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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:	Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:	White House Offices Files

OA/ID Number:	29179
Folder ID Number:	29179-009

Folder Title:
National Security Affairs (Transition)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	25	5	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Note	From GB to Brent Scowcroft Re: President Saleh of North Yemen (1 pp.)	1/12/89	(b)(1)	
02. Letter	From Fahad Bin Abdulaziz to GB Re: Relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. (Unofficial English translation) SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL (2 pp.)	1/19/89	(b)(1)	
03a. Note	From GB to JAB III Re: Note from Zbigniew Brzezinski (1 pp.)	11/21/88	P-5	
03b. Letter	From GB to Zbigniew Brzezinski Re: Nov 9 Memo [Open Upon Deed of Gift - March 16, 2015] (1 pp.)	11/21/88	PRM	
03c. Letter	From Zbigniew Brzezinski to GB Re: Attached Memorandum on Foreign Policy Strategy [Open Upon Deed of Gift - March 16, 2015] (1 pp.)	11/9/88	PRM	
03d. Memo	From Zbigniew Brzezinski to GB Re: Foreign Policy: A Strategic Agenda for the Bush Presidency [Open Upon Deed of Gift - March 16, 2015] (4 pp.)	11/9/88	PRM	
04. Note	From GB to Brent Scowcroft Re: Consultations w/Congress (1 pp.)	12/20/88	P-5	

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Affairs (Transition)

Pinksheet Number: KO0514
OA/ID Number: 29179-009
Date Closed: 11/30/2004
FOIA/Sys Case #: 1998-0004-F[1]
Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Letter	From George Schultz to GB Re: Security Assistance program (2 pp.)	12/19/88	P-5	
06a. Memo	From John Sununu to Tony Lopez Re: Robert Gates (1 pp.)	1/6/89	P-5	
06b. Memo	From Brent Scowcroft to John Sununu Re: Portal-to-Portal Transportation for Robert Gates (1 pp.)	1/3/89	(b)(7)(c)	

Page 2 of 2

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

file

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, DC

January 10, 1989

General Scowcroft,

This is the memorandum
that Governor Sununu discussed
with you.

Linda Casey



National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Washington, D.C.
20546

Office of the Administrator

January 6, 1989

Memorandum for the Record

The enclosed letter to a member of my staff is from Dr. John McElroy who served as co-chairman with Brent Scowcroft on a study of civil space policy for the Bush Administration.

McElroy makes two recommendations I feel are worth serious attention: he recommends a particular form and membership for the new Space Council, and he urges that the NASA Administrator be the responsible focal point for all civil space matters throughout the Cabinet departments and agencies. In my opinion, if these recommendations are accepted, President-Elect Bush will be able to attract and retain from the private sector absolutely first-rate talent for both the NASA Administrator's job and that of the Space Council Executive Secretary.

I believe Brent Scowcroft's views on these matters will be extremely important since so much of civil space has profound implications for foreign policy and national security in the largest sense.

For the record, I disassociate myself from the marked paragraph on the last page of McElroy's letter; as I have already indicated, I believe I have done my part in restoring the civil space program to a position of both successful current performance and deliverable future promise, and it is time for other hands at the tiller. I will, of course, do whatever I can to effect a smooth transition with the new Administration.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jim F", with a stylized flourish at the end.

James C. Fletcher

Enclosure



The
University of Texas
at
Arlington

Office of Dean of Engineering
Box 19019
Arlington, Texas 76019
Metro 817-273-2571

December 9, 1988

Mr. David Williamson Jr.
Office of the Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
400 Maryland Ave.
Room F7119
Washington, DC 20546

Dear David,

Since we last talked I returned to Texas; I am enjoying greatly a new career in academia. The Dallas-Fort Worth area isn't the same as El Paso was thirty years ago, but Texas is always pleasant. The contrast with government and industry isn't anywhere as bad as it is often perceived. Large organizations require bureaucracies, and the similarities vastly outweigh the differences.

For the last year Brent Scowcroft and I have been co-chairing the steering committee on a space policy study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). CSIS will be briefing various administration people over the next few weeks using the charts that are attached. Last week, for example, they briefed Bob Guttman, who I am told Vice-President Elect Quayle has asked to collect information regarding the National Space Council and what tasks it might undertake.

As with all committee activities, the result tends to resemble a composite of many views, rather than a coherent whole. I won't go over the committee charts, because you can readily read them and form your own opinion. In overseeing this work and reviewing it with knowledgeable people, I believe, however, there is a modest, but very important, variant on the CSIS study that is worth your consideration. In the next few paragraphs, I will try to convey the gist of the idea.

My starting point is simple. The civil space policy business is a mess. It is a mess because there is no focus of responsibility, and because there are too many people who are permitted to influence policy, but who have no truly legitimate role. I experienced this all too vividly in the 1982-1985 period when I ran the weather satellite program in the Department of Commerce.

Peripheral officials in my own department and in the Departments of Transportation, Interior, Justice, Agriculture, and others exerted an influence that was wholly out of proportion to their governmental responsibilities. Equally important, the role of space matters was so small in the context of their department's overall interests and responsibilities, that it was never treated as a significant matter having national importance. Consequently, in spite of occasional lip service, little senior management attention was paid to it, and all too often the

responsibility for participating in space policy activities was delegated to unknowledgeable people, whose actions were then untempered by any effective oversight. Of course, in such circumstances, OMB almost always wins.

My next point of departure is equally simple; if the space policy mess is ever to be straightened out, it can only be done under a transition, when so many new players are brought in, and when the situation is most fluid. In the current circumstances, the establishment (or reestablishment, if you prefer) of the National Space Council creates a further opening that I believe can be exploited.

There are two issues in my opinion. First, what is the government-wide role of the NASA Administrator? Second, what is the role of the National Space Council?

My proposition, and that of the CSIS study as well, is that the NASA Administrator must be the Executive Branch focal point for all civil space matters. He must occupy the same position on space matters that the DCI occupies on intelligence matters. The CSIS study recommends that this be achieved by Executive Order, and that the Administrator carry the additional title of Assistant to the President for Civil Space.

The added title is a departure from the DCI analogy, and may be undesirable, if the Administrator is then lumped with other Assistants to the President under the authority of the White House Chief of Staff. Under the current statute, the Administrator reports directly to the President, and it would be most unfortunate if that access were lost, simply by making the Administrator part of the White House bureaucracy.

Therefore, my preference, and the recommendation of others whose judgement I respect as well, is to follow the DCI analogy to the letter, especially in the matter of the NASA Administrator being the official who assembles the total governmental civil space budget and presents it to the President and OMB. This should be a unified perspective that includes all space-related activities of Commerce, Transportation, Interior, Agriculture, etc. As is always the case, the Cabinet Secretaries could appeal around the Administrator to the President, but any such actions would be couched in terms of an appeal, rather than being a voice of equal authority to the Administrator.

The second matter is the role of the National Space Council. My version flows directly from the above definition of the responsibility of the NASA Administrator. First, I believe that the most pressing need for the National Space Council to address is the coordination of defense-related and NASA activities, notably in launch vehicles. You will see in the CSIS charts, that it is proposed that the Council oversee a major study on access to space that looks at a 20-year horizon. That seems like a good idea.

Second, I believe that membership in the National Space Council should be limited to those who actually have substantive responsibilities in space activities. Therefore, I propose the following membership. Per the various statements made during the campaign, the Vice President should serve as chairman. Beyond that, and in contradiction to campaign statements, the only members should be the Secretary of the Air Force, DCI, and the NASA Administrator. In his role as the focal point for all civil space matters, the Administrator would represent the other Cabinet departments.


I would not have Cabinet Secretaries or members of the White House staff (e.g., Director of OMB and Science Advisor) sitting as members of the Council. First of all, Cabinet Secretaries will never attend the meetings after the kick-off session in any event. Second, if, as the CSIS study proposes, the Secretary of Defense were to attend, he would be the only Cabinet member, and would exercise an undue influence. The Secretary of the Air Force is delegated all significant military responsibility in space, and is the person who would have a genuine interest in the Council. Third, the function of staffing the Council could be assigned to OSTP, and the Science Advisor could maintain his knowledge of its activities through his staff. Fourth, and finally, having the OMB Director sit on the Council gives him two opportunities to inject very narrow concerns, and to thwart consensus. In this scheme, only those with direct operational authority over a federal space budget would have a seat at the table.

I believe that Jim Fletcher has a unique opportunity to establish a dramatically improved civil space policy and management structure. It would strengthen his hand for his continuing tenure and leave a strong legacy for his successor when he eventually chooses to step down. If this time of flux is not utilized, I see no possibility of the United States digging itself out of the current space policy mess. I advocate most strongly that the Administrator use whatever ties he has to Mr. Bush to gain this important improvement in the national space policy structure.

Because I am stepping outside of my co-chairman's role in sending you this, you should treat this only as my opinion, rather than that of a CSIS recommendation. I have also not shown this to my co-chairman, although our dealings would lead me to suspect that he would endorse the general sentiments. Also, as my only ambitions are simply to build a strong College of Engineering here at UTA, I have no personal axe to grind in this matter. I have no need for attribution to me of any of these thoughts. Use them or reject them as you see fit. Obviously, I am not unaware of how much easier it is to be a kibitzer, instead of having real responsibility in these matters.

I hope you and your family have the very best of holiday seasons. I am sure you are carrying a heavy load in NASA, and from an outsider's perspective it is hard to see where it can be very much fun. You all seem determined to prove to us NASA veterans that we should be relieved to be out of the target zone. I hope that perspective is wrong, and that you really are finding considerable satisfaction in your tasks, rather than simply a plethora of problems.

Best personal regards,


John H. McElroy
Dean of Engineering

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20270

January 17, 1989

TO: Brent Skowcroft

FROM: John Sununu

More on Eveland file.

EXPRESS MAIL

Info Copy

Post Office Box 186
Waverly, MA 02179
December 30, 1988

Richard C. Morris, Esquire
24131 Summerhill Avenue
Los Altos, California 94040

(415-948-2582)

Dear Dick:

The enclosed letter was handed to John Sununu after he completed a press conference in Concord. At that time, I told his secretary that a copy would be sent to you but that I would not file for a Rule 65(b) Temporary Restraining Order against George Shultz until John had an opportunity to contact me and you had an opportunity to discuss this option with Judge Clark.

On Wednesday, in the wake of the PA 103 bombing, I felt very much as I did on August 20, 1982 when the issue of sending U.S. troops to Lebanon was being debated. Following the meeting Judge Clark arranged for me with Raymond Tanter of the NSC staff, I left at the White House a copy of a letter describing the events that had caused me to flee Los Altos in May 1982. It opened up a new vista of the problems Presidents Carter and Reagan had inherited from the Vietnam and Watergate eras. Had I been wrong in 1982, both my personal credibility and the forecasts I made on pages 342-43 of Ropes of Sand would have been discredited.

Following our September 22, 1982 meeting in the White House basement, I provided you with affidavits, mailgrams, photographs, and tape recordings as evidence that my life had been in danger in Santa Clara, San Bruno, and Monterey Counties until I abandoned my Mustang and used an assumed name to fly to Washington. I can now prove that Daisy's fate and my own life were linked to the presence of Stanford Technology, Inc. (by then associated with Vinnell Corporation) in nearby Los Gatos. Secord, Hakim, Erich von Marbod, Shackley, Clines, and other Iran-contra figures were well aware of my location and activities. Robert Neil Gellatly, Daisy's brother-in-law, who grew up with von Marbod in Wenatchee, was the link between 22301 Larkellen Lane and Los Gatos, so he had to recover that Mustang. Remember our January 1983 correspondence while I was in East Hampton? Secord also wrote me; he then resigned.

From your copy of my June 8, 1988 motion to the First Circuit Court of Appeals you can see how these things have continued to affect me. After Judge Clark left as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (six days before we lost the 241 men in Beirut) and the two of you moved to Interior your letter to me of March 19, 1984 acknowledged that my contributions to the efforts for solutions in the Middle East had been perceptive of future events and of substance.

The day after you wrote me I was in Washington and was approached by Eleazer A Williams who had been the CIA's chief of station during the April 30-July 13, 1975 period when my passport was con-

December 30, 1988

fiscated, I was incarcerated in a maximum security prison, and then ejected from the American embassy to live on the streets. The explanation was that Singapore's police and military intelligence service are under Israeli control.

Singapore's dictator, Lee Kwan Yew is, like former Libyan prime minister Mustafa Ben Halim, a close friend of Secretary Shultz. I mentioned Bechtel's corruption in Libya in my book, but I ended it effectively on April 30, 1975, the day Saigon fell (pages 332-39) because I knew there had to be good reasons for the attempts on my life in Singapore. I can now prove them.

Secretary Kissinger had to know about our relations with Israel in Singapore and this is the genesis of my suit against Shultz. I would never have gone to Singapore to sue Chase Manhattan had not Shultz, then executive vice president of Bechtel Group, not collaborated with the CIA and Vinnell Corporation to use fabricated CIA and FBI charges that I was a traitor to induce J. Robert Fluor to fire me as the Middle East vice president based in Riyadh of the company that had just taken over Aramco contracts Bechtel had held since 1940. Fluor Corporation is Bechtel's largest American competitor but the Parsons Corporation is the one Bechtel hoped to outbid in a January 1983 tender to rebuild Beirut for \$30 billion.

That prompted Shultz's May 18, 1983 Israeli-Lebanese "withdrawal agreement." It failed, and Judge Clark knows all that is needed to expose the Bechtel pipeline from Iraq to Aqaba that I mentioned in my letter to John Sununu. The President is now being importuned to punish Libya and Iraq again; rumors are rife that Syria was involved in the PA 103 bombing.

My reasons for raising these things at this time are not related to personal retaliation or retribution. For six years you have known of my belief that the Oval Office is the symbol of our greatness, no matter who occupies it.

President Reagan can emulate President Eisenhower in 1956 and end up with a Nobel Peace Prize by joining with Michael Gorbachev to demand that the United Nations supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Unless that devastated country is able to govern itself, there can be no "comprehensive peace" as the President advocated on December 14. If Israel is forced to leave south Lebanon, nine Americans held hostage may be released and President-elect Bush can then end 40 years of conflict and bring peace to the Middle East. We owe this to the three faiths that hold Jerusalem sacred. That's the theme of my now-completed Jerusalem the Golden.

Sincerely,

cc: John H. Sununu


Wilbur Crane Eveland III

GENERAL

Other than the enclosures to the letter I delivered to John Sununu (enclosed for your information), I have hurriedly assembled others from the three briefcases I was able to avoid putting in storage on September 23 when I had three hours in which to vacate the cottage I had occupied in Marion since April 1984. These things, including my computer and the disks upon which I have my new book, will be sold at auction unless I find means to pay the packing and storage charges.

When I returned to Marion from Washington and New York on May 14, 1988, I found a notice that I was to be evicted and that my home had been searched without a warrant. This was prompted by a letter I wrote to my landlord explaining that I had filed suit in the Southern District of New York against Ed Meese, et al. on March 21, 1988 -- the same day the PLO offices were to be closed. On the 10th, the PLO had offered to publish Ropes of Sand in an Arabic edition. Since I have never seen the translation done in Damascus in 1984 and have been refused copies by the CIA and State, I saw no reason why I should not do this.

I filed a civil action against my landlord in the state court on June 16 and was prepared to serve him until he agreed that I might remain until Labor Day and obtain a winter rental. By then, he filed a civil process for eviction which should have been subordinate to my civil action. The judge ruled otherwise. A major loss was my "free telephone" which had been allowed to operate since May 1986 with an accumulated bill of over \$4,000.00. That "service" started at the time I was sponsored by the Bishop of Massachusetts and the Presiding Bishop's office to go to Syria and negotiate with Assad for the release of the American hostages.

To stop this, Shultz had Robert B. Oakley call me and then the Presiding Bishop's office to quote Ambassador Bill Eagleton as saying my life would be in danger if I went to Damascus. Bob Oakley, Carlucci's Princeton classmate, was then ambassador-at-large for counter terrorism. When I talked to Eagleton after his return in January 1987, Bill denied he had even made this statement to Oakley.

This fits in with the role Oakley played when he flew to Germany to meet the TWA hostages and warned spokesman Allyn Conwell that if he spoke of "no retaliation or retribution" the plane would not land at Andrews Field. A new spokesman was appointed for the White House meeting. This can be confirmed by James Baker who knows W. V. Ballew Jr. of the Houston firm of Baker & Botts. Bill Ballew arranged that Conwell and I get together and co-author a book about the TWA hijacking. Houghton Mifflin had made such a proposal to Conwell but when I sent by air freight a copy of a sample chapter Houghton Mifflin backed out.

Robie Macauley, Houghton Mifflin's editor in chief was formerly with the CIC and CIA and had withdrawn an earlier offer to publish my Jerusalem the Golden. I'm only assuming that wire taps and communications intercepts can be authorized so long as the

fabricated CIA and FBI files allege that I was a key informant for Kim Philby.

Judge Webster can confirm or deny this. He can also read the original allegation of November 1961, a month after Allen Dulles retired and Steve Bechtel's former partner, John A. McCone, took over as DCI.

It was not until I reached Kansas from East Hampton and received on September 8, 1983 a partial response to my Privacy Act appeal of March 21, 1977 that I first knew of the Philby allegations. This was the memorandum written while I was in Changi prison in Singapore. Then, in July 1985, I received the Vinnell memo of January 7, 1977. This was written while Geroge Bush was DCI, but the Washington Post exposed earlier this year the fact that Henry Kissinger had kept from Bush (as well as Bill Colby) the most sensitive information. Vice President Bush could confirm this as well as Brent Scowcroft who took over the NSC when President Ford made Kissinger settle for State alone.

An important document is the FBI memorandum that deals with my activities in Panama in 1942 and my role in the expulsion of Commander Sergius Martin Riis. Riis went on to become a leader in the Venice-based Temple Mountain Trust. This is the one that still exists and could be the next move of a frustrated Shamir-Sharon effort to break up our relations with the PLO. At the time I was in Central America, the ADL operated much like the Gestapo. The FBI, however, used the ADL as a source of informants and continues to do so.

In no other way can you account for Judge Webster's statement of December 10, 1985 warning that Arab-Americans, Arab diplomats, and those who opposed Israel's policies were living in a "zone of danger." This includes John Sununu and Senator Mitchell, both of Lebanese-American heritage. I have qualified at least since I caught Chaim Herzog spying and recruiting Jordanians in Washington in 1953-54. Bedell Smith at State and Bobby Cutler at the NSC importuned me to gather the information the FBI wanted to use to declare Herzog persona non grata. His brother-in-law, Ambassador Abba Eban, and Shimon Peres, then director general of the ministry of defense, enabled Herzog to be replaced by the military attache from London and escape untarnished. Jonathan Jay Pollard was the next one to be caught red-handed.

How could Shultz ignore Webster's statement about Alex Odeh who was murdered in Santa Ana and deny Arafat a visa because of Leon Klinghoffer who took the wrong cruise on an Italian ship? Now Shultz is ignoring Eban's March 16, 1988 statements about the PLO and Israel having been since 1948 the strongest small state in history? This has been true since at least 1952 when I was assigned to Army G-2 to compare the relative strengths of the Arab armies against the Israelis. What we really have is Jewish terrorists killing Americans, distributing drugs, and then going to Israel where we can't extradite them. Again, they serve as informants on former Nazis.

This was true in 1981-82 when the Sephardic Israeli mafia of some 2,000 was extorting from Jews and Arabs and described as the largest cocaine distributors in five major cities. I know that Kissinger and Sinatra were fronting for the Las Vegas mafia that had just purchased the Inn at Pebble Beach when I was hot in Monterey.

Had my district court case not been dismissed on May 1, 1987, I would have been able to introduce the affidavit from Edwin P. Wilson. This shows Secord, von Marbod, Shackley, and Clines involved in drugs with Samozza before the Sandinista took over. Who protected Secord and von Marbod? Frank Carlucci. He was deputy DCI when Stansfield Turner was persuaded to try to stop my book by invoking U.S. v. Snapp, as it was crossfiled from Snapp v. U.S. but never argued.

Carlucci learned his trade in the Congo and was in Elizabethville when I quit over the plan to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. It was in the Katanga Province that Tshombe and Mobutu had Lumumba murdered. Frank was then expelled from Zanzibar but went on to B. zil to learn about coups from Vernon Walters. Kissinger sent Carlucci to Lisbon where another coup was involved. When Walters left as deputy DCI, Frank took over.

If Judge Webster will release the whole file on the December 1, 1955 Byelorussian Democratic Republic, you will find that these people came through a "rat line" in Iran and were involved in Kim Roosevelt's 1953 Ajax Operation. Walters helped set this up when he accompanied Averill Harriman on a trip for Truman to make sure that Mossadeq made no headway in Washington.

I now know that my district court case was dismissed on May 1, 1986 just after my judge, A. David Mazzone, handed out an unprecedented \$22 million contempt of court fine against Lyndon LaRouche. At that time, Kissinger was scheduled to appear as a government witness and he was a defendant in my case. The contempt citation gave the IRS a hunting license in Virginia and produced the Eastern District Case in which you testified. Judge Clark knows that La Rouche's Project Juarez conflicted with North's Project Democracy. You also testified at the NBC trial, didn't you?

If you add my background going back to Panama in 1942, my Middle East experience from 1949 until 1975, and my White House service in 1955 to that of Charles Richard Crane who was the first American King Abdül Aziz ever met and from whom he got the oil concession that became Aramco, there is a lot of family history involved. Some of this was communicated to Vice President Bush in my letters starting on July 14, 1982. It might be worthwhile seeing if Donald Gregg turned over to William Eckert the task of answering me instead of informing the Vice President of my warnings about not sending troops to Lebanon.

My biggest problem stems from not overthrowing the Syrian government on October 29, 1956. If I had, Iraq would have had Syria and Israel the Lebanese waters they didn't divert until 1982.

Finally, the thing that made me hottest in Los Altos was my 1980 proposal to write a book about Iran with Ya'acov Sharett which would have blown Iran-contra before it ever got started. This was known to Richard V. Allen at Hoover, and possibly to Shultz who kept his Stanford post while with Bechtel.

Neill Gellatly stole the proposals I was going to send express mail to two major publishers the night he broke into my poolside office. That produced the confrontation that caused me to do as Daisy asked and move in with her sister in Menlo Park.

The book with former Foreign and Prime Minister Moshe Sharett's only son would have proved how Shimon Peres made the 1954 deal with France that started the 1956 Suez war. I was used to get Eden to agree, after his summit with Bulganin and Khrushchev was sabotaged by British SIS, and the plan that I pull a Syrian coup followed. George Kennedy Young, who was the deputy director of SIS, sent Philby to Beirut and then urged him to defect in 1963 to avoid a collapse of the British government. Young is still loose and is a major reason Mrs. Thatcher banned Spycatchers. Young and Victor Rotschild be Israeli agents and may still be.

Miles Copeland, in my book, gathered up Archie Roosevelt and Arnaud deBorchgrave (who had tagged me with Philby in November 1987) to support George Bush for president. I'm sure he was wise to this plan to bring back the old clandestine operators. In any case, Copeland was on British radio yesterday claiming that he would have no trouble rounding up the PLO men who set the bomb on PA 103. This leaves a huge question in my mind!

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 13, 1982

Dear Mr. Eveland:

Thank you for the letter of July 14, 1982. I appreciate your willingness to share your ideas with me.

Regarding the issue of U.S. troops, you should recognize that the President decided in principle to introduce a small contingent of marines only if certain conditions are met, such as an explicit agreement among the contending parties, multinational participation, etc.

The President is well aware of the risks involved in the use of American forces and thus seeks to minimize these risks prior to any decision to send the forces.

Please feel free to contact my staff if you wish to follow up your ideas further. In this regard, Mr. Raymond Tanter, at 395-5697, would be happy to meet with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William Clark". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized "C" at the end.

William P. Clark

Mr. Wilbur Crane Eveland
124 7th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20003

Rec'd 9/20/82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1982


Dear Mr. Eveland:

William P. Clark, who is currently away from Washington, has asked that I respond to your letters to him dated August 19 and 20, with enclosures relating to your Kuwait News Agency story, an autographed copy of your book, Ropes of Sand, and a copy of a personal message.

Judge Clark has had opportunity to examine only portions of your autobiography. The portions which have been read are fascinating. Certainly the history of crucial events related in the book is invaluable. Judge Clark expresses his gratitude and asks that I thank you for the gift of his copy of the book and the autographed copy you forwarded to the President on September 7.

The copy of the personal message enclosed with your letter of August 20 tells an equally fascinating story, but one not then complete. Judge Clark is unable to comment, of course, and hopes those to whom the message was addressed have been able to assist in reaching some resolutions. By this late date there certainly must be some improvement in your situation, and we would be interested in being further advised.

Sincerely,



Richard C. Morris
Special Assistant to
William P. Clark

Mr. Wilbur Crane Eveland
124-B 7th Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003



United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

March 19, 1984

Mr. Wilbur Crane Eveland
P.O. Box 748
Marion, Massachusetts 02738


Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of January 25, advising of events that have affected and will continue to affect your perceptions and performances. Your contributions to the effort for solutions in the Middle East were not only perceptive of future events, but, indeed, were of substance. Perhaps your admonitions should have been better heeded.

I am indeed sorry to learn of your medical problem, and do hope that the condition can be controlled.

My best wishes.

Sincerely,


Richard C. Morris



the
Episcopal Diocese
of
Massachusetts

The Right Reverend John B. Coburn, D.D.
The Rt. Rev. David E. Johnson, D.D.

6 June 1986

Mr. Wilbur Crane Eveland, III
P.O. Box 748
Marion, Massachusetts 02738

Dear Bill:

I do not know the eventual outcome, but it seems to me you have been heard, in Washington, Damascus and "815" New York City. Not much else to do now, I guess, but pray. I have continued to do that, and who knows, may be we will all be surprised.

This is just to assure you that I have never felt pushed or in an inappropriate situation in all this. My major concern is that we all do the correct act - free hostages, and make peace!

Hang in there. Maybe we will write another chapter err long.

Faithfully yours,

David E. Johnson

DEJ:cm



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

July 16, 1982

Mr. Wilbur C. Eveland
124 7th Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Mr. Eveland:

On behalf of the Vice President, I want to thank you for your letter concerning the situation in Lebanon.

We are deeply saddened by the violence in the Middle East. The United States Government has joined in a call for an immediate and simultaneous cessation of all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border, and for withdrawal of Israeli military forces. The United States is engaged in intensive diplomatic activity to bring about these conditions as soon as possible.

A return to the previous conditions in Lebanon would not serve the interests of any of the parties concerned. There must be restoration of the full sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Lebanon on the one hand and the protection of Israel's security on the other.

Our efforts are consistent with the long standing United States policy to end the violence and achieve a just and lasting peace for all the peoples of the Middle East.

With the Vice President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

William D. Eckert
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Military Assistant/Aide
to the Vice President

P.S. My Dad, as Vice Commander of Tactical Air Command, led the composite air strike force that went from the U.S. to Lebanon in 1958. I have read the report of the King-Crane Commission, admired it as a truly American document, and wish more people would read it.

Review of *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*, by George Weller, in the January 14, 1983 edition of the Rome Daily American. During the 1950s and '60s, Weller covered the Middle East for the Chicago Daily News, before retiring in Italy.

Wilbur Crane Eveland's diplomatic accounting ranks as a classic

George Weller

Daily American

ROME — In the two years since *Ropes of Sand* appeared, the story of Wilbur Crane Eveland as diplomat, military attache and CIA amateur in the Middle East, it has become a classic. The more sand of experience its readers have in their shoes, scalps and fingernails, the less they dare to criticize its details. *Ropes of Sand* is an immense credit to the publishing house of W.W. Norton & Co. It deserves to stand with three other American classics in a terrain formerly dignified largely by British talent: the 767-page *Suez* (McGraw Hill) by Kennett Love, once a *New York Times* correspondent; *Terror Out of Zion* by Professor J. Bowyer Bell of Harvard, MIT and Columbia (a documentation of the bloody birthright of Begin, Shamir, and Sharon); and *The Assault on the Liberty* (Random House) by Lt. Comdr. James Ennis, U.S. Navy retired, the cryptographer of that tragedy of censorship, American political cowardice, and naval incompetence that cost 34 American lives (or only 10 lives, if you believe *Vantage Point*, the whitewashing autobiography of Lyndon Johnson).

If *Ropes of Sand* has sold 15,000 copies, perhaps 60,000 Americans have read it. Yet for all but perhaps 5,000 capable of understanding it — a number, possibly doubled or tripled since the events in Lebanon — even its faultlessly clear prose is not enough to overcome confusion about boundaries, national histories, and all those funny names.

The vast majority of readers know nothing about Middle East intrigues going on under their noses in Washington and even less about those at the scene itself. Juvenal, before the succession of Arabian emperors to the Roman throne, grew so fed up with Eastern intrigues that he cried: "The Orontes flows into the Tiber!" In 1947, Begin's Irgun terrorists bombed the British Embassy near Piazza San Giovanni. Who knows why?

Why, then, did Bill Eveland bother? What chance did his years-long personal story have to compete with the material produced by the endless parade of ignorant, history-poor writers and cameramen who fly from New York to Israel, clear their credentials with the Israeli Defense Force, thereby pass into Lebanon, and sit through a lazy weekend in Israel's East Beirut while 15 minutes' walk away, between them and the airport, a thousand Palestinian refugees are systematically slaughtered?

To write a very good book requires money, and time, and a high purpose. Eveland's purpose is confessional: thus his subtitle *America's Failure in the Middle East*.

This work represents his effort to balance his family's books. Eveland inherited a moral account to square, and bears its mark in his middle name — which is also an honorable Midwestern name — of "Crane." He gave it to his son.

The Crane relevant to Eveland's book came from a family of corned brothers, like the Eisenhowers. At the behest of Woodrow Wilson, whom he trusted, Charles Richard Crane of Wisconsin, an industrialist rich in experience in Russia and China, went into the Middle East in mid-1919. Wilson had already decided that in Europe the old empires were to be broken up and given back to their "liberated" peoples. But what about the Middle East, where Britain, France and Italy

already had earmarked secretly the oil, soil and peoples for themselves? Would the Arabs accept that? Wilson asked Crane.

Crane came back with the word that the various Arab peoples wanted to be free of all masters. What they especially did not want was the imposition of a Jewish Zionist state (promised by both imperial Germany and Britain to their Jewish citizens). However, instead of giving the Arab majorities the same deal as the Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs and Poles, Wilson hearkened to the advice of a Jewish pressure party from the Harvard Law School. It consisted of two judges, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter (both later Supreme Court appointees) and their

bined heat simply blew Crane's plea into Wilson's pigeonhole, where it remained secret until 1922.

Crane was not the only loser to the rising wind from the Harvard Law School (where, according to the study *The Harvard Mystique*, half the students and the dean are now Jewish). His fellow-loser was Henry Morgenthau, a Jew whom Wilson sent as ambassador to defeated Turkey to persuade the hardup Turkish sultan to sell Palestine to the Zionists. Morgenthau, like Crane, blew himself out of Wilson's favor with his dissent:

"Zionism is the most stupendous fallacy in Jewish history. I assert that it is wrong in principle and sterile in its spiritual ideas. Zionism is a betrayal, an Eastern

published documents and became a restaurant owner in Rome. He was unlike Morgenthau's junior, Henry, who became a Zionist Cato, demanding defeated Germany be destroyed, like a camp of Palestinian refugees.

Three years ago, before the name of Gen. Sharon was known to the world, our Crane had learned enough to write prophetically:

"Claiming that its survival is still threatened by the presence of Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon, Israel continues to bomb, strafe, and invade Lebanese territory. It would be naive to believe that such a policy will make the Palestinians any more tractable."

Well, what took Eveland that far? He couldn't do it on genes alone. If he had hit in the Kissinger period, the Herr Doctor (from Harvard, naturally), would have blown him to Paraguay as swiftly as Wilson got rid of Crane and the senior Morgenthau. If David Niles failed to finger him, Clark Clifford or Alexander Haig, ardent Zionists both, would have busted him early.

But Eveland slipped through by arriving early, like his ancestor; he arrived in the 1950s when John Foster Dulles was running the Department of State, and his brother Allen the CIA. It was a freak period, when Eisenhower was able to get Israel out of Sinai and Gaza in 125 days just by whispering "sanctions" to Ben Gurion. (No five years of Camp David at \$2.5 billion each, without undoing Gaza and the West Bank.)

With the blind luck of enthusiastic novices, Eveland found himself, though nominally a low-ranking military observer, being sucked upward first into Foster's diplomacy and then into Allen's gentlemanly subversion

It was a well-meaning aunt who reminded Eveland the young military attache that, being a Crane, he should study Arabic. He moved east. He was unlike Morgenthau's junior Henry, a Zionist Cato, demanding defeated Germany be destroyed.

ideologue and teacher in Zionism, Jacob de Haas, British editor of Boston's *Jewish Advocate* and a bitter rival of Chaim Weizman for the first presidency of Israel-to-be.

This team, representing votes and money, (Brancheis was supporting Frankfurter financially and took him to Europe to buttonhole Britain's Lord Balfour, a self-proclaimed Zionist), was too powerful for Crane. Their com-

European proposal, fathered in this country by American Jews. If they were to succeed, [it] would cost the Jews of America most of what they have gained of liberty, equality and fraternity."

It was a well-meaning aunt who reminded Eveland, the young military attache, that, being a Crane, he should study Arabic. He moved east. He was unlike Crane's own son John, who hoarded his father's un-

of Lebanon. He was State and CIA, and that at a time when the CIA's very pro-Zionist policy was being directed by old-Roman-hand James Angelton (to be trimmed in power later and nudged out by another old-Roman of CIA, director William Colby).

Eveland owes, and we owe, the fullness of this book to the fact that unlike other whistle-blowers on the CIA, the author neither succumbed to a middle-aged infusion of Marxism, nor did he violate any oath. When the CIA complained about *Ropes of Sand*, he asked them to show him his pledge of obligation. There wasn't any. Somehow, brother Allen, before borrowing Eveland from brother Foster, had overlooked the procedure. The CIA eventually rejected what it called his "belated attempt to submit the manuscript."

This ambiguity came in handy early. Crane met Lebanon's President Camille Chamoun, a Catholic who conned Eisenhower into sending the Marines to Beirut in 1958, ostensibly to "stop communism," but really to halt Nasser, the Moslem Lebanese, and the first infusion of Palestinians.

To Chamoun, "deliberately not specifying which of the brothers I met, I said I had just left Washington, here I'd met with Mr. Dulles."

Soon Eveland found himself as clandestine CIA paymaster to the Chamoun Maronite machine, then unarmed (later to be armed, then to be annihilated in the 1970s by the Israeli-armed Christian clan of the two Gemayel brothers).

He may not have given away as much to this Catholic hustler as the cash millions CIA's Miles Copeland was giving to Nasser.

But he gave in smaller denominations, so it looked like more. And he gave with more style, driving a white American convertible with gold trimmings — just a gay Gatsby calling at the presidential mansion with an overnight bag. H-e-e-re comes money!

Ropes of Sand thrashes around like a loose lariat. It moves so fast, and is so full of hysterical history never touched in either newspapers or diplomatic accounts, that it has no rival for indiscretion except the sorrowful diary of Israel's one-time Premier Moshe Sharett, when steamrollered by Ben Gurion and Moshe Dayan.

A peak of American confusion comes in the same period, in 1956. Israel had already concocted its plan, with Britain and France, to make their attack on Nasser's Egypt coincide with the U.S. presidential race between Eisenhower and the stoutly Zionist Adlai Stevenson.

Crazy as it seems nowadays (especially in view of Eisenhower's rage when he found the three-power invasion timed to turn him into an anti-Arab interventionist), there actually was — Eveland reveals — an American role in this conspiracy.

The scene, in fact, resembled today's, when once again the bait is the same. Syria. The American Sixth Fleet is being early booked by the IDF to intervene "to protect itself" against the Soviet missiles in Syria. But the plan in 1956 was a lot quieter, nothing so noisy, just a quiet grab of Syria by Iraq and Lebanon by Israel while the three powers were dumping Nasser.

And the arch instrument, on assignment, was Eveland.

So what was this sprig of the House of Crane doing in such preposterous reversal of his ancestral principles?

He was driving his disarming playboy's convertible across the border from Lebanon into Syria with a CIA suitcase-full of a half million dollars in Syrian paper pounds (about \$3 to \$1).

With this money our friend of Arab self-government was under orders to buy (partly for the U.S., but mainly for Britain and Israel) an anti-Nasser revolution in Syria (already "united" with Egypt to keep the Syrian Communists out of power).

How. Eveland could not help asking himself, do I spend a half-million bucks buying Syrian colonels? And how can I make sure that they will lie down until (and this was the British plan, already confided to the Israelis) the powerful British-trained tank corps of the Royal Iraqi Army sweeps into Syrian Damascus? At that point Syria was supposed to turn its back, like a fickle jade, on the doomed Nasser and throw herself into the arms of Iraq's youthful king. What this sub-plot required was some fancy timing. The Syrian takeover had to look independent of the main Suez attack.

And what was Israel's bonus? Eveland did not know it then, but he must know it now, from his minute study of Dayan's indiscretions. It was at that point, when this scion of Crane's prob-

helpful offered by the U.S. or what-will-our-allies think? Hence the Syrian ploy: really a second front operation against Nasser, taking Syria away from Nasser while Israeli-American air superiority kept his head down in Egypt.

CIA-Washington, apparently because Israel moved up the timing to effect the U.S. election more, sent Eveland a hurry-up-your-putch message. It came before he had a single Syrian colonel in his pocket. The Syrian conspirators, led by an Iraqi friend of Eveland's sent him back word, "Impossible before Oct. 29."

And that — as perhaps Nasser and his side in Syria may already have known — was to be the actual invasion day. Which meant that the Syrian colonels had time

The Syrians kept our half-million dollars, and they inflicted the worst snub of all. Since everyone was repentant, and the American role never came out, nobody had to be shot.

ty had immobilized the Syrian army (just as the U.S. is trying to do today), that the Israelis would take advantage of the inability of Syria to protect equivocating Lebanon. And the Israelis would take over forcibly, as now, as much soil and sky of Lebanon as they wanted.

Where, if anywhere, was any noble American purpose in all this carving? It was here: the British originally had a simple pre-plan to go with the invasion — murder Nasser. They tried to sell it to the CIA, and Eveland was a troubled witness. But "the Company" refused to buy.

Yet clearly, since the Dulles brothers — Eveland thinks — really favored the Suez invasion, there had to be something

to dither awhile, and to find out how well Nasser held out. He lost, but he did not fall. And he ended up with Britain's Labor Party on his side, and Eisenhower. And Syria.

And the Syrians kept our half-million dollars, and they inflicted the worst snub of all on the sub-plot. Since everyone was repentant, and the American role never came out, nobody had to be shot. What kind of coup is that?

And Israel, instead of getting Lebanon a generation ago on an American platter, had to postpone the honors of easy invasion away from Ben Gurion and Dayan and give Lebanon to Begin, Sharon and Shamir, in 1982.

Never mind, the Americans remained still in there, trying to dismember Syria; Kissinger took Syria's Golan Heights and presented it to Israel, for "temporary occupation." The Knesset turned it into annexation without a protest from Washington. What price West Bank? And Gaza?

Still, if someone ransacked the smashed garages of Beirut, they might be able to find Bill Crane Eveland's old white convertible with the golden decorations. The CIA could drive it through the ruins of Tyre, Sidon, the two Beiruts, Tripoli and Syrian Kuneitra, with Bill standing up and throwing out handfuls of you-know-what. After all, that's the American way. But Bill's heart is broken. What can he tell the new Crane Eveland?

ROPES OF SAND, By Wilbur Crane Eveland, W.W. Norton, N.Y., \$14.95.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-15155)

DATE: December 1, 1955

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (97-133)

SUBJECT: BYELORUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC,
CENTRAL COUNCIL IN U. S. A., aka.
RA
(OO-New York)ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-12-85 BY SP-7 mac/psRereps of SA [REDACTED] 5/19/52 and 6/18/54.
b7c

[REDACTED] furnished to SA'S [REDACTED] information concerning an organization for white Russians, which he called CENTRAL RAD ORGANIZATION (CRO). [REDACTED] the majority of the members of CRO are United States residents who, during World War II, were German collaborators who fled Poland when the Russian Army invaded Poland. [REDACTED] these persons had power and a comfortable life as Nazi collaborators during the German Occupation of Poland and that they originally organized the CRO to insure that a Nazi totalitarian form of government would rule Poland in the event Russian armies were driven out of Poland at a future date. b7c, b7D

He said that since 1945 the CRO has hoped and believed that the U. S. and Soviet Russia would engage in a conflict. They desired the U. S. to be victorious and hoped to be able to persuade the U. S. Government to aid the CRO in establishing itself as an official governing body of Poland. [REDACTED] in order to obtain U. S. backing, U. S. Congressmen have been invited to attend the organization's annual meetings in New York City each year. [REDACTED] the CRO does not aim to change the democratic form of government existing in the U. S. b7c, b7D

[REDACTED] CRO Headquarters are located in Garfield and South River, N. J., and that the majority of its 200 members live in South River, N. J. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALEXANDER RUSSAK, [REDACTED] N. J., is prime minister of the organization, and that (FNU) OSTROWSKI, who is believed to be living in Argentina, is president. b7c, b7D

RECORDED-38

INDEXED-38

DEC 5 1955

EXHIBIT "C"

55

LETTER TO DIRECTOR, FBI
NK 97-133

12/155

4/17/55
=6.1
Newark indices are negative regarding CRO, but the Newark file on the BYELORUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, CENTRAL COUNCIL IN U. S. A. reflects that ALEXANDER RUSSAK, [REDACTED] N. J., was reportedly chairman of the Executive Board of this organization and that RADISLAW OSTROWSKI headed the BYELORUSSIAN CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION and lived in Argentina. b7c

It appears that the organization referred to as the CRO [REDACTED] is actually the BYELORUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, CENTRAL COUNCIL IN U. S. A. and, consequently, the results of the interview with [REDACTED] are being furnished to New York for information purposes. RUC. b7c, b7D

- 2 - Bureau (105-15155)(REG MAIL)
 - 2 - New York (97-1251)(REG MAIL)
 - 2 - Newark
 - (1) 97-133
 - (1) 105-2492 (CENTRAL RAD ORGANIZATION)
- [REDACTED] ajm
(6) b7c

GAS:RLE

RECORDED

December 28, 1942

38637

New York, New York

Dear [REDACTED]

Your letter of December 4, 1942, has been received in the absence of Mr. Hoover from Washington, and I wish to advise that the requirements for appointment to the various positions in the FBI have not been changed since Mr. Hoover wrote you. We do not have available at this time any positions for one possessing your particular qualifications.

I am sure Mr. Hoover will appreciate your greetings for the holiday season and I will call your letter to the Director's attention on his return to the city.

Sincerely yours,
For the Director

Clyde Tolson
Assistant to the Director

SEE PAGE 2

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 6
DEC 29 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED READING ROOM
DEC 26 5 36 PM '42

DEC 28 1942

[REDACTED]

New York City. Dec. 4, 1942

38638

Dear Hoover:

It is quite some time since I had the pleasure of reading your last promise to find a niche for me somewhere in your organization. In fact the last personal correspondence between us was about 2 years before the conflagration of the war started. It was because of my age, and only age, that my services could not be made available to your organization then. Much musty, poisonous and deadly water, has gone over the dam since. No doubt you have kept the record of my qualifications in your files intact. There is no need to go over the same again. Suffice to call your attention however, that I am an ex-Naval Officer, with highly Distinguished Service record - eleven decorations from four major powers, including the first Navy Cross ever cited for in the U. S. history, for Distinguished Service as Intelligence Officer and as U. S. Naval Attache to the American Embassy in Russia.

I am still going strong. Excellent health. Much wiser and if anything mentally more alert. Just as good as ever with foreign languages, as previously recorded, and READY TO SERVE. No personal risk too great, in order to help save American lives and property and aid us to frustrate any nefarious plans of enemies, aimed at our vitals, through sources from within.

Recently while temporarily in the Government Service in the Canal Zone, I accidentally, through indiscretion of some of the lesser "brass hats", had occasion to closely examine and follow up the methods and means employed in an investigation, by two of your young graduates, Wilbur C. Eveland and Russel B. Frizzell (now Special Agents MI). While I have no doubt of their honesty and integrity of purpose and that they are entirely trustworthy, according to their verified records - unconsciously, because of lack of experience, these "babes in arms" not only overstep their assigned functions, but may well become an easy prey to any clever subterfuges and cunning buildups. All I can say, that it was simply pitiful, the way they carried on..... Perhaps some more training will be of help? Such inexperienced youngsters in life in general, leave alone as investigators, should not be allowed on their own. They must have immediate supervision and guidance of mature and experienced judgment, until they have learned the ropes.

Judging from published reports and public records, the successes you have had so far - it appears that you have been exceedingly lucky. In every case which received wide publicity (intentional I suppose) your so-called counter-espionage agents and the main states witnesses, have been accidental or voluntary.

On the face, the very successful efforts of the FBI in cornering so swiftly and efficiently, the saboteurs, landed from subs, would indicate that the hoped for proper functioning of the Nazi under-cover organizations, supposedly planted here before the war started, have been frustrated, otherwise, they would not attempt and risk the landing of others on our shores, apparently not so high intellectually? Or was it subterfuge? My idea is, better to overestimate the enemy cunningness, rather than underestimate it.

You know as well as I do, that there is no such a thing as absolute secrecy. So long one person knows, plus circumstances which never lie

it is no longer a secret. Given money and time, experience and patience and the cat, no matter, how invisible, will be caught in the bag.

Please let me hear from ^{you} at your earliest convenience - whether my age is still a bar, for the Government to make use of my experience and services, even in these times of great national stress and agony.

Please remember, that our only aim and our most foremost aim is now WINNING THE WAR and that we are in a TOTAL WAR, most disastrous in our whole history. Only experience and the concerted efforts of the whole nation can bring us eventual victory. Pre-war Rules and Regulations as to ages of those useful and other red-tape must not any longer be allowed to interfere. Nothing should interfere, until a complete victory is achieved and the nefarious organizations of our enemies forever silenced.

The Navy Department has recently informed me, that in the event an age waiver can be arranged through the Executive Order, a place would be found for me. I seriously doubt that this will go through, as the Navy seldom budges from the strict adherence to rules and regulations. The army let Doolittle back and look-he is now a Major General, over the heads of many good regular aspirants. Doolittle is as much a specialist in his line, as I am in mine. As distinguished officers, both gained most of their experience in the civil life, after the last war.

Perhaps you can be of some help in connection with this, unless your organization takes me on.

Wishing you the Compliments of the coming Season (in spite of the war) and thanking you for an early consideration of the matter, I am

Faithfully,

[Redacted signature]

Handwritten note:
All of my highest regards are to you.
[Signature]

NEW YORK

INTELLIGENCER

BY SHARON CHURCHER



Did Israel's President Once Recruit 'Informants' Here?

FIVE YEARS AGO, WILBUR Crane Eveland upset the CIA with a kiss-and-tell book, *Ropes of Sand*, which exposed, among other things, an abortive Syrian coup he said he helped finance as a top aide to agency boss Allen Dulles.

Now, in an upcoming work, he claims that Israeli

president Chaim Herzog recruited State Department staffers as Israeli informants back in 1954, when Herzog was Israeli defense attaché in Washington. Eveland declined to call the alleged recruits spies: "Israel is a friendly government, and they were passing on verbal information, not docu-

ments." The State Department, he added, disagreed and fired one recruit, "who later committed suicide."

Herzog "encouraged me to write the last book," said the author. "But he didn't know what I had in my files. This book will shake a few people up."

Herzog, Israel's first chief

of military intelligence, has denied involvement in any "recruitment of informants."

The CIA delayed publication of *Ropes*, but Eveland contended the agency won't have any control over this book, *Jerusalem the Golden*. "There's nothing in it I could have known only through the CIA," he said.

Approved for Release

Date 24 APR 1985

4
4

Borrowing power. Two Israelis associated with their country's nuclear-weapons program illegally gained access to a supercomputer at the Los Alamos nuclear-weapons laboratory in New Mexico. Congressional investigators report that earlier this month the Israelis used a friendly lab technician's access code and personal computer to tap into a nonsecret but highly sophisticated computer to work on designs for a nuclear-weapon detonator. Israel has nothing comparable to the \$13 million machine, manufactured by Cray Research, Inc., in Minneapolis. The two Israelis, who earlier had been denied entry to California's Livermore Laboratory, left the U.S. before their intrusion was discovered. The technician, whose name has not been disclosed, has been disciplined.

Staffing up. Who would run a George Bush White House? Favored to stay on as chief of staff is Craig Fuller, 37, who has served the Vice President since 1981. Richard Darman, longtime deputy to James Baker, can have the slot as budget director, and Sheila Tate is likely to be offered the opportunity to be the first female White House press secretary. Alternate scenarios have Fuller in a cabinet job; either New Hampshire Governor John Sununu or pollster Bob Teeter as chief of staff; Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, a Bush intimate, a senior White House counselor, and tart-tongued Darman replacing Brady at the Treasury.

Haft time at SEC. Herbert and Robert Haft, the Washington, D.C., father-and-son team of corporate raiders, may soon be forced out of the takeover business. The Securities and Exchange Commission staff has warned the Hafts' company, Dart Group Corporation, that it may be subject to sanctions for failing to register as an investment company, which could drastically curtail their raiding. What troubles the SEC is that, while Dart operates two chains of book and auto-supply stores, it has made most of its recent money from a string of failed takeover moves for companies like Safeway, Stop & Shop and Kroger. Consistently foiled, Dart Group has nevertheless reaped hundreds of millions of dollars in profits by later unloading its stock positions in such firms. The Hafts were unavailable for comment.

Outspending U.S. pols. American sympathizers have contributed about \$7 million of the more than \$50 million that will be

Israelis illicitly tap U.S. weapons computer

SEC may halt Hafts' corporate raids

Bush targets doctors' fees for budget cuts

spent in Israel's election campaign. Unlike the U.S., where foreigners are forbidden to make contributions, Israel has neither restrictions on outside gifts nor rules about disclosure. The top Israeli fundraiser in the U.S. is fiery Gen. Ariel Sharon, who reportedly netted \$2.5 million for Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Likud during two days in Beverly Hills earlier this month. His opponent, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, took advantage of his trip to the U.N. General Assembly in September to raise \$1 million for his Labor



The Israeli contenders
Shedels from Beverly Hills

Party. Israeli politicians, who are allotted free TV time and have far shorter distances to cover, will spend about \$20 for each voter. The comparable figure in the United States: \$5.

Doctoring the budget. One way George Bush may cut the budget deficit is by reducing excessive fees paid to some doctors under medicare. Outgoing Rea-

gan administration officials are drafting budget proposals to cut medicare payments for certain services by 25 percent—a step that could save more than \$500 million in the next budget. Among the fees slated for cuts are those for cataract surgery, coronary bypasses and pacemaker implants. A recent Harvard study concluded that, on the basis of the true costs and skills involved, medicare overpays doctors for these services by as much as 400 percent.

Blacks and Bush. Although George Bush has made no campaign appearances in black communities since the New Orleans convention, experts believe the Vice President will draw as much as 20 percent of the black vote, twice the percentage that Ronald Reagan received four years ago. The explanation may lie in a recent poll that showed while 72 percent of blacks think Ronald Reagan is "prejudiced," only 43 percent believe the same of Bush. Another reason is that almost half of those surveyed think Jesse Jackson has been treated unfairly by Michael Dukakis.

Nuclear wink. The President is soon expected to certify that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons—even though experts within and outside the administration believe that country possesses all the components and could put a bomb together in a matter of hours. Without presidential certification, Congress would automatically cut off aid to Pakistan. In the past, Washington has ignored Pakistan's not-so-secret drive to match India's nuclear capabilities because it did not wish to antagonize the government that funnels aid to Afghan rebels. Now, Washington wants to avoid upsetting relations in the midst of Pakistan's election campaign to choose a successor to the late Gen. Mohammed Zia ul Haq.

Consolation prize. With fading prospects that the party will have a President-elect to help make the choice next month, at least a half-dozen candidates have begun skirmishing to succeed Paul Kirk as chairman of the Democratic National Committee. Among those taking early political soundings are Jesse Jackson's former campaign manager, Ron Brown; two ex-congressmen, Michael Barnes of Maryland and Jim Jones of Oklahoma, and the insiders' favorite, Rick Wiener of Michigan, president of the association of Democratic state chairmen. If the infighting gets too divisive, Kirk may agree to stay on an additional six months.

Edited by Charles Fervvesi

Form No. 3366

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 65(a), (b)¹Motion for Temporary Restraining Order²

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

. District of

(Title of Action)

Civil Action No.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Plaintiff moves the court for a temporary restraining order restraining defendant from pending hear-

(Text continued on page 640.4)

¹ Rule.—Rule 65(a) and (b), as amended in 1966, and in 1987 to include technical changes, provide:

(a) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

(1) *Notice.* No preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party.

(2) *Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits.* Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible upon the trial on the merits becomes part of the record on the trial and need not

be repeated upon the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury.

(b) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; NOTICE; HEARING; DURATION. A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or that party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting that

PARTIAL - NOT FILED

FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT

61A-23

IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY, EXPERT OR OTHER COURT SERVICES WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE

IN UNITED STATES ☐ MAGISTRATE ☒ DISTRICT ☐ APPEALS COURT or ☐ OTHER PANEL (Specify below)

IN THE CASE OF

EVELAND III vs. SHULTZ AND

WEBSTER

FOR
Eastern District of Massa-
AT
chusetts at Boston

LOCATION NUMBER

PERSON REPRESENTED (Show your full name)

WILBUR CRANE EVELAND III, pro se

CHARGE/OFFENSE (describe if applicable & check box →)

☐ Felony
☐ Misdemeanor

Assault, Libel & Slander (nonfeasance and malfeasance)

- 1 ☐ Defendant—Adult
- 2 ☐ Defendant—Juvenile
- 3 ☐ Appellant
- 4 ☐ Probation Violator
- 5 ☐ Parole Violator
- 6 ☐ Habeas Petitioner
- 7 ☐ 2255 Petitioner
- 8 ☐ Material Witness

9 ☒ Other (Specify) Rule 65(b) petitioner

DOCKET NUMBERS

Magistrate

District Court

Court of Appeals

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS REGARDING ABILITY TO PAY

EMPLOYMENT

Are you now employed? ☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Am Self Employed

Name and address of employer: _____

IF YES, how much do you
earn per month? \$ _____

IF NO, give month and year of last employment
How much did you earn per month \$ _____

If married is your Spouse employed? ☐ Yes ☐ No

IF YES, how much does your
Spouse earn per month \$ _____

If a minor under age 21, what is your
Parents or Guardian's approximate monthly income \$ _____

ASSETS

OTHER INCOME

Have you received within the past 12 months any income from a business, profession or other form of self-employment, or in the form of rent payments, interest, dividends, retirement or annuity payments, or other sources? ☐ Yes ☐ No

IF YES, GIVE THE AMOUNT RECEIVED & IDENTIFY THE SOURCES

RECEIVED	SOURCES
446.59	Monthly Social Security
121.75	Monthly VA Disability

CASH

Have you any cash on hand or money in savings or checking account? ☒ Yes ☐ No IF YES, state total amount \$22.50

PROPERTY

Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

VALUE	DESCRIPTION
IF YES, GIVE VALUE AND \$	
DESCRIBE IT	

DEPENDENTS

MARITAL STATUS

☐ SINGLE

☐ MARRIED

☒ WIDOWED
☐ SEPARATED OR
☐ DIVORCED

Total
No. of
Dependents

0

List persons you actually support and your relationship to them

OBLIGATIONS & DEBTS

DEBTS & MONTHLY BILLS

(LIST ALL CREDITORS, INCLUDING BANKS, LOAN COMPANIES, CHARGE ACCOUNTS, ETC.)

APARTMENT OR HOME:

SEE ATTACHED SHEET

Creditors

Total Debt

Monthly Pay.

\$	\$
\$	\$
\$	\$
\$	\$

I certify the above to be correct.

SIGNATURE OF DEFENDANT
(OR PERSON REPRESENTED)

W. Crane Eveland III 12/1/88

WARNING: A FALSE OR DISHONEST ANSWER TO A QUESTION IN THIS AFFIDAVIT MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT, OR BOTH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

(		)	
(	WILBUR CRANE EVELAND III	)	
(		)	CIVIL ACTION NO.
(	v.	)	
(		)	
(	GEORGE P. SHULTZ AND WILLIAM F. WEBSTER	)	_____
(		)	

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, LOCAL RULE 9(2) AND RULE 65(b) FRCP

Plaintiff moves the court for consideration by a Miscellaneous Business Docket Judge of this application to proceed in forma pauperis and motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against defendants, personally or acting as Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence under official color, on the ground that the issues herein relate to a pending grand jury investigation and a case pending in another jurisdiction. During the 10-day period of the temporary restraining order, plaintiff will seek certiorari under the Supreme Court's Rules 21 and 46 or, should this motion be denied, under 28 USC 1253.

Failure to grant the injunctive relief sought would result in irreparable damage and loss to plaintiff who was diagnosed on October 24, 1988 as a terminal cancer patient(Exhibit A) and has, since September 23, 1988 been homeless without access to his legal, personal, and declassified Privacy Act documents. As shown in the complaint, affidavit, and certificate herein, time and other circumstances mitigate against giving notice to the defendants.

The matters complained of herein are personal to plaintiff, dating back to 1942 when he was special agent in charge of counter-

intelligence for the states of Central and South America fronting on the Caribbean Sea (based in Panama) as well as the 1950-55 period when he moved from an assignment in Iraq as an army attache to the executive office of the President in charge of Middle East National Security Council policies when the activities of Nazi war criminals in Iran and Israel were being investigated. Two reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are attached as Exhibits B and C to illustrate that plaintiff is capable of exposing first person the history of events which now threaten the national security of the United States, Soviet-American relations, the future of disarmament, the future of the United Nations, and the Middle East peace process.

For all of these reasons, plaintiff prays the court to reconfirm its November 11, 1986 decision to allow plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, CA-86-3265-MA; 87-1480 in the First Circuit Court of Appeals (July 10, 1987), and to issue the temporary restraining order sought on an emergency basis.

December 1, 1988



WILBUR CRANE EVELAND III
Pro se in forma pauperis
Post Office Box 186
Waverly, MA 02179
(Homeless with no fixed
address or telephone.)

C O M P L A I N T

On information and belief, plaintiff charges as follows:

COUNT NO. 1: George P. Shultz, while acting under the color of law in performing the duties of secretary of state, has ignored the law that governs the performance of his duties and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner to the detriment of the national security of the United States by deceiving the President and Congress while undermining the capabilities of President-elect Bush to engage in Middle East peacemaking and disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. (See Hammond v. Hull, et al., 1942, 131 F.2d 23, 76 U.S. App D.C. 301, certiorari denied 63 U.S. S.Ct. 830, 318 U.S. 777, 87 L.Ed. 1145.) Shultz, by personally and arbitrarily refusing to emulate the governments of France, West Germany, and Britain in negotiating with Iran for the release of American nationals held captive in Lebanon and by ignoring senior advisers, including the assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and personally refusing the request of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the overwhelming majority of members of the General Assembly that Yasser Arafat be granted a U.S. visa, appears confident that he can retire from office after fulfilling his boast, quoted by Thomas Dine of the American Israeli Political Action Committee, that no secretary of state will be able to alter America's commitments to Israel for at least eight years. These commitments by Shultz have involved torts against plaintiff personally as will be described chronologically. They involve the point upon which Hammond v. Hull turned: the right to appeal fabricated charges of disloyalty.

COUNT NO. 2: Violation of 42 U.S.C.A Section 1983 in the State of California. Shultz, also a resident of Cummington, Massachusetts, became a senior executive of Bechtel Group in 1974 at the time plaintiff was employed by J. Robert Fluor, chief executive officer of Fluor Corporation -- Bechtel's largest American competitor -- to become a vice president for Middle East operations of a Fluor subsidiary with assignment in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This was known to plaintiff's opposite number in Bechtel, Parker T. Hart, and Hermann F. Eilts, American ambassador to Egypt. Both had served as ambassadors to Saudi Arabia. Also aware of plaintiff's assignment was Henry A. Kissinger, a cabinet associate of Shultz's in the Nixon administration, and Raymond F. Close, chief of the CIA station in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff notified Close, a former junior officer in the Beirut CIA station when plaintiff was posted there as a principal adviser to Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles, of the approval of plaintiff's residence and work permits for Saudi Arabia and communicated the same information to Hart, a former government colleague, at a luncheon Hart hosted at the Cosmos Club in Washington. Kissinger, who later joined Chase Manhattan Bank as director of international operations, was aware that plaintiff had been give leave of absence by J. Robert Fluor, personally, and Fluor's general counsel to complete litigation he had initiated in 1971 against Chase Manhattan in the Queen's Bench of the Royal Courts of Justice of England, as a litigant in person.

After plaintiff's personal effects had been airshipped by Fluor to Saudi Arabia in January 1975, plaintiff's immediate superior in Los Angeles indicated that plaintiff's assignment might be can-

celled but this was overruled by J. Robert Fluor and his general counsel who approved plaintiff's leave of absence and departure for London to meet a February 3, 1975 trial date. Despite repeated subpoenas, Chase Manhattan Bank's London solicitors refused to produce a key document upon which the trial could have turned but, acting alone in court, plaintiff failed to seek a summary judgement and the trial continued through March 17, 1975.

Judgement was reserved pending the court's further examination of nearly 2,000 documents plaintiff had adduced in over three years of litigation in Singapore, Hong Kong, and London. After arriving in Beirut on March 21, plaintiff sent for the woman he married on March 30. On March 25, before her arrival, the local representative of Fluor's Saudi Arabian partner, Sheikh Ahmed Juffali, delivered to plaintiff a telex purporting to terminate his position as a Fluor executive. The only reason given was that plaintiff had used his Fluor business card to request Middle East Airline's London representative to facilitate the issuance of a Lebanese entry visa. Also unusual was the verification by plaintiff's hotel that H. Thomas Lorne, formerly plaintiff's supervisor in Los Angeles, had arrived at the hotel from Saudi Arabia the same night plaintiff arrived from London but had failed to request a meeting. Lorne, who retained charge of Fluor's operations in Iran, had used Kermit Roosevelt, a CIA colleague of plaintiff's in the mid-1950s, as a consultant in dealing with the shah's family.

Unlike in the case of Ogden H. Hammer who sued Secretary of State Cordell Hull over the right to appeal accusations of disloyalty in Hammond v. Hull, plaintiff did not become aware until

September 8, 1983 (eight years after his termination by Fluor) of fabricated charges in the files of the CIA and FBI alleging that plaintiff had in November 1961 passed to British double agent H. A. R. "Kim" Philby confidential files of Vinnell Corporation, a California engineering and construction firm for whom plaintiff was a vice president for petroleum-related operations worldwide. This document was released to plaintiff by the CIA six years, three months and five days after plaintiff's March 17, 1977 appeal of the denial of Privacy Act documents.

As the CIA has known since September 9, 1983, plaintiff was not in Italy when this disclosure of information purportedly took place in Rome. Also, until Philby was induced by British intelligence to defect to Russia on January 23, 1963, the CIA believed that Philby was an agent of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) operating under journalistic cover. More important, the CIA memorandum making this allegation was dated May 30, 1975 when plaintiff was incarcerated in Singapore's maximum security Changi prison as a result of his having gone to Singapore to sue Chase Manhattan Bank, using documents acquired in discovery, after Fluor had purported to terminate plaintiff's position as a vice president. This and other relevant documents are exhibits in CA-86-3265-MA filed in this court on October 31, 1986 and in 87-1480 in the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Obviously, had plaintiff been allowed to take up his position with Fluor in Riyadh he would have waited there until the judgement in the Queen's Bench of the Royal Courts of Justice was handed down sometime in April 1975. and then decided whether to appeal an adverse judgement in London.

Plaintiff charges that Shultz, acting in concert with Henry A. Kissinger, used his position with Bechtel to procure plaintiff's dismissal by Fluor, just as Shultz has since becoming secretary of state used Bechtel Corporation as an instrument of foreign policy.

To enable the court to appreciate the terrorism to which plaintiff was subjected in Singapore between April 30 and July 13, 1975, two exhibits are submitted herewith: Exhibit D, a letter from plaintiff's legal adviser in London, Robert A. Albert, shows that the possibility of plaintiff ever leaving Singapore was in doubt and that his dismissal by Fluor was a result of continuing with the London trial. (On March 20, 1984, plaintiff was approached at the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Washington by Eleazer A. Williams, who had been the CIA's chief of station in Singapore during plaintiff's incarceration in 1975, and told that the American embassy had been powerless to provide assistance because the special branch of the Singapore police and its army intelligence were controlled by the intelligence services of Israel; a fact obviously known to then-Secretary of State Kissinger and possibly Shultz. The price of plaintiff's departure from Singapore was leaving all of his documents adduced in evidence behind; since 1976, the State Department has refused requests to facilitate their recovery.)

Exhibit E is an appraisal by the Canadian affiliate of the Los Angeles international appraisal firm of Marshall & Stevens which was entered in evidence in the Queen's Bench. It shows that plaintiff's shares in his Singapore company were set at \$675,000.00 as of February 15, 1971 when Chase Manhattan created an illegal receivership to take over plaintiff's Southeast Asia oilfield

operations. This does not include the value of plaintiff's Hong Kong company, which he owned exclusively, or the loss of stock options, bonuses, and retirement to which plaintiff would have been entitled at age 65 (a982) had his employment not been terminated and all of his personal effects left in Saudi Arabia.

COUNT NO. 3: Plaintiff charges that these things were known to Shultz when he became secretary of State in August 1982 but that he did not reveal them to President Reagan, Vice President Bush, or William P. Clark, then assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, although they were known to Henry Kissinger. Exhibit F is a CIA memorandum dated January 7, 1977 which plaintiff received in further response to his March 17, 1977 Privacy Act appeal on July 2, 1986. It deals with Vinnell Corporation and was written at the time George Bush was director of Central Intelligence. The same allegations of plaintiff's treason appear in the only uncensored paragraph but the contents of the memorandum have been revealed as a result of plaintiff's contacts with former Vinnell executives who were induced to sell the shares in the company they acquired after the death of the company's founder in 1969, the year plaintiff arrived in Singapore to start his Southeast Asia oilfield operations. At that time, Vinnell was implementing government contracts in Vietnam. Taiwan, and on Quemoy and Matsu.

Between 1969 and 1975, U.S. intelligence agencies acquired the shares of Vinnell Corporation and used it for operations in Southeast Asia and, by 1975, in Saudi Arabia. During the tenures of CIA directors Colby and Bush, Henry Kissinger used his own back-channel communications with the National Security Council and did not include the CIA's directors in the distribution of sensitive

communications. In fact, it was a member of the Navy's Task Force 157, Kissinger's backchannel communications link, placed on plaintiff's Singapore company's board by a Chase Manhattan affiliate, who facilitated the takeover of plaintiff's company. This man, Robert Bruce Sheeks, was still present in Singapore (despite a payment of \$10,000 plaintiff had made for his repatriation in 1971) in 1975 when plaintiff was incarcerated, deprived of his passport, and expelled from the American embassy.

When plaintiff was terminated by Fluor in March 1975, Vinnell Corporation was mobilizing its contract to train the Saudi National Guard. By April 24, 1980, Richard V. Secord used Vinnell's contract in Oman to direct the abortive hostage rescue operation called Desert-One which produced the only eight Americans killed in action during the Carter administration. Albert Hakim, with whom Secord became affiliated in Stanford Technology, Inc. of Los Gatos, California and later Vienna, Virginia, was waiting in Tehran to facilitate the rescue of the 52 American hostages in the event Desert-One had not been aborted.

These things are cited not only because they adversely affected plaintiff but to illustrate that President Reagan inherited one of the "private, off-the-shelf, self-supporting enterprises" used in Iran-contra and that Shultz, if not directly, through Kissinger was aware of this at all material times as secretary of state. Because Secord and Hakim worked in collaboration with the Israelis in Iran, and Lt. Col. Oliver L. North was aware of this, it seems certain that this accounts for the inability of Shultz to oppose Israeli government policies at the risk of personal exposure. This includes his most recent ruling denying a visa to Yasser Arafat.

12/4/89

THE WASHINGTON POST

Americans Not Target of PLO Faction

State Dept. 'Fact Sheet' Contradicts Shultz's Statement on Arafat

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

A new State Department "fact sheet" on the terrorist activities of Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) shows it has been actively engaged in attacking Israeli targets, but—so far—no American ones.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said his Nov. 26 decision to deny a visa for Arafat to address the United Nations in New York was based largely on "convincing evidence" that the PLO had engaged in "terrorism against Americans and others."

The evidence, according to a State Department statement issued that day, included operations by Fatah's Force 17 security organization and a Fatah group led by al-Hamid Labib, also known as Col. Hawari. Those operations were undertaken, the statement said, following the PLO's 1985 declaration in Cairo forswearing terrorism.

The latest fact sheet prepared by the department's counter-terrorism bureau, but not formally released, details the history and activities of Force 17, which is led by Mahmud Ahmad al-Natur, alias Abu Tayib, and widely regarded as Arafat's personal security service. A copy of the document was obtained by The Washington Post.

The document makes clear that Force 17's main energies have been directed at carrying out terrorist activities in Israel and the Israeli-occupied West Bank and covert operations against enemies of Fatah's leadership.

Of 22 incidents listed between June 1985 and March 1988, none involved American citizens, according to the fact sheet.

"Force 17 has concentrated its attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and the occupied territories where the group is believed to have been

responsible for at least 15 terrorist attacks since 1985," it said.

Many of those attacks involved bombings in public places or assassination of Israelis. The general State Department definition of terrorism is all acts of violence aimed at innocent civilians wherever they are.

The PLO, even after renouncing terrorism in its Cairo declaration, has always regarded activities carried out inside Israel or the Israeli-occupied territories as acts of "national liberation" rather than terrorism.

In addition, Force 17 and other PLO groups have long engaged in a tit-for-tat war outside Israel against agents of Israel's secret intelligence service, Mossad.

Force 17's most sensational attack outside Israel was the killing of three Israelis aboard a yacht in the harbor in Larnaca, Cyprus, on Sept. 25, 1985. PLO officials said the

three were Mossad agents. In retaliation, Israel carried out a spectacular bombing attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis on Oct. 1.

The fact sheet also says Force 17 has been "instrumental" in assassinating other Palestinians opposed to Arafat's leadership, including Ali Naji Awad Adhami, a cartoonist killed in London in July 1987.

Another fact sheet on terrorist groups released Oct. 31 by the counter-terrorism office dealt with the Hawari Group, the special operations group of Fatah's central security and intelligence apparatus. It is led by Abdallah and Hawari.

Most of its activities since 1985 have been aimed at Syrian and Libyan targets in Western Europe, such as airline offices and diplomats. But the group's agents were involved in at least two attacks on American airline carriers, according to the State Department.

Safeguarding Secrets—and More

Intelligence Units Take Hard Line Against Disclosure in North Case

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA, the NSA and the rest in the alphabet soup of the U.S. intelligence community have been taking a hard line against the disclosure of secrets—from the most urgent to the seemingly trivial—as the Iran-contra scandal winds its way through the U.S. Courthouse here.

Recent court filings in the case against former White House aide Oliver L. North have opened a window on the murky process, showing an elaborate effort to protect not only information that could endanger lives, but also widely known details that became part of the public glossary during last year's televised congressional hearings.

For the intelligence agencies, turmoil set in last July when North filed his "second supplemental" discovery request under seal to U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell.

In it, sources say, North demanded almost every high-level secret in the government's storehouse since 1984. Many of them dealt with operations still in progress.

Independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh informed the court of the intelligence community's overwhelmingly negative reaction in a special report on July 20, and it was discussed in veiled terms at a hearing seven days later. It amounted to a broad-brush denial of the documents North wanted to defend himself, especially against the central charges of conspiracy and theft of government property.

The records that North hopes to use to blunt those key charges are the most sensitive, sources said. They reportedly include the secret U.S.-Israeli counterterrorism agreement under which Amiram Nir, who died in a plane crash in Mexico Wednesday, said he and North supervised secret operations in 1985-86. Few details of these operations have been disclosed.

But the bulk of the classified information being withheld, sources said, concerns the names of countries, the identities of U.S. and foreign officials, and other items that amount to "diplomatic niceties." Administration officials continue to insist that these details—which af-

fect all the counts in the indictment against North—cannot be officially acknowledged.

Ilopango airfield in El Salvador, where the contra supply network's planes were based, is one example. Government censors are still excising it from documents as if it were still a genuine secret. Another is the identity of countries that were solicited for aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, such as China and Saudi Arabia. Still another, perhaps known only to Iran-contra aficionados, is Mohammed Kangariou, chief deputy in the Iranian prime minister's office who served as the "first channel" in the administration's secret arms sales to Iran.

In a memo to Gesell last Tuesday, Walsh emphasized that he had "deferred to the determination of the agencies and departments as to whether disclosure of any information reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security." He added that he was prepared to prove the government's case without it.

Walsh said he is prepared to negotiate further with the agencies if Gesell should rule that some or all of what North wants is essential for his defense. But the special prosecutor warned, as did the White House last week, that there are "certain categories of information"—some of it deleted from the prosecution's exhibits, some of it contained in other papers that North has demanded—that can never be publicly disclosed.

North has taken the position that he should be allowed to explore other U.S. covert operations to show how they were funded, who knew about them, and what his involvement was. Intelligence agencies blanched when he asked for "any and all" records about them.

"There are certain areas where they [the heads of the intelligence agencies] say the price is too high, that Col. North has found a price they can't pay," Walsh told Gesell at the July 27 hearing where the problem was first discussed.

Walsh, sources said, tried to get Central Intelligence Agency Director William H. Webster, an old friend, to ease up on some of the secrecy at a meeting last July, but got nowhere.

The issue was finally joined last

week in secret hearings before Gesell under the Classified Information Procedures Act. The sessions, which will resume Tuesday, are devoted exclusively to the excisions in the 350 classified documents, covering about 3,000 pages, that the prosecution wants to use in pressing 14 felony counts against North.

The former White House aide is also proposing disclosure of another 3,500 documents, covering 40,000 pages, as needed for his defense, but Walsh has attacked that as an attempt to "graymail" the government into dropping the case. The judge has yet to deal with that headache.

In his memo to Gesell Tuesday, Walsh listed 10 categories of information that has been censored from his exhibits by an interagency task force of the intelligence agencies. They presumably include the five that Gesell was told in July were especially important.

But the list also includes what White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater conceded Thursday are "minor categories."

Sources familiar with the case doubt that the intelligence agencies would force dismissal of the case by refusing to consent to disclosure of details already publicly known. But Walsh has said that they will recommend against disclosure of the crucial categories even if Gesell holds such material essential for a fair trial. So far, the agencies are maintaining a hard line on all fronts.

The Justice Department has the last word. If the attorney general refuses to release information the court rules is material and relevant, then Gesell can order dismissal of the entire indictment or certain counts in it; strike or preclude a particular witness' testimony, or simply rule against the prosecution on any of the issues underlying the contested secrets.

It seems likely, however, that some sort of trial will take place. The charges most in jeopardy, as Gesell has repeatedly suggested, are the conspiracy and theft of government property counts against North concerning his role in diverting profits to aid the contras from arms shipments to Iran and other unauthorized activities. Thus far, the judge has shown no inclination to dismiss any of the 12 other counts.

U.S.-Israeli Accord^{12/4/88} Said to Authorize North-Nir Operations

Ex-Official Made Disclosure Before Death

By Bob Woodward
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

Amiram Nir, the former Israeli official who died in a Mexican plane crash Wednesday, said last June that a confidential Israeli-American agreement authorized still-secret counterterrorist operations that he and Lt. Col. Oliver L. North supervised in 1985-86.

American and Israeli sources confirmed that there was an Israeli-American agreement, referred to as "terms of reference" or "accords" by some knowledgeable sources. Its existence has never been disclosed to Congress, according to American sources familiar with it.

A White House spokesman said yesterday the Reagan administration would have no comment on the agreement or any operations that may have been conducted under it.

Yossi Gal, spokesman for the Israeli embassy, said, "I won't go into this agreement . . . Israel and the United States have lots of agreements . . . We have never maintained that Nir was operating on his own or as a renegade . . . Everything he did was being done by the government of Israel."

Nir disclosed the existence of an agreement during interviews in London last June. He maintained that secret U.S.-Israeli covert operations were authorized by President Reagan and then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres under the accords. Few details of these operations have been disclosed. Nir said



AMIRAM NIR
... said he was kept on "short leash"

the Israeli government has detailed records of all of them.

One operation conducted under the agreement was the organizing of an armed force of Lebanese Druze in Beirut in May, 1986, at a time when the White House was considering the use of force to try to free American hostages.

Disclosure of the agreement adds yet another layer to the mysteries surrounding the Iran-contra affair. As described by Nir, the agreement led to a series of covert actions that had common tactical elements. The now-famous secret transactions that produced unauthorized aid for the Nicaraguan contras from the profits of arms sales to Iran may

See NIR, A16, Col. 1

■ Survivor of crash that killed Nir reportedly used assumed name. A14

Nir Described Still Secret U.S.-Israeli Accord

NIR, From A1

have fit a pattern established in those other secret undertakings. And, like the arms-for-hostages dealings with Iran, these other secret operations were apparently hidden from Congress.

References were made to the North-Nir "off-the-books" operations during the congressional Iran-contra investigation, but Nir's assertion that they were carried out under an agreement was the first indication that he and North, who has since retired from the military, claimed top-level governmental authorization for their activities.

Nir was interviewed by reporter Bob Woodward for 13 hours last June 25 and 26 in London. He discussed some of his activities with the understanding that these were preliminary and "private" conversations. He said he expected to tell his story publicly later, and said he was debating how best to do it—in a television interview, for a newspaper or some other way. Woodward and Nir agreed that the information Nir provided was not to be attributed to him without further discussions.

In those interviews, Nir said repeatedly that half or less of the story of the secret arms transactions with Iran was publicly known. He refused to elaborate.

Throughout the summer Nir did not return numerous phone calls to his home in Israel. The Post prepared a story on the secret U.S.-Israeli agreement, but editors decided not to print the story in hopes of getting a fuller account later from Nir or other U.S. or Israeli sources.

In a subsequent telephone conversation Oct. 10, Nir said he was not ready to "go public," citing the damage publicity might do to his business activities. But he said he would be willing to meet again in London sometime in the future, and held out the possibility that he would provide important revelations about U.S. officials.

Washington Post editors concluded that Nir's death Wednesday removed the reasons for the agreement to withhold attribution to Nir of the information he provided in June. In a telephone interview on Friday, Nir's widow, Judy, said she knew that her husband was talking to Woodward, but she had "no idea" why he was doing it. At the time of his death he was not prepared to tell his story publicly, she said.

Nir was a central figure in many aspects of the Iran-contra affair:

- He was cited by North as the originator (in November 1985) of the idea of generating profits from arms sales to Iran to fund other covert projects—the idea North used later to divert support to the Nicaraguan rebels. In January 1986, North and Nir discussed using \$2.5 million from the first direct sale of U.S. arms to Iran for their joint covert operations, according to an entry in North's notebook made public by the congressional Iran-contra committees. When details of the Iran-contra operation were about to be disclosed in November 1986, Nir refused North's request that he take the blame for the diversion of profits to the contras, according to North's notebooks. Nir said in the June interview: "I like Ollie. He was under great pressure. To mix the Iran operation and the contras was stupid, stupid, stupid."

- Nir represented Israel in negotiations with U.S. and Iranian representatives that led to three shipments of U.S. arms to Iran in 1986.

- He accompanied former national security adviser Robert C. (Bud) McFarlane and North on their secret mission to Tehran in May 1986. Nir said in the June interview that McFarlane failed to improvise and take advantage of the meetings, that "fully 50 percent of [this trip] is not known," and that he had extensive notes on this and other aspects of the secret initiative.

- Nir and North planned and carried out at least two secret joint operations outside normal intelligence channels. These were "only part" of their covert activities. Nir said, "There is much more."

- With Iranian middleman Manucher Ghorbanifar, Nir arranged for Iranian help in freeing the Rev. Lawrence C. Jenco, an American hostage held by Lebanese extremists. Jenco was released in July 1986 based on Ghorbanifar's promise that the United States would subsequently ship arms to Tehran. Nir called Ghorbanifar "a tool, no matter whose tool," adding that he was told by an important figure in the affair that "imperfect tools must be used for imperfect ends."

- On July 29, 1986, within days after Jenco was released, Nir briefed Vice President Bush and his chief of staff, Craig L. Fuller, in Israel on the need to respond to the release by shipping arms to Iran.

Like the other Israeli participants in the affair, Nir was barred by his government from answering questions from the U.S. Justice Department, independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh and congressional investigators. Nir was interviewed during an Israeli investigation and information he provided was included in reports Israel filed with the House-Senate Iran-contra committees and Walsh.

Nir said in the interview that Israel carefully restricted the information that was provided to U.S. investigators of the Iran-contra affair, assigning a former senior Israeli official who had been inspector general of the Israeli armed forces, reserve Gen. Raphael Vardi, to review the Israeli documents. Two limited chronologies, one financial and the other historical, were given to the United States. By sticking to dates and the most general descriptions of planned agenda items for meetings, the Israelis conveyed very little of substance to the United States, Nir said.

Nir said Israel has assembled extensive records not turned over to the U.S., based in part on his detailed notes and papers. They provided point-by-point documentation of all contacts, discussions and undertakings with U.S. officials, including North, Nir said.

Nir said he also provided full written reports to his superiors and gave oral briefings to Shimon Peres, the Israeli prime minister who hired him as counterterrorist adviser, and later to Peres' successor, Yitzak Shamir. Nir said he was "on a short leash."

At the time North and Nir joined forces in 1985, the former military correspondent for Israeli television was the newly appointed counterterrorist adviser to Peres. North was a member of the staff of the National Security Council and was responsible for coordinating counterterrorist activities for the White House.


Informed sources said the secret agreement that Nir said authorized the Nir-North undertakings was signed by high-level officials for both governments. Nir said he drafted the agreement and that it was formalized in an exchange of letters between Reagan and Peres. Other sources involved in counterterrorist operations for the two countries said the agreement was signed at a lower level.

Whatever form it took, the agreement is an important missing piece in the history of secret White House operations in President Reagan's second term.

U.S. government sources said the agreement originally was negotiated by the State Department and the Israeli foreign ministry to permit the exchange of sensitive information between U.S. and Israeli government counterterrorism experts. These sources said Nir and North in their activities clearly went beyond this intent, at least as understood by senior State Department officials.

The agreement is formally spelled out in its "terms of reference," which officials said included vague language and statements that are subject to different interpretations.

One senior U.S. source said the American-Israeli agreement appeared to be connected to earlier authorizations or "findings" for covert intelligence operations signed by Reagan, which authorized aggressive antiterrorist actions. The Post reported in October that Reagan signed findings in 1984 and



OLIVER L. NORTH
... said to endure "great pressure"

1985 authorizing antiterrorist operations and stipulating that any actions taken under those orders in "good faith" would be "deemed" legal—language several officials interpreted as a "license to kill."

Under longstanding executive orders, it is illegal for American intelligence operatives to engage in any activity that could lead to assassinations, but those intelligence findings signed by Reagan seemed to at least some officials to create a legal loophole to circumvent that prohibition.

One of several versions of the "license-to-kill" finding was signed by Reagan on Aug. 11, 1985, at about the time that Nir said he was drafting the secret American-Israeli agreement on counterterrorism.

The same senior American source said that because Congress was never told of this secret antiterrorism agreement with Israel, it appeared to be a new case of failure by the administration to give the legally required notification to Congress of a covert intelligence activity. The Iran-contra investigations showed that the administration also failed to notify congressional oversight committees about the 1985-86 secret sales of U.S. arms to Iran.

North faces criminal charges that he conspired to divert U.S. government funds for unauthorized activities based on his use of the proceeds of arms sales to Iran. Nir said in the interview that he expected North to maintain at his trial that

these joint operations financed by Iranian arms sales were authorized by the secret U.S.-Israeli counterterrorism agreement, and so were legal. North's lawyers have said they want to introduce still-secret material in his defense; this agreement is one of the secrets they want to use, according to an informed source. North's lawyer, Brendan V. Sullivan Jr., declined comment.

Nir and North's counterterrorist operations were mentioned in records released in the Iran-contra investigations. They show Reagan and Peres were aware of covert counterterrorist plans and operations being arranged by North and Nir.

For example, a Sept. 15, 1986, memo from North to then-national security adviser John M. Poindexter shows that Reagan was informed of some of these plans.

Poindexter was set to meet with Nir for 10 minutes before an upcoming meeting between Peres and Reagan. "Purpose of this meeting is to debrief Nir on his meeting with Peres over the weekend," North told Poindexter. After that session with Nir, "You will then be able to brief the President on Peres' views ... " North told his boss.

The same memo shows Reagan was briefed for a scheduled meeting with Peres the next day at which bilateral counterterrorist efforts were high on the agenda. The memo was heavily censored in the Iran-

See NIR, A17, Col. 1

Survivor of Mexican Crash Reportedly Used Alias

Focus of Attention in Mystery Surrounding Israeli Shifts to Secretive Canadian Woman

By William Branigin
Washington Post Foreign Service

MEXICO CITY, Dec. 3—The focus of attention in the mysterious case of Amiram Nir Nisker, the Israeli arms dealer and Iran-contra middleman who died in a plane crash Wednesday in rural Mexico, shifted here today to the activities of a secretive Canadian woman who was badly injured in the crash.

The woman, identified as Adriana Stanton, 25, is recovering from her injuries in a Mexico City hospital, where Canadian authorities say she is in "critical but stable condition."

According to a Mexican newspaper, Stanton, like Nir, was traveling under an assumed name on the ill-fated flight.

Stanton was one of four persons, including the pilot, on board the Cessna six-seater plane that went down Wednesday on a ranch south of Ciudad Hidalgo in the central Mexican state of Michoacan, about 110 miles west of Mexico City.

The plane, apparently chartered by Nir under an assumed name, was en route from the Michoacan town of Uruapan to Mexico City when it developed engine trouble. The pilot attempted an emergency landing, Mexican officials said.

Nir and a Mexican passenger, Pedro Espinoza Hurtado, were killed instantly when the plane smashed into the ground, while Stanton and pilot Guillermo Cuahonte, 28, survived with serious head and bodily injuries.

Since being transferred to a Mexico City hospital, Stanton and an unidentified friend who has been staying with her have told reporters that she did not know Nir and that her presence on the flight with him was coincidental.

However, some details of her account have been contradicted by Mexican officials, making it likely that she will be investigated by police when she is medically fit to answer questions.

According to the Mexico City daily *La Jornada*, Stanton registered under the name of "Ester Arriaga" for the flight, which was chartered by Nir using the alias "Pat Weber."

Two Mexican officials in Michoacan state have said Stanton was serving as a secretary or "guide" for Nir during his unexplained visit to Uruapan.

According to his passport, Nir received a visa from the Mexican Embassy in London on Nov. 25 and arrived in Mexico City two days later. Mexican authorities say he flew to Uruapan the following day, Nov. 28, and stayed there with unidentified "friends" to carry out some as yet unspecified "business" dealings.

When the Michoacan state attorney general's office issued a statement on the plane crash Thursday, the injured woman was identified as Ester Arriaga, 23. No mention was made of Adriana Stanton in that initial statement.

According to Anselmo Esparza Verduzco, an official in the public prosecutor's office in Ciudad Hidalgo, the body of Nir was initially identified and recovered by Pedro Cruchet, an Argentine citizen residing in Uruapan.

At Stanton's hospital room today, a young woman who answered the door initially said that Cruchet was in the room and went to get him. But an Argentine woman who emerged a few minutes later, quickly shutting the door behind her, said Cruchet was not present and denied knowing any such person.

For the past two days, Stanton's hospital room has been virtually guarded by several persons who have identified themselves as her "friends" but refused to give their names or provide any information that might clear up the mystery surrounding the case.

One of Stanton's unidentified companions, the Argentine woman who claims she is in Mexico as a "tourist," asserted yesterday and today that Stanton's trip on the Taxi Aereo de Uruapan charter plane with Nir had been a "pure coincidence" and that she had had no connection with the Israeli.

However, when asked how this assertion could be reconciled with the fact that the flight was not scheduled but apparently had been chartered by Nir, the Argentine woman would not answer, nor would she comment on what Stanton was doing in Uruapan.

Nir Reportedly in Mexico to Buy Avocados

12-5-88

Associated Press

URUAPAN, Mexico, Dec. 4—Amiram Nir, the Israeli go-between in secret U.S. arms deals with Iran who died in a plane crash last week, told people he was in Mexico to buy avocados, police said.

Federal authorities continued today to investigate the light-plane crash and Nir's visit to Uruapan, an out-of-the-way city in the western mountains of Michoacan state famed for its avocados and notorious for its drug trafficking.

Nir, 37, was a counterterrorism adviser to Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres and his successor, Yitzhak Shamir. He was a central figure in many aspects of the Iran-contra affair that grew out of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and the subsequent diversion of some sales profits to the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan contra rebels.

Police here said they have no evidence that Nir's visit to Uruapan involved anything but avocados. But

they could not explain why he apparently decided to travel under an assumed name.

Jose Luis Arriaga, a Federal Judicial Police commander in Uruapan, said Nir spent three days at the best hotel in town and discussed avocado prices with a French-owned exporter. Nir was traveling on a visa issued Nov. 25 in London.

"He came to solicit prices for avocados," Arriaga said, adding that he did not know if Nir was acting as an independent buyer or as an agent for an importer abroad.

He said Nir had planned to return to Uruapan in a week, possibly to close a deal with the exporter Eupasa, a local subsidiary of Lucal France, a fruit-and-vegetable importer based in France.

When Nir left Uruapan on a charter flight, he registered under an assumed name, Pat Weber. However, Arriaga said, Nir used his own name at the hotel he stayed at in Uruapan.

Arriaga said police obtained information about Nir's visit from Pedro Curchet, the local agent for Eupasa, which he said employs about 50 people in an avocado-packing operation in Uruapan.

Curchet identified Nir's body in the wreckage of the Aerotaxis of Uruapan Cessna T-210 that went down Wednesday in the mountains outside Ciudad Hidalgo, about 110 miles west of Mexico City.

Curchet was one of a party of about eight people from Argentina who had been staying at the hillside hotel since September but left Thursday or Friday.

Hotel personnel and police who interviewed Curchet said the visit was Nir's first. Curchet could not be located for comment, and the offices of Eupasa in Uruapan were closed today.

Israeli Embassy officials and friends of Nir in Israel have said Nir was in Mexico on a business trip but would not reveal the nature of the visit.

July 31st, 1980

Dear Bill,

I hope by now you have received an Israeli envelope containing four rather long clippings in a curious semitic language. Well, these were the four installments published so far in Maariv, translated (not by me, though) from your book. A good friend who read them all told me recently: "This is an eye opener!" So there you are. A fifth and last installment shall be published within few weeks. Of course I'll send you a copy.

Now you cannot imagine how happy you have made me with the exhilarating news about chances to have the Hoover Institute publish my father's diaries. I remember this important institute from my days back at the Russian Institute at Columbia University, where several heavy volumes full of fascinating documents all relating to the Russian Revolution had the name "Hoover Institute" clearly printed on them. In my mind I do not see a more appropriate publisher of the condensed diary than this place. Now that I agree, all that is left is for the other party to consent...

I have so far ~~have~~ not heard from Charles Palm, though perhaps it is too early. However, meanwhile a rather important event had occurred, namely, the forboding booklet "Israel's Sacred Terror" by Livia Rokach (a former Israeli journalist; daughter of an Israeli Minister for the Interior who also served under my father; ~~who~~ became a vigorous anti-Zionist; presented in the above mentioned booklet as "an Italian writer & journalist of Palestinian origin") has been published in the USA by the AAUC organization in spite of warnings from "our side" (including myself) that this publication involves breach of copyright laws.

Now I got this booklet yesterday. It is very well written. I even ~~for~~ agree with most of its contents. I am convinced, though, that the publishers just stole parts of my old man's diary and that they should be rightly persecuted (I

am now looking for the right lawyer who specializes in these matters; only if he insists that no copyright laws have been broken, ^{as far as} I shall let go). But all this is beyond the point. What is important ~~from~~ publishing the condensed volume is concerned is that now we have on our hands quite a stunning booklet, containing the most provocative elements in my father's diary well translated into English. What's more, the very ~~existence~~ of the booklet by Rokach as well as her comment on the value of the diary ~~should suffice~~ to entice any serious publisher, and especially an academic one, to fight over rights of publishing the source material on which such a booklet is built.

Again, I have been playing chess with myself, but what I do dare suggest here is that you get hold of the booklet (I understand it can be purchased for \$4.50 from National Association of Arab Americans, 1825 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington D.C. 20009), and then pass it on to Charles Palm and see what he thinks afterwards.

I was happy to note you were accorded visiting scholar status at Hoover for the purpose of writing your next book on Iran. Surely you are aware of the intricate relations which evolved between "us" & the Shah regime. I do not know now you want to handle this subject in your book and how much length you will have to give it. However, I would be happy to help. Some of my best friends served in Iran (including our last Ambassador Uri Lubrani). I myself spent a whole year in Teheran (1970) thank to my wife the choreographer who was invited over there to be the main teacher of Iran's national school for folklore in Teheran. Indeed, if the dream of publishing my father's diary by H.I. comes true, it might be a great idea if I could manage to come there for clinching matters and then we could meet and discuss your book plan too. Moreover, at the back of my head I have a little flame of an idea to ^{write} ~~write~~ a book on the Sinai campaign of 1956, detailing especially the Israeli story which has never been told truly. Perhaps, the H.I. is the right place to sponsor such an effort. I would love to spend there several months on the project. Please give a little thought to this idea and let me have your judgement of it.

Sincerely,

Yasaka

Former CIA agent running covert campaign for Bush

Author sees Republican candidate as spy agency's savior

By Miguel Acoca
SPECIAL TO THE EXAMINER

WASHINGTON — A former CIA officer who is highly critical of the way the Reagan administration has run covert operations is quietly promoting the presidential candidacy of Vice President Bush as the man capable of renovating the beleaguered spy agency.

The former CIA operative is Miles Copeland, a covert-operations practitioner who served in the CIA in the 1950s as a link to Gamal Abdel Nasser, the anti-Israeli Egyptian nationalist leader. Copeland also won a degree of fame in the 1960s as the author of "The Game of Nations," a book based on his experiences.

He says he and other retired CIA officers support Bush, who was CIA director in 1976-77.

Last summer, Copeland sent other retired intelligence operators a paper calling for a radical change in the way covert operations are run. The Examiner has obtained a copy of the document, which also derides the way President Reagan and former CIA Director William Casey conducted the Iran-contra operations.

"The fault of the Reagan administration has not been in keeping secrets, but in doing stupid things in secret," the paper said.

In an interview, Copeland said members of his informal pro-Bush group advocated greater collaboration with the Arab nations and a more even-handed approach toward Israel.

Copeland acknowledged that

such a view could cause problems for the Bush campaign, but he emphasized that the group believed U.S. support for Israel's integrity should continue.

Documents released by the congressional Iran-contra probe indicate that Bush always was wary of Israel's role in the secret weapons sales.

Other intelligence sources said that some former CIA officers working behind the scenes to promote Bush included Archibald Roosevelt, who worked with Copeland in the Middle East during the turbulent 1950s.

The sources said that Roosevelt had discussed Copeland's ideas for a "new CIA" with Bush. Copeland declined to discuss Roosevelt's involvement, and he would not name others in his group.

Copeland is proposing to change the nature of covert operations, switching from an emphasis on arming and supporting guerrilla factions to a more political approach. That would focus on attempting to change the direction of unfriendly governments.

He said he had not discussed the proposal directly with Bush. Intelligence sources familiar with Copeland's plans, however, said he would meet with Bush in the near future and brief him.

Copeland's "confidential" paper last summer said he would not give campaign speeches for Bush. However, Copeland said he was speaking in "support of my friends in the intelligence community who argue that we cannot hold our own in the

international game' as it is presently developing without covert operations, and that the 'new CIA' we propose will be ineffective without a president the American people will trust."

He said: "To most of us this means George Bush."

Copeland, both in the interview and in the paper, was highly critical of Reagan's and Casey's support for the Nicaraguan rebels and for seeking military solutions to political problems with Third World governments hostile to U.S. policies.

He advocated reducing the influence within the CIA of paramilitary operators from the Vietnam War era and concentrating on developing a group of regional experts with skills in language and history.

Copeland said the problem with

Reader's Note: Copeland was the author of the article in the Washington Star published only 3 days before Carter's Desert One hostage rescue mission, which "blew" the details of the mission and was broadcast into Iran from Iraq radio up until the April 25, 1980 rescue attempt. Copeland is an old and close CIA colleague of George Bush.

Examiner file photo

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH GAINS SUPPORT OF FORMER CIA AGENT Candidate backed by 'friends in the intelligence community'

Nicaragua's government could have been solved by sending CIA experts to deal with the government the way he and others operated in the Middle East. They toppled governments to promote U.S. interests without firing a shot or arming and organizing guerrilla troops.

Copeland's support for Bush comes despite the fact that Bush has been among the staunchest supporters of the contras and has had nothing but praise for Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, who faces the possibility of prosecution for his role in running the Iran-contra op-

erations.

Copeland said he had been approached by Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian middleman in the secret arms sales, for help in promoting the sales with Casey.

Copeland began in U.S. intelligence with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, joined the CIA in the late 1940s and served as a CIA consultant on "operational techniques" upon his retirement.

Always outspoken, he now is writing a book.

SUMMARY

No estimate of developments likely to follow President Reagan's December 14 decision "to initiate a dialogue with PLO representatives" leading to a "comprehensive peace in the Middle East" should overlook documented history.

Specifically, attention should be paid to the roles of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.N., and Sweden before and after David Ben Gurion's unilateral declaration of a Jewish state, with deliberately-undefined borders against the advice of Secretary of State George Marshall, on May 14, 1948 and the negotiation of armistice agreements among Israel and its four Arab neighbors in face-to-face meetings mediated by the U.N.'s Dr. Ralph Bunche starting on January 7, 1949.

On September 17, 1948, U.N. Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte (of Sweden's royal family) and his assistant, Col. Andre P. Serot of the French Air Force, were brutally murdered in the New City of Jerusalem by members of the terrorist Stern Gang, led by Yitzhak Shamir (then Izer-nitsky), Joshua Cohen, Yisrael Elad, and Stanley Gold-foot (a South African racist), but two Americans, Frank Begley and Cdr. William R. Cox. USN, survived.

The peace plan Bernadottes had forwarded to the United Nations was accepted and it became the basis of de jure U.S. recognition of Israel and Trans-Jordan by the U.S. government on January 13, 1949. The armistice agreements followed, but these were renounced by Ben Gurion during the 1956 Suez War.

The seven basic premises of the Bernadotte Plan, accepted by Israel, are:

- (1) Peace must be restored in Palestine by any means possible;
- (2) A Jewish state called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so;
- (3) The boundaries of this state must be fixed by the United Nations if the parties concerned cannot agree upon them;
- (4) The boundaries originally proposed by the General Assembly's vote on Nov. 29 for a partition of Palestine must be revised to produce "geographical homogeneity;"
- (5) The innocent people uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war must be assured the right to return to their homes or to get compensation if they cannot or will not return.

(6) Jerusalem, "because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment."

(7) International guarantees should be provided "as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights."

Each one of these provisions was anathema to Israel's governments and they continue to be so. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have offered to guarantee Israel's borders and security; in each case the offer was rejected on grounds that only the Jews could provide for their own security after the holocaust. Offers of U.N. observation forces have always been refused by Israel on grounds that the U.N. was pro-Arab. The only U.N. forces Israel has accepted have been based on Arab territory: the Sinai in 1957; the Golan Heights in 1975; and Lebanon in 1978. In each case, the Israeli army overran the U.N. groups when starting a new war.

Israel is the only country in the world receiving U.S. military and economic aid without any end-use inspection or restrictions on its use for defensive purposes only, as still required by the Mutual Security Act. In evacuating the Sinai, Israel sold U.S. equipment back to America, was given vast amounts to construct replacement facilities, and rejected a U.N. force to separate its forces from Egypt. Kissinger then arranged that U.S. troops perform the function assigned to the U.N. with the risk that Americans will be killed (as were those flying home for Christmas) if they interefered with a new attack on Egypt based on a breach of the Camp David Accords. A constant threat by Sharon!

The status of Jerusalem is nonnegotiable in Israel's eyes and this has never been challenged by the Reagan administration. The same applies to the Golan Heights and Shultz has never been able to change this position. The annexation of south Lebanon can be expected if Israel is faced with a U.N. resolution demanding the removal of all foreign forces from that country. Yet, Russia and the U.S. forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1957. We are today living with the price paid for this -- Israel's nuclear capability.

In summary, "a comprehensive peace agreement" is anathema to Israel and has been since 1949 when the CIA and Bechtel sponsored a ~~coup~~ installing a military dictator who was supposed to make peace bilaterally. Ben Gurion rejected this and Col. Za'im was assassinated five months later. Nuri Said, King Abdullah, Anwar Sadat, and Bashir Gemayel met the same fate. With the new U.S. position on the PLO, Arafat becomes a target for assassination for the first time.

Belt Sanim colony, which the Egyptians captured on Tuesday. After allowing the Israeli forces to encircle the colony, the Egyptians counter-attacked, the communiqué said.

Egyptian forces entered Aqur and Hartuv on the Jerusalem-Ramleh road and light infantry made a successful raid on Ein Guinom colony on the Jerusalem-Lebron road, destroying several buildings and setting two dumps on fire.

[An Egyptian advance to that sector would put the patrols, at Hartuv, only three miles south of Bab el Wad on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road, and that distance from a junction with the

Arab Legion west of Jerusalem, the United Press said.]

The communiqué added that Talpith, a suburb of New Jerusalem, was bombarded by heavy artillery.

The Egyptian air force bombed fortifications on the Jerusalem-Latrun road and in Tel Aviv gasoline dumps were hit. Egyptian planes returned safely from both operations, the communiqué added.

Rival Positions at Deadline

AMMAN, Trans-Jordan, June 10 (UP)—With the four-week truce only a few hours away, this was the military picture in the Holy Land:

Israel has lost the Negeb area in south Palestine to the Egyptians

but has won control of large north Palestine areas assigned to the Arabs under the United Nations partition plan.

Israeli forces hold the coastal strip from Tel Aviv to the Lebanese border, running inland to the Syrian frontier. They control the Hule Valley and the key towns of Safed, Tiberias, Beisan and Afule. In addition to virtually all roads leading to the north Palestine coast.

Syrian and Lebanese troops bolstered by irregulars, have occupied Malikia and taken up positions overlooking Lake Hule.

In that northern area, Iraqi forces hold the Arab triangle formed by the towns of Nablus, Tulkarm and Jenin. The Iraqis

have thrust westward toward the Israeli-held coastal plain.

Trans-Jordan troops control the Jerusalem area with the aid of irregular tribal fighters who have occupied Lydda, Ramleh and Latrun, sealing off 100,000 Jews in modern Jerusalem. The Arabs control all roads leading to Jerusalem.

The Legion and Palestine Arabs control Jerusalem's Old City and the Sheikh Jarrah quarter, while Israeli forces hold the modern sections.

Egyptian regulars dominate south Palestine. They have advanced within twenty miles of Tel Aviv in the west and have linked with Arab legionnaires at Bethlehem in the east.

June 11, 1948

BERNADOTTE IS SLAIN IN JERUSALEM; KILLERS CALLED 'JEWISH IRREGULARS'; SECURITY COUNCIL WILL ACT TODAY

HIS CAR AMBUSHED

Mediator Was Defying
Warnings by Tour—
French Aide Dies

STERN GROUP IS BLAMED

U. S. Consul Calls Terrorists
'Presumably' Responsible
—Palestine Is Tense

By JULIAN LOUIS MELTZER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

TEL AVIV, Israel, Sept. 17—Count Folke Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator for Palestine, and another United Nations official, detached from the French Air Force, were assassinated this afternoon within the Israeli-held area of Jerusalem.

Count Bernadotte was on his way from the former British High Commissioner's residence in southern Jerusalem and was passing through the Katamon suburb when "Jewish irregulars" held up the Mediator's car.

[John J. MacDonald, United States Consul General in Jerusalem, reported to the State Department that Count Bernadotte and Col. Andre Pierre Serot had been ambushed, "presumably by the Stern Gang."

[Reuters quoted a Stern Group

spokesman in Tel Aviv as having said: "I am satisfied that it has happened," but added that the spokesman was unaware whether members of the group were responsible for the killing.

[A Jerusalem dispatch quoted Dr. Bernard Joseph, Military Governor for the Israeli part of Jerusalem, as saying that all possible measures had been taken to apprehend the assassins.]

U. N. MEDIATOR KILLED IN PALESTINE



Count Folke Bernadotte

The New York Times (by Neal Boenzi)

Truce Staff Announcement

A United Nations truce staff announcement here said:

"Count Bernadotte killed by two Jewish irregulars in hold-up 1700 hours today on way to New City of Jerusalem. In same hold-up United Nations senior observer Col. Andre Serot of French Air Force killed.

"Mediator was on tour of Middle Eastern capitals to bring security and peace to Palestine.

"Arrangements made bring bodies in Red Cross ambulance from Jerusalem to Haifa."

Dr. Paul Mohn, acting chief of staff and legal adviser to the central truce supervision board at Haifa, ordered that all United Nations flags over the buildings that it occupies be lowered to half staff.

The Israeli-controlled "Voice of Jerusalem" radio gave the following account of the assassination of Count Bernadotte:

He was traveling in a car from Government House to Katamon. A jeep with three armed men approached the vehicle and automatic fire opened at the Mediator's car. Count Bernadotte was seriously injured and the French colonel was killed outright. The Count died shortly afterward.

Colonel Lundstroem Unhurt

The radio statement added that Gen. Aage Lundstroem, Count Bernadotte's chief of staff, in the same car, was unhurt. Col. Frank Begley of the United Nations Secretariat was slightly injured.

Numerous wall placards appeared recently in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv over the imprint of Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Stern

that Count Bernadotte "get out" of Israel. One cartoon showed a boot kicking the Count.

On he held a news conference in the Belgian Consulate at Jerusalem, two jeeps of young men and women of the Stern Group picketed the entrance with large signs. One said: "Jerusalem is yours. Jerusalem is yours."

The other advised him to get out. If it is proved that the Stern Group had connection with the slaying, doubtless will provoke rapid action by the Israeli military administration in Jerusalem.

Over the indeterminate position of Jerusalem, pending the solution of its future constitutional status, the Stern Group operates in the Israeli areas and, like the Irgun, maintains its private army camps and its status.

Although the Irgun announced an agreement with Dr. Ben-Gurion to accept the authority and line of the statutory Israeli authorities, the Stern Group up to now has not reached any such agreement. Negotiations have been going on, however, in a desultory way for some time.

In Tel Aviv both the Irgun and the Stern Group have dissolved their military formations and their members have joined the regular defense army.

Shot at Point-Blank Range

By The Associated Press
TEL AVIV, Israel, Sept. 17—Official United Nations telegram to the Security Council declared that the two men had been shot and killed by Jews of unknown identity in a cold-blooded manner.

The telegram said that the killed used an Israeli army-type jeep and had shot Count Bernadotte at point-blank range at a road block within the Jewish area of Jerusalem's Katamon district. He was driven to Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus, where he died within a few minutes without regaining consciousness.

Colonel Serot was killed instantly. The telegram telling of the attack was signed by Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, United States member of the United Nations Secretariat.

An Israeli spokesman in Tel Aviv said that Moshe Shertok, Israeli Foreign Minister, had sent telegrams to King Gustav V of Sweden, Countess Bernadotte and United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie that had said:

"Deeply shocked by outrageous murder of Count Bernadotte by criminal outlaws who are execrated by the entire people of Israel and the Jewish community of Jerusalem. On behalf of the Government of Israel I beg to express our feelings of grief and profound sympathy. The Government of Israel is adopting the sternest measures to bring the criminals to justice."

In the attack Frank Begley, chief security officer for the United Nations, who was driving Count Bernadotte's car, suffered powder burns. He raced to the hospital with the fatally wounded Count.

Continued Despite Warning

AMMAN, Trans-Jordan, Sept. 17 (AP)—The Mediator was shot down in Israeli territory while on an official truce inspection tour of the "trigger-happy" city, a phrase that the Count himself had used a few hours before to describe conditions within Jerusalem.

He had gone despite an anonymous warning that he would be fired upon, and had continued even after a sniper's bullet had hit his automobile tire.

"I will not be frightened," he had declared.

Mr. MacDonald said that four men in a jeep suddenly had blocked the car's way. Colonel Begley, a former Connecticut state policeman, grappled with one of the men and was slightly wounded in the face. But one of the others reached the car and shot down the Count and the Frenchman with a Sten gun. Mr. MacDonald said that the four men in the jeep had escaped.

[United States authorities in Washington said that the assassination was likely to lead to new violence. Israeli leaders already had asserted that an early

end of the truce had been threatened by Arab preparations for attack.]

The 53-year-old Count had just capped four months of mediation efforts in the Palestine dispute by forwarding his report for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly meeting in Paris next week. He had said that this report had pointed to conclusions that might end the conflict.

He had flown yesterday from Rhodes, his headquarters, to Damascus, the Syrian capital, where he had announced his intention of again trying to demilitarize Jerusalem.

Discussing the second two-months-old truce in Palestine, which he had negotiated, he had told reporters in Damascus that Jerusalem was a "trigger-happy" city where both sides were shooting in the dark without knowing what they were shooting at.

He had left Damascus this morning and had arrived in Jerusalem at 11 A. M. He was killed six hours later.

En route from Damascus to Kollandia Airport, outside Jerusalem, Count Bernadotte had revealed a note that had been received by radio. It had read:

"Urgent — Inform all aircraft against landing Kollandia Airport. They will be fired upon."

TEXT OF REPORT TO U. N.

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES

LAKE SUCCESS, N. Y., Sept. 17—The following is the text of the report of the assassination as cabled today to the United Nations Security Council in Paris by Ralph Bunche, who has been designated new head of the United Nations Mission in Palestine.

Count Folke Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator on Palestine, brutally assassinated by Jewish assailants of unknown identity, Palestine. Cold blooded attack in the New City of Jerusalem at 1405 Greenwich time today, Friday, September 17.

Mediator, in Jerusalem on official tour, was enroute from Government House YMCA in a convoy of three cars, two of which were flying United Nations flags and one, a Red Cross flag. Party

accompanied by an official liaison officer of the Jewish forces.

In the Katamon quarter of the New City, well within Jewish lines, all three cars were stopped at a road block in which was parked an Israeli Army-type jeep filled with men in Jewish Army uniforms, all of whom got out but the driver.

Two of these men, apparently recognizing the Mediator's car, approached it, stood by the window and fired at point-blank range. Count Bernadotte and Col. Andre P. Serot, French Air Forces, United Nations observer, sitting beside him in rear of car, were both hit several times. Colonel Serot being killed instantly, and Count Bernadotte having lost consciousness almost immediately, dying within a few minutes after his arrival at Hadassah Hospital, where he was driven by United Nations Secretariat officer, Frank Begley, who was driver of Mediator's car at time of attack and who suffered only powder burns.

Gen. Aage Lundstrom, chief of staff truce supervision, also seated in rear of car, miraculously escaped injury. Comdr. William R. Cox, USN, United Nations observer, seated in front of car, also uninjured.

Dr. Bernard Joseph, Military Governor of Jerusalem, and Colonel Dayan, military commander of Israeli forces in Jerusalem, immediately expressed deep regret and concern and stated their intention to hunt down assailants.

The situation in Jerusalem tense. Am consulting with Truce Commission and senior observers concerning future arrangements affecting observer personnel Jerusalem, who are in constant danger.

General Lundstrom, as personal representative of the Mediator and his chief of staff, is carrying on with direction of the Truce Commission and Gen. William E. Riley, USMC, senior United Nations observer.

All members of observer corps and United Nations Secretariat staff deeply shocked at the sudden loss of their leader in this work whose high integrity, tirelessness, devotion to his mission and great personal courage were inspiration to us all.

September 18, 1948

BERNADOTTE URGED AN IMPOSED PEACE BASED ON RECOGNIZING STATE OF ISRAEL

Mediator Asked Change Boundaries, Aid by Assembly for Victims

By AM POPE BREWER

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES
TEL AVIV, Sept. 20—The United Nations mediator today urged a compromise settlement between the Arab countries and Israel. The Palestine war is

to be ended, Count Folke Bernadotte declared in his final report to the General Assembly, received here after his slaying and released today.

The Mediator predicted that the Arabs and Israelis would object to such a settlement, but he said that they knew that in the end they would have to accept any solution the United Nations was determined to enforce.

In a 35,000-word report the United

Nations Mediator for Palestine summed up the history of his mission, outlined the status of the problem and recommended what he termed a reasonable compromise.

Seven "Basic Premises"

He set forth seven "basic premises" for his recommendations. They were:

(1) Peace must be restored in Palestine by any means possible.

(2) "A Jewish state called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming it will not continue to do so."

(3) The boundaries of this state must be fixed by the United Nations if the parties concerned cannot agree on them.

(4) The boundaries originally proposed by the General Assembly's vote on Nov. 29 for a partition of Palestine must be revised to produce "geographical ho-

Partition of Palestine

mogeneity."

- (5) The "innocent people uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war" must be assured the right to return to their homes or get adequate compensation if they cannot or will not return.
- (6) Jerusalem, "because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment."
- (7) International guarantees should be provided "as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights."

U. N. Control Suggested

On the basis of these premises, Count Bernadotte recommended specifically that the truce in Palestine be superseded by a proclamation of peace and that both sides demobilize and a broad, neutral No Man's Land be created and controlled by the United Nations.

He urged a United Nations delimitation of frontiers with radical changes from the original partition boundaries. He would give the Negeb, desert area in southern Palestine, to the Arabs instead of to Israel, and all Galilee to Israel. The Assembly's partition plan gave western Galilee to the Arabs.

The Mediator suggested that it would be advisable to merge the Arab part of Palestine with Trans-Jordan.

"The United Nations by declaration or other appropriate means," he said, "should undertake to provide special assurance that the

boundaries between Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned."

The port and oil installations of Haifa should be in Israel, he declared, but should be accessible to all as a free port. The Lydda Airport, the report added, should be a free station, open to all.

Jerusalem, Count Bernadotte said, should be under United Nations control, "with full safeguards for the protection of the holy places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom." All parties should have "the right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air," the report recommended.

The Mediator urged the United Nations to "affirm the right of Arab refugees to return to their homes. Their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return should be supervised and assisted" by a United Nations Conciliation Commission, he declared.

Population Exchange Covered

He recommended full guarantees by Israel of the rights of Arab residents and by the Arab Governments of the rights of Jews resident in their countries. An effort should be made to reach agreements on an exchange of population to solve minority problems, according to the report.

The Conciliation Commission was described as a body that should be formed to operate for a limited period to aid in a "peaceful adjustment of the situation" and supervise the execution of agreements.

acting United Nations Mediator in Palestine, originated with the Egyptian Government and represented a sharp turnabout from previous Arab refusals ever to sit at the same table with representatives of the Israeli Government.

(Britain charged that Israeli troops were still on Egyptian soil, holding a strongpoint five miles inside the frontier.)

News of the Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of three major resolutions of the Security Council was received here with some jubilation and many observers were confidently predicting that Egypt's conciliatory approach would set the pace for other Arab countries.

Azcarate Sent First Message

First word that the cease-fire and armistice agreements were acceptable to both sides came from Dr. Bunche's representatives in

The report includes a section on the history of the mediation mission's efforts and one on the problems created by the flight of more than 300,000 Arabs from the war. Count Bernadotte cited the plight of the Arab refugees as a fourth "fundamental issue" to be added to the three others that, he said, existed in Palestine: partition, Israeli sovereignty and Jewish immigration.

The Mediator argued that Israel was established and could not be removed except by military action on a scale of which the Arab countries were incapable. At the same time, he said, the Arab states must have guarantees against any expansionist ambitions of Israel.

Economic Union Held Impossible

He recommended a readjustment of boundaries on the ground that those set forth in the partition plan were impractical without economic union of the Arab and Israeli areas. This has proved impossible, according to the report.

In his introduction the Mediator said it would be "a mistake of tragic consequences if at this critical period in the history of Palestine and in the intensive effort to achieve a peaceful solution the question were not to be considered and the necessary decisions taken by the General Assembly."

Some basis for a peaceful settlement can ultimately be found, he maintained, but "the conclusion is inescapable that at some juncture vital decisions will have to be taken by the General Assembly if a peaceful settlement is to be achieved."

The truce cannot continue forever, he said. There is danger, he added, that "the accumulated irritation from daily incidents, war nerves, the economic strain of maintaining large armies in the field, the pressures of public opinion and the tendency to despair of

any peaceful settlement may provoke one or the other party to take the foolhardy risk of resuming hostilities in the vain hope of a quick victory."

Benefits of Truce Noted

Count Bernadotte noted that each side contended that the truce was working to the benefit of the other but that the halt of hostilities provided a "cooling off period."

"There are recent indications," the report said, "of more moderate and sober counsel in at least some important quarters."

During the first seven weeks of the current truce there were only about 300 complaints of violations, compared with 500 during the earlier, four-week truce, Count Bernadotte said. Of the later complaints 105 were against the Arabs and 182 against Israel. Some of the recent violations were more serious, however, than earlier ones, according to the report.

Four serious violations cited were the destruction of the Latrun pumping station by the Arabs, the seizure of the Red Cross zone around Government House in Israeli Jerusalem, the killing of two French observers near Gaza by Arab irregulars and the attack on the Arab villages of Ein Ghazal, Jaba and Ijzim.

In the third part of the report the Mediator reviewed efforts to aid the refugees from the Palestine war. The aid provided to date is "quite inadequate to meet any continuing need," he said.

A spokesman for the Israeli Government said of the report: "We shall give it the most careful and earnest study, and no doubt the Government of Israel will have the opportunity of expressing its views before the appropriate committee of the General Assembly."

September 21, 1948

TRUCE IS ACCEPTED BY EGYPT, ISRAEL; DIRECT TALKS NEAR

U. N. Is Told That Negotiations
for Armistice on All Fronts
Will Start Immediately

By GEORGE BARRETT

SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES

LAKE SUCCESS, Jan. 6—Egypt and Israel informed the United Nations today that they had agreed to a cease fire on all fronts at 10 o'clock tomorrow, Greenwich time (9 A. M. Friday New

Henri Vigier, his agent in Tel Aviv. Final word came through today.

The original Cairo communication called for the cease-fire to be effective yesterday at 2 P. M., but because of delays in transmission it was necessary to postpone the deadline to today at 2 P. M. Tonight, however, another delay in communications necessitated further postponement, and Dr. Bunche ultimately decided to settle on tomorrow's deadline.

It was a banner day for the Security Council and the United Nations, for the acceptances by both countries were three-way affairs. Israel and Egypt agreed first to the Dec. 29 resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. They then went on to accept jointly and amicably the Nov. 4 and Nov. 16 resolutions, calling for withdrawal of armed forces from seized posi-

had contended that they were willing to talk armistice but they argued firmly that they would do so only after Israel had obeyed the Council resolution calling for troop withdrawals from the Negeb. It has been one of Egypt's most bitter arguments that the Israeli Government was not only not complying with this resolution by keeping its troops in advance positions but was even preventing Egypt from obeying the resolution by refusing to let bottled-up Egyptian troops in Faluja cross Israeli lines to return home.

Sudden Break Today

The Israeli Government has contended that the Council resolution on troop withdrawals was obeyed, and that only those troops that were already in the Negeb as settlement guards before the Oct. 14 deadline set by the Council were remaining in the disputed area. It was upon this basic stalemate that the entire case rested until today's sudden break.

U. S.
AM
FT

Habakkuk 2:1-4, 9-20. *But the Lord is in his holy temple; let all the earth keep silence before him.*

Silence is hard to come by. Even in the country, one can hear sounds from farm machinery, hay trucks, lowing cattle and barking dogs. Cities are loud with cars, jackhammers, voices and sirens. Houses settle and creak, disturbing the quiet of the night. It may sometimes seem that there is no way to observe the command that earth keep silence before God.

But we can create personal quiet and will to be silent within, so that our minds are not racing with ideas and our bodies not fidgeting. We can wait in stillness, just being with God, coming to know God's presence as it bursts into the silence of the heart. With effort, we can even take time every day for a quiet adventure with God at the stillpoint of life.

The demand that earth be still is not a harsh demand by a capricious god who is appeased only by adoration; like all commands that issue from heaven, silence is given as a blessing to humanity, as a pole that vaults us toward intimacy with God.

Thank you, God, for the church, and for the gift of your servant, Samuel Seabury. The first bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America 1784.

Ps. 89:1-18; Jas. 2:14-26; Luke 16:19-31

15

INTRODUCTION TO JERUSALEM THE GOLDEN

(FROM HABAKKUK 2)

"1. I will take my stand to watch, and station myself in the tower, and look forth to see what he will say to me, and what I will answer concerning my complaint.

"2. And the Lord answered me: Write the vision; make it plain upon tablets, so he may run who reads it.

"3. For still the vision awaits its time; it hastens to the end -- it will not lie. If it seems slow, wait for it; it will surely come, it will not delay."

"15. Woe to him who makes his neighbors drink of the cup of his wrath, and makes them drunk to gaze on their shame!

"16. You will be stated with contempt instead of glory. Drink, yourself, and stagger! The cup in the Lord's right hand will come around to you, and shame will come upon your glory!

"17. The violence done to Lebanon will overwhelm you; the destruction of the beasts will terrify you, for the blood of men and the violence to the earth, to cities, and all who dwell therein."

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Date January 12, 1989

TO: General Brent Scowcroft

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT 

Because of my visit to North Yemen, President Saleh feels we have a personal relationship. At some point it would be appropriate to invite him here. Recently he has accepted a liberal largess from Libya, but he is basically a very decent guy and the United States has a very important stake in the oil which is produced there.

cc: Secretary-designate Jim Baker
Governor John Sununu
Joe Hagin



THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1989


Mr. Ray L. Hunt
1401 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75202-2970

Dear Ray,

Pardon my delay in answering your letter of December 23. As soon as I become President, I will discuss a possible visit by President Saleh to the United States. He is a good man and we have a stake in his independence and success. Thanks for weighing in on this, and once again just before I assume the presidency, let me thank you for standing by me through the political wars throughout the last twenty years. Your support has meant a great deal to me.

Love to Nancy.


Most sincerely,



George Bush

RAY L. HUNT
1401 ELM STREET
DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-2970

December 23, 1988



PERSONAL

The Honorable George H. W. Bush
Vice President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear George:

I was in North Yemen five days ago for a series of discussions with the Prime Minister and various senior ministers (including the Foreign Minister) of the Yemen Arab Republic. These ministers constitute the governing body for North Yemen's oil, gas and mineral operations. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both expressed how pleased they were that you had been elected president.

I also had the opportunity to visit with President Saleh, and he asked me to convey a personal message from him to you which I am doing with this letter.

President Saleh said that he wished to congratulate you most sincerely upon your being elected president, and that he and his government had been very hopeful all along that this would be the outcome of the election. He repeated the statement that he has made to me on several occasions, namely, that he felt you were the most qualified person, probably in the history of the United States, to ever assume the presidency. He also stated (in a very appropriate way) that he hoped his invitation to come to Washington was still in good standing, as he would enjoy, very much, having the opportunity to come to the United States and personally pay his respects to you. (In that regard, it is my personal opinion that North Yemen wishes to continue strengthening its relationship with the United States.)

George, I know that a number of government leaders around the world would enjoy, very much, being invited to Washington, and it would be very inappropriate for me to offer any personal opinions or recommendations as to whom you might invite or not invite (or the order in which such invitations might be scheduled). I was specifically asked by President Saleh to convey this message, however, and I told him I would be pleased to do so.

Vice President George H. W. Bush
December 23, 1988
Page 2

George, I hope that you, Barbara and the family have a most enjoyable Christmas season and a wonderful new year. We are planning to be amongst the throngs on January 20, and while we'll probably not have a chance to see one another personally, I do want you to know how proud all of us are (for both you and the good old U.S.A.).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Ray L. Hunt', with a stylized, sweeping flourish above the name.

Ray L. Hunt

RLH/ss

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Letter	From Fahad Bin Abdulaziz to GB Re: Relationship between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. (Unofficial English translation) SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL (2 pp.)	1/19/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Affairs (Transition)

Date Closed: 11/30/2004	OA/ID Number: 29179-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Note	From GB to JAB III Re: Note from Zbigniew Brzezinski (1 pp.)	11/21/88	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Affairs (Transition)

**Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)**
 By *JF* (NLGB) on 4/10/08

Date Closed: 11/30/2004	OA/ID Number: 29179-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Date 11 21- 88

TO:

JAB III cc nick Brady

FROM:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

The attached incoming from
from ZBIG has some good ideas.
I think it makes sense ot stayu in touch wit
him.

AT some point I'd like to do what he suggest
about meeting with Congress/to spell otu
my goals in a broad sense

and to go further iwth the idea of periodic
non-crisis meetings/

When we get our full NSC team in place I'd li
like ot have a meeting to go over the objecti
manby of which are spelled out in
Zbuig's memo.

gb.

cc: Governor Sununu



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

November 21, 1988

PERSONAL

The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
The Federalist Society for Law and
Public Policy Studies
1625 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Zbig:

I have now had a chance to think more about your memo of November 9.

I had not given a lot of thought to institutionalizing our Trans-Pacific Partnership. We have been looking at this area almost exclusively in a bilateral context. The importance of China is very clear to me. I'd love to return to China before Deng leaves office entirely. I feel I have a special relationship there.

I like your idea of a Pacific Rim summit and will ask Jim Baker to give this some serious consideration. Frankly, I think such a summit would help with Europe in a perverse sort of way.

Eastern Europe has a real chance now for more liberty if we handle their Soviet relationship properly.

On consultation with Congress, I meant what I said in the campaign about "bipartisanship," and I have already written several Senators suggesting the very meetings that you suggest.

We are considering an early bilateral with Japan; and as you have now seen, a meeting with Mexico's new President is set for tomorrow.

I will not neglect Canada.

Since your memo, Gorbachev has asked for and we have agreed to a meeting in New York.

Some of what you suggest under "Other Administration Initiatives" have yet to be considered, but points 1-8 will all get early consideration. I just want you to know I read your memo carefully and appreciate it.

Sincerely,

*Zbig -
Please keep confidential*
GB

[Signature]
George Bush

bcc: Honorable James A. Baker
Honorable Nicholas Brady
Honorable John Sununu

Nov. 9, 1988

To: the President-Elect
From: Zbigniew Brzezinski



Subject: Attached Memorandum on Foreign Policy Strategy.

One of your most important tasks as President will be to impose a strategic sense of direction on U.S. foreign policy. This cannot be done from any other level but the Presidential. Moreover, unless such strategic cohesion is firmly dictated by the President himself, from the top downward, the entrenched bureaucracies will themselves strive to ensure that their own, more parochial perspectives come to dominate the thinking of your Cabinet heads.

By capitalizing quickly on your political triumph, you will be in a better position to obtain a broad public mandate for foreign policy initiatives that can also help you shape a supportive bipartisan coalition. The fact that Congress remains in the hands of the other Party makes it all the more important that such a mandate be deliberately generated. Otherwise you could soon find yourself checkmated by the Congressional leadership.

It should also be noted that lately it has been the Soviets under Gorbachev, and not the U.S., who have been setting the pace with dramatic -- though obviously self-serving -- proposals. Within the Alliance, the French have also become more innovative in developing new approaches, while the Germans have been pursuing their own line with the East.

Accordingly, it is all the more important that from day-one you seek to infuse your own national security team with a shared strategic vision and with clearly defined priorities. Your personal background in foreign affairs -- more extensive than of any postwar President, save Eisenhower -- gives you a special advantage in asserting Presidential leadership in this crucial area of public policy.

The attached memo is designed to help you, and also Jim Baker, define such a grand strategy. More specifically, it outlines:

- 1- The central strategic goals on which your foreign policy should deliberately concentrate;
- 2- The requisite Presidential initiatives in the first six months of the new Administration;
- 3- The recommended U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the first six months of the new Administration.

Nov. 9, 1988

Memorandum to the President-Elect

From Zbigniew Brzezinski



Subject:

FOREIGN POLICY: A STRATEGIC AGENDA FOR THE BUSH PRESIDENCY

The moment is ripe for major American initiatives. Just as in the late 1940's, the time was "pregnant" for the grand undertakings that led to the Atlantic Alliance and to the creation of a whole host of new international institutions, so now too the global situation calls for major acts of U.S. initiative, designed to exploit the opportunities that beckon especially in the Pacific area and in the management of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

1- FOUR CENTRAL STRATEGIC GOALS.

1. To Nurture and Institutionalize a Trans-Pacific Partnership;
2. To Consolidate a more stable U.S.-Soviet Relationship;
3. To Update U.S. global military strategy and force posture;
4. To Revive genuine bipartisanship in the pursuit of the above goals.

Each of these central goals is timely. The Atlantic connection, which has been the main focus of America's global involvement since the late 1940's is ripe for a parallel, though not identical, effort at the development of new relations and institutions of partnership across the Pacific. Such a partnership should reflect the new economic and political realities of a prosperous and rapidly developing Pacific rim. Only America is in the position to foster such a new cooperative relationship, especially with Japan. Moreover, failure to infuse our trans-Pacific relations with positive political content runs the risk that conflicting trade issues could become destructively dominant, even as the Soviet Union is activating its policy towards the region.

✓ The growing likelihood that for the next decade the Soviet Union will remain preoccupied with its systemic crisis gives you the best opportunity of any U.S. President since 1945 to stabilize the U.S.-Soviet relationship in several critical areas, and on terms favorable to the U.S. Strategic arms control could lead to conventional arms control. Regional accommodation could begin to extend to Eastern Europe, potentially undoing the prime cause of the Cold War. Progress on human rights could diminish one of the major sources of public antagonism towards the Soviet regime.

However, our policy should be one of sympathetic prudence, reaching agreements only on their merits, but not providing a bail-out for the Soviet economy. The Soviets are likely to continue their efforts to separate us from our allies, and they will quietly persist in seeking to gain a military edge. Armed might is the last source of the Soviet claim to the status of a global power, and the Soviet leaders are very much aware of this. Moreover, it is likely that internal national tensions in the Soviet Union will grow, prompting new conflicts and probably even political repression. The management of these contradictory trends will require close Presidential scrutiny.

The internal Soviet crisis will will also affect U.S. defense planning. If the U.S.-Soviet relationship is managed skilfully, both sides eventually may be able to move away -- in addition to reaching more ambitious arms control arrangements -- from their current reliance on strategically offensive weapons towards a more prudent mix of offensive/defensive systems. In addition, in the course of the next four years it should prove possible to reexamine the force levels of the U.S. military presence abroad, in order both to respond to the changing strategic realities and to provide for fairer burden-sharing with our allies.

Each of these major goals is timely. Progress towards each is feasible. But movement towards each will have to be deliberate, and public support for their pursuit will be more forthcoming if such goals are shared on a bipartisan basis by the Congressional leadership.

Accordingly, it is recommended that early in the life of the new Administration, or perhaps even during the phase of transition, you convene a special conference, attended by members of your national security team and by the pertinent Congressional leaders from both

parties, at which you would outline your over-all foreign policy goals and engage in an in-depth discussion particularly with the Congressional leaders. You might also take advantage of such an opportunity to indicate to them that you plan to hold periodically such *consultative* meetings on foreign policy issues.

2. PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL INITIATIVES IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS.

1. A Comprehensive Statement by the President of the broad foreign policy goals of his Administration, preceded by consultations with the Congressional leadership (as recommended above), with special emphasis on bipartisanship as an on-going consultative process.
2. Announcement of your intention to hold monthly Presidentially-chaired *consultative* meetings of the NSC with top Congressional leadership.
3. A call for a special summit of the Atlantic Alliance, to formulate long-term political and economic goals in the East-West relationship, and, also in relations with the developing world.
4. A proposal to the Pacific rim countries for a similar summit meeting, to be prepared first by conferences among the respective top ministers, preceded by a bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of Japan.
5. In keeping with past tradition, bilateral informal meetings, perhaps at some border sites, with the President of Mexico and with the Prime Minister of Canada.
6. An invitation to the Soviet President, for an informal consultative meeting (outside of Washington -- perhaps in Alaska), to review the state of the U.S.-Soviet relations and to set the agenda for further negotiations.

3. OTHER ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVES IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS

designed to sustain Presidential momentum:

1. The Vice President charged to head an inter-agency effort to submit within three months a militarily stabilizing and politically appealing long-term strategy for conventional arms control.

2. The Secretary of Defense instructed to submit in six months a review of the U.S. strategic force posture, of the value for deterrence of an early deployment of some limited strategic defense, and of the strategic and budgetary rationale of U.S. force deployments abroad.
3. The Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Commerce charged to undertake a review of possible initiatives to upgrade U.S.-Japan economic and political relations, particularly in the light of the 1992 EEC target-date.
4. The Secretaries of State and Treasury instructed to initiate bilateral talks with the Japanese regarding a joint U.S.-Japanese development initiative for Central America.
5. The Secretary of State instructed to explore the practicalities of a formal international treaty for the comprehensive and verifiable neutralization of Nicaragua.
6. The Vice President dispatched to meet and consult with the top Chinese leadership, underlining the importance of the relationship.
7. Secretaries of State and Treasury instructed to consult with NATO counterparts regarding a joint western political-economic initiative designed to address the growing crisis in East-Central Europe.
8. Reaffirm U.S. willingness to undertake high level mediation in the Middle Eastern conflict if the Israelis and Palestinians so desire, and U.S. interest in the eventual normalization of relations with Iran.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON, DC

December 27, 1988

NOTE TO GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: Linda Casey

Governor, this is the letter the Vice
President mentioned to you last week.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Note	From GB to Brent Scowcroft Re: Consultations w/Congress (1 pp.)	12/20/88	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Affairs (Transition)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JF (NLGB) on 4/10/08

Date Closed:	11/30/2004	OA/ID Number:	29179-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Date 12-20

TO:

Brent (see para 2
of Sec State letter)

FROM:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

If Congress really
wants to cooperate
maybe we should
have an early
meeting with key
leaders - outline
the problem (graphs,
bells, whistles) and
ask for their advice
or help CFB

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Letter	From George Schultz to GB Re: Security Assistance program (2 pp.)	12/19/88	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Affairs (Transition)

Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)

By JP (NLGB) on 12/12/07

Date Closed:	11/30/2004	OA/ID Number:	29179-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1988

Dear Mr. Vice President:

Because of the critical importance of the Security Assistance program to the foreign policy and national security of the United States, we recommend that you give it high priority attention during the current transition period and in the early months of your Administration. The program has contributed substantially to many of the successes of the Reagan Administration, notably in reducing the level of conflict in the world, bolstering our alliances, and containing the Soviet Union and its clients. Yet, its effectiveness has been curtailed in the last several years, and may be sharply curtailed further in the near future.

The great problems in the program, especially in the military assistance and arms sales components, lie in sharply reduced funding -- over 33 percent reduction since 1985 -- and increasing Congressional controls. Particularly damaging have been the unprecedented and increasing levels of earmarking by Congress -- well over 90 percent of appropriated funds -- for a few favored countries. This has left us no choice but to reduce severely funding for other high priority countries, such as Jordan, Thailand, and those in Central America, and to terminate funding for numerous other programs. Congress has also proliferated harmful restrictions on countries and on sales, most notably for the Middle East.

This trend threatens a future crisis in our foreign relations, given the role of security assistance as a vital underpinning for both the foreign policy and defense components of U.S. national security policy since World War II. At risk is U.S. access and influence in many key regions of the world, and, with that, our ability to advance U.S. global interests. Furthermore, rapidly evolving situations in many areas of the Third World make it imperative that the President have the instruments to react rapidly and effectively in pursuit of American objectives.

The Honorable
George Bush,
President-elect of the United
States of America.

We believe that early top-level attention to the issues of security assistance and foreign military sales by your Administration can pay major dividends over the coming four years. We are at your disposal to discuss this, or we can arrange an Executive Branch-Congressional group of knowledgeable persons to meet with you to discuss early steps with Congress on the program.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "George P. Shultz". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Frank C. Carlucci
Secretary of Defense

George P. Shultz

Issue file

Made
via
Permission

NUCLEAR TESTING AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUES

U.S. Strategic Doctrine has evolved over the last several decades from Assured Destruction to Sufficiency and Equivalence and now includes Negotiated Disarmament with Assured verification. While negotiating disarmament, the United States is challenged by critical issues in its ongoing strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union. These include the multi-faceted Soviet strategic offensive and defensive system buildup of military capabilities that threaten, if not countered by new U.S. weapons systems programs, to establish a clear-cut superiority in the 21st century.

The Advent of Arms Control and other Strategic Defense initiatives that result in U.S. defense policy relying on far less nuclear weapons will require that those weapons needed in the year 2020 be identified and developed. The fundamental position of the United States is clear: Nuclear testing is indispensable to maintaining the credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over 40 years. Thus we must consider nuclear testing as a tool to be employed responsibly in pursuit of national security.

The United States tests nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, we do so to ensure the reliability of our nuclear deterrent. Second, we conduct nuclear tests in order to improve the safety, security, survivability, reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. Testing has allowed the introduction of modern safety and security features on our weapons. It has permitted a reduction by nearly one-third in the total number of weapons in the stockpile since 1960, as well as a reduction in the total megatonnage in that stockpile to approximately one quarter of its 1960 value.

In the field of nuclear testing, as in other aspects of national security, arms control has an important role to play. Arms control is not, however, an end in itself, but one of several tools to enhance the security of the United States and its Allies and to diminish the threat of war.

It is important to recognize the asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union on the subject of nuclear testing. Because of inherent differences in the two nations' approaches to their security requirements, stringent limitations on nuclear testing, or even its complete cessation, would have less impact on Soviet security than on our own. The Soviet advantage in conventional forces, the less sophisticated designs of their strategic weapons made possible by the massive Soviet ballistic missile throwweight, and the ability of a controlled society to maintain design teams intact even without testing (as they demonstrated during the informal 1958 - 61 moratorium on nuclear testing), all may allow the Soviets to be more willing to accept restrictions on nuclear testing. Clearly, to the U.S. nuclear testing is indispensable to maintaining the credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over 40 years!

DISCUSSIONS

U.S. willingness to enter negotiations on further limitations on nuclear testing, in association with real arms reductions, is not based on any lessening on the technical requirement for testing following a successful outcome to any current arms reductions negotiations. Rather the United States must recognize that neither testing nor arms control per se are ends in themselves. Both are tools to be employed in the interests of enhancing national security.

There are two basic reasons for U.S. nuclear testing--to ensure the reliability, of our nuclear deterrent and to improve the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. Major reductions in the numbers of warheads, such as the United States seeks in START, would not alter our requirement for a number of different types of weapons to meet the Soviet threat, and hence would not alter the requirements for testing.

Only if entire systems and warhead design classes were eliminated might the requirements for associated reliability testing be reduced. Indeed, under deep reductions in strategic offensive arms the reliability of our remaining U.S. strategic weapons could be even more important and the need for testing even greater, particularly if the Soviets continue their current trends toward improved survivability.

Finally, the need to continue nuclear testing to avoid technological surprise and respond to the evolving threat would not necessarily be influenced by reductions -- even deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles. As the number of nuclear and conventional forces decrease, the potential relative advantage the Soviets could gain from an unforeseen technological breakthrough increases. To avoid being surprised by such a breakthrough, we must maintain and improve our understanding of the physics of nuclear weapons.

Each of the reasons we test today would remain valid to some degree even if every arms reduction initiative proposed by the United States were to come to fruition. Thus there is no direct technical linkage between progress in other areas of arms control and the acceptability of progressively more stringent limitations on nuclear testing. If -- as we hope -- progress in other areas of arms control increases overall U.S. and allied security and enhances stability, it may be possible to identify, negotiate and accept some form of further limitations on nuclear testing. Naturally, agreement on any such increased limitations could only be acceptable in parallel with the conclusion of legally binding treaties which serve to enhance stability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the field of nuclear testing, as in other aspects of national security, arms control has an important role to play. Arms control is not, however, an end in itself, but one of several tools to enhance the security of the United States and its Allies and to diminish the threat of war. Within the overall requirements for nuclear testing discussed, the United States' position on nuclear testing limitations should be as follows;

- * As the U.S. considers further arms control reductions, such as START, it must consider what the U.S. Nuclear stockpile must be at some arbitrary point in the future, say 2010. Given the "greater-than-ten-year cycle of a nuclear weapon (from conception until inclusion into the inventory) the "stockpile of the future" must be designed and tested in the next few years;

- * Those nuclear weapons that might remain in the "stockpile of the future" must be modernized to assure that they contain the newest and most reliable safety features.

Since there will be continuing pressure by the Soviet Union to proceed to "further limitations" on testing, the U.S. negotiation position should;

- * Fully supports the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, the oceans and outer space. The United States urges those nuclear weapon states which have not yet adhered to this treaty to do so. All U.S. testing is conducted in strict compliance with the requirements of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

- * Continue to conduct its test program strictly in accordance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and its companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976. These two treaties limit yields of individual underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons. The U.S. has not, however, ratified these treaties because of a strong conviction that, in their present form, we cannot effectively verify whether the Soviet Union is in compliance with the 150 kiloton threshold.

In nuclear testing, as in other areas, treaties which cannot be effectively verified cannot contribute to U.S. security of world stability; indeed, such treaties carry serious military and political risks, so that the U.S. position should;

- * Concluded that we require effective verification through direct, on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements of appropriate Soviet nuclear explosions. We should be seeking the right to conduct such measurements on a routine basis.

* Once these verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the U.S. should immediately propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

* A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the U.S. We believe such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep, and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence--building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces thereby assuring our long-term National Security.

U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUES

Today, the United States Strategic Defense Doctrine and its Nuclear deterrent concept of a Triad of U.S. strategic forces--ICBMs, SLBMs, and Bombers--is in transition, and managing this transition will be crucial to our future national security and a challenge to the next Administration

U.S. Strategic Doctrine has evolved over the last several decades from Assured Destruction to Sufficiency and Equivalence and now includes Negotiated Disarmament with Assured verification. In addition, the President recently included his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) into the equation, thereby increasing the complexity of managing the transition.

While negotiating disarmament, the United States is challenged by critical issues in its ongoing strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union. These include the multi-faceted Soviet strategic offensive and defensive system buildup of military capabilities that threaten, if not countered by new U.S. weapons systems programs, to establish a clear-cut superiority in the 21st century.

Presently, all U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear weapons system capabilities reside in the U.S. Nuclear Complex managed by DOE Defense Programs. Our ability to counter this growing Soviet strategic confrontation is dependent on dedicated execution of advanced technology development by the DOE-Defense organization of associated laboratories and industrial contractors.

Unfortunately, the U.S. Nuclear Complex is old, fragile and in need of replacement in several areas. In addition, Defense Programs finds itself in heated debates with DOD over manpower at the nuclear weapons laboratories and debates in Congress over the Environmental and Safeguards impacts of this Nuclear Complex.

This situation is clearly not in the national interest and is additional evidence of a serious diminishing stature of the nuclear weapons complex within the Executive and Legislative Branches of the U.S. government at a time when the U.S. is negotiating disarmament treaties and trying to manage the transition and maintain our National Security.

If the nuclear weapons complex is to remain healthy and be able to provide, without question, the nuclear competence necessary to continue to provide the cornerstone of this nation's defense, then it is critical that the new Administration take the appropriate steps to insure that the nuclear weapons complex has the political, operational and budgetary visibility it needs to assure U.S. National Security.

DISCUSSIONS

ARMS CONTROL

Under any credible Arms Control scenario, the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the backbone of national defense for many decades to come. All of the initiatives either consummated or under consideration, such as INF, Defense and Space, START, PNET, TIBT, CTB, etc., while reducing both the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons inventories of the United States and the U.S.S.R., still will not result in the absolute elimination of nuclear weapons as the backbone of U.S. defense strategy.

This situation is further complicated by the fact that all the arms control initiatives involve, at this juncture, only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and therefore, do not affect or influence the other nations of the world that possess nuclear weapons. It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the defense posture of the U.S. will necessarily depend on both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons as the basis for deterrence well into the next century.

DOE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The current Defense Programs part of the DOE was actually born in 1946 as a result of the transition from the Manhattan Engineering District to a new civilian agency, called the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 created the AEC as a free-standing Agency whose responsibilities included the research, development, testing and production of the Nation's nuclear weapons.

Through numerous reorganizations on the part of both the Executive and Legislative Branches, the responsibilities, and therefore the visibility of the Nuclear Complex, was assigned to the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and finally to Defense Programs within the Department of Energy. From its single focused, high visibility position in the AEC, the Nuclear Complex now is led by the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs reporting through both the Under Secretary and the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet position of Secretary of Energy.

This diminished reporting relationship does not provide the visibility and negotiating position necessary in either Executive Branch deliberations--ranging from budget to Arms Control--or in the process of defending the requirements of the nuclear weapons complex before Congress. Unless the nuclear weapons complex receives both the political and financial support it requires, it will be unable to either provide or assure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent will be available and reliable over the next several decades to assure U.S. national security.

MANAGING THE TRANSITION

By current standards, the weapons of today, and particularly nuclear weapons, require up to ten years from concept to actual inclusion in the inventory and the overall strategic defense system. Since it may be up to 20 years before advanced technologies are developed, tested, and put into place into an integrated Strategic Defense (SDI)/Offense system that provides improved credible deterrence, there are additional management challenges that need to be addressed. One of the challenges is to manage the transition from the current times of nuclear weapon preeminence for strategic deterrence to non-nuclear SDI systems without ever jeopardizing national security during the transition.

The advent of Arms Control and other Strategic Defense Initiatives that result in U.S. defense policy relying on far less nuclear weapons will require that those weapons needed in the year 2020 be identified and developed. This is particularly critical in view of the fact that an announced goal of the U.S. is a treaty banning nuclear testing. As work proceeds on such a treaty, it must be preceded by the research, development, and testing that will provide a reliable nuclear stockpile in the year 2020, with the clear realization that both developmental and confidence testing of U.S. nuclear weapons will likely cease sometime in the next decade.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The new Administration must assure the integration of Strategic Defense/Offense policy formulation, the critical importance of the Nuclear Complex and the crucial management of the transition now underway in U.S. Strategic Doctrine.

INTEGRATION

Establish a Nuclear Defense Council (NDC) as an adjunct of the National Security Council that consolidates the inputs from;

- * The military community (principally JCS)
- * The technical community (DOE)
- * The arms control community (ACDA)
- * The foreign policy community (State)
- * The intelligence community (DCI)
- * The political community (White House)

The NDC would recommend defense policy to the President thereby assuring, as much as possible, that the nuclear deterrent of the U.S. is protected over the next twenty or thirty years.

NUCLEAR COMPLEX

Elevate the level of the executive heading Defense Programs to that of the Under Secretary or Deputy Secretary, or form a free-standing Agency of the Executive Branch (such as it was in the AEC). Either move will greatly increase the Nuclear Complex representation of the issues within both the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government.

MANAGING THE TRANSITION

Managing the transition means managing the efficient and effective coordination of resources. This includes coordination of both various agencies in the Executive Branch and coordination among various committees in Congress. This also includes coordination in keeping a proper balance between strategic nuclear weapons work and SDI technology work as it evolves.

By establishing a policy group within the Executive Branch that looks at very long-range defense planning in the light of arms control initiatives, and by elevating the political visibility of that portion of the Executive Branch that is responsible for the design, testing, and production of nuclear weapons, the nuclear deterrent of the U.S. will be protected in the out-years, and the Legislative Branch will have to support what is a coherent story.

There is an urgency to these recommendations! While the U.S. hesitates and the Congress debates, indulging in wishful thinking and self-deception, the Soviet Union continues to move forward with programs on advanced warhead design as a basis of an extraordinary and accelerated increase in Military and Strategic forces.

Nuclear deterrence and indeed the applications of Advanced Nuclear Defense systems is the bedrock issue of our Foreign and Defense policy in terms not only of cost and technical issues but of geo-political relevance as well.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Memo	From John Sununu to Tony Lopez Re: Robert Gates (1 pp.)	1/6/89	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Affairs (Transition)

Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)
By JF (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	11/30/2004	OA/ID Number:	29179-009
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AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20270

January 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LOPEZ

FROM: JOHN H. SUNUNU *JS*

SUBJECT: Robert Gates

Please see that Robert Gates is provided portal-to-portal carpet coverage as soon as he begins his duties as Deputy NSC Advisor.

If there are any questions or problems, please give Ed Rogers a call at 673-2636 or 456-2164.

cc: Bonnie Neuman

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Memo	From Brent Scowcroft to John Sununu Re: Portal-to-Portal Transportation for Robert Gates (1 pp.)	1/3/89	(b)(7)(c)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: National Security Affairs (Transition)

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