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SYDNEY, MARCH 23 (REUTERS) - A TOP U.S. BROADCASTING EXECUTIVE HAS SAID THAT THE SHADOW OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) LIES OVER ANY PART-TIME OVERSEAS CORRESPONDENT EMPLOYED BY AMERICAN NEWS AGENCIES.

ELMER LOWERY, VICE-PRESIDENT FOR CORPORATE AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY (ABC), SAID THE SUSPICION STEMMED FROM A STATEMENT FROM FORMER CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLEY IN 1975.

"HE HAD AGREED HE WOULD NOT USE STAFF CORRESPONDENTS AS AGENTS, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WAS PERMISSIBLE TO EMPLOY STRINGERS OR PART-TIMERS," MR. LOWERY SAID.

"IN ONE SENTENCE, HE THREW A CLOAK OF DOUBT AROUND EVERY STRINGER WHO WORKS ABROAD FOR AN AMERICAN NEWS ORGANIZATION," MR. LOWERY ADDED. "FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WILL CERTAINLY DOUBT THEIR CREDIBILITY."

HE MADE THE COMMENTS IN AN ADDRESS YESTERDAY TO A MEETING OF NEW SOUTH WALES RADIO AND TELEVISION NEWS CHIEFS.

MR. LOWERY SAID THERE WILL STILL A FEW PEOPLE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WHO BELIEVED FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS SHOULD CO-OPERATE WITH THE CIA.

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what a cheap
irresponsible "shot" with
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
put in CIA
file

*Pop thought this would
interest you.*

**Last year the
CIA conspired
to assassinate
Prime Minister
Michael Manley
of Jamaica.**







In December 1975, while official Washington reverberated with mock hysteria over the assassination of Allende of Chile and indulged in self-castigation and guilt over the covert operations of the CIA, Henry Kissinger approved a plan to overthrow yet another government.

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Bribes, pure and simple

Houston Post
March 8, 1977

CIA payoffs to foreign leaders illegal

By Norman Cousins

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has joined President Carter in defending the secret payment of millions of dollars by the CIA to heads of foreign governments. They have defended these payments as "appropriate and legal." Yet they are troubled about the damage to America's position in the world caused by the disclosures.

An obvious question arises at this point: If the payments are "appropriate," why were they made secretly? After all, the United States has a large foreign aid program. Couldn't "appropriate and legal" payments be made under that program?

The equally obvious answer is that the secret payments were made not to governments but to individuals. Since the individuals received the money, they could use it for personal purposes. Therefore, what they received were not appropriate or legitimate payments but bribes, pure and simple.

Things have to be called by their right names. A secret payment to an individual made to win his favor or to get him to do certain things is a bribe. Bribery is against the U.S. law. There is no way under the Constitution to use public funds for this purpose. Therefore, a government agency has violated the law in bribing heads of state. This violation has now been defended by the President of the United States who only recently promised the voters that he would be just as scrupulous about morality in government as he is about morality in private life.

The present episode began when someone in the White House got wind of the fact that The Washington Post was about to break the story about CIA payoffs just as Secretary Vance was about to meet in Jordan with King Hussein, one of the recipients. The President feared that Vance's mission would be severely compromised by the disclosures. According to reports, the President called in Ben Bradlee and Bob Woodward of The Washington Post — two key names in the

Watergate disclosures — and informed them that publication of the story could be damaging to U.S. interests. He did not make any direct request to kill the story but asked that, if The Post did decide to publish, it would at least defer the story until after Vance's meeting.

When The Washington Post proceeded with immediate publication, the President made a public statement deploring the failure of the news media to honor confidentiality on security matters. The President not only did not repudiate the bribery by the CIA but defended it.

The President is correct in saying that the disclosures have been deeply embarrassing to the United States. But it was not the American press that bribed foreign officials; it was the U.S. government itself.

It would be unfortunate indeed if President Carter, like President Nixon, should be more intent on managing news about embarrassing situations than about correcting them. Richard Nixon's way of dealing with Watergate was to blame the press rather than to face up to

the crimes the press had uncovered. Nixon never really understood the historic function of the press in American society. He persisted in regarding it as a malicious and trouble-making appendage to American society rather than as an essential part of the American design. In the perspective of history, this failure by Nixon may be seen as the key to his collapse.

President Carter certainly cannot be accused of underestimating the power or importance of the press. In his election campaign, and in his presidency so far, he has been open and accessible to a degree unmatched in recent presidential history. But the CIA episode has demonstrated that the President's advisers were far off base in having him request the press to withdraw or delay the bribery story, however embarrassing or even damaging the publication of that story might be. The Washington Post was doing what it was supposed to do. And the American people have a right to expect that their President will apply to government the same standards the people themselves are expected to maintain.

Carter seems to see no 'mistake' in payments

By James McCartney

Knight News Wire

When he was campaigning for President last year, Jimmy Carter made it sound like things were going to be different with the CIA if he was elected and discovered any shenanigans.

"If the CIA ever makes a mistake," he said last spring, "I'll be the one, as President, to call a press conference, and I'll tell you and the American people, this is what happened, these are the people who violated the law, this is the punishment I recommend."

Jimmy Carter was elected, and not a month went by before a 20-year-old program of secret payments to Jordan's King Hussein was exposed, totaling millions of dollars. Carter didn't call a press conference. He didn't tell the American people what had happened. And he didn't recommend any punishment.

In fact, the Carter White House fell back on an old and practiced routine of many administrations of the past, where CIA activities have been involved. It would "neither confirm nor deny" the story — and it hasn't yet — even though King Hussein himself, by this time, has acknowledged that the story was true.

This set of circumstances has puzzled many, not only in Washington, but around the country. What happened to the Carter of the election campaign, who promised an "open" government? Did he break a promise? Why has he been unwilling to put all of his cards on the table, as he seemed to pledge?

A careful reconstruction of events since the exposure of the CIA payments to Hussein, as well as interviews with top White House staff members, suggests that Jimmy Carter got caught in an oversimplification of a presidential election campaign.

As he and his top aides at the White House see it, he hasn't broken a promise. But he has chosen to be less than totally candid about what has happened.

Nevertheless, the reasons for Carter's reluctance to be completely "open," seem clear. Carter's promise, repeated

often in the election campaign, was that he would go public if the CIA made a "mistake."

Top White House officials said privately, immediately after the Washington Post reported the secret payments to Hussein, that no one thought the pay-

ments were a "mistake." And the administration still doesn't think they were a "mistake."

Hussein is considered the key to a possible long-term peace settlement in the Middle East — a moderate bridge between Israel and the Palestine Liberation



'Wherever you go, son, just remember, mom's the word'

The Christian Science Monitor

Organization. In fact, the U.S. investment in Hussein — questioned by many liberals for a long time — now appears to be close to paying off. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the most powerful politician in the Middle East, is now pushing for an accommodation between Hussein and the PLO.

It is also true, officials say, that Carter was not told about the payments in CIA briefings before he became president.

Now the White House has decided that there is no reason that the program can't be made public, and is looking for ways to do that.

While insisting that he will not comment directly on any specific CIA activity, Carter has said that in an initial review of CIA activities he hasn't found "anything illegal or improper."

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, however, has been somewhat more candid. Vance was asked on a TV show if he thought it was "permissible in this age" for the U.S. to "make secret payments to foreign leaders abroad." Said Vance: "Let me answer by saying, yes."

Why has Carter been so close-mouthed? He has explained that himself. He is afraid that if he starts admitting one kind of CIA activity, he can be drawn into acknowledging others.

So he has chosen to continue a long-time government policy about the CIA: admit nothing, deny nothing.

But the incident has brought out a side of Carter that does, indeed, contrast with the image of himself he projected in the election campaign. What has bothered him most about the exposure of the payments to Hussein is that there was a "leak" of a program of extreme delicacy.

Now he is taking the attitude of almost all of his predecessors. He wants to find ways to plug leaks, to hold down on the number of those exposed to government secrets.

It is an old story for presidents — Lyndon Johnson and leaks of planned troop levels in Vietnam; Richard Nixon and the Pentagon Papers.

Presidents all seem to get there, sooner or later. Jimmy Carter is just showing that he's no exception.

Hussein affair: The whole truth?

by Tom Wicker

STATEMENTS by President Carter and others have left unanswered several questions about the Central Intelligence Agency's secret payments to King Hussein of Jordan, and Carter's decision to stop them:

- When, and from whom, did Carter learn of the payments?
- If, as he is reported to have told congressional leaders, there was "nothing whatever wrong with" the payments to Hussein, why were they kept secret for 20 years?
- And why did the President order the payments stopped in February, when they were about to be disclosed by the Washington Post?

The Post reported that Carter had not been told of the payments by the CIA and learned of them only when the newspaper began its inquiry. The White House has not denied this allegation, but Carter's news conference statements last week and other remarks he made to State Department employees left the impression that he had been reviewing all such operations carefully and thoroughly.

Answering a question about the Hussein affair, for example, Carter spoke of "these kinds of operations which are legitimate and proper." Maybe they are, but if so the President surely should have been informed about them officially, not by a newspaper. That's why the question of when and from whom Carter learned of the payments is important to making a judgment about their propriety and about the CIA's operations in this extraordinary matter.

The secrecy surrounding the Hussein deal also tends to give a somewhat hollow ring to Carter's protestations that there was "nothing whatever wrong with" the arrangement. In most cases, transactions that cannot be made in public and accounted for are illegal or reprehensible or dishonorable or all of the above. Throughout the period of the secret payments to Hussein, for example, his country also was a frequent recipient of military and

other foreign assistance, from funds openly appropriated by Congress and accounted for in the federal budget.

That Hussein was personally receiving other payments totaling millions of dollars, secretly provided by the CIA and not accounted for to anyone, in Jordan or the United States, can only mean that he was in effect an agent of a foreign intelligence service, in the

pay of a foreign country, and therefore not exclusively the servant of his own country. This may well have been to the advantage of the United States; but that in itself does not mean that there was "nothing whatever wrong with" subverting a chief of state.

If, moreover, the payments to Hussein were as fruitful and useful as Carter seems now to be suggesting,

and if they were "legitimate and proper," why did their impending public disclosure cause them to be stopped? Admittedly, the publication of the fact that Hussein has been on an American secret payroll may reduce his effectiveness as a provider of intelligence. But he remains king of Jordan; as such, he is bound to have, a major part in any Middle Eastern settlement and its carrying out; and if clandestine payments to him have been necessary to make him useful and friendly in the past, why would they be less so in the future?

Once again, the implication is that these secret payments to a foreign head of state just couldn't stand the light of day as a legitimate and proper expenditure for a democratic government. That's the real issue — not the question whether the Post should have published its account of the Hussein payments on the eve of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to Amman, or at all.

Understandably enough, Carter viewed the publication as a threat to the secretary's mission in the Middle East. But a newspaper's obligation under the First Amendment is not to the success of a diplomatic mission but to the knowledge of the American people. To have withheld publication of information to suit the government's aims, or even to have scheduled publication at the government's convenience, would have been to serve the government, not to further the people's knowledge. The Post would have been cooperating in a cover-up.

Once again, however, and even in a new administration bearing no real responsibility for the Hussein payments, an effort is being made to say that disclosure is the problem, rather than the activity or practice being disclosed. Sen. Frank Church put it bluntly: "Once we put an end to this hanky-panky (payoffs to foreign leaders) then we don't have to worry about leaks."

Wicker is associate editor of the New York Times.



"Where'd everybody go?"

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Don -

Please put in my

file (CIA) on

bad reporting

"examples of bad
journalism" -

~~maybe~~ There are
several stories

CIA a monster that operates in secrecy

by Tom Wicker

IF ADMIRAL Stansfield Turner didn't know it when President Carter called him home from Europe to become director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he surely knows it now. He's got a bear by the tail, one that even the most bold and determined director probably can't control.

That was made clear by the disclosure in the Washington Post that the CIA, since 1957, secretly had paid millions of dollars — \$750,000 last year — to King Hussein of Jordan. Not only did these payments survive through five administrations and into a sixth, but:

—They were labelled an "impropriety" last year by President Ford's Intelligence Oversight Board; Ford took no action and let the payments continue.

—Neither the CIA nor Ford mentioned the Hussein payments to the Senate Intelligence Committee nor to House and Senate special committees that recently investigated the intelligence community.

—Neither Ford's CIA director, George Bush, nor Ford himself informed President-elect Carter of the Hussein payments, although Bush met with Carter five different times to brief him on the world situation and on the agency's "sources and methods."

Carter is reported by the Post to have stopped the payments when the newspaper's investigation made him aware of them; and this has led to the criticism that, by halting them on the eve of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's visit to Jordan, Carter has made it less likely that Hussein can play a useful role in a Middle East peace settlement.

This criticism reflects the classic bureaucratic reaction (in this case, no doubt the CIA's reaction) to disclosure

of mistakes and improprieties — an attempt to shift the attack from those who committed the mistake or the impropriety to those who exposed it.

But that won't wash. If, as the Intelligence Oversight Board reported, the payments were improper, they should have been discontinued last year; at the least Carter should have been given timely information about them, so that he could perhaps have made a more timely decision on their discontinuation.

Aside from the impact on Middle East policy, moreover, the Hussein matter tells all too much about the CIA and about the impossible task confronting Turner and Carter in trying to control a monster that operates in secrecy and arrogates to itself immunity to the restraints of law and policy.

It would be interesting to know, for example, whether the five presidents who preceded Carter each knew in detail and approved specifically the continuing payments to Hussein. Whatever rationale there might have been for clandestine payments to him in 1957, was it reexamined annually or even quadrennially?

Did the CIA determine the necessity for these payments and persuade or deceive one administration after another into going along? Or did one administration after another decide as a matter of policy to make the payments, then merely use the CIA as a secret bank? Who has been telling whom what ought to be done? And how many more little secrets like this one does the agency have to spring on Carter or on the presidents who succeed him?

Congressional "oversight," moreover, has been mocked again. Two long-term investigations failed to turn up information about the Hussein payments. The agency and the Ford administration did not hesitate to withhold the information from Congress' supposed watchdogs, although Aaron Donner, chief counsel for the House investigators, told the Post that the committee "went into the question of payments and other favors and gifts to heads of state sufficiently that the failure to supply such information would be in the nature of withholding such information."

Those who are defending the Hussein payments as necessary and effective

have the burden, moreover, of explaining the 20 years of secrecy that surrounded them. If the payments were not bribes but reflected an honorable and fruitful relationship, they might better have been made and defended openly. Secrecy once exposed, as it might have been at any time, could only lend itself to any interpretation the worst enemies of Hussein and the United States wanted to put on the story.

No wonder, therefore, that one pur-

pose of Carter's current review of "sensitive foreign intelligence activities" is to assure that "what can be done openly is not done secretly." But he can have no such assurance as long as he and Turner must hang on to the tail of a bear that obviously doesn't want to be controlled. Isn't it time to rid ourselves of the bear in favor of a pet that can be housebroken?

Wicker is associate editor of the New York Times.

Opinion

Thursday, February 24, 1977

Page 2, Section 6

Houston Chronicle

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AND NOW, ISRAEL, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul. — Deuteronomy 10:12.

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JAN 1 1977

The CIA and Soviet Strength

The Board of National Estimates, the arm of the Central Intelligence Agency that makes final judgments on intelligence, has just completed its annual appraisal of the long-range plans of the Soviet Union. The report will go to President-elect Jimmy Carter soon after the inauguration, but high CIA officials are quoted as describing it as "more somber" than any such report has been for a decade.

Reports in earlier years indicated that Moscow was aiming only for a rough parity with American strength. The new one concludes that the true Soviet objective is superiority.

The "somber" nature of the report is reason for serious concern for a nation that may have been lulled by detente. Even more serious, however, is the fact that the CIA revised it to its present form only after, and probably because, an independent panel of experts challenged the soft appraisals of Soviet intentions that have been submitted in recent years.

The CIA's report for the President may well be the most important single document in the fields of defense and diplomacy. It is the basis for White House decisions as to defense programs and arms negotiations. Misjudgments in it could lead to disastrous weakness in both our weapons development and in the positions we take in negotiating limitations on arms.

Because of insistent reports that there was strong internal dissent to these appraisals, the White House has been considering an "outside" analysis of the process for some years. Last September the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board appointed seven knowledgeable men to make an independent study. The panel was headed by Richard Pipes, professor of history at Harvard and an expert on Russia.

The Pipes group's report to the President, because of the information it analyzes and its critical importance, probably will not be published, but those familiar with it call it a devastating indictment of the work of the Board of National Estimates. It took a much more serious view of the information used by the CIA's board and dissented so sharply from the conclusions that the CIA revised its judgment that Moscow still was seeking only equal strength with the United States.

Time after time, news stories have informed the average citizen of the Soviet buildup of tanks, submarines, missiles, planes and men. Not long ago, *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* said this country had seriously underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet forces. This outside information, developed without the benefit of the CIA's resources, makes the agency's conclusions all the more mystifying.

One of Theodore C. Sorenson's most important tasks, after he is confirmed as new director of the CIA, will be to analyze the Board of National Estimates and perhaps reorganize it completely. Revision of its report because of the Pipes panel is virtually an admission of incompetence. And in an area as important as this, incompetence is little better than treason.

FALSE REPORTING

Swine fever

CIA Linked to 1971 Swine Virus in Cuba

By Drew Fetherston
and John Cummings

Newsday

NEW YORK—With at least the tacit backing of Central Intelligence Agency officials, operatives linked to anti-Castro terrorists introduced African swine fever virus into Cuba in 1971. Six weeks later an outbreak of the disease forced the slaughter of 500,000 pigs to prevent a nationwide animal epidemic.

A U.S. intelligence source told Newsday he was given the virus in a sealed, unmarked container at a U.S. Army base and CIA training ground in the Panama Canal Zone, with instructions to turn it over to the anti-Castro group.

The 1971 outbreak, the only time the disease has hit the Western Hemisphere, was labeled the "most alarming event" of 1971 by the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization. African swine fever is a highly contagious and usually lethal viral disease that infects only pigs and, unlike swine flu, cannot be transmitted to humans. There were no human deaths involved in the outbreak, but all production of pork, a Cuban staple, came to a halt, apparently for several months.

A CIA spokesman, Dennis Berend, in response to a request for comment, said: "We don't comment on information from unnamed and, at best, obscure sources."

Why the virus turned up in Cuba has been a mystery to investigators. It had been assumed that the virus entered Cuba in garbage from a commercial airliner or in sausages brought in by merchant seamen.

However, on the basis of interviews with U.S. intelligence sources, Cuban exiles and scientists concerning the outbreak—which occurred two years after President Nixon banned the use of offensive chemical and biological warfare—Newsday was able to piece together the following account of events leading up to the outbreak.

The U.S. intelligence source said that early in 1971 he was given the virus in a sealed, unmarked container at Ft. Gulick, an Army base in the Panama Canal Zone. The CIA operates a paramilitary training center for

career personnel and mercenaries at Ft. Gulick.

The source said he was given instructions to turn the container with the virus over to an anti-Castro group. The container then was given to someone in the Canal Zone, who took it by boat and turned it over to a fishing trawler off the Panamanian coast. The source said the substance was not identified to him until months after the outbreak in Cuba. He would not elaborate.

Another man involved in the operation, a Cuban exile who asked not to be identified, said he was on the trawler when the virus was put aboard at a prearranged rendezvous point off Bocas del Toro, Panama. He said the trawler carried the virus to Navassa Island, a deserted, tiny, U.S.-owned island between Jamaica and Haiti.

From there, after the trawler made a brief stopover, the container was taken to Cuba and given to other operatives on the southern coast, near the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay in late March, 1971, according to the source.

The source said he had no direct knowledge of whether the virus that came from Ft. Gulick was responsible for the outbreak in Havana, 500 miles northwest of Guantanamo.

A paper prepared by the Cubans for a scientific conference in Mexico City said the first sick pigs were found about May 6, but no precise location was given. A non-Soviet bloc agricultural technician then in Cuba said the disease easily could have gone undetected for months. The virus can be transmitted rapidly through the food or water supply.

The source on the trawler, who had been trained by the CIA and had carried out previous missions for the agency, said he saw no CIA officials aboard the boat that delivered the virus to the trawler, but added: "We were well paid for this and Cuban exile groups don't have that kind of money."

He said he suspected, but never knew for sure, what was in the container. "When I asked about this stuff all they told me was, 'It's from Gulick,'" he said.

He said he was revealing the information because he is a member of an exile group being investigated by the United States in connection with terrorist activity in Florida.

His account was confirmed by another intelligence source in Miami. This source said he had no proof that the operation was approved by CIA officials in Washington, but added: "In a case like this, though, they would always give them [CIA officials in Washington] plausible deniability."

The investigation referred to by the operative on the trawler involves a federal inquiry into terrorist acts allegedly carried out by Cuban exiles. These include bombings and assassination attempts in the United States and Venezuela. Trained originally by the CIA for operations against Cuba, the exiles have become more restive as they view what they believe to be an increasing move toward rapproche-

ment between Premier Fidel Castro and the United States.

Congressional sources with access to some CIA records said the swine fever operation was not mentioned in the list of approved covert operations. But Congress' efforts to probe CIA activities in chemical and biological warfare have been frustrated. The Senate intelligence committee said in its final report last year that the Army and the CIA had entered into a special agreement to build biochemical agents and delivery systems, but that written records of these activities were destroyed.

According to the Cuban scientific paper, presented in August, 1971, the country's entire production of pork came to a halt until the disease was confined to Havana province and eradicated by slaughtering the infected pigs and incinerating their remains. Cuba reported that about 500,000 pigs were slaughtered.

The non-Soviet bloc agricultural technician then in Cuba said that at the time of the outbreak there was a chronic shortage of meat and any Havana resident who could was keeping a pig in his backyard. Because of this situation, highly unusual for an urban area, the "disease could have existed months before it was found," the technician said, adding that it was impossible to pinpoint the source of the epidemic.

In a speech on July 26, 1971, Castro said: "The origin of the epidemic has not yet been ascertained. It could be accidental or it could have been the result of enemy activity. On various occasions the counterrevolutionary

wormpit [anti-Castro groups based in Miami] has talked of plagues and epidemics; however, we cannot yet say categorically that it was either."

Ft. Gulick, where the U.S. intelligence source said he was given the container with the virus, was built during World War II to protect the Panama Canal. It is headquarters for the Army's school of the Americas, which trains army officers from 17 Latin American countries. Unofficially, according to intelligence sources, it is a staging area for covert operations in the Caribbean and Latin America.

Former CIA official Victor Marchetti, author of the book "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," told Newsday that the CIA had its own base near Ft. Gulick where it trained its own operatives. He said Ft. Gulick also was used to train mercenaries and career CIA personnel in paramilitary operations.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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To The Director

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May 30, 1975

STATEMENT

Recently the news media have mentioned the names of Mr. Virgino Gonzales and Mr. Frank Sturgis.

Neither Mr. Gonzales nor Mr. Frank Sturgis have ever been connected with the Central Intelligence Agency in any way.

2
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MIAMI (RP) - MAX GORMAN GONZALEZ SAID MONDAY HE PLANS TO SUE THE CIA FOR INVOLVING HIM IN WHAT HE CHARGED WAS A PLOT HEADED BY WATERGATE BURGLAR FRANK STURGIS TO ASSASSINATE CUBAN PRIME MINISTER FIDEL CASTRO IN 1968.

THE MISSION WAS SCRUBBED BEFORE THE WOULD-BE ASSASSINS REACHED CUBA AND "HE WERE THROWN TO THE WOLVES," CHARGED GONZALEZ, 45, OF MIAMI.

GONZALEZ SAID HE "HAD NO IDEA THAT FRANK (STURGIS) WAS WORKING FOR THE CIA. BUT THE PIECES HAVE BEEN FALLING INTO PLACE EVER SINCE."

A CIA SPOKESMAN SAID MONDAY, HOWEVER, THAT STURGIS "IS NOT AND NEVER HAS BEEN A CIA MAN." HE HAD NO FURTHER COMMENT ON GONZALEZ'S STATEMENT.

GONZALEZ AND HIS MIAMI LAWYER, PHILLIP CARLTON, SAY THEY ARE PREPARING A MILLION-DOLLAR DAMAGE SUIT AGAINST THE CIA, CHARGING THAT GONZALEZ WAS ARRESTED, CONVICTED AND SERVED TIME IN PRISON BECAUSE HE WAS "USED UNWITTINGLY, WITHOUT HIS CONSENT OR KNOWLEDGE BY THE CIA."

THEY SAY THEIR ACTION WILL BE PARTIALLY BASED ON A STATEMENT MADE IN LONDON THURSDAY BY FORMER CIA LATIN AMERICA CHIEF DAVID PHILLIPS THAT THE UNITED STATES WARNED CASTRO OF A PLOT TO ASSASSINATE HIM IN 1968.

ASKED ABOUT THE PHILLIPS STATEMENT, STURGIS SAID THE MISSION PHILLIPS TALKED ABOUT "WAS VERY POSSIBLY OPERATION SWORD," WHICH WAS HEADED BY STURGIS AND INVOLVED GONZALEZ AND 10 OTHER AMERICANS.

STURGIS, GONZALEZ AND ANOTHER MAN WERE CONVICTED IN MIAMI IN 1973 OF FEDERAL CHARGES OF PARTICIPATING IN A CONSPIRACY TO ILLEGALLY TRANSPORT STOLEN CARS INTO MEXICO FROM FLORIDA AND TEXAS. THEY SAID THIS WAS PART OF OPERATION SWORD.

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the CIA Operations Center and of the appropriate analytic component in the Agency to the attached item from the news wire services.

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

STURGIS FRANK

August 17, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: MAG Members

REFERENCE : Memorandum (undated) from George K.
McConnell (ER 76-8949)

SUBJECT : Sturgis Claims

1. In his most recent appearances, Sturgis has become quite cautious about passing himself off as a veteran of CIA exploits. Please note that the UPI item attached to the referenced memorandum cites him as refusing to say for which agency he was working in his latest escapade. The notation that "records have indicated that he was working for the CIA at about that time" was added gratuitously by UPI.

2. Our Office in this particular case called the Miami television station which originally did the Sturgis interview, the Miami and Washington UPI bureaus, the Washington AP bureau, both Washington newspapers, and a Washington TV station which aired the Miami interview. In these calls we tried to set the record straight by citing the Rockefeller Commission findings. The Miami TV station included our remarks in a subsequent continuation of its Sturgis interview. UPI in Miami also issued a new story to include our disclaimer. None of the Washington media picked up the disclaimer, but all of them promised not to be taken in again by anyone's claims that Sturgis had CIA links.

3. Whether there is basis for legal action against Sturgis, as suggested in the referenced memorandum, would have to be determined by OGC. We suggest that little, if anything, would be gained by providing him a new opportunity to garner headlines.

SIGNED

Dennis Berend
Deputy Assistant to the
Director of Central Intelligence

✓ ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4

WASHINGTON POST
10 JULY 1976

Castro Is Linked To Ruby, Oswald

MIAMI, July 9 (UPI)—
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and Jack Ruby discussed "removal of the President" at a 1963 meeting 10 weeks prior to President Kennedy's assassination, according to Watergate burglar and one-time Central Intelligence Agency agent Frank Sturgis.

Sturgis claimed in a telephone interview Thursday he had been assigned to investigate possible involvement of Cuban exiles in the Kennedy assassination. He would not say what agency had ordered the probe.

The investigation failed to show any Cuban exile links to Kennedy's death, but produced evidence that Kennedy assassin Lee Harvey Oswald and Ruby, who shot Oswald in Dallas, were "involved in the same conspiracy, along with other people," Sturgis said. He said he and "other agents" gave information of the meeting to several government agencies in 1964.

HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT
COURANT

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NOV 23 1976

Watergate Burglar Speaks His Mind

By CAROL GIACOMO

Frank Sturgis' name is recorded for the ages and that, for him at least, is an accomplishment.

"It's history," he says now of his part in the Watergate burglary. "It's a rough way to do it," he admits, but "I believe a person has maybe one chance in his life to make history."

Sturgis, a chain-smoking portly, middle-aged Italian-American (not Cuban, as some have said) with a big brush of wavy dark hair, has worked as a sales manager for a Miami book company since completing a prison term following the infamous political break-in.

Although he professes not to have joined the lecture circuit like other Watergate notables, Sturgis was in Hartford Monday to address a University of Hartford seminar on political assassinations — for which he said he was paid \$100.

The ex-Marine, ex-Navy reserve officer, ex-Army man, ex-CIA operative, in comments at a press conference and later in the seminar, wove tales of plots and subplots involving Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, the late President John F. Kennedy and government intelligence units.

Many of his comments were confusing to all but aficionados of assassination theories and intelligence community activities.

Among the things he said were:

— John Kennedy's death, and possibly the death of his brother, Sen. Robert Kennedy, were the result of conspiracy, not individual acts of individual men. The former president's assassination was carried out by Castro's Communist agents, in concert with some pro-Communist Americans. The Russians, aware of the plans, did not interfere.

— He "believes" the mafia, the syndicate, the CIA and the FBI as institutions were not involved in John Kennedy's assassination, although he admitted "I don't know this."

— Castro's rationale for the assassination was revenge for the numerous attempts by the U.S. government — set up by Sturgis himself and known to Kennedy — on his life.

— Sturgis said he was offered mob-linked funds to kill Castro but refused them. His attempts to kill Castro failed because both he and those he hired "got tired of waiting for the green light" from the CIA.

— An American government cover-up has kept the entire story of the Kennedy assassination from the people, says Sturgis, who is not optimistic the current Congressional inquiry will unearth the real facts.

He recommends the Kennedy family be called to testify and that the data in the National Archives which President Johnson embargoed for 75 years be disclosed.

— Sturgis, who has already testified before a litany of Congressional panels, spoke easily about his career as a double agent in Cuba in 1959, working both as security chief of the Cuban Air Force and minister of gambling casinos under Castro and as an operative of the U.S. government.

He admitted that Cuban exiles in Miami "resented terribly" the American government's failure to free Cuba in the Bay of Pigs incident and said he himself "did not love" President Kennedy.

The Cuban underground spotted Russian missiles in Cuba 10 months before it became public knowledge, said Sturgis, who accused Kennedy of using this issue "as a political edge."

But the unflappable-appearing anti-Communist, who concedes he "comes a-running" when someone "waves the flag" and offers him an intelligence assignment, disputes theories he killed Kennedy.

"If I wanted to kill the president, there are ways of doing it professionally," he said, gesturing, "like putting poison on a ring."

STAYING SPOOKED

BY TAD SZULC

The spy agencies have been ordered to behave themselves.

But as these sensational, top secret schemes make painfully clear, it's business as usual in the land of dirty tricks.

- The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a top-secret "satellite war" in outer space. The aim is to destroy each other's intelligence surveillance satellites with laser-beam weapons. Thus far the score is 2-0 for the Russians. Washington maintains total silence about this war to avoid public complications in the negotiations for a new strategic-arms pact with Moscow.

- Foreign insurgent groups are being secretly trained in guerrilla operations by military intelligence agencies and the CIA in out-of-the-way locations in the western United States. The trainees include Laotians, Cambodians, Afghans, Kurds, and even Russians. This, presumably, portends new covert operations, to be run mainly by the military, all over the world. Appropriate congressional committees apparently have not been informed of it despite legislative requirements.

- With the surreptitious aid of American professors, Third World students at United States colleges and universities are being recruited by the CIA as future "agents of influence" for the day when they assume leadership in their countries. Currently, the CIA has its pick of 250,000 foreign students attending our institutions of higher learning. Such a program clearly degrades our American educational system.

- The CIA still secretly uses in a variety of ways American news organizations abroad as intelligence "covers" and information sources. This is being done despite the CIA's public pledge to keep its hands off United States news media.

- Shortly before the 1973 Vietnam peace settlement, United States military intelligence agencies secretly organized an elaborate "stay-behind" espionage network—linked to a parallel plan for resuming American air operations in Vietnam if the Communists violated the cease-fire—including covert penetrations by special teams from abroad. Thus the United States was prepared to violate the peace agreement even before it was signed.

These five items, touching upon the whole spectrum of United States intelligence activities, are among the many subjects about which Americans have not been told despite three separate investigations of the intelligence community conducted in 1975 and 1976.

In some instances the investigators simply were not informed about highly sensitive operations. The intelligence agencies volunteered very little and, as a rule, were responsive to questions only when the committees developed independent leads or stumbled upon information (as in the case of the cover-up by the CIA and the FBI of crucial facts pertaining to the assassination of John F. Kennedy).

In other instances the intelligence agencies invoked "national security" as a reason for denying investigators access to certain material. Finally, there were compromises: the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, for example, negotiated the extent to which information would be "sanitized" by them—censored, of course, is a better word—before appearing in public reports.

Perhaps the most important area of such compromise on the part of the Senate committee, which engaged in the most exhaustive investigation of all the groups looking into the intelligence scandals, concerned the CIA's use of American news media and the involvement of university professors and administrators—the "academics"—in the recruitment of foreign students by the agency. The majority of the academics, some 60 percent of them, were "willing" (they knew that they were used by the CIA to finger prospective recruits); some were paid for their talent-scouting; others acted out of their perceived sense of patriotism.

But it's not entirely the CIA's fault that this description of the recruiting process failed to surface in the final report. The burden lies chiefly on Sen. Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat who served as the committee's chairman, and who, despite his many public pronouncements of indignation over CIA operations, tended to be rather reluctant to embarrass the intelligence community.

This tendency increased when Church entered the Democratic presidential primaries, a period coinciding with the drafting of his committee's final report. As a former committee staff member observed privately, "Church was away a lot, he was not willing to risk his candidacy on pushing too hard, he'd keep things out of the report even if the CIA was willing to let them be printed."

In the case of the academics, the committee staff and the CIA arrived at an agreed "sanitized" draft; but in the rush of things, as the report was being written, Church said, "The hell with it!" and the section on academics was thrown out. Thus this whole subject of foreign student recruitment is dismissed in the report with the comment that "American academics are now being used for such operational purposes as making introductions for intelligence purposes."

The Church committee also compromised to a significant degree on the question of how the CIA's collection of intelligence, a legitimate pursuit, often becomes entangled with covert operations, which was a matter of substantial concern to the investigators. In the year-long tug-of-war between the Senate committee and the agency over what materials could be made available to the senators, the CIA often refused to discuss any number of covert actions on the grounds that intelligence-collection activities could have been compromised in the process. This also applied to "black" propaganda, the CIA's planting of provocative or erroneous information in foreign news organs with the aim of achieving specific political gains.

The agency's argument, forcefully expressed by its outside attorney, Mitchell Rogovin, was that disclosures of all types of covert actions—including political

6
After Frank Church
became a
presidential candidate,
he kept some things
secret even
if the CIA was willing to let
them be printed.

9
covert action—could damage intelligence collection. The CIA, in fact, would not even agree to the use of the word *espionage* to describe its supposedly legitimate work. Committee staffers came to suspect that the agency was using the sacrosanct shield of protecting intelligence collection to conceal covert actions of which the Senate should have been aware.

These distinctions are, of course, extremely hard to document, but the committee's frequent compromises serve to make one wonder how aggressive the individual members of the committee were. Church himself, in the judgment of some of his staffers, was "too soft." Senators Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota and Gary Hart of Colorado, both Democrats, were said to have been "the best," with Sen. Walter D. Huddleston, the Kentucky Democrat, a close second. Tennessee's Republican Sen. Howard H. Baker, Jr., was described as "okay, but pro-administration." John G. Tower, the Texas Republican who was the committee's vice-chairman, won the reputation of acting with "benign neglect."

The performance of these committee members raises the larger question of how effective congressional oversight of intelligence activities is likely to be in the future. Some of these senators serve on the new, permanent intelligence-oversight committee created by the Senate. Will they be aggressive and insistent that the White House and the intelligence agencies live up to their commitments? Or will they lapse back into the traditional "benign neglect" that characterized Congress when it came to keeping the intelligence community honest, protecting our civil rights, and sheltering the best interests of the United States from mindless and dangerous foreign adventures?

These questions lead, in turn, to the fundamental problem of accountability for the actions of the intelligence community. Notwithstanding Gerald Ford's eminently reasonable view (which, somehow, had not occurred to his predecessors) that the intelligence agencies must ultimately be accountable to the president of the United States, who must take total responsibility for their deeds and misdeeds, Americans still cannot be certain *who*, if anybody, is in charge.

The CIA, which was the target of the greatest criticism during the two-year investigation, still insists, of course, on secrecy and on the need for such operations—highly questionable according to a great many outsiders—as the recruitment of foreign students as "agents in place," and on a variety of other covert actions. But oddly enough, the CIA seems to have taken the new strictures more to heart than have most of its fellow members of the intelligence community.

Considerable credit for this state of affairs is given by intelligence experts to the CIA's new director, George Bush, who has turned out to be much more assertive about the control and management of the agency than had been generally anticipated. Presumably, he has not yet discovered all the skeletons in all the closets of the 10,000-employee agency that for decades had a virtually free rein in what it did at home and abroad—and that had long tolerated such private fiefdoms as Counterintelligence and Clandestine Services. Nonetheless, Bush has shaken up the CIA with new top-level headquarters appointments and major changes overseas. Moreover, he appears to be presiding over the crumbling of the "old-boy network," which for many years had a free run of the agency and was responsible for some of its most damaging policies and enterprises.

But while the CIA is, at least temporarily, accommodating itself to some of the requirements of an open society while retaining its operational capabilities, the same cannot be said of the military agencies—the largest, richest, and most powerful segment of the intelligence community—and, still less, of the FBI.

Military intelligence has become an empire unto itself, supposedly controlled by the secretary of defense (who reports to the president and the National Security Council) but wholly autonomous for all practical purposes. The FBI, even late in 1976,

seemed to be run by the minions of the late J. Edgar Hoover, with neither Clarence Kelley, the director, nor Ford's attorney general, Edward Levi, having much of an idea of what the bureau had done in the past or what it is doing now. As a Church committee senior staffer, who helped investigate both organizations, remarked recently, "Next to the FBI, the CIA smells like a rose."

Both the military intelligence establishment and the FBI pose serious accountability problems. Under a 1976 internal reorganization plan, the Pentagon has brought all its agencies under a director of defense intelligence (a new post) who, in turn, reports to a second deputy secretary of defense (also a new slot), with special responsibility for intelligence. This was judged necessary by the Pentagon bosses because several of *their* intelligence agencies, notably the huge and supersecret National Security Agency (NSA), had long enjoyed quite a bit of independence from just about everybody in Washington.

But there was a double purpose in reorganizing the military intelligence establishment. First, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wanted to tighten up the operation, an intention which is probably commendable. But the reorganization has also served to isolate this whole empire from direct civilian control.

In theory, the director of central intelligence (who is also the CIA director) runs the entire United States government intelligence complex. In the past, agencies such as the NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (as well as the CIA) were directly responsible to him—at least operationally—and they couldn't ignore him. Under the Rumsfeld reorganization, they no longer have this responsibility. Now the director of central intelligence, known as the DCI in professional parlance, has to go through the Pentagon intelligence command to deal with these military agencies. Thus a filter has been established.

Moreover, the DCI (George Bush) has lost control over the intelligence community's purse strings, which is the real power. In November 1971 Nixon decided, in one of the few rational moves he made in this area of government, to vest in the DCI the full power to allocate budget resources to the various intelligence agencies—including the military. The idea was that a strong DCI was essential to keep order in the community. However, the DCI (then Richard Helms) never chose to exercise this authority. Responding to military pressures in 1976, Ford moved the budget allocation authority to a new steering committee, in which this responsibility is now divided among the DCI, the deputy secretary of defense, and the deputy director of the National Security Council staff.

Because Defense controls 90 percent of the overall intelligence budget (which stands around \$25 billion annually, although the administration insists it is no more than \$10 billion—actual figures are secret—by ignoring the vast sums spent on research and development of electronic intelligence hardware), it becomes clear that today the Pentagon is actually the most powerful voice in foreign intelligence.

And considering the qualitative weakness in military intelligence evaluations—analysis is the strong suit of the CIA, and most of it is remarkably honest—there is a growing danger that the intelligence product given to the president and top policy-makers will be slanted toward "worst-case" assessments endemic with the military. These assessments, of course, influence the formulation of national defense and foreign policies. It should also be added that covert-action responsibility, including paramilitary operations, are increasingly being shifted from the CIA to military intelligence agencies.

So, once again, we face the question of full-time civilian control (including the president's) of the intelligence apparatus. With the DCI effectively deprived of his role as the president's principal adviser on intelligence, it becomes debatable whether the chief executive can truly be accountable and responsible for all the actions of the intelligence community.

The principal conclusion of the Senate Intelligence Committee after its lengthy investigation is that the president *must* be fully accountable for United States intelligence. Speaking of the CIA, the committee's report noted that "Washington is where the problem arises. No one outside the CIA, unless it be the president himself, is responsible for directing and supervising CIA clandestine intelligence operations or is authorized access to the information necessary to do so." This, of course, applies equally to the military agencies, particularly the NSA; as matters stand now, the law even prohibits the public disclosure of the NSA's mission.

It is generally known, nevertheless, that the NSA is in charge of everything affecting technological intelligence. It monitors all electronic communications in the world, military and civilian (it illegally eavesdrops on all international telephone calls by Americans and reads all the cable and telex traffic sent and received by Americans); it surveys developments in Soviet and Chinese strategic-arms testing and deployments (as it should); and it is deeply involved in breaking secret foreign codes and devising U.S. codes it hopes will be unbreakable.

Investigators for the Senate Intelligence Committee acknowledge privately that, as a practical matter, they were unable to study adequately the NSA and other military agencies. But they have seen enough to conclude that the NSA's principal weakness is that it is not allowed to analyze the data it obtains. Raw data, often wholly meaningless, is sent on to the White House,

sometimes described as not items. The trouble is that often nobody can make any sense out of it. As one staffer noted, "The state of Maryland [NSA headquarters are located at Fort Meade in Maryland] is sinking under the weight of NSA material that nobody has the time or capability to use." When investigators for another congressional committee, which was pursuing NSA's illegal eavesdropping on private telephone and cable traffic by American citizens, requested pertinent information, NSA officials asked them to sign first a secrecy pledge, which meant that they would be unable to pass on their findings to members of Congress. The investigators refused and went home.

In terms of domestic intelligence, the FBI was—and is—by far the worst offender. In testimony before the Senate committee, Attorney General Levi simply refused to make data available on the FBI's illegal operations ranging from wiretapping to physical surveillance and "black-bag jobs," unauthorized break-ins into homes and offices of individuals and organizations considered radical, dissident, or subversive. FBI director Kelley first convinced committee staffers that he was lying when he said that these operations had ended in 1966; later they learned that Kelley did not know what he was saying.

In what unquestionably was one of the most pathetic public performances on record, Kelley kept repeating on the CBS program "Face the Nation" on August 8, 1976, that he had been "deceived" by his own bureau about "black-bag jobs"—the latest had occurred three weeks earlier—and other lawless FBI operations. Just as pathetically, he acknowledged that he had been unable to find out who in the bureau had so deceived him.

If the FBI director and the attorney general cannot control their runaway bureau, how can the president be accountable for its actions? Considering that the FBI is a vital agency in domestic law enforcement, now long can American presidents tolerate this state of affairs, including the emerging evidence of financial corruption in the bureau? (Kelley himself has been accused of misusing government services and property and accepting expensive gifts from his subordinates.)

The problem of accountability also underlies the five secret intelligence community endeavors mentioned earlier.

(1) *Foreign students' recruitment.* In general, according to the Church committee's report, "The CIA considers . . . operational relationships with the United States academic community as perhaps its most sensitive domestic area." The report added that "the committee has far from the full picture of the nature and extent of these relationships and the domestic impact of foreign clandestine operations. Nevertheless, it has enough . . . to underscore its serious nature."

The report spoke out against the overall use of the United States academic community by the CIA, which ranges from pay-

ing scholars to engage in intelligence collection while they travel abroad to provide "leads" and making "introductions" for intelligence purposes. It was unable, as noted above, to go in any detail into the recruitment of foreign students as agents (it did not even mention the subject) but it emphasized that "time and experience would . . . give increasing currency to doubts as to whether it made sense for a democracy to resort to such practices as the clandestine use of free American institutions and individuals—practices that tended to blur the very difference between 'our' system and 'theirs' that these programs were designed to preserve."

The foreign students' recruitment program has a long history. It was initiated in the 1950s by military intelligence and then taken over by the CIA, which simply refuses to terminate the program although it is now supposedly at a much lower level than in past years.

The idea behind this extraordinary program, concentrating on students from Latin America, the Far East, the Middle East, and Africa—the Third World—was that through recruitment on American campuses, the CIA would in time acquire "deep-cover assets" inside foreign governments, educational and cultural centers, private industry, the military, and so on. These are known as "agents of influence" or, more commonly, as "moles."

The CIA created this covert program on the theory that many young foreigners educated in the United States would become part of ruling elites in their countries. Embedded in governmental or private power, these agents can render two types of services to the CIA: influencing policies favoring the United States, and supplying vital inside intelligence.

Such recruitment is, of course, a long-term investment. The CIA does not expect results for years, even decades. But patience is a hallmark of intelligence work, and the agency is working for the future. However, the agency cannot be certain that, once recruited, these students will remain faithful to the CIA and respond to the control of case officers. The rule of thumb is that no more than one out of ten recruited agents will actually remain in CIA service once he matures and acquires a responsible position.

To assure itself of loyalty, the agency can, and on occasions does, avail itself of blackmail; if a "subject" refuses to cooperate, discreet ways are found to spread the word about his CIA connections—which could ruin him at home. Yet blackmail in this instance could be double-edged: disclosure of recruitment could be immensely damaging to the CIA, to say nothing of the reputation of the United States educational system. But, as a CIA official remarked in a recent conversation, "It was a risk worth taking."

It is impossible to say how many such "agents of influence" are nowadays operational. This is one of the CIA's closest kept

secrets, known only to a handful of people in the agency. But we can suggest the magnitude of the potential pool of recruits available to the CIA.

In 1955, for example, there were 34,232 foreign students in the United States. The number went up to 82,045 in 1965, and is close to 250,000 in 1975. Over a twenty-year period, therefore, the CIA had its pick of some 1 million foreign students. But those familiar with the program doubt that more than 100 or so foreigners would be recruited during an average year. Extremely high selection standards had to be applied, considering both the promise a student held for the future and his political receptivity to CIA enticements.

It is believed that one of the most important recruitment areas was the foreign training program of the Agency for International Development. AID in the past has served as a "cover" for other CIA operations, most notably through its refugee relief program in Indochina. The CIA believed that a "foreign contract" student had at least a moral debt to the United States and thus might be more open to its persuasion.

Agency officials still claim that this is a necessary ingredient in building an effective foreign-intelligence network. They profess to see no difference between it and the open recruitment of American students.

Another side of this story is the way in which the CIA has been using—and continues to use—"academics" (professors and administrators) to help in its recruitment. As noted above, some 60 percent of these academics were selecting promising candidates for recruitment and making "introductions" in full knowledge that they were acting on the CIA's behalf. In an undetermined number of cases, money would change hands. The other 40 percent of these academics were "unwitting": they did not know that they were fingering recruits for the CIA, thinking, instead, that they were being helpful to the students by introducing them to prospective above-board employers. The CIA recruiters worked, of course, under deep cover.

Evidently, both the CIA and the "witting" academics were guilty of vastly reprehensible behavior. They were—and still are—responsible for polluting, prostituting, and degrading the American educational system, one of our most admired institutions. The CIA is guilty of suborning the academics. The academics, in turn, are guilty of allowing themselves—and their institutions—to be corrupted. Often they do it because they have individual CIA contracts for research or books that they do not wish to jeopardize.

Curiously, no investigative body has ever thought of looking into these relationships that exist in more than 100 American colleges and universities.

(2) *Use of American news media.* In 1976 the CIA admitted that it had relations with some fifty United States journalists "accredited" abroad, although it refused to disclose their names. It also said that "effective immediately, CIA will not enter into

any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station."

The Senate committee believes, however, that "fewer than one-half [of the fifty] will be terminated under the new CIA guidelines." At least one staffer believes that 194 American news-media personnel had CIA ties if "infrastructure" workers, such as telex operators, are included.

In some instances American journalists were CIA employees while performing *bona fide* professional functions. "Infrastructure" workers used these jobs as "covers" for other activities, usually taking advantage of the fact that they had unusual working hours and thus their movements escaped suspicion. Speaking of CIA-employed newsmen, a Church committee staffer said, "They were CIA case officers masquerading as journalists rather than newsmen who were used 'wittingly.'"

Although the Senate report has not gone into these operational details, it is also known that in numerous instances special relationships existed between CIA officials and legitimate newsmen based either on professional favors or even payments for specific jobs performed. For example, according to a Senate staffer, "a correspondent would be told by a CIA officer that 'so long as you're going to such or such city, why don't you look into this or that for me?'" This procedure, it should be noted, is distinct from normal relationships between foreign correspondents and CIA officials, who maintain special contacts and exchange information or opinions on a "two-way-street basis." A great many newsmen engage in such relationships, just as they do with State Department or U.S. Information Agency personnel.

The CIA's use of the media is dangerous because it undermines the credibility of the American press both abroad and at home. Thus it is, in the long run, a disservice to United States institutions. That the Soviet Union, say, uses its journalists for intelligence work is, obviously, not an excuse. As the Senate report observed, the line between "our" system and "their" system should not be blurred.

(3) *Vietnam "stay-behind" spies.* The Vietnam peace agreement, negotiated by Henry Kissinger for the United States and signed in January 1973, provided that "the United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam" and that within sixty days of the signing, the United States would withdraw all "troops, military personnel . . . and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material."

Two months earlier, however, the Pentagon approved a top-secret plan designed to violate the peace agreement the moment it was signed. Worked out between

the American military command in Saigon (MACV) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, this plan, denominated "Organizational Changes in Southeast Asia," provided for the establishment of a covert minicommand in South Vietnam, heavily emphasizing intelligence operations, when the peace agreement went into effect. The cover for this minicommand was the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) at the American Embassy in Saigon.

Normally, defense attaché offices are staffed with a handful of military personnel. The new Saigon DAO, however, was assigned 50 military personnel and 1,345 persons described in the document as "Department of Defense civilians." In this case "Department of Defense civilians" were created by changing from military uniforms to slacks and sport shirts. Of the 1,395 personnel attached to the Saigon DAO, 219 were described as "intelligence personnel." The operational order noted candidly that six military personnel in DAO "will perform traditional DAO missions and/or functions." It was a carefully engineered piece of deception.

Dated November 27, 1972, this immensely detailed order included a contingency plan for the reintroduction of American tactical air operations into Vietnam should the Communists violate the cease-fire. But the main emphasis was on intelligence operations.

The minicommand thus encompassed the 219-man "Intelligence Division" charged with responsibility for "continuing essential aspects of operations, intelligence and contingency planning, [and] force development." An "Intelligence Branch" of DAO's "Readiness Operations Section" acted as the "primary U.S. element for collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information pertaining to NVN/C [North Vietnam Army/Viet Cong] activities in the Republic of Vietnam [RVN]." A "Surveillance Section" coordinated "Humint" (human intelligence) activities, which was the Pentagon's espionage network to be left behind after the cease-fire. This surveillance section was also the "in-country contact point for coordinating unilateral 'Humint' operations with Department of Defense collection units from out-country." This was the plan for secretly introducing military intelligence teams into Vietnam from abroad. These teams, crossing by air from Thailand to be dropped in Vietnam, worked with the South Vietnam army's intelligence units under DAO's coordination.

Additionally, DAO provided daily intelligence summaries on South Vietnam and "adjacent territories," indicating that military intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos (and, presumably, North Vietnam) were run out of Saigon by Americans. A "Counter Intelligence Section" formulated "security policies to prevent, detect, neutralize hostile espionage and subversion attempts, conduct discreet liaison with ARVN [Army of Republic of Vietnam] counterintelligence and police agencies."

The plan took into account the possibility that United States military intelligence operations would "not be authorized" in South Vietnam under the DAO cover, probably because they would be violating the peace agreement. Noting that in such an event there "would be appreciable degradation of intelligence available to support U.S. objectives," the document devised alternative methods.

Thus a small group within DAO "would be required to obtain the total intelligence output" of the South Vietnamese military intelligence and "to forward it in some meaningful format to an agency capable of collating, analyzing, and disseminating this intelligence." This would be "externally" coordinated. The top-secret "Fast Pass" operation—the standing arrangement for exchange of intelligence with South Vietnam—"would be appreciably expanded."

Because Americans held South Vietnamese intelligence in low esteem and were particularly concerned about "coverage" along the borders and in Laos and Cambodia, United States military intelligence personnel were stationed not only in Saigon but also in Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, "and other areas as required."

This Pentagon intelligence network had to be removed when South Vietnam was taken over by the Communists in the spring of 1975. But intelligence experts say that

there are still American, or American-directed, "stay-behinds" working under deep cover in Vietnam.

(4) *Insurgent training.* Military intelligence agencies, with CIA assistance, are training foreign insurgent groups at abandoned airfields in out-of-the-way areas in California. The purpose of this effort is unclear except for the likelihood that the United States wishes to have ready-to-move foreign guerrilla units for possible covert operations in different parts of the world.

Among several hundred guerrillas being trained in California there are Laotians and Cambodians drawn from post-1975 refugees as well as Afghans, Kurds, and Russians. The Kurds are the survivors of the Kurdish tribal army that fought for years the government of Iraq with help from the Iranians next door and from the CIA under a secret program approved by Nixon in 1972. The Kurdish army was destroyed in 1975 when the shah of Iran, who struck a deal with Iraq, withdrew his support and the CIA followed suit.

There are, of course, ample precedents for secretly training foreign guerrillas on American soil. It was done with Cuban exiles in preparation for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and with Tibetans secretly brought to Colorado by the CIA in the mid-1960s for reasons that still remain mysterious.

The California training program suggests that the Pentagon is increasingly taking over paramilitary covert-operations responsibilities from the CIA.

(5) *Space warfare.* This information is extremely limited and closely held in the White House. Reliable sources say, however, that during 1976, Soviet satellites damaged one United States "spy-in-the-sky" satellite and destroyed another by firing a laser-beam charge.

Under the provisions of the 1972 Soviet-American agreement on limiting strategic arms, both sides are permitted to use space satellites and other "national means of verification" to police the enforcement of the pact.

Washington specialists are perplexed over these Soviet attempts to interfere with United States satellite verification procedures. Some of them suggest that the United States has not yet fully developed its laser-firing capability in space.

In any event, these attacks on American satellites are a top intelligence secret. As far as can be determined, the Ford administration does not wish them to be known publicly so as not to damage current negotiations on a new strategic-arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

But it seems that the government always feels there is a reason why Americans "should" be kept in the dark about what the intelligence community is up to. Clearly the time has come to end the cover-ups and stonewalling, and to inform our citizens about what the intelligence agencies are doing that affects all of us and the legitimate interests of the United States.

an investigative report

By Larry DuBois and Laurence Gonzales

THE PUPPET...

... AND THE PUPPETMASTERS

UNCOVERING THE SECRET WORLD OF NIXON, HUGHES AND THE CIA

including

The Buying of the President
The World's Biggest Intelligence Front
The War Within the Hughes Empire
The Untold Story Behind Watergate

Of all the mysteries surrounding the Watergate affair, perhaps the strangest is that in this, the most thoroughly investigated burglary in history, no publicly accepted motive for the break-in itself has ever been established. A vague notion that a group of Republican-sponsored burglars decided to get some dirt on the Democrats and did so without knocking is still widely believed. Lost in the bonanza of books and movies about who did it and how it was done is the central question: Why did it happen?

In the recent past, some accounts—notably, J. Anthony Lukas' massive Watergate study, "Nightmare"—have suggested that both the Howard Hughes organization and the CIA had connections with Watergate. And some important pieces of the puzzle were put in place by a few of the investigators on Sam Ervin's Senate Watergate committee. But the puzzle was never made whole, the pieces never seemed to fit.

A set of unusual circumstances led PLAYBOY to undertake an investigation of Hughes and the CIA and to get a fuller picture of Watergate. Part I of our report will examine the links between Hughes and the CIA and the events leading up to Watergate. Part II, to appear in November, will examine the cover-up that succeeded and will reveal how newsmen were misled in their efforts to report the whole story.

PART I

A SURVIVOR'S NOTEBOOKS

To sort of take the term Watergate and link it to Howard Hughes, I think, is really unfair. —BOB WOODWARD, April 25, 1976

IN THE SPRING OF 1973, a man named Virgino González (no relation to Laurence Gonzales) drafted an affidavit that was executed in Mexico City. In the sworn document, he claims to be an ex-CIA agent who was assigned by the agency to monitor the activities of John Meier, a former Hughes executive. "At the end of 1971," Virgino González wrote, "I was ordered to an assignment that included monitoring the activities of John Meier and was shown a file on him. . . . This file showed that Meier came from New York, his early business life and how he joined Hughes and evaluated the underground [nuclear] testing in Nevada. He was giving the AEC a hard time on behalf of Hughes."

Meier, a computer expert and environmentalist who had worked for Hughes off and on since 1959, was sent to Las Vegas by Hughes to evaluate environmental problems. Before Hughes moved to Vegas in November 1966, he wanted Meier to give him a full report on the effects of atomic testing at the Nevada Test Site, about 100 miles from the city. During three

of Hughes's four years there (1966-1970), Meier was his scientific advisor and one of the few Hughes executives who communicated directly with the boss. Hughes had chosen Meier to handle his personal pet projects, such as his fierce campaign against nuclear testing. Secretly—not even known to others in the organization—Meier managed Hughes's investigations into areas that appealed to the farthest reaches of Hughes's imagination: parapsychology, LSD, mysticism, cryonics (the science of freezing human bodies with the hope of later reviving them) and other equally unlikely subjects.

Meier received the 1966 Aerospace Man of the Year award, the 1968 Nevada Governor's Award for Technical Achievement in Data Processing and was a member of President Nixon's Task Force on Resources and Environment. He was on the board of advisors of *The Manhattan Tribune*, was a member of the Governor's Gaming Industry Task Force and in 1971 was appointed special advisor on environmental affairs to Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska.

When Virgino González filed his affidavit, a copy was flown to Los Angeles, where Meier's attorney, Robert Wyshak, was told in an anonymous phone call to pick it up at a hotel near the airport. Wyshak, former Assistant U.S. Attorney with experience as chief of the tax division of the Central District of California, determined to his satisfaction that the document was authentic and that Virgino González was telling the truth about his illegal surveillance of Meier. He sent a copy to Meier and Meier sent a copy to Washington for examination by another attorney. It was intercepted en route—they believed by the CIA—and they then decided to file it in the U.S. district court in Nevada.

Wyshak provided PLAYBOY with a copy of the affidavit because of the last line, which reads, "I asked to be put elsewhere and was put onto Hugh Hefner [sic] for a time." The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (the Church committee) was unable to locate Virgino González, or to confirm his employment by the agency, and views the affidavit with suspicion. We never found González but did interview sources who claim to have had contact with him, including one writer who told us about interviewing González on his agency activities. The authenticity of the document still remains in doubt, but there is strong circumstantial evidence indicating that the agency did spy on Meier, as Virgino González claims.

What began as an attempt by us to determine the extent of illegal CIA surveillance of Hefner gradually developed into an investigation of the CIA itself. That search led us straight into the Hughes organization, where the story emerged of how critical Hughes had been in the rise and fall of Richard Nixon, how the CIA had gradually turned the Hughes companies into its largest front organization and how those inter-related matters were all part of the motive for the Watergate break-in.

John Meier¹ is now a fugitive from the United States, living with his family in British Columbia under landed-immigrant status granted him by the Canadian government. He supports himself with part-

¹Not to be confused with Johnny Meyer, a former Hughes aide who, in the late Forties, was involved in the Hughes military-contracts scandal that ended in a Senate investigation.

time consulting work for the Canadian government and private organizations while he fights his case. The reason he is a fugitive stems from an extremely complex legal case that began with an IRS indictment for back taxes on money he supposedly made from Hughes companies on mining deals. Meier claims he is innocent; the IRS claims to have a strong case against him. The press has rarely mentioned Meier's name in connection with Watergate and most accounts of him have discussed only his alleged crime. As a result, we were reluctant to believe him at first. But more than 100 hours of interviews with him and hundreds of documents obtained by PLAYBOY during a year's research all point to one inescapable conclusion: On the subject of his role in events leading to Watergate, Meier is telling the truth, and his recall of detail rivals John Dean's.

In a recent interview with us, Meier said, "I'm fully convinced that one big reason for the break-in wasn't to get something on McGovern but to find out what I was telling the friends of Larry O'Brien [the Democratic national chairman] about Richard and Don Nixon and Hughes, to see if anything was going to break before the election. They knew the Nixons were Hughes's greatest asset in getting his purchase of Air West airlines approved and that Hughes was fronting for the CIA; they knew I was talking to left-wingers, Democrats, McGovern people—people who scared the hell out of the agency and the White House."

Meier, at 42, is an intense, often obsessive man. He kept a meticulous diary of his Hughes years. Every phone call on Hughes's behalf, every flight number, every meeting is noted neatly in ballpoint pen in one of a dozen leather-bound "executive planners." One of his reasons for keeping these records was that the meetings, calls and flights involved Meier's dealings with some of the world's richest and most powerful men. He was, for example, Hughes's liaison to another reclusive billionaire, D. K. Ludwig. In Meier's six filing cabinets are hundreds of handwritten memos to and from Hughes, as well as internal White House memos, letters from various Government officials and political lobbyists and numerous in-house reports prepared for Hughes.

These documents and Meier's own accounts provided the key to the bits and pieces of information that are buried in the mass of publicly available information generated by [

Watergate—either in news reports or in court proceedings, in affidavits or in the transcript of the Watergate hearings. The picture that emerges shows the Hughes organization inextricably entangled in American politics, inside the White House and out. It shows the gradual merger of the Hughes organization and the CIA to such a point that it is difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins.

After Meier was indicted on August 9, 1973, he sought immunity in exchange for his story. He offered his testimony to the Watergate committee and was interviewed for 13 hours on October 13 and 22 of that year so that investigators could decide whether or not to take his testimony officially. According to the transcript of those sessions, Meier asked Watergate investigators, "Why not put the cards on the table about Hughes, Nixon and [Bebe] Rebozo? I have been shell-shocked from the IRS and Hughes. I told you that [John] Ehrlichman had me bugged and put the IRS on me. I don't have the organization behind me the President has or the money Hughes has. I'm fighting for my life and my family."

Meier's name is scattered throughout the Senate Watergate report, but he was never called to testify. His story seemed confusing and contradictory to investigators and they decided against granting him immunity. But the fact remains that most of the major targets of the investigation had significant ties to Hughes:

- Attorney General John Mitchell, overruling a prior decision of the Antitrust Division, had given Hughes permission to buy more than the five casinos he already owned in Las Vegas.

- E. Howard Hunt worked for Robert F. Bennett, who had the Hughes public-relations account in Washington. In February 1972, Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy had discussed with Hughes security chief Ralph White a plan to burglarize the offices of *Las Vegas Sun* publisher Hank Greenspan.

- Nixon's confidant Bebe Rebozo was the bag man for Hughes's now famous \$100,000 contribution to Nixon.

- Charles Colson had encouraged the White House to cultivate Bennett's friendship because of the financial and political clout Bennett's Hughes connection carried.

Meier tried to convince the Watergate investigators that he could prove himself a valuable witness. "I want to prove my statements to you," he told them, "I don't want to say it's my feeling Richard Nixon

has money in the Bahamas.² I want to say this is why, this is what I was told and this is who told me. These are serious charges. I don't want to talk in general, without having to prove what I'm saying."

At that point, Watergate investigator Scott Armstrong—who later worked on *The Final Days* with Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein—explained to Meier, "We are not conducting an investigation of Summa [Hughes's holding company] or of Hughes. We are conducting an investigation of the 1972 campaign." That was, in fact, the Senate committee's mandate, but clearly, those were impossible ground rules, rather like investigating cancer over the telephone.

The relationship between Hughes and Nixon goes back at least to 1956. That year, Hughes lent Donald Nixon \$205,000 to save a failing restaurant business. For Hughes, giving money in exchange for potential political favors was not unusual. Right after that loan—in a coincidence that investigators have been suspicious of for years—while Nixon was Vice-President, the Hughes Medical Institute was suddenly granted a tax-exempt status after prior refusals by the IRS. The loan to Donald was kept secret for obvious reasons. But four years later, one week before the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon election, columnist Drew Pearson got the story and printed it. The press flashed it across the country and to this day, Nixon and his friends believe it was the news of that loan that was partly responsible for his defeat by Kennedy.

In 1962, Nixon was running for governor of California. The loan again became a campaign issue³ and Nixon was called on to explain it publicly. Again he lost the race. Later, Rebozo's attorney, William Frates, was to say that Rebozo felt the story "had materially affected the outcome of the 1960 Presidential election and the 1962 governor's race in California." So not once but twice Nixon's relationship with Hughes was connected, at least in his mind and the minds of his friends, with agonizing political setbacks.

In 1968, Nixon was again running for President. Hughes had moved into his penthouse suite at Las Vegas' Desert Inn

² The reference is to fugitive financier Robert Vesco, who successfully swindled at least \$224,000,000 from a company named Investors Overseas Services, then moved to the Bahamas for a while. Two hundred thousand dollars he later secretly contributed to Nixon's 1972 campaign was used in part to finance the Watergate break-in.

(known locally as the D.I.). Meier's files are jammed with photocopies of memos from that period, all of which had been handwritten with a ballpoint pen on lined yellow legal pads. Hughes didn't mince words when directing his executives to achieve his goals for him. In reference to political contributions that year, for example, he wrote to Robert Maheu, manager of the Hughes-Nevada Operations: "I want you to go see Nixon as my special confidential emissary. I feel there is a really valid possibility of a Republican victory this year. If that could be realized under our sponsorship and supervision every inch of the way, then we would be ready to follow with [Paul] Laxalt [Nevada's governor at the time] as our next candidate."

Frank statements like that, as well as court documents from lawsuits against Hughes, show that he desperately wanted four things at that time and was prepared to devote enormous resources to getting them.

1. He wanted to select a Presidential candidate of his own and "go all the way" in funding him.

2. He wanted to purchase an airline. He had been forced out of ownership of TWA and aviation had always been his first love. Air West was for sale and he was determined to buy it.

3. He wanted to expand his Las Vegas empire. He had bought five hotel-casinos and the Justice Department had ruled he could make no more purchases without violating its antitrust guidelines. Hughes's attitude was that Justice could go to hell.

4. With a fury that bordered on the pathological (see *A Hughes Vignette* on page 182), he wanted the Atomic Energy Commission to stop underground nuclear testing, which caused the D.I. to sway back and forth a few inches.

THE PURCHASE OF NIXON

I can make or break anybody.

—HOWARD HUGHES

The last three problems could be solved much more easily if the first goal were accomplished. Maheu had initially convinced Hughes that Hubert H. Humphrey could take care of the AEC. Hughes wrote to Maheu in early 1968, "There is one man who can accomplish our objective through [Lyndon] Johnson—and that man is HHH. Why don't we get word to him on a basis of secrecy that is really, really reliable that we will give him immediately full, unlimited support for his campaign to enter the White House if he will just take this one on for us?"

It turned out that Humphrey wasn't altogether willing to go along with Hughes's plan. He wanted technical

information—conclusive scientific proof that the tests were as harmful and dangerous as Hughes claimed. Hughes had told Meier he didn't place much importance on the technical side—it was nice backup leverage, but he simply wanted, as he wrote, to "handle this just as if we were buying a hotel." In other words, paying for it was Hughes's idea of a solution. That is perfectly acceptable in buying a hotel, but when a Government decision turns on the deal, it is known as bribery.

Hughes chose Nixon and bribed him. The \$100,000 he gave Rebozo for Nixon was well reported during the Watergate investigation. At least another \$150,000 changed hands in subsequent years, some through Robert F. Bennett, who would later figure prominently in the Watergate affair. *The New York Times* reported on August 4, 1975, "Howard R. Hughes got his secret contract with the Central Intelligence Agency for the ship *Glomar Explorer* five weeks after making an 'emergency' contribution of \$100,000 to President Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign."

Meier claims to have discussed with Don Nixon possible Hughes contributions of sums much larger than the \$100,000. Nobody has ever proved the money changed hands, but there were conversations in the summer of 1968 between Don, Meier, Rebozo and others that indicate that it was a definite possibility. Don wanted Rebozo out of it. Rebozo wanted Meier and Don out of it. There were difficulties with the logistics, but the attitudes—the expectations and intentions—were clearly aimed at making the deal work.

The sum total of Hughes's favors and contributions may never be known, but his generosity was rewarded. In April 1968, with Johnson in the White House, he wanted to buy the Stardust and other casino-hotels, but the Justice Department drew up a complaint against the proposed acquisitions. Hughes temporarily abandoned his plans, dropped back and regrouped for another attack. He hired Richard Danner in February 1969, just a few weeks after Nixon's inauguration. He was put in charge of the Frontier Hotel. But one reason for bringing him aboard was that he could act as go-between for Hughes and Nixon through Rebozo. Even Hughes couldn't just walk up to the White House and hand the President a bundle of cash. Danner was a friend of both Nixon and Rebozo, had been for 20 years and claimed he had introduced the two.

According to Danner's executive-session Watergate testimony, \$50,000 in \$100 bills was removed from the safe at the Frontier.

He gave the money to Rebozo to pass along to Nixon. (The cash was a campaign contribution, according to Danner.) Hughes returned to his plan for expansion, first sending Danner to see Attorney General Mitchell, who conferred with the head of the Antitrust Division, Richard McLaren. McLaren strongly objected to any more purchases by Hughes. Antitrust had already ruled on the case of the Stardust (Hughes's lawyers had already bulldozed through the purchase of the Landmark) and a turnaround would make the division look foolish.

This wasn't cause for much concern in the Hughes organization. Maheu had written to Hughes as early as June 28, 1968 (when the Democrats were still in power), that there would be no problems. In a gleefully vicious memo, he reinforced what Hughes already knew about the Government:

You can bet your life that the Antitrust Division will live to regret their contemplated action. Yesterday they had "firsthand" evidence that we have many friends in Washington who truly believe in us. Today, they have received many inquiries—including one from the chairman of the Judiciary Committee—and that is just the beginning. Howard Cannon [Senator from Nevada] called me this afternoon to inform me that he and Senator Bible [of Nevada] have been told all day long—by fellow Senators—that they can depend on full support and assistance in sustaining their position that we obtain the Stardust. Cannon stated that Justice was severely ridiculed. . . . In the meantime, I've been in touch with George Franklin [Las Vegas district attorney] and Governor Laxalt and they are both ready to challenge the department "singlehandedly."

Clearly, Hughes was at the zenith of his power. He could demand almost anything from the Government and expect to get it.

The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on December 17, 1975, "The Justice Department in a dramatic turnaround just three days before Nixon's 1969 inauguration agreed not to oppose Hughes's proposed acquisition of the Landmark, a Las Vegas hotel and casino. Only 28 days before, the same Justice Department had informed Hughes's attorneys . . . that the Government intended to oppose in court any attempt by Hughes to acquire the Landmark on the ground that such a move would violate the antitrust laws."

On March 19, 1969, only two months after Nixon's inauguration, Danner met with Mitchell and was told that Hughes could buy more hotels. At the time, he wanted the Dunes. Mitchell said, "We see no problem." Later, Danner gave another \$50,000 campaign contribution to Rebozo, this time in cash from the Silver Slipper casino.

The acquisition of Air West was accomplished by an exchange of favors as well. Hughes told Meier just to keep Don and Richard Nixon happy and they'd get what they wanted as long as Hughes got Air West. It was agreed at the time that Hughes would hire Don in some executive capacity (though this never happened). Rebozo met with Maheu on Nixon's behalf and worked out a "deal with the President" (as Hughes put it to Meier), whereby Hughes would stop his four-year-long campaign against atomic testing if Nixon approved his purchase of Air West. It worked well for Hughes, because the AEC, under pressure, had already decided to move to Amchitka, Alaska, and Hughes didn't so much care whether or not they exploded atomic bombs, he just didn't want them set off near him.

The Hughes empire wrapped itself so totally in the upper echelons of the Nixon Administration that soon after his inauguration in 1969, Nixon offered to send his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, to Las Vegas to negotiate with Hughes on the AEC problem. Nixon told Maheu that Kissinger was willing to meet Hughes personally or, if that was not acceptable to Mr. Hughes, Kissinger would settle for a telephone call. Hughes refused. The White House was advised to deal with Maheu. The President already regarded Hughes as a foreign government of sorts—at least foreign enough to send his National Security Advisor to negotiate with the man who ran Las Vegas.

Clearly, Nixon hadn't been President long before he had a great deal to protect. The Hughes-Nixon relationship was so sensitive that the scope of it was even kept from people at high levels in the White House. And Nixon was going to some extraordinary lengths to protect himself. Photographs showing Meier with Donald Nixon and others at Orange County Airport in July 1969 were taken by the Secret Service and passed to Rebozo at the President's request. Rebozo was supposed to contact Maheu to have Meier fired or "kept out of things."

Meier was Hughes's liaison with Don Nixon, and the White House was understandably anxious about this arrangement. Those close to the Nixons would always remember the disastrous Hughes loan to

Don. As Ehrlichman told an interviewer recently, "I was sort of responsible for the care and feeding of the President's brother Don, and Don seemed to have a sort of magnetic attraction to the Hughes organization and the Hughes people . . . and so I was continually being confronted with Don Nixon's involvement and continuing relationship with people who had been or were members of the Hughes organization . . . so I was always engaged in trying to extricate him from those kinds of things."

After carefully setting up his career and going through more than his share of troubles, one of the last things the President wanted was to have anyone learn how entangled his career had become with Hughes.

THE MAGIC BOX

Hughes was extremely anxious to get himself into an alliance with the CIA that would protect him from investigation by other Government agencies.

—ROBERT MAHEU

A CIA cover organization is a strange and very useful thing. It's like having a magic box. You can put things in and you can take things out. You can take things out that you never put in and you can put things in that will never come out. Or you can get into the box yourself and go away somewhere—or perhaps go away forever. If the box is large enough, you can put an entire country inside it and no one will ever know.

The Hughes organization is such a box, the biggest and most useful of its kind. According to information given to us by a highly placed intelligence source, there is nothing else like it in the world, as far as intelligence fronts go. It is no secret to most foreign governments, most of which stand in awe of its ineffable, elegant vastness. From within this magic box, an important part of the United States' covert intelligence operations emanate. But by 1971, it had begun to crack. So much had been put into the box that things were beginning to come out. The magic was fading.

Hughes's alliance with the agency started as early as 1949. Only two years after the CIA got its charter, it began giving contracts to Hughes.

On April 1, 1975, *The Washington Post* reported, "Hughes Aircraft [HAC] has been mentioned as a potential hotbed of interrelationships with the CIA." *The New York Times* on March 20, 1975, quoted high Government officials as saying that HAC had been building satellites for intelligence purposes for years and "employs a number of high-ranking CIA and military men." As early as 1960, Maheu had Hughes's blessing in taking on one of the agency's most sensitive assignments: the assassination of Fidel Castro. Maheu worked out several unsuc-

cessful plots with gangsters Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli.

The affinity between Hughes and the agency was natural: America's most secretive billionaire and the most secretive part of America's Government. In a way, Hughes was a kind of modern-day Leonardo da Vinci, an eccentric genius who pushed to the cutting edge of the 20th Century, whether in early talking movies or in space satellites. Just after his death was reported, *Newsweek* quoted a top-ranking Washington intelligence official as saying, "Hughes gravitated into areas that other people refused to go into or didn't believe in." HAC pioneered the synchronous-orbit satellite, built the first Early Bird satellite and the Surveyor spacecraft that made the first soft landing on the moon and sent pictures back to NASA in preparation for the manned moon shots. Without Hughes's signal-amplifying microwave tubes, pictures from Mars would have been impossible. HAC is responsible for three-dimensional radar that is used for tracking hundreds of planes simultaneously. And the world's first operating laser arced across the labs of HAC. Laser weapons are now one of the hottest topics within the Pentagon—they may someday make nuclear weapons obsolete. The secrets of laser-weapon technology are so closely guarded that Pentagon insiders will discuss it only in state-of-the-art terms.

HAC became a leading Government electronics contractor with the building of an early fire-control system in 1948 and the Falcon air-to-air missile. During the Korean War, HAC was the only contractor of fire-control systems for Air Force interceptors. More recently, HAC built the entire ground-based defense systems for Japan, Belgium, Switzerland and NATO.

For years, Hughes Tool Company (Toolco—sold by Hughes in 1972) held a virtual monopoly on mining-drill bits. (On the subject of whether or not he really did have a monopoly, Hughes once said, "We don't have a monopoly. People who want to drill for oil and not use the Hughes bit can always use a pick and shovel.") A highly placed intelligence source told *PLAYBOY* that this monopoly was one of the important factors in the relationship between Hughes and the CIA because of the importance of resource-recovery information to the agency. What this means is that any time someone drilled into the ground, the information about what was down there went straight back to the agency. The setup with Toolco had put the agency in a position of awesome power with respect to other countries' abilities to keep the exact nature of their resources confidential.

Over the past decade, according to *Time*, the Hughes organization received at least six billion dollars in secret

CIA contracts. That's approximately \$11,500,000 a week, over and above \$11,500,000 a week in public Government contracts awarded to Hughes. That is about 1.2 billion dollars a year. Put another way, the *Glomar Explorer*, the Hughes-CIA secret ship that cost \$343,000,000 to build and made headlines in 1974 for trying to raise a sunken Russian sub, was to CIA funding of Hughes as six cents is to a dollar.

The one Hughes operation that doesn't seem likely to be involved in these types of dealings is the Hughes Medical Institute, established in 1953 "for the benefit of mankind." The Miami-based tax-exempt foundation has as its stated purpose medical research. Hughes turned over to the H.M.I. all HAC stock and 50 percent of Theta cable TV—assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars—to support that purpose.

But, as with all explanations of Hughes's actions, behind that story is another story: Mismanagement of HAC had upset the Air Force so much that Secretary Harold Talbot threatened to cancel all HAC contracts if the problems weren't taken care of. This was done on December 17, 1953, by Hughes's donating HAC to H.M.I. and naming himself sole trustee of H.M.I. Apparently, that satisfied the Air Force, because HAC now has an annual cash flow in excess of \$900,000,000. (Despite the enormous assets it owns, H.M.I. grants only about \$1,500,000 a year in medical-research funds.)

Hughes had said for years that when he died, he intended to leave his entire estate to H.M.I. Meier claims that Hughes instructed him to meet with the institute's president, Ken Wright, to discuss the institute's relationship with the CIA and that on March 8, 1969, Wright told him it was really a CIA front doing only token amounts of medical research in order to protect its tax-exempt status. According to Meier, H.M.I. had taken a long lease on Cay Sal, an uninhabited Bahamian out island 40 miles north of Cuba, to provide a site for covert CIA training operations. Meier's story that the medical institute is actually a CIA front was corroborated recently when a former Pentagon official was quoted in *Time* as saying that HAC (solely owned by H.M.I.) "is a captive company of the CIA. Their interests are completely merged." In other words, if Hughes left his fortune to H.M.I., control of his whole empire would legally—and secretly—pass to the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA could then—under the guise of tax-exempt charity—fund any project, any covert activity imaginable, working its magic with billions of untraceable dollars through the seemingly legitimate channels of the Hughes empire.

Making Hughes's other companies nearly as attractive to the CIA was the fact that he was, personally, the sole

A HUGHES VIGNETTE

On the morning of April 16, 1968, Howard Hughes was so scared he wanted to die. No, make that live. He had just picked up the *Las Vegas Sun*, published by his good friend Hank Greenspan, and read that the Atomic Energy Commission was going to set off the largest nuclear explosion ever right under the desert floor at the Nevada Test Site, not 120 miles from his home. In an uncharacteristic flurry of activity over the next few days, Howard wrote memos, made frantic phone calls and, in general, caused a stink that eventually would be blamed for postponing the shot that was originally scheduled for the 24th. In short, Howard was freaking out.

His top executive aide, Bob Maheu, was sent on wild missions to plead with politicians. Hughes was so firm in his stand against the blasts that as early as 1967, he had sent Maheu to offer President Johnson \$1,000,000 to stop the tests (what exactly happened to the \$1,000,000 is unclear).

It wasn't just any atomic tests that bothered Howard so much. It was the ones he could feel. His home—the Desert Inn in Las Vegas, which he had bought when he learned it was check-out time and decided he didn't want to leave—would rock gently back and forth in the aftershocks of large underground nuclear explosions. Howard didn't like that one bit.

He called John Meier, his scientific advisor, and told him to do anything he could to stop the test. "All my money," Howard said, "is at your disposal."

Over the next ten days, the vision of what was going to happen when the bomb went off became more and more bizarre in Howard's mind. Meier was calling Senators, Congressmen, assembling large groups of scientists to amass technical data showing that if the test went off on schedule, the entire city of Las Vegas would be destroyed. The Desert Inn, the Sands, the Frontier—all of them would crumble like so many card houses, killing everyone, but most of all, killing Howard Hughes.

Meier flew Barry Commoner out to speak against the test. The public outcry resulted in the Atomic Energy Commission's holding a scientific briefing to reassure the people that it was quite safe, that nothing would happen, that everything was under control. And the test would, indeed, go off, and it would be on Friday, April 26, 1968, at six A.M.—period.

Howard panicked. His voice was shaking when he phoned Meier. "Tell

them I will give them anything," Meier remembers him saying. "Find out how much it cost them to set this test up. We will pay it. Ten million, twenty million—I don't care! Tell them we'll pay them their costs if they stop this test."

"But Mr. Hughes, they've been working on this for thirty years. You can't reimburse the Atomic Energy Commission."

April 26, 1968: Howard had a plan. Admittedly, it was a pretty weird plan, but at least it was a plan.

Meier was quietly ascending the stairs to the roof of the Desert Inn. It was four in the morning. He carried with him a scientific instrument: a piece of string. As he opened the door to the roof, he found himself face to face with another man, who also had a scientific instrument or two. But then, this man was from the U. S. Geological Survey, which had sent him out as a result of Hughes's protest to find out if, indeed, Las Vegas would fall down when the test went off. He was ready to monitor several thousand dollars' worth of seismic gear that measures the aftershock.

But one of the richest men in the world had sent his scientific advisor up with a string, so he could make a plumb line to measure the sway of the building. The plan was that if the plumb moved more than six inches either way (Howard had figured this out mathematically), Meier, who had taken a large friend along, was to stomp up and down with his friend on the roof above Howard's bedroom to alert him that the Desert Inn was about to fall down. Meier had a transistor radio tuned to a local station to let him know when the bomb went off.

At exactly six, Boxcar was fired. Meier and the man from U.S.G.S. watched the plumb. Pretty soon, it started swinging back and forth. About 6:05, John Holmes, one of Howard's Mormon valets, went running out onto the roof in a panic.

"He felt it! He felt it!" Holmes screamed. "He's going crazy. Get down there immediately and call him, John; the building's going to fall down. He's hiding under the bed!"

Hughes stayed under his bed in the penthouse of the Desert Inn until nearly 8:30 that morning. When Meier called, Holmes handed Hughes the phone under the bed and Howard chewed Meier's ear off for ten minutes.

owner of them. The sleight of hand with billions of dollars was not subject to the scrutiny publicly held corporations come under. And—aside from the obvious money, security and benefits—making the CIA attractive for Hughes was the fact that he was a fiery anti-Communist and a superpatriot.

Charles Colson has said that "Hughes is the CIA's largest contractor." In this position, Hughes had another advantage. He could hire its influential people for his own team.

Scores of high-level officials from Government intelligence and investigative agencies have moved over to the Hughes organization. A. D. "Bud" Wheelon left his position as deputy director of science and technology for the CIA to become president of HAC. At the age of 46, a three-star general named Ed Nigro was in line for the position of deputy director of plans for the Pentagon. He turned it down, ended his promising military career and went to work managing hotels in Las Vegas for Hughes. When questioned by reporters on this strange career tactic, Nigro commented, "I felt I could come out here and still serve my country." (Hughes wrote a memo to Maheu suggesting that Nigro could use his contacts in the Pentagon "to keep the Vietnam war going," in order to allow HAC to sell more helicopters.)

Robert Pelouquin resigned as head of the Justice Department's organized-crime strike force and started what has become the world's largest private security company, Intertel. Hughes quickly became one of Intertel's most prominent clients.

In turn, Toolco and HAC routinely hired CIA agents, who would then be given jobs in other countries. Meier first learned of Hughes's involvement with the agency in 1968. On August fifth, Maheu told Meier that a man named Michael Merhige, a new young Toolco executive, would be handling some business in South America. Meier was asked if he would use his contacts in Ecuador to open the right doors for Merhige. It was a routine request and Meier handled it in a routine way. He flew to Quito before Merhige arrived and explained to his friends in high government positions the importance of giving Merhige all the help he needed.

Meier returned to Vegas and when they met there, Merhige began explaining to Meier how really important this particular project was from an agency standpoint, believing Meier knew he was an agent using Toolco as cover. Meier was stunned by the revelation. (Merhige was apparently just a clumsy agent. In Meier's file on the Ecuadorian situation is a letter from a bemused Ecuadorian official explaining that Merhige "was so obvious" they spotted him as an agent.

PLAYBOY'S "SHALLOW THROAT"

almost immediately.) While Merhige was still in Nevada, he again let Meier in on an agency matter that should have been kept confidential, and this time it proved to be a serious mistake. He gave him a list of American politicians the CIA wanted funded through Hughes. Meier was supposed to act as a courier and give the directive to Hughes, but later the agency would suspect that Meier had retained a copy of the list. He did keep a copy, which *PLAYBOY* now has.

The directive is dated September 2, 1968. It is addressed to H.R.H., with a copy designated for R.M.A.—Robert Malien Associates—and is headed "Proposed Fund-Support List as Through Local Outlets."

In the directive is our current President, Gerald Ford (then a Congressman from Michigan). The list reads as follows:

Paul J. Fannin, Arizona
 Wilbur D. Mills, Arkansas
 Craig Hosmer, California
 Robert L. Leggett, California
 Gordon L. Allott, Colorado
 J. Herbert Burke, Florida
 Hiram L. Fong, Hawaii
 Larry Winn, Jr., Kansas
 Joe D. Waggonner, Jr., Louisiana
 Gerald R. Ford, Michigan
 James O. Eastland, Mississippi
 William J. Randall, Missouri
 Paul Laxalt, Nevada
 Howard W. Cannon, Nevada
 Norris Cotton, New Hampshire
 James R. Grover, New York
 William H. Harsha, Ohio
 Frank T. Bow, Ohio
 John N. Camp, Oklahoma
 Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
 Dan H. Quayle, Tennessee
 James H. Quillen, Tennessee
 James M. Collins, Texas
 Olin E. Teague, Texas
 Omar Burleson, Texas
 Abraham Kazen, Texas
 John G. Tower, Texas
 Wallace F. Bennett, Utah
 W. C. Daniel, Virginia
 Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia
 Vernon W. Thomson, Wisconsin

We have been unable to determine why the CIA selected this particular group or to get any indication of whether or not they were aware that the agency had chosen them for funding. But the depth of CIA influence can be partly measured by the behavior of new, middle-level executives such as Merhige. When he didn't get a quick enough response to the funding directive, he gave another copy to Meier and this time wrote, "John—am asking for progress," and signed it.

The diplomatic relationship between Hughes and the American Government had clearly become extremely delicate, and only a very select group of people knew it was so deep and so broad that it

With disaffected agents spilling their stories and Congressional committees announcing new exposés every few weeks, the penetration of CIA secrecy has become almost commonplace. But breaching security at the Summa Corporation is another matter. It is one of the most secretive companies in the world.

For this reason, one of *PLAYBOY*'s sources of corroboration for *The Puppet and the Puppetmasters*, Charles Kenworthy, is in a unique position. He has breached Summa security and, far from seeking the anonymity of "Deep Throat" status, he has been rather eager to let Summa know about it. The story of how he got into this cold war is an interesting one.

Kenworthy is a flamboyant Los Angeles millionaire who made his fortune in real estate. His favorite pastime is hunting for lost treasures. In 1974, he formed a company called Quest and persuaded the initially skeptical Stanford Research Institute to work with him applying sophisticated technology to the task of finding ancient treasures. Using radar, lasers, sonar and electronic gear from its radiophysics lab, Kenworthy has turned an adventurous old art into a lucrative new science.

Shipping records from the 16th Century indicate that a Spanish galleon carrying treasure now worth \$30,000,000 sank off the coast of Catalina Island, near Los Angeles. Last year, Kenworthy, after finding evidence of the galleon's location, got a permit from the state of California for sole search rights. His crew then began the time-consuming process of zeroing in on the sunken ship.

Then along came the Glomar Explorer.

On August 20, 1975, she arrived, anchored a quarter of a mile off the coast, over the very area from which Kenworthy planned to raise the galleon, and remained there for nine days. During that time, a perimeter of half a mile was drawn around the Glomar to keep private ships away.

Kenworthy thought it odd for the Glomar to show up within 1400 feet of a populated area to perform a "secret" mission. But when he set out to investigate, he drew a complete blank. And Summa, in a one-paragraph note, simply assured him that the Glomar's activity off Catalina "involves no ocean-bottom exploration or salvage operations" and ignored demands for proof.

So Kenworthy took matters into his own hands. Using his own connections with ex-investigative and intelligence agents, he penetrated Summa's security system and began compiling a dossier of Summa documents. He has not yet been able to prove his case, but he has acquired a rather remarkable array of documents, ranging from the startling to the ridiculous. He has, for example, part of Bill Gay's personal phone book, which lists R. Spencer Oliver and Robert R. Mullen & Company. The minutes of the June 6, 1975, Hughes Air Corporation board of directors meeting note that Robert F. Bennett, who leaked stories to Bob Woodward that helped bring down Nixon, was "present by invitation." Bennett was president of the CIA front Robert R. Mullen & Company. He is now director of public relations for Summa. Other documents show the massive losses sustained by Hughes-Nevada casinos. The Desert Inn, for example, lost \$5,702,000 last year. The Summa color codes are among Kenworthy's treasure chest of papers. Summa executives, depending on their rank, have emblems on their company cars that show by the colors how important they are. And one executive's note to himself says, "Get CIA clearance" on "mining operations." Yet another directive shows that Richard Danner—who passed \$100,000 of Hughes's money to Bebe Rebozo and is now general manager of the Sands—can't spend over \$1000 without clearing it through Steve Savoldelli, now manager of Hughes-Nevada Operations. Kenworthy also discovered evidence that suggests that Summa has committed Watergate-like break-ins against its own staff.

Jean E. Clary, food-and-beverage director of the Landmark Hotel, on April 23, 1976, wrote a letter to Summa saying that the Summa security men had broken into his home in an attempt to prove he was accepting kickbacks.

Summa has so far only threatened legal action and Kenworthy has failed to inspire an official Governmental investigation to determine the truth about whether or not the Glomar is the pirate ship that stole his treasure. *PLAYBOY*'s own investigation of his charges has turned up two sources who claim that the Glomar did remove that treasure from off the coast of Catalina. In the meantime, *PLAYBOY* and Kenworthy are continuing to gather evidence to prove or disprove the story.

constant communication with him via means and phone calls. Maheu's ambitions represented a very real threat to Davis, Henley and Gay.

During the Nevada period, Howard's orders outside Nevada were frequently ignored. He could have his little half-billion-dollar playground in Nevada, but Gay, Davis and Henley directed the course of serious world-wide business for the empire. Both Maheu and Meier witnessed Howard's gradual loss of control.

It is not easy to imagine how Hughes could own his empire outright and not have solid control over it. But he was a very unusual man. It is easy to forget that in 1953, he legally stepped down when he passed control of HAC to the institute to take his name off the books as official head of that company to smooth over the mismanagement problems he was having with the Air Force. This maneuver was designed to allow Howard to maintain control of HAC while satisfying the military that some one else was in charge. Later, his fear of guns, of kidnapping, of court subpoenas would seal him off from the outside world and make him dependent on a small group of Maheu aides for everything from food and medical attention to news from the real world. It was a simple matter for them to see that with ten communications to Hughes about the course of business in his empire did not escape their attention—or their censorship. Even Maheu was never allowed to meet Hughes face to face.

Aside from Maheu and the Maheon valets, one of the few people who spoke with Hughes on the phone regularly was Meier. His position was unique. Maheu and the other executives ran the Hughes-Nevada business; Meier handled the projects personally important to Hughes. Hughes also involved Meier in some of his political and business projects, including the acquisition of Air West, the purchase of several mining claims in Nevada and Hughes's extremely delicate dealings with Donald Nixon.

In November 1969, Meier officially resigned his position with Hughes to set up the Nevada Environmental Foundation. Secretly, he continued to carry out assignments for Hughes.

But by 1970, Howard Hughes was a very sick man, and in early November, he was near death. His health had been failing since his mysterious operation in Boston in 1966, after which he had moved to Las Vegas. Now his weight was down to about 100 pounds, he was suffering from anemia and pneumonia and his hemoglobin count was down to four. This condition causes euphoria and erratic behavior. Normal hemoglobin is between 14 and 18 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. One of the doctors who attended him in his penthouse later

continued

good reason for this. Any leaks could prove disastrous.

NIGHT OF THE LONG KNIVES

For quite a while, the security system seemed to be working very well. But in November 1970, a series of bizarre events took place that started cracking the shell of secrecy that had surrounded the operations for years. Exactly what took place in November 1970 is likely to remain a mystery. But it is certain that the date is crucial in beginning to comprehend Watergate and its aftermath.

An internal crisis had been brewing inside the Hughes empire since Howard's arrival in Las Vegas in 1966. During his years in Nevada, Howard Hughes the man was becoming separate from the Hughes companies, and his control of them gradually diminished. When he sold TWA, he received \$545,349,711, and with it he built Hughes-Nevada Operations, putting Maheu in charge. But the rest of his multibillion-dollar empire was controlled by three executives outside Nevada. A woman named Nantine Henley, secretary, had installed Ken Wright, one of her former chauffeurs, as president of the Hughes Medical Institute, and his first loyalty was to her.

In California, Toolco was controlled by a Maheon named Frank W. "Bill" Gay. He had maneuvered his way to a senior vice-presidency after beginning as the manager of Hughes's car pool. He was responsible for hiring the Maheon valets who surrounded Hughes day and night. They controlled the flow of information into and out of his penthouse suite. With no word to the contrary forthcoming from Hughes himself, Gay was able to maintain his public image as that of a son to Hughes.

From New York, an attorney named Chester C. Davis handled much of the ongoing litigation involving Hughes, including the 12-year court battle over TWA. Davis, with his fiery tongue, dramatic gestures and shrewd maneuvering, has a well-earned reputation as just about the meanest man in any courtroom. (During the Watergate testimony, Davis represented Danner, who had delivered the now famous \$100,000 to Rebzo. Davis personally steam-rolled over many of the investigators' questions. At one point, when Danner tried to add to Davis' own remarks, Davis growled: "You open that mouth again and you're going to have to go see a dentist." The court reporter dutifully typed it into the record.)

Davis, Henley and Gay had won control over the Hughes empire outside Nevada, but they had no proximity to Hughes; Hughes directed the Nevada Operations through Maheu and was in

even included the intelligence apparatus as its critical component. The press, the public, the FBI, the IRS, Congress—all of them were necessarily ignorant of the gravity of the relationship between Hughes and the agency and what it meant.

Even among Government insiders, it couldn't become common knowledge that the Hughes organization was in possession of some of the nation's most explosive national security secrets, ranging from attempts to assassinate foreign leaders to the Glomar (see *Shallow Throat* on page 183) to the secret funding of American politicians by the CIA, using Hughes as the conduit for these funds.

With adventures like these on their hands, it was clearly imperative for agency officials to keep a very tight rein on any information about the inner workings of the Hughes-agency merger. Since other Government agencies were not

3 It was so important that the details of this merger not come out that in June 1974, three days after several documents that touched on the CIA links were subpoenaed by the Justice Department for the Securities and Exchange Commission, a group of highly professional burglars broke into Sunna headquarters and removed those documents. According to several sources with firsthand knowledge of the case, this was a CIA job done to protect the Hughes-CIA relationship.

aware of the extent of the relationship, investigations of Hughes's holdings could not be allowed to succeed. There was investigation of tax-exempt foundations came up empty when it looked into H.M.I. During the course of the investigation, this exchange took place between Seymour Mintz, representing H.M.I., and Representative Ben D. Blackburn of Georgia:

BLACKBURN: [Howard Hughes] certainly has done well in mixing up his money. We cannot keep up with all the financial transactions. We have received a report, but our staff has had problems understanding all of these notes floating around and interest floating around mentioned in it. . . . Why can't that superb management pay off that note?

MINTZ: We have never made that demand on the Hughes Aircraft Company because we felt that it was not in the interest of the institute to hamstring the aircraft company to the point where it would be deprived of its working capital.

BLACKBURN: You mean Mr. Hughes, the trustee, has never felt that Mr. Hughes, the chief executive, ought to be hamstringing in paying Mr. Hughes the money Mr. Hughes owes Mr. Hughes?

told police his condition was so poor they feared for his life if he did not get to a hospital's intensive-care unit. For unknown reasons, Hughes remained in his suite. His memos and phone calls to Maheu and Meier, which had been tapering off since September, abruptly stopped in mid-November. On or about November 25, 1970, Thanksgiving eve, he suddenly vanished, having methodically worked to take over not only the city of Las Vegas but the entire state of Nevada. Hughes's Mormon valets put out the story that a smiling, healthy, high-spirited Howard R. Hughes had sashayed down nine flights of stairs at the back of the D.L., climbed into a limo and been winged away on a long-overdue and well-deserved vacation.

He enjoyed the flight, they said.

A number of media people took that jaunty-departure story at face value. *Time's* report began, "A few minutes before ten o'clock on Thanksgiving eve, Howard Hughes pulled an old sweater over the white shirt that he wore open at the neck, donned a fedora and walked to the rear of the penthouse atop the Desert Inn. . . . Hughes eased his tall, thin frame through a long-unused fire door and walked the nine stories down an interior fire escape to the hotel parking lot."

It's a nice picture, but neither Maheu nor Meier believed it for a second. They claim instead that an emaciated Hughes was carried out by Intertel agents, who sent a decoy caravan of limousines to the Las Vegas airport while Hughes was taken to Nellis Air Force Base and flown away in a Lockheed Jet Star. (According to an account in *Look*, by Benjamin Schemmer, editor of *The Armed Forces Journal*, Hughes was on a stretcher when he was loaded on the plane, and the flight crew that departed from Nellis was told, "Your life depends on your not looking to the rear.")

As mentioned before, what took place on November 25, 1970, may remain a secret, and there are only fragmentary reports on Hughes's actual condition. If he did throw on some old clothes and walk down nine flights of stairs, however, it represented a remarkable recovery from his condition earlier that month.

Meier had strong circumstantial evidence to support his belief that whatever happened that night, Hughes was no longer in control. On October 28, 1970, Meier and his wife had arrived in Honolulu and checked into the Kahala Hilton Hotel. They were joined there the next day by Donald Nixon and his wife. Both couples were vacationing at Hughes's expense, but Meier says he was also negotiating with Don about a high-level job for him in the Hughes

empire. Hughes was eager to find Don a position and was keeping in touch with Meier by phone. On November third, a friend of Meier's named Mike O'Callaghan, in an upset victory (not expected or funded by Hughes), won the governorship of Nevada. Hughes called Meier the same day and instructed him to fly back immediately and begin to cement a sympathetic relationship with the new governor. Meier went to see O'Callaghan and on November 12 returned to Honolulu with Mr. and Mrs. O'Callaghan, who stayed until November 15. Meier sent his report to Hughes on November 16 and was told he would receive a prompt return call from Hughes, whose Nevada Operations had always run smoother with the good will of the governor. The call never came. Either Hughes was no longer functioning. Meier concluded, or he had suddenly lost interest in the President's brother and Nevada's new governor.

Maheu was not even told of Hughes's disappearance until December fourth, when, in a dramatic scene resembling a South American *coup d'état*, a strike force of Intertel agents swooped down on Maheu's offices, physically ejected him and his staff into the street, locked and guarded the offices and files and seized control of the Hughes-Nevada Operations in the name of Gay, Davis and Henley.

Literally, one minute Maheu was in his office, carrying on with Howard's business; the next, he was on the street, having been told that he was relieved of all authority, including the authority to continue drawing the \$500,000-a-year retainer he had been charging Hughes.

Maheu had evidence that Hughes had been kidnaped. He knew that Gay had long been on the outs with Hughes, despite the father-son image. One memo

later circulated by Maheu expressed Hughes's opinion that Gay was responsible for the breakup of Hughes's marriage to Jean Peters. "I feel he let me down utterly, totally, completely," Hughes wrote. He added, "If I were to list all the grievances, it would fill several pages." In another memo to Maheu, dated March 21, 1968, Hughes had written of Gay, "Apparently you are not aware that the path of true friendship in this case has not been a bilateral affair. I thought when we came here and I told you not to invite Bill up here and not to permit him to be privy to our activities, you had realized that I no longer trusted him. . . . My bill of complaints against Bill's conduct goes back a long way and cuts very deep. Also, it includes a very substantial amount of money, enough to take care of any needs of his children several times over." Meier was also aware of Hughes's dislike for Gay. He explained that the money reference is to Hughes Dynamics, a computer-software company Gay had set up in the early Sixties without Hughes's knowledge or approval. Gay had spent millions of dollars hiring a staff of computer experts, who, according to documents in Meier's files, prepared studies on the computerization of such institutions as police departments and the U.S. Postal Service. Hughes Dynamics had also assisted the Mormon Church in Salt Lake City, at Hughes's expense, in beginning to computerize its operations. "They had offices all over the States, hundreds of people, they were spending millions of Hughes's dollars," says Meier, who was on the staff of Hughes Dynamics himself until he was tipped off that Hughes was not even aware of the operation and advised that he should get out. Meier resigned, and not long after that, Hughes's wife saw a TV news story about Hughes Dynamics and reported it to Hughes, who ordered the entire staff fired within 24 hours.

That was not the first time he had fired Gay. But each time, Gay managed to find a way around the order. Hughes had also sent Maheu a memo giving him "full authority" to take over the TWA case from Davis, which Maheu had attempted to do. On November 12, 1970—two weeks before Hughes's disappearance—in a three-page teletyped message to Davis, Maheu charged him with mismanagement of the TWA court case. Maheu wrote, "I must insist that you now step aside." Two days later, Davis drafted a proxy turning over control of the Hughes-Nevada Operations to himself and Gay. On the afternoon of November 14, 1970, according to Levar Myler and Howard Eckersley, two of Hughes's Mormon valets, they handed the proxy to Hughes for his signature. Myler served as witness; Eckersley, a notary public, sealed the proxy, which was then used as the legal

basis for ousting Maheu. Both men had been hired by Gay to attend Hughes.⁵

Shortly after the take-over, Davis and Gay made public a "Dear Chester and Bill" letter from Hughes reiterating his desire to remove Maheu and ordering them to get the Maheu affair over with as quickly as possible. It is signed "Howard R. Hughes" and his fingerprints appear at the bottom of the page. At the very least, Maheu thought the letter was suspicious because Hughes did not begin his written communications to executives with "Dear." He began directly with a first name, such as "Bob—" or "John—." Nor did he sign personal messages "Howard R. Hughes." He signed them "H" or "Howard." The purpose of the fingerprints was to prove Hughes had written the letter. But curiously, sheriff's police captain William White of Clark County in Nevada later testified about those fingerprints: "From the way the latent prints developed on the three separate examinations, we feel it is impossible to tell *how* [emphasis added] those prints were placed on that piece of paper."

A BEAST WITH TWO HEADS

But whether or not Hughes was in control at the moment his fingerprints were placed on that letter, the meaning of the 1970 coup was that Maheu and Meier, the two men who knew intimately the inner workings of the Hughes empire, were convinced that Hughes was no longer calling the shots; and hostile actions taken toward them, in Hughes's name, made them bitter enemies of the new regime practically overnight. Powerful executives who are accustomed to having the nation's business and political elite seek their favor do not simply fade quietly into the background when they believe—rightly or wrongly—that an illegal coup has taken place and they are its victims, abruptly and ignominiously thrown out onto the street and made to look like fools. Together, Maheu and Meier had enough information to topple the entire structure involving the Nixon White House, the Hughes empire, the CIA and politicians from both parties who were secretly indebted to Hughes in ways that could cause a public outrage.

Ironically, the initial White House response to the Hughes upheaval was jubi-

lant. Maheu had retained Larry O'Brien, for some of the Hughes public-relations work in Washington. Once Maheu was out, so was O'Brien—no friend to the Republican White House. The powerful Hughes account was turned over to Robert F. Bennett, who was, like Bill Gay, a Mormon. Bennett purchased Mullen & Company, a public-relations firm that also served as a CIA front organization, and which employed E. Howard Hunt. On January 15, 1971, Charles Colson wrote to another White House aide: "Bob Bennett, son of Senator Wallace Bennett of Utah, has just [taken] over the Mullen public-relations firm here in Washington. Bob is a trusted loyalist and good friend. We intend to use him on a variety of outside projects. One of Bob's new clients is Howard Hughes. I'm sure I need not explain the political implications of having Hughes's affairs handled here in Washington by a close friend. As you know, Larry O'Brien has been the principal Hughes man in Washington. This move could signal quite a shift in terms of the politics and money that Hughes represents."

But already there was concern about the dangers posed by the angry Maheu's relationship with O'Brien. A White House memo dated January 26, 1971, from Dean to H. R. Haldeman, says: "I have also been informed by a source of Jack Caulfield's that O'Brien and Maheu are longtime friends from the Boston

area. . . . Bebe [Rebozo] is under the impression that Maheu had a good bit of freedom with Hughes's money when running the Nevada operation. Bebe further indicated that he felt he could acquire some documentation of this fact if given a little time and that he would proceed to try to get any information he could. He also requested that if any action be taken with regard to Hughes that he be notified because of his familiarity with the delicacy of the relationships as a result of his own dealings with the Hughes people." (The "delicacy" Rebozo referred to is not hard to understand. At that moment, he had \$100,000 of Hughes's money that he had never reported to the IRS stashed in a safe-deposit box.) Two days later, Haldeman instructed Dean to get more information on Maheu and O'Brien: "You and Chuck Colson should get together and come up with a way to leak the appropriate information. . . . However, we should keep Bob Bennett and Bebe out of it at all costs."

In other words, the White House was looking for information to embarrass O'Brien because of his Hughes connection, but before long, it started to look like the change of command in the Hughes empire was going to threaten the White House far more than O'Brien. Maheu and Meier would see to that.

It was an odd couple that set out to destroy the new Hughes regime. Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who worked for the CIA while on the Hughes payroll and was instrumental in creating the role of CIA front for the Hughes empire; Meier was a computer expert who was more interested in cleaning up the environment than in planting spies overseas. Maheu and Meier had probably not seen eye to eye on anything important until they came to the same conclusion about Davis and Gay's take-over of the Hughes organization. For once, their hands were forced in the same direction.

Maheu began by taking his grievances into court, letting out bits and pieces of information. Meier began by talking to his friends—liberals, Democrats, journalists—about such things as Air West. Maheu and Meier both talked with columnist Jack Anderson. The conversations resulted in articles that were potentially more disastrous for both the Hughes people and the White House than the column by Drew Pearson, Anderson's predecessor, about the 1956 loan. Anderson, for example, was the first to print, in August 1971, the outline of the \$100,000 payoff to Nixon through Rebozo.

Haldeman wanted Rebozo kept out of it "at all costs," and now Anderson was bringing him into it. Anderson told PLAYBOY: "That column, and every other column I wrote about Hughes and Nixon, provoked a reaction so much stronger than on any other subject I could write about. They went crazy over there whenever I linked them to Howard

⁵ A few months after Hughes's disappearance, Eckersley, after years of laboring anonymously as chief staff executive for Hughes, showed up in Montreal touting a new mining stock called Pan American Mines Ltd. and implying that it was a Hughes venture. The stock quickly shot up 500 percent before Toolco announced that the venture was not backed by Hughes. The Canadian government indicted Eckersley for stock fraud. He remained in his position in the Hughes organization.

Hughes. And I learned from sources in the White House inner circle that they believed the source for that column about the \$100,000 to Rebozo was Larry O'Brien. They were mistaken, but they were convinced at the time that I was getting my stuff on Hughes and Nixon from Larry O'Brien."

The tension gradually increased through 1971. Maheu and Meier talked more and more. The agency, the Hughes empire and the White House became more and more concerned. In the Watergate testimony, several witnesses alluded to their nervousness about the struggle within the Hughes organization and its potential for serious political embarrassment.

In early 1972, the Clifford Irving biography of Hughes surfaced in the press as a fraud, prompting an unprecedented phone call from either Hughes or a man purporting to be Hughes. The reason for suspicion about the identity of the man making the call is the fact that he couldn't answer several of the identifying questions put to him by reporters who supposedly had known him. In the four-hour conversation, the voice rambled disjointedly, going into extended discourses on such topics as the way in which he trimmed his fingernails and the advantages of a clipper over a scissors. At one point, the voice said, Maheu "robbed me blind," sending Maheu into a rage that ended in a \$17,500,000 defamation suit against Summa. In the course of this action, a very angry Maheu began telling even more about the internal workings of the organization as they related to Nixon and the CIA:

- He presented a tape recording of a phone call from Hughes, who told him in reference to a possible move to the Bahamas, "If I were to make this move, I would expect you to wrap up that government down there to a point where it will be, well, a captive entity in every way."

- July 4, 1972, Maheu gave the first detailed account of the famous \$100,000 gift to Nixon—in a sworn deposition. While there had been some question before, Maheu now stated conclusively that the money was unquestionably meant for Nixon.

- He revealed that approval for Hughes's purchase of additional casinos was a favor granted by Nixon implying that Hughes had bought Nixon off.

- He described showing Hughes executive Ray Holliday the Hughes memo asking Maheu to give Lyndon Johnson the \$1,000,000 bribe to stop atomic tests. "Mr. Holliday," Maheu said under oath, "dropped the yellow sheet of paper to the floor and requested of me whether or not his fingerprints could be taken off the piece of paper."

Although some of this was to take place after the Watergate break-in, its general impact gives an idea of how far Maheu

was willing to go. He had apparently decided to pull out all the stops and blast the organization.

In some ways, Meier represented even more of a threat, especially to the White House. His close friendship with Don Nixon, as mentioned before, had long been a source of concern for the President. Although Donald and Meier were told at various points to keep away from each other, Don wanted to maintain his Hughes connection and Meier had a job to do. Meier, after all, was charged by Hughes with handling business dealings with Don. Don later testified to the Watergate committee that he viewed Meier as "the number-two man with Hughes." The Secret Service had already tapped Don's telephone because of his connections with Hughes, and as early as July 1969, the Secret Service had, as mentioned, photographed Meier and Don at the Orange County Airport, prompting an angry call to Don from Rebozo. But Don persisted in seeing Meier, which led to yet another embarrassing column by Anderson. Meier was going to have lunch with George Clifford, an Anderson investigator, and Don joined them, only to start bragging about his international wheeling-dealing. A February 11, 1972, Anderson column reads, "Suddenly he fixed his gaze on a visitor [Meier] connected with the airline Air West. 'How do I get Air West?' Donald demanded. 'We ought to do their catering. They owe me that.'" The story "upset the entire Nixon family," according to Meier, who was told that by Don.

Just the seamier aspects of the Air West story were enough to threaten Nixon's chances of re-election. Nixon hadn't forgotten the disasters of 1960 and 1962, caused by the Nixon family's relationship with Hughes, and in early 1972, his old nightmare was showing signs of repeating itself, and all because of the fallout from the internal Hughes explosion. On February third, *The New York Times* added a new dimension by carrying a story saying that *Las Vegas Sun* publisher Hank Greenspun had a safe full of Hughes memos. One day later, Mitchell met with Liddy and the result was Liddy's belief that he had the go-ahead for two missions: the burglary of Greenspun's safe and a mission into O'Brien's office at the Watergate.

Friends throughout the Hughes organization had warned Meier not to get into politics after the 1970 blowup. He was told the organization would "ruin" him if he did. Meier ignored them, determined to get to the bottom of what he regarded as the mysterious disappearance of Hughes and to get on with his own career, now that he'd lost his position with Hughes. He decided to run for the U. S. Senate from New Mexico against an old friend of Nixon's, Pete Domenici. Meier announced his candidacy on January 11,

1972, and as the election year started, the White House had cause for alarm at Meier's conversations not only with Jack Anderson but with high-level McGovern supporters as well.

"I was telling them," Meier says, "that my feeling was that McGovern stood a chance of winning the election only if he exposed Nixon in areas such as his relationship with Hughes, such as the fact that I was told directly by Hughes to lay off the AEC because he had a deal with the President that he would get approval for the acquisition of Air West. And I was sitting there in Don Nixon's house, listening to him talk to Nixon in the White House about Air West and Hughes. Now, where are those tapes between Don and Richard Nixon? Nixon had Don's phone tapped. Why didn't those tapes come out?"

Left alone, Meier stood a good chance of winning over Domenici, who was thought to be a weak opponent. But in the next five months, before Meier lost in his campaign for the Democratic nomination, he experienced a series of disasters. According to an affidavit by Harry Evans, Meier's campaign coordinator, Tom Benavidez, then a New Mexico senator, was managing the campaign and had his real-estate offices burglarized of Meier's papers, including tax records. Benavidez found a transmitting device on his office phone. The campaign was being directed from that office. Evans' report to Meier on the state's political structure was stolen when someone broke into the Downtowner Motel room in which Evans was staying. (The wire tapping and burglaries by that time were nothing new to Meier. As early as January 27, 1970, he was at the Fontainebleau in Miami with his wife and their room was broken into. Meier's files were taken and he reported the incident to the police.)

Telephone threats on Meier's life became so common that he had to get a police monitor on his phones in an attempt to trace the calls. Although Meier had never met Clifford Irving—and so testified—he was dragged before a Federal grand jury in New York investigating the hoax and subjected to heavy publicity about his possible involvement.

As soon as Meier was cleared of the Irving matter, Summa sued him and others, claiming \$9,000,000 had been swindled from Hughes in mining deals.

Then, in May, someone leaked the story to the press that Meier was under investigation by the IRS. Meier had initially come under IRS scrutiny as a result of a massive investigation of the Hughes empire. At the end of 1971, the IRS and the Justice Department—presumably unaware of the depth of the CIA connections to Hughes—sent teams of dozens of volunteer agents into Las Vegas to investigate Hughes-Nevada Operations. The heat was on in Vegas, considering that

Intertel, Hughes, IRS, Justice, the CIA and who knew who else were all there spying on one another. According to Hunt's own Watergate testimony, "It was Mr. Bennett who told me that if I ever got out to Las Vegas, to be very careful even of using a telephone booth there; there was so much electronic surveillance out there that he for one would not even trust a coin phone in Las Vegas."

It wasn't surprising. The IRS was uncovering what *The Wall Street Journal* called the largest skimming operation the IRS had ever seen. In its July 31, 1972, report, the *Journal* said, "The billionaire was roundly fleeced... the noose is beginning to tighten." It quoted a "seasoned" Federal agent as saying the situation involved "some of the most incredible swindles I've ever seen" and described the "massive investigative force that is combing Las Vegas, several other U.S. cities and such remote points as the Netherlands and the Dominican Republic."

A minimum of \$50,000,000 could not be accounted for right at the outset and all indications were that there were more mysteries where that came from. Spokesmen for the IRS admitted to total bafflement about how business had been conducted in Vegas since Hughes arrived.

Nixon's problem was that some money was intentionally moved in circuitous ways because at least \$100,000 had been taken from casinos and passed to Rebozo, earmarked for the White House. The IRS was beginning to turn up bits and pieces of evidence pointing to a Hughes-Nixon relationship and the investigation was immediately flagged "sensitive." In May 1972, less than a month before the Watergate break-in, Roger Barth, assistant to the commissioner of the IRS, reported to Ehrlichman at the White House. He said the IRS had developed information that might embarrass the President (meaning ruin his chances for re-election). The IRS further told Ehrlichman that Donald Nixon's name kept coming up in the Hughes investigation.

The sequence of events leading up to Watergate reads like an invasion plan.

- During January, Meier's Albuquerque home was broken into and bugged.

- During February, there was a break-in at Meier's room at the Marriott Hotel in New York.

- During March, two additional Albuquerque break-ins were made at Meier's campaign offices.

- Meier's Senate campaign ran from January 11 to June 6, 1972. Less than two weeks before the break-in at Watergate, he lost the primary, his campaign in a shambles.

The situation was beginning to get out of hand for Hughes, the CIA and the White House. Even for them, it was an awfully active schedule of larceny.

The three groups had many worries in common. They also had in common E.

Howard Hunt, inasmuch as he was employed by Bennett, had been one of the CIA's top clandestine talents and was in 1971 on a daily retainer of \$100 from the White House to do special projects. Liddy had worked with Hunt before. By late 1971, he was doing "law-enforcement" work for the White House. He had a flair for wild schemes, guns, fast cars and planes. It was Liddy who originally proposed to Mitchell the brutal tactics for sabotaging the Democratic campaign (such as hiring a yacht full of prostitutes to lure Democrats into compromising situations).

Hunt and Liddy had planned to drug Anderson to make him incoherent during a public appearance and thereby discredit him. Every time someone got close to the Hughes connection, he was bugged or burglarized or discredited.

By the spring of 1972, militaristic security actions had become almost a day-to-day business for Hunt, Liddy and their associates. There were at least two failed attempts to break into Watergate (Liddy, in his typical style, had even suggested shooting out a streetlight to give the break-in team the cover of darkness for a job aimed at McGovern's headquarters). Then in late May, the plumbers, under the direction of Hunt and Liddy, entered the Democratic National Headquarters in Watergate for the first time. They placed electronic bugging devices, which were monitored from the Howard Johnson's across the street and reduced to memo form.

In the process of scrambling to re-establish some semblance of security, the White House, the agency and the Hughes organization also found O'Brien worrisome. His old relationship with Maheu and his friends' conversations with Meier could be providing the Democrats with some unbeatable ammunition for the election. Maheu and Meier could also threaten the integrity of America's largest covert-operations front. The plumbers had already been in the Watergate once in May. There were so many taps in place already, it was probably not even considered a very important job to place a couple of eavesdropping devices on the phones of O'Brien and one of his assistants, R. Spencer Oliver, Jr. (whose father worked for Bennett at Mullen & Company), and to photograph some documents at the same time.

Liddy, Hunt, the agency, the Hughes organization, the White House all regarded it by that time as just part of business as usual. And the June 17 Watergate break-in would have been just another small job—a repeat performance, in fact—in the process of finding out just what was going on with Meier, Maheu, O'Brien, Greenspun, Anderson—the entire nexus of the Hughes connection and the mass of information swirling around it. It would have been just another step if the burglars hadn't been caught. That

opened the floodgates. During the next year, the only thing to do was to head for high ground. But someone had to go down. Someone had to take the blame. The only thing certain at that point was that it wasn't going to be the world's largest CIA cover organization or the CIA itself.

In the following months, different versions of the motive for the burglary would be rolled out: First, it was a group of anti-Castroites who had pulled off the job, believing McGovern to be pro-Castro; then it was a band of overzealous campaign workers pulling a dirty trick on the opposition; and finally, of course, it was a group of plumbers hired directly by the White House. Supposedly, as the drama unfolded, the public would be getting closer and closer to the truth.

But of the three interested parties—the White House, the CIA and the Hughes organization—two of them had the power to ensure that the whole truth never emerge. As the White House portion of the cover-up began to crumble, it would become clear that Nixon could not be saved and would have to be thrown overboard to keep the CIA and Hughes afloat. The attention of the news media would have to be focused on the White House alone—surely a large enough target for tenacious journalists. Robert Bennett, Hughes public-relations man and director of a CIA front, would play a fascinating, complex and mysterious role. He would supply information to a number of newsmen: notably, Bob Woodward. In the following year, Woodward and his partner, Carl Bernstein, would write the stories credited with bringing down the President, stories that would make journalistic history without ever mentioning Hughes or the CIA in any substantive relationship to the motive for the Watergate break-in. In Woodward and Bernstein's two books, which are the most popularly accepted accounts of the Watergate scandal, Howard Hughes's name is mentioned only in passing.

Clearly, Hughes and the CIA were more important than a mere President. They were the magic box in which the country's most sensitive secrets were kept. It had almost come open and those in charge of its security were determined not to let it happen again. The magic box had to be closed once and for all and whoever wasn't inside—God help him.

This is the first of a two-part series. In November, the conclusion: Bennett secretly provides stories to Woodward; Nixon falls, but the CIA succeeds in covering its own tracks; Hughes's death, under circumstances even more suspicious than previously reported, causes Summa and the CIA drastic problems requiring drastic action, including a tentative peace feeler to their old foe, Meier; the scramble behind the scenes for a Hughes will.



Revelations from CIA's Former Korea Chief

Donald Gregg reveals CIA Could Overthrow Park Dictatorship

By Steve McGuire

On October 6, 1976, an upper echelon CIA agent, speaking at the University of Texas, warned that if President Park runs for another six year term, as he is expected to do, he will probably not live to serve out his term. The CIA agent left it open whether the CIA would support a coup against Park like the one in which Diem was assassinated in Vietnam. The agent was Don Gregg whose background for sounding such a warning includes being the CIA chief of station in Korea until last year. Gregg spent 18 of his 25 years in the CIA in Asia. Ten of those years were spent in Japan, the rest in the Marianas, Vietnam, Burma, and Korea.

The occasion for these surprisingly candid remarks was a trip to Austin, Texas to give a lecture for a course on "Policy Makers in Government" directed by Dr. Sidney Weintraub. Gregg had expressed an interest in meeting with foreign students and the Center for Asian Studies was prevailed upon to provide a meeting place.

Gregg had much to say about his work in South Korea and about General Park. He stated that South Korea must depend on the American CIA to provide intelligence information about the North. Gregg personally feels that the best thing which Park could do would be to resign. He could then be a national hero and also be responsible for South Korea's first peaceful change of government. However, the CIA feels that a coup right now might encourage the North to attack, so they continue to provide Park with information about coup attempts. Whether they will continue to do so in the future is unclear.

Gregg had high praise for Lt. General James F. 'Holly' Hollingsworth, former allied commander along the DMZ in Korea. An article which appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* recently (January 13, 1976, p. 1) pictured Hollingsworth as an old-style general whose primal instinct was to kill commies. Hollingsworth claimed that he could end another Korean War in nine days, four days of 'real violence' and five days to clean up. Gregg said he agreed with Hollingsworth's assessment of a nine day war, and stated that the *WSJ* article was an accurate description of Hollingsworth.

Gregg told an 'amusing' story about how the U.S. once caught the South Koreans with sophisticated weaponry which they were not supposed to have. Gregg reported his information to a U.S. Admiral who promptly confronted the Korean Admiral with the charge. Of course the Korean denied it and the U.S. Admiral believed him. The U.S. Admiral then proceeded to chew Gregg out about his 'sources'.

Gregg suggested that aerial surveys be made to see if

the Koreans were building a berth for the weapon. Sure enough they were and the U.S. then confronted the Koreans with the evidence. Gregg evidently thought that placing sophisticated weapons in Korea's hands was real funny. We are lucky that they did not decide to use them.

The CIA evidently wants to keep Park and his boys from getting too far out of hand. They can have their fun as long as they do not get carried away. The CIA was involved in saving the life of an opposition leader in Korea who was on a fast boat headed out for the bay with rocks tied around his feet. In another incident the Korean CIA head was removed after he committed a brutal murder of a professor.

Regarding Cuba, and the attempts to kill Castro by the CIA-backed Mafia hit men, Gregg said that he once asked why Richard Helms failed to tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots against Castro. Gregg was told that Helms kept quiet because Bobby Kennedy knew about the attempts but said nothing, so Helms did likewise.

Gregg characterized Kissinger as a man who likes intelligence information. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Kissinger has been one of the CIA's most 'avid customers'. Kissinger disliked the CIA during the Vietnam War because they kept telling Kissinger that the South Vietnamese were going to lose. The CIA was a major source of information during the Angolan conflict. Gregg stated that the CIA was only involved in a reporting role until after Cuba became involved. However, in order to get into Angola to provide reports, as Gregg put it, training some military troops was a quid pro quo for being allowed near the action.

Gregg claimed ignorance of the rumors that Saipan was a major nuclear weapons base. He said that the Marianas were not overflowing with CIA men, and that the CIA was not involved in squelching dissent on the islands.

From 1953 to 1963, Gregg was involved in covert activities in Japan. Japan was a case where, as Gregg put it, the CIA 'did their job right'. Apparently meaning that the radical left opposition, such as the Communist Party of Japan, was kept from acquiring popular support. The CIA, employing one of their favorite techniques, provided support for moderate left opposition parties such as the Socialists and the Social Democrats. While engaged in these covert activities, Gregg was employed as a civilian working for the Department of Army and an employee of the American Embassy. Later, Gregg worked directly with the Japanese police.

Between the years 1970 to 1972, Gregg served in Vietnam, where he began his CIA career in 1952. He was the head of Bien Hoa section, but made no mention of

Operation Phoenix.

Regarding CIA involvement in the overthrow of Allende's regime in Chile, Gregg said that the election of a Marxist in South America posed a threat to the U.S. government's design for South America. It was essential that Allende be overthrown as a lesson to other Third World countries that the U.S. will not tolerate any Communist governments which it feels threaten U.S. interests.

On international terrorism Gregg felt that Libya was the 'patron saint' of the terrorists. According to Gregg, Libya appears to be the country which is providing a substantial part of the financial and moral support for the terrorists throughout the world.

After the general meeting with Don Gregg a number of professors gathered in the plush surroundings of the University of Texas faculty club for a cocktail party. Don Gregg and Bill Wood served as both the guests of honor and the hosts. After drinks someone asks, "Whats your sign, Don?"

"Sagittarius," he said.

"I knew it, a fire sign, a sign of adventure."

Don adds, "I don't regret my twenty-five years in the C.I.A. After all, what did the rest of my classmates do in that time, just divorces and dull jobs. I joined up because it was the thing to do at that time."

In the midst of the polite chit-chat the C.I.A. gets down to "brass tacks". Dr. Jannuzzi, director of the Center for Asian Studies, is collared and given the hard sell, to allow the C.I.A. to train their people at the Center. Jannuzzi equivocates a bit, "We can't give them any special treatment. Wouldn't a place nearer Virginia be more convenient?" Nervous at the obvious jeopardy in which such an arrangement would put the reputation of the Center, he apparently resists their blandishments.

Dr. Sidney Weintraub, who had invited Don Gregg to speak at the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs, catches people to remind everyone of the excellent opportunity to meet and interact with policy makers. Dr. Weintraub had been

approached twice by Bill Wood with the offer of a speaker from the C.I.A. including one time shortly after Weintraub's arrival (Fall 1976).

Bill Wood, the personnel director of the local C.I.A. office is everywhere with a cherry hello and a, "I don't believe we've met." No one escapes being asked: "Do you think this sort of thing is worth while?" The universal answer is affirmative, although some for different reasons than others.

The process, begun earlier, in the afternoon, discussion session of stressing the idea that the C.I.A. is basically an "alright" group of people devoted to peace and democracy, continues unabated. There might have been occasional cases of overzealousness but now the "company" has matured.

The less public process of establishing liaison with the academic community engaged in foreign area studies also continues unabated. The foreign area studies centers represent valuable sources of training and expertise to the C.I.A. and the centers are highly dependent upon an always uncertain grant funding. Grant support is a powerful inducement even when balanced against the pall of suspicion that would accrue in due time to all of the center's associates and students. That this might be morally wrong, that area specialists should not be agents of a particular government, and that they may be accordingly shut out of their countries of interest, is not brought up.

Bill Wood, always his effervescent self, attempts to recruit where possible, "When you get to the job hunting stage give me a call down at the Federal Building." In general, the urbane, sophisticated approach seems to have an almost narcotic effect on the fascinated faculty.

In conclusion, Gregg maintained that the CIA, throughout its history, was only doing what it was told to do. This includes both the 'legal and illegal' acts which the CIA committed in the name of democracy. After all, Gregg noted, the CIA is really in the 'people business'. We know that, and that's what bothers us, because we do not know which people.

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to carry out similar, if less ideologically complete, political actions.

Early in June 1972, acting on a series of tips, police trapped most key members of the Red Army Fraction; Baader, Raspe, and another leader Holger Meins, were captured in a dawn raid on their Frankfurt hiding place and Ensslin was apprehended while shopping in a Hamburg store.

On June 15, Fritz Roderwald, in whose house Meinhof had been hiding, called the police inspector in charge of the Hanover Baader Meinhof Kommando (a force resembling American SWAT teams in most German cities) and turned her in. Roderwald, a 33-year-old teacher, came to regret his decision and turned over the reward money he received to the Jirike Meinhof Defense Fund. According to the police, Meinhof and her co-

prison conditions described as "inadequate" to "purposefully cruel."

One woman died from cancer because prison doctors refused to diagnose her symptoms. Holger Meins died from inadequate medical attention during forced feeding after a long hunger strike by RAF prisoners. Meinhof and others were subjected to "sensory deprivation"—a new form of torture, in specialized cells, preventing all human contact. Many people have recurring hallucinations from such treatment. Meinhof herself was in a sensory deprivation cell for one six-month period and then again for two weeks last Christmas, but by all accounts had a tough mind.

But the RAF organized inside the dozen jails the government sent them to. Meinhof continued to influence the European left and it is for this reason

Chancellor Schmidt's words after Meinhof's arrest when he called Meinhof and the Red Army Fraction "the most serious challenge in the 26-year history of our democracy."

CounterSpy editor Winslow Peck, contributing editor Philip Agee, and two former Military Intelligence officers, K. Barton Osborn and Gary Thomas, were the first witnesses called by the defense in Meinhof's trial last summer. They tried to testify on the use of German soil for the conduct of the war in Indochina. The defense hoped it might mitigate the sentences of Meinhof and her companions who were moved to protest U.S. aggression in Vietnam. But the court's president prevented the testimony and said it would only assist the "terrorists." He further ruled that there could be no defense whatsoever in a case such as this.

C.I.A. Official Calls Park's Government a Threat to U.S. Asian Interests

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22—The former station chief of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Korea, Donald Gregg, has asserted that the Government of President Park Chung Hee is inherently unstable and, therefore, jeopardizes American interests there.

According to sources who heard Mr. Gregg address a class in East Asian studies at the University of Texas last October, the C.I.A. official said that President Park's regime was repressive and that he had found many aspects of it personally offensive.

Administration Policy Noted

Mr. Gregg, the sources said, contended that any such regime built on repression could not last long. But he was said not to have put any time limit on the issue or to have suggested how Mr. Park's Government might fall.

Mr. Gregg's remarks paralleled those of a senior State Department official who argued in a confidential report several years ago that the United States was working itself into a dangerous position by continuing to support the Park Gov-

ernment. He recommended that Washington slowly disengage itself.

The policy of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, however, has been to continue full support of President Park on the ground that any other course might undermine Korean security and thus American national interests in East Asia.

According to the Texas sources, Mr. Gregg also said that the C.I.A. had a close working relationship with the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in training and in operations directed against North Korea. He was reported, however, to have said that he did not like the implications of that close relationship.

Mr. Gregg denied in a telephone interview that he knew of alleged K.C.I.A. operations in the United States but said that he was shocked by the ease with which Korean largesse was accepted on Capitol Hill and then rationalized away.

Magazine Reported Remarks

He declined, however, to repeat the substance of his Texas remarks. He said that he saw no purpose in it and that he was under instructions by his agency not to repeat them. He added that there had been a lot of pressure from the Korean Government on the issue. No spokes-

man was available at the Korean Embassy for comment.

A C.I.A. spokesman said that Mr. Gregg had nothing further to communicate on the matter even though his remarks in Texas had become known.

He was the agency's station chief in Seoul from mid-1973 until earlier this year, through the period in which President Park imposed increasingly restrictive rules on his nation. Mr. Gregg is currently working at the agency's headquarters outside Washington.

A brief account of Mr. Gregg's remarks appeared in the December issue of CounterSpy magazine, a radical publication that tries to expose the C.I.A. That article asserted that Mr. Gregg had predicted President Park would not live to serve out another six-year term if he were re-elected in 1978.

He was also reported to have said that the best thing Mr. Park could do for his nation was to resign and open the way for a peaceful change of government.

The C.I.A. spokesman said the CounterSpy account was "inaccurate and disorted." But he refused to say in what respect.

Although Mr. Gregg was said to have presented his personal views to the class in Texas, those views presumably showed up in his reports from Seoul to Washington. He was said to have referred to President Park's Government as a dictatorship that he personally found offensive and one that had sown the seeds of its own dissolution.

In another development today, the Korean Residents Association of Greater Washington issued a statement calling on President Park to halt all illegal K.C.I.A. activities in this country, to disclose the names of the American politicians alleged to have been bribed by Korean agents and to return to a democratic national order.

A spokesman for the association, which represents about 20,000 Koreans living in this area, said that copies of the statement would be sent to the White House, all Senators and Representatives, American mass media and to President Park, the K.C.I.A., and the National Assembly in Seoul.

The spokesman said that Koreans living here had been "disappointed and shocked" by the allegations of Korean bribery of members of Congress.

MALICIOUS

Open

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

(Editor's Note: The following is primarily a review of the book, and does not purport to examine the possibility or extent of Soviet involvement in Agee's actions, from the start or at an early stage.)

INSIDE THE COMPANY: CIA DIARY. By Philip Agee. (Penguin Books, 1975.)

Philip Agee's 600-page story of his career and views as a junior and middle-level case officer in Quito, Montevideo, and Mexico City will anger all those who have worked for the Central Intelligence Agency because he is its first real defector in the classic sense of the word. Though it is unlikely that he could be successfully prosecuted in a cold or at least cooling war, in a hotter context Agee would fall into the area which the Constitution, speaking of enemies in time of war, defines as "giving them aid and comfort." In any case *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* will certainly give aid and comfort to any one looking for concrete and heretofore classified information about some aspects of the Clandestine Service. Unlike previous information about CIA operations made available by Victor Marchetti and others who have claimed to have had the best interests of the country at heart, this book aims, Mr. Agee says, to get "useful information on the CIA to revolutionary organizations that could use it."

Agee begins with an account of his recruitment in 1959 and his training in the Career Trainee program. His 50-page recitation of the instruction he received is an accurate description of the intelligence community, the CIA structure, and the doctrines, tradecraft, and terms of the Clandestine Service. He then devotes 216 pages to his tour of duty in the Embassy in Quito, 1960-1963, almost as many pages to Montevideo, 1964-1966, and 64 pages to his final tour in Mexico City, 1966-1968. He introduces each of his three tours with the headquarters appreciation of the local operating climate, a description of the political parties, and, except for Mexico, the CIA's objectives in the area (the Related Mission Directives). His most thorough revelation of sensitive information is given in his accurate descriptions of each station's operations under identifying cryptonym.

After establishing this very complete background, Agee publishes what appear to be chronological diary entries which describe his operations and their progress, other station operations, and new operational initiatives as they developed. However, whatever factual information may have been contained in his actual diary, the entries now have been expanded to include the historical, political and economic contexts of his operations as he now views those contexts since leaving the Agency. Thus, what we have in this book is not a diary of the period, but an account of that period interpreted after four years of subsequent research, and evaluated by very different ideas and attitudes than those he held at the time. Agee makes no attempt to conceal his methods of composition, but what he presents in the form and rhetoric of his restructured recollections is a "diary" that sounds more authoritative, comprehensive, and intelligible than any diary actually kept by a professional in similar circumstances could possibly have been.

Agee's personal story as he now sets it forth is that, upon joining the Agency as a "patriot dedicated to the preservation of my country and our way of life," he readily accepted the policy that some covert extension of the national effort to counter

Communist expansion was desirable in order to allow political forces to evolve a better society. He finished his three and one half years in Quito in tune with the station program. He wanted to resign by the end of his Montevideo assignment, however, because—he says—he arrived slowly at the conclusion that the U.S. role in Latin America, while superficially well intended, perpetuated injustice rather than reducing it. In Mexico City his increasing dissent amounts to defection. After resigning from the Agency in Mexico City, he cast about for other employment. His need to earn a living became acute, and the writing of this book appears to have been a solution to that problem. In the last and briefest part of the book he shares some of his new economic views on Latin America and describes some of his steps and problems between 1970 and 1974 in preparing and publishing his "diary."

The effect of the publication of the classified information in his book is clearest in its damaging impact on CIA's activities and persons with whom it dealt in Ecuador, Uruguay, and Mexico. Those whose interests lie in identifying and neutralizing U.S. covert action will find it useful, especially the alphabetized Appendix of 429 names and descriptions of "CIA Employees, Agents, Collaborators and Organizations," largely in Latin America. He does not discuss specific projects or identify agents in other geographic areas, though some of the text could be used to identify operations outside Latin America, such as CIA's international security cooperation, Labor, Division D, and UN operations. His description of the Clandestine Service's *modus operandi* is valid outside Latin America, and Agee is said to be working on a larger project describing CIA activities all over the world. I would assume that he has prepared a long extension of the Appendix name list, with the new title of "Probable and possible CIA employees, Agents, Collaborators and organizations," and that such a list would be extremely useful to other intelligence organizations. However, I would judge that most Latin readers will perceive his revelations in context with the Soviet and other nations' activities and within the concrete realities of their own continuing struggles, and that they will express no broad new surge of moral revulsion against the U.S. The book's main achievement is to provide the Communists and extreme Left with specific knowledge of CIA's Latin American operations and insight into CIA *modus operandi* in order to permit them to counter U.S. and particular CIA actions. As such, it will doubtless make the required reading list of the KGB mid-career course. The book will, of course, disillusion some U.S. readers and will doubtless be used to support some "causes." It may also, however, educate the broader public beneficially on the subject of secret intelligence.

The book will affect the CIA as a severe body blow does any living organism: some parts obviously will be affected more than others, but the health of the whole is bound to suffer. A considerable number of CIA personnel must be diverted from their normal duties to undertake the meticulous and time-consuming task of repairing the damage done to its Latin American program, and to see what can be done to help those injured by the author's revelations.

Agee's knowledge of local personalities and history is impressive. I have no great quarrel with his reporting and analysis of events, though I remain uneasy as to the extent of the bias introduced into his recollections from 1970-1974 by his research in institutions in Mexico City, Havana, Paris and London, as well as by his strong, but not ultimately clear, attitudes and feelings about his own past or the world about him. Nor do I fault his concern (shared by the U.S. Government) for the unequal distribution of income in Latin America, a point he returns to frequently. I can even stay with him as he claims that U.S. policies do not always deal fully with injustices.

Apart from a subtle pervasive imbalance in judgment stemming from the fact he writes his book long after his conversion, other problems arise because his economic analysis is stereotypically Marxist. He gives undue emphasis to the reporting of violence. He is over-impressed with the possible impact of CIA operations on public affairs. Out of the factual material he provides, someone else might have written a critique of the Alliance for Progress which might have favorable influence on U.S. policy. With only hints as to the depth of his dissatisfaction, however, he sets forth on page 503 a fantasied letter to the Director, in which he says, "Our (the U.S.) only alternatives are to continue to support injustice or withdraw and let the cards fall by themselves . . . it is clear that the only real solutions are those advocated by the Communists and others of the extreme left . . ."

Rather than "withdraw and let the cards fall by themselves," he takes an emotional leap, committing his personal energy to use the knowledge he has come to possess against the value structure he has been part of. However, he is not really interested in telling us much about this. His account in the last part from his defection to the publishing of his book is sanitized and as devoid of the names of those he dealt with as the earlier parts are full of them. That he omits part of his story is patent. One assumes that when he visited Havana he received editorial assistance from the Cubans and Soviets, but how much is, of course, not clear.

This book will not be of as much interest to Agee's former colleagues in the Agency as he might imagine. Agee gives no professional account of operations, *per se*, judgments in the inception of operations, agent motivations, or the effectiveness of different operations. Nor does he consider or speculate about CIA thinking and judgment at operational echelons higher than his junior level. He provides little insight into his relations with colleagues and agents, nor is he candid enough about his tergiversation to be thought-provoking. Such additions, larded with a little humor, would have made it the best-yet story of life as a case officer. As for the themes which would surely attract serious writers on this topic, he sheds no fresh light on human behavior, international relations or the role of intelligence in a democracy. Nor does he give us any good reading on our paramount interest—why (and how), after becoming disenchanted with his work, does a case officer fully aware of Soviet history and practice, take the course of acknowledged betrayal?

Agee appears personally to have been compatible with his colleagues as a case officer, to have competed well with his peers, and to have held a conventional political outlook. He observed in an alleged diary entry dated 1968 that he feels "unsure about finding satisfactory work inside the same system rejected long ago as a university student." Yet after college he appears to have stayed in the system, joining the CIA for patriotic reasons, involving himself in sophisticated political operations, and as he puts it, becoming one of capitalism's secret police. In Mexico in 1971 he reports a further change in his political views (page 564) saying, "The key to adopting increasingly radical views has been my fuller comprehension of the class divisions of capitalistic society based on property . . . that class identity comes before nationality. . . ." This time he decides to take action ". . . to name all the names and organizations connected with CIA operations . . . to convey them to revolutionary organizations that could use it to defend themselves better." He expresses neither pleasure nor concern that this step carries with it his rejection of his colleagues and country. He certainly emerges as a person with shallow attachments.

In addition to rejecting the political system he had been a part of, Agee earlier had rejected going into his family business, had left law school after three months,

and left his wife and later his girl friend. He says in January 1971 "I begin again after a year of great disappointment and sense of failure. My hopes for a new start and future in Mexico were clouded with the failure of my marriage plans, and I am unsure of my direction. The reasons are a complex series of mistakes, perhaps even unrealistic hopes from the beginning, but with results too damaging to overcome." Whether one's hopes are realistic or unrealistic, the pain and anger caused by recurring disappointments are intense and pervasive, yet he is inarticulate about his deep sense of personal injury. He gropes to express his values associated with defection in these words:

"There is a contradiction in what I am doing but I don't have much choice given the plans we have and our need for income. One has to take the realistic view: in order to fulfill responsibilities you have to compromise with the system knowing full well that the system doesn't work for everybody. This means everybody has to get what he can within decency's limits—which can be stretched when needed to assure a little more security. What I have to do now is get mine, inside the system and forget I ever worked for the CIA. No, there's no use trying to change the system. What happened at the Plaza of the Three Cultures is happening all over the world to people trying to change the system. Life is too short and has too many delights that might be missed. At thirty-three I've got half a life time to enjoy them."

He gives up any pretension to idealism. Is this not the mercenary saying "Because I find there is no use in trying to change an iniquitous system, I shall become iniquitous myself in order to obtain the satisfactions I desire"? Like other adolescents of the 1960s who have vented their impatient and frustrated idealism in destructive acts, Agee, out of touch with his deeper feelings, vents his rage and displays a towering arrogance. By virtue of the trust placed in him, he damages more than himself.

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Tomorrow

STATION WRCB-TV
NBC Network

DATE January 30, 1975 1:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

Philip Agee Interview
~~FULL TEXT~~

TOM SNYDER: ...And he is the author of a book which is called "Inside The Company -- The CIA Diary."

Those of you who watch this program by habit know that I rarely, if ever, hold up books, but I can hold this one up because you can't buy it in the United States and, as you know by now, we're doing this interview in Toronto, Canada, through the facilities of CTV, Canadian Television.

Mr. Agee, why did I have to come here to interview you? Why could we not have done this in New York City?

PHILIP AGEE: Mainly because I have had advice to -- to stay out of the United States until after the book is published there by Mel Wolfe, who is the Legal Director of the ACLU.

SNYDER: Does the fact that you've named names of CIA agents, and that you tell stories about your activities in countries other than the United States, does that have anything to do with your reluctance to go on television in the United States?

AGEE: No, there's no reluctance to go on television in the United States. There's reluctance to go back until I get the right advice to -- to...

SNYDER: I -- I'm still going forward with this. There's no danger of reprisal. You're not going to get shot in the head if you fly into New York City and do a television show, or Washington...

AGEE: No -- no, it's simply a matter of following the proper procedures so that the book will not be suppressed in the United States. This is why it's being published first outside the country -- that is in the U.K., and in Canada -- to

be followed shortly in the United States, I hope. Of course the government could suppress it if they tried, but it would be ridiculous if --if the book is available all over the world and not in the United States.

SNYDER: But it is -- it is your feeling, the feeling of your literary agents, your attorneys, the ACLU, that there would be a conscious effort on the part of the government of the United States to suppress parts of this book, to censor it, to make it impossible for the American people to buy it and learn what's in there.

AGEE: Well don't forget that the secrecy around CIA activities is not to keep them secret from the Soviets, because they're obvious to the Soviets. It's to keep them secret from the American public. That's why I wrote the book.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

In New York, I heard a line the other day at a cigarette counter. They were talking about Nelson Rockefeller and the commission which will now investigate the possibility of domestic spying on the part of the CIA, and the line went, "Having Rockefeller investigate the CIA is much like having the Mafia's books examined by their own accountants." How do you feel about that line?

AGEE: I think that's a -- that's a -- that's a very plausible line, I would agree. Certainly, Rockefeller is a recipient of CIA services.

The first job that I had in CIA after my training was over was to run name checks in headquarters. Name checks are a check of all the files in order to find any derogatory political information that may exist in those files. And the procedure was this: The Creole Petroleum Company which, as you know, is a -- is a very major subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

SNYDER: I must confess to you that I did not know that.

AGEE: Oh, you didn't?

SNYDER: No.

AGEE: Well, it's a -- it's a major peg or foundation of the Rockefeller family fortune, and the Creole office in Caracas would pass the names of the prospective Venezuelan employees to the CIA station in the U.S. Embassy in Caracas. They would forward the names up to headquarters. I would receive these names and make all the checks. Where political or derogatory

political information existed, I would then forward this back to Caracas. They would pass it back to the Creole people and, of course, those Venezuelans wouldn't be hired.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: And in this sense, certainly Rockefeller and his family -- the -- the economic base of the family fortune were recipients of the CIA services, and it had been going on for many years, and I would assume it still goes on today.

SNYDER: Now, can you define for me what is improper about having an American business interest use the investigative services of the CIA for political screening purposes?

AGEE: Well, from their point of view, it's -- that's why CIA exists. CIA, when you come right down to it, is -- is nothing more than the secret political police of these companies, American multinational corporations.

So...

SNYDER: We are told that the CIA operates to protect the -- the interests of the United States of America around the world, and to maintain our national security. You are saying to me that the CIA is a political operative tool which is used by American corporations in conducting their operations in countries other than the United States. Now...

AGEE: Oh, yes, I am. Yes. Because you will have to go back and take it...

SNYDER: I mean, is that the prime purpose of the CIA, to...

AGEE: It has several purposes. This certainly is one of the major purposes, and this is where most of the money and the personnel go.

CIA, according to the official version, was founded in order to prevent another Pearl Harbor, and in order to bring to bear all the expertise in order to produce national intelligence. But this gets into a discussion of what is the national security. If you think that there is one set of criteria for the national security of the United States which apply to all the people of the United States, then I'd like for you to tell me, because I don't think there is.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: But beyond that, with regard to the application of the CIA in the -- around the world, particularly in Third World countries, I think you have to take a historical approach, and that is to recall that the CIA was founded right after World War II when the major problem facing the United States was how to avoid a return to the depression -- unemployment of the 1930s.

During the first six months after World War II, production in the United States went down, unemployment quintupled, and the problem was how to find foreign markets for our excess production, and to export capital. So we subsidized the rebuilding of European economies for this purpose.

CIA came into the picture in order to destroy the Left in Europe, particularly in Italy and France, and in order to promote Christian democracies so that the Left Wing parties and organizations which had been the backbone to the resistance to Fascism could be deprived of participation in government. This was the very first entry of CIA, really, into this type of political action abroad. Since then, of course...

SNYDER: And commercial venturism then as well?

AGEE: Oh, yes. Well they -- they were there to secure those markets for American companies.

Now -- now in the Third World, which are primarily sources of -- primary products for the American economy, the purpose of CIA has been to insure that the optimum conditions -- that optimum conditions will exist for the operations of those countries in those countries in order to get these raw materials that we lack in the United States as cheaply as possible.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: So that's how you get CIA operating in Indonesia, in Brazil, in Chile, in Guatemala, in so many countries. The list just doesn't have an end, practically.

SNYDER: Now I want to go back to Nelson Rockefeller using -- or the Rockefeller family. Let's be quite specific on that, because I don't think either one of us know if Nelson Rockefeller, in fact, said, "I want the CIA report on such and such before the Creole Petroleum Company," or whatever it is, "hires this person or for whatever we're going to do with this person." But it is your feeling that the Rockefeller family and the Rockefeller business interests use the CIA for their own purposes in political screenings?

AGEE: Oh, no, I didn't say that.

SNYDER: You did not?

AGEE: No. I said that the -- the system was to keep out political undesirables from employment from the Creole Petroleum company in Venezuela. But there's no telling what else was going on. Certainly if it's used in that form it could be used in any -- many different forms.

CIA, for example, has -- has a section which provides biographic data and sheets on thousands of foreigners, and certainly when Rockefeller goes on a trip -- long before now, when he was -- when he is Vice President -- but he would be provided with -- with biographic data and political background on the people he was going to meet. This happens routinely.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: And...

SNYDER: Would this have been given to him at his request, or would it simply have been done as a matter of course for a political dignitary visiting a foreign country?

AGEE: Either way I don't think it makes any difference one way or the other. But...

SNYDER: It does make a difference if, in fact, because Mr. Rockefeller is now saying he will get to the bottom of the CIA domestic spying possibilities no matter what the political implications. So I think that whatever his past use of the CIA is, or his family's use, I think is quite important at this point.

AGEE: Well certainly he's compromised from the start. Obviously he's -- don't expect anything from that commission, I tell you.

SNYDER: No, wait a minute.

AGEE: On the other hand, the -- the -- well, because all of those people are -- are clearly part of the process of what's been going on in American foreign policy.

SNYDER: Who should be on that commission? Maybe you should be on it.

AGEE: Well, I think they ought to have some of the -- some of the leaders of the minority communities in the United States on it, because those are the people who, when CIA works to secure the Rockefeller Foundation, for example, they're also securing the poverty of these other people in the United States because of the way the pie is divided in the United States. After all, forty million people are living in poverty in the United States,

and -- and unemployment is going up all the time. This relates directly to the concentration of wealth in the United States in income.

So -- so that's why I get back to this question of national security and all. And these are very clearly Establishment people who are on this committee -- this Rockefeller committee.

On the other hand, the Senate committee may get somewhere. Who knows? It depends on just how hard they want to probe.

SNYDER: You know, had the -- the thought that I expressed to you before we cranked up the cameras here -- how can I be certain because you, after all, were an agent for the CIA. You were trained by the CIA. And heaven only knows how a Notre Dame boy got involved by the CIA. Maybe that's another story. But how can anybody be certainly, Philip, that you are not still a CIA operative, that this book is a cover to take attention away from something else, and to refocus the -- the energies of the people? How can we be sure about that?

AGEE: Well you can only be sure if you read it, I think. That -- that would be my answer, because you'll see whether -- after you read it -- whether you think it could possibly be of any use to CIA. This book is an attempt to weaken the agency. It's an attempt to create a consciousness in the United States, because it's principally written for the United States reader as well as many others, but you will see that it can only be damaging to -- to the -- to...

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

And it is coincidental that its appearance or, let's say, its forthcoming appearance on the American market -- it is coincidental that the timing of its appearance and the timing of a great public occupation now with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency within the United States occurring at the same time. That is all coincidental?

AGEE: It...

SNYDER: (Laughs).

AGEE: IT's sheer coincidence exactly, because, you see, I've been working on this for five years. It took me five years to write it, because I had to go back and research in order to reconstruct...

SNYDER: Sure.

AGEE: ...and the events that happened, then show our participation in them, you see, and place all of this in the -- which is most important -- into the context of the political and social injustices that they reinforced...

SNYDER: You identify yourself in this book, and you will probably do some more identification of yourself in this program as a man who operated in the foreign sphere. You were not involved in the domestic operations, if there are any, of the CIA.

AGEE: No.

SNYDER: So this will be a speculative question. There is a concern that the CIA spied unlawfully on some of the American people. Do you think that could have happened?

AGEE: Absolutely. Yes.

SNYDER: Who would the people be that would be spied upon besides the obvious senators and congressmen?

AGEE: Well, they would be the people who provided a threat, who constituted a threat, at any one moment to the same interests for which CIA is working abroad. For example, if -- if a -- if the leaders of American industry for example, received an internal threat within the United States they'll use whatever tools are at hand to suppress that threat and if CIA happens to be around and can devote energy, time and money to that problem then, of course, they're going to use it regardless of the law.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: But up until these -- just these most recent revelations I didn't know about that. But the important point to be made on the CIA in the United States is not so much this list of ten thousand people which really isn't very much, and my suspicion is that most of those cases will be related in this investigation to some foreign aspect.

But the most important thing about CIA and the domestic situation is that the activities of the FBI, the military intelligence, now CIA, and this whole Watergate episode represent to me the application within the United States, finally, of the same techniques which the CIA has been employing abroad for going on thirty years, and it was only inevitable that these would finally come home.

Now before no one would have thought that they would have been applied in the United States because we've -- we felt that morality changed when we crossed our national frontiers.

SNYDER: Right.

AGEE: But now we see that when the threat did occur in the United States, or which seemed to have occurred during the 1960s, well of course these methods were applied right at home.

SNYDER: Uh-huh. And we're no better than the rest of them if we -- if we maintain that philosophy about morality improves as we come back home to the United States.

AGEE: Well, I think that was a hypocritical approach right from the beginning, because if you look at certain aspects of American society you see that there is -- we don't always practice what we preach. So I think it was consistent that they do be applied in the United States eventually.

SNYDER: If there were a reporter, a network journalist, a network correspondent who uncovered some story which documented once and for all the CIA engaging in unlawful intelligence gathering operations on the American people, would that person be subject to any kind of reprisal by the CIA?

AGEE: Ah...

SNYDER: Would the CIA try to silence that person?

AGEE: Well if they could do it before, they might try it. But trying to do it after the fact serves no real purpose. It only raises greater risks for more scandal for CIA.

SNYDER: They aren't that stupid, are they?

AGEE: Well, let's not...

SNYDER: (Laughs).

AGEE: ...Let's not say that. Let's not overestimate their...

SNYDER: The intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We will continue with Mr. Agee after these announcements. I hope you will all stay tuned.

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(Slight delay in returning to network).

...In Canada with Mr. Philip Agee, who is the author of a book entitled "Inside The Company -- The CIA Diary", and I caution you at the outset, as I did before, that this book is not yet available within the United States of America. But maybe

some night if I can -- am I allowed to take this back across....

AGEE: Yes.

SNYDER: ...Across the border?

AGEE: Yes, of course.

SNYDER: Well maybe I'll read a little to you all some night (laughs) if it's never on sale there.

This is the first book to name CIA agents and operatives. I -- I looked through this just a couple of seconds ago before we came on the air, and one of the names in here caught my eye, and that name is George Meany, who is the President of the AFL-CIO. And if I can find it here... "George Meany, President, American Federation of Labor, principal CIA agent and collaborator in U.S. trade union movement for the purpose of CIA international labor operations." Now I never knew that George Meany was a CIA agent and collaborator.

AGEE: Well, I think a lot of other people did.

SNYDER: But you know?

AGEE: Oh, yes. In our training program, for example, back in 1959-1960, we were trained in all the different types of operations which CIA undertakes. Among those is our trade union operations, labor operations. The labor operations are executed through quite a number of facilities and mechanisms, but one of the principal ones of those are the international organization. That is the -- principally, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels, and what is known as the International Trade Secretariats, which are unions grouping the workers in particular industries, as transport, public employees, et cetera.

SNYDER: All right.

AGEE: Whereas the other is a geographic thing. And the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which is the ICFTU, has its regionals, like in the Western Hemisphere, et cetera...

SNYDER: And I know you're getting to how George Meany got...

AGEE: Exactly.

SNYDER: ...a hand in this.

AGEE: Yes. Well, part of this training...

SNYDER: Because George, I'm sure, will be interested in hearing this.

AGEE: ...part -- part of the training, of course, was to tell us how it all worked. And the CIA hand in this for control and for manipulation and for funding was exercised through Mr. Meany, through Jay Lovestone, who handled his foreign activities, and through the regional representatives, such as Ervin Brown in Europe, and Seraphino Rumandi(?) in Latin America.

Now this was taught to us in the training programs. In addition to that, I took a special -- that was a course when which all of us were getting...

SNYDER: Oriented.

AGEE: ...Oriented.

SNYDER: Okay.

AGEE: Now I had a specialist course in 1960 just before I went to Ecuador, which I was forced to take, on trade union operations. Now we -- we rehearsed many of the things that had been taught in the general course, because this other course, this specialist course was for men who had been serving in operations for many years, and who were going to be working in trade union operators abroad. They were just going out.

This course went into even more detail than the earlier ones. And we even had a -- had a lecture there by a CIA agent who ran the International Federation of Petroleum and Chemical Workers. That is one of the -- one of the international trade secretariats. It groups the petroleum workers all around the world.

SNYDER: Can you tell me...

AGEE: Let -- let me tell you about this one.

The CIA founded that union. Its headquarters is in Denver, and the Secretary-General of the Union, Lloyd Haskins, came and lectured to us right in the CIA building, see. He was a CIA employee, you see. This is how CIA gets into the trade union field.

SNYDER: What would George Meany do as a CIA collaborator? Can he give...

(Confusion of voices)

SNYDER: ...instructions, for example?

AGEE: Yes. And don't -- don't get the idea that he was working as a puppet for the CIA, because there's a community of interest there, and it wasn't that CIA was ordering him or that he was ordering CIA. These are -- the decisions for action, of course, would be taken in discussions and decisions reached, sometimes not reached, if there is disagreement.

SNYDER: Do you say, "Hey, George, are we going to set up a trade union in Venezuela?"

AGEE: Well, for example, yes. The setting up of the American Federation -- the American Institute for Free Labor Development is an example. This was set up in the early 1960s under Kennedy at a time when the CIA and the AID trade union operations were not considered to be sufficiently successful in Latin America.

The American Institute for Free Labor Development was set up in Washington. It still has its headquarters there with branch offices in most Latin American countries. It is called an adult education institute in free -- so-called free trade unionism. It's a vast operation.

Now in this case, Mr. Meany was -- was -- was put in, or he went in as the chief of that organization. It was a mixed board of directors, with people like Peter Grace and other industrialists...

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: ...As well as trade union leaders. But the president of it was George Meany. Now in this -- this is an example of how he would serve as a collaborator, because it was a CIA thing from the start. It probably still is today.

SNYDER: Would Mr. Meany get money from the CIA for this?

AGEE: No, I wouldn't think so. Does he need it? If he needed it, of course he would, yes.

SNYDER: (Laughs).

AGEE: He probably didn't need it.

SNYDER: You did not work in the domestic area. You worked in the foreign area, and I think it might be helpful if you just gave me a thumbnail sketch of what it is you did. Did you kill people? Did you train agents? Did you hire agents? All of those things? Some of those things, or none of those things?

AGEE: Well, first of all, I'm in Ecuador. I take Ecuador because then I went to Uruguay and then to Mexico.

Now in -- in Ecuador, I worked principally in operations to penetrate the Left Wing movements there, the Communist Party, and related groups, efforts to prop up the local government by support and financing and guidance and training and equipping of the police, political action operations, propaganda operations -- this is where we would put stories in newspapers. We had editorialists who would be paid on a piece work basis.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

Listen, here, I'm just going to go through the list and see if there are any other favorites of mine that are in here.

AGEE: And they would then place these in the different journals, because press was the -- was the main...

SNYDER: Sure, sure.

AGEE: ...public information medium at the time. Television wasn't -- wasn't so important then. We would write false documents which would be attributed to people who wanted to discredit and have them surfaced in one way or another so that the people would land up in jail for -- for months and months, for example.

We undermined the governments of -- of Velasco in 1960-61. Velasco fell partly as a result of these operations. The same with President Arosemena, because we were trying to force the Government of Ecuador to break relations with Cuba...

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: ...and to suppress the local Left. So, eventually in 1963 we ended up with a military junta.

SNYDER: Did the CIA run that whole Bay of Pigs thing? Was that a CIA operation?

AGEE: Yes. I think that's a probability.

SNYDER: Uh-huh. Well, I just wanted to hear it from somebody who was operating in Latin America at the time.

AGEE: Yes. Well I had nothing to do with it, directly, but it definitely -- it certainly was a Bay of Pigs -- a CIA operation.

In fact, I was in Ecuador at that time, and about the second day when we received a propaganda cable when it went out to all the CIA stations, and we were supposed to place in the local media the story that this invasion had been only an attempt to resupply guerrillas who were operating in the Es Camaguey Mountains nearby.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: There'd been no attempt to take and hold any territory and, as such it had been a success. This was the CIA version of the Bay of Pigs thing.

SNYDER: I notice here, just looking through this list, that Radio Free Europe is a CIA operation.

AGEE: Yes. And also Radio Liberty, which is directed at the Soviet Union.

SNYDER: Well, now, isn't it interesting that the broadcasting industry in this country gives free time to appeals for funds for Radio Free Europe, saying that it sends the truth to the people of the -- of what we call the Iron Curtain countries or the occupied countries, when, in fact, the CIA is running it. The question becomes are we telling them the truth, or are we feeding them propaganda?

AGEE: Well, obviously propaganda.

SNYDER: Well, that -- I -- I don't know, because I don't listen to Radio Free Europe.

What did they do to you to make you a CIA agent, and I don't mean what did they do to you, but how did they train you? How did they indoctrinate you? What kind of a course do you have to go through to become an agent of the CIA?

AGEE: Yes. Well it's -- first of all -- in the first place, there's a distinction in CIA between what is an agent and what is an officer. I was an officer, meaning a career employee who was going to be doing operations for an entire career.

An agent, in CIA usage, is the person at the end of the line. He's the Brazilian, or the Mexican, or the German, or the indigenous who is actually doing the operation...

SNYDER: Okay.

AGEE: ..that the officer in the station is directing, and initiating. So I was trained as a CIA officer, meaning that I was recruited. I -- I had turned down the first recruitment approach, but then I was faced with doing compulsory military service, and they had described to me a way that I could do that and become an officer at the same time in a CIA program.

SNYDER: When you say they described...

AGEE: That is the CIA recruiter. So I was faced with...

SNYDER: Did he come to the Notre Dame campus?

AGEE: He came to the campus and approached me through the Placement Bureau there.

SNYDER: We can also say, then, that Notre Dame University is a collaborator with the CIA.

AGEE: Oh, yes. Many universities around the country have spotters. This wasn't the case in my case, but many of the universities have people on the faculty who have a relationship with the CIA, and they're spotting students.

SNYDER: What do they look for? Are you -- I wouldn't -- are you a shifty-eyed person?

(Laughter).

Sneaky person?

AGEE: I don't really know what they look for. The -- the people I knew in CIA were -- were very -- just like in any American group. They look for certain language skills, of course. They look for cer -- a person who has a stake in the way things are in the traditional values of the United States. But anyway...

(Confusion of voices).

Yes. So I was recruited eventually, and I went up to Washington, then went off in the Air Force in this special CIA program which I was actually on duty in the Air Force, but I was a CIA body. And I was doing Air Force work, though. A couple of years later, I came back on active duty, but never wore a uniform after that, and was eventually discharged while I was in the CIA training program. This was about nine months from September of 1959 until July of 1960.

The first three months, until the end of the year, that is, we worked in the training program in headquarters buildings in Washington itself. These were the old temporary buildings around Potomac Park in Washington, which I think have disappeared now, long before the building out in Langley was built.

Then the six months from January to July of 1960, this class -- there were about fifty of us, of which about seven or eight were women -- this -- we all passed down to Camp Perry, just outside Williamsburg, in Virginia, which is this big CIA training

base. And we were called at that time Junior Officer Trainees. This was the CIA program for bringing into the agency its future executive leadership.

In this training course -- the headquarters past -- we studied Communism, for example. We did -- we read a lot of the writings of the anticommunist propagandists, for example, some Marx and Lenin, but the main emphasis was on the Soviet Union and the great threat the Soviet Union posed to the United States, that every Left Wing movement or Communist Party around the world was a manifestation...

SNYDER: Are you sold on that? Did you hate the Soviet Union?

AGEE: No, I had no emotional feeling toward the Soviet Union. I -- I swallowed that line, though, as the beginning, but I don't anymore, because I don't -- I think that the problems of insurgency around the world are -- they -- they are generated by the local injustices and not by the Soviets.

SNYDER: All right.

Mr. Agee, we have to puase here for a couple of minutes. "Tomorrow will continue in about two minutes and ten seconds, and I hope that we keep you turned on.

Thank you.

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We continue now with Mr. Philip Agee, who is the author of a book which you can't buy, called "Inside The Company -- The CIA Diary".

I would imagine that in the near future this is going to be available in the United States.

AGEE: I certainly hope so, unless the government decides to suppress it there. We'll see when the time comes.

SNYDER: Do -- do you hope so -- forgive me for asking this -- to bring the truth to the American people or to make a buck? Or Both?

AGEE: I want the book to be successful commercially because I want to help other CIA people right now who may have quit CIA or who are on the borderline. They may be questioning the rights and wrongs of this activity, or for whatever reasons, and I would like to be able to help them, because it takes money to reestablish, to avoid the types of things that I had to go through to get this thing written.

At the same time, I want it read so that American people will realize what the government is doing in their name secretly for minority interests in the United States. That is, minority economic interests in the United States, not the ethnic minorities, but the rich and powerful in the United States. That's why I want the book to be a success.

SNYDER: If you ask me this question, I'd give you my answer, so let me ask you and you give me yours, and if you want to ask me, I'll tell you mine.

What's wrong with the CIA? What's wrong with having an organization like the CIA operating on behalf of whatever it (technical difficulties) in the United States?

AGEE: Because, precisely of minority interests. It's not serving all the people of the United States. And it certainly is not in the interest, as Ford says, for example, of the people it's operating. I mean, the repression in Chile and the economic decline there is so atrocious since the coup no one would argue that could possibly...

SNYDER: Does CIA do nothing which would insure or help to protect what we call collectively the military and domestic security of the United States of America? Does it do nothing in that area?

AGEE: Oh, yes, it does. It has a very important role in early warning, for example, of possible attack from the Soviet Union. This is valid function, I think, of CIA. But it's also a function that well could be done by the military.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: And...

SNYDER: Would you say that the CIA began as a, quote, "noble effort", quote, but somehow its original goals and aims became perverted because of the economic interests of a certain small group of people in the United States? Would that -- would...

AGEE: The noble aim, of course, is -- is in keeping with American foreign policy since World War I when we became a power. This is this "third way" idea, not the imperialism of the last century and before, and not the revolutionary socialist solution. A third way -- capitalism in the economic order, liberalism in the political order, and free trade in the international order.

Now I found out over the years working for CIA that there is no such thing as a third order. What we're doing through

CIA is -- is a subtler type of -- of in -- interference, of intervention, and of domination -- subtler, that is, than the gunboat -- gunboat diplomacy of the past. But when this doesn't work, that is where you don't see great tumult -- that is, when the repression is silent and effective -- that's where CIA is doing its job best. But when CIA fails, as in the Dominican Republic, or in Southeast Asia, that's when over intervention by the military service is necessary.

One of the reasons I started to write this book was that I realized the more successful we were, you see, in beating down the Left in the United States -- that is, in other countries -- and propping up the minority governments, the further away the reforms got, but at the same time the people's resistance was greater, as in Vietnam. So the intervention in Vietnam, the whole Vietnam war and what not, was simply a higher level of intensity of the types of -- of activities that we were undertaking in Latin America, but with greater successes.

SNYDER: Now, to go back to your work, you were an officer -- a career officer in the CIA. You were not an operative. You were not an agent working in the fields. You did not go out and put guns in people's heads and blow their brains out, or torture them, or do any of that sort of thing, did you?

AGEE: Well, I didn't -- no, I didn't do any of those things directly. I did have a very bad experience so far as torture is concerned in Uruguay, but things were different then than what they are now. But I'll tell you what -- what my experience was in that.

We were very active in supporting and equipping and financing and directing and training police services all over Latin America. Well, all over the world, for that matter. Now we were doing that in Uruguay when I was there, and I was the officer in charge of that, along with some other things that I was doing. Meaning that I was working almost daily with the -- the police.

In 1965, there were two states of siege declared in -- in Uruguay because the trade union movement had been stopping the country. The trade union movement, incidentally, was under Left control. It was stopping the country because of -- of its protests and its strikes against the -- the terrible mismanagement, the terrible inflation, and the corruption in the government and in all the economic and financial circles which we're servicing all the time. So the trade union movement was very active and militant, and the government had imposed a state of siege in order to repress the trade union movement.

SNYDER: Okay.

AGEE: During the second state of siege, we wrote a false report in the station tying certain officers of the Soviet Embassy to the trade union leaders, depicting this agitation and the strikes as emanating from the Soviet Embassy. This was completely false, but we wrote it all up as if it were a -- a...

SNYDER: Factual document?

AGEE: Factual document, yes. And it was to be used by the Uruguayan military intelligence service who asked us for the report. In fact, we suggested it.

SNYDER: (Laughs).

AGEE: For the President, because the President of the country, you see, was -- had already come out for breaking relations. No, one of the members of the National Council of Governments, which was like a board of directors they had there at that time. They had a nine-man presidency there, one man serving as President for one year.

Well, one of the members of the National Council of Governments said that Uruguay should break relations with the Soviet Union. So when we wrote this document very fast (sic) and got it all set up nicely in Spanish and got it typed and...

SNYDER: To show them what a bunch of -- the people in the Soviet Union were?

AGEE: ...but to use it to justify the breaking relations with Russia. The government's going to break relations with the Soviet Union and we wanted to help. Well, this coincided -- when we wrote this document -- coincided with another thing. In the station, we had, through one of the Communist Party penetration agents, the identities of the leaders and members of three of the Soviet -- Communist Party of Uruguay's self-defense brigades. And these self-defense squads, during this state of siege, were very effective, and they made our policemen look -- look horrible, because they would go around making these lightening demonstrations and distributing propaganda, and the police could never catch them because they were so good.

And so the Chief of Station -- John Horton at that time -- decided that I should give to the police the name of the leader -- the name of the leader of one of those squads so that if he were arrested and put under preventive detention, the Party might decide that there's a spy some place, or they might decide that they'd have to call them off.

SNYDER: Right.

So the police wouldn't look so bad. And, well, we had a discussion in the station. I eventually ended up giving this name and address to the police. They picked up the guy, and he was -- he was put in jail for a while. About four days after he was arrested -- three days after he was arrested, I guess, John Horton, the Chief of Station, and I were over at the police Chief's office. We took the document on the Soviets over to be read by the chief of police, who was an army general.

Before we gave it to the military intelligence to give to the President to use in breaking relations with the Soviets, he was sitting there reading this document -- right here. Horton was across from me and right there was sitting Roberto Ramedez, who was an army colonel, who was the chief of the Metropolitan Guard, which is the anti-riot shock force of the police department in Uruguay. As we were sitting there, Ramedez was reading these...

SNYDER: Storm troopers?

AGEE: More or less, yes.

SNYDER: Yes.

AGEE: They are the heavies, in other words.

SNYDER: Uh-huh. The bad guys?

AGEE: Yes.

SNYDER: That was in "exercise 22." I know the picture.

(Laughter).

AGEE: As Ramedez began reading, I began hearing a low wailing sound, and I thought it was a street vendor outside trying to sell something. And -- and it got louder and louder, and as it got louder I could tell it was moaning and screaming. And Rodriguez told Ramedez to turn up the radio. Ramedez was listening to the soccer game on -- on a little tiny transistor radio as we were talking, because as the state of siege -- the games were on Sunday morning instead of their normal time of Saturday night.

But Rodriguez told Ramedez to turn up the radio and -- and this screaming got louder and louder. Quite a few times he told him to turn it up, and pretty soon the radio was so loud we couldn't even hear each other talking. And Rodri -- and Ramedez read the report very quickly and told us it was great stuff and all and -- and we left.

But there's no doubt that we were hearing someone being tortured. And I thought to myself at that time, "My God, if that's the guy's name that I gave, I -- I -- I'm responsible for that torture." So a couple of days later, through my police agents, I found out that it was the guy that I gave the name of. You see, I didn't realize it was going -- he was going to be tortured, but the decision was taken by somebody else in the police -- a man named Bragga(?), who was the Deputy Chief of Investigations, also a person with whom we worked -- to torture this guy and try to find out the names and addresses of all these other people who were on these squads.

Of course that was a shattering experience, and I -- it was one of the things that began -- just added to my disaffection from the CIA work which had already started.

But there's no way that CIA can be separated from this terrible repression that's going on in countries like Uruguay right now. Worse than ever, Brazil and Chile and Indonesia, and Iran, and all of these countries. The security services in many of those countries are creatures of CIA. In other words, CIA is tell -- giving them money and equipment, tell...

SNYDER: Hold on. Because I've got to break away for a second, but let me ask you this question. Does the fact that you can sit in this television studio and tell with great dispassion the story of a man being tortured almost at your command give any indication of how well you were trained by the CIA?

AGEE: You mean to be able to tell it coldly?

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: I don't feel it coldly, and I -- I'll remember that forever, you see. I think that maybe it means the CIA didn't train me well enough, because at the time I -- I didn't quit right then and there which is what I should have done. Maybe. Or there are a lot of possibilities of things. I stayed in CIA much too long after that and after a lot of other things.

It could be that the whole fact that I've written this book, I've quit CIA, and I'm trying to struggle against it now means that they failed in my case anyway. And I am sure that there are lots of other people in CIA right now who are on the borderline and who are wondering if they ought to do something about these activities, because there's terrible repression going on in so many countries that's directly related to CIA.

SNYDER: We will continue after these announcement.

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ANNOUNCER: The "Tomorrow show from Canada with Tom Snyder interviewing Philip Agee continues in a moment.

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SNYDER: I must ask you here about yourself and about what's happened to you since you gained this certain amount of fame. Everybody in the United States with media wants to talk to you. Some people knew that we were coming up here and they said, "Where can we find him? When can we talk to him?" What's happened to you since all this started -- to your family?

AGEE: Well that is a very long story. Of course I was living in Mexico. My plan when I resigned from CIA was not to write a book. I simply wanted to forget that I...

SNYDER: ...Just get out, surely.

AGEE: ...ever worked for the agency. But it was a little over a year after that that I began to get the idea to write this book. I began to work on an outline and to write down material.

But not too long after that I realized I wouldn't be able to do it still living in Mexico, so I rearranged my life, and I went to -- I got some support from a Paris -- from a publisher in France. I made a trip to Cuba for -- for precisely getting material...

SNYDER: How's Fidel? Is he okay?

AGEE: I didn't see him.

SNYDER: Oh.

AGEE: I -- I then continued in Paris on the research, and eventually came to London to finish at the British Museum Newspaper Library, and eventually wrote the "Diary".

Now what happened in between was a lot of -- is like a saga, really. It's being down and out and wondering where the next meal is coming from. This agency was leaning on my former wife in the States where my children were (word unintelligible) so she wouldn't send them over to see me any more.

SNYDER: What do you mean, "they were leaning" on you?

AGEE: Well, they were asking her not to send them so that in my desperation to see them I would go back to the United States where they could bring me under control.

Well, eventually, the American Civil Liberties Union's legal director, Mel Wolfe, he -- he confronted the CIA attorney, the same one who was talking to my ex-wife with this, and...

SNYDER: Call off the dogs?

AGEE: ...he called it off, yes. In fact, the -- he more or less admitted that he was doing that. But that eventually was solved.

SNYDER: But the CIA wanted to keep your kids away from you?

AGEE: Oh, yes, they wanted to use them. In fact, they even went around to the house, you see, and talked to my former wife. And my son had been sent out of the room, but he listened underneath the steps to the conversation, and he wrote me a letter about it, which I've put in the book, to the effect that the CIA wanted to offer me money not to write the book, wanted to make that approach through her. And also we're going to find a new job, and all that sort of thing.

SNYDER: Would you have entertained that offer, their coming up with a million dollars for you?

AGEE: I certainly wouldn't, no.

SNYDER: All right.

AGEE: But eventually things worked out. I was under a -- I felt like I was under a great deal of pressure before I finished, but as I got closer to finishing I began to relax, and now I don't think that there's any -- there's any problem.

But the thing is, this book is only a start. For me it's a first step. I'm working with other Americans right now who are working in the United States to organize and promote a campaign to identify and expose CIA people working all around the world. It's a solidarity campaign between Americans who are working against this activity with the people who are victimized by it so that the organizations in those countries can take whatever act...

SNYDER: Do you think, Philip, in the background of what you say is a wish to somehow reorder the economic pie in the United States, to redistribute the wealth somehow, to end whatever classism there is there, and whatever exploitation there is of the working class? Is that working at all in your own personal philosophy?

AGEE: Well, that is the real argument. The real argument isn't with the CIA. You see, CIA is an instrument of repression, an international secret political police, if you will. But the real argument is with economic exploitation. If -- it's the CIA propping up minority governments, a few very rich people while all the rest of the people have to go without schools for their children, without a decent diet, no housing, without any medical care. This is the real problem. There's plenty to go around in the world. It's just that too many -- to few people...

SNYDER: I want to be very candid with you. If I make a million dollars in doing this television show, or any other television show, I'm going to keep it. If you make a million from this book, are you going to keep it?

AGEE: No, I'm not. I'm going to make it available to other CIA people. You see...

SNYDER: Well, you're a better man than I am.

AGEE: Well, I worked on this book for five years. Imagine, nobody knew about me or about this book or anything. Who knows but what there's three, four, five CIA people working on their book right now...

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: ...that we don't know about.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: Or others in CIA right now who might be entertaining these thoughts. I want to make support available to them, you see, so that they won't have to go through all of this -- this grief that I went through to get this book written. And that's where this money's going to go, and for this campaign to expose CIA people, and to try to struggle against this mechanism, against this -- this repression. That's the point of the whole thing.

SNYDER: Where do you live right now?

AGEE: I live out in Cornwall, in England, precisely because I don't have enough money to live in London.

SNYDER: Uh-huh.

AGEE: And, hopefully, in July we'll be able to move back to London, and...

SNYDER: You say, "we", do you have...

AGEE: Well, my children now are living with me permanently. That was finally settled last year. It was their insistence, really, which brought that about, but that's another story.

SNYDER: That's another story that belongs, I think, to you and your family.

AGEE: Yes. That's another story.

But I live with a girl, who -- with a woman. I'm sorry. Who is Angela Sachus(?), and she is Brazilian who was a political prisoner and was very badly tortured in Brazil and spent two and a half years in prison there. We met by chance in Paris, and we now form a family -- the four of us.

We are going to be living in London until we see whether we can come back to the United States and work in this same activity. That is, to try to do what we can to destabilize CIA -- that's what it is -- in the United States itself while we continue writing a second book, because we've started on a second book.

SNYDER: Finally, there are people who after watching this program or subsequently reading your book would look at you and say you are a traitor. How would you respond to this?

AGEE: I would say that the people who are betraying the -- the real ideals of the United States are the CIA. They're the aggressors. They're not sitting back innocently picking up information. They're going out all around the world trying to promote repressive governments, if that means good business for American companies. They're the traitors of American ideals, not the -- not me. I'm trying to expose this, trying to show the American people through this book just what it is the government is doing. And this is -- this is -- this is a fact of exposing truth. There's nothing betraying about that.

SNYDER: Mr. Agee, I thank you for spending considerably more time than I'm certain you'd planned to spend with us on this program this morning, and I thank you for your apparent candor and for your friendly discussion about the CIA, and I -- I personally wish you well.

AGEE: Thank you.

SNYDER: Mr. Philip Agee is the author of a book. It's called "Inside the Company -- The CIA Diary." It's not yet available in the United States, but I'm certain one day it will be available, and I am also certain most people watching this program will want to have a look at same.

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((("PREPARING REPRISALS"--TASS HEADLINE))

((TASS CORRESPONDENT VLADIMIR BAYDASHIN REPORT))

((TEXT)) NEW YORK--THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS EXERTED PRESSURE ON BRITAIN IN AN ATTEMPT TO GAIN THE EXPULSION FROM THAT COUNTRY OF THEIR FORMER AGENT, THE AMERICAN PHILIP AGEE, WHO BROKE AWAY FROM THE CIA, "THE AGEE DEPORTATION CASE," WHICH IS NOW BEING TRIED IN A LONDON COURT, IS THE DIRECT RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, WHICH IS TRYING TO DEAL WITH THE EX-AGENT WHO DARED "TO WASH ITS DIRTY LINEN IN PUBLIC." THIS IS

REPORTED BY THE NEWSPAPER NEWSDAY, QUOTING INFORMED CIRCLES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ORGANS,

P. AGEE FELL OUT OF FAVOR WITH HIS FORMER BOSSES AFTER HE PUBLICLY CRITICIZED THE ILLEGAL OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. ESPIONAGE DEPARTMENT AIMED AT OVERTHROWING GOVERNMENTS WHICH WERE NOT TO WASHINGTON'S Liking IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. IN HIS BOOK "INSIDE THE COMPANY: A DIARY OF THE CIA," PUBLISHED IN 1975, HE EXPOSED CERTAIN BEHIND-THE-SCENES ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN "CLOAK-AND-DAGGER KNIGHTS" OPERATING UNDER THE GUISE OF DIPLOMATS.

ACCORDING TO NEWSDAY, AGEE'S BOOK, IN WHICH HE CALLS A SPADE A SPADE, HAS INFURRIATED THE CIA CHIEFS. AN ORGANIZED PERSECUTION CAMPAIGN HAS STARTED AGAINST AGEE. THE STUBBORN AGENT WAS INFORMED THAT HE WILL HAVE TO PAY FOR "DIVULGING THE SECRETS" OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT. IN REPLY THE EX-AGENT MADE FURTHER EXPOSURES OF THE ESPIONAGE DEPARTMENT.

AMONG OTHER THINGS, AT THE END OF LAST YEAR HE REPORTED CIA PLANS TO ORGANIZE THE OVERTHROW OF THE JAMAICAN GOVERNMENT. AGEE NAMED 54 EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN JAMAICA WHO WERE IN FACT CIA AGENTS. AGEE SAID THAT THE AIM OF THE CIA-ORGANIZED CAMPAIGN IN JAMAICA WAS TO DRAG THE COUNTRY INTO ECONOMIC CHAOS, AS THEY SUCCEEDED IN DOING IN CHILE ON THE EVE OF THE OVERTHROW OF THE POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT, AND TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A REACTIONARY COUP.

P. AGEE'S LAWYER EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT IF THE CIA MANAGES TO GET AGEE OUT OF BRITAIN, IMMEDIATE REPRISALS AWAIT THE EX-CIA AGENT IN HIS OWN COUNTRY. 162224 BLOKHAM/JF 17/1629Z JAN

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PHILIP COHEN INTERVIEW WITH EX-OR EMPLOYEE PHILIP COHEN:

YOUR PEOPLE NOT THE GOOD GUYS -- (SPEAK)

TEXT: PHILIP COHEN, NOW 41, HAS EXPOSED THE WORK OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA -- JOURNAL AND PUBLICATION.

AUTHOR OF THE BOOK, "THE COMPANY -- THE STORY OF THE
IN PERSON CIA AGENT, AND THE CIA'S STRATEGY FOR
RUSSIA AND THE DEFEATED WITH DEFEAT OF THE
REVENUE REEFS. THEY ARE FARMERS OF GELLY, WARRIORS TO
SECURITY.

PHILIP COHEN, NOW 41, HAS EXPOSED THE WORK OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA -- JOURNAL AND PUBLICATION.

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DEFENSE

Behind the Great Submarine Snatch

On June 20, 1974, the *Glomar Explorer*, a new 36,000-ton ship fitted with a tall derrick amidships and towing a submersible barge the size of a football field, sailed from Long Beach, Calif., toward an area in the Pacific 750 miles northwest of Hawaii. Publicly proclaimed to be a special vessel built by Howard Hughes to mine mineral deposits from the ocean floor, the *Glomar* was actually on a CIA mission approved by the White House. Its code name: Project Jennifer. Its aim: to salvage a Soviet submarine that had plunged 16,000 ft. to the bottom of the Pacific in 1968 after an explosion.

The sub was believed to be armed with three nuclear missiles and several torpedoes. U.S. intelligence officials were determined to examine the weapons and the codes aboard—without the knowledge of the Russians. The *Glomar Explorer* stationed itself over the sub and extended a length of pipe with giant claws on the end to pick up the wreck on the bottom. The barge was then submerged to a depth of about 100 ft., where it was to cradle the salvaged sub. But there was a hitch. When the sub was halfway to the surface its damaged hull cracked in two. The after two-thirds of the craft, including the code room and the coveted weapons, slipped away. Only the forward third was successfully retrieved.

At least that was the story the CIA floated in March 1975, when reports of the submarine caper began leaking to the press. But *TIME* has learned that Project Jennifer did in fact succeed: the entire wreck, a 320-ft-long Golf-class II diesel-powered submarine built in 1961, was recovered virtually intact. Confirms a senior U.S. Navy officer: "It was all one hell of a success." Why the partial-recovery story? The CIA remains mum about its motives but the agency evidently had a dual aim. For one thing, it wanted to defend the high cost of Jennifer—about \$550 million, all billed to the Navy. At the same time, the agency wanted to avoid unnecessarily embarrassing the Russians, who, U.S. intelligence officials knew, would not fall for the CIA's story anyway.

All equipment aboard the sub worth analyzing was removed—including three SSN-5 surface-to-surface ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads, and several torpedoes. Though study of these prizes was begun on board the *Glomar Explorer*, the detailed examination took place elsewhere, most likely at the U.S. base on Midway Island. There experts were able to carefully go over the sub's equipment. Says a Navy official: "It was dated somewhat, but still a technical mother lode of stuff."

After careful analysis, which included photographing certain parts and taking metallurgical samples for further

study, the sub's hull was broken up into sections, some of which were compacted like old cars and jettisoned at various spots in the Pacific.

Although the accommodations for the 80-man crew were spartan by U.S. standards, the sub itself was skillfully designed for silent running, and construction details showed that the Russians "can turn these things out like Mexican fritters," as one Navy expert put it. Before the sub was retrieved, the U.S. knew almost nothing about Soviet torpedo technology. The Navy had also underestimated the sub's firepower. Its short-range (about 700 nautical miles) SSN-5 missiles carried hydrogen-bomb warheads packing a much bigger punch than the uranium-fission weapons that

the same kind of documents Daniel Ellsberg had signed." During the lift of the sub, the ship heaved and groaned so much that some feared it would tear apart. Others fretted about the Soviet spy trawlers that were frequently spotted. Says Joe Rodriguez, who was recruited for the mission out of a Hollywood hairdressing salon because he had served a Navy stint on an aircraft carrier: "We worried about capture. We used to joke in the engine room about Roosky women and what they do with civilian spies." An oiler on the *Glomar*, Rodriguez is the first crew member to talk publicly about Project Jennifer.

Deep Throat. The crew worked twelve hours a day, seven days a week, and they were paid generously, averaging about \$1,350 a month; Rodriguez managed to save enough during the operation to open his own haircutting shop near Sacramento. There were some perks too: menus featured filet mignon,



GLOMAR EXPLORER CREW MEMBER JOE RODRIGUEZ WITH PHOTO OF THE SPY SHIP
A total success yielding "a technical mother lode of stuff."

were once the staple of Soviet defense. Very possibly one of the warheads was exploded underground before a U.S.-Soviet ban on such testing of bombs of more than 150 kilotons went into effect this year.

How did the *Glomar Explorer* haul up a 5,500-ton weight from the ocean floor? Taking cues from tiny radio beacons placed near the sub, a computer aboard the ship directed an array of water jets and propellers that kept the *Glomar*—and its suspended claws—in place against waves and currents.

Despite all the advanced equipment, Jennifer was a nerve-racking job for the *Glomar*'s crew of about 400. The racking began early on, when the crewmen were told what the ship's real mission was and given secrecy pledges to sign. Says one crewman: "They told us that they were

roasts and lobster tails, while the entertainment included television shows and movies on video cassettes (most popular flick: *Deep Throat*).

Today the *Glomar Explorer* sits idle in Suisun Bay, Calif., near San Francisco. Had its cover not been blown, the ship would have been used for recovering other seabed prizes like missile re-entry vehicles and underwater listening devices. Instead, the Government has put the vessel up for sale. Last week the National Science Foundation said it would study the possibility of using the ship for deep-sea research. The General Services Administration has also offered to lease the ship to firms interested in using it to mine minerals in the ocean—precisely what the *Glomar Explorer* was supposed to be up to when it first sailed off on its CIA mission.

DEFENSE

The Glomar Mystery

When the *Glomar Explorer* story first broke 21 months ago, the Central Intelligence Agency did a purposeful job of disclosing as little information as possible. In a series of briefings, then CIA Director William Colby confided to reporters that the U.S. had used a large vessel, reportedly built for Howard Hughes, to try to retrieve a 1961-vintage Soviet submarine that had sunk northwest of Hawaii. Unfortunately, the Golf-class sub cracked apart as it was being hoisted. Only the forward third was recovered. Colby did not say what it contained, but any knowledgeable person would expect that it housed torpedoes and perhaps other valuable materials. The mid- and aft sections, containing the far more important nuclear missiles and code room, slipped through the retrieval tongs.

Two weeks ago TIME printed an article about *Glomar* based partly on a talk with a former *Glomar* crew member named Joe Rodriguez (TIME, Dec. 6). As the first of *Glomar*'s some 200 crewmen to speak, Rodriguez provided previously unknown touches about ship-board life (filet mignon was standard fare; *Deep Throat* was the favorite flick). Rodriguez's most significant hint, however, was that *Glomar* retrieved the entire Soviet sub. TIME checked out Rodriguez's suggestion with a number of Pentagon experts, who appeared to confirm it. They conceded that significant, and so far undisclosed portions of the sub—including nuclear missiles and torpedoes—had been recovered from the seabed. "A technical mother lode," one Navy official called it.

Last week, after TIME raised additional questions about his involvement with *Glomar*, Rodriguez, now a Sacramento-area hairdresser, admitted that he had not been on the ship during the recovery; he had taken part only in training cruises and had left before the key voyage. ("I'm sorry. I feel bad. I will not sleep well tonight," he said.)

Times Story. Meanwhile, the New York Times published two articles by Reporter Seymour Hersh that directly contradicted the TIME accounts. Hersh named as chief sources two brothers: Wayne Collier, 33, who worked as CIA recruiter for the crew, and his younger brother Bill, hired by Wayne as a cutting-torch handler. Though neither man was aboard the *Glomar* at the time of the sub lifting, Bill was on the ship when the retrieved portions were being dissected. In a sense, Hersh's account reinforced the original CIA thesis: only the sub's forward third was recovered. But he added that four torpedoes were found as well as a partial description of cryptographic codes and booklets on the state of Soviet nuclear technology.

In fact, much more than that was recovered, say TIME's Pentagon sources, even though the previous version that

the entire sub was raised was apparently wrong. What was recovered was the bulk of the weapons system installed in the vessel, which carried three SSN-5 surface-to-surface nuclear missiles. This is according to the Pentagon sources, who stick by their accounts of a far fuller retrieval than previously conceded by the CIA. Thus, after another twist of the *Glomar* mystery, the successes—or failures—of the mission remain confused.

The Soviets, in any case, are taking no chances. Since 1975, they have stationed an intelligence-gathering ship over the spot in the Pacific where the *Glomar* found the ill-fated Soviet sub. The vessel apparently is there to make certain that the U.S. does not attempt to pick up any more pieces—if indeed there are any more.

Glomar Reportedly Raised Russ Submarine

From Times Wire Services

NEW YORK—Contrary to public statements, the Central Intelligence Agency succeeded in lifting a Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean two years ago, Time magazine said Sunday.

The magazine said it had learned that the deep-sea exploring vessel Glomar Explorer recovered nearly intact a 320-foot long, 5,500-ton Russian submarine of the Golf II class which sank 16,000 feet in 1968.

The magazine said in its current issue that CIA experts removed and analyzed three surface-to-surface missiles armed with nuclear warheads and several torpedoes from the ship.

It quoted an unidentified U.S. Navy official as saying of the submarine's equipment: "It was dated somewhat, but still a technical mother lode of stuff."

At the time of the operation, codenamed Project Jennifer, in the summer of 1974, the CIA said the vessel belonged to the late billionaire Howard Hughes and was engaged in exploring for underwater minerals.

But when reports of the operation were published in March, 1975, the CIA indicated the mission failed—that the submarine broke in two and the more valuable half sank again.

At that time, the CIA said the stern section—containing top-secret Soviet missiles and the ship's code room—was lost.

Time said the CIA "floated" its story about a partial recovery evidently to justify the \$550 million cost of Project Jennifer while at the same time avoiding unnecessary embarrassment for the Russians who had trawlers in the area and were aware the entire sub had been salvaged.

Time said its story of full recovery of the sub was confirmed by a senior Navy officer who described the operation as "all one hell of a success."

According to the magazine, the Navy learned that it had underestimated the ship's firepower, and that its missiles—with a range of about 700 nautical miles—were armed with hydrogen-bomb warheads, rather than the less-powerful uranium-fission weapons that once were the "staple of Soviet defense."

Very possibly one of the warheads was exploded underground before a U.S.-Soviet ban on such testing of bombs of more than 150 kilotons went into effect this year, Time said.

American experts also made discoveries about Soviet torpedo technology, about which little was previously known, the magazine said.

After subjecting the submarine's hull to metallurgical analysis, the submarine was broken up and parts of it were crushed like old cars and dumped in various spots of the Pacific Ocean, the magazine said.

The magazine report named Glomar crew member Joe

Rodriguez, now a California hairdresser, as a source. It quoted Rodriguez as saying the Operation Jennifer crew worried about the Soviet trawlers which stalked the Glomar throughout the recovery operation.

"We worried about capture," he was quoted as saying. "We used to joke in the engine room about Rostky women and what they do with civilian spies."

Glomar lifted Soviet sub from Pacific, Time says

New York (Reuter)—Contrary to public statements, the Central Intelligence Agency succeeded in raising a Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean two years ago, *Time* says in its latest issue.

According to the weekly magazine, the Glomar Explorer, a deep-sea exploring vessel, recovered nearly intact a 320-foot, 5,500-ton Soviet submarine of the Golf II class which sank in 16,000 feet in 1968.

CIA experts removed and analyzed three surface-to-surface missiles armed with nuclear warheads and several torpedoes from the submarine, *Time* said. It quoted an unidentified U.S. Navy official as saying of the sub's equipment:

"It was dated somewhat, but still a technical mother lode of stuff."

At the time of the operation, in the summer of 1973, the CIA said the Glomar Explorer belonged to the late Howard Hughes and was engaged in exploring for underwater minerals. But when reports of the effort to recover the Soviet submarine were published in March, 1975, the CIA indicated that the operation had failed—that the submarine broke in two and the more valuable half sank again.

The *Time* article said the Navy learned that it had underestimated the submarine's firepower and that its missiles—with a range of about 700 nautical miles—were armed with hydrogen-bomb warheads rather than the less-powerful uranium-fission weapons that once were "the staple of Soviet defense."

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The CIA presumably "floated" its story about a partial recovery of the sub to justify the \$550 million cost of the project while at the same time avoiding unnecessary embarrassment for the Soviet Union, the weekly magazine said.

Entire Soviet Sub Salvaged By Glomar, Officer Says

NEW YORK (UPI) — The CIA, using the Howard Hughes-built Glomar Explorer with its submersible barge and remote-control "claw," salvaged all of a sunken Soviet submarine in 1975 — not just the front end of it as the spy agency initially reported, Time Magazine says.

The Russian sub sank in 16,000 feet of water, 750 miles northwest of Hawaii, after an explosion in 1968.

The CIA admitted going after the vessel only after news of the venture — dubbed "Operation Jennifer" — began to leak to news media.

At that time, the agency said the sub, grappled by the Glomar's claw, broke in two and that the stern section — containing top-secret Soviet missiles and the ship's code room — was lost.

TIME SAID the report was false —

a cover story, aimed at precluding embarrassment for the Russians who had trawlers in the area and were aware the entire sub had been salvaged.

Time said its story of full recovery of the sub was confirmed by a senior Navy officer who described the operation as "all one hell of a success."

One Navy official was quoted as saying the expedition netted "a technical mother lode of stuff" for U.S. experts who winnowed it at a Navy base on Midway Island.

Time said the Navy learned it had underestimated the firepower of the 5,500-ton "Golf Class II" ship which was carrying three intermediate-range missiles tipped with hydrogen bomb warheads, rather than the uranium-fission weapons once standard aboard Soviet submarines.

about 700 nautical miles, and Time said one of the warheads may have been detonated in an underground test before the U.S.-Soviet ban on blasts in excess of 150 kilotons went into effect this year.

The magazine report named Glomar crewmember Joe Rodriguez, now a California hairdresser, as a source. It quoted Rodriguez as saying several torpedoes also were recovered aboard the sub, giving U.S. technicians some of their first information on Soviet torpedo technology.

Rodriguez said the Operation Jennifer crew worried about Soviet trawlers which stalked the sophisticated Glomar throughout the recovery operation.

"We worried about capture," he was quoted as saying. "We used to joke in the engine room about Roosky women and what they do with civilian spies."

He said that after exhaustive technical and metallurgical tests, the hull of the Russian sub was broken up into sections, some of which were "compacted" like old cars, and dumped at various locations in the Pacific Ocean.

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library
Incomplete as received.

NEW YORK, NOV 28 (REUTERS) - CONTRAST TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS
THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) SUCCEEDED IN LIFTING
A SOVIET SUBMARINE FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN TWO
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PACIFIC OCEAN; THE MAGAZINE ADDED.
TIME SAID THE CIA "STATED" ITS STORY ABOUT A RECENT
RECOVERY EXACTLY TO OPPOSITE THE CIA WILSON COLLECTOR POST OF
PROJECT JENNIFER WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AVOIDING ANYMENTION
OF THE RUSSIAN.

Bush/Carter Briefings

- Evans & NOVAK

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Bush and Simon: Audiences With Carter

EXCERPT

The departure of George Bush from the CIA sooner than anybody expected and the more startling possibility that Treasury Secretary William Simon may moonlight for the new administration stem from the nature of their encounters with President-elect Carter during the transition.

Bush's six-hour intelligence briefing of Carter at Plains on Nov. 19, called a "disaster" by one Carter insider, was followed a week later by Bush's announcement he would quit as director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). But a warm, hour-long session between Carter and Simon at the Treasury Nov. 22 may produce the seemingly impossible: the conservative Republican serving as a part-time consultant to the Democratic President.

Since holdover CIA directors were retained in the 1960 and 1968 transitions, there had been speculation that Bush would stay for six months—perhaps longer if he hit it off with Carter. That was ruled out in Plains Nov. 19.

"Jimmy just wasn't impressed with Bush," a key Carterite told us. At one point, when Bush volunteered that the President-elect would probably prefer his own man at CIA, an unsmiling Carter replied coolly that was indeed the case and a new director would be ready Jan. 21.

Simon has been described in such lurid Democratic tones as a reactionary bogeyman that transition at the Treasury was expected to be barely civil. "I don't know anybody in the Ford administration that Jimmy detests as much as he does Simon," one insider told us before their meeting.

There was no sign of that Nov. 22, however. Carter asked Simon whether he would be available for special assignments next year, and Simon indicated he would. If that exchange involves more than simple courtesy, it could mean Simon's help on oil price questions—making use of his excellent contacts in the Arab world.

A footnote: Carter talent scouts are clearly looking for a businessman, not an economist, to succeed Simon at the

Treasury. Two intriguing new names under serious consideration: Aiden S. Clausen of Bank of America and Irving S. Shapiro of Dupont Company.

Socialist Workers'
Party

U.S. Citizens Spied On by CIA Abroad

By Warren Brown
Washington Post Staff Writer

Some Americans living overseas have been targets of U.S.-approved break-ins and electronic surveillance, Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush said in a sworn statement made public yesterday.

Bush's disclosure is believed to be the first official acknowledgment of U.S. spying on Americans abroad.

His statement was contained in a two-part affidavit taken July 1 at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. It was filed yesterday in U.S. District Court in New York City in connection with a suit seeking \$37 million in damages filed by the Socialist Workers Party against the CIA, the FBI and other federal agencies.

In the suit, the party charges that in its pursuit of legitimate political activities it has been the target of illegal harassment by the federal government. It also is seeking a court order against government surveillance of the party.

Bush's sworn statement, given in response to questions from lawyers handling the party's suit, said:

"The files of the CIA do contain information indicating that certain of the individual plaintiffs were overheard by means of electronic surveillance conducted abroad; and that certain other information, apart from the conversations that were overheard, was acquired as a result of several surreptitious entries that were made into premises abroad... which certain of the named plaintiffs had regular access [to] or [in which they] may have had a proprietary interest."

It was not clear from Bush's statement whether CIA agents themselves conducted the break-ins and eavesdropping. Nor was it clear whether the government has discontinued its surveillance of Americans living abroad.

Bush said in the statement that the CIA files contained no information "indicating that the SWP... [or] any of the individual plaintiffs... have been the subject of electronic surveillance conducted by the CIA in the United States."

The CIA refused to comment yesterday on any aspect of the affidavit.

"I am not able, under any circumstances, to add to or subtract from an affidavit that is before the court. And I'm obviously not going to comment on any affidavit by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency," said Andrew Falkiewicz, an agency spokesman.

Specifics on the government's spying on Americans overseas were contained in a separate "top secret" sworn statement Bush gave to Assistant U.S. Attorney William S. Brandt in New York.

The CIA director said in a legal memorandum defending his separate statement that secrecy was needed to "protect the sources and methods of the CIA... because one of the CIA's principal purposes is to gather intelligence information."

He added: "Disclosure of covert operations would undermine the very operation which is assertedly taken in the national interest. Disclosure may endanger future relations [with foreign countries] as well as expose the participants to personal risks."

Bush's contentions were attacked by Cathy Perkus, an official of the New York-based Political Rights Defense Fund, which is financing the Socialist Workers Party suit.

"The CIA doesn't have the right to burglarize Americans overseas. We believe that Americans don't give up their rights when they cross the borders of the U.S.," she said.



GEORGE BUSH
... statement made public

Though Bush's public affidavit contained no specifics, CIA files released last January showed that the agency kept track of virtually all the overseas movements of party leader Peter Camejo from about 1971 to 1974.

The files were released to Camejo under the Freedom of Information Act, which gives citizens the right of access—with certain exemptions—to government documents.

Camejo is the party's 1976 presidential candidate. The CIA said in the heavily censored files he received that the agency monitored his overseas meeting with other Socialist leaders and circulated information about his activities to one of its overseas stations.

A Socialist Workers Party spokesman said yesterday that since the 1960s, and continuing today, party officials "have traveled abroad and rented apartments, including in France and Belgium."

July 17/10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Civil Action No. 73-3160 (TPG)

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, et al.,

Defendants.

AFFIDAVIT

GEORGE BUSH, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. I am the Director of Central Intelligence. I have served in that office since January 30, 1976.

2. As Director of Central Intelligence, I am the executive head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §402, et seq., as was the position of Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Under Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403(d), it is the responsibility of the CIA to perform intelligence functions relating to the national security, under the direction of the National Security Council.


4. Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3), provides in part: "That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

5. I have been informed of certain discovery requests, including Interrogatory No. 7 of plaintiffs' second set of interrogatories, and certain discovery orders in this case. I have also been informed that, in connection with those discovery requests and orders, the Office of General Counsel of the CIA has caused a search to be made of CIA files to determine whether those files contained any information relating to electronic surveillance or interception of wire communications of any of the plaintiffs in this case or the other individuals named in the Court's order of May 4, 1976. I have been further informed that all systems of CIA records that might reasonably have been expected to contain information relating to the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the individual plaintiffs, or the other individuals named in the Court's order of May 4, 1976 were identified and examined in the course of the file search that the Office of General Counsel caused to be made.

6. The files of the CIA do not contain any information indicating that the SWP, the YSA, any of the individual plaintiffs, or any of the other individuals named in the Court's order of May 4, 1976 have been the subject of electronic surveillance conducted by the CIA in the United States.

7. The files of the CIA do contain information indicating that conversations of certain of the individual plaintiffs, and certain of the other individuals named in the Court's order of May 4, 1976, were overheard by means of electronic surveillance conducted abroad; and that certain other information, apart from conversations that were overheard, was acquired as a result of several surreptitious entries that were made into premises abroad as to which certain of the named plaintiffs, and certain of the other individuals named in the Court's order of May 4, 1976, had regular access or may have had a proprietary interest.


8. I have executed an In Camera Affidavit and Claim of Privilege in this case. That affidavit, classified Top Secret, formally asserts privilege with respect to the disclosure of information to which reference is made in paragraph 7 above. That affidavit also outlines the basis for the claims of privilege. Specifically, the claims are that the information to which reference is made in paragraph 7 above is subject both to the state secrets privilege and to the statutory privilege arising from the provision in §102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §403(d)(3), making the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. I have personally reviewed the matters and appraised the information as to which the claims of privilege are asserted in my In Camera affidavit, and I have personally determined that those claims, which I now assert in this affidavit, are appropriate under the circumstances.


GEORGE BUSH

Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

County of Fairfax)
) ss.
Commonwealth of Virginia)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of July 1976.


Notary Public

My Commission expires 3 November 1979

OUTRAGEOUS.

✓
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 123

THE WASHINGTONIAN
December 1976

People I'm Not Sending Christmas Cards to This Year

By Frank Getlein

No card to the CIA—a Scrooge-like outfit itself—for killing agent Richard Welch in Athens and blaming it on Dan Schörr. (The writer is aware that this interpretation is as yet unproved; the writer arrived at it through the classical question, *cui bono?*, and through the known style of the Agency.)

3 December 1976

Editor-in-Chief
The Washingtonian
1826 L Street
Suite 200,
Washington, D.C. 20036

Sir:

The reference to CIA in Frank Getlein's feature on page 123 of the December issue of The Washingtonian is not just an example of black humor in abominable taste.

It is a deliberate and lying insult to the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a painful mockery of the life and memory of Richard Welch which neither his family nor his proud colleagues can excuse.

Andrew T. Falkiewicz

Andrew T. Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-14

WASHINGTON POST
28 SEPTEMBER 1976

"YOU FELLOWS THINK I SHOULD HAVE SENT
A FLORAL PIECE?"



©1976 HERELOCK


THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
18 January 1977

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 11



THE WASHINGTON POST
24 August 1976

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 16



"WE CAN'T RUN THE RISK OF HAVING IT LEAK OUT
TO THE U.S. TAXPAYERS"



RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-3540

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM CBS Evening News

STATION WTOP TV
CBS Network

DATE December 23, 1976 7:00 PM

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Sorenson Appointed to Head CIA

WALTER CRONKITE: Theodore Sorensen said he will approach his new job as CIA Chief with, quote, "a sensitivity to civil liberties." He said he will not allow such practices as domestic spying, foreign assassination plots and attempts to overthrow governments. Accusations of such activities have brought the agency unaccustomed publicity and much criticism.

Richard C. Hottelet reports.

RICHARD C. HOTTELET: In 1947, the United States, by law, created the Central Intelligence Agency. Before World War II, the U.S. had not had a national intelligence service on the principle that gentlemen don't read each other's mail. But by 1947, it was clear that the West was in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. The communists' seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, followed by the Berlin blockade, seemed to signal mortal danger. As the Kremlin tried to take over foreign governments, the U.S. worked against it in a global chess game.

One possibly historic success was in Iran -- the removal of Premier Mossadegh, who was disturbingly pro-Soviet and the return of the Shah to his throne. This was no longer intelligence; it was covert operations.

In 1961, the CIA failed totally and tragically in the biggest covert action till that time, the invasion at the Bay of Pigs meant to eliminate Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. The CIA grew to a staff of fifteen thousand people and more, with a secret budget of some half a billion dollars a year. But Congress had never precisely defined its function, and the CIA did what the President of the United States told it to do.

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Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

The CIA covered a lot of ground. It spied on Americans abroad, opened mail, burglarized the homes of suspected employees, ruined lives through experiments with LSD, all in the name of security and deepest secrecy.

Congress was not informed, except for a few senior members, who saw to it that the intelligence budget was passed and occasional leaks swept under the rug.

In the Vietnam period, the CIA ran a secret army of tribal irregulars in Indochina, ran an airline, did covert work of influence and bribery, even apparently executions, which the United States could not openly do.

CBS News correspondent Ike Pappas spoke with David Wise, author of several books critical of the CIA and its operations.

DAVID WISE: We don't need the covert action operations where we go around overthrowing other governments or assassinating foreign leaders, interfering with the political processes of other countries.

I do think we need an intelligence gathering and analysis organization.

HOTTELET: Today Jimmy Carter named his own choice as Director of Central Intelligence, Theodore Sorensen. Sorensen is forty-eight years old, a lawyer with no intelligence background. He was born in Nebraska and raised in the prairie tradition of liberal populism by a Danish father who became state attorney-general and a Russian Jewish mother, who was an ardent feminist and pacifist. Sorensen was asked how to guard against the dangers of size, secrecy and the corruption of power, even in the office of the President.

THEODORE SORENSEN: The same thing that must be done to safeguard the Department of Justice and Internal Revenue Service and the White House staff itself against presidential corruption of the kind that occurred in the Nixon administration; namely, rules of accountability of the kind that I've been talking about, not only to the President, but to the Congress, and staffing with people of integrity and independence who have the courage to say no if they are ever asked to do anything wrong.

HOTTELET: Over the past thirty years, America has learned a great deal about intelligence and the dangers it poses for a democratic society. Director Sorensen's challenge is to help re-shape an agency which will move swiftly, secretly, effectively while staying within the moral code and the limits of the law.

Richard C. Hottelet, CBS News, New York.

TASS - Legionnaires
Disease

MYSTERIOUS DISEASE OR NEW WEAPON?

BORIS BANNOV

"All last week there were flag-draped caskets, tears and tolling bells — and a surge of atavistic fears clearly stemming from inherent memories of the plague and the pox," "Newsweek" in its August 16 issue quoted Dr. Leonard Bachman, the chief health officer of the State of Pennsylvania, as saying. People in Philadelphia were avoiding going anywhere near the homes of the victims of the fearsome unknown disease that had hit the city.

The thirty people who had died and the 150 who were hovering between life and death in hospitals had been present at the American Legion convention which brought together veterans of America's wars in Philadelphia three weeks earlier.

U.S. specialists have described the affliction as the most horrendous in the history of medicine. It kills as cruelly as mustard gas. After an incubation period of a few days, the patients are overcome by a sudden weakness, they are shaken by fever, and then comes asphyxiation. Postmortems attribute death to pulmonary congestion.

All efforts to find the disease carrier have failed so far. Dr. David Sencer, director of the Disease Control Centre in Atlanta, told the press that the analyses made totally exclude all hitherto known viruses and bacteria as possible pathogenic agents. Dr. Sencer believes that the disease is caused by some toxin.

So far there is no more accurate description of the cause than "killer bug," and the affliction has been termed "Legionnaires' disease."

"Whatever it is, it's one of the most dangerous things in the world," said Dr. Jay Staz, chief virologist of Philadelphia.

"What we know is really what we don't know," Dr. Sencer says.

"Investigation will take a year or two," was the comment of Dr. Bachman.

The problem, however, is whether

the "killer bug" will wait that long.

While the medical men, virologists, chemists and microbiologists are trying to establish the characteristics of the deadly virus or toxin, the U.S. press and the public have embarked on their own search.

Hints have appeared in the press that the tracks lead to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon. As was revealed during the recent investigations of CIA operations, the agency has on more than one occasion planned activity involving the use of toxins or other chemical substances injurious to health.

Recently some secret documents relating to a CIA long-term programme for testing on Americans (without their knowledge of course) chemical substances affecting the activity of the human brain have been published in the Washington press. The programme is code-named MKDELTA. The documentary evidence shows that CIA researchers have studied in recent years at least 139 chemical compounds in order to choose the most effective agents capable of paralyzing the human will with a view to extracting the needed information or facilitating recruitment, and of depriving the victim of his mental faculties, memory and ability to think independently.

So far it is not known how many of these substances have been tested on human guinea pigs or how many people have been involved in such experiments. The Washington correspondent of the Baltimore "Sun" says that practically all reports on the use of toxins in wholesale experimentation on human beings were destroyed on orders from former CIA director Richard Helms. However, a surviving document that has come to light relates to the purchase for the CIA from the Swiss Sandoz pharmacological company enough of the hallucinogen LSD to affect 100,000,000 people.

The documents show that experiments with chemical substances were conducted on inmates of the state prison at Vacaville, California. But similar inhuman experiments have been made without their knowledge on Americans at large.

"In a number of instances the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization," one report reads. In such cases CIA agents collaborated closely with the doctors in charge and the local police so as to conceal the real causes of the affliction from both the patients and the public, and to ensure the secrecy of the MKDELTA programme.

The report touches upon the death of biochemist Frank Olson, who in a state of mental disturbance, after being given LSD without his knowledge, committed suicide by jumping out of a window of a New York hotel. CIA documents that have been brought to light show that the agent who administered the drug to Dr. Olson was reprimanded by his chiefs for having given him an "overdose."

In this connection Americans recall that last year the CIA tested a system for the release of toxic and nerve gases at New York subway stations during rush hours.

Pentagon officials are similarly experimenting on human beings. According to a "New York Times" report, experiments with hallucinogens resulted in the death of the professional tennis player Harold Blauer, who was given a derivative of mescaline.

The U.S. press has on repeated occasions carried reports on experiments with chemical substances conducted on American servicemen.

Many Americans are now wondering whether the CIA and the Pentagon are not involved in what happened in Philadelphia. One assumption that has been made is that one or more of the participants in the American Legion convention had been engaged in some secret experiment under a programme like MKDELTA.

Is it a matter of an experiment getting out of hand or was it all deliberately planned?

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 3

THE BALTIMORE SUN
31 August 1976

Soviet sleuths blame CIA

By RAL PIPER

Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—Soviet radio propagandists have done a little detective work on the mysterious killer of 28 American Legionnaires in Philadelphia last month—and they say the clues point to the CIA.

The theory has not been advanced in any serious forum. But a broadcast beamed in English last week from Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress to Asia and Africa said that although virologists, chemists and microbiologists are stumped, "stubborn signals have appeared."

The broadcast noted news reports and congressional investigations into the use by the CIA and the Pentagon of various drugs and chemicals.

"Tests were made on American citizens without their knowledge," the broadcast said. Citing American press reports, it said that experiments with chemicals were carried out on American servicemen.

Since American Legionnaires are present and former servicemen, concluded Radio Peace and Progress, it may be that some of them were involved in the testing.

Thus, "documentary facts," the broadcast said, have "many Americans thinking with alarm that the CIA and the Pentagon may be responsible for the horrible events in Philadelphia."

TOP SECRET

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS ANALYSIS SERVICE

Date. 24 Aug 76
Item No. 10
Ref. No.

DISTRIBUTION I

FBIIS 53

PEACE AND PROGRESS SUGGESTS CIA LINK TO PHILADELPHIA DISEASE

LD244540 MOSCOW RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS IN ENGLISH TO 0510 1030 GMT
24 AUG 76 LD

(EXCERPTS) GREAT HORROR STILL PERSISTS IN PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEATH OF PEOPLE FROM SOME HORRIBLE UNKNOWN DISEASE. ALL 30 PEOPLE WHO DIED THE 150 WHO ARE IN THE HOSPITAL BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE AMERICAN LEGION IN PHILADELPHIA. SPECIALISTS CLAIM THAT THIS IS THE MOST HORRIBLE DISEASE IN AMERICAN MEDICAL HISTORY. ALL ATTEMPTS TO ISOLATE THE KILLER, WHETHER IT BE A VIRUS OR A TOXIN, DID NOT GIVE ANY RESULT. THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL CENTER OF CONTROL OVER DISEASES IN ATLANTA, DR (SPENCER), TOLD THE PRESS THAT ANALYSIS COMPLETELY EXCLUDED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE BEING FROM ANY 30 FOR KNOWN VIRUSES OR BACTERIA. (SPENCER) BELIEVES THAT THE DISEASE IS CAUSED BY SOME SORT OF TOXIN.

Comments:

Orig / American Legion
Disease

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the CIA Operations Center and of the appropriate analytic component in the Agency.

BUT WHILE THE MEDICS, THE VIROLOGISTS, CHEMISTS AND MICROBIOLOGISTS ARE LOOKING FOR THE HORRIBLE NEW VIRUS OR TOXIN, THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR OWN SEARCH. (ASTORBORN) SIGNALS HAVE APPEARED THE TRACES OF WHICH LEAD TO THE CIA AND THE PENTAGON. AS HAS BECOME KNOWN FROM THE PROCESS OF RECENT INVESTIGATIONS, THE CIA TIME AND AGAIN PLANNED OPERATIONS WITH THE USE OF TOXINS OR OTHER CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WHICH WERE FATAL TO THE PEOPLE ON A MASS SCALE. RECENTLY AN ABSOLUTELY SECRET PAPER OF THE CIA'S LONG-TERM PROGRAM WAS MADE PUBLIC FOR THE PRESS IN WASHINGTON REGARDING TESTS AND THE USE ON AMERICAN CITIZENS, WITHOUT THEIR KNOWLEDGE, OR CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WHICH CHANGED THE ACTIVITY OF THE BRAIN AND THE MENTALITY OF A PERSON. THE CODENAME OF THIS PROGRAM IS (MK DELTA). FROM THE DOCUMENTS IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE IN THE PAST YEARS HAS STUDIED AT LEAST 139 CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS, SEEKING THE MOST EFFECTIVE ONES FOR USE IN THEIR WORK WITH THE AIM OF PARALYZING THE WILL OF MAN WHEN HE IS BEING WORKED ON AND TO GIVE THE DESIRED INFORMATION WHEN RECRUITING. (WORDS INDISTINCT), TO DEPRIVE ONE OF MEMORY AND THE ABILITY TO THINK INDEPENDENTLY. IT IS UNKNOWN HOW MANY OF THESE SUBSTANCES WERE TRIED ON AMERICANS AND HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE INVOLVED IN SUCH EXPERIMENTS.

THE AMERICAN PRESS REPORTED TIME AND AGAIN THAT EXPERIMENTS WITH CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES WERE CARRIED OUT ON SERVICEMEN.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THESE DOCUMENTARY FACTS, MANY AMERICANS ARE THINKING WITH ALARM THAT THE CIA AND THE PENTAGON MAY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HORRIBLE EVENTS IN PHILADELPHIA. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SOMEONE OUT OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE AMERICAN LEGION CONFERENCE, FORMER AND PRESENT SERVICEMEN, WAS CONNECTED WITH THE CARRYING OUT OF ANOTHER SECRET EXPERIMENT UNDER AN (MK DELTA) TYPE OF PROGRAM.

24 AUG 1642Z BR/RB

5 Aug 76

~~SECRET~~
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COPIES TO LIAISON (2)

MORE ON CIA EXPERIMENTS WITH NARCOTICS

LD051331Y REF LD050132Y (MOSCOW ENGLISH NORTH AMERICA 042300--

CIA EXPERIMENTS WITH MIND MANIPULATION)

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 0025 GMT 5 AUG

76 LD

((TEXT)) WASHINGTON, 5 AUGUST, 5--THE DETAILS OF A MONSTROUS PROGRAM OF EXPERIMENTS ON PEOPLE IMPLEMENTED FOR MANY YEARS BY THE CIA HAVE BECOME KNOWN IN THE UNITED STATES,

THE PUBLIC ORGANIZATION "THE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIONS IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL SECURITY" HAS PUBLISHED 59 "TOP SECRET" CIA REPORTS WHICH DESCRIBE EXPERIMENTS TO STUDY THE EFFECTS OF NARCOTICS ON THE HUMAN ORGANISM, AS THESE DOCUMENTS SHOW, THE PROGRAM KNOWN UNDER THE CODE NAME "(MCULTRA AND MCDELTA)" WAS STARTED IN 1955 ON THE INITIATIVE OF THE CIA MANAGEMENT, APART FROM AGENTS OF THE SPY ORGANIZATION, WORKERS OF THE THEN EXISTING U.S. FEDERAL BUREAU ON NARCOTICS WHO HELPED IN THE EXPERIMENTS WERE

INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM,

THE CIA SET UP SPECIAL CENTERS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY FOR ITS EXPERIMENTS, ONE OF THESE CENTERS WAS FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND, WHERE EXPERIMENTS WERE CARRIED OUT ON MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE REPORTS SAY THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE PROGRAM ORGANIZERS, INJECTIONS OF NARCOTICS WERE ALSO GIVEN TO "REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL GROUPS, NATIVE AMERICANS AND FOREIGN CITIZENS," OFTEN THE "PATIENTS" DID NOT EVEN KNOW THEY WERE BEING USED FOR TESTS, "IN A NUMBER OF CASES," ONE OF THE REPORTS SAY, "THE SUBJECT BECAME ILL AND HAD TO BE HOSPITALIZED..."

WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF THE AUTHORITIES, THE CIA COMPLETED THE PROGRAM IN 1967, IN ADDITION TO NARCOTICS, THE DOCUMENTS SHOW, "OTHER MEANS OF CONTROLLING PEOPLE'S BEHAVIOR WERE FOUND, INCLUDING RADIATION, ELECTRIC SHOCK, PSYCHIATRY ETC."

FEARING PUBLICITY THE CIA LEADERS IN 1973 DESTROYED A LARGE PART OF THE ARCHIVES CONCERNED WITH THE EXPERIMENTS, HOWEVER, EVEN THE DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE LEFT AND WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED

CREATE A VIVID PICTURE OF THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA AGAINST AMERICANS, 050825 IRELAND/MC 05/1348Z AUG

BT

#1383

I thought it was the Russians who discovered the ~~plot~~ connection between behavior and psychiatry.

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

NNNN

Moscow Journalists

Paper in Moscow Links 3 U.S. Correspondents to the C.I.A.

MOSCOW, May 25 (UPI)—The Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta, in its issue for tomorrow, suggested that three American news correspondents accredited in Moscow were associated with the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

The correspondents were Christopher S. Wren of The New York Times, George Krinsky of The Associated Press and Alfred Friendly, Jr. of Newsweek.

Literaturnaya Gazeta, the publication of the Union of Soviet Writers, gave no evidence to support its allegation.

A United States Embassy spokesman denied the allegation.

"We certainly know of no journalist in this town who has any connection with the C.I.A.," the spokesman said.

In Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency said that pending study of the full Soviet article, it would stand by the statement by the embassy spokesman in Moscow that he knew of no American journalist in the Soviet capital with any C.I.A. connections; United Press International reported.

Much of the article, two full columns on page 9, quoted extensively from the American press about the alleged involvement of some newsmen with the C.I.A.

Of the three newsmen in Moscow, it said:

No Details on 'Letters'

"Their loyalty to the C.I.A. is surprisingly combined with their commitment to the free press."

The literary publication said it had received letters from readers in Moscow, Tbilisi and Tallinn, "confirming this."

"These letters concretely and convincingly described the hostile, subversive activity of these correspondents in plain clothes," Literaturnaya Gazeta said.

It gave no indication of who had sent such letters or what they contained.

"In particular," the article said, "the letters spoke about the heightened interest of these correspondents in certain information and objects that evidently exceeded the framework of the journalists' profession."

It added that the correspondents "do not bother their professional conscience" about journalistic ideals and alleged: "They receive their payments from places other than the cash offices of their newspapers."

A senior Western diplomat said the allegation was clearly "preposterous" but could not immediately offer any explanation for it. The three correspondents are competent in the Russian language and have worked in the Soviet Union for two years or more.

Although the Russians have often made accusations in the past against American and other foreign reporters accredited in Moscow, this was the first time in recent memory that the Russians have alleged any link between a correspondent and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Allegations Strongly Denied

The Associated Press, Newsweek and The New York Times each denied charges yesterday by the Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta that their Moscow correspondents were associated with the Central Intelligence Agency.

"It's ridiculous," said a spokesman for the A.P.

"Newsweek correspondents work for Newsweek only," a spokesman for Newsweek said.

In a statement, The New York Times Company said that "The Times emphatically denies the charge." The statement said that The Times had received assurances in the past from George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence, that no staff

member or employee of The New York Times was used operationally by the C.I.A. The Times said that it would once again seek to get assurances from Mr. Bush that no Times employees or part-time employees were involved in C.I.A. activities.

The Times said that if these assurances were not forthcoming, it would consider filing suit to compel the C.I.A. to make the information known. Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, publisher of The New York Times, said that the present C.I.A. policy of refusing to reveal its full association with American journalists had the effect of casting suspicion on all newsmen and making them "susceptible to any unsubstantiated charges that anyone might wish to bring against them."

Neither Mr. Krinsky nor Mr. Friendly could be reached for comment. Mr. Wren, speaking from The Times Moscow bureau, said that the charges were "totally fabricated."

"I am looking forward to having them present me with the evidence," Mr. Wren said.

Wren in Moscow 3 Years

Mr. Wren became Moscow bureau chief in December 1974 after a year as a Times correspondent in the Soviet Union. Before that he worked on the metropolitan staff in New York for a year. He came to The New York Times from Newsweek Magazine, where he was a general editor, and before that he worked at Look magazine. A graduate of Dartmouth College, he lives in Moscow with his wife and two children.

Mr. Krinsky joined the Associated Press in 1969. He worked for two years as a correspondent in Los Angeles and then on the world service desk in New York. He was transferred to the A.P. Moscow bureau in 1974. He is married and has one child.

Mr. Friendly worked for Newsweek in Chicago and Rome from 1962 to 1965. He then joined The New York Times and worked in Indonesia, Nigeria, Italy, and Yugoslavia. In 1972 he became counsel to the Senate subcommittee on intergovernmental relations. Two years later, he rejoined Newsweek as Moscow bureau chief. He is married with two sons.

STATEMENT BY TIMES

The following statement was issued yesterday by The New York Times Company:

The Soviet Literary Gazette, an official organ of the

U.S.S.R., alleged today that one of The New York Times correspondents in Moscow, Christopher Wren, was associated with the Central Intelligence Agency. The Times emphatically denies the charge, and Mr. Wren, reached in Moscow, said, "The charges are totally fabricated. I never worked for the C.I.A."

The basis of The Times's denial are Mr. Wren's own statement and two letters from George Bush, Director of the C.I.A., in response to queries directed to the agency by A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor, and Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, chairman and president of the company and publisher of the newspaper.

These letters were dated Feb. 3, 1976, and Feb. 9, 1976.

In the Feb. 3 letter, Mr. Bush reported that "no staff member or employee of The New York Times is used operationally by the C.I.A." A similar assurance to Mr. Sulzberger was made in the Feb. 9 letter in response to a request by The New York Times under the Freedom of Information Act. The Times was seeking to know if any of its employees or stringers had acted, knowingly or unknowingly, as United States intelligence agents or as informants for the United States intelligence community.

continued

nity. Mr. Bush's assurances dealt only with full-time staff members. Mr. Wren is a full-time employee.

"This event," Mr. Sulzberger said, "dramatically confirms The Times's view that The Times and all other news organizations cannot maintain their reputation for independence as long as the C.I.A. continues to obscure the facts by refusing to reveal its full association with American journalists. The present C.I.A. policy of withholding the full extent of these associations results only in casting suspicion on all newsmen and makes them susceptible to any unsubstantiated charges that anyone might wish to bring against them."

"It is essential that not only the readers of the newspaper but our news sources have assurance that they are dealing only with us and not with some secret branch of the Government," he added.

In the light of the latest developments The New York Times will, once again, seek to get the necessary assurance from Mr. Bush and the Central Intelligence Agency that none of its employees and stringers are involved in intelligence activities. In the event that such assurances are not forthcoming, The Times will consider filing a suit to compel the agency to make the information known.

WASHINGTON POST

27 MAY 1976

U.S. Scores Press-CIA Allegations

The United States will protest Soviet charges that three American news correspondents work for the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department said yesterday.

Named were Christopher S. Wren of The New York Times, Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek, and George Krinsky of The Associated Press.

"We deplore such irresponsible charges, particularly since the charges were published in the official journal of the Soviet Writers Union," Literaturnaya Gazeta, said State Department spokesman Frederick Z. Brown. He said the three are "highly respected professional journalists, and in our view the charges slander their reputations and the organizations they represent."

In Moscow, Wren said he has asked the editor of the writers' journal to document the charge.

BALTIMORE SUN
27 MAY 1976

Soviet adds details in linking 3 to CIA

Moscow (AP)—The Soviet publication that charged three Moscow-based American correspondents were associated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency added some details yesterday to its accusations.

In Washington, the State Department said it planned to protest the accusations against George A. Krimsky, correspondent of The Associated Press; Christopher S. Wren, bureau chief of The New York Times, and Alfred Friendly, Jr., correspondent for *Newsweek* magazine.

A State Department spokesman, Frederick Brown, said the three writers are "highly respected" and that the charges "slander their reputations and the organizations they represent."

All three correspondents and their news organizations denied any CIA involvement when the accusation was published Tuesday in the *Literary Gazette*, official organ of the Soviet Writers' Union.

In an interview with CBS News correspondent Richard Roth, the foreign editor of the weekly publication produced a dozen letters, purportedly written by Soviet citizens, that the editor said "point to the conclusion" that the three were in the service of the CIA.

The *Literary Gazette* editor, Oleg Prudkov, was quoted as saying a letter from an unnamed Moscow resident accused Mr. Krimsky of recruiting a young Soviet citizen to work for the official Tass news agency and subsequently receiving unauthorized "special material" from the agency with the employee's help.

Mr. Krimsky denied he recruited anyone or that he received unauthorized Tass material. "The whole thing is a trumped-up charge," Mr. Krimsky said. "I knew someone who worked for Tass but he was one of many Soviet acquaintances, and we transacted no illicit business."

27 MAY 1976

LETTERS ON C.I.A. SHOWN IN MOSCOW

Editor—in a CBS Interview
Says Readers Complained
About 3 U.S. Newsmen

MOSCOW, May 26 (AP)—The Soviet publication that suggested that three American correspondents here were associated with the United States Central Intelligence Agency added some details to its accusations.

The correspondents are George A. Krimsky of The Associated Press, Christopher S. Wren, bureau chief of The New York Times, and Alfred Friendly Jr. of Newsweek magazine. All three, and their news organizations, denied any C.I.A. involvement when the accusation appeared in the latest issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta, the weekly of the Soviet writers.

In an interview with Richard Roth, a CBS News correspondent, the foreign editor of the weekly produced a dozen letters, purportedly written by Soviet citizens, that the editor said "point to the conclusion" that the three were in the service of the C.I.A.

Link to Tass Charged

The editor, Oleg Prudkov, was quoted as having said a letter from an unnamed Moscow resident accused Mr. Krimsky of having recruited a young Soviet citizen to work for the official Tass press agency and thereby subsequently receiving unauthorized "special material" from the agency with the employee's help.

Mr. Krimsky denied that he had recruited anyone or that he had received unauthorized Tass material. "The whole thing is a trumped-up charge," Mr. Krimsky said. "I knew someone who worked for Tass but he was one of many Soviet acquaintances and we transacted no illicit business."

Mr. Roth said he had been told that, Mr. Wren, The New York Times correspondent, was accused of efforts to elicit information about Soviet troop and rocket strengths.

Mr. Wren said in comment to The Associated Press: "I would rather not comment until I hear from Literaturnaya Gazeta myself." He has formally asked the editors to show him the accusing letters.

Mr. Friendly of Newsweek, was accused of having tried to incite anti-Russian nationalist feelings in the republics of Estonia and Georgia, according to the interview with Mr. Prudkov.

"No, I have not done anything to oppose the Georgians to the Russian or Estonians to the Russians," Mr. Friendly said when asked.

A.P. Rejects Accusation

In New York, an Associated Press spokesman said "The Soviet charges are a complete fabrication. To begin with it is ridiculous to assume that Krimsky or any American correspondent would have the slightest influence on who might or might not work for Tass."

"All three correspondents are fluent in Russian and able to talk directly to the Russian people and have been in contact with the dissidents in Moscow."

"Soviet magazines and newspapers have trumped up charges in the past against foreign correspondents in Moscow who have been able, through their knowledge of languages, to deal directly with the Russian people, particularly dissidents. They hope in this way to intimidate the correspondents and cut off news sources with the Soviet people."

"The only difference this time is they are trying to tie the discussion in the United States about the C.I.A. to the situation in Moscow. The connection is entirely false."

Kenneth Auchincloss, managing editor of Newsweek, said: "We are confident that Friendly has no connection with the C.I.A."

State Department to Protest Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 26—

The State Department said today that it would protest to Soviet authorities against the article in Literaturnaya Gazeta suggesting that three American correspondents were closely allied with the Central Intelligence Agency.

The American Embassy, the three reporters and their organizations have all denied the allegation, and today the department said, "We deplore such irresponsible charges."

It said the three correspondents are "highly respected journalists, and the charges slander their reputations and organizations they represent."

"We plan to protest the charges," said the department spokesman, Frederick Z. Brown.

2
NEWSDAY
27 May 1976

Letters

CIA: No Newsmen Need Apply

Your editorial "A Case of Subversion From Within" (May 5) has come to my attention. In it you said my statement of last February 11 "seemed to promise that journalists would no longer be hired."

My statement said: "Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. new service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station. As soon as feasible, the agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy."

This policy is being carried out.

You may base the views in your editorial on statements in the Senate Select Committee report. The committee was working from brief and necessarily highly sanitized case summaries. We do not necessarily agree with their conclusions.

Although the body of your editorial says nothing about subversion, the caption over it does. I can assure you it has never been the intent, nor is it the intent now, nor will it be the intent in the future, for the CIA to attempt to "subvert" the American press.

George Bush, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.
TIMES
D 1,005,442 — S. 1,190,516
LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN AREA

1975

Colby Cites Dispute With Kissinger on Data Release

BY JACK NELSON
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—Commenting for the first time on his dismissal by President Ford as CIA director, William E. Colby said Wednesday that some Administration officials had disagreed with his "forward posture" in cooperating with congressional investigating committees.

Colby said that he and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had disagreed a number of times over release of information to the committees and that on one occasion the President had resolved the dispute.

Although Colby attempted to play down his differences with Administration officials as a factor in his dismissal, it is known that his failure to resist congressional demands for access to sensitive intelligence matters irritated some White House officials.

At times, Colby said Wednesday, Kissinger opposed his releasing certain information and at other times the secretary wanted to release information that Colby believed should be kept within the CIA.

Within the Administration, he said, "there were differences as to wheth-

er the forward posture was the right one."

White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen indicated Wednesday that any policy differences between Colby and Kissinger had not entered into the President's decision to dismiss Colby. Nessen said that the Cabinet "tensions" Ford had referred to were personal in nature rather than policy oriented.

Nessen said he had never heard Ford criticize Colby's handling of congressional investigations in discussing the CIA director's firing.

Speaking to a group of reporters, Colby said that he had declined Ford's offer to appoint him ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because of his professional background and "all of the hullabaloo over the CIA."

He explained that he "didn't think it was a good idea" for a person with his background in intelligence to take such a diplomatic post because of possible protest demonstrations

and other adverse reaction in NATO countries.

His rejection of the post leaves the President with another appointment to make in the immediate future. The Times has learned that NATO Ambassador David K. E. Bruce has informed Ford of his wish to leave NATO by the end of the year.

Colby refused to be drawn into the controversy over Ford's selection of a political figure, George Bush, as the new CIA director. "I don't think it's part of my responsibility to talk about that," he said.

However, Colby said he had high regard for Bush, head of the U.S. liaison office in Peking, and added that he thought there was nothing wrong with naming as director someone without a professional intelligence background.

Although opposition to the nomination of Bush, a former Republican National Committee chairman, is mounting in Congress, Colby said he did not expect a "substantial delay" in confirmation.

At Ford's request, Colby agreed to remain as director until Bush is confirmed. Colby said Wednesday that he hoped this would be some time in December. Asked whether he would remain as director indefinitely if confirmation was delayed, he said: "I think there would be a limit some place."

Ford Will Stick by Bush Nomination, Nessen Says

WASHINGTON (UPI)—President Ford will stick by his nomination of George Bush, former Republican National Committee chairman, as CIA director despite criticism from some

leading congressional Democrats, a White House spokesman said Wednesday.

Ron Nessen, Ford's press secretary, said that Ford did not consider Bush's political background a reason to drop the nomination and that persons who saw a conflict there were mainly "seeking the (presidential) nomination of their party and looking for headlines."

Nov 12 1975

Bush Is Too Partisan To Head CIA— Church

WASHINGTON (AP) — of the Democratic party) to The chairman of the Senate be a director of the CIA." intelligence committee said "We just can't have a Tuesday he would do his best director of the CIA who is to block confirmation of under active consideration for George Bush to head the CIA higher political office." because it would make "a Church told reporters in a travesty" of efforts to reform reference to Ford's refusal to rule out Bush as a possible running mate in 1976.

In a Senate speech, Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said confirmation of President Ford's choice of the former Republican party chairman to succeed the ousted William E. Colby would threaten the agency's ability to stand up to the White House and the Pentagon in policy disputes. "I will do my best" to block Bush's confirmation, Church also told reporters, including possibly calling Bush, now U.S. representative in Peking, as a witness before the intelligence committee, even though that panel does not have jurisdiction over the nomination.

"Can you imagine, in an election year, so partisan, a Senate Armed Services Committee said it seemed unlikely of the Republican party that hearings on the Bush nomination would be conducted until next year." Church asked his Senate colleagues. "I can just imagine what the uproar in this chamber would have been if a Democratic president had nominated Larry O'Brien (a former chairman of the Bush nomination) as the director of the CIA." Church has repeatedly criticized the Bush nomination, at the same time insisting that he "is a likable man" and "I find him to be a personal friend."

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.
TIMES

D. 1,005,442 — S. 1,190,516
LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN AREA

9 1975

Ford's appointment of George Bush to head the CIA is the last thing that agency needs. A highly partisan individual, such as the former chairman of the Republican National Committee, can only weaken further the agency's credibility. An experienced person from within the agency and with a neutral political background would be best suited for the job.

JEFFREY A. MANSFIELD
San Diego

I must say I am surprised at Sen. Frank Church's objection to the appointment of Bush as director of the CIA.

Bush is the logical—indeed, almost the inevitable—choice for the job. Who, after all, would know more about espionage than the former chairman of the Republican Party?

MICHAEL GROSSMAN
Newport Beach