

WASHINGTON — Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on intelligence, saw the brutal spy movie *Three Days of the Condor* recently and says "I've been looking over my shoulder ever since." He is only half joking.

The committee's report exposing several CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders will be presented to the senate in a secret session today. The Senate is expected to approve making the report public, although President Ford and the Justice Department have pleaded that it remain secret.

Church says he has been "personally shocked" by the committee's discovery of plots to kill foreign officials, secretly open citizens' mail, discredit unpopular figures, and pull various other unsavory and illegal stunts. He feels satisfied that the assassination report — and the final committee report, to follow in January when hearings are finished — will reveal more about the CIA and its clandestine world than the public ever suspected might exist.

But he concedes "there are many holes in the evidence. Many unanswered questions." He adds, "we couldn't make findings where the evidence is contradictory or

insufficient." One such area is the question of whether President John Kennedy's assassination was somehow triggered by the fact that the CIA had unsuccessfully plotted to kill Cuban premier Fidel Castro.

The committee's evidence reportedly does not disprove that theory but it does not prove anything, either.

Church also acknowledges that his committee was unable to establish whether any given illegal activity was specifically approved by a President.

Church does not believe, as presidential candidate Fred Harris does, that the CIA should be abolished altogether. He has tried to expose the unlawful conduct while preserving such secrets as necessary to protect the proper international information-gathering apparatus. For his pains, he has been denounced both as a headline-hunter and as too soft on the CIA. The truth, as usual, lies somewhere in between those two extremes.

Church is somewhat puzzled by the lack of public outrage. He is also a bit disappointed, since he had counted on the attention given to the probe to provide him with a foundation for a presidential campaign.

Senator Church's Cover-up

D/pres. Cin. Enq. 11/24/75

By William Safire

WASHINGTON: On October 10, 1963, Attorney General Robert Kennedy put his personal signature on a document that launched and legitimized one of the most horrendous abuses of federal police power in this century.

In Sen. Frank Church's subcommittee hearing room this week, the authorized wiretapping and subsequent unauthorized bugging and attempted blackmailing of Martin Luther King Jr. is being gingerly examined, with the "investigation" conducted in such a way as not to unduly embarrass officials of the Kennedy or Johnson administrations.

WITH GREAT care, the committee has focused on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Last Tuesday when the committee counsel first set forth the result of shuffling through press clips, it seemed as if no Justice Department had existed in 1962; Wednesday, an FBI witness pointed out that it was Robert Kennedy who authorized the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the President of the United States and the attorney general specifically discussed their concern of Communist influence with Dr. King."

But the Church committee showed no zest for getting further to the Kennedy root of this precedent to Watergate eavesdropping. If Church were willing to let the chips fall where they may, he would call some knowledgeable witnesses into the glare of the camera lights and ask them some questions that have gone unasked for 13 years.

For example, he could call Nicholas Katzenbach, attorney general Kennedy's deputy and successor, and ask what he knows of the Kennedy decision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at Justice concurred in the

recommendation? How does the FBI know the President was consulted or informed?

AFTER KATZENBACH assumed office, and the wiretapping continued, he was told by angry newsmen that the FBI was leaking scurrilous information about Dr. King. Why did he wait for four months, and for a thousand telephonic interceptions, to discontinue the officially-approved tap?

Of course, this sort of testimony would erode Church's political base. That is why we do not see former assistant FBI director Cartha "Deke" DeLoach, Lyndon Johnson's personal contact with the FBI, in the witness chair. What did President Johnson know about the character-assassination plot and when did he know it? What conversations took place between DeLoach and President Johnson of the tapping of Dr. King, or about the use of the FBI in any other intrusions into the lives of political figures?

The committee is not asking embarrassing questions even when answers are readily available. A couple of weeks ago, at an open hearing, an FBI man inadvertently started to blurt out an episode about newsmen who were wiretapped in 1962 with the apparent knowledge of Attorney General Kennedy. The too-willing witness was promptly shooshed into silence, and told that such information would be developed only in executive session. Nobody even raises an eyebrow.

THAT PATTERN of containment by the Church committee is vividly shown by the handling of the buggings at the 1964 Republican and Democratic conventions which were ordered by Lyndon Johnson. Such invasions of political headquarters were worse than the crime committed at Watergate, since they involved the use of the FBI, but the Church investiga-

tors seem to be determined not to probe too deeply.

If FBI documents say that reports were made to specific Johnson aides, why are those men not given the same opportunity to publicly tell their story so avidly given the next President's men? If Lyndon Johnson committed this impeachable high crime of using the FBI to spy on political opponents, who can be brought forward to tell us all about it?

But that would cause embarrassment to Democrats, and Church wants to embarrass professional employees of investigatory agencies only. A new sense of congressional decorum exists, far from the sense of outrage expressed in the Senate Watergate Committee's hearing room. When it revealed that the management of the National Broadcasting Co. (NBC) news gave press credentials to LBJ's spies at the 1964 convention, everybody blushes demurely — and nobody demands to know which network executive made what decision under what pressure.

I HAVE been haranguing patient readers for years about the double standard applied to Democratic and Republican political crimes, and had hoped the day would come when the hardball precedents set by the Kennedy and Johnson men would be laid before the public in damning detail.

Obviously, Democrat Frank Church is not the man to do it. His jowl-shaking indignation is all too selective; the trail of high-level responsibility for the crimes committed against Dr. King and others is evidently going to be allowed to cool.

Pity. You'd think that after all the nation has been through in the past few years, our political leaders would have learned that the one thing that brings you down is the act of covering up.

NY Times 12/4/75 The Blowsoft

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3—A blowsoft is a low-key blowhard. He does not get all red in the face, or expostulate angrily, or wave his arms; he simply takes a wrongheaded position and stands there in dignity as the ground erodes under him.

Otis Pike, a Representative from Long Island with a reputation for good sense, has allowed his desire to become U.S. Senator to transform him into a blowsoft.

As chairman of the House committee investigating intelligence abuses, Mr. Pike had a unique opportunity to shine in comparison to Senate competition—the Church committee—which today, under much prodding, and with Senator Church discreetly absent, produced Lyndon Johnson's F.B.I. finger-man, Cartha DeLoach, and former Attorneys General Nicholas Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark. (Even under cream-puff questioning, Mr. Katzenbach displayed a forgettery rivaling Sally Harmony's—he just did not remember putting his initials on all those terrible documents.)

If he wished, Congressman Pike could have exposed the first—and worst—White House abuse of the Internal Revenue Service by publicly examining Kennedy hatchetman Carmine Bellino, who appeared at the I.R.S. only six days after President Kennedy's inauguration with a list of enemies to investigate.

Or the intrepid House committee chairman could have called to the stand Bill Moyers and Walter Jenkins, the L.B.J. aides who passed the orders and received the reports on the F.B.I.'s illegal political wiretapping and bugging of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions in 1964. (Mr. Moyers' moral denunciations of Richard Nixon in his Newsweek column now have a special poignance.)

Mr. Pike might have summoned Marvin Watson, top L.B.J. political operative now hitting the nail on the head for Dr. Armand Hammer, to look into his "plumbers" operation, which

By William Safire

the Church committee seems to be glossing over.

Or he might ask aides to Robert Kennedy about the precedent-setting wiretapping of Hanson Baldwin of The New York Times and Lloyd Norman of Newsweek in 1961.

Or Mr. Pike might even go so far as to call John Stewart, until recently the director of communications of the Democratic National Committee, about attempts reportedly made by Democratic lawyers to impede an F.B.I. investigation into the prior knowledge Mr. Stewart might have had about the Watergate break-in. (Fat chance of Mr. Pike calling him: Mr. Stewart now works for Ted Kennedy's energy subcommittee.)

But Mr. Pike is pursuing none of the above. Instead, he seeks the approbation of Democrats by leading the charge to cite Henry Kissinger for contempt of Congress.

Secretary Kissinger does not frequently find a defender in this space, and he contributed to the Administration's predicament by foolishly withholding information on SALT violations to which the Congress was clearly entitled. But the attempt to use the contempt power of Congress to force any individual in the Administration to disobey a Presidential order is a basic violation of the principle of the separation of powers.

Because that principle may have been used to conceal evidence of law-breaking in the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon years does not mean the principle does not exist: President Ford has decided that certain recommendations on covert intelligence actions should remain within the executive branch. This decision should be subject to normal, not abnormal, Congressional coercion.

The Congress has constitutional, traditional pressures it can apply on

the Presidency, ranging from withholding appropriations to threatening impeachment. The legislative branch does not need, and ought not to have, the intercession of the judicial branch to settle routine disputes with the executive branch.

If the Congress votes a contempt action against Secretary Kissinger—or Commerce Secretary Rogers Morton; in a similar situation—obviously the local U.S. Attorney could not carry the case to court, in conflict with the rest of the Justice Department. A Congressional doorkeeper could be sent to make the arrest, or a court could be asked to send an agent of its own—but is that the kind of institutional clash the Congress wants?

Of course not. For one branch to ask another to hold the third branch in contempt is to use a hydrogen bomb where rifles and mortars would do. To make such a threat idly is to show disrespect for the system; to actually take a contempt charge to court would substantially weaken Congressional power (if the case were lost) or destroy executive power (if, as is most unlikely, Congress' case were won).

Gray areas are painted gray for a good reason: Certain matters of power between branches are best left undecided, to be worked out on the basis of mutual respect, shrewd trading, human jockeying, and countervailing pressures. May the Constitution preserve us from tidy men, determined to paint everything black and white; a system of checks and balances loses when one branch "wins."

The decline of Secretary Kissinger, which will accelerate if Richard Helms becomes a grand jury target, is not sped by Mr. Pike's overkill. His contempt threat is idle, the threat of a blowsoft; by using it to aggrandize himself in headlines, Mr. Pike joins that little group of willful men who only make our Government helpless and contemptible.

Jackson Pledges Kissinger Will Be Campaign Target

By PAUL R. WIECK
Of the Journal's
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson, D-Wash., made it clear Friday that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will be one of his major targets as he campaigns the country for the Democratic presidential nomination.

"Sure he is an issue," Jackson said, adding "it involves the gross mismanagement of our foreign policy."

JACKSON'S long-standing contempt for Kissinger was agitated again this week when President Ford dumped Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, a Kissinger foe within the administration's top echelon.

He cited two reasons for making Kissinger a target.

First, he spoke of Kissinger's "lack of forthrightness."

THAT'S AT the heart of the problem," Jackson said, adding, "One can disagree and not be disagreeable but, in this case, it goes to the whole question of personal integrity."

He spoke of Kissinger's habit of playing with words to avoid a forthright answer and referred to a time when he had to "put Kissinger

under oath to extract the truth from him."

In contrast, Jackson said he didn't always agree with Schlesinger but, "when we called him in to testify he didn't get technical and play with words."

HOWEVER, Jackson and Schlesinger do share a common view of the problems of detente.

Schlesinger often expressed, within the National Security Council, views on this country's position in the SALT II talks which Kissinger viewed as obstacles to his efforts to reach an agreement with the Kremlin.

Jackson tended to agree with Schlesinger on these matters.

SECONDLY, Jackson admits he disagrees with Kissinger's concept of detente, saying Kissinger "underestimates the strength of the United States and, as a result, moves for temporary

accommodations which aren't permanent."

He cites the Peking regime as an example of the danger inherent in this.

Jackson, who relies heavily on his new-found friendship with the Chinese Communists these days, claims they are "terribly upset" by developments under Kissinger and Ford.

"THEY ARE relying on a strong, stable United States with a President who can make tough decisions," Jackson insists.

He expands his criticism of Kissinger to include a claim he doesn't understand the economic implications of foreign policy, that his vision in dealing with world problems has been limited to a few areas.

For instance, it took him six years to prepare a speech on third-world nations.

JACKSON oozes confidence when speaking of his campaign.

It now appears his first major effort will be in New York on April 6 where he has been working for months to build support although he may campaign earlier in Massachusetts and, to a limited extent, in Florida.

Appointment a shock, enigma

Pentagon mood joyless as Rumsfeld sworn in

By Guy Halverson
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

With ruffles and flourishes and the band playing "Hail to the Chief," President Ford and newly designated Defense Secretary Donald R. Rumsfeld walked quickly down the stairs fronting the riverside entrance of the Pentagon with the massive 16 columns supporting the entrance to the world's largest military establishment behind them.

Within 30 minutes, Mr. Rumsfeld — President Ford's former chief of staff at the White House — had become Defense Secretary in what political analysts argue may well be among the President's riskiest political ventures.

For the Pentagon, the Rumsfeld appointment is both a shock and an enigma.

- In the past seven years the Pentagon has had four defense secretaries: Melvin Laird, Elliot Richardson, James R. Schlesinger, and now Mr. Rumsfeld. Yet for a vast governmental bureaucracy with a budget of about \$100 billion a year that must plan weapons systems and defenses in terms of decades, the almost continuous "revolving doors" at the Pentagon has meant confusion and uncertainty.

- The Pentagon is taking the worst drubbing on Capitol Hill in a decade. The Senate this week, for example, slashed the defense budget for fiscal year 1976 some 7 percent.

- Despite some grumblings by military chieftains over his professorial manners and drive for weapons standardization in NATO, former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger commanded deep respect at the Pentagon. As Dr. Schlesinger was a university-trained economist and PhD who had served an important post with the prestigious Rand

Institute, Mr. Rumsfeld's background is basically political. Mr. Rumsfeld is a former Illinois congressman who later headed the Office of Economic Opportunity in the Nixon administration and served a brief stint as U.S. ambassador to NATO.

It was a perfect day for a swearing-in ceremony: 70-degree autumn weather with clear blue skies and a slight wind. To the north, silhouetted against the Washington Monument and the Jefferson Memorial, glistening jet aircraft slowly made their approach, dipped and descended toward Washington's nearby National Airport.

Behind the President and Mr. Rumsfeld were the Cabinet members of the Ford administration: Justice Potter Stewart was there for the oath-taking.

Despite the martial music and spit and polish of the color guards, the mood at the Pentagon Thursday was joyless and contrasted sharply with the sadness evident at the mustering-out ceremony for former Secretary Schlesinger.

In his brief introductory remarks, President Ford came out again briefly in favor of "a military capability second to none." Observers noted, however, that he failed to chide current congressional defense budget cuts.

Mr. Rumsfeld, moreover, while insisting that the U.S. would maintain its "vigilant and due caution," came down squarely on the Ford administration's detente posture. "Detente must be seen for what it is — a word for the approach we use in relations with nations who are not friends . . . whom we are not sure we can trust, and who have military power and have shown an inclination to use it to the detriment of freedom.

"With such nations," Mr. Rumsfeld added, "we test to see if there are ways to reduce confrontations. . . ."

Schlesinger Firing Upsets Senators

Leaders Pledge Searching Probe, Tough Questions

By FRANK VAN DER LINDEN
Banner Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON — President Ford had better get braced for a searching Senate investigation to find out why he abruptly fired James R. Schlesinger, his brilliant and courageous secretary of defense.

Some of the Senate's most influential members in both parties want to know whether Schlesinger was sacrificed to the ambition of Donald Rumsfeld, the hatred of Henry Kissinger, or the hostility of Leonid Brezhnev.

THE ARMED SERVICES committee intends to ask a lot of questions about the rough dismissal of the defense secretary in hearings on confirmation of Rumsfeld, the White House chief-of-staff who emerged from the "Sunday night massacre" as Ford's nominee to run the Pentagon.

Chairman John C. Stennis, who had his gall bladder removed in an operation at Walter Reed Army Medical Center October 20, is returning to Capitol Hill to take personal command of the Rumsfeld hearings.

The Mississippi Democrat, 74, has his dander up. He admires Schlesinger immensely. He wonders why Ford got rid of him. Was it because Schlesinger stubbornly resisted the demands of Ford and Kissinger that he go along with almost any deal with Russians on arms reductions for the sake of saving "detente"?

Two other Democrats on armed services — Henry Jackson of Washington and Howard Cannon of Nevada — are convinced that the secretary was moved out of the way to speed up final agreement between Washington and Moscow on the new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, or SALT II, which has been delayed for months by disputes on the scope of its coverage.



'Now we'll have a little detente around here'

Ford and Brezhnev, the Communist Party boss in the Soviet Union, agreed a year ago in Vladivostok on the basic outline of a ten-year deal which set a ceiling of 2,400 on the number of each nuclear power's strategic delivery vehicles — missiles and bombers. They decided that 1,320 of them could have multiple warheads, or MIRV's.

However, Schlesinger, speaking for the joint chiefs of staff, demanded that the new Soviet strategic bomber, the "Backfire," must be in the 2,400 and that the total must leave out the new American cruise missiles. The Russians dug in their heels and called for just the opposite. Kissinger wants to make concessions to Moscow. Schlesinger op-

poses them. Ford so slavishly depends upon Kissinger's guidance in every detail of foreign policy that he sides with the secretary of state in the bitter dispute.

Schlesinger also has made powerful enemies on Capitol Hill and in the office of management and budget by fighting against meat-axe cuts in the defense budget. He correctly insists that, although the Pentagon's annual budget has risen to the \$100 billion range, it actually has dropped in terms of real dollars because of the runaway inflation. Any more slashes by Congress, like the pending one for \$7 billion, he says, would slow down our development of more modern weapons and give the Russians eventual strategic superiority.

Ford claims he favors a strong national defense too, and he probably believes it. But when it comes to a showdown with the Russians or with the budget-slashers in Congress, the President seems to lack Schlesinger's backbone for the bare-knuckles fight. It is ironic that Ford contends the drastic shakeup of his high officials enables him to be his own boss and direct his own foreign policy.

IN FACT, JACKSON contends, the changes only prove that Kissinger emerged more powerful than ever — even though the secretary of state gave up his second hat as the President's national security adviser.

Jackson, the only Democratic presidential candidate so far taking a strong anti-detente position, said he will use the Rumsfeld hearings to find out "Who is running the national security council." "This," he said, "is the real issue: Is the President going to get honest dissent in the council, or only a bunch of sycophants? The fundamental differences are that Schlesinger makes a full disclosure to Congress while Kissinger does not."

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