

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
1998-0004-F[2]; 1999-0098-F; 1999-0163-F

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Issues Files

OA/ID Number: 29169
Folder ID Number: 29169-001

Folder Title:
Polling (2 of 3) 1991 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	25	3	7

THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE

A Roper Center Review of Public Opinion and Polling

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 4

MAY/JUNE 1991

THE PARTIES, LOOKING TO 1992

The Republicans

PRESCRIPTION FOR THE GOP

By Edward J. Rollins

To appreciate the outlook for Republicans in 1992, let's begin by correcting some notable misperceptions about how the Grand Old Party fared last year. Before President Bush's midterm, there had been twenty-two midterm elections this century: Twelve occurred with Republicans holding the White House, ten amidst Democratic presidencies.

Holding Ground in Adversity

In the Republican midterms, the GOP lost a total of 361 House seats—an average of 30 per election. Senate losses have averaged 4.7; 1986, when the party lost eight senators, pushed the average up a bit. Governorship losses have averaged 4.5. The GOP gained governors in only two of its midterms since 1900. Against this historical experience, Republicans lost in 1990 just nine House seats net, one in the Senate and one governorship. And the party managed this despite a national political environment in which the President's approval rating plummeted only a month before Election Day as a result of the budget debacle. To be sure, Republicans began with a lower base than usual and therefore had fewer seats to lose. But without the budget mess and the President's switch on taxes, the party was poised to make off-year gains, something rare indeed.

Some Republican losses in 1990 came in states important both presidentially and in terms of reapportionment. But here too, the GOP's woes have been greatly

The Democrats

WHERE WE STAND

By Leslie C. Francis

The 1992 elections will present extraordinary challenges for both political parties. It's reasonable to expect 100 or more fully competitive House races and tough battles for Senate seats held by members of the 1980 and 1986 classes. Moreover, 12 governorships and thousands of state legislative races will be contested amidst a presidential election, an unpredictable factor for those now mapping local or state strategies.

The New Competitiveness

It's likely that 1992 will produce more competitive contests than any set of elections in the last two decades—which is fitting, because this is a bigger election with higher stakes than any since 1972, the last time presidential balloting occurred immediately after a census and reapportionment. And, given the problems and opportunities facing the nation, the stakes are very high indeed.

In virtually every region of the country, involving some newer members but also some veterans, some Democrats and some Republicans—congressional candidates will find themselves in hard-fought campaigns. This competitiveness is caused by several factors, including a redistricting process which will result in many districts gaining or losing at least 50,000 voters. More importantly, for a variety of reasons, 50 incumbents in 1990 saw their reelection margins reduced by at least 10 percentage points. Eighty-five incumbents winning reelection did so with under 60% of the total vote.

IN THIS ISSUE

Politics in the US: Contending views on the parties' standing, and a comprehensive review of poll data on the national political pulse. **Politics in Canada:** The fractured political scene, with renewed argument over the future of the federation. **Politics in Puerto Rico:** The perennial absorption with the "status" issue, and the conflicting claims of culture and economics.

CONTENTS

THE PARTIES, LOOKING TO 1992

Prescription for the GOP, By Edward J. Rollins	Cover
Where We Stand, By Leslie C. Francis	Cover
Interview with Richard B. Wirthlin	6
Interview with Geoffrey Garin	6
Living in the Past: How Liberals and Conservatives are Failing America, By E. J. Dionne, Jr.	11
The President and the Parties After the Gulf War, By Jeffrey Alderman	13
Party Identification: The Idea and Its Measure, By Everett Carl Ladd	17

THE PUBLIC OPINION REPORT

Center

O CANADA: GLORIOUS AND FREE...AND DEEPLY DIVIDED

Fragmentation in the Canadian Party System, By Peter Regenstreif	22
---	----

The Unravelling of the Ties That Bind, By Michael Adams and Mary Jane Lennon	26
---	----

PUERTO RICO: TO BE OR NOT TO BE...THE 51ST STATE, AN ASSOCIATED COMMONWEALTH, OR AN INDEPENDENT NATION?

So Sunny an Island, So Clouded a View: Snapshots of Puerto Rican Public Opinion, By Lawrence Kaagan	29
--	----

Cultural Aspirations vs. Political Calculations, By Eliut D. Flores-Caraballo	31
--	----

AT THE CENTER

I.A. Lewis Scholarship Fund	34
-----------------------------	----

exaggerated. Democrats gained the governor's mansion in Florida and Texas, but lost Ohio and Michigan. They now control states with a total of 294 electoral votes—down eight from what they had before last November's balloting. The GOP emerged from the 1990 elections significantly stronger than it had any right to expect.

A Presidency Transformed

A swift and relatively bloodless Gulf War victory—coupled with Democratic bungling in the vote authorizing the President to use force—pulled Bush's approval ratings out of their domestically-driven slump of last October to record highs. While the approval ratings were bound to decline from their post-war peaks, the President's handling of the crisis has added a dimension to his political persona which will not easily be diminished in the voters' minds. The American public now sees him as a leader willing to make tough decisions. Looking at his performance in the six months of Desert Shield and Desert Storm, it's hard to believe that this is the same George Bush whom some derided for the "wimp factor" in 1988, and who had to get tough with CBS anchorman Dan Rather to demonstrate his resolve to skeptical voters.

President Bush has crossed a political Rubicon, the kind many candidates dream of but never reach. His presidential mettle is now established. The question of his ability to lead in a crisis is settled. Once the voters see these qualities in an incumbent president, only the gravest crisis can derail his reelection.

Carefully-crafted television spots, mirroring the imagery we saw in CBS's recent prime-time homecoming extravaganza for the troops (produced, not so coincidentally, by Roger Ailes), may evoke nostalgic yearning for the unity we all experienced during the war. But to try to sustain war euphoria is to miss the point of the political benefits Bush gets from his mastery of this crisis: He no longer has to prove himself to the electorate. For the Democrats, the burden of convincing voters to switch to the challenger has become unbearably heavy. Assuming peace, the end to the recession, and Bush's continuing good health, the 1992 presidential election is *afait accompli*. This doesn't mean, though, that the best thing the GOP can do now is to wait as close to November as possible wrapped in the tranquility of the Rose Garden.

Out of the Rose Garden, Into the Arena

Two factors argue for an early, vigorous, and sustained presidential campaign. The first is the relative strength the GOP enjoys after a midterm which ought to have left it weaker. That foundation should be built upon now, using the presidential campaign as a tool. President Bush is at the probable peak in popularity he will enjoy

We Democrats view this climate as a challenge—not the nightmare that many pundits have predicted. The mood is up-beat because the party's position is strong on the issues Americans care most about. While Newt Gingrich and Phil Gramm tramp across the country eagerly describing negative ads attacking Democrats who voted in January for continued sanctions against Iraq, and GOP operatives gloat over George Bush's temporarily high poll ratings, Democrats are looking at other issues and more important numbers: a 6.8% unemployment rate; a \$300 billion plus dollar deficit; increases in family disintegration, school dropout rates, health costs, violent crime, and other alarming domestic trends.

Economic Protest

Growing disenchantment with the economic status quo is evident in almost every segment of American society. The broad working class feels especially hard-pressed and totally by-passed in the boom of the 1980s. As Kevin Phillips has pointed out [*The Politics of Rich and Poor*, Random House, 1990], growth in real wealth and income during the 1980s was concentrated among the top 1% of Americans; that narrow slice of the populace saw its share of the national income rise sharply over the decade. As a result of the general public's reaction to this, Phillips has said, "Republican domination of the White House is pretty well played out." He also cites other factors which are causing a breakdown in basic tenets of Republicanism, from the collapse of the Soviet Union, to the savings and loan scandal and bailout, to the fact that the "Religious Right is losing its edge on social issues."

Retrospective analyses of the Reagan presidency have shown graphically that "Reaganomics" was a sham. George Bush was right in 1980 when he called the whole thing "voodoo economics." But, because he played the role of head cheerleader for the scheme from 1981 to 1989, he cannot escape responsibility for its disastrous aftermath. Voters are clearly ready to hold Bush and his accomplices accountable for the current "state of the union." A cross-section of Americans were asked by the Gallup Organization in March, after the end of the war in the Gulf, whether they approved or disapproved of the president's handling of various domestic issues:

	Approve	Disapprove
Poverty and homelessness	27%	65%
Savings & loan crisis	28	56
Availability of health care	34	57
The economy	37	56

These numbers are not aberrations. Similar measurements from November 1989, July 1990, and October 1990 show that the president has been consistently rated low by voters on a host of domestic issues.

during his two terms. Popular presidents raise funds, draw crowds, and energize party workers. The grassroots of the GOP are most in need of cultivating, and the president ought to use his reelection as a reason to go out early and raise money for Republican state parties.

My second reason for advocating a prolonged campaign season answers the objection a politically-astute reader might have—why risk the high presidential approval by descending to the level of a partisan candidate? The answer is that coming out of the Rose Garden early poses no real risk. This is not 1984, when President Reagan began his reelection drive after polarizing tax and budget battles with Congress, a steep recession with double-digit unemployment, and a host of very credible challengers clamoring to unseat him. Head-to-head polls in 1983 showed Walter Mondale and John Glenn giving the President a run for his money in '84, and Gary Hart's surge in the early primaries sent shock waves rippling through our campaign headquarters in Washington.

By contrast, even the much-vaunted Mario Cuomo barely breaks into double-digits in a poll pairing with George Bush. With leads ranging from forty to sixty percent over even credible Democratic challengers (and it is an irony of 1992 that the more credible a Democratic challenger is, the less likely he is to actually enter the race), Bush has nothing to fear from abandoning a Rose Garden strategy and giving the voters a little excitement.

The only risk to the GOP comes from a delayed entry into the political arena. If voters, including base Republicans, decide that 1992 is a foregone conclusion, many will stay home. Because the increased GOP turnout is of substantial benefit down the ticket in a presidential year, it's critically important to excite the rank-and-file. Given the likely depressed state of straight-ticket Democratic voting, there's a real possibility a strong President-inspired Republican turnout would pull in victories for House and Senate candidates next year who would get only 45-49% of the vote in an off-year.

Accentuate the Partisan Differences

A political platform is a good place to start an aggressive campaign. In 1980, the GOP platform featured declarations of principles written in political poetry. Tax cuts were advocated not because of some macro-economic objective like growth, but because it's a citizen's right to keep what he or she earns, not government's right to take what it wants. In contrast, the 1988 platform was written in the language of technocrats eager to defend the eight-year record of government programs under the GOP. To be sure, our platform was not bad compared to the Democrats', who offered only a vague "statement of principles" out of fear of alienating middle-of-the-road

President Bush gets high marks, as he should, for his performance in the heat of the Persian Gulf conflict. However, the Administration's failure to recognize the critical foreign policy events that led to the war will be debated vigorously. And voters will continue to wonder about the reckless judgment that encouraged an internal uprising against Saddam Hussein, which resulted in thousands of refugees dying on the Iraq-Turkey border. These events and others serve to remind Americans that this is an administration which lacks abiding principles, which substitutes today's pragmatism for long-term policy.

The Record of Electoral Results

While Republican leaders profess to be pleased with poll results that show a shift in their direction (in terms of party identification), more skeptical observers realize that the post-war glow has distorted the political scene in the near term. Polls are merely fairly reliable "snapshots" of public opinion at particular points in time. When compared to similar measurements over a longer period, they help us understand shifts in voter attitudes and concerns. But, in designing political strategies, polls must be compared to and matched against other data, including actual voter performance.

Democratic performance in races for the US House of Representatives, the Senate, state legislatures, and governorships has been consistently high over the past two decades. In the House, the Democratic majority has averaged 265 seats (out of 435) since 1976, for an average margin over the Republicans of 95 seats. Although the Senate went Republican in 1980 and remained in the GOP column until 1986, Democrats have still averaged 53 seats (out of 100) since 1976. The party's performance at the state level has been equally impressive. Since 1976, Democrats have managed to hold an average of 33 governorships, to only 17 for our Republican competitors. Of 99 state legislative chambers (Nebraska's legislature is unicameral), our margin has ranged from a low of 59 to 40 (in 1984) to a high of 68 to 31 (in 1976). Today it's 60 to 39.

In actual voting, then, Americans back candidates they trust to deal with issues most important to them, like reducing unemployment, strengthening schools, providing better health care, improving transit, roads and highways, and protecting the environment. In a recent Wall Street Journal/NBC poll, respondents trusted Democrats to do a better job than Republicans on all of these issues—in some cases by more than a two-to-one margin.

Bullish on '92

Next year Americans will base their electoral choices on which party best represents the needs and concerns of

voters with special interest planks for their divergent constituencies. But what we need now is for the President to give the voters a sense of the direction in which he will take the country not if—but when—he is reelected.

This focused victory will give him a mandate to go back to Congress after his second inauguration with a whirlwind of legislation, instead of having to pin his hopes on a bipartisan breeze that would, in fact, never materialize. The 101st Congress voted against the Administration more often than any Congress in the past decade. The Democrats have no interest in bipartisanship. If the President wants to make the most of the next four years, the way to do so is to build a mandate for change in 1992.

The Republican Congressional Committee's post-election survey in 1990 found that 55% of voters thought it made little difference whether a Democrat or a Republican represented them in Congress. That view has developed largely because it's been a long time since anyone made an issue of Congress in a presidential year. The last time was the famous 1948 campaign against the "Do Nothing 88th Congress," a master stroke of setting up the House Republicans to take the fall in a presidential campaign.

Split Government: An Accident That's Been Allowed to Happen

Back in 1984, then-Speaker Tip O'Neill advanced the theory that voters wanted Democrats to run Congress while Republicans hold the presidency. It was his way of making the best of a year when Reagan was reelected by a landslide, and his hand-picked candidate, Geraldine Ferraro, became a drag on the Democratic ticket. Now, some serious thinkers and political scientists advance this ludicrous theory as though it has real explanatory power.

Split government endures because incumbents have made it harder for challengers to unseat them, and we haven't had a highly-charged partisan campaign with clear agendas articulated since 1980. But in 1992 the opportunity is present for energizing voters, enlarging GOP turnout over most presidential years, and building on the party's base. GOP campaign professionals have played a good defensive game in recent election years. Now is the time to wage an aggressive, issues-driven campaign which will not only leave President Bush with a mandate but also more control over Congress in his second term.

Edward J. Rollins is a Republican strategist and a partner with Sawyer/Miller Group

the hard-pressed middle class—and Democrats will fare very well. In addition, Democrats have consistently fielded better congressional candidates and have run better grassroots-driven campaigns than have our GOP counterparts. That tradition will continue in 1992.

House Democrats are in the third year of a four year plan, the first half of which was dedicated to building their majority before the '92 presidential cycle. We now have 267 seats in the House of Representatives—our third highest margin this century, and 25 more than a decade ago. Through IMPAC 2000, the Democratic committee which focuses on state races where redistricting is a factor, we've had enormous success. In 19 states, including Florida and Texas, Democrats control the entire redistricting process. Republicans run the whole show in just three.

There's a lot of press talk about a "lack" of declared or obvious Democratic presidential contenders. As one who has operated in the national political arena for 20 years, I see no cause for alarm at this supposedly "late start." DNC Chair Ron Brown points out how useless it would have been to have had Democratic presidential candidates running around the country looking for votes during the Gulf crisis. Besides, we're really not late at all. Jimmy Carter hadn't yet made his first trip to Iowa at this point in the 1976 cycle. How many average voters—not the press types who flock to the Savery Hotel bar in Des Moines or the Wayfarer's watering hole in Manchester—complain that presidential campaigns are too short? A shorter pre-nomination contest may well result in a more vigorous, more interesting campaign.

It is also true that, beyond its position on key issues—where it is clearly in concert with the majority view—the Democratic party is in an excellent position to convey its capacity to govern. With steady and impressive leaders such as Tom Foley, Dick Gephardt, and George Mitchell increasingly well known to the public, this objective will be accomplished over the next several months.

So, the media wizards and cocktail party sages who have already written off the Democrats in 1992 should be a little less cocky. Eighteen months is an eternity in American politics, and personal popularity is ephemeral. More issues cut for the Democrats than against us—a fact which will be at the heart of our strategy throughout the coming campaign. What's more, I always answer those who ask me how we can beat George Bush, or counter his popularity: "Remember, this is the guy whose very first 'presidential' decision was the selection of Dan Quayle to be vice president. He's capable of anything!"

Leslie Francis is executive director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee

THE BUSH PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES AFTER THE GULF WAR

To explore George Bush's standing as president and the comparative strength of the two major parties at this juncture, after the war with Iraq and just before the campaigns for the critical 1992 elections have shifted into forward gear, Public Perspective talked to two respected electoral and opinion analysts—Republican Richard Wirthlin and Democrat Geoffrey Garin. We began by asking each—in separate interviews—whether the political standing of the Bush presidency has been transformed as a result of his handling of the Gulf crisis.

INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD B. WIRTHLIN

Successful wars drive presidential ratings higher than any other events. That is especially true when a war is viewed by the public as both necessary and successful. Such wars at this historical juncture must: (1) be against a foe who has clearly breached international norms and standards; (2) be fought against a personalized villain—a role Saddam Hussein abundantly filled; and (3) result in a clear-cut resolution of the conflict. All of those things worked very much to President Bush's advantage in the Gulf conflict. Kurdish suffering in the post war did not diminish the way Americans viewed President Bush. Still, it's quite remarkable that he got as high a set of ratings as he did, and especially significant that, in our national omnibus study of March 1991, when his overall approval percentage stood at 82, fully 56% of those we interviewed *strongly approved* of what he was doing. That's a very high number indeed.

PP: How does the 56% strongly approving compare to Ronald Reagan's best figures?

RBW: Two of Mr. Reagan's best marks overall came in our studies of November 1985, 75% approval, and April 1986—also 75%. It's my recollection that in one of our tracking studies, right after the Geneva Summit, it went a little higher than that, pushing into the high 70s. At these points, however, only about 40-42% strongly approved. So, Bush's 56% is unusually strong. The question, of course, remains, "How firm is Bush's present standing?" Ratings of 70% and higher are "stratospheric"; it's hard for even a popular president to breath oxygen at that altitude.

When the president is perceived to be the primary agent of positive change, when he seems to control that change in a manner consistent with Americans' expectations and values, then his job ratings soar. But, like all mortals, presidents don't always induce positive change: They sometimes are themselves the victims of change. If you go back, for example, and look at Roosevelt's popularity in the middle of 1940, he lost 18% off his job rating between May and September. While there were not a lot of published polls during the war, his rating again fell 15 to 16 percentage points from the beginning to the middle of 1942. Dwight Eisenhower, another popular president,

INTERVIEW WITH GEOFFREY GARIN

George Bush clearly helped himself and his political standing a great deal during the Persian Gulf crisis, but I have genuine doubts about the permanence and the depth of the change. In several polls I have conducted in states where there will be Senate elections in 1992, I've asked a "would you re-elect" question about Bush and incumbent Democratic senators. The question on the president goes this way: "George Bush will be running for reelection as the Republican candidate for president. Would you definitely vote for Bush, probably vote for Bush, probably vote for the Democrat or definitely vote for the Democrat?" Then, as I've said, we ask a parallel question about the incumbent Democratic senators—at least one of whom the Republicans would claim to be on a marginal list. In each case Bush was at or just below 50%, and what's more running behind the incumbent senators, including the more marginal one. So, while George Bush gets an awful lot of personal respect from voters, the depth of the political loyalty to him is still suspect.

PP: Would the typical responses you've referred to be on the order of 48% to re-elect Bush, 35% for the Democrat?

GG: "The Democrat" would be substantially below Bush—more likely in the high 20s, with a large undecided group. But again, I would have expected a substantially higher number for the president. And in terms of his approval rating, we find that even at the peak of his popularity it's been evenly divided between people who approve strongly and those who approve only mildly of his performance. He has a base from the mid-30s to the high 40s [percentages] of people who are thorough-going Bushites; beyond that there's a lot of softness. Another key measurement comes from a national survey I've just completed, where three-quarters of the electorate said they were dissatisfied with economic conditions. When asked to rate the President's performance on economic issues, respondents were evenly divided between approval and disapproval. It all adds up to something less than superhero status.

PP: Is the economy Bush's main point of vulnerability as you see it for 1992?

GG: It's a real weak point—and in ways that go beyond the traditional statistics on overall economic performance.

was subject to events he couldn't control. His job rating peaked at the end of 1956 at about 78%. Then he got into the budget battle and sent troops to Little Rock and his standing dropped—and his job rating didn't recover until he sent Marines to Lebanon. It fell again in the latter part of 1959 and early 1960, after the U-2 incident and the cancellation of a scheduled trip to Japan. Of all the presidents since Roosevelt, Eisenhower's approval ratings are probably the most stable; yet from the end of 1959 to the middle of 1960, his approval fell from about 75% to 50%. Hence, no president can "bank" job approval with any certainty.

Still, I must say that things at this moment look favorable, indeed, for George Bush. First, it's unlikely he will again be ridiculed as weak or, in the vernacular, a wimp; he has completely buried that charge forever. Another different kind of factor in his favor involves the shift in party identification toward the Republicans. When I put the strategy together for the Reagan campaign in the spring of 1980, 51% of Americans identified as Democrats, and only 28% as Republicans. During the Reagan years those Democratic advantages fell sharply, to the single-digit range. This shift is continuing: Our January 1991 survey showed a 3% Republican advantage, and studies by others show the party at least at parity. Watch carefully, however, as we move into next year and see if the current GOP position holds up. If in fact Republicans have even a slight margin of 3 or 4% a year from now, that small advantage in party identification will provide George Bush with a strong political buffer that he didn't have in 1989 and Ronald Reagan certainly didn't have in 1980.

Another positive component in Bush's present position is the likelihood that we are not going to get into a gut-wrenching recession. While indexes of consumer confidence are not always good predictors of economic health down the road, they're not bad leading indicators if taken in conjunction with other measures. We just recorded one of the sharpest recoveries in consumer confidence we have ever seen; I think that's been reflected in the Conference Board and Michigan Survey Research Center data as well. And what happens to real per capita disposable income from November of this year to October of next will provide the ultimate indicator of the presidents's re-election prospects. At this moment it seems likely that the economy will be looking better by the end of the year.

A final factor I would cite as an element that bodes well for President George Bush is the absence of strong Democratic challengers. Of all of the political advantages Bush has gained from the last two or three months, I would put this one near the top of the list. The Democrats must soon get someone to challenge Bush, someone who can make their case eloquently and, of course, begin to put together the organizational nuts and bolts of a presidential

This is, from a political perspective, an unusual recession in that unemployment is not the leading concern; rather people are much more troubled about the rising prices for necessities, whether it's health care, housing, higher education, or whatever. Even if the unemployment figures improve, people will feel hard pressed well into the 1992 political year. There is a perception among middle-class people that Bush doesn't particularly understand their economic problems, let alone have any particular solution to them.

PP: Compare your "re-elect" data to the trial heats we see in the public polls. For example, the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll of March 15-19 recorded 67% saying they would vote for Bush, just 22% for Mario Cuomo. Do you consider the latter findings misleading?

GG: Indeed. They don't at all forshadow what 1992 will be like or be about. Should some potential Democratic nominees take such numbers seriously and not run as a result, they will come to be very sorry about that.

PP: At this point when a lot of people are discussing the Democrats' liabilities with regard to the presidency in 1992, tell us what you see from your surveys or otherwise as to the party's assets.

GG: The most important asset is that on economic issues, the Democrats are seen as much more of the party of the middle class than the Republicans are. Given the political dynamics of 1991 and 1992, this is critical. There is a very strong feeling of economic turmoil and frustration among middle class people. I worked in a series of Senate and congressional campaigns in 1990 where for a variety of reasons we shouldn't have come close, and yet where it turned out to be close, and where we even won in some cases, precisely because of this economic feeling. Tim Roemer, the new congressman from Indiana, is a good example of somebody who used this issue very well. Harvey Sloane in Kentucky, who ended up with 48% of the vote really against all odds and all expectations of doing anything close to that, did so well primarily because these economic frustrations were so strong and the Democrats were seen as the party of the middle class. In addition, on a lot of the issues that are out there right now, including health care and jobs, Democrats still have a very significant advantage.

PP: In public polls, too, on questions asking which party cares more about people like you, or which is better for the middle class, the Democrats get the edge. [See the Public Opinion Report of this issue, p. 90.] On the other hand, asking which party is more sympathetic to interests of the rich finds Republicans heavily cited. And yet, when we look at presidential voting over this long stretch from the 1968 contest on, Republicans have been winning. Obvi-

campaign. Of those Democrats now actively seeking the nomination, while they may be good men, none represent a serious challenge to the President.

Nevertheless, the Democrats clearly have some issue assets. At present Bush must in my view exercise care in the way he handles domestic policy. I don't believe he can walk away from it with political impunity. I was happy that he recently staked out a strong position on education. But if the economy recovers, it's going to be hard for the Democrats to leverage any one issue.

PP: One other question about Bush himself. Over his presidency the comment has been made a thousand times that, yes, he's got good numbers in approval, but his popularity is a "mile wide and an inch deep". You've touched on this matter in noting that now a very large proportion say they strongly approve his presidency. Still, there's the notion that Reagan had an "army" which Bush lacks. How does this assessment look to you?

RBW: The times and the sequence of political change are different today than they were with Reagan. Basically, I think the assessment is true that he lacks "a political army" in the sense that there were many more "true believers" who were willing to walk over hot coals for Reagan—he had that kind of army. His campaign was a crusade. There was the sense of really making an historic difference, which swept through the ranks of the conservative Republicans in 1979, 1980, 1981. And there was in fact a major agenda change. Such moments of political history generate a kind of single-minded enthusiasm for a national leader. We saw the same thing occur with FDR.

In contrast, the international and domestic agendas for Bush remain pretty much the same as they were for Reagan. There isn't any sweeping historical shift. But while this means Bush won't have an army of believers like those that marshalled behind Reagan, it also means that such an army really isn't needed for what President Bush may want to accomplish. In many ways he's following much the same agenda as his predecessor, with perhaps a softer, gentler tone. What Bush does need, of course, is strong overall public approval, which he can draw upon to help sustain him in pursuing his legislative objectives. Without question, Bush's job rating has become firmer. It has crystallized more positively as a consequence of the last three or four months.

Whether that in turn translates into major gains by Republicans across congressional and gubernatorial balloting in 1992 is still an open question. If you'd asked me six months ago what were the chances of substantial GOP gains in the House and Senate next year, I would have said they were slight—even though at that point I felt Bush's position was strong. Today, I think there's a possibility

ously there are a lot of things on people's minds when they cast presidential votes, but if the Democrats are seen as the party of ordinary people, why don't they get more ordinary people to vote for them?

GG: Well, I think that the party of ordinary people still needs to have extraordinary candidates. In 1980 and 1984, although I disagree with the outcome, the voters' decisions were logical in the context of the times. People were enormously unhappy with the status quo in 1980, and they voted for change. By 1984, they felt a lot more comfortable with things and believed that the country had changed for the better; sticking with Reagan made sense in that context. But in 1988, I believed from the outset that the Democrats could win, and I believe today that the Democrats should have won the election, precisely because of the economic issues I have discussed. The story of 1988 is not about the failure of these economic issues, but the failure of a particular Democratic campaign to make the voters feel comfortable with the nominee and to take advantage of the opportunities. Michael Dukakis in 1988 didn't want to be the candidate of economic doom and gloom, and until the very end of the campaign didn't talk about a lot of the economic difficulties. Democrats really can't afford to make that mistake again in 1992.

PP: A moment ago you said that if any Democrat looks at the trial heats and sees Bush way ahead and doesn't run as a result, that candidate would be making a mistake. As you look around the country, are Democrats backing away from making runs for Congress in the aftermath of the Gulf War?

GG: No. Part of the irony is that, while we are only four months into the 1992 election cycle, we have already had a more successful recruiting cycle for the Senate than we had for the entire 1990 campaign. In the Democratic challenge races, last time we could not persuade a single sitting member of the House to challenge a Republican senator. It was the first time since the New Deal days when there wasn't a single Democratic governor or member of Congress running for the US Senate. Now it appears that Richard Stallings in Idaho is prepared to take on Steve Symms, in a very conservative state. In Oregon, Les AuCoin or Peter DeFazio will take on Bob Packwood. It appears likely that Dan Glickman will go against Bob Dole in Kansas and Bob Mrazek is challenging Al D'Amato in New York. So, if anything, it seems that the Democrats are now more willing to press forward than they were two years ago. This is very much a reflection of the fact that when these Democrats go home, they hear about these economic and social issues I've mentioned, rather than about the war. Voters are saying quite clearly that in terms of our domestic economic policies they want a change in Washington—a change much more oriented to the needs of middle class people.

that we could see a bigger shift in the party line-up in both houses in 1992 than we've seen in some time. Why? Because of the significant shift in party ID. Moving from a 23 point deficit to a six or seven point advantage is a shift that you and I will likely see only once in our lifetimes.

Of course, the major question is, will that advantage hold? Work we have done clearly shows that party ID isn't the stable bedrock it was or at least was thought to be in earlier times. It's pretty fluid. But if the Republicans should go into the 1992 fall balloting with, say, a 6 point lead, that puts in reach a lot of Democratic seats which weren't considered vulnerable four months ago.

This brings us directly to the issue of realignment. I still think there has been a "rolling" realignment—rolling in the sense that it has clearly moved in one direction, but also rolling in the sense that it isn't firm. It's neither embedded nor stabilized. Realignment to me means first, a major shift in the national agenda—which did in fact occur in 1979 and 1980. Second, it takes a charismatic leader to see that many of those agenda changes are reflected in national legislation—something which Ronald Reagan accomplished. Third, it requires a major shift in party ID, which we have had. The fourth component of an enduring realignment hasn't occurred, however, and I don't think it's likely to be realized in the near future. In order to provide permanence to the first three components of realignment, they must be institutionalized through redistricting in the state legislatures. The party which controls state legislatures has the power to fashion the composition of each congressional district and therethrough controls the most fundamental political lever. While the Republicans may continue to make gains in other areas, their inability to end the dominance of Democratic legislatures places a lid on their other partisan gains.

PP: When you look at Republicans making big gains in party ID—and dominating presidential balloting, while the Democrats control legislatures national and state, what's your principal interpretation? How much does the split reflect ambivalent feelings in the public as to the proper course of public policy—people liking the Republicans in some ways and Democrats in others, and hence splitting their votes to achieve divergent ends? Conversely, does divided government instead reflect simply the cutting off of legislative races from party and policy—with the results reflecting such things as incumbency advantages? How much does the public want a Republican presidency along side a Democratic Congress, or is this split just an unintended by-product of other factors?

RBW: I believe that the main reason for the partisan split at the legislative and presidential levels stems primarily from the power of congressional and legislative incum-

PP: Looking at the range of poll findings on party identification, from 1980 to the present [see pp. 18-21] while polling organizations vary considerably in the pictures they provide at any one point in time, and while there's an awful lot of bounce in these figures, the Republicans are clearly stronger in the latter part of the period—1989-91—than they were in the first part, according to every one of the survey organizations.

GG: I believe that's true.

PP: Why? What has accounted for this at least modest realignment?

GG: "Modest" is your word. I'd probably say "temporary." The most recent figures are very much a response to the war. There have been relatively few positive stories about the Democratic party written in the last several months. The other truism of American politics is that nothing succeeds like success. The Republicans have had a spell of it recently, and have benefitted from it, but the pendulum will swing back the other way. There hasn't been any real permanence to party ID figures for some years now. Emphasizing them has become silly, because for many people professed party identification is very soft, a reaction to specific events. If I ask party ID at the end of the questionnaire in a survey on economic issues, I will get a higher Democratic figure; if the survey is mainly about foreign policy—surprise, surprise—I will get a higher Republican proportion. Voters don't invest a lot when they announce partisan preference. Analysts still treat party identification as if they were asking the respondents' age, or gender. It's not that at all. It's much more akin analytically to asking, "How do you feel about the way things are going in the country today?" It's very fluid. Of course, it didn't used to be like that. Party once meant a lot more to people than it does now.

PP: So, in effect, the whole idea of party identification as Gallup introduced it in his surveys of the 30s and a great many political scientists have employed it, should now be buried?

GG: It's certainly a lot less meaningful. Experience shows us that even in the most Democratic states, there are enough people who are open-minded to a Republican to elect him. And even in the most Republican and conservative state, there are enough people who are open-minded about Democrats to elect them.

PP: If we asked one hundred of the most politically knowledgeable people privately about the likely 1992 election outcomes, a pretty large majority would say they expect the Democrats to win both Houses of Congress, and the Republicans to win the White House again. Whether this actually happens in 1992 we will see, but

bency. Incumbents can show that they are serving their districts in ways large and small, and this has buffered them from what otherwise would be more frequent political change. Also, we have found that Americans are quite comfortable with today's divided government—a unique expression of the separation of powers. In the early 1980s Republicans tried to see whether they might leverage the fact that President Reagan could accomplish more if he had a Republican House and Senate. They found that that argument fell on deaf ears. Many of our respondents told us that argument didn't really carry much weight because they believed it was a "good thing" to have Democrats controlling Congress, and Republicans controlling the White House. Nevertheless, in all practicality, I don't believe that many Americans go through that reasoning process and decide we need a balance, and hence will vote top of the ticket Republican but also for a Democratic Congress. Voting for a congressman is a much more pragmatic matter of who they know, and of some more narrow constituency issues.

PP: But even in face of these incumbency advantages and constituency issues which have buttressed the Democrats' legislative position, you see enough going on with regard to Bush's standing on the one hand and the Republican pick-up in party ID on the other, to conclude there is some prospect of significant change in the partisan make-up of Congress in 1992?

RBW: That I do. And I would feel much more comfortable about that if, a year from now, party ID still gives the Republicans an edge. At the end of the 1988 campaign we did an analysis of what factors explain the vote for a variety of offices including president; party allegiance, while not the sole and even in some regards the most significant explanatory variable, nevertheless, "explains" why people voted for candidates. The challenge for the Republican party is to leverage the advantages of party identification, especially among younger voters. A good get-out-the-vote effort will clearly help the party. It wasn't too long ago when Republicans hoped for rain and snow and sleet on November election day. Now, they should hope for warmth and sunshine.

Richard B. Wirthlin is chairman of the Wirthlin Group

split control has been the result for a long time. What do you emphasize in explaining it? Does it reflect conscious choice?

GG: While they express frustration with the deadlock in Washington that split government produces, in fact voters like the idea of having the executive and legislature controlled by different parties. Today voters are more concerned about the excesses of governmental action than they are about the inadequacies of governmental action. So they welcome the checks and balances. This feeling really took root during the Reagan administration. Voters disagreed with Reagan on a lot of domestic issues, and very much liked the fact that the Democrats were there to stop the excesses. But they liked a lot of what Reagan was doing in foreign affairs, and that he could check the Democrats on some tax and spending issues as well. So the bottom line is that voters do feel comfortable with split government. Right now, though, the pressure on divided government is much less on the Democrats for blocking George Bush, because they clearly are not, but on George Bush for becoming an obstacle to things which need to be done in the domestic social agenda. The pressure is more on the presidency than on the Congress.

Geoffrey Garin is president of the Garin-Hart Strategic Research Group

LIVING IN THE PAST: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES ARE FAILING AMERICA

By E.J. Dionne, Jr.

Excerpted from *Why Americans Hate Politics*, By E.J. Dionne, Jr. Copyright © 1991 by E.J. Dionne, Jr. Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc.

The categories that have dominated our thinking for so long are utterly irrelevant to the new world we face. The international alliance assembled against Iraq would have been inconceivable just two years earlier. Indeed, the very weapons we used against Saddam's forces were built for a different conflict in a different place against a different enemy. So much of the debate over Iraq was shaped by the Vietnam conflict, as if the use of American force always means the same thing in every part of the world and against every adversary.

Most of the problems of our political life can be traced to the failure of the dominant ideologies of American politics, liberalism and conservatism. The central argument of this book is that liberalism and conservatism are framing political issues as a series of false choices. Wracked by contradiction and responsive mainly to the needs of their various constituencies, liberalism and conservatism *prevent* the nation from settling the questions that most trouble it. On issue after issue, there is consensus on where the country should move or at least on what we should be arguing about; liberalism and conservatism make it impossible for that consensus to express itself.

To blame our problems on the failure of 'ideologies' would seem a convenient way to avoid attaching responsibility to individuals. But to hold ideologies responsible for our troubles is, in fact, to place a burden on those who live by them and formulate them. It is also a way of saying that ideas matter, and that ideas, badly formulated, interpreted and used, can lead us astray. We are suffering from a false polarization in our politics, in which liberals and conservatives keep arguing about the same things when the country wants to move on.

The cause of this false polarization is the cultural civil war that broke out in the 1960s. Just as the Civil War dominated American political life for decades after it ended, so is the cultural civil war of the 1960s, with all its tensions and contradictions, shaping our politics today. We are still trapped in the 1960s....

To argue that the polarization around the issues of the 1960s is irrelevant to most Americans is to defy many of our political assumptions. If race is no longer a divisive

issue, why did Willie Horton play such an important role in the 1988 campaign, and why did racial quotas loom so large in 1990? If we are approaching a consensus on moral issues, why does the abortion issue seem to divide us into such passionate factions? Before taking on these questions directly, it is worth examining briefly how much we already hold in common on 'the sixties issues' of race, gender, and Vietnam.

Overwhelmingly, the country accepts the entry of women into the workforce. The vast majority of Americans see their presence as, at least, an economic necessity and, at best, a positive good.... Yet if Americans, on balance, agree with liberals that women are in the workforce to stay, they agree with conservatives that not all the effects of this revolution are positive. They worry especially about what will happen to children in the new world we have created. They are concerned that in women's rush to the workforce, the children are being left behind, since men do not seem eager to take up the slack. The debate the country wants to hear is not one involving false choices between an ideal 'feminism' and an idealized 'traditional family.'...

Abortion is a more morally complex and personally wrenching issue. It is a difficult issue to straddle or compromise. Yet the evidence from polls is that even on this question, Americans resist 'yes/no' answers. The polls show that Americans overwhelmingly believe that abortion should be available in the 'hard' cases, involving rape, incest, or danger to a mother's life. The polls show that Americans are uneasy with government restrictions on abortion in other cases, too, believing it is a 'private' matter. Yet the same surveys show that Americans are uncomfortable with how many abortions are being performed and feel that women often resort to abortion in circumstances where they should avoid it. Americans oppose outright bans on abortion but favor a series of restrictions, including requirements that minor girls get the permission of their parents before getting abortions....

In dealing with America's racial dilemma, the public, black and white, accepts that the last thirty years is not all good news or bad news but a mixture of both. The civil rights revolution was, first, a revolution in *attitudes*, and this revolution was largely successful. Racist views that were routinely expressed by white Americans and their leaders just three decades ago are now beyond the pale. By overwhelming margins, whites support integrated neighborhoods and integrated schools and oppose racial discrimination in jobs, housing, or public accommodations. This change is too easily dismissed as mere politeness, the result of whites' saying certain things simply because they believe the polltakers want to hear them. Over time, when people stop *saying* things publicly, they stop *believing* them privately. And when they stop *acting* on them.

Tearing down the barriers of segregation has had a series of highly positive results. A substantial share of the black community has seen its incomes and its opportunities grow. The black middle class, which was once hemmed in by racial prejudice, now enjoys something approaching equality with whites. In black families headed by a married couple, 89 percent are above the poverty line. That is still below the 95 percent rate among comparable white couples, but the gap has been closing. In families where both husbands and wives work, black and white incomes are virtually equal.

But this relatively good news is counterbalanced by a great deal of bad news. Overall, the black median family income is just 56 percent of white family income. Nearly a third of all blacks, as against only 10 percent of whites, live below the poverty line. Among black children, 45 percent live in poverty, as against only 15 percent of white children. These grim figures are closely related to another statistic: Half of all black children, as against only 15 percent of white children, live in families headed by a woman. Perhaps the grimmest statistic of all is this one: Black men account for 3.5 percent of America's college students but 40 percent of its prison inmates....

The tragedy of our politics is that the concerns aroused by a Willie Horton should be unifying rather than divisive. Blacks and whites agree that the condition of the black poor is a national crisis that needs attention. They agree that the public schools, which in the big cities are increasingly black schools, need to be improved. They agree that life in black neighborhoods needs to be enhanced, in particular by cutting the crime rate. They agree that young blacks should have better job opportunities and enhanced job training. They agree that teen pregnancy needs to be reduced. Blacks and whites also agree that the problems require spending money.

But blacks and whites also know that money alone will not suffice. They agree that the problems of the poorest people in urban areas have to do not just with economics but also with a moral crisis. They agree that

whatever money is spent should be directed not only at improving opportunities but at changing values. Fathers need to be required to care for their children, work should be required from those who receive social benefits, young women need to be encouraged to avoid pregnancy and stay in school, criminal behavior needs to be sanctioned severely. Both blacks and whites agree that the broader society has an obligation to lift up those trapped in poverty; both blacks and whites agree that the poor have obligations to society, and themselves....

As for the foreign policy debates fostered by the Vietnam War, events have at last forced us to engage in some new thinking. They have also showed us how flawed our old thinking was. On the one side, liberals would never have believed that at the end of Ronald Reagan's defense buildup, the Cold War would end. Liberals and conservatives can debate how much Reagan's policies had to do with what happened and how much of the change was 'inevitable,' given the Soviet Union's internal difficulties. What is clear is that in 1980, few people thought that what has happened in Eastern Europe was at all 'inevitable.' Here, conservatives, no less than liberals, proved themselves to be poor prophets. In the late 1980s, many conservatives were convinced that the world would succumb to 'the totalitarian temptation.' They saw the victory of freedom not as inevitable, but as highly problematic. Most conservatives believed that internal transformations within the Communist block were impossible. 'Totalitarian' governments controlled by Communists could never change their stripes. But they did....

It is far too early to know the long-term effects of the Gulf War. If America is lucky, the war will help close the book on thirty years of dead-end arguments. But it will not end the popular hatred of politics unless the country's politicians seize the opportunity to settle the cultural civil war and transform the nation's political discussion into a real debate over how to maintain America's standard of living, reduce the economic pressures on the nation's middle class, and restore hope to the poor....

E. J. Dionne, Jr. is a columnist for the Washington Post

THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES AFTER THE GULF WAR

By Jeffrey Alderman

If the 1992 election had been held this past March, President Bush would have won a landslide victory with coattails long and broad enough to have retaken the Senate and put a major dent in the Democratic majority in the House.

The reason: The war has made Bush one of the most popular president's in modern history. His approval rating, in early March, was higher than any president from FDR forward. Though it has now fallen off somewhat, the President's standing remains exceptionally strong (see figure 1). And Bush's popularity has rubbed off on the Republican party which now has at least as many adherents as the Democratic party. Recent ABC/Washington Post polling suggests the 1992 election might even produce a major political realignment if Bush and the GOP are able to hang on to their gains for 18 months and find some credible congressional candidates in the meanwhile.

Luckily for the Democrats, a year and a half is an eternity in politics. The recession, other items on the domestic agenda, and the inertia of incumbency could turn things around for them. But the current Republican numbers are very strong, and if the Democrats rely solely on random events and the power of incumbency to pull their political assets out of the fire, they could lose a lot more than the presidency on November 3, 1992.

They are not merely confronted with a popular president: They face a popular president whose ratings may be accelerating a trend toward his party that has, in fits and starts, been growing at least since Ronald Reagan's first term. Right now the Democrats face a public which not only wants to re-elect a popular Republican president, but one which is also thinking about giving him a more Republican Congress. And they're thinking that way in the middle of a recession in which the Republicans control the White House. Imagine their inclinations if better economic times return.

Party Loyalties

The numbers beyond the war-glow-driven presidential ratings look more auspicious for the Republicans than they have in a very long while. In fact, when it comes to party affiliation, there are about as many Republicans as Democrats out there. When asked March 1-4 which party they favored, 31% of the adult public said the Democrats and 31%, the Republicans. When the 37% who preferred the term "independent" were asked which party they lean

toward, 15% picked the Democrats, while 17% went for the GOP. This strong Republican showing is partially, but not totally, a phenomenon of the President's extraordinary rise in the polls. Even without such high presidential numbers, the average Democratic point advantage in party identification over the Republicans has steadily declined over the last dozen years—from over 20 points in the late seventies to near parity today (see figure 2). Before that decline began, the Democrats had maintained a 15 or 20 point edge in party identification for nearly 50 years. This change within the general population has been reflected in the party identification of voters in every election tracked by exit polls since 1980. It hasn't been a straight line decline for the Democrats, nor has it been precipitous. But it has been substantial enough to reach the point where the Democrats can no longer claim to be the majority party. Of course the GOP, though it has increased its share of the affiliation pie by about 10 percentage points in the past 12 years, cannot claim a majority either. And ABC polling in mid-spring showed the GOP's gains in identification dropping back a bit along with Bush's popularity.

The Demographics of Today's Alignment

The demographics of party identification in the more politically detailed March poll show that the groups which support the Democratic party at the highest rates are older, poorer and less educated than most Americans. In looking at "leaned" party identification—including those who first call themselves independents, but on a follow-up question indicate they lean either Democratic or Republican—the list of groups in which a majority favor the Democrats comprises: blacks, liberals, the elderly, high school dropouts, union members, the poor, and Catholics. Meanwhile, on the more upscale Republican majority list are: whites, conservatives, the young, college graduates, the middle class, the rich and white Protestants.

At first glance, there aren't too many surprises on either list, but a few calculations reveal that, in terms of voting impact, the Republican list is far more powerful. It's more powerful because Republicans are winning more large groups than are the Democrats. Example: 75% of blacks favor the Democrats, while just 51% of whites favor the Republicans. But those black Democrats represent just 8% of the total population, while the white Republicans are 41% of it. Table 1 shows the parties' best groups and the *share of the population* each group represents. Simply put: The larger demographic groups tend to be Republican and the smaller ones tend to be Democratic.

Regional strengths

The Democrats have only one section of the country where a bare majority favor their party, the East, which

Table 1
Groups Where an Absolute Majority
(Leaners Included) Identify as Repub-
lican or Democratic; and the Group's
Population Share

Democratic...	
Blacks	8%
Liberals	15
61 or older	12
Less than HS education	13
Union members	10
Earn less than \$12,000	9
Catholics	15
Republican...	
Whites	41%
Conservatives	22
18-30 years old	14
College graduates	21
Middle class	23
Earn \$50,000 or more	12
White Protestants	28

accounts for 20% of the country. And the region is losing electoral votes following the 1990 Census. The Republicans counter with 52% favoring them in the West—19% of the country. They also have a 49/39 edge over the Democrats in the Midwest—where 24% of the country lives.

The South (37% of the population) finds the parties dead even—with 47% favoring Democratic affiliation and 47%, Republican. If ever a figure showed the old Democratic presidential coalition of East and South dead and buried, it's this one. The huge edge the Democrats enjoyed in the South through most of US history is gone.

Catholic Voters

One of the biggest reasons the Democrats still have the party ID lead in the East is that white Catholic ethnic groups continue to think of themselves as Democrats, in part out of family tradition. But for a long while Catholics have been attracted to the Republicans at presidential voting time, and now they may be thinking of trying them out at the House level, too.

The March 1-4 ABC News/Washington Post poll showed that a clear majority of all Catholics still preferred a Democratic party ID, but were divided on which party is better able to handle the country's overall problems and divided on which can better with the economy. Right now, 70% of Catholics say they would vote for Bush for president. More important, perhaps, they are evenly split in their likely House vote in 1992. This means that Catholics, the single largest stalwart group of Democratic

adherents—who constitute nearly 3-in-10 voters—are thinking about leaving the fold at the grass roots level.

Other strong Democratic groups all plan to vote Democratic for House in 1992, but as the chart of 1988 presidential voters shows, they do not have much company (see table 2). When it comes to hypothetical '92 presidential voting, all core Democratic groups—including blacks—desert their partisan home for Bush.

Democratic Strengths

The Democrats, a demoralized bunch at the moment, are not without hope of regaining ground lost to the GOP, and that hope does not require a prolonged, deep recession (though it would help). Essentially the Democrats are tied with the Republicans in party identification, and these loyalties bounce around a good deal depending on circumstances. It's too soon to know how much of recent the Republican gains will prove lasting. And it's certainly too soon to be predicting Democratic declines in the House and Senate, or even a Bush presidential victory in 1992.

The public does not have a clear idea of where Bush is leading the nation domestically. Just 22% of Americans say they have a good idea where he wants to lead the nation in the next two years. Thirty-seven percent have "just some idea" and 40% "not much of an idea."

Perhaps Democrats can give the public a better idea of where they would like to see the nation go. There are plenty of domestic problems beyond the recession on which they could call the administration to task. The public feels not enough progress is being made on a long list—from drugs and crime, to education and environment.

The Democratic party has done a good job of painting the GOP as the party of the rich, and itself as the party of the poor. Of course, it's the people in the middle that have the most votes, and by a narrow margin more people say the Democrats better represent the middle class than do the Republicans (by 44 to 37%). When asked which party is better able to "help the middle class," the Democrats get a clearer 48 to 34% victory. That's a base to build a constituency on.

Unfortunately for the Democrats, self-described members of the middle class are planning to vote Republican for House by 54 to 35% and for Bush by 72 to 16%. If the Democrats continue to let the president and his party set the national agenda, that could be the way it turns out in the next election.

Jeffrey Alderman is director of the ABC News polling unit

Figure 1




Figure 2




Table 2

1988 VOTERS AND THEIR PLANNED 1992 CONGRESSIONAL VOTE

	Congress 1992	
	Dem.	GOP
Republican (without "leaners")	7%	87%
Conservative	28	63
Age: 18-30	32	61
\$50,000 +	30	59
White Protestant	33	56
College	33	54
Middle Class	35	54
White	37	52
Age: 31-44	36	51
South	41	51
1988 Voters	40	50
Male	40	50
Female	41	50
HS Grad	41	50
Midwest	39	50
East	42	49
West	39	49
Age: 45-60	41	48
Less than \$12,000	44	48
Working Class	45	46
Independent	36	46
Moderate	42	46
Catholic	43	46
Age: 61+	50	44
Less than HS	56	41
Union	50	38
Liberal	56	37
Leaned Ind.	32	34
Black	67	28
Democratic (without "leaners")	82	15

Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, March 1-4, 1991.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION: THE IDEA AND ITS MEASURE

by Everett Carll Ladd

No other measure of voters' partisan preferences and the parties' strength has been deemed nearly so telling a political statistic, or used as widely as party identification. American parties really have never had members; rather, they have had vast armies bound to them by psychological bonds—of memory, "tribal" membership, and interests. We ask, then, Which team is yours? Do you *think of yourself* as a Republican or a Democrat?

So far as I have been able to discover, the first survey operationalization of the idea was by Gallup, in a study of March 3-8, 1937. Midway through it, in between questions on whether sit-down strikes should be made illegal, and had the respondent gone to the movies in the past month—both answered affirmatively by roughly two to one—Gallup asked: "Do you regard yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or a Socialist?" The November 1939 poll was the first to use the now familiar, "In politics, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat...or an Independent?" By 1946 Gallup was including the party "ID" question regularly, and by 1947 it was part of a standard battery of demographics at the end of the questionnaire—where it is found today in most polls.

It was long political science gospel that party ID for most people is a bedrock identity, rarely and reluctantly changed, which serves as a uniquely powerful determiner of electoral behavior. Some analysts now believe that this assessment, though perhaps valid in the past, no longer holds—in an era when political parties have become objects of diminished attachment. Geoffrey Garin argues in this issue (p. 9) that asking about party ID is "much more akin analytically to asking, How do you feel about the way things are going in the country today? It's very fluid."

As part of our comprehensive examination of the parties' standing and changes therein, we present in the pages which follow every poll finding on party identification by six leading organizations for 1980, 1982, 1985, 1988, and 1990-91—covering the sweep of the Reagan and Bush presidencies. Some developments in party preference are shown clearly and consistently across these data. Most notably, the consensus of the six polling groups finds the Republicans much stronger in the latter years of the period than they were at the beginning. Though space constraints prevented us from printing all of them, we have compiled the complete ID findings for every year since 1980. The total array (available from the Center upon request) shows Republican gains even more clearly.

The reader will note that the survey organizations sometimes differ markedly as to the parties' relative strength. In February 1985, for example, Roper showed the Democrats up by 14 percentage points, whereas Gallup had them ahead only by 4, and NBC found them actually trailing by 2. In 1980, the Gallup and Roper pictures were identical: Gallup put the Democrats in the lead by an average margin of 22 points, Roper by 24. In 1990 and thusfar in 1991, however, Gallup has shown the Republicans moving up and taking the lead, while Roper has continued to find a decisive (if reduced from the early Eighties) Democratic margin of 10 points or so.

The polls differ on other aspects of the party ID story. For example, was there any short-term change in the parties' standing over the course of the Gulf conflict? The Yankelovich Clancy Shulman polls for Time say there really wasn't. In fact, they show the Democrats' lead essentially constant over the last two years. In contrast, the ABC/Post polls show the GOP closing the gap in ID during the war months but then (in a Post-only survey) falling back a bit again in April. Gallup agrees with ABC/Post on the Republicans' moving up during the war—but differs in that it finds no Republican fall-off in April.

While the polls differ on the parties' relative strength overall, they are consistent in finding the Republicans doing better among the young than among any other age group. The persistence of patterns in party identification based on generational experience, and the marked Republican success among those who have come of age politically since the late 1970s, is shown by data in the Public Opinion Report (pp. 94-95).

When those independents who say they "lean" to one party or the other are added into the respective bodies of partisans, the Republicans' relative position almost always is shown improving slightly, in recent polls. As the beneficiaries of the realignment, they have more soft support than do the Democrats. The GOP margins of 10 to 12 points in Gallup polls of late March and April—with leaners included—represent the first instance in the history of polling when a respected survey organization has found a clear (if temporary) Republican ascendancy.

The Roper Center is engaged in a long-term study of partisan identification, involving both substantive matters of party strength—among them, issues of realignment and dealignment; and methodological issues of how inter-organization differences of sample composition, question wording, question placement, etc., may contribute to the contrasting findings.

Everett Carll Ladd is executive director and president of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut

The Parties. Looking to 1992/Ladd/continued

PARTY ID, 1980-PRESENT

Questions:

ABC News/Washington Post - "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, or Independent?"

CBS News/New York Times - "Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?"

NBC News (in various associations) - "In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else?" (NBC News/Associated Press, 1982; NBC News, January-July 1985; NBC News/Wall Street Journal, October 1985-October 1988)

- "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?" (NBC News/Wall Street Journal, 1990-91)

The Gallup Organization - "In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?"

The Roper Organization - "Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—a Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?"

Time/Yankelovich (in two different associations) - "Are you a Democrat, Republican, or what?" (Time/Yankelovich, Skelly & White, 1980-85)

- "Are you a Democrat, Republican, or Independent?" (Time/Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, 1988-91)

* = registered voters, † = likely voters

1980

ABC/WP			CBS/NYT			NBC			GALLUP			ROPER			TIME/YANK.		
Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D
(None in 1980)			1/9-13	24	41	(None in 1980)			1/4-7	19	48	1/5-19	20	51	1/23-24	26	49
			2/13-17	25	44				1/25-28	20	46	2/9-23	22	49	3/19-20	30	51
			3/12-15	26	41				2/1-4	21	47				3/29-30	28	49
									2/29-3/3	25	47						
									3/7-10	21	45						
									3/28-31	22	45						
			4/10-14	24	43				4/11-14	25	45	3/29-4/5	23	45	5/14-16	26	53
			6/18-22	23	44				5/2-5	28	46	4/26-5/3	24	49			
									5/16-19	22	48	6/5-12	23	49			
									5/30-6/2	22	47						
									6/13-16	24	49						
									6/27-30	25	46						
			8/2-7	24	43				7/11-14	25	47	7/7-13	24	47	8/26-28	27	53
			9/10-14	23	46				8/1-4	23	48	8/16-23	25	48			
									8/15-18	24	51						
									9/12-15	33	47						
			11/7-12	24	46				10/10-13	26	45	9/27-10/4	25	48	10/14-16	28	52
									11/7-10	26	42	11/8-15	24	45			
									11/21-24	25	43	12/6-13	23	46			
									12/5-8	27	42						

PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT

- 82 THE COUNTRY'S MOOD
- 85 PREVIEW 1992: PARTY IMAGES
- 96 RATING OUR VICE PRESIDENTS
- 101 THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIAGE

Editors

Karlyn H. Keene
Everett Carl Ladd

Assistant Editors

Jennifer Baggette
John Benson

Consulting Editor

Karl Zinsmeister


The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut helps compile the data used for this section. The Roper Center is the largest archive of survey data in the United States. Polls are available from the Roper Center by computer or through DIALOG.

THE COUNTRY'S MOOD

The events of the Gulf War boosted evaluations of how the country and the economy are faring. Large majorities consistently find a high level of satisfaction in their personal lives.

Question: **How well do you think things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, fairly badly, or very badly?**

Percent




Note: "Not sure" response does not exceed 3% for time period shown.

Source: Surveys by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for Time and Cable News Network.

Question: **In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States at this time? In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in your own personal life?**

Percent



Note: * = Gallup poll for Newsweek.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 1, 1991.

Things in the country these days are going ...

1990


	Very/fairly well	Very/fairly badly/not sure
Jan. 31-Feb. 1	67%	33%
Feb. 14	70	30
Mar. 14	62	38
Apr. 9-10	62	38
Jul. 24-25	55	45
Aug. 9	55	45
Aug. 23	52	48
Sep. 13	52	48
Oct. 3	42	58
Oct. 10	41	59
Oct. 15-17	38	62
Nov. 14	42	58
Nov. 27-28	45	55

1991

	Very/fairly well	Very/fairly badly/not sure
Jan. 10	39	61
Feb. 7	58	42
Mar. 7	74	26
Apr. 10-11	59	41

Question: **What is your best guess about the United States five years from now? Generally, if things go pretty much as you expect, do you think things will be better, worse, or about the same as they are today?**

Five years from now in the United States, expect things to be...



Personal life

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
1990		
Feb. 8-11	83%	16%
Jul. 19-22	81	17
Aug. 9-12	85	13
Sep. 27-30	85	14
Oct. 11-14	82	16
Oct. 25-28	87	11
Dec. 13-16	82	18

1991

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Jan. 3-6	84	14
Jan. 17-20	86	12
Feb. 14-17	84	15

In the United States

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
1990		
Feb. 8-11	55%	39%
Jul. 19-22	45	51
Aug. 9-12	43	51
Sep. 27-30	37	58
Oct. 11-14	29	67
Oct. 25-28	31	66
Dec. 13-16	33	64

1991


	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Jan. 3-6	32	61
Jan. 17-20	62	33
Feb. 14-17	54	40
Mar. 1*	65	28

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, March 4-6, 1991.

The public's economic forecasts are becoming more optimistic. Assessments about current economic conditions, however, are still more negative than positive.

Question: **How would you describe the economic conditions in the country today—as being very good, fairly good, poor, or very poor? During the next 12 months, do you think the economic conditions in this country will get better, become worse, or stay about the same?**


Percent



Source: Surveys by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for Time and Cable News Network, latest that of April 10-11, 1991.

Question: **We are interested in how people's financial situation may have changed. Would you say you are financially better off now than you were a year ago, or are you financially worse off now? Now looking ahead, do you expect that at this time next year you will be financially better off than now, or worse off than now?**

Percent



Note: "Same", a volunteered response in both questions not shown here.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 11-14, 1991.

Economic conditions today ...

1990	Very good/fairly good	Poor/very poor
Jan. 31-Feb. 1	60%	39%
Jul. 24-25	49	50
Aug. 9	52	46
Aug. 23	56	43
Oct. 10	37	63
Nov. 27-28	39	61
1991		
Jan. 10	31	68
Mar. 7	52	46
Apr. 10-11	39	59

During next 12 months, economic conditions will ...

1990	Get better	Stay the same	Get worse
Jan. 31-Feb. 1	14%	64%	20%
Jul. 24-25	12	57	29
Aug. 9	14	38	44
Aug. 23	12	32	50
Oct. 10	13	32	50
Nov. 27-28	16	36	45
1991			
Jan. 10	19	32	43
Mar. 7	44	40	15
Apr. 10-11	42	40	15

Today are ...

1990	Better off than a year ago	Worse off
Feb. 8-11	49%	26%
Jul. 19-22	44	27
Aug. 9-12	43	29
Sep. 27-30	40	32
Oct. 11-14	32	41
18-21	27	30
25-28	38	35
Dec. 13-16	38	36
1991		
Jan. 3-6	35	32
11-13	27	33
Feb. 14-17	37	28
Feb. 28-Mar. 3	37	28
Mar. 21-24	31	37
Apr. 11-14	29	33

At this time next year will be ...

1990	Better off	Worse off
Feb. 8-11	65%	16%
Jul. 19-22	58	17
Aug. 9-12	57	20
Sep. 27-30	52	20
Oct. 11-14	48	30
18-21	41	34
25-28	50	27
Dec. 13-16	58	18
1991		
Jan. 3-6	52	18
11-13	41	25
Feb. 14-17	57	15
Feb. 28-Mar. 3	64	9
Mar. 21-24	56	18
Apr. 11-14	56	17

Pundits pay extraordinary attention to a question about whether the country is headed in the right direction, or off on the wrong track. A careful reading of the responses shows wide variation in results by polling organizations, although the findings generally go in the same direction. George Bush's high overall ratings suggest that he is on the right track.

Question: **Do you think things in this country are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have gotten pretty seriously off on the wrong track. (ABC/WP)** All in all, do you think things in the nation are generally headed in the right direction, or do you feel that things are off on the wrong track? (NBC/WSJ) Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the right direction or do you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track? (CBS/NYT) Generally speaking, would you say that things in the country are going in the right direction, or have they pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track? (Wirthlin)


	Jan. 1990	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan. 1991	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.
ABC/WP																
Right track	48%	49%	—	—	39%	—	37%	—	36%	19%	—	—	49%	58%	—	42%*
Wrong	49	48	—	—	60	—	60	—	60	79	—	—	48	39	—	51
	-1	+1	—	—	-21	—	-23	—	-24	-60	—	—	+1	+19	—	-9
NBC/WSJ																
Right track	49%	—	44%	47%	42%	—	40%	—	45%	22%	—	28%	—	65%	55%	—
Wrong	29	—	31	32	38	—	37	—	40	59	—	51	—	22	26	—
	+20	—	+13	+15	+4	—	+3	—	+5	-37	—	-23	—	+43	+29	—
CBS/NYT																
Right track	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	51%*	—	51%	—
Wrong	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	39	—	42	—
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+12	—	+9	—
Wirthlin																
Right track	45%	48%	43%	40%	36%	38%	35%	35%	35%	20%	25%	26%	58%	47%	—	44%
Wrong	44	43	48	51	56	53	58	57	54	73	64	64	32	43	—	47
	+1	+5	-5	-9	-20	-15	-23	-22	-19	-53	-39	-38	+26	+4	—	-3

Note: * = Washington Post poll, CBS News poll.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, CBS News/New York Times, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, and the Wirthlin Group, latest that of April 5-9, 1991; March 4-6, 1991; March 13-15, 1991; and April 15-17, 1991, respectively.

Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president?**

Handling of job as president




Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of April 25-28, 1991.

		Approve	Disapprove
Gallup	1/3-6/91	58%	31%
CBS/NYT	1/5-7	62	27
YCS/Time/CNN	1/10	61	30
Gallup	1/11-13	64	25
CBS/NYT	1/11-13	66	25
NBC/WSJ	1/23	77	15
Gallup	1/23-26	83	13
YCS/Time/CNN	1/24	82	12
Gallup	1/30-2/2	82	15
YCS/Time/CNN	2/7	80	14
Gallup	2/7-10	79	18
CBS/NYT	2/12-13	78	13
Gallup	2/14-17	80	14
LA Times	2/15-17	82	14
Gallup	2/21-24	80	13
CBS/NYT	2/24-25	85	10
NBC/WSJ	2/26-27	85	11
NYT	2/28-3/1	86	10
Gallup	2/28-3/3	89	8
CBS/NYT	3/4-6	88	8
YCS/Time/CNN	3/7	86	9
Gallup	3/7-10	87	8
LA Times	3/9-11	84	13
NBC/WSJ	3/15-19	81	13
Gallup	3/28-30	82	11
CBS/NYT	4/1-3	80	12
Gallup	4/4-6	83	12
ABC/WP	4/5-9	80	18
LA Times	4/6-9	82	16
YCS/Time/CNN	4/10-11	76	18
Gallup	4/11-14	77	13
Gallup	4/25-28	76	15

PREVIEW 1992: PARTY IMAGES

An early assessment of the standing of the two parties shows that the Republicans have some substantial strengths. Defense and foreign policy remain Republican strongholds.

Question: Overall, which party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job in coping with the main problems the nation faces over the next few years?



Party trust to do better job


	Democratic	Republican	Both equally (vol.)	Neither (vol.)
Sep. 1982	45%	37%	—	10%
Oct. 1982	44	38	—	10
Aug. 1983	45	36	2%	9
Dec. 1983	38	38	—	14
Jan. 1984	42	37	—	11
Feb. 1984	41	45	—	8
May 1984	41	40	—	12
Jul. 1984	44	43	—	9
Jan. 1985	33	49	—	11
Feb. 1985	40	52	—	5
Jun. 1985	36	47	—	10
Jul. 1985	41	43	—	10
Sep. 1985	39	45	—	10
Oct. 1985	37	45	—	11
Feb. 1986	40	46	2	8
Mar. 1986	40	46	2	8
Jun. 1986	41	46	—	8
Sep. 1986	38	47	2	8
Jan. 1987	46	38	3	8
Mar. 1987	47	38	3	9
Jun. 1987	47	41	3	6
Oct. 1987	44	43	2	8
Dec. 1987	49	39	1	6
Jan. 1988	43	44	1	9
Mar. 1988	45	42	1	7
May 1988	45	40	2	7
Jul. 1988	43	39	1	10
Jul. 20 1988	51	36	1	7
Aug. 14 1988	47	36	1	11
Aug. 17 1988	40	43	2	8
Sep. * 1988	45	45	1	4
Aug. 1989	42	43	4	9
Jan. 1990	38	50	3	6
May 1990	41	45	3	8
Oct. 1990	46	41	1	8
Nov. * 1990	42	40	3	11
Mar. 1991	34	47	5	9

Note: * = Registered voters in September 1988 and likely voters in November 1990.
Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.

The Strength Dimension


Question: Regardless of how you usually vote, do you think the Republican party or the Democratic party is more likely to make sure U.S. military defenses are strong?

More likely to make sure U.S. military defenses are strong




Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job maintaining a strong national defense?

Trust to do a better job maintaining a strong national defense



Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job increasing the influence of the United States in world affairs?

Trust to do a better job increasing the influence of the United States in world affairs




Note: *Sample = registered voters. 1985 survey is a New York Times poll.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of March 4-6, 1991.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.

Americans trust the Republican party more than they trust the Democrats to reduce the threat of nuclear war and to keep us out of "World War III." Perhaps reflecting the Gulf War experience, the public believes the Democrats are more likely to keep us out of war more generally.


Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job reducing the threat of nuclear war?

Trust to do a better job reducing threat of nuclear war



Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.


Question: Regardless of how you usually vote, do you think the Republican party or the Democratic party is more likely to keep us out of war?



Note: Asked of registered voters in 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988. In 1988, respondents were asked "Regardless of which presidential candidate you intend to vote for next month, do you think the Republican party or the Democratic party ...". "Neither" and "Don't know/no answer" responses combined.



Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of March 4-6, 1991.

Question: Looking ahead for the next few years, which political party do you think would be more likely to keep the United States out of World War III—the Republican party or the Democratic party?



Note: March 1, 1991, survey is a Gallup/Newsweek poll. * = Registered voters.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 1, 1991.

Question: Which political party's politicians tended to support the war against Iraq more strongly? (LAT) During the war with Iraq, do you think one political party supported the war more than the other, or do you think they were equal in their support of the war? (CBS/NTT)




Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times (March 4-6, 1991) and the Los Angeles Times (March 9-11, 1991).

Prosperity and Competitiveness

During the 1980s, the Republicans gained the edge on keeping the country prosperous. Today they also lead the Democrats on insuring a strong economy, making American industry competitive, and protecting America's trade interests.

Question: Which political party—the Republican party or the Democratic party—will do a better job of keeping the country prosperous?



Party do a better job keeping country prosperous

Republican party
Democratic party

Nov. 1951	29%	37%
Jan. 1952	31	35
Aug. 1955	34	40
May 1956	36	38
May 1957	35	37
Feb. 1958	22	47
Feb. 1960	29	43
May 1961	20	54
May 1962	25	48
Jan.-Apr. 1963	21	46
Jan. 1964	20	48
Feb. 1965	16	51
Feb. 1966	19	48
Aug. 1968	36	36
Jul. 1970	29	44
Jul. 1971	23	46
Aug. 1972	35	38
Mar. 1974	19	49
Aug. 1976	23	47
Mar. 1978	23	41
Jun. 1980	31	37
Apr. 1981	41	28
Feb. 1982	32	42
Sep. 1983	33	40
Apr. 1984	44	36
Mar. 1985	48	32
Mar. 1986	51	33
Jan. 1987	38	37
Jan. 1988*	42	35
Jul. 1989	51	30
Oct. 1990	37	35
Mar. 1991	51	27


Note: * = Registered voters. March 1991 survey is a Gallup/Newsweek poll.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of March 1, 1991.

Question: Regardless of how you usually vote, do you think the Republican party or the Democratic party is...?


Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job making American industry competitive with Japan and other countries?

Question: Let me read you some other issues. When it comes to protecting America's interest on trade issues, which party do you think ...?


Better able to insure a strong economy



Trust to do a better job of making American industry competitive with Japan and other countries



Would better protect America's interests on trade issues



Note: *Sample = registered voters. In 1984 and 1988, respondents were asked "Regardless of which Presidential candidate you intend to vote for next month ...".
Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of March 4-6, 1991.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.


Note: Sample = registered voters.
Source: Surveys by Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NBC News/Wall Street Journal, latest that of March 15-19, 1991.

Economic Sense

Faith in the Republican party's ability to control federal spending and hold taxes down has slipped, but its superiority in controlling inflation is solid. A plurality believes the Republicans are better recession managers, but the Democrats lead the Republicans as the party best able to keep unemployment down.

Question: I would like to read you a list of issues and would like you to concentrate on the two major political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans. As I read each issue, please tell me whether you think the Republican party or the Democratic party can best handle the problem.


Party best able to control government spending



Source: Surveys by the Wirthlin Group, latest that of April 16-19, 1990.

Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job holding taxes down?


Party trust to do a better job holding taxes down



Source: Surveys by the ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.

Question: Let me read you some other issues. When it comes to dealing with taxes, which party do you think would do a better job—the Democratic party, the Republican party, both about the same, or neither?


Party which would do better job dealing with taxes




Note: Sample = registered voters.

Source: Surveys by Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NBC News/Wall Street Journal, latest that of March 15-19, 1991.

Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job ...? (ABC/WP) Let me read you some other issues. When it comes to ..., which party do you think would do a better job—the Democratic party, the Republican party, both about the same, or neither? (NBC/WSJ)




Controlling Inflation



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, March 1-4, 1991, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal, March 15-19, 1991.


Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job keeping unemployment down?

Party trust to do better job keeping unemployment down



Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.

Question: Let me read you some issues again. When it comes to getting the country out of a recession, which party do you think would do a better job, the Democratic party, the Republican party, both about the same, or neither?




Note: Sample = registered voters.

Source: Surveys by Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NBC News/Wall Street Journal, March 15-19, 1991.

Handling the Domestic Agenda


The Democrats tend to inspire confidence on domestic matters such as health care, social security, and helping the elderly. Crime, though, another element of the strength dimension, favors the Republicans.

Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job improving education and the schools?




Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.

Question: Let me read you some issues again. When it comes to strengthening our educational system, which party do you think would do a better job, the Democratic party, the Republican party, both about the same or neither?



Source: Surveys by NBC News/Wall Street Journal, latest that of March 15-19, 1991.

Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job ...?




Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.

Question: Let me read you some issues again. When it comes to providing better health care, which party do you think would do a better job—the Democratic party, the Republican party, both about the same, or neither?



Source: Surveys by Hart Teeter Research Companies for NBC News/Wall Street Journal, March 15-19, 1991.


Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job ...? (ABC/WP) Let me read you some issues again. When it comes to ..., which party do you think would do a better job—the Democratic party, the Republican party, both about the same, or neither? (NBC/WSJ)



Note: NBC/WSJ samples = registered voters*.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post and Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NBC News/Wall Street Journal, latest that of March 15-19, 1991.

Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, do you trust to do a better job handling the crime problem?




Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of March 1-4, 1991.

Looking Out for Us

Democrats can claim to be the party of the "common man," while the Republican's reputation as a party of the privileged sticks. The Democrats are also judged better able to aid women and minorities.


Question: Which political party, the Democrats or the Republicans, better represents the interests of people like yourself?

Party that (better represents the interests of/cares more about) the needs and problems of people like yourself?




Source: Survey by the ABC News/Washington Post, March 1-4, 1991.

Question: Regardless of how you usually vote, do you think the Republican party or the Democratic party cares more about the needs and problems of people like yourself?



Source: Survey by the CBS News/New York Times, March 4-6, 1991.

Question: Do you think the Democratic party or the Republican party can do a better job protecting the interests of people like you?





Source: Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for Time and Cable News Network, October 10, 1990.

Question: In general, do you think the (Republican/Democratic) party favors the rich, favors the middle class, or favors the poor, or does it treat them all pretty much the same?

The Republican party ...

The Democratic party...

Favors the rich
 Favors the middle class
 Favors the poor
 Treats them all pretty equally
 Don't know/no answer




Note: Sample in 1988 survey consisted of registered voters.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of October 28-31, 1990.


Question: Do you think the Democratic party or the Republican party ...?

Republican party
 Democratic party
 No difference
 Not sure

Can do a better job helping the middle class



Can do a better job insuring the rights of women and minorities




Note: * = "No difference/not sure" combined response.

Source: Surveys by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for Time and Cable News Network, latest that of October 10, 1990.

Summing Up: Advantage GOP?

Heading into 1992, the Republicans appear to have more voting issue advantages than the Democrats. Their support is strongest in areas of national security and foreign affairs, less so on economic issues. The Democrats enjoy their strongest advantages on "compassion issues," like helping the homeless, the elderly, and the poor.

Question: Which political party, the Republicans or the Democrats, do you trust to do a better job ...?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, March 4-6, 1991.

Changes in Party Identification

The Republican party has made striking gains over the last decade in party identification. In 1978, Democrats had a 25 percentage point lead. In 1989-91, though, the parties stand at parity. Democratic support among the party's traditional constituencies—for example, women, minorities, the less educated—has ebbed.



Note: * = Gallup surveys for *Newsweek*, October 1989-February 1991 combined. Respondents were asked: "As of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?"

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

After tilting Democratic in the late 1970s, college graduates ages 18-44 are now one of the Republican party's strongest constituencies. Blacks are still heavily Democratic, though less so than in the past.




Note: * = Gallup surveys for *Newsweek*, October 1989-February 1991 combined. Respondents were asked: "As of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?"
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.


Politics of the Ages

The spread below illustrates Republican momentum in terms of party identification. Those who came of age politically during Reagan's presidency are more Republican than Democratic. Compare that to the significant advantage Democrats have among those who turned 18 during the Depression years.

Party identification in 1952




Depression generation



In 1978

Those who came of age politically during the Depression (see box) are significantly more Democratic than Republican in their political leanings.


Years when respondent turned 18
Age today
Republican-Democrat



In 1983-84

This Depression generation has remained Democratic, as you can see by following them in 1978, 1983-84, in 1985, and in 1989-91, when they were between 69 and 74 years old.


Years when respondent turned 18
Age today
Republican-Democrat



In 1985

Contrast them with those who formed their first impressions of politics during Ronald Reagan's presidency (see box). Their "coming of age" experience has inclined them toward the GOP.


Years when respondent turned 18
Age today
Republican-Democrat



In 1989-91*


The tendency toward the GOP is strongest among those who turned 18 during the late 1980s (see box). Compare them to the Depression-era Americans who look more Democratic than any other group in the population.

Years when respondent turned 18
Age today
Republican-Democrat



Note: * Gallup surveys for Newsweek, October 1989-February 1991, combined.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

Young people (who look so Republican in this chart) tend to vote less than older Americans. History tells us that they will vote in greater numbers as they age, probably strengthening the GOP's base.



RATING OUR VICE PRESIDENTS

The paucity of ratings of vice presidents—contrasted with the wealth of data on presidents—makes comparisons of them difficult. Pulling together what data are available, the following five pages offer a basis for analyzing our vice presidents.

Question: Here's an interesting experiment. You notice that the ten boxes on the card go from the highest position of plus five—or something you like very much—all the way to the lowest position of minus five—or something you dislike very much. Please tell me how far up the scale or how far down the scale you would rate ...

■ Favorable
(+2+3+4+5)

■ Unfavorable
(-2-3-4-5)


Richard Nixon as Vice President (Jan. 20, 1953-Jan. 20, 1961)



Lyndon Johnson (Jan. 20, 1961-Nov. 22, 1963)




Hubert Humphrey (Jan. 20, 1965-Jan. 20, 1969)



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

Two vice presidents turned president—Nixon and Bush—garnered some of the highest ratings, particularly toward the end of their respective terms as vice president.




Quayle and His Predecessors

Well into the third year of his term as vice president, Dan Quayle carries less public favor than his predecessor did during a roughly comparable time period.

Question: **How would you rate the job Vice President... is doing as Vice President—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris) What kind of job do you think George Bush is doing as Vice President? (NBC/WSJ) Considering everything, how would you rate the job that Dan Quayle is doing as Vice President? (ABC/WP)**

■ Vice President is doing an excellent/good job ■ Only fair/poor

Agnew




Ford




Rockefeller



Mondale



Bush



Quayle



Note: * = NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll. ** = ABC News/Washington Post poll. Question wording for Mondale: "Now let me ask you about the job the key people in President Carter's Administration have done over the last year. How would you rate the job done by Vice President Walter Mondale?" (Harris)


Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, and ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of August 4-8, 1989.

Question: **I'm going to name some people and ask what you think of them. If you haven't heard much about someone I name, just tell me. Do you have a favorable or not favorable opinion about George Bush, or don't you know enough about him to have an opinion?**

Opinion of George Bush as vice president

	Fav.	Not Fav.	Undec.	Dk enough
Mar. 11-15, 1982	48%	12%	7%	33%
Sep. 24-28, 1983	34	29	7	30
Jan. 14-21, 1984*	28	24	32	16
Jun. 23-28*	33	13	21	33
Aug. 5-9*	37	15	20	27
Nov. 2-4*	47	26	16	11
Jun. 19-23, 1986	30	16	25	29
Nov. 30	29	17	20	33
Dec. 7-8	29	15	22	34
Jan. 18-21, 1987	43	23	26	8
Feb. 28-Mar. 1	32	19	23	25
Apr. 5-8	28	31	27	13
May 5-6	36	29	28	6
May 18-21	29	25	28	18
Jul. 21-22	34	32	26	7
Oct. 18-22	44	23	27	5
Nov. 20-24*	38	27	29	6
Mar. 19-22, 1988*	34	35	23	8
May 9-12*	33	35	21	10
Jul. 5-8*	26	31	26	15
Jul. 31-Aug. 3*	27	33	29	9
Aug. 19-21*	39	25	27	8
Sep. 8-11**	40	28	25	5
Sep. 21-23**	39	31	24	4
Oct. 1-3**	39	32	25	4
Oct. 8-10**	42	32	22	3
Oct. 13**	58	30	11	1
Oct. 21-24**	47	30	19	2
Oct. 29-31**	46	33	18	2
Nov. 2-4**	46	34	18	1
Nov. 10-16	50	23	17	7

■ Favorable ■ Not favorable
■ Undecided ■ Don't know enough



George Bush and Dan Quayle at roughly comparable points in their vice presidencies

Question: **Is your opinion of Dan Quayle favorable, not favorable, undecided, or haven't you heard enough about Dan Quayle yet to have an opinion?**

Opinion of Dan Quayle

■ Favorable ■ Not favorable ■ Undecided
■ Have not heard enough ■ Refused




Note: In 1983-84 and 1987-88, respondents were asked about "possible presidential candidates" and "president candidates." *Sample = registered voters. ** = Likely voters. Surveys conducted August 19-21 and October 29-31 are CBS News surveys.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times.

Note: * = less .5%
Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of March 4-6, 1991.

For most of his term, a plurality has approved of the way Dan Quayle is handling his job as vice president. Doubts about whether he is qualified to assume the presidency still hang over him.

Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the way Dan Quayle is handling his job as vice president?**




Handling of job as vice president	Approve	Disapprove	Don't know
Mar.-Apr., 1989	52%	30%	18%
Aug.	43	22	34
Nov.	43	29	28
Feb. 1990	57	34	9
Mar.	46	27	27
May	48	27	25
Jul.	44	30	26
Aug.	47	23	30
Nov.	47	33	18

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post (Mar.-Aug., 1989) and the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 8-11, 1990.

Question: **If President Nixon were impeached and Congressman Ford were vice president, do you think Congressman Ford would be qualified to be president or not? If President Nixon were impeached and Gerald Ford were to become the president, do you feel Ford would be qualified to be president or not? (Harris) I'd like to read you the list of possible candidates for president in 1988. Regardless of who you support, please tell me if you think each person is basically qualified or not qualified to be President of the United States, or if, perhaps, you don't know enough about that person to say. (ABC/WP)**


Would be qualified to be president of the United States Would not be qualified Not sure



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates (1973-74) and ABC News/Washington Post, latest that of May 28-June 1, 1987.

Question: **If something were to happen to President Bush, do you think that Dan Quayle would be qualified to take over as President of the United States, or not? (ABC/WP) In your opinion, is Vice President Dan Quayle qualified to serve as president if it becomes necessary, or not? (May 1989) Based on what you know about Vice President Dan Quayle, do you think he is qualified to serve as president if it becomes necessary, or not? (March 1990, Gallup) Do you think Vice President Dan Quayle is qualified to take over the job of president, or not? (LAT) Do you think Dan Quayle is qualified to be president if something were to happen to George Bush? (YCS/Time/CNN)**

If something were to happen to President Bush, Dan Quayle would be qualified to take over Would not be qualified Don't know




Note: * = Likely voters.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post, the Gallup Organization, the Los Angeles Times, and Yankelovich Clancy Shulman/Time/CNN; latest that of February 22-26, 1991.

President Quayle?


The data suggest that Dan Quayle is neither a great asset, nor a significant liability to President Bush.

Question: **If anything were to happen to President Bush, would you feel comfortable or uncomfortable with Vice President Quayle being president?**




Source: Survey by Hart and Teeter Research Companies for NBC News/Wall Street Journal, September 15-18, 1990.

Question: **Thinking about all the different responsibilities of the presidency, which one of the following types of experience do you think best prepares someone to be president?**



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Newsweek, October 7-9, 1987.


Question: **Is having Dan Quayle as vice president something that worries you or not?**



Note: In August 1989, ABC News and the *Washington Post* reported that having Dan Quayle as vice president did not worry 63% of respondents; 17% were worried "a little bit"; 13% were worried "a lot"; and 1% were worried by having Dan Quayle as vice president but did not know how much.

Source: Survey by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for *Time* and Cable News Network, November 27-28, 1990.

Question: **No matter how you plan to vote in the 1988 presidential election, which do you think is better training for a president: having been the vice president or having been governor of a state?**



Source: Survey by NBC News/Wall Street Journal, September 16-19, 1988.


THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MARRIAGE

Marriage has fallen in favor over the last generation. People are marrying later, and they are "unmarrying" each other in record numbers. More children are raised outside of married households than ever before. Because married people behave differently (see following pages), the marriage decline has broad effects on U.S. society.

Marital status over time

Persons ages 18-54

Men Women




Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Marital status of whites and blacks, 1989

Persons ages 18-54


Never-married Widowed
Divorced or separated Married, spouse present



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Median age at first marriage

Years




Median age at first marriage

Men Women

1890	26.1	22.0
1900	25.9	21.9
1910	25.1	21.6
1920	24.6	21.2
1930	24.3	21.3
1940	24.3	21.5
1950	22.8	20.3
1960	22.8	20.3
1970	23.2	20.8
1980	24.7	22.0
1989	26.2	23.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Children living with married and non-married parents, March 1989



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Married households produce far higher incomes than unmarried counterparts. While married women are less likely to be in paid employment than unmarried ones, married men are more likely to be employed than single men.

Labor force participation by marital status, 1988



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Work "Effort" and Marital Status, 1990

Average weekly hours at work, employed persons 16 and older

Married men	43.9 hours
Never-married men	37.8
Married women	35.6
Never-married women	34.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.


Income Earned by Similar Married and Unmarried Households, 1989

Median income of households headed by high school graduates

	Age of householder		
	Under 25	25-44	45-64
Married-couple households	\$24,565	\$38,057	\$45,332
Female-headed family households	8,660	16,346	27,399
Households of unrelated individuals	18,740	23,859	19,395

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Economic fortunes of married and unmarried households



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Marriage is an arrangement associated with avoiding poverty and accumulating wealth. In addition it is an equalizer: married couples vary comparatively little in income. Judging from homeownership rates, the institution may also encourage community-mindedness.

Degrees of Income Inequality in Married Versus Unmarried Households

Gini ratios for 1989 income data


Married-couple households	.368
Female-headed families	.450
Males living alone	.450
Females living alone	.428

0 = Absolute equality of income distribution among all households within the category
1 = Absolute inequality of income distribution

Note: Gini ratios measure how close a given distribution of income is to absolute equality or inequality.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Marriage and incidence of poverty, 1989



Note: Rates are calculated after the effects of all taxes, government transfers, and home equity returns are included, using CPI-U-XI poverty thresholds.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Marriage and Wealth, 1988

Median net worth of various household categories, by age of householder

	Under 35	35-54	55-64
Married couples	\$12,041	\$60,611	\$120,158
Male-headed households	4,959	17,055	34,722
Female-headed households	1,378	10,945	40,796

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Median Family Incomes, 1989

Married-couple families

White	\$39,208
Black	30,650
Hispanic	27,382

Female-headed families (with one or more children)

White	\$14,864
Black	10,283
Hispanic	10,074


Mother works

White	\$15,021
Black	10,749
Hispanic	9,522

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Marital status and home ownership, 1989

Percent of households owning homes



Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Behaviorally, married persons are quite different from both divorced and never-married individuals. Important elements of these differences, of course, stem from factors other than marital status itself. For example, people who have never married are disproportionately young; and young people are disproportionately both victims and perpetrators of crime.

Marriage and Health Habits

	Currently married	Never-married
Percent of population reporting that they		
Are 20% or more above desirable weight	26%	15%
Are currently a smoker	28	27
Drank five or more alcoholic drinks in one day at least five times in last year	21	40
Annual household spending on alcohol, per adult	\$134	\$183*

Note: * This figure includes divorced, separated, and widowed as well as never-married persons. Smoking figure is for 1987; alcohol spending is for 1989; other data are for 1985.
Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.


Marital status and violent death, 1988

	Currently married	Unmarried*
In accidents	38%	62%
Homicides	40%	60%
Suicides	43%	57%
Marital status of general population	56%	44%

Note: * Unmarried=widowed, divorced, and never-married.
Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics.

Marital status and crime, 1986


Composition of state prison inmate populations



Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Marital status and crime victimization, 1988

Crimes experienced per 1,000 persons ages 12 and older



Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.

The Parties, Looking to 1992/Ladd/continued

1982

ABC/POST			CBS/NYT			NBC			GALLUP			ROPER			TIME/YANK.		
Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D
1/22-30	23	39	1/11-15	23	39	1/18-19	26	33	1/8-11	29	45	1/9-23	24	46	3/16-18	30	52
2/17-18	26	38	3/11-15	25	40	1/27-28	28	35	1/22-25	27	45	2/12-27	24	48			
3/3-8	21	40				3/29-30	28	35	2/5-8	24	47	3/20-27	24	48			
3/18-21	26	41							3/12-15	24	41						
4/21-25	24	36	5/19-23	23	40	5/10-11	27	36	4/2-5	24	46	4/24-5/1	26	44	6/8-10	30	52
						6/14-15	31	38	4/23-26	27	44	6/5-12	26	44			
									4/30-5/2	26	45						
									5/14-17	26	46						
									6/11-14	28	45						
8/17	25	40	9/13-18	26	42	8/9-10	27	39	7/23-26	27	46	7/10-17	25	47			
9/9-13	24	40							7/30-8/2	26	47	8/14-21	23	47			
9/24-26	27	41							8/13-16	28	43	9/11-18	26	46			
									9/17-20	26	44						
10/5-11	23	44				10/18-19	29	38	10/15-18	26	45	10/23-30	26	47	10/5-7	32	52
						11/15-16	26	35	11/5-8	25	43	12/4-11	23	49	12/8-9	31	51
									11/19-22	23	46						
									12/10-13	27	46						

1985

1/11-16	29	34	1/2-4	30	38	2/3-4	33	31	1/25-28	35	36	1/5-19	27	45			
2/22-26	28	38	1/14-17	32	36				2/15-18	35	39	2/9-23	31	45			
3/21-25	30	41	2/23-27	29	39				3/8-11	34	37	3/23-30	30	43			
4/22	28	41	5/6	31	39	5/14-15	35	35	4/12-15	32	37	4/27-5/4	27	46	4/30-5/2	34	47
5/8-13	28	38	5/29-6/2	32	36	6/18-19	34	37	5/17-20	35	35	6/15-22	28	47			
6/17	25	38							6/7-10	31	40						
6/19	31	36															
6/30-7/1	28	37	7/16-21	34	39	7/2	34	35	7/12-15	34	36	7/13-20	28	45	7/7-9	34	50
7/25-29	31	37	9/15-19	33	36	7/15-16	36	36				8/17-24	27	45	9/17-19	33	48
9/19-23	29	35										9/21-28	27	48			
10/24-28	31	34	11/6-10	31	36	10/7-8	35	33	10/11-14	35	43	10/26-11/2	29	45	11/5-7	35	47
11/10-13	30	35	11/18-19	33	39	11/7-8	34	34				12/7-14	27	47			
12/12-17	29	36				11/22-23	31	34									
						12/18-21	34	35									

The Parties, Looking to 1992/Ladd/continued

1988

ABC/POST			CBS/NYT			NBC			GALLUP			ROPER			TIME/YANK.		
Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D
1/17-23	28	35	1/17-21	31	40	1/20-22	32	32	1/22-25	29	41	1/9-23	29	41	1/3-6	28	41
3/16-21	32	37	2/17-21	32	37	2/28-3/1	34	36	3/4-7	27	45	2/13-27	28	43	3/10	33	41
												3/19-26	30	46			
5/19-25	26	37	5/9-12	28	36	6/9-13	24	37	4/8-11	30	43	4/16-23	34	42	4/20-21	31	44
									6/10-13	29	43	5/14-21	28	41			
									6/24-27	27	43						
7/6-13	30	36	7/5-8	30	37	7/8-11	29	35	combined:			7/9-16	30	42			
9/14-19	27	44	7/31-8/3	31	42	8/5-8	28	42				7/15-18	33	42			
			8/19-21	32	37	8/20-22	35	34				8/24-31	33	42			
			9/8-11	34	36	9/16-19	30	34									
			9/21-23	32	40												
9/21-10/10†	32	39	10/1-3	30	39	10/14-16	31	34				9/24-10/1	32	42	10/25-26	30	41
			10/8-10	31	39							10/29-11/5	30	45			
			10/21-24	33	37							12/3-10	33	42			
			11/2-4	32	42												
			11/10-16	29	40												
1990																	
1/11-16	30	35	1/13-15	32	34	1/13-16*	29	35				1/6-20	32	42	1/31-2/1	30	40
2/1-4	29	32				3/10-13*	26	34				2/10-24	33	43	2/14	32	41
												3/10-17	32	43	3/14	29	36
4/20-24	26	35	3/30-4/2	32	34	4/11-16*	32	35	4/19-22	34	35	4/21-28	31	42	4/9-10	31	38
5/17-21	29	33	5/22-24	33	35	5/18-22*	31	31	5/17-20	34	37	5/12-19	33	43			
			6/5-8	33	36												
7/24	25	34	8/16-19	34	32	7/6-9*	30	34	9/14-16	37	37	7/7-12	31	42	7/24-25	27	37
9/6-9	29	34				8/18-19*	29	36	9/27-30	35	36	8/11-18	33	42	8/9	26	43
						9/4-5*	32	37				9/8-15	31	41	8/23	26	38
						9/15-18*	27	34							9/13	29	34
10/5-7	22	31	10/8-10	31	35	10/19-21*	27	34	10/3-4	34	34	10/20-27	29	42	10/3	31	38
10/10-14	27	37	11/13-15	30	41	10/30-31*	27	34	10/25-28	33	36	12/1-8	32	40	10/10	28	35
11/2-4	30	34	12/9-11	29	37	12/8-11*	27	34	11/8-11	30	37				10/15-17	29	36
									11/15-18	30	37				11/14	27	38

1991

ABC/POST			CBS/NYT			NBC			GALLUP			ROPER			TIME/YANK.		
Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D	Date	R	D
1/13	33	36	1/5-7	35	35	1/23*	53	38	1/3-6	33	37	1/5-19	30	42	1/10	32	37
2/14	34	33	1/11-13	31	39	2/26-27*	31	35	1/11-13	33	34	2/10-24	33	43	2/7	34	39
2/27	33	37	1/17-20	33	38	3/15-19*	29	36	1/17-20	36	34				3/7	33	35
3/1-4	31	31	2/12-13	35	39				1/23-26	34	36				3/13	29	41
4/5-9	29	36	3/4-6	30	35				2/7-10	34	33				410-11	29	38
			4/1-3	31	34				2/14-17	32	34						
									2/21-24	34	34						
									3/7-10	39	30						
									3/14-17	38	33						
									3/21-24	37	35						
									3/28-30	39	33						
									4/11-14	37	32						
									4/25-28	34	27						

Party Identification, 1990-91

[With "first round" independents asked whether they lean Democratic or Republican added to those who said they were Democrats or Republicans in the first round.]

<u>1990</u>														
1/11-16	46	48	1/13-15	44	45	1/13-16*	38	44	Didn't ask "lean" follow-up in 1990, but did ask it again in 1991	Doesn't ask "lean" follow-up	Doesn't ask "lean" follow-up			
2/1-4	46	46				3/10-13*	35	42						
5/17-21	45	48	3/30-4/2	44	45	4/11-16*	42	44						
			5/22-24	43	45	5/18-22*	43	42						
			6/5-8	44	44									
7/24	42	52	8/16-19	47	43	7/6-9*	41	43						
9/6-9	46	47				8/18-19*	39	43						
						9/4-5*	41	46						
						9/15-18*	36	44						
10/5-7	41	50	10/8-10	42	47	10/19-21*	37	43						
10/10-14	43	51	11/13-15	38	48	10/30-31*	36	43						
11/2-4	44	48	12/9-11	40	45	12/8-11*	36	44						
<u>1991</u>														
3/1-4	47	45	1/5-7	47	43	1/23*	41	45	2/14-17	48	45			
			1/11-13	40	47	2/26-27*	40	41	3/14-17	52	39			
			1/17-20	42	44	3/15-19*	40	44	3/21-24	49	42			
			2/12-13	44	45				3/28-30	50	39			
			3/4-6	41	45				4/11-14	48	39			
			4/1-3	43	42				4/25-28	49	38			

FRAGMENTATION IN THE CANADIAN PARTY SYSTEM

By Peter Regenstreif

Canadian politics could be headed toward an extremely fragmented parliament after the next federal election—which must be called for sometime between now and the late fall of 1993. The result could leave five parties with significant representation and with no single one having more than 100 of the 295 seats in the House of Commons. Today, the partisan orientations of Canadians are as fractured as they have ever been. While the situation has been several years in emerging, it is being driven by processes and issues which are endemic and which recent events and issues are intensifying.

Canadians have had a multi-party system since the end of the First World War. While either the Liberals or the Progressive Conservatives (PC) have formed every government in Ottawa, there have always been three or four parties, depending on the period, contending in the federal arena.

As is the case now, these third and fourth parties have typically been regionally-based: the Progressive movement from the Prairies in the 1920s; the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), the forerunner of the New Democratic Party (NDP), and Social Credit, both products of the Great Depression, also rooted in western Canada. As well, Social Credit had a Quebec incarnation in the 1960s and 1970s. When the Progressive Conservatives under the leadership of Brian Mulroney captured two consecutive majority victories, in 1984 and 1988, the number of parties with representation in the House of Commons was reduced to three—Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats. Now there are five, as two new regionally-based groups have appeared: the Reform Movement, centered in Alberta but spreading into the adjoining provinces of British Columbia and Saskatchewan, and in March announcing an intention to mount an effort throughout English Canada; and the *Bloc Quebecois*, a group committed to taking Quebec out of the federation. The present standing in the House of Commons: Conservatives, 159; Liberals, 81; NDP, 44; *Bloc Quebecois*, 8; Reform, 1; Independent Conservative, 1; Independent, 1.

A Legitimacy Crisis

While partisan fragmentation isn't new, its present manifestation comes at a time when the political system is confronted with a severe crisis of legitimacy. Prompted by the failure to achieve an agreement on the Meech Lake Accord in June, 1990, and confronted with a series of

decisions by the federal government which it strongly opposed, the Canadian public is now not only questioning the Conservative government but, as well, the processes through which decisions are reached. Parliament and federal-provincial conferences—the traditional mechanism through which policies are harmonized and constitutional agreements achieved—even the system of representation in Ottawa, are being challenged.

The challenges are showing up in the polls, in call-in shows on radio and television, and at the hearings being conducted by a variety of forums and commissions appointed in various jurisdictions. For example, Quebec's Belanger-Campeau Commission, set up to determine what the province should do in response to the failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord, has just reported. The federal government has a Citizens' Forum which completes its work at the end of June; and an all-party Committee on Confederation, appointed by the Premier of Ontario, is still deliberating.

The unhappiness of Canadians with their political processes is not difficult to understand. On the key issues of the last few years, the Conservative government has gone one way, the public another:

Δ The free trade agreement with the United States found more people opposed to it than in support. That agreement, along with the Mulroney government, would have been defeated in the 1988 election but for the fact that the opposition was split between the Liberals and the NDP. Recently, when Canadians were asked who has gained from the free trade arrangements between the two countries, 71% said the US, only 5% Canada (Table 1).

Δ During that fateful week in June of last year, when the country's ten provincial premiers and the prime minister were in Ottawa meeting non-stop to ratify the Meech Lake Accord, a clear majority of Canadians were opposed to it.

Δ A Goods and Services Tax, something akin to a value-added tax, was instituted early this year. Close to 80% of Canadians had declared themselves opposed for almost two years prior to its adoption, yet still the government persisted.

Both Historic Parties Fall Back

These issues affected the standing of the parties in the opinion polls (Table 2). The Mulroney government enjoyed a rather brief five-month honeymoon before its support fell below that of the opposition Liberals. As antipathy to Meech Lake increased, so did Liberal strength. Mounting opposition to the Goods and Services Tax also took its toll on Conservative support.

Table 1

The Free Trade Issue

Do you support the trade agreement?

	Favor	Oppose	Don't Know
November 1990	31%	52%	17%
March 1990	32	49	19
October 1989	41	46	14
December 1988	44	38	19
November 22, 1988	34	41	25
November 15, 1988	32	45	23
November 8, 1988	26	50	24
October 1988	34	42	24

Who has gained more?

Canada	5%
United States	71
Both/Neither	11
Don't know	13

Questions: "Are you in favor of the free trade agreement with the United States?" "Since the policy of free or freer trade between the United States and Canada was adopted in January 1989, who has gained more—Canada or the United States?" September 1990 survey.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

But Canadian partisan orientations are volatile. Support for the Liberals reached a high point in June 1990, when the party was in the midst of a convention to choose its new leader, Jean Chretien. It began to slide almost immediately thereafter. First, the *Bloc Quebecois* was formed in the aftermath of the failure of Meech Lake, and it began to make serious inroads in Quebec. Last August it won a by-election for a vacant seat in Montreal. Then, in the provincial election in Ontario in September, the NDP mounted an effective effort and, with 38% of the vote, won 74 of the 130 seats in the provincial legislature.

The surprise NDP victory reverberated throughout the country. The party's federal support increased dramatically throughout the fall, until the outbreak of the war in the Persian Gulf in mid-January of this year. At that point, NDP federal leader Audrey McLaughlin took a strong stand against the use of force by the US and its allies (including Canada)—and, almost immediately, her party began falling in the polls, while the Mulroney government began to come back a bit.

The ability of the government to increase its support is limited by the fact that a majority of *Bloc Quebecois* adherents are voters who backed the Conservatives in the

last election. The same is true of the Reform Movement in the west. As conditions continue to favor these two new groups, conservative prospects suffer. Poll data (Table 2) underline the marked regional variations. The Liberals today are strong in Atlantic Canada, have just over one third support in Quebec, are neck-and-neck with the NDP in Ontario and the Prairies, and trail the NDP in British Columbia. The *Bloc Quebecois* is confined to Quebec while, as noted, the Reform Movement's base is in the west, although it is increasingly showing signs of spreading eastward into Ontario. The Conservatives are trailing, and badly, all across the country.

Which Way Quebec?

Electoral prospects depend very much on what happens with Quebec. The recommendation of the Belanger-Campeau Commission, ratified by Premier Robert Bourassa, calls for a referendum on sovereignty either between June 8 and 22, or between October 12 and 26, 1992. In the meantime, the rest of the country is being challenged to bring an attractive constitutional offer to the province. If such an offer is accepted, the referendum might not be held.

A federal election isn't required by law for two and a half years. If a solution to the constitutional impasse with Quebec is achieved and a referendum avoided, then an election is likely to be called in the fall of 1992. However, if a referendum is held, the government is unlikely to call for a national vote before 1993—at least such is its thinking now.

The Parties and Their Prospects

Quebec aside, however, some points are clear:

Δ The Liberals, the traditional government party which has dominated Canadian politics throughout this century, are in disarray. They have no clearly established program and are split on the key issues: free trade, tax policy and the deficit, whether to maintain universality in social programs, and what to do about Quebec. Moreover, they are in extreme financial difficulty, with a deficit of over \$4 million. They dominate in the poorest regions of the

country and among the minority ethnic populations who have come to Canada since the Second World War. Their present parliamentary representation is concentrated in lower-middle and working class constituencies in central and eastern Canada.

Δ The NDP's strength is greatest in the west, and its hopes for a substantial increase there and elsewhere now appear to depend on the performance of the newly-elected Ontario government led by Premier Bob Rae. However, the recession has hit Ontario hard and the new government has been having its problems. Meanwhile, there is a strong possibility of NDP governments in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, which would no doubt enhance the party's standing federally.

Δ The strength of the *Bloc Quebecois* depends on the heightened support for sovereignty in Quebec. Should a referendum be avoided or should it be held and fail to carry a majority, the bloc could be seriously wounded. In the

Table 2

PARTY SUPPORT IN CANADA SINCE THE 1988 ELECTION

	PC	LIB	NDP	Reform	BQ	Others
1988 Election	43%	32%	20%	2%	—	3%
December 1988	49	28	20	—	—	4
January 1989	48	26	23	—	—	4
March 1989	41	30	26	—	—	4
April 1989	37	38	22	—	—	3
June 1989	30	45	21	—	—	4
September 1989	30	41	24	—	—	5
December 1989	26	39	28	—	—	7
March 1990	17	50	25	—	—	8
June 1990	17	50	23	—	—	10
July 1990	19	49	23	—	—	10
September 1990	15	39	32	7	4	3
October 1990	15	31	38	9	4	3
November 1990	14	35	36	8	6	2
December 1990	12	34	35	8	6	2
January 1991	12	31	41	9	7	1
February 1991	16	35	34	8	5	2
March 1991	16	39	30	7	7	1
April 1991	14	32	26	16	10	2

Regional Breakdown

April 1991

	PC	LIB	NDP	Reform	BQ	Others
Atlantic	19%	41%	30%	3	0	7
Quebec	16	26	11	0	41	5
Ontario	11	41	32	15	0	1
Prairies	15	21	22	43	0	0
B.C.	13	25	43	18	0	1

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

meantime, it dominates Quebec outside the island of Montreal and is severely damaging to the Conservatives.

Δ "If an election were held today"—the classic preamble to the question asking vote intention—the Reform Movement would likely sweep most of Alberta, where it won a federal by-election 18 months ago, and carry a substantial number of constituencies in British Columbia and Saskatchewan. Whether it can make major inroads in Ontario depends on its ability to break out of its largely male, middle-aged, English style to encompass the wide variety of ethnic and religious groups making up the province's population. The movement is opposed to bilingualism across the country and its right-wing policy positions are powerful inducements to traditional Conservative supporters. Its decision to confine its campaigning to areas outside Quebec is a not-too-subtle appeal to those fed up with that province's continuing demands and domination of the country's political agenda.

Δ Last, and at this point least, the Conservatives. The Mulroney government embarked on a major new policy direction for the country when it assumed office in 1984:


deregulation, privatization, free trade with the United States, tax changes, and a new agreement with Quebec. The attempts to achieve these objectives have severely shaken the country. With the Goods and Services Tax an on-going negative and with the economy in deep recession, the Conservatives have dropped in the opinion polls to the lowest level ever for a governing party. Mulroney himself is extremely unpopular. Polling this spring shows that only 17 percent believe that he "... would make the best Prime Minister," compared to 27% for Chretien and 24% for McLaughlin. Another 23% said that none of them would be best, and 9% were unsure (Gallup: March 1991).

Still, the government fell to 22% in the polls in the middle of its first term but came back to win a second majority in 1988. That experience cautions against writing Mulroney off entirely. His hopes rest on a substantial economic recovery and some sort of resolution of the constitutional crisis. Pending those eventualities, the prospect for the next federal election is for five political parties to have substantial representation, much of it regionally-based. At the moment, the Liberals and the NDP appear to be the best positioned, with the possibility of some sort of a governing agreement between them.


Peter Regenstreif is professor of political science, the University of Rochester, and president of Policy Concepts, Toronto

Assessing Present and Future Economic Prospects

Question: Financially speaking, do you feel that you are better off, worse off, or about the same as your parents were at your age?



Question: Do you think that the next generation (for example your children, nieces or nephews) will be better off, worse off, or about the same when they are your age?



Source: Survey by Environics Research Group, October 22-November 15, 1990.

THE UNRAVELLING OF THE TIES THAT BIND

by Michael Adams and Mary Jane Lennon

Sir George-Etienne Cartier, a founding father of Canada, once described his nation as one with a "political nationality," that is, as one in which citizens are united not by language, religion or a common ethnicity, but by a set of constantly evolving political arrangements.

In fact, Canada as a national entity began essentially as a "marriage of convenience" between two peoples—the French and the English. Today, many are questioning whether this marriage can be saved, or whether as a nation we have begun the long painful walk to the divorce court. Are the economic and cultural forces currently threatening so many other countries around the world also causing an irreversible unravelling of the ties that once bound together this peaceable northern kingdom?

The Deepening Crisis

Certainly, an overall perusal of Environics' tracking data point to a weakening of the will to stay together as a nation, and suggest that many Canadians believe the current political leadership lacks the ability to lead the country toward a new and workable consensus. We are in the throes not only of a constitutional crisis but of a crisis of confidence.

The watershed event was the failure of the Mulroney government to secure ratification of the Meech Lake accord. This agreement, hammered out in 1987 by the prime minister and the ten provincial premiers, was designed to bring Quebec formally into the Constitution. (Quebec was the only province not to ratify the 1982 constitutional changes initiated by former prime minister Pierre Trudeau.) Without going into the details of the accord and the many points of controversy surrounding its contents, one may safely say that, in both English and French Canada, the document came to symbolize acceptance of Quebec as the "distinct society," with a certain "special status" among the ten provinces.

When the Newfoundland and Manitoba legislatures refused to endorse the agreement by the June 23 deadline, the rejection was largely perceived in Quebec as a denial of that province's linguistic and cultural aspirations. In English Canada, however, where there is strong resistance to any sort of "special status" arrangements for any province or group, the collapse of the accord was widely greeted as a rejection of "a bad deal" initiated by an incompetent government.

Throw Them All Out

The tactics used by Prime Minister Mulroney to force ratification of the accord during and immediately after his meeting with the provincial premiers in June were seen as ineffective, cynical, heavy-handed, and typical of a government that could not be trusted to lead the country out of its constitutional quagmire.

On the other hand, neither of the leaders of the two main opposition parties—the Liberals' Jean Chretien and New Democratic Party leader Audrey McLaughlin—seem poised to fill the leadership vacuum created by the crisis of confidence in Mulroney's Conservative government. Add to this mix the current high levels of concern over economic recession, and one sees a Canadian public which is disgruntled, disheartened, and disillusioned.

A Record He Didn't Want to Set

An Environics survey of 2,220 Canadians in February 1991 found that just 17% approved of the way Brian Mulroney was handling his job as prime minister. This level, which was the same as that reported November 1990, was a record low for the prime minister. The November approval rating was five points below that found in the July survey, which had been conducted in the midst of and immediately following the demise of the Meech Lake agreement and at a time of increasing concern over the economy. In other words, Brian Mulroney's popularity continued to fall throughout 1990. His low standing rivals that in the USSR for President Mikhail Gorbachev, and may be the lowest of any democratically elected leader in the world today.

A Leadership Vacuum

When Canadians were asked in the February survey which of the three party leaders would make the best prime minister, a plurality of 43% either said "none," named a fourth individual, or threw up their hands and said they had no opinion on the question. Twenty-five percent named New Democrat leader Audrey McLaughlin, 19% Liberal leader Jean Chretien, and 14% the incumbent PM Brian Mulroney. The political messiah for whom Canadians yearn is seemingly absent from the national stage.

Another national Environics' poll, conducted in February for *La Presse* newspaper of Montreal, found that, "if an election were held today," no party would come close to forming a majority government. Sixteen percent—up six points from a previous survey conducted in November 1990—were undecided or refused to state a preference. Among decided voters, the New Democrats and the Liberals tied for first place, the Conservatives placed a distant third, and approximately one-fifth of the electorate said

they would vote for regional or protest parties (primarily the rightist Reform Party and the separatist *Bloc Quebecois*). (Table 1)

Regional analysis reveals the potential for what, in the media, is increasingly referred to as the "balkanization" of Canadian politics. In Quebec (once the bastion of the Liberal party and, since 1984, the linchpin of Mulroney's Conservative majority) the *Bloc Quebecois* leads with the support of 36 percent of decided voters. The New Democrats enjoy a big lead over the other parties in Ontario and in British Columbia; and in Alberta, the Reform Party leads the others by a wide margin.

Is the Present Crisis Really Different?

Beyond this balkanization of the political landscape lies another more profound threat to the continued existence of a viable Canadian federation: a disturbing shift in the public's emotional response to the possibility of Quebec's declaring itself independent. During the 1980 Quebec referendum debate, English Canadians expressed a strong desire that the province remain part of Canada. Today, the mood is quite different. English Canada, by and large, seems ambivalent about Quebec's possible departure. More than ever before, there's a sense that if Quebecers want to leave, the rest of the country should let them go.

Environics has been tracking these feelings through a question which asks Canadians whether they would be

happy, sad, or indifferent if Quebec decided to separate. The survey from February of this year found Quebecers almost evenly divided between those who say they would be sad and those who would welcome independence. Few were indifferent. These findings have changed little since April 1990, although Quebec opinion, particularly between January and April of 1990, showed an erosion of attachment to the rest of the nation. During that period, the proportion of Quebecers who said they would be happy to see Quebec separate increased by 6 points.

Canadians elsewhere were significantly less likely than Quebecers to say they would be happy if Quebec left the Canadian federation. The pattern of response has changed little since the question was first asked in January 1990. However, only in Ontario did a majority say they would feel sad if Quebec's departed. In the other provinces, pluralities indicated regret at the prospect of Quebec independence, but large proportions—over 30%—expressed indifference.

The Evolution to Devolution

It's clear from trend data that English Canadians, like their Quebec compatriots, want a restructuring of the federation and, in many areas, a devolution of jurisdictional powers from the federal to the provincial level. Earlier this spring, Quebec's ruling Liberal party released a constitutional proposal, known as the Allaire Report, which called for Quebec to have full sovereignty in 22 areas of jurisdiction, many of which are currently shared

Table 1

Federal Party Support Among Decided Voters February 1991

	Total	Atlantic Prov.	Quebec	Ontario	West
New Democratic Party	30%	35%	14%	42%	29%
Liberal Party	29	32	30	31	23
Progressive Conservative Party	19	27	18	16	21
Reform Party	11	5	1	9	26
Bloc Quebecois	9	—	36	—	—
Other Party	1	—	1	2	1

Source: Survey by Environics Research Group for *La Presse*, February 1991.

with Ottawa or are under exclusive federal control. When asked, in the *La Presse* poll, whether they agreed with the proposal, 59% of Quebecers, compared to 24% of other Canadians, replied in the affirmative. However, the views of English Canada shifted dramatically when respondents were asked if they would agree to "a constitutional proposal that would give all provinces, including your own, the same increased powers that Quebec has asked for"—a substantial majority of 57% of Canadians outside Quebec said they would agree with this second proposal; just 36% disagreed (Figure 1).

These results suggest that while English Canadians are unwilling to grant Quebec "special status" or special powers within the Canadian federation, they are quite ready to consider proposals that would devolve constitutional powers to *all* provinces, recognizing the equality of each.

Majority support for an equal devolution of powers exists right across English Canada. However, it's important to note that 25% strongly disagreed with this proposal.



In other words, English Canada is sharply split between those who favor the devolution of powers from the federal government to all provinces, and those who prefer the status quo.

There is considerable public sympathy for a more decentralized federalism of the sort that Prime Minister Mulroney's government now seems to be considering. As American pollster Larry Kaagan observed at an Environics conference on social change in September 1990, Canada has much in common with the Soviet Union. Both countries are laboring under the strains of strong centrifugal forces, and both are headed by an embattled political leadership that has no choice but to respond to these demands for empowerment. In both, the ultimate solution—if such a thing exists—will lie in satisfying the demands for greater regional and cultural autonomy without completely emasculating the central government.

Michael Adams is president and Mary Jane Lennon is editor of Environics Research Group Limited of Toronto, Canada

Figure 1

More Powers to the Quebec Government*




Questions: As you may know, under the Canadian federal system, the federal government has certain powers such as defense and currency and the provinces have certain powers such as education and health. Some other powers are shared between the two levels.

*Recently, the Quebec Liberal party made a constitutional proposal, called the Allaire Report, that would greatly increase the powers of the Quebec government and reduce the powers of the federal government, but would leave Quebec in Canada. Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with this proposal?

**Would you say that you strongly agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with a constitutional proposal that would give all the provinces, including your own, the same increased powers that Quebec has asked for?

More Powers to all the Provinces**



Source: Survey by Environics Research Group for *La Presse*, February 1990.

**SO SUNNY AN ISLAND,
SO CLOUDED A VIEW:
SNAPSHOTS OF PUERTO
RICAN PUBLIC OPINION**

By Lawrence Kaagan

The governor of Puerto Rico surprised voters—and many of his own aides—by announcing in his 1989 inaugural address that he would seek to hold a plebiscite on the island in 1991. The vote, he said, was to determine once and for all what relationship Puerto Ricans sought with the United States: statehood, independence, or a continuation of commonwealth status.

Part of the surprise was that Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon, as head of Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party, is nominally the standard-bearer for the status quo; his political career has been a history of strategies to stave off statehood and minimize the appeals of independence. And now, after nearly two years of complex partisan bickering among the three major political parties in San Juan, and a failure to vote on the necessary enabling legislation by the two parties in Washington, there will probably be no plebiscite this year. With gubernatorial elections already scheduled, 1992 is too crowded to hold the vote. Still, the question remains: in an era when the UN scans the horizon to rid the world of its last remaining "colonial" structures, what do the people of Puerto Rico want?

No Status, No Quo

Legal scholars and politicians dispute whether a simple majority (50% plus one) or some form of "super-majority" (perhaps 60% or more) would be necessary for formal Puerto Rican application for statehood (or any other modification of status). But, polls have shown clearly, the Puerto Rican people have long been unable to decide on their permanent relationship to the United States. *None* of the status options has found majority support among Puerto Rican voters.

In surveys conducted for El Nuevo Dia, Puerto Rico's leading newspaper, in January and February of this year, 66% of registered voters favored moving ahead with a plebiscite vote. Though this figure was down from the 73% who sought "closure" in an October 1990 survey, there was still solid support for bringing the status matter to a head. But surveys show voters quite evenly split between statehood and commonwealth slid past each other for the second time since February of 198, with these two options trading places, in terms of the lead, over time. In February 1989, just weeks after the Governor's surprise call for a plebiscite, his preferred choice, retention of

commonwealth, led in the polls by 45% to 37%. By January of 1990, though, there was a margin for statehood, and it seemed a trend might be brewing. But in January and February 1991, El Nuevo Dia found a hair's-breadth lead for commonwealth (Table 1).

The January poll revealed something else that may be at least as troubling in Washington it is as frustrating in San Juan. Not only isn't there majority support for any of the three status options, only 45% of Puerto Rican voters thinks the Congress favors allowing Puerto Ricans to make up their own minds about political status; 34% say that Congress actually opposes this self-determination.

Status and Language

Now, a new wrinkle has been added to the old debate over status. The island is first and foremost an Hispanic society, and the daily life of almost everyone (and everything but tourism, high commerce and the Federal courts) is conducted in Spanish. But since 1902, under various laws and constitutional provisions, English has been enshrined in Puerto Rico as a "co-official" tongue. No longer. In order to devise a "poison pill" which would make an application for statehood distasteful to the US Congress, the pro-commonwealth party has pushed through the legislature and the Governor has signed a law making Spanish the sole "official" language.

It's important to note that Puerto Ricans were not given a chance to vote on this change—perhaps because they opposed it so adamantly in recent polls. In the October 1990 survey for El Nuevo Dia, voters rejected calls for making Spanish the sole official language by a whopping three to one margin. Pro-commonwealth voters, pondering a threat to the complex economic ties to the US, scorned the idea, by 72%-28%. Even among supporters of independence, often the most outspoken defenders of the "purity" of Puerto Rican culture against US influence, 55% opposed the Spanish-only legislation.

The Other Agenda

The fact of the matter is that Puerto Ricans have other, more immediate things on their minds than political status and language. Those issues, which have gotten tangled up in perennially rancorous local politics, are viewed as much less important than an unemployment rate hovering near 17%, a crime problem which includes armed robbers intercepting cars at highway intersections, and plans to privatize many of the island's government-owned utilities and public services.

On this last issue, Puerto Ricans have a love/hate relationship with their utilities: They protest poor service, wasted resources, and bureaucracy, but they are quite

attached to the idea that these entities remain publicly owned. Governor Hernandez Colon has announced plans to sell off the Puerto Rican Telephone Company, along with the Bus Authority, the Water Resources Authority, and the Energy Authority. This strategy appears driven less by free-market ideology and more by the pressing needs of the Puerto Rican Treasury. In any case, voters don't like the idea of selling off their patrimony for a short-term "fix" of the island's finances. The government is moving ahead with negotiations to sell the telephone utility just the same.

There are two sources of opposition. One is something akin to national pride in a public infrastructure, the other more practical. While a slim 32% plurality voters think that if the PRTC is operated as a private company the quality of service would improve (29% say it would stay the same), a big majority fear that their phone bills would rise immediately after privatization.

Jobs, Taxes, and Political Status

The size and role of the public sector is only one debate that Puerto Ricans will be drawn into as they

ponder their future. Between 25% and 30% of the workforce draws a paycheck from government. An even higher percentage work for big US corporations who built manufacturing facilities on the island under the auspices of "Section 936" of the IRS Code. This provision, written specifically to enhance the commonwealth's economic development, allows American companies to repatriate a substantial portion of their island-generated profit tax-free. How that loophole, and those jobs, would fare in any revision of Puerto Rico's political relationship to the United States, is a major issue.

More than one observer has looked north while pondering south, wondering if Puerto Rico contains the ingredients to become "America's Quebec." Riven by feuds over language, wary of dominance by "Anglo" culture while benefitting hugely from it, and ensnared in fractious domestic politics that colors everything, the "shining star of the Caribbean" is still far from a popular consensus on what flag it wants to fly.

Lawrence Kaagan is president of Kaagan Research Associates and, since 1983, has conducted polls for El Nuevo Dia

Table 1

Expected Vote in Status Plebiscite

Question: If there is a plebiscite vote, for which of these alternatives would you vote?

Likely to Vote For:	1/91	10/90	1/90	9/89	2/89
ELA (Pro-Commonwealth)	41%	34%	36%	37%	45%
Statehood	39	41	43	41	35
Independence	5	6	5	4	5
Don't know/Not sure/ Would not vote	11	14	9	12	11
Refused	4	5	7	6	4

Source: Surveys for El Nuevo Dia conducted by Kaagan Research Associates (New York), with field work conducted by Stanford Klapper Associates (San Juan). Surveys are conducted with an Island-wide sample of 1,000 eligible voters, conducted in-home.

CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS VS. POLITICAL CALCULATIONS

By Eliut D. Flores-Caraballo

Puerto Ricans have long been divided over the political relationship of Puerto Rico with the United States: Some would like the island to become the 51st state; others support an autonomous yet permanent relationship with the US. A third, smaller group would prefer to see Puerto Rico a sovereign republic.

Much of the status debate has centered on economic and political matters. The cultural dimensions have not, however, received as much attention. The US is a predominantly English speaking country, and Puerto Rico a Spanish speaking, Latin American country. The two simply don't share a common cultural base. Supporters of independence claim that Puerto Rican culture can survive and flourish only if the island becomes a sovereign country. Commonwealth backers argue that the *Estado Libre Asociado* (Free Associated State) status protects Puerto Rican cultural sovereignty and ensures the country's prosperity through a permanent tie to the US. Those who favor statehood want to gain formal representation and participation in all of the power institutions of the American Union. They call openly for *political* integration. But does a desire for political integration imply support as well for *cultural* assimilation of Puerto Rico into the United States?

I address this question using survey and focus group data. The door-to-door survey was conducted in the summer of 1989, with a stratified convenience sample of 450 Puerto Ricans ages 12 and older, belonging to 160 households in the cities of San Juan, Adjuntas, and Quebradillas. Interviewing was done by upper division and graduate students from the School of Public Communication of the University of Puerto Rico in San Juan. Questions covered several areas, among them, cultural and political attitudes and media use.

Cultural Pride is Not a Dividing Line

My study found that respondents exhibited high levels of cultural pride regardless of their political beliefs. For someone familiar with Puerto Rican politics, this isn't surprising. Since its inception, the *Partido Nuevo Progresista* [New Progressive Party] (PNP) has promoted the concept of *estadidad jibara* [Puerto Rican-culture-styled statehood]. PNP's official position has been that statehood would bring a financial bonanza to the island, and that the people would be allowed and able to maintain their Hispanic language and culture under statehood. In

fact, during the first Congressional hearings on the proposed plebiscite held in Washington in the summer of 1989 and broadcast live on Puerto Rican radio and television stations, the PNP delegation made an ardent defense of Puerto Rican culture. They urged their party's position that the US Senate definition of the statehood option include provisions guaranteeing that Spanish and English would remain the official languages on the island. The senators were baffled by this position of the annexationist party, and rejected it. Back in Puerto Rico, the PNP leadership rationalized this refusal as an understandable action meant to avoid anything controversial which could ultimately jeopardize the statehood bill. The PNP argued that the people of Puerto Rico need not worry, that in the end Spanish would continue as the *lingua franca* on the island, whether protected by law or not.

The latest episode in this struggle over the cultural implications of status options is now being played out. On March 5, 1991, the Puerto Rican legislature overwhelming approved a bill that would make Spanish the sole official language. The legislature is controlled by the PPD, *Partido Popular Democratico*, the pro-commonwealth party; and has delegates from the PNP and from the PIP, *Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño*, the pro-independence party. Only the PNP legislators voted against the bill. The Official Languages Act of 1902 designated both Spanish and English as the Puerto Rican government's official tongues. This is the state of affairs supported by the PNP. The PPD and the PIP, however, were more interested in arousing nationalistic feelings, to reinforce the appearance of cultural distance between Puerto Ricans and Americans. The language bill was signed into law by the governor on April 5, 1991, an event seen as a blow to the statehood movement because it underscored how culturally "different" Puerto Rico is and apparently wants to be.

Respondents in my survey were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a series of seven statements representing a range of attitudes toward English and Spanish, and toward Puerto Rican culture, to assess their "cultural pride." Table 1 shows the distribution of support for each language/culture statement for all respondents and those supporting each of the political status formulas. The average respondent felt proud of Puerto Rican culture. However, many also valued learning English in Puerto Rican schools, and most believed that all Puerto Ricans should know how to speak English. These findings suggest that cultural pride is not unconditional, and that even people who otherwise prefer Puerto Rican culture nevertheless recognize the need to widen their horizons and to adopt/learn those foreign skills/values that can help them.

Cultural Pride and Political Preferences

Responses to several of the cultural pride measures varied significantly when analyzed by political status preference (Table 1). A significantly larger percentage of independence and commonwealth supporters agreed with the more "political" statements, such as "All classes in public and private Puerto Rican schools should be taught in Spanish," and "Spanish should become the official language of Puerto Rico." Likewise, proportionately fewer independence and commonwealth supporters agreed with the pro-English language statements that "All Puerto Ricans should know how to speak English," and "English should become the official language of Puerto Rico."

Still, virtually all of the supporters of the three political options agreed with the more "strictly cultural" statements, such as "I believe that Puerto Rican culture is worth preserving," and "All Puerto Ricans should know how to speak Spanish." Pro-statehood respondents are as proud of their Puerto Rican culture as commonwealth and independence supporters.

Respondents from all political orientations agree on basic cultural pride tenets. Differences by political preferences appear when people are asked to operationalize their cultural pride into political actions to protect their culture. Statehood supporters feel compelled by their political beliefs to legitimate a role for the English language in Puerto Rico. Not too strong a role, though, as suggested by the fact that only 9% of them wanted English to become *the* official language of the Island.

Findings of the Qualitative Study

In addition to the survey, I conducted eleven focus groups with survey participants. Eleven households were chosen from the total sample to represent a wide cross-section; each constituted a kind of mini-focus group. The discussions were held in each family's home and audio recorded. The discussions offered an opportunity to probe

deeper into respondents' political beliefs and behavior. In the majority of the families chosen, all of the immediate members supported the same political party. Among the eleven families, 5 backed statehood, 4 supported commonwealth, and 1 was for independence. The remaining family had divided allegiances.

Two things came across strongly: (1) discussants wanted to preserve their Puerto Rican-ness; and (2) most were convinced that Puerto Rico would not survive without US assistance. The average discussant exhibited strong cultural pride. He perceived himself as very different from the people of the US, and had no desire to assimilate to the culture of the US. Still, a majority of the discussants expressed a sense of fatalism regarding Puerto Rico's ability to sustain and govern itself. They feared that with independence, chaos, communism, poverty and hunger would take hold of the Island. Many were negatively impressed by the experience of Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Their conclusion was that small republics cannot make it without US aid. Several said that if Puerto Rico becomes a republic, they would move to the US.

We see, then, the extent to which cultural aspirations and political calculations diverge. Pro-US ideologies have achieved hegemony: the large majority of those interviewed seemed convinced that Puerto Rico does not have the resources to live and prosper on its own, without the help of the US (whether through commonwealth or statehood status). However, nationalist ideologies have succeeded in keeping alive in the hearts of the people (regardless of their political status preference) pride in Puerto Rican culture and in their Spanish language.

Eliut D. Flores-Caraballo is a doctoral candidate of the International Communication Program, the University of Texas at Austin's Radio-TV-Film Department

Table 1


Cultural Pride Measures by Political Status Preference
(% agreeing with each statement)

	Statehood	Commonwealth	Republic
<u>Pro-English Attitudes</u>			
1. All Puerto Ricans should know how to speak English	91%	80%	70%
2. All classes in Puerto Rico's private and public schools should be taught in English	10	10	0
3. English should be the official language of P.R.	9	6	0
<u>Pro-Spanish Attitudes</u>			
1. All classes in Puerto Rico's private and public schools should be taught in Spanish	45	53	80
2. I believe Puerto Rican culture is worth preserving	98	98	100
3. All Puerto Ricans should know how to speak Spanish	97	96	97
4. Spanish should be the official language of P.R.	83	92	100
n=(Plebiscite aware) 370	139	158	30


OTHER ISSUES

The Status Issue is only one of many things on the minds of Puerto Rican Voters.
A Brief Sampling from El Nuevo Dia Polls.

Question: How well do you feel that things are going in Puerto Rico these days...very well, fairly well, pretty badly or very badly?



Question: In the Middle East crisis, how would you say President Bush is handling the situation..? Would you say you agree strongly with the job he is doing, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?



Source: Survey by Kaagan Research Associates for El Nuevo Dia, January 1991.

I.A. LEWIS SCHOLARSHIP FUND

Dear Friends of Bud Lewis:

We have an unusual opportunity to honor one of the pioneers in public opinion polling for the media, and at the same time, to help educate a college student who intends to enter that field.

At the time of his death on August 18, 1990, I.A. "Bud" Lewis had been Director of Polling for the Los Angeles Times for twelve years. Prior to joining the Times, he was with the Roper Organization and before that, with both NBC and CBS News in their election and polling units. As a pollster, Bud Lewis was innovative; he conducted polls from Moscow to Managua. He surveyed bus riders and people who had just voted in national, state and local elections. He was erudite and curious about everything from architecture to zoology. To know him was to respect his professional integrity and admire his personal warmth.

His friends and family have decided the best way to remember him is to establish a scholarship in his honor. His widow, Alison, has selected the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut as the home of what will be known as the "I.A. Lewis Scholarship" in Public Opinion Research. The university has a well-respected master's degree program in public opinion research. It has agreed to invest our contributions and to use the income to award annually a scholarship to a graduate student in the field of survey research. Our committee has stipulated that each year one student is to be selected on the basis of his or her academic record, professional potential and financial need.

We seek your help. Would you make out your check to the University of Connecticut and mail it to the I.A. Lewis Scholarship Fund, University of Connecticut, Development Office, U-190, Wilbur Cross Building, Storrs, CT 06269-4190. Contributions are tax deductible. You may be employed by a company or school that follows a policy of matching employee contributions to organizations such as the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. If your employer sends a matching contribution direct to the university, make certain the university is informed that the contribution is designated for the I.A. Lewis Scholarship.

All contributors will be acknowledged through the University of Connecticut and will be informed about how much money we have raised.

Sincerely,

I.A. LEWIS SCHOLARSHIP FUND COMMITTEE

John Brennan, John Foley, Mary L. Klette, Everett Carl Ladd, Warren Mitofsky, Susan H. Pinkus, Richard Scammon, and William Schneider

THE ROPER CENTER SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM

To fulfill its educational missions, the Roper Center needs the support of leading business corporations and organizations. The Center seeks to build a firm base of sponsors who commit themselves to annual contributions.

<i>Senior Sponsor</i>	\$5,000 or more
<i>Associate Sponsor</i>	\$2,500
<i>Sustaining Sponsor</i>	\$1,000
<i>Donor</i>	Under \$1,000

We deeply appreciate the support already pledged by a number of leading organizations. For further information, contact: John Barry, Associate Director, The Roper Center, P. O. Box 440, Storrs, CT 06268-0440, 203-486-4440.

Senior Sponsors

Exxon
Gannett Foundation
Reader's Digest

Associate Sponsors

3M Company
Atlantic Richfield
Chevron Corporation
The Carnegie Foundation
IBM
Johnson & Johnson
Merrill Lynch
Philip Morris
Procter & Gamble Fund
The Washington Post

Sustaining Sponsors

AT&T
Capital Cities/ABC Foundation
Chatam, Inc.
Coca-Cola
Deere & Company
DuPont
G.D. Searle Charitable Trust
Honeywell
IMCERA Group
Monsanto
NYNEX
Pfizer
Rockwell International
S. C. Johnson Wax
SmithKline Beecham
Times Mirror

THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE

Everett Carll Ladd

Editor

Associate Editors

John Barry, John Benson, J. Ronald Milavsky, and
Lynn A. Zayachkiwsky

Editorial Staff

Marc Maynard, Marianne E. Simonoff, and
Lois Timms-Ferrara

© May 1991 @ The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
All rights reserved. Copies of articles may be noncommercially
reproduced for educational purposes, and short excerpts may
be used for the purpose of reviews. Otherwise, no part of this
publication may be reprinted or reproduced in any way without
the permission of the Roper Center.

Please send all correspondence to:

The Roper Center
P. O. Box 440
Storrs, CT 06268-0440
Tel. (203)486-4440

THE ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
A Research Library on the Campus of the University of Connecticut

The Roper Center is a non-profit research facility in the field of public opinion and public policy. It maintains the largest and most comprehensive collection of survey data and seeks to promote their informed use. Thousands of scholars, students, policymakers, journalists, public affairs officers, survey research professionals, and others use the Center each year. Founded in 1946 at Williams College, the Center has since 1977 been located at the University of Connecticut.

THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE

A Roper Center Review of Public Opinion and Polling

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 3

MARCH/APRIL 1991

CONTENDING WITH THE SOARING COSTS OF HEALTH CARE

by Richard Leshner

The cost of health care for employers in the United States has grown explosively in recent years, placing severe strain on both the public and private sectors, and posing a threat to the US economy.

A typical company spent about 22% more on health care for its employees in 1990 than the year before. Over the last two years health care costs have risen, on average, an incredible 43%. Many companies now spend an amount equal to one-fourth of their net earnings buying medical coverage for their employees. According to a survey of 1,955 employers conducted by Foster Higgins & Company of New York, an average business firm spent \$3,161 per employee for medical care in 1990, up from \$2,600 in 1989. Costs have become prohibitive for many small businesses. Approximately two-thirds of the 31 million Americans who don't have health insurance are employed, but their employers can't afford to provide them with insurance.

The business community recognizes the critical need to do something about the surge in health care costs. But while the problem is obvious, the solution is far from clear. Many people seem to be seeking a "magic bullet" solution—simple, neat and painless. Political and budgetary realities suggest such hopes are illusory.

Root Causes

The most obvious reason for our medical care cost dilemma is our presumption that everyone is entitled to extensive medical services, regardless of his or her ability to pay. Other industrial nations, including those with national health care systems, routinely deny expensive care to certain groups of citizens: They won't, for example, provide kidney dialysis to older patients; they deny infants with severe disabilities heroic lifesaving measures; they limit organ transplants to recipients likely to survive many years, or don't make them available at all. What all this means, in effect, is that thousands of patients each year are told to go home and die because their lives aren't worth

saving. It's difficult to imagine the US ever enforcing such an arbitrary system.

Americans not only want advanced medical care—we want it now. In countries with national health care systems, elective surgeries are commonly delayed for months or years. Again, it's difficult to imagine us putting up with such restrictions.

Another reason for our sky-rocketing medical bills is the tab for research and development of new medicines, therapies and medical equipment. We take pride that the United States is the world's most fecund source of medical research. A disproportionate percentage of important medical breakthroughs are achieved in American universities and laboratories. But the cost of such innovations is very high.

Continued on page 3

IN THIS ISSUE

HEALTH ISSUES

What changes do Americans want in their nation's health care system? Comparing the medical community's views to the public's. Trends in US opinion about AIDS.

FAMILY ISSUES

The steep decline in the proportion of stable two-parent families: What has caused it, and what are its consequences? Family structure and poverty. Children and divorce.

AMERICA AND THE GULF

A comprehensive Public Opinion Report charts US opinion on the Gulf crisis from start to finish, and reviews European opinion as well. What marks does the press get for its coverage of the crisis?

CONTENTS

PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH ISSUES

**Contending with the Soaring Costs of Health Care,
By Richard Lesher** **Cover**

**National Health Insurance: Does the Public Buy It?,
By Robert Blendon and Karen Donelan** **5**

American Opinion on Health Issues: A Roper Center Sampling **8**

**Physicians and the Public: Converging Views on Health
Care Issues, By Lynn K. Harvey** **11**

**Trends in Public Opinion About AIDS, 1983 to 1990,
By Eleanor Singer and Theresa F. Rogers** **13**

THE GULF CRISIS: PUBLIC OPINION COMPLETE **15**

THE PUBLIC OPINION REPORT **Center**

THE AMERICAN FAMILY BELEAGUERED

**Flight from the Nuclear Family: Trends of the Past
Three Decades, By David Popenoe** **19**

Race and Family in the United States, By Everett Carl Ladd **21**

Costs of the "Post Marital Family," By Daniel Patrick Moynihan **22**

Children of Divorce: Transition or Trauma?, By Robert E. Emery **23**

Democratic Authority and the Family, By Jean Bethke Elshtain **26**

THE GULF CRISIS: ASSESSING THE PRESS

**The Media and the Persian Gulf: Learning to Cover War Again,
By Everett E. Dennis** **28**

The War, the Media, and the Public, By J. Ronald Milavsky **29**

AT THE CENTER **34**

Finally, no analysis of our soaring medical costs would be complete without reference to our rapacious legal system, in which every negative medical outcome is viewed as cause for action and all too often produces exorbitant awards. These costs are factored into the fees of every physician and medical facility. Of course, many of the negative medical outcomes are themselves the offshoot of medical progress—in that the individuals who suffer severe trauma or medical injury would have been denied heroic measures in any other country, and left to die. American doctors who push their craft to its outer limits to save lives all too often get sued for their trouble.

Remedial Options

Virtually everyone finds the status quo unacceptable. There is, however, no consensus as to remedy. Though the debate is not clearly defined, it seems to center broadly on whether to enact some sort of comprehensive, national health care plan, or to pursue incremental reforms as opportunity permits.

Congress has been rebuffed in the past year on two health benefits issues—the Medicare Catastrophic Act, and Section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code—and will want to see a greater degree of consensus than currently exists before moving forward with legislation.* Many looked to the Pepper Commission, which was comprised of 12 key Congressional players in the health care debate and three private sector representatives, with the hope a consensus would emerge. But the Commission's recommendations regarding access to health care were approved by a bare 8-7 margin, and were attacked by left and right.

Further complicating the situation at the national level, and in many states as well, are budgetary pressures which limit what government can do to address health care problems. This has led to an increased focus on employers as the "financial" source of a solution.

In Washington and in various states, commissions are studying health care reform. Unfortunately, many of them have focused on mandated employer-provided health insurance as the solution—a policy which is fraught with negative side effects. A study released in October 1990 by the Partnership on Health Care and Employment found that many workers—estimated at 630,000 to 3.5 million—would lose their jobs if all employers were required to provide health insurance. The study found a total of 5.4 million to 8.6 million jobs—6.8 percent to 10.8 percent of the nation's workforce—"at risk" in some way through wage cuts, losses in other benefits, or job elimination. Most of the negative impact would be felt in small firms with 25 or fewer employees.

Employer mandates assume there are lots of businesses which can afford health insurance but are refusing to provide it. Yet the great majority of businesses that don't provide health insurance are smaller firms that simply cannot afford it. Faced with requirements that they extend it nonetheless, they would simply lay off workers, cut back hours, or eliminate other fringe benefits in order to absorb the additional cost.

These same small businesses were responsible for more than 60 percent of new jobs created in the 1980s. Mandated health insurance would have its greatest impact on people at the margins of the workforce, the same people the policy is intended to help. Small employers also hire about 66 percent of first-time workers and traditionally have employed twice as many young workers as large firms. These inexperienced workers have low skill levels and relatively lower rates of productivity; they are the most likely to lose their jobs.

The same problems obtain in proposals to require employers to provide coverage to employees or pay an alternative tax, the so-called "pay or play" mandate. Massachusetts enacted such a requirement in 1988 and other states are likely to consider similar proposals in 1991. The Pepper Commission also recommended a "pay or play" mandate with the contention that this approach would be less burdensome on low-wage industries. But small businesses are generally labor-intensive; thus, payroll taxes fall more heavily on them, adding to the marginal disincentives to expand their workforces. High payroll taxes not only deter employment, but bear no relationship to a firm's profitability. They must be paid regardless of the company's financial situation.

Incremental Reform

There's a better way: an incremental approach which recognizes the complexity of our health care challenge, and permits a variety of solutions for different aspects of it. This approach involves (1) addressing the factors driving up the costs of health care; (2) making it easier for business, especially small business, to offer health insurance; and (3) ensuring that indigent and medically uninsurable people have access to health care.

With regard to the first, one option is to reform the small group health insurance market where forces of tough competition have driven carriers to stricter underwriting practices for small business. Competition on the basis of risk selection has reduced availability of insurance for many small employers. We must return to the traditional concept of insurance—the broad spreading of risk. To achieve that, insurers must change their underwriting practices to accept all employees when providing

Public Opinion on Health Care Issues/Lesher/cont.

group insurance to a company; guarantee renewal of a group at pooled rates, once a company has been accepted; impose no new pre-existing condition limitations on a person who has been continuously insured, even when that person changes employment or coverage; and provide a reinsurance mechanism to spread risks among participating insurers and HMOs.

With regard to reducing the burden on small business, we need to deal with an unfortunate trend among states to require employers to provide specific levels of extra medical coverage—for example, for chiropractic coverage, drug and alcohol abuse, and psychiatric care. However desirable these benefits may be, they increase insurance costs by 20-30 percent. There are now more than 700 such mandates nationwide. The Health Insurance Association of America estimates that, all other factors aside, some 16% of small businesses not now offering health insurance would do so were these mandates eliminated.

Finally, reform of the Medicaid system is needed. In 1988, only 42% of the population with income below the poverty level qualified for Medicaid. Because of the costs of reform to both federal and state governments, an incremental approach is necessary.

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is part of a broad-based coalition whose participants include the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association,

the Children's Defense Fund, the Health Insurance Association of America, and the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association. We successfully supported an incremental expansion of Medicaid eligibility for poor children that was included in the 1990 budget. Some may not consider poor children a natural constituency of the business community. Our concern reflects the fact that the health costs to business do not occur in a vacuum, but are part and parcel of a greater societal problem. Public sector deficiencies are now being thrust upon and made up by private payers in the form of cost-shifting.

Incremental reform at the state and national level is necessary to address the health care crisis in our country. No "universal" or "comprehensive" remedy is feasible in light of today's budget constraints. In any event, it would likely do much more harm than good.

*The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act was passed in June 1988—and then repealed in November 1989, amidst a storm of protest. The so-called Section 89 rules, enacted as part of 1986 tax legislation, were scheduled to go into effect December 1, 1989. They would have required employers to prove their employee-benefit plans provide roughly equal benefits for all their employees. Business groups opposed the rules as burdensome and too complicated, and Congress finally repealed them in the fall of 1989, before they ever became operative.

*Richard Lesher is president of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce*

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: DOES THE PUBLIC BUY IT?

By Robert Blendon and Karen Donelan

In 1989, the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Harvard School of Public Health launched the Harvard Program on Public Opinion and Health Care. It focuses on the roles that public and leadership opinion play in the formation of health policy, in the US and abroad. The program has published reports on a range of topics including access to services, health insurance coverage, and satisfaction with health systems and services. It also works with various survey organizations to develop and conduct new health surveys, and to advise on the design of additional surveys relevant to health policy research and development.

Perception of a Need for Change

Recently, the program has paid special attention to the emerging debate over health care system reform in the US. In the course of this we have reviewed hundreds of surveys done on health reform issues. The need for change in the US system is now widely recognized—by leadership and policy groups and by the public. The United States spends more on a per person basis for health care than any other industrialized country: \$2,051, compared to \$1,483 in Canada, \$1,093 in West Germany, \$915 in Japan, and \$758 in Britain. Still, we fail to provide access to health care insurance to all our citizens, and our system is viewed more negatively by its populace than are the systems of several other industrialized nations by theirs (Figure 1).

Two concerns drive the call for reform in the US: costs, and uncertainty about maintaining health insurance benefits. When Americans who said either that there are some good things about our health care system but fundamental changes are needed to make it work better (44% in the 1990 Roper survey cited in Figure 1) or that the system has so much wrong with it that we need to completely rebuild it (25%) were asked in an open-ended question about the most serious problem facing the US health care system, more than half of them cited cost, while a third mentioned access to health insurance or services. Other studies have made similar findings. Eighty-four percent of respondents to a 1990 Conference Board survey said the cost of medical care was a serious problem—greater than the proportion making this judgment for crime, pollution, AIDS, homelessness, poverty, unemployment, and 14 other items. Only drug abuse ranked as high as medical care costs. The rising cost of health services is clear to Americans because they pay a substantial portion of those costs out-of-pocket: on

average, 25%; and nearly 20% pay more than 40% directly. This compares, for example, with the approximately 10% of health bills paid out of pocket by citizens of Scandinavian countries. Rising costs borne significantly by individuals themselves lead to a great public uncertainty among Americans about their ability to cope in the future.

Rising costs are also the driving force behind the more recent involvement in this debate by many US corporations. Large corporations say that the cost of providing health insurance is hindering their ability to compete in international markets. Small businesses argue that proposed government requirements that employers provide insurance would put them out of business. Disputes over health benefit premiums were the second leading cause of labor strikes in 1989. Employers surveyed by the magazine *Business and Health* indicated that increasing premiums, deductibles and copayments were the options they would most likely use to cut their health care costs in the future.

The general public is getting the message from business. More than 30 million people in the US are now without health insurance coverage, a number that has grown by 25% since 1980. A 1989 Census Bureau survey underscores that much of the populace has reason to be worried. More than one in four (28%) reported having been without insurance in a 28-month period prior to the survey. In 1989, a majority of insured persons feared they would lose their coverage if they changed jobs, or worried about having a health problem or a work schedule that would disqualify them from obtaining coverage through employers' policies. A 1990 Los Angeles Times survey found 18% reporting their insurance benefits had been reduced over the preceding two years. Since 1980, the share of health premiums paid by employers has declined from 80% to 69%, leaving employees to pay the difference.

Support for a National Health Insurance Plan

These factors have made Americans more receptive to change. There is now remarkable consistency in the public's response to the two primary national policy options. One is a national health insurance scheme, covering everyone, financed through general taxation or Social Security. The model most frequently cited is Canada's, but given the lack of familiarity with this system in the US, it is better understood here as Medicare for everyone. In surveys conducted by Harris, NBC News, Gallup, Roper, the Los Angeles Times, and state polling units in Connecticut and Kentucky, some 60-70% of Americans have backed this general approach. Support for a national health insurance program is higher now than it was a decade ago.

The second approach to health reform—put forth by Nixon in 1970 and in another form by the Pepper Commission in 1990—would (1) require all employers to provide

private health insurance to their employees, and (2) create public insurance programs for the unemployed and poor. Such a program would address the fact that two-thirds of the uninsured in the US are employed, or are family members of someone who works. The latter plan has garnered a marginally greater measure of public support than an entirely government financed system. Surveys in 1989 and 1990 found 75-80% of Americans supporting the mandating of health benefits.

One problem with much of the survey data is that pollsters often don't give the public the major options in one question, to see which is preferred. We are left, then, with high support for alternative options to the current system and little indication whether people are willing to make a choice. A poll conducted by Gallup in 1972 showed the public, when offered three options, was split, with a plurality in favor of the "government requiring health insurance covering everybody who has a job and his or her family, with employers and employees sharing the costs, and the federal government providing insurance only for people who do not have jobs." In 1990 when Harris asked a somewhat different trichotomy, a plurality opted for a comprehensive national health insurance program. That option as presented, however, stipulated that "under such a program the government would control hospital costs, physicians' fees and other charges."

Satisfaction: Services vs. the Overall System

What is sometimes perplexing about public attitudes toward the US care system is that the high support for change is not accompanied by dissatisfaction with personal health care services. In fact, the vast majority of Americans who use the health care system are generally very happy with its services. In a 1990 Gallup survey for the American Medical Association, 85% said they were satisfied with their most recent visit to a physician; in another survey conducted by the Roper Organization for the Health Insurance Association of America in 1990, 88% were satisfied with the quality of their physician care and 76% with their hospital care.

The public wants, then, to maintain existing health care arrangements—but wants the services to cost less and to be guaranteed in the event of a serious illness. This conclusion is further supported by responses to a number of surveys in which Americans back cost-control policies which would regulate hospital charges and physician fees, regionalize expensive medical technologies and reduce unnecessary hospitalizations, tests, and procedures. They are not happy, however, with proposals to limit choice of health care providers (as in health maintenance organizations), or limit care to the elderly or terminally ill purely as cost-saving measures.

Is the Public Willing to Pay for Reform?

Three surveys undertaken between 1988 and 1990 show the level of support for adopting a national health insurance plan declining in proportion to the increase in taxes proposed to fund it. Americans back national health insurance if it entails only a modest increase in their tax burden. The Los Angeles Times poll found in 1990 that when asked how much each year they would be willing to pay in additional taxes to support such a plan, only 22% said \$200 or more (with a very large 33% not indicating what additional amount they would pay). Harris surveys have demonstrated that the most popular source of revenues to fund a universal health program are, in descending order, increases in taxes on cigarettes and liquor; Social Security taxes paid solely by employers; insurance premiums paid by the individual; and income taxes.

Possibilities for Shaping a Consensus

Despite the high level of public interest in finding a solution to the nation's health care problems, there is as yet no agreement about what plan would be acceptable. Based on our analysis, we believe that five guidelines should be followed in the design of new national health insurance proposals if a public consensus is to be achieved. (1) Elements of both public and private funding should be included in the final package. (2) Cost-containment proposals should not require dramatic shifts in individual medical arrangements, but rather should focus on hospitals, doctors, and insurers. (3) The new program should rely on taxes other than the progressive income tax, and revenues should be placed in a fund earmarked for this program. (4) Given the current perceptions of wasted money in health care, some of the resources for a program of universal health care should come from reallocation of funds already spent within the health system. (5) The costs of the new program should be phased in over a period of years so as to blunt the impact on the taxpayer.

A Note on Future Research

How can future survey research efforts help remove some of the uncertainties about the public's support for health system reform? We have three major suggestions. Questions should focus on reform options which are realistic. As noted, there are really only two such options: a national health insurance program covering all Americans, financed through taxes or Social Security; or a mixed private-public system in which employers would be required to provide coverage for their employees, and government would cover the unemployed and poor. In 1989, NBC News and Gallup each used appropriately worded questions describing these approaches. Beyond this, it's essential that more than one policy choice be offered within the same question. Too few pollsters ask people to


choose between the current system and a proposed change. The University of Connecticut's poll for the Hartford Courant (November 1990) provides a good example of a question with clearly worded options.* Finally, we need more useful measures of the public's willingness to pay for health policy changes. It's not enough to tell people that a new program will cost \$60 billion and then ask if they will pay the increased taxes to make it happen. It's also probably not reasonable to ask what they would pay on a yearly basis. On the other hand, monthly payments of insurance premiums and health care bills are quite common in our society, so this might provide a good standard of comparison. Tradeoffs should also be made clear. If a new plan means that people will pay more in taxes but less out of their pocket, the question should indicate that fact. Overall, careful attention to research already conducted on these issues will save us from some

of the confusion which results from having too many questions yielding seriously insufficient answers.

*The Connecticut Poll question asked: "There are differing opinions as to how health care insurance should be provided. Some people favor the present system of private insurance and health plans. Others say we should have a national system of health insurance provided through the government and paid for like Social Security now is. Which do you favor—our present system of private health plans, or a national health insurance plan provided through the government?"

Robert Blendon is professor and chairman, and Karen Donelan is research associate, Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health

Table 1
An Apparent Increase in US Support for National Health Insurance



Question: Do you favor or oppose national health insurance, financed by tax money, and paying for most forms of health care?


Note: Surveys by CBS News and the New York Times.

Question: Which of the following statements comes closest to expressing your overall view of the health-care system in this country? (A) On the whole, the health-care system works pretty well and only minor changes are necessary to make it work better; (B) There are some good things in our health care system, but fundamental changes are needed to make it work better; (C) Our health-care system has so much wrong with it that we need to completely rebuild it.

Note: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates for the Baxter Foundation and the Harvard School of Public Health, November 11-14, 1988. Percentages represent "B" and "C" responses combined. When this same question was asked in a 1990 Roper Organization survey conducted for the Health Insurance Association of America, 69% of Americans opted for one of the two critical options—responses which are closer to those in the other countries than the extremely critical 1988 US responses.

Figure 1


Does the Health Care System Need Major Change?
Responses from 10 Nations



PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH ISSUES/ROPER CENTER SAMPLING


AMERICAN OPINION ON HEALTH ISSUES: A ROPER CENTER SAMPLING

Question: Are you personally covered by a health care plan, or not?




Note: Survey by NBC News, April 23-25, 1989.

Question: Please tell me if you feel financially secure in the following areas:...Your health insurance coverage.




Note: Survey by ABC News, February 10-21, 1988.

Most of the public finds its health coverage OK, but a substantial minority doesn't. Many worry about the impact of major illness.



Question: Generally, how confident are you that you have enough money or health insurance to pay for...a major illness.

Note: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the American Medical Association, January-February, 1990.




Question: Suppose you became critically ill. Taking into account whatever medical insurance you have and also your current finances, do you think you would be able to afford good medical care today, or not?

Note: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, January 21-24, 1990.


Costs are too high for value rendered

Question: Do you believe that medical costs in the United States can be reduced substantially without affecting the quality of health care, or do you think that's not possible?



Note: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, January 21-24, 1990.


Question: (Agree/Disagree) All things considered, the high quality of health care in the United States justifies the high cost of health care.



Note: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the American Medical Association, January 1990-February 1990.


The general idea of national health insurance wins approval. Paying for it is another matter.

Question: Do you favor or oppose national health insurance, which would be financed by tax money, paying for most forms of health insurance?



Note: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, October 28-31, 1990.

Question: If it meant an increase in your taxes, would you favor or oppose a comprehensive national health insurance plan for all Americans?




Note: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, January 21-24, 1990.





Question: About how much each year would you be willing to pay in additional taxes to support expanded health insurance coverage for all Americans?

Note: Survey by the Los Angeles Times, January 21-24, 1990.



EVERYONE



BY INCOME



BY AGE



PHYSICIANS AND THE PUBLIC: CONVERGING VIEWS ON HEALTH CARE ISSUES

By Lynn K. Harvey

Physicians occupy a unique position in the U.S. health care system as educators, researchers, administrators, and clinical decision makers. Because of this, they maintain an important minority perspective on health care and medicine, sometimes quite different from the public's. Nevertheless, surveys commissioned by the American Medical Association indicate that physician and public views are now converging on issues many consider critical.* Where the physician perspective remains distinct from that of the general populace—including doctors' and patients' views of each other—reasons are not hard to find.

Cost, Access and Quality

Physicians and the public were asked in 1988 this open-ended question: "Thinking about everything that has to do with health care and medicine, what do you think is the main problem facing health care and medicine in the United States today?" A majority of the public (55%) spontaneously mentioned something about the cost of care, but physicians were less than half as likely (26%) to do so. The following year, 57% of the public and 29% of doctors cited costs as the main problem.

This gap between physician and public perceptions diminished in 1990. The proportion of the public saying costs were the main problem edged upward to 59%, but the proportion of physicians doing so increased more sharply to 39%. Another 18% of physicians said access to care (or the unequal distribution of physicians) was the main problem. The 18% "access" figure was up from 7% in 1988 and 14% in 1989. Public mentions of access during the two-year period remained constant at 6-7%. Thus in 1990, 65% of American adults believed that one of two interrelated issues—costs or access—was the main health care problem in the United States. And, despite their unique position and interests in the system, 57% of US physicians shared that perspective.

Like people in other professions, physicians generally pride themselves in doing high-quality work. Implying a similar perception, 85% of respondents in the 1990 public survey said they were satisfied with the medical care they received at their most recent physician visit. To explore such evaluations of quality in the context of the public's perception of the main problem—costs—physicians and the public were asked in 1990 whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "All

things considered, the high quality of health care in the United States justifies the high cost of health care." Physicians, whose pride and income are both involved in this issue, were more than twice as likely to agree: 54% compared to 22%. Still, the proportion of physicians in agreement has fallen significantly. It had been 68% in 1978 and 64% in 1979, according to AMA-commissioned surveys taken in those years.

Individuals who disagreed that high quality justifies the high costs were asked whether they saw quality or cost as the main problem in the cost-quality imbalance. Six percent of physicians and 12% of public respondents said "quality;" 82% and 77%, respectively, said "cost." Among college-educated respondents in the public survey, 81% named cost the problem, virtually identical to the 82% of physicians who did so.

Sensitive to the issue of maintaining quality, about half of all American adults (49%), and four out of five physicians (81%), believed in 1988 that quality of health care was being hurt by attempts to control rising costs. It's not surprising that physicians would be more inclined to express this sentiment, since it's often non-physicians who are trying to control costs by influencing treatment decisions and otherwise regulating medical practice. Still, when physicians were asked to respond to this statement again in 1990, agreement fell to 69%, a 12-point drop from the 1988 level.

Approaches to Solving Problems

Majorities of physicians and the public agree that cost and access are the main problems facing health care and medicine. To what extent do they agree on possible solutions? First, they are virtually identical in their response to increasing government spending to assure access by the poor, even if taxes must be increased to do so. In 1989, 72% of physicians and 73% of the public supported that idea. Second, large majorities of both populations—in 1989, 70% of physicians and 79% of the public—support the notion of the federal government requiring employers to provide health insurance to their employees. At the same time, physicians, many of whom are owners of medical practices which are essentially small businesses, were significantly more likely than the public to say that such a federal requirement should make exceptions for small businesses or for part-time workers (36% versus 22%). They were also more likely, 27% to 19%, to reject the idea of a federal mandate entirely. Public respondents (57%) were much more likely than physicians (34%) to support the application of such a mandate to all employers. The proportion of the college-educated who selected each of these options fell between that of physicians and the public at large.

When both samples were asked in 1988 about ways of providing insurance for long-term nursing home care for the elderly, physicians and the public made similar responses on two out of the three possibilities being explored. Forty-one percent and 45% respectively said employers should provide such insurance even if doing so reduces salaries and wages. Forty-six percent of doctors and 50% of the public endorsed the idea of financing long-term care insurance through a special tax on everyone. However, while two-thirds (68%) of physicians said that people themselves should purchase nursing home insurance coverage, rather than expecting government or employers to do it, only half (52%) of the public agreed.

Factors Pushing Costs Up

Despite the concern generated by incidents of serious medical malpractice, professional liability is one aspect of medicine where the public has expressed a position generally sympathetic with physicians. For example, 39% of American adults in 1990 thought that medicine was a worse career to be in than it was ten years earlier (a proportion remarkably similar to the 38% of physicians who would not recommend medicine as a career). In response to an open-ended follow-up question, 63% of those who said a medical career is less attractive now cited malpractice insurance or lawsuits as the reason. Much of the public seems to recognize that there's a connection between the overall cost of medical care on the one hand, and malpractice insurance rates, the number of suits, and the size of jury awards on the other. Seventy-five percent of physicians interviewed in 1989 said that the threat of malpractice suits caused them to do tests they might otherwise believe were not needed. A smaller but still substantial 61% of the public agreed that doctors do too many tests because of the fear of malpractice suits.

Physicians also sometimes feel pressured by patients to do more than they believe is necessary. When asked in 1989 whether patients generally demand too many services from their doctors, 48% of physicians, but only 21% of the public, said "Yes." Aside from the possibility that health care spending is being inflated by the provision of unnecessary services, the difference of opinion reveals a source of tension in the physician-patient relationship.

Sometimes, differing levels of physician and public knowledge show through in their responses. For example, half of physicians (51%), but 37% of the public, believed in 1989 that the federal government should increase its funding for biomedical research. But the numbers reversed when the question referred specifically to AIDS research. One year earlier 80% of physicians, compared to 68% of the public, said children with AIDS should be allowed to attend regular school classes.

Misreading the Public's Call

Americans are plainly troubled by escalating health care costs. This doesn't mean that they are generally down on the medical profession. Many doctors, however, seem to make the connection and see their professional standing plummeting. In 1989, only one percent thought non-physicians respected physicians more than they had 10 years earlier; 25% said public respect had remained the same, while 72% said respect had decreased.

In marked contrast, 14% of public respondents said they themselves respected physicians more than they had 10 years before, and 56% said their level of respect had not changed; only 26% said they respected physicians less. Relative prestige rankings of occupations continue to place physicians near the top, and most American adults give their own personal physicians much more positive ratings than they give doctors in general.

Thus, it appears that many physicians are over-reacting. Feeling scrutinized in their practice, questioned in their expertise, pressured by high expectations in the face of attempts to control costs, and unappreciated for their many years of training and long hours of work, some no doubt see their sources of pride, self-fulfillment and livelihood as being under attack. The public's concerns, however, appear much more focused and limited, and on some of the issues they and physicians largely agree.

*Data cited in this article are from telephone surveys conducted for the American Medical Association by Tarrance/SRI in January 1988 and by the Gallup Organization in January of 1989 and 1990. Interviews were completed with 1,000 randomly selected US physicians and 1,500 randomly selected US adults in each year.

*Lynn Harvey is director of issue and communications research,
American Medical Association*

TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT AIDS, 1983 to 1990

By Eleanor Singer and Theresa F. Rogers

Since 1987, when our first summary of public opinion polls about AIDS appeared in *Public Opinion Quarterly*¹, more than 450 questions about AIDS, in over 50 surveys, have been archived at the Roper Center.² We briefly summarize the major trends since the beginning of questioning on this topic in 1983.

Knowledge and Concern about AIDS

One of the clearest trends has been the steady gain in the public's information about how AIDS is transmitted. Close to 100% now know that the virus can be transmitted by an exchange of blood or semen, as in homosexual or heterosexual intercourse, oral sex, or the sharing of needles when injecting drugs. At the same time, misinformation has steadily declined: the proportion who think AIDS can be transmitted by working next to someone, shaking hands, sharing a drinking glass, or from a toilet seat has decreased from a high of between 50 and 60% in the mid-eighties to between 10 and 20% in 1988 and 1989.³ In one important area, misinformation may have increased: the percentage believing AIDS can be caught by donating blood jumped from 29% in 1988 to 44% in 1989.

But when people are asked, not whether AIDS can be caught by working next to someone who has the disease, but whether they would be willing to work next to someone who has AIDS, the figures change dramatically. For example, in a 1987 Gallup poll, 84% said that AIDS could not be caught by working near an AIDS victim. In that same poll, though, only 65% disagreed with the statement, "I would refuse to work alongside someone who has AIDS." And in a July 1987 Roper poll, only 38% said they would work with someone with AIDS.

Despite the steady increase in the number of AIDS cases (to more than 115,000 in 1990)⁴, and in the percentage of people reporting personal acquaintance with an AIDS victim (from around 6% in 1985 to more than 10% in 1989), concern about AIDS as a personal health threat has not increased since the mid-eighties. About one fifth of the population reports they are "very concerned," and another fifth, "fairly concerned." Still, the perception that the disease is likely to spread to the population at large has remained high, at around 70%.

Changes in Behavior

Depending on the wording of the question, about 10-20% of the public said they had changed aspects of their

sexual behavior in response to the AIDS epidemic in 1985 and 1986; by the end of the decade, the percentage had increased to between 20 and 30%. The percentage reporting increased condom use showed a small but statistically significant increase, from 8 to 12%, between 1987 and 1988, the last year in which the question was asked; condom sales in fact increased between 1986 and 1988.⁵ But, altogether, very few questions have been asked about changes in behavior in response to the threat of AIDS on any of the surveys we have examined.

Attitudes toward Testing

In January 1988, 6% of the population reported having been tested for AIDS, and another 7% said they were considering such a test. There have been great differences in responses to questions about willingness to be tested, depending on how the question is put. For example, although 90% said (ABC News survey, June 1987) that they would be willing to take a blood test for AIDS, only 43% said they would be willing to give a blood sample for this purpose in a national survey (Gordon Black survey, December 1987). Opinions on who should be tested range from 80-90% for immigrants, prisoners, and people applying for a marriage license; to 65-75% for those in high risk groups, patients in hospitals, and foodhandlers; to 50-60% for tourists; and 35% for children entering school.

Few questions have been asked about the consequences of testing. Most people would have doctors notify the local health department, spouses, and sex partners, but less than half would have them notify the federal government, insurance companies, or employers.

Restricting the Rights of Others

From the beginning, the public has tended to see AIDS as a community health rather than a civil liberties issue. But the percentage prepared to curb the rights of others has varied over time and from one topic to another. For example, between 40 and 50% say it would be appropriate to test employees for the AIDS virus, but 75% believed in 1988 that people with AIDS should be allowed to continue to work. The latter figure was an increase from about 67% in 1985. About two thirds have consistently favored allowing children with AIDS to attend public schools, but some polls find that only about half as many are willing to send their own child to a school where another child has AIDS. The data show a slight decline—from about 30% to about 20%—in the proportion favoring more stringent measures, such as quarantining AIDS patients. Here, however, different question wordings produce different, in some cases much more restrictive, responses.

Sympathy for People with AIDS

Almost half of those questioned agree that AIDS may be a punishment for the decline in moral standards; this number does not appear to have changed over time. And while almost half express "a lot" of sympathy for people with AIDS, the proportion drops drastically when the disease is said to have been acquired from sharing needles while using illegal drugs, or from homosexual activity.

There has been speculation that the AIDS epidemic would end the sexual revolution, as well as trigger a backlash of negative attitudes toward homosexuals. A recent comprehensive review by Tom W. Smith indicates that while "revolution" may have been an overstatement, some leveling off of approval for premarital sex does seem to have occurred since the early 1980s, along with a slight increase in disapproval of premarital sex and of homosexual behavior.⁶ Tolerance for gay civil rights has not decreased, however.

Concluding Observations

The latter half of the eighties saw a dramatic increase in public information about AIDS. The Surgeon General's Report on the disease was released in 1986, and figures compiled by the Centers for Disease Control indicate that media coverage peaked in 1987, with a total of 11,852 news stories, up sharply from some 5,000 stories each in 1985 and 1986. Early in 1988, the federal government mounted a nationwide information campaign. One of the consequences of this information explosion seems to have been a large increase in the number of people who feel they know a lot about AIDS.

Since 1988, however, both media coverage and government attention have declined. It's too early to determine the consequences of this decline for public information, attitudes, and behavior—especially because polling on the subject also seems to be on the decline. Furthermore, there are indications that AIDS is coming to be seen as largely confined to specific subgroups within the population, a redefinition that may have important consequences for public policy.

In our 1987, POQ article, we made a plea for standardization of at least some AIDS questions. Our plea has not been heeded. As a result, few trends can be traced precisely from the beginning of the epidemic to the present. It's hard to separate true change from fluctuations attributable to variations in question wording (as well as to sample definition, or other survey procedures). The opportunity to identify trends is also curtailed because questioning tends to be topical rather than cumulative. Although this is inevitable when many of the polls are sponsored by media organizations, some standardized

questions ought to be repeated at regular intervals. The Centers for Disease Control surveys do just that for some AIDS-related topics; many others, though, including preventive behavior, are not covered at all.

The social issues surrounding AIDS engage strong emotions—of fear and disapproval, as well as compassion and tolerance. Polls have helped chart the course of these reactions, and have documented changes in information and misinformation about the disease. We urge that polling on these matters be continued by the private sector.

Endnotes

¹Eleanor Singer, Theresa F. Rogers, and Mary Corcoran, "Polls Report: AIDS." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 51:580-95, 1987.

²These figures exclude the monthly surveys carried out by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) since 1987, which would have more than tripled the number of questions archived between 1987 and 1990. Because summaries of trends in responses to these questions are published at regular intervals by NCHS (see "Advance Data" from Vital and Health Statistics of NCHS, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), we have instead focused this article on nongovernmental surveys about AIDS. None of our conclusions from the private sector polls are contradicted by the NCHS data.

³The figures cited in the text include those who responded DK. There is no evidence that the observed changes are attributable to the government information campaign of 1988. See Eleanor Singer, Theresa F. Rogers, and Marc B. Glassman, "Public Opinion about AIDS Before and After the U.S. Government Information Campaign of 1988." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, forthcoming (1991).

⁴Heather G. Miller, Charles F. Turner, and Lincoln E. Moses, eds. *AIDS: The Second Decade*. Washington, D. C., National Academy Press, 1990.

⁵Singer, Rogers, and Glassman, op. cit.

⁶Tom W. Smith, "Polls Report: The Sexual Revolution?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 54:415-35, 1990.

Eleanor Singer is senior research scholar, and Theresa Rogers is senior research scientist, Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University


PUBLIC OPINION AND THE GULF CRISIS: THE REVIEW COMPLETE

The Gulf crisis was a major political and policy event. It was also the subject of an unprecedented barrage of polling—easily the greatest number of questions ever asked of any focused event. Our coverage of findings as to the course of public opinion is, in response, unusually comprehensive: 20 full pages of data, beginning here and continuing through the first 15 pages of the Public Opinion Report (POR)—the latter published jointly with *The American Enterprise* magazine. This special Gulf coverage concludes with data (p. 33) from a special tracking poll done by the Roper Center itself, in conjunction with its sister organization at the University of Connecticut, the Institute for Social Inquiry.

Contents

- p. 15—Bush's popular standing
- p. 16—The partisan fall-out
- p. 17—Even in "euphoria" the public makes subtle distinctions
- p. 18—After the war
- POR pp. 74-78—Basic trends in US opinion
- POR p. 79—Confidence in the military
- POR p. 80—The public's mood at war's end
- POR pp. 81-84—International opinion on the war
- POR pp. 85-87—Women and the use of force
- p. 33—The University of Connecticut Gulf tracking poll

PRESIDENTS' HIGHEST MARKS: ROOSEVELT TO BUSH




Except for Reagan and Bush, each president's highest rating was found in a Gallup survey. Reagan's highest score occurred in an ABC News/Washington Post survey (73%). Bush's highest score occurred in a Gordon Black/USA Today survey (91%). For both Reagan and Bush, their highest Gallup rating is also shown.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way [name of president] is handling his job as president?

Interview Dates: Roosevelt, 1/8-13/42; Truman, 6/1-5/45; Eisenhower, 12/14-19/56; Kennedy, 3/8-13/62; Johnson, 2/28-3/5/64; Nixon, 11/12-17/69 and 1/26-29/73; Ford, 8/16-19/74; Carter, 3/18-21/77; Reagan, 4/20-22/81 (ABC/WP), 5/8-11/81 (Gallup); Bush, 2/28/91 (Gordon Black/USA Today), 3/1/91 (Gallup/Newsweek).


BUSH AND THE GOP LOOK STRONGER




Questions: If President Roosevelt runs for a third term next year, will you vote for him or will you vote against him, no matter who the Republican candidate happens to be? (People's Research, 11/17-22/39). Thinking about the 1984 presidential election, do you definitely plan to support President Reagan, would you consider voting for someone else, or do you definitely plan to vote against him? (Penn & Schoen Associates, 2/8-12/84). If the presidential election were held today, would you vote for or against George Bush—regardless of who was running against him? (Gordon Black/USA Today, 2/28/91).

Note: Because the questions differ and the FDR and Reagan soundings were not made at the time of a major event that made Americans extremely happy, these data are not strictly comparable. They do, however, compare Bush's current standing to typical tests of support for popular Democratic and Republican predecessors.

Keeping Out of World War III



Prosperity




Questions: Looking ahead for the next few years, which political party do you think would be more likely to keep the United States out of World War III—the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? Which political party—the Republican or the Democratic party—will do a better job of keeping the country prosperous?

Note: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, October 25-28, 1990; Gallup/Newsweek, March 1, 1991. "No Difference" (vol.) and "Don't Know" not shown.


THE U.S. PUBLIC IS GREATLY SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME IN THE GULF, BUT IT STILL KEEPS A SENSE OF PROPORTION

Question: I'm going to read you the names of several people who are active in the news. I'd like you to rate your feelings toward each one as either very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, or very negative. If you don't know the name, please just say so...Norman Schwarzkopf, Colin Powell (NBC News/Wall Street Journal, February 26-27, 1991). Would you like to see (General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander of the Allied Forces/General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) run for president some day? (Gordon Black/USA Today, February 28, 1991)




SCHWARZKOPF


Positive or negative feelings?



Yea or nea for prexy?




POWELL



Question: Does success in the Persian Gulf war make you feel the US should be more willing to use military force in the future to help solve international problems, or not?

Note: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Newsweek, March 1, 1991.

More inclined to use force?





The Gulf Crisis: Public Opinion Complete/cont.


YES TO A DEFENSE SPENDING AND A U.S. PRESENCE IN THE GULF; YES WE HAVE MADE LONG-TERM GAINS

Question: There is much discussion about the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too little, about the right amount, or too much?


Note: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, January 25-28, 1985 and August 16-19, 1990; Gallup/Newsweek, March 1, 1991.




**Opinion on Current
Defense Spending**




Questions: Once the war in the Persian Gulf is over, do you think the US should keep some troops in the Gulf in order to insure stability in the region, or should the US withdraw all its troops from the area after the war? (CBS News, February 25, 1991). Taking everything into consideration, in the long run, do you think the war against Iraq will end up making...the Middle East a more stable and secure place, a less stable and secure place, or won't it have much effect one way or the other?...America's overall position in the world stronger, or weaker, or won't it have much long-term effect on America's position in the world? (Los Angeles Times, February 15-17, 1991).



Keep troops in Gulf?



**Effect on Mid-East
and US World Role**



FLIGHT FROM THE NUCLEAR FAMILY: TRENDS OF THE PAST THREE DECADES

By David Popenoe

The past three decades have witnessed a remarkable "flight" from the family. It has been not only from the "traditional" family, the relatively patriarchal form made up of male breadwinner and female housewife, but also from the nuclear family itself—one focused on childrearing and constituted by a legal, lifelong, sexually exclusive, heterosexual, monogamous marriage. The rejection of the traditional family now has wide popular support, but we are perhaps unwittingly in the process of throwing out the baby with the bath water.

The recent transformation has been especially dramatic because just prior to the period in question the nuclear family had reached its apogee in America. In the 1950s—fueled in part by falling maternal and child mortality rates, greater longevity, and a high marriage rate—a higher proportion of children than ever before grew up in stable, two-parent families. Similarly, in this period, the highest-ever proportion of women married, bore children, and lived jointly with their husbands until at least age 50.

In the 1960s, however, four major social trends emerged to prompt a widespread decline of the nuclear family: rapid fertility decline; the sexual revolution; the movement of mothers into the labor force; and the divorce revolution. None of these trends were entirely new to the 1960s; each represents a tendency already in evidence earlier. But the sixties saw a striking acceleration of the tendencies.

Turning From Having Children

First—taking these four trends without reference to their relative importance or causal priority—fertility declined in the United States by nearly 50% between 1960 and 1990, from an average of 3.7 children per woman to only 2.0. Although it had been gradually diminishing for several centuries (the main exception being the two "baby boom" decades following World War II), the level of fertility fell during the 1980s to its lowest point in US history, and below that necessary for the replacement of the population. Over the last 30 years, children dropped from more than a third to about one-quarter of the total population. A growing dissatisfaction with parenthood is now evident among adults in our culture, along with a dramatic decrease in the stigma associated with childlessness. Some demographers have predicted that between 20% and 25% of today's young women will remain

completely childless, and nearly 50% will have at most one child.

Dismantling Traditional Strictures on Sex

What is often called the sexual revolution has shattered the association of sex and reproduction. The erotic has become a necessary ingredient of personal well-being and fulfillment, both in and outside of marriage, as well as a highly marketable commodity. The greatest change has been in the area of premarital sex: over just eleven years, from 1971 to 1982, the proportion of unmarried girls in the US aged 15-19 who engaged in premarital sexual intercourse jumped from 28 to 44%.¹ This reflects a widespread change in values. In 1965, 69% of women under 30 called premarital sex "always" or "almost always" wrong. By 1986 however, the proportion doing so had fallen to just 22%. There was a similar change in the attitudes of women over age 30, and of men.² The sexual revolution has also been a major contributor to the striking increase in unwed parenthood. Nonmarital births jumped from 5% of all births in 1960 to 25% in 1990—the highest rate ever recorded in the US.

Turning to Child Care by Others

Unmarried women have long been in the labor force. The past three decades have seen a dramatic movement into the paid work-world of married women with children. In 1960, only 19% of those with children under 6 years of age were in the labor force (full or part time); by 1990, the proportion had climbed to 59%. Shifts of this magnitude are without any real precedent or parallel.

Breaking the Bond

The divorce rate in the US nearly quadrupled—from 35 to 130—over the past thirty years (measured by the number of divorced persons per 1,000 married persons). It's not hyperbolic to call this a divorce revolution. A landmark of sorts was passed in 1974, when for the first time in American history more marriages ended in divorce than in death. Estimates of the probability that a marriage contracted today will end in divorce range from 44 to 66%.

Unlike most previous family changes, which reduced family functions and diminished the importance of the kin group, the recent shifts have tended to break up the actual "nucleus" of the family unit—the bond between husband and wife. Nuclear families are therefore losing ground to single-parent families, serial and step-families, and unmarried and homosexual couples. The number of single-parent families has grown sharply—the result not only of marital breakup, but also of marriage decline (fewer persons who bear children are getting married), and widespread male abandonment. In 1960, only 9% of US

The American Family Beleaguered/Popenoe/cont.

children under 18 were living with a lone parent; in 1990, this figure had climbed to nearly one quarter.

Over the past thirty years there has also been a retreat from family living in general. For instance, the percentage of "nonfamily" households—those not containing two or more persons living together and related by blood, marriage, or adoption—has nearly doubled, from 15% to 28% of all households. About 85% of these new households consist of a person living alone.

Today, fewer persons are marrying and they are marrying later in life; those marrying are having fewer children and delegating more of the latter's care to others; and more marriages are ending in divorce. Trends such as these have dramatically reshaped people's lifetime family experiences—their connectedness to the institution of the family. The proportion of an average person's adulthood spent with spouse and children was 62% in 1960, the highest in our history. Today it has dropped to 43%, the lowest in our history.

Leveling Off at Unprecedented Levels

Many of the family trends noted above have leveled off; a few have even changed direction. The fertility and marriage rates have edged up, and the divorce rate has reached a plateau. The rapid increase in mothers of young children in the labor market has diminished. The sexual revolution has shown signs of a modest conservative shift. Few experts find signs, however, of any large-scale reversal of the enormous shifts which have distinguished the modern era. The chances are strong that the fertility and marriage rates will continue to go down, and that the divorce rate will remain near its record high.

There have, of course, been many real and substantial social gains in the past three decades. But the family trends of this period have taken their toll, most notably on children. A recent national survey found that children from single-parent and step families are two to three times more likely to have developmental, learning, and emotional problems than are children from intact families.³ Non-intact families also contribute disproportionately to the very high (and currently increasing) rate of juvenile delinquency. The changing family structure has, moreover, helped to continue—and in some ways has exacerbated—the tragedy of child poverty. Since 1974, the poverty rate among children has exceeded that among the elderly, and 40% of all poor people in this nation today are children. According to a recent estimate, almost one out of every four American preschoolers in 1987 was living below the poverty line.⁴

The unavoidable conclusion from recent family trends is that American society has been moving in an ominous direction—toward the devaluation of children.

¹Cheryl D. Hayes, *Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Childbearing* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987).

²Arland Thornton, "Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 51-4:873-893, 1989.

³Nicholas Zill and Charlotte A. Schoenborn, "Developmental, Learning, and Emotional Problems: Health of Our Nation's Children, United States, 1988," *Advance Data #190* (Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, 1990).

⁴Data from National Center for Children in Poverty (New York: Columbia University School of Public Health, 1990).

*David Popenoe is professor of sociology and
associate dean for the social sciences at Rutgers University*

RACE AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES

By Everett Carll Ladd

Probably no other domestic problems are as intractable as those of the inner-city underclass. Far from showing signs of moving toward resolution, many of these problems—including crime and violence, drug use, and joblessness—are still deepening.

There can be no question that these social pathologies derive in some significant part from racial discrimination. But since they have surged just when the US began making greater efforts than ever before to end discrimination and mitigate its legacy, there can also be no doubt that the root dynamic is something more complex than discrimination itself. As sociologist William Julius Wilson observed in *The Truly Disadvantaged* (University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 3,11), "despite a high rate of poverty in ghetto neighborhoods throughout the first half of the twentieth century, rates of inner-city joblessness, teenage pregnancies, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, welfare dependency, and serious crime were significantly lower than in later years and did not reach catastrophic proportions until the mid-1970s....[E]ven if racism continues to be a factor in the social and economic progress of some blacks, can it be used to explain the sharp increase in inner-city social dislocations since 1970?"

Family Distress is at the Center

Twenty-five years ago, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then a Labor Department official in the Johnson Administration, saw a new set of problems emerging around developments in the black family. He wrote in *The Negro Family* (US Department of Labor, 1965, pp. 5-6) that "the Negro community is in fact dividing between a stable middle-class group that is steadily growing stronger and more successful, and an increasingly disorganized and disadvantaged lower-class group." The latter's plight, he concluded, is inextricably caught up and expressed in the deterioration of family life in the inner-city ghettos. "...[T]he family structure of lower class Negroes is highly unstable, and in many urban centers is approaching complete breakdown." When issued in 1965, Moynihan's report sparked intense controversy.

Today, however, its finding of unprecedented family deterioration, seen linked to a host of other problems, from poverty to crime, is accepted by analysts across the political spectrum. This has come because, unfortunately, the rising dislocations Moynihan detected in their early stages have since progressed so far. In 1960, for example, 74% of all black families were husband-wife

families. By 1970, married couple families had declined to a 68% share; and over the next decade their proportion plunged another 13 points. A new Census report (*Household and Family Characteristics*, 1990) shows that in 1990 married couples made up just half of all black families. The proportion female-headed, with no husband present, had climbed to 44%—from around 25% when Moynihan wrote his report.

Even these data understate the implications for the raising of children. In 1988, 64% of all births to black women were out of wedlock. The 1990 Census report showed that 56% of all black families with children under 18 years were single-parent, female-headed; only 39% included both parents.

The association between family status and poverty, evident for all groups, is especially sharp for blacks. The latest Census study found that for black married-couple families, the 1989 median income was \$30,650; but it was scarcely more than a third as great—\$11,630—for "female householder" black families. There are similar links between family structure and crime. For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics' 1987 survey showed that of all young blacks incarcerated in long-term juvenile facilities, only 22% grew up with both their parents.

Unraveling the causal structure is far more difficult, of course, than pointing to the associations themselves. If virtually everyone now sees the steep decline of the "traditional" two-parent family right in the middle of a host of social pathologies which beset inner-city black populations, analysts differ on why this decline came about—and, hence, on what to do about it. Some of these differences reflect long-familiar ideological arguments. Thus, some conservatives see the whole governmental welfare system as especially culpable in providing economic incentives for family break-up, and in discouraging individual responsibility. Many liberals are inclined to believe that the causes lie in government's not doing enough—for instance, through programs to cut inner-city joblessness, which they see disintegrating all inner-city social life. Both sides here are probably right in part.

An Acute Case of a General Problem

Increasingly, however, the argument is shifting from invocations of liberal and conservative nostrums to a recognition that the problems of the black family may be only the most acute expressions of problems now affecting all groups of US families. Whites began experiencing historically unprecedented family dislocations at exactly the same time blacks did. The latter's legacy from discrimination, and their current economic problems, simply left them far more vulnerable to these forces.

THE AMERICAN FAMILY BELEAGUERED/MOYNIHAN

What happened? Senator Moynihan wrote in a seminal article two years ago (see the excerpt which follows) that along with America's entry into the postindustrial era "has come a new form of social distress, associated with the 'post-marital' family." While there isn't as yet any fully adequate explanation of this development, there's compelling indication that a root cause is the radical redefinition of individualism which transformed so much of American social life in the 1960s and 1970s.

In *Habits of the Heart* (U. of California Press, 1985), the best book yet on the subject, sociologist Robert Bellah and four colleagues argue that this redefinition left the self so sovereign and its claims for personal reward so narrow as to make it hard for collective institutions like the family

to work satisfactorily. "What is at issue," they write, "is not simply whether self-contained individuals might withdraw from the public sphere to pursue purely private ends, but whether such individuals are capable of sustaining either a public or a private life....Modern individualism seems to be producing a way of life that is neither individually nor socially viable..." (pp. 143-44).

I believe the line of reasoning is generally right—though I think Bellah, et al, overstate the problem by overly discounting the strength of traditional limits on narrow self-serving in American individualism. This means we will need to find some of the answers to the special problems of black Americans in acts and measures that curb the excesses of modern individualism and thereby strengthen family life for all Americans.

Everett Ladd is executive director,
the Roper Center. This article is adapted
from his *Christian Science Monitor*
column of March 1, 1991.

COSTS OF THE "POST MARITAL FAMILY" By Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Along with this new form of society [postindustrial] has come a new form of social distress, associated with the 'post-marital' family. As yet we have no explanation for this development, nor any great ground for thinking that we ever will. We do know, however, just how sharp and sudden the change was. It began at midcentury and has not yet stopped. Its suddenness and unexpectedness at least partially explain our inability so far to respond.... (p. 17)

Nathan Glazer was the first to suggest that some of these 'old' programs might create or perhaps 'abet' new problems. As he puts it, we come up against the 'limits of social policy' when welfare programs designed to deal with the breakdown of traditional structures weaken them further, 'making matters in some important respects worse'....(p.18)

Family structure is the principal correlate of child poverty. As demographers repeat, children in single-parent families are poor, and there are more and more of them. Thus Sandra Hofferth projects that relatively few children born in 1980 will live to age seventeen with both natural parents. For white children the likelihood of living with both parents fell from 81 percent for those born in the early 1950s to 30 percent for those born in 1980. For black

children it dropped from 52 to 6 percent over the same period....

A growing number of children—now almost one in four—are born to unmarried women. The increase in illegitimacy has been striking. In 1951 the illegitimacy rate among whites was 1.6 percent; by 1986 it had reached 15.7 percent. More extensive historical series are for some reason still hard to come by, but there can be little doubt of the trend. In 1909 W.E.B. DuBois recorded the percentage of illegitimate births among blacks in Washington, D.C., for the years 1870 through 1907; it began at 19 and ended at 21. In 1986 it was 68 percent; in Baltimore it has reached 80 percent. Among blacks nationwide the rate is 61.2 percent.... (p. 22)

In sum, family structure may now be the principal determinant of class structure. Able scholars are now testing this proposition, and while they have found evidence of intergenerational transmission of poverty and dependency, it is not as yet overwhelming. Then again, we have only just entered this period of social history; half a century may be needed to sort things out.... (p. 24)

Excerpted with the author's permission from "Toward a Post-Industrial Social Policy,"
THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Number 96, Summer 1989.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan is the senior senator from New York.

**CHILDREN AND DIVORCE:
TRANSITION OR TRAUMA?****By Robert E. Emery**

Historians and anthropologists have demonstrated how family forms are shaped by economic demands and social traditions found during different periods and within particular cultures. While it's useful to acknowledge these variations, it's nevertheless true that a happy, two-parent family remains the ideal environment for rearing children in America today. Many two-parent families are not happy, of course, and economic conditions and cultural attitudes increasingly allow unhappy marriages to end in divorce.

Conclusions about the effects of divorce on children seem to embrace one of two positions. The most common is alarmist: The family is disintegrating, and children are being reared in environments prone to pathology. "Liberation" is the alternative theme. A variety of family forms have blossomed, unhappy (or abusive) relationships can be escaped, and children can thrive irrespective of family status. Each position is partially accurate. Divorce is devastating for some parents and for some children, yet it is a relief for others. The effects depend on the degree of distress experienced during marriage, and the deterioration or improvement in family life which follows divorce.

Limitations of Research on Divorce

Scientific evidence on children and divorce is invariably viewed through the lens of personal, social, and moral/religious beliefs. Because the research is difficult to conduct and its findings sometimes ambiguous, such biases intrude upon its interpretation. It's essential to clarify some problems inherent in the scientific investigation of the topic. The most important caution is that evidence on children and divorce points to correlation, not necessarily causality. When an investigator finds more emotional difficulties among children from divorced families, it cannot be concluded that divorce itself caused the problems. Divorce often is accompanied by economic struggles, diminished parenting effectiveness, and intense parental conflict. Any or all of these problems may be responsible for disturbances among children of divorce, just as they create psychological distress among children whose parents remain married.

Measurement is another major consideration. Assessment of children's psychological health is necessarily imperfect, especially assessment of children's internal states. Even parents of the same child are likely to see divorce as having different effects upon him or her. The parent who wanted the marriage to end is likely to see the

child as coping well; the one who wanted the marriage to continue is apt to see him deeply troubled. Other measures have similar problems. Objective indicators like school grades may be insensitive to children's internal distress, while highly individualized measures like clinical interviews can turn normal worries into cataclysmic struggles.

Sampling is a third consideration. Much research on divorce has been conducted on samples of convenience, particularly clinical cases. One shouldn't generalize about all children's experience with divorce from narrow samples—especially since clinical samples are comprised of children who are notably disturbed. Investigators who focus only on such narrow samples are in danger of ignoring resilience and diversity across children, families, races, and cultures.

Sensitive clinicians might detect hidden pathology among children of divorce, but numerous questions can be raised about their findings. Are the children's difficulties really caused by divorce as such? Would the children have fared better if their parents had remained unhappily married? How pathological are problems which are only evident under the clinical microscope? To what extent do their experiences apply to other children, especially those from different ethnic backgrounds? Fortunately, recent research has provided evidence based on hard indicators and national samples. It clarifies the correlations between divorce and difficulties among children, although as we will see, problems of interpretation remain.

Studies of National Samples of Children

The demographics of divorce is one point of clarity. Although divorce rates stabilized in the 1980s, they did so at a very high incidence. Projections indicate that as many as half of the current generation of children will experience divorce by the time they are 18 years old. Divorce is especially likely to occur early in children's lives; about half of all divorces involving children take place before the children are six years old.

Another clear finding concerns mental health utilization. Children whose parents divorce are 2 to 3 times more likely to see a mental health professional as are children whose parents remain married. The great majority of children of divorce do not need professional help, however, and one can question to what extent referrals reflect parental concern rather than child psychopathology.

National survey data are less clear in pointing to the specific behavioral disturbances that may lead to clinic referrals or subclinical distress. The most consistent evidence points to increases in aggression and noncompliance among children of divorce, especially among boys.

Survey studies generally find more ambiguous evidence for less visible difficulties such as depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem. Even when increased internal or external disturbance is found, however, the magnitude of the relation can be debated. For example, in the well-known national studies of Frank Furstenberg, Nicholas Zill, and colleagues ("Marital Disruption: Parent-Child Relationships and Behavior Problems in Children," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 1986, Vol. 48, pp. 295-307), divorce generally was as strongly related to children's psychological health as were other demographic measures such as race or socioeconomic status. The increased behavioral and emotional difficulties experienced by black children, or by children reared in poverty, should not be dismissed. Neither should the risk associated with divorce be discounted. Still, whether one is considering race, income, or divorce, it is essential to remember that the majority of children who experience the epidemiological disadvantage are *not* emotionally or behaviorally disturbed. The study of children "at risk" also teaches us much about resilience. (Furstenberg, "How Marital Dissolution Affects Children: Variations by Age and Sex," *Developmental Psychology*, 1989, Vol. 25, pp. 540-549.)

Survey studies typically find quite small differences in the academic aptitude and achievement test scores of children from divorced families, in comparison to children from married families. Notable differences are found in the number of years of school completed, however. For example, David Featherman and Robert Hauser (*Opportunity and Change*, New York Academic Press, 1978) found that men reared in single-parent families during the first half of the 20th century completed an average of three-quarters of a year less formal education than did men who were reared by two parents. A potentially important trend found in the survey was that the disadvantage associated with family status diminished for men born later in the century.

Popular concern has recently focused on the heterosexual relationships of children from divorced families. All young adults worry about forming close relationships, and children whose parents have divorced may face added anxieties. Some survey data indicate that children of divorce engage in sexual activity somewhat sooner than children from married families. It is well-established that there is some intergenerational transmission of divorce. For example, divorce rates generally are 15-20% higher among adults whose parents were divorced; such increases may reflect attitudes about the acceptability of divorce rather than difficulties in maintaining relationships.

This leads to a final area of concern, psychological health during adult life. As adults, children of divorce generally are indistinguishable from others on various indices of their psychological health. The small influence

of parental marital status on adult mental health stands in stark contrast to the influence of the adult's *own* marital status. Married adults have consistently been found to have fewer psychological difficulties than divorced adults irrespective of their own parents' marital status.

Interpreting the Correlation between Divorce and Children's Disturbances

This brief outline of research on divorce points to a moderate but socially significant relation with psychological difficulties among children. Still, it is not clear how the correlation should be interpreted. Much of children's distress is attributable to the events that sometimes surround divorce, not to the divorce itself. Numerous studies have found that indices of family economics, parenting quality, and interparental conflict predict children's psychological functioning more accurately than does marital status. Moreover, longitudinal studies have documented that children's distress lessens as time passes after divorce. Most important of all, recent prospective research indicates that many of children's behavioral difficulties actually are present *before* a divorce occurs. It's the overall quality of family life that's at issue, not divorce alone.

There is no doubt that most divorces are distressing, and that children fare better when their parents are happily married. The key question is whether the functioning of an *unhappily* married family improves or deteriorates following divorce. It's clear that disposable income declines, especially for women and children. Parenting also may be less effective, at least for a period of time. On the other hand, conflict presumably de-escalates following separation and divorce.

Demands on Public Policy

What's the net effect? Can policy be redesigned to minimize economic and parenting difficulties? Why are we so concerned about economic well-being, adequate parenting, and contained conflict in divorced families but not in married families? This suggests a new twist to the old question: Should parents stay married for their children's sake? Perhaps our societal concern should focus less on marriage and more on children. Our social philosophy is to allow pluralism in marital preferences and family forms. The adequate rearing of children is, however, a singular societal concern. Child support, child care, and dispute resolution policies can be designed to apply to families irrespective of marital status.

Child support policies can demand that all parents support their children by establishing paternity, providing clear formulas for determining support, and by making sure the financial support is forthcoming. The collection

of income tax provides the model for the future collection of child support. Child care programs can be offered to all families, but they should be of special benefit to single-parent families, given the latter's economic and practical needs. Policy needs to be concerned not only with the *rights* of noncustodial parents, but also with their *responsibilities* to their children.

Family feuds in marriage or divorce need not be tolerated, let alone encouraged by the adversary legal system. "No fault" legal statutes have made divorce much more of a private matter. Alternative methods of dispute resolution such as divorce mediation are a logical outgrowth of this trend; they place the responsibility of ordering affairs after divorce on parents, not on the state.

Cooperative dispute resolution is especially needed in relation to child custody and visitation, while clear guidelines are most pressing for directing couples toward economic settlements.

Finally, more efforts from the state, social organizations, schools, therapists, and individual families should be directed at the "front end" of divorce: marriage. As we acknowledge the difficulties of divorce, we must also face the problems that accompany marriage and childrearing. If our concern is children, our policies should be directed toward children, not marriage. If our concern is marriage, our efforts are should be targeted toward strengthening marriage, not bemoaning divorce.

*Robert Emery is associate professor of psychology,
University of Virginia*

FAMILY DISRUPTION AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP

A panel in the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) was interviewed eight times between the fall of 1983 and the spring of 1986, with data collected on family status and economic position. The SIPP panel study found "economic hardship for children who experience the departure of their father from the household...[resulting] from two different factors: One was the loss of income earned by the absent parent; the other was that children who made the transition into single-parent households were less well-off to begin with...."

Change in Average Monthly Income (in constant dollars), by Family Status

	Always Two Parents	Mother Present, Father Leaves	Mother Only Present Throughout
Average Income			
Fall 1983	\$2,834	\$2,346	\$1,132
Spring 1986	\$3,060	\$1,815	\$1,176

Note: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Family Disruption and Economic Hardship*, 1991.

DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND THE FAMILY

By Jean Bethke Elshtain

Familial authority, though seemingly at odds with the presumptions of democracy, is nonetheless a prerequisite for the survival of democracy. Family relations could not exist without familial authority. Such relations remain the best way we know to create citizens, that is, adults who offer ethical allegiance to the principles of democratic society. Family authority is the best way to structure the relationships between adults and dependent children who slowly acquire capacities for independence. Modern parental authority, moreover, is shared by the mother and father. Some may take strong exception to this claim, arguing that the family is patriarchal, even today, or that the authority of the mother is less decisive than that of the father, or that [John Stuart] Mill was right.

Children, however, exhibit little doubt that their mothers are powerful and authoritative, though perhaps not in ways identical to fathers. This ideal of parental equality does not presuppose sameness between the mother and father. Each can be more or less a private or a public person, yet be equal in relation to children.

What makes family authority distinctive is the quality of stewardship: the recognition that parents undertake solemn obligations, under authority that is special, limited, and particular. Parental authority, like all authority, can be abused. But unless it exists, the activity of parenting is itself impossible. Parental authority is essential to democratic political morality, because parents are the primary providers of the moral education required for democratic citizenship.

The *Herzenbildung*—education of the heart—that takes place in families should not, however, be viewed as merely one item in a larger political agenda. To construe it as such is to treat the family merely instrumentally, affirming it only insofar as it can be shown to serve external purposes. Yes, the family helps sustain the democratic order. But it also offers alternatives, even resistance, to many policies that a public order may throw up at any given time.

The loyalties and moral imperatives nurtured in families may often clash with the demands of public authority. For example, a young man may refuse to serve in a war because to do so violates the religious beliefs taught by his mother and father. This, too, is vital for democracy. Democracy emerged as a form of revolt. Keeping alive a potential for revolt, keeping alive the space for particularity, for difference, for pluralism, sustains democracy in

the long run. It is no coincidence that all 20th-century totalitarian orders labored to destroy the family as a locus of identity and meaning apart from the state. Totalitarianism strives to govern all of life; to allow for only one public identity; to destroy private life; and most of all, to require that individuals never allow their commitments to specific others—family, friends, comrades—to weaken their commitment to the state. To this idea, which can only be described as evil, the family stands in defiance.

Familial authority simply does not exist in a direct homologous relation to the principles of civil society. To establish an identity between public and private lives would weaken, not strengthen, democratic life. The reason for this is children. They need particular, intense relations with specific beloved others. If a child is confronted prematurely with the “right to choose” or situated too soon inside anonymous institutions that minimize that special contact and trust with parents, that child is much less likely to be “free to choose” later on. To become capable of posing alternatives, a person requires a sure and certain place from which to start. In Mary Midgley’s words, “Children . . . have to live *now* in a particular culture; they must take some attitude to the nearest things ‘right away.’”¹ The family is the social form best suited to provide children with a trusting, determinate sense of “self.” Indeed, it is only through identification with concrete others that children can later identify with nonfamilial human beings and come to see themselves as members of a wider community.

Familial authority is inseparable from parental care, protection, and concern. In the absence of such ties, familial feelings would not be displaced throughout a wider social network; they would, instead, be vitiated, perhaps lost altogether. And without the human ties and bonds that the activity of parenting makes possible, a more general sense of “brotherhood” and “sisterhood” simply cannot emerge.

The nature and scope of parental authority changes over time. Children learn that being a child is not a permanent condition. Indeed, the family teaches us that no authority on this earth is omnipotent, unchanging, or absolute. Working through familial authority, as children struggle for identity, requires that they question authority more generally. Examples of authoritarian parents do not disconfirm this ideal case; they do, however, show that familial authority, like any constitutive principle, is subject to abuse. Yet granting particular instances of abuse, familial authority, in both ideal and actual forms, remains uniquely capable of keeping alive that combination of obligation and duty, freedom and dissent, that is the heart of democratic life.

Any further erosion of the ethical life embodied in the family bodes ill for democracy. For example, we can experience the plight of homelessness as a human tragedy only because we cherish an ideal of what it means to have a home. We find it easier to love others if we ourselves have been loved. We learn self-sacrifice and commitment as we learn so many things—in small, manageable steps, starting close to home. Thus, the family, at its best, helps foster a commitment to “do something” about a whole range of social problems. The ideal of family, then, is a launching pad into more universal commitments, a civic *Moralität*. The child who emerges from such a family is more capable of acting in the world as a complex moral being.

To destroy the family would create a general debacle from which we would not soon recover. The replacement for parents and families would not comprise a happy, consensual world of children coequal with adults. It would be a world in which children would become clients of bureaucrats and engineers of all sorts, many of whom would, inevitably, regard children largely as grist for the mill of extrafamilial schemes and ambitions....


*Mary Midgley, *Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 291.

*Excerpted with the permission of the publisher from
David Blankenhorn, et al, ed., Rebuilding the Nest:
A New Commitment to the American Family*



(Milwaukee: Family Service America, 1990), pp. 126-128.

Jean Bethke Elshtain is Centennial Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University.

DOONESBURY



**COMMENTARY
BY GARRY TRUDEAU**



DOONESBURY COPYRIGHT 1991 G.B. TRUDEAU. Reprinted with permission of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.

THE MEDIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF: LEARNING TO COVER WAR AGAIN

By Everett E. Dennis

Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the idea that the United States might "go to war" seemed both fanciful and unlikely. After all, except for brief interventions in Libya, Grenada, and Panama, US had not been to war since Vietnam, which for many people was a memory that films like "Platoon" and "Born on the Fourth of July" had recently chronicled.

The new media dutifully and competently covered Saddam Hussein's forces as they drove the Kuwaiti government out of Kuwait City and took over what was typically given the clichéd descriptor, "tiny oil-rich kingdom." Almost at once a multifaceted news strategy ensued involving coverage of action on the ground in the Gulf, activities in several interested and effected capitals as well as diplomatic initiatives and determinations at the United Nations. The "story" had governmental and economic implications and was seen essentially as a distant artifact of public policy until American naval aid and ground forces began to move with greater numbers into the region in early fall.

By the time Congressional debates were in full flower in November, media coverage was echoing the language of war drawn from the speeches of legislators, diplomats and government officials here and elsewhere. Press coverage then became essentially debate coverage—presenting the points of view expressed in the House and Senate as President Bush got permission to proceed with what would become active warfare on January 16.

The Pentagon vs. the Press

While the administration was developing a strategy of support for its policy through briefings and press conferences, there was in the Pentagon growing sentiment that "never again" would the media be allowed to undermine the war effort as the generals believed it had in the Vietnam conflict. Rules for coverage were promulgated and presented in late autumn. After the press denounced their restrictive and, some said, "Draconian" nature they were modified, but the revisions still met media disapproval. Nevertheless the rules, aimed at preventing the release of information that would interfere with military operations or endanger the lives of troops, were set forth.

Amid questions about "whose side are you on anyway?" the news media, especially the major broadcast and cable networks as well as nationally-oriented newspapers, had to consider practically how (and with what approach)

they would cover the war should one ensue. While media people argue that they are engaged in impartial and objective observation and reporting, they are, in fact, part of a communication system which is essentially national (and sometimes nationalistic) in character and operation. The US media in wartime essentially report on and cover the war with US news-sources from an American viewpoint for an American audience.

Vietnam as the Exception

Contemporary reporters who had not previously covered war, and journalists with little institutional memory, didn't know, for example, that throughout history reporters have most often been supportive of "their side" in any war, as Philip Knightly's book *The First Casualty* (Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1976) amply documents. For most wars in our experience, except Vietnam, war correspondents travelled with the troops and were even assigned to units. Some even wore uniforms. Our images of great war correspondents—from Richard Harding Davis to Edward R. Murrow and Ernie Pyle—were of chroniclers of war clearly sympathetic to our side.

Censorship—except in Vietnam—has been commonplace in all wars and especially in recent years in Grenada, Panama, and in the British-Argentine conflict in the Falkland Islands. While Vietnam was different both in the freedom given to correspondents and in some of their reports that were highly critical, even in that war many correspondents were more the cheerleader than the critic.

Journalists' Education

But the media in covering the events leading up to the Persian Gulf war as well as the six-week war itself, had little time to be concerned about history. While they cited the Vietnam war, for the most part they knew little about it. While they are fond of painting a picture of a rigorous, investigative press corps in Vietnam—and while their critics accept much of this interpretation of the press's performance, in faulting it for undermining the war effort—the picture of a "critical," investigative press in Vietnam is wildly exaggerated. It is true that late in that war television coverage of military action brought to us conflicting and critical information which was sometimes linked to declining confidence in and eventual public opposition to the war—though survey data show a more complex picture of the public's views and response. Memorable performances by the press in Vietnam, like those by David Halberstam, were more the exception than the rule.

For the media and later for the public, the build-up prior to the Iraq war and later the war itself was a time of learning that:

—censorship in time of war is readily accepted by the public, if only grudgingly by the media;

—debate over public policy whether in Congress, on the street or on campuses is necessarily complex and requires considerable context;

—war coverage is necessarily multifaceted and complex, requiring stories about politics, economics, geography and social custom;

—new technology associated with the gathering and transmission of news by satellite is both a blessing and a curse. It brings information faster and provides better visual display; but it does not necessarily build public support in or for the media's overall performance; and

—relative newcomers to the news business like CNN could outdistance better-heeled broadcast and print competitors through a competitive edge aided by technology and assured by economics.

These and other lessons of war would condition the media as the war emerged not just as so much jingoistic talk, but as a harsh and inevitable reality.

Ironically, for some media executives early public opinion soundings seemed contradictory. As one editor asked plaintively, "how can 85% of the people support the war, 80% support the president and only 60% approve of us?" The old refrain of "why do they hate us out there?" which led to the media credibility crisis of 1984, was raised anew.

Whether the role of the media in informing the public about the Gulf war and in setting an agenda for understanding it will be found to have had a greater impact and influence than in the past, is something researchers will have to tell us later. But this may be the first important test in our new "age of information," when cities are wired and public communication is more abundant than ever before.

Everette E. Dennis is executive director of the Gannett Foundation Media Center at Columbia University, and a vice president of the Gannett Foundation

THE WAR, THE MEDIA, AND THE PUBLIC

By J. Ronald Milavsky

The war with Iraq is in at least one respect like all other wars: most Americans know it only as a mediated reality. We learn about it from media depictions and reporting.

Information coming to us about this war is sparse and highly selective. Much of what we might want to see is unavailable to any news media's cameras or human eyewitness, either because of the logistical difficulties in getting to battle and damage sites, or because the military prevents access. The images which do reach us are different than in previous wars. They are "live", the video equivalent of Edward R. Murrow's radio reporting from London rooftops. These bits of live war action and military and civilian press briefings, interrupt an otherwise steady flow of analyses from a very large number of experts, the television news organizations' back-up when live action images are not available.

What has been the reaction of Americans to the way this war has been reported? To answer this, we draw on both television ratings data, to examine the pattern of exposure to the war news, and on survey data to learn about usage of other media and about qualitative aspects of reactions to this mediated experience.

Television Viewing

Within minutes of the beginning of Allied bombing of Iraq, there was a massive turning to television for information. People had been primed to expect something by the UN-imposed deadline of January 15 for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Data supplied by the Cable News Network (CNN) show that during the last full week before the start of bombing, CNN averaged 2.0 rating points for weekdays and 1.7 rating points on the weekend among the 60% of the country's households that subscribe to the network. These ratings were just a little higher than CNN achieved during the same week a year earlier. On January 14 and 15, the two evenings before the bombing's onset, CNN's ratings for the 8 pm to midnight time period increased to an average of 4.2. This means that 4.2% of all those television households were tuned to CNN during the average minute on those nights—almost three times what CNN averaged during the same week a year earlier.

On the 16th, the night the bombing started, news of it traveled mostly electronically. A CBS News/New York Times survey of January 17 found that the great majority heard about the bombing first directly from the media;

only 10% heard from other people. That first night, CNN's ratings zoomed to 19.1, outperforming ABC, CBS, and NBC in its own universe of households—an historic first, even though the other networks' ratings also increased. The fact that CNN was the only network with a live transmission from Baghdad was easily discovered by most of the country who have remote controls for tuning, and probably was a major factor drawing so many to its audience. But CNN had come close to beating the regular networks on previous occasions when big news was breaking.

The night of January 16 was easily CNN's best performance; their ratings have since declined steadily. The average of the ratings for the first two weekend evenings declined to 9.4. Each subsequent weekend the ratings dropped from those of the weekdays immediately preceding it, and each 5-day weekday average was lower than that of the preceding five weekdays. As of the latest Monday through Friday period available when this article went to press (February 11-15), CNN's 8 pm to midnight ratings had deflated to an average of 3.9—a little lower than they had been in the two days before the bombings began.

Ratings made available for ABC, CBS, and NBC by A.C. Nielsen, including a special tabulation for the week the bombing started, show a pattern similar to CNN's. Both the morning and evening news programs increased their ratings over 1990 in the week before the bombings, the week of the bombings and the week after. The first week of war (which contains two pre-war days), increased most (+2.8 points for evening news, +4.0 for morning news). All the ratings in the week after the bombing declined from the first war week. Increases for the "big three" networks in their news time periods were modest compared to those experienced by the all-news CNN during the 8 pm to midnight timeslot. In any case, taken together with the CNN ratings, television news watching increased markedly as a result of the outbreak of war, and then fell off.

People certainly turned to television for the first breaking news about the war. Did they also turn to other media? We lack equivalent data for radio or print press. However, press reports have indicated that street sales of newspapers also increased in the days immediately following the war's onset, and then also subsequently declined.

As far as people's subjective impressions are concerned, there was a substantial short-term increase in reliance on television and a decrease in their reliance on other media. Illustrative are data from a Roper Center/Institute for Social Inquiry poll of adults in Connecticut. When asked in the four days prior to January 16 where they got most of the news about what's going on in the

Persian Gulf, 47% of Connecticut adults singled out television. This percentage jumped to a high 64% in the four days after the outbreak of hostilities. But by January 29 to February 1, the percentage choosing television declined to the pre-outbreak level. Before the beginning of bombing, newspapers were the main source for 18%. This dropped to 6% in the first four days of the war and rose only to 8% by January 29-February 1. But the "Other" response, which consists primarily of combinations of media, did show a substantial increase. These opposing trends for television and for print indicate that television is the primary source for breaking news. They raise the question, which cannot be answered yet, of exactly what role newspapers now play in such crisis reporting.

How should we interpret the decline in the intense concentration on television for breaking war news with each passing week? There are at least two hypotheses. First, the news about the conduct of the war was very reassuring in the early going, lessening the need to monitor for possible disaster. Second, it may also be that, despite the spectacular images of "smart" high-tech weaponry at work, those seeking new information found they didn't get enough news in return for the viewing attention expended. The unique images of war and other crises are good for the news business, but it takes a constant flow of new information about developments to sustain that business.

The Public's Evaluations of the Press Coverage

Thus far, evaluations of the news media have been positive. Seventy-eight percent said in late January that the press was doing an excellent or good job overall; and 72% believe the media were trying hard to get the story independently of what the military was telling them (Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, January 25-27, 1991). The public deemed the reporting both accurate (Table, item 1) and balanced (Table, item 2), although considerably more people said they had heard too much about the views of those opposed to the war than said they had heard too little (Table, item 3). Two-thirds of Americans believed in mid-February that the US military was holding back information about the war (CBS News/New York Times, February 12-13, 1991), but 57% maintained the military should exert *more* control over how news organizations report the war (Table, item 4). (To place this latter belief in perspective—a similar question in December 1941 provoked a nearly identical response, see Table, item 5.) People believe that rather than hiding bad news, the military is telling all they should under the circumstances (Table, item 6).

Of all the above results, the opinions which support military censorship are the most dismaying to those like

the news media who believe that society is best served by the free flow of information. Why does the public support such control? Again we have hypotheses but little to support them. Perhaps at the onset of a "just" war, where US forces are engaged, people feel that society is best served for the time being at least by support of the military effort. In addition, in the early stages of the war, which has broad support and which is going so well for the allied side, confidence and trust in the military are high; that, too, supports the belief that they are reporting everything they can report. In fact, the public had as much confidence in the military as they did in the press to give an accurate picture of the war (Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, January 25-27, 1991). There can be no doubt the public felt during the Gulf war that the nation was better served by military control over information than by its unimpeded flow.

L'Affaire Arnett

The reporting from Iraq has been characterized by some critics as Iraqi propaganda; Peter Arnett of CNN in particular has been accused of aiding the Iraqi side and hurting the Allied cause. Although equal numbers in late January supported and disapproved of "American news organizations broadcasting news from Iraq that has been

censored by the Iraqi government" (Table, item 7), a majority of Americans by mid-February felt that having reports cleared by Iraqi censors was better than no reporters in Iraq at all (Table, item 8), and that reporters were gathering valuable information that might be reported after they leave (Table, item 9). When Iraqi censorship was not mentioned, 51% approved of Arnett and other news organizations broadcasting from Iraq and 38% disapproved (Gordon Black/USA Today, February 14, 1991).

When this piece went to press in late February, the picture which had emerged about Americans' evaluation of the media's performance in reporting the war was neither simple nor logically consistent. But it makes sense. People supported the media's efforts to inform us, and they also backed the military control of information. They were a long way from branding as traitors reporters who provide censored news from Iraq and wanted them to continue their reports. They saw the necessity of censorship on our side, and were not afraid of harm to the nation from reports censored by the other side.

J. Ronald Milavsky is professor of communication sciences and associate director of the Roper Center

Table

1. "How much confidence do you have that the press is giving the public an accurate picture of how the (Gulf) war is going?"

Note: Survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, January 25-27, 1991.

A great deal of confidence	26%
A fair amount of confidence	59
Not too much confidence	11
No confidence at all	2
Don't know	2

2. "Do you think the media has been too negative in their reporting of the war (with Iraq), too positive, or do you think it has been just about right?"

Note: Survey by Gordon S. Black Corporation for USA Today, January 20, 1991.

Too negative	8%
Too positive	13
Just about right	69
Don't know	10

3. "Have you heard too much, too little, or the right amount about the views of Americans who oppose the war in the Gulf?"

Note: Survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, January 25-27, 1991.

Too much	47%
Too little	13
Right amount	33
Don't know	7

The Gulf Crisis: Assessing the Press/Milavsky/cont.

4. "Do you think the military should exert more control over how news organizations report about the war or do you think that most decisions about how to report about the war should be left to news organizations themselves?"

Give military more control	57%
News organizations should decide	34
Don't know	9

Note: Survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, January 25-27, 1991.

5. "Which of these two ways of releasing war news to the public do you favor?"

Let newspaper reporters and radio commentators handle the war news as they are doing now	36%
--	-----

Note: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, December 1941.

Have official government spokesmen write the war news for the papers and broadcast it over the radio	55
--	----

Don't know	9
------------	---

6. "Do you think the United States military is hiding bad news (about the Gulf) from the public or do you think it is telling the public as much as it can under the circumstances?"

Holding back bad news	19%
Telling as much as it can	78
No opinion	3

Note: Survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, January 25-27, 1991.

7. "Do you approve or disapprove of American news organizations broadcasting news from Iraq that has been censored by the Iraqi government?"

Approve	43%
Disapprove	45
Don't know	12

Note: Survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates for Times Mirror, January 25-27, 1991.

8. "Which do you think is preferable—having American reporters in Iraq reporting only those stories that have been cleared by the Iraqi government censors, or having no American reporters in Iraq at all?"

Reporters in Iraq	65%
No reporters in Iraq	26
Don't know/No answer	9

Note: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, February 12-13, 1991.

9. "Some people say that the United States media should not carry reports from CNN's Peter Arnett and other journalists in Baghdad because the reports are too controlled by the Iraqi government and serve as enemy propaganda. Others say such reports should be carried—with proper labeling—because they are better than no reports from inside Baghdad and because the journalists are gathering valuable information they can report after they leave. Which comes closer to your view?"

Not carry reports	28%
Should carry reports	69
Don't know/Refused	3

Note: Survey by the Gallup Organization for Newsweek, February 15, 1991.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT'S TRACKING POLL ON THE WAR IN THE GULF: A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE

On January 12, 1991, the Institute for Social Inquiry at the University of Connecticut, host institution for the Roper Center, began a daily tracking survey to (1) follow changes in opinion on policy issues relating to the Gulf crisis; (2) examine changes which might occur in where people get their news of developments in the Gulf, and how they evaluate this coverage; (3) chart opinion change on the collateral issue of energy policy; (4) examine how confidence as to the disposition of the crisis shifts with events and reporting of events; and 5) explore how confidence in the nation and its larger standing fluctuates with these developments. Daily tracking was concluded February 1. In late February and early March, however, a regular ISI survey (ConnPoll) repeated many of the questions from the earlier tracking.

One finding of the above inquiry is especially interesting. Many reports since the US-led coalition won its speedy victory have suggested that the victory had greatly boosted public confidence, even "finally put an end to the legacy of Vietnam." Public Perspective doubts this—not because we doubt that most Americans have taken satisfaction from their country's handling of the crisis, but because we think data show that a recovery of confidence—shaken by Vietnam and other events of the late 1960s and 1970s—had already long-since been achieved. The resolution of the Gulf crisis thus produced satisfaction—but not a transformation of the general public's view of the nation.

The data shown here are consistent with this interpretation. Connecticut residents entered the war in January with positive views of the country's larger place and performance. The uptick which did occur came with the initial decision to begin the war, not with winning it.

Question: Some people think that the US will never again have it as good as we did in the past; others disagree. How about you? Do you think the country has already seen the best times we are going to, or not?

	Yes, seen best times	No, better coming	DK, etc.
1/12-15/91	41%	53%	6%
1/17-20/91	27	64	9
1/21-24/91	32	62	7
1/25-28/91	29	64	7
1/29-2/1/91	32	63	5
2/26-3/5/91	24	67	9


Question: Generally speaking, how much confidence do you have that the United States will fulfill its responsibilities in the world over the next few years?

	A Lot	Some	Only a Little	None at all	DK, etc.
1/12-15/91	49%	37%	8%	1%	5%
1/17-20/91	60	33	5	1	2
1/21-24/91	58	35	5	1	2
1/25-28/91	59	33	4	1	4
1/29-2/1/91	61	28	5	1	5
2/16-3/5/91	57	32	6	1	3


Question: The United States has great military power. Do you think that on the whole, we've been too ready to use it to protect our vital interests, not ready enough, or have we generally shown good judgment about its use?

	Too Ready	Good Judgment	Not Ready Enough	DK, etc.
1/12-15/91	27%	55%	14%	4%
1/17-20/91	17	73	6	4
1/21-24/91	16	72	7	5
1/25-28/91	20	68	7	4
1/29-2/1/91	18	71	9	2
2/26-3/5/91	20	73	4	3


% Saying Better Times Coming



% Saying a Lot of Confidence



% Saying Shown Good Judgment



THE ROPER CENTER SPONSORSHIP PROGRAM

To fulfill its educational missions, the Roper Center needs the support of leading business corporations and organizations. The Center seeks to build a firm base of sponsors who commit themselves to annual contributions.

<i>Senior Sponsor</i>	\$5,000 or more
<i>Associate Sponsor</i>	\$2,500
<i>Sustaining Sponsor</i>	\$1,000
<i>Donor</i>	Under \$1,000

We deeply appreciate the support already pledged by a number of leading organizations (listed on the right). Here is a sampling of the endorsements the Center has received by these organizations:

"Searle is proud to assist in this most worthwhile cause."

—Debbie Santy, Corporate Communications Manager, Public Affairs, G. D. Searle's Charitable Trust

"We support the educational mission of the Center. To promote a more intelligent and informed utilization of public opinion information does strengthen the democratic process."

—George V. Grune, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Reader's Digest

"We believe in the effectiveness of the Center...."

—Elliot R. Cattarulla, Vice President and Secretary, Exxon

"We are impressed with your group's capabilities and look forward to our association with you."

—Randal W. Donaldson, Manager, Public Relations Services, Coca-Cola

"Over the years your facility has been accommodating to Capital Cities in general and ABC News in particular."

—Jane Maxwell, Director of Research, ABC News

"We hope this financial support will enable [the Roper Center] to continue the fine work for which it is known."

—Robert R. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Vice President and Secretary, Procter and Gamble Fund

"We look forward to making significant use of the broad range of resources maintained by the Roper Center."

—William T. Applegate, Jr., Corporate Manager, Strategic Assessment, AT&T

If you are interested in learning more about the sponsorship program, please contact:

John M. Barry
Associate Director
The Roper Center
P. O. Box 440
Storrs, CT
06268-0440
(203)486-4440.

Senior Sponsors

Exxon

G. D. Searle Charitable Trust

Gannett Foundation

Reader's Digest

Associate Sponsors

3M Company

Atlantic Richfield

Chevron Corporation

CIGNA Corporation

The Carnegie Foundation

IBM

Johnson & Johnson

Merrill Lynch

Philip Morris

Procter & Gamble Fund

The Washington Post

Sustaining Sponsors

AT&T

Capital Cities/ABC Foundation

Chatam, Inc.

Coca-Cola

Deere & Company

DuPont

Monsanto

NYNEX

Pfizer

Rockwell International

S. C. Johnson Wax

SmithKline Beecham

Times Mirror

THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE

Everett Carll Ladd

Editor

Associate Editors

John Barry, John Benson, J. Ronald Milavsky, and
Lynn A. Zayachkiwsky

Editorial Staff

Marc Maynard, Marianne E. Simonoff, and
Lois Timms-Ferrara

© March 1991 @ The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
All rights reserved. Copies of articles may be noncommercially
reproduced for educational purposes, and short excerpts may
be used for the purpose of reviews. Otherwise, no part of this
publication may be reprinted or reproduced in any way without
the permission of the Roper Center.

Please send all correspondence to:

The Roper Center
P. O. Box 440
Storrs, CT 06268-0440
Tel. (203)486-4440

THE ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH
A Research Library on the Campus of the University of Connecticut

The Roper Center is a non-profit research facility in the field of
public opinion and public policy. It maintains the largest
and most comprehensive collection of survey data and seeks to
promote their informed use. Thousands of scholars, students,
policymakers, journalists, public affairs officers, survey research
professionals, and others use the Center each year. Founded in 1946
at Williams College, the Center has since 1977 been located at
the University of Connecticut.

PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT

- 74 AMERICAN OPINION ON THE GULF
- 81 INTERNATIONAL OPINION ON THE GULF
- 85 WOMEN AND THE USE OF FORCE
- 88 WHAT WE THINK ABOUT THE ECONOMY
- 91 THE BUSH BAROMETER
- 93 FAMILY DEMOGRAPHICS

Editors

Karlyn H. Keene
Everett Carl Ladd

Assistant Editors

Jennifer Baggett
John Benson

Consulting Editor


Karl Zinsmeister

The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut helps compile the data used for this section.
The Roper Center is the largest archive of survey data in the United States.
Polls are available from the Roper Center by computer or through DIALOG.

AMERICAN OPINION ON THE GULF

Between August 1990 and early March 1991, pollsters such as Gallup and ABC News/*Washington Post* posed some 4,000 questions to the American people. An extraordinary 80% of those dealt with the situation in the Persian Gulf. This immense collection shows solid public support for U.S. actions throughout the months-long ordeal—as illustrated on the following pages.

Question: **Do you think President Bush is doing a good job or a poor job of handling (the crisis/the war) with Iraq? (YCS/Time/CNN)** **Do you approve of the way George Bush is handling Iraq's invasion of Kuwait? (CBS/NYT)**




	YCS/Time/CNN		CBS/NYT
1990		1990	
Aug. 9	83%	Aug 7-8*	64%
23	76	16-19	76
Sep. 13	75	Sept. 10	71
Oct. 3	65	Oct. 8-10	57
10	65	28-31	59
15-17	59	Nov. 13-15	50
Nov. 14	53	Dec. 9-11	57
27-28	54	1991	
1991		Jan. 5-7	58
Jan. 10	61	11-13	58
24	84	17-20	83
Feb. 7	85	27-28*	78
		Feb. 12-13	80
		24-25	85
		Feb. 28-Mar. 1**	86

Note: * = CBS News poll. ** = New York Times poll.

Source: Surveys by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman for Time and Cable News Network and by CBS News/New York Times.

Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling Iraq's invasion of Kuwait?**



Selected groups


	Women	Blacks	Republicans	Democrats
1990				
Aug. 7-8*	57%	36%	73%	54%
16-19	68	51	87	64
Sep. 10	66	42	87	63
Oct. 8-10	50	31	66	50
28-31	55	34	73	53
Nov. 13-15	41	28	65	38
Dec. 9-11	49	30	68	47
1991				
Jan. 5-7	50	28	73	44
11-13	50	28	72	49
17-20	78	58	92	78
27-28*	74	55	91	68
Feb. 12-13	75	51	89	73
24-25	79	60	95	77
Feb. 28-Mar. 1**	84	NA	92	84

Note: * = CBS News poll. ** = New York Times poll.

Source: Surveys by CBS News and The New York Times.

While there have been some differences among groups (blacks in particular have been less supportive and women moderately less supportive but consistently so), the main story here is one of a public backing Bush policies firmly from the beginning.

Question: In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Saudi Arabia, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Saudi Arabia, or not?




1990	All	Blacks
Aug. 16-19	75%	55%
23-26	76	61
Aug. 30-Sep. 2	76	59
Sep. 10-11	76	50
14-16	73	45
27-30	73	49
Oct. 3-4	71	46
11-14	68	43
18-21	67	43
25-28	71	59
Nov. 8-11	68	44
15-18	65	34
Nov. 29-Dec. 2	66	38
Dec. 6-9	66	47
1991		
Jan. 3-6	61	31
11-13	65	35
17-20	80	62
23-26	77	54
Jan. 30-Feb. 2	79	47
Feb. 2-7	76	40

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

Question: Do you agree or disagree that the United States should take all action necessary, including the use of military force, to make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait?

	All	Rep.	Dem.
1990			
Aug. 17-20*	76%	81%	75%
Sep. 6-9	75	84	73
Oct. 10-14	70	83	66
Nov. 2-4*	70	78	67
14-15	65	74	55
Nov. 30-Dec. 2	67	81	62
Dec. 9*	65	80	52
1991			
Jan. 4-6	68	80	59
9	75	86	61



Note: * = ABC News poll. Sample for survey conducted November 2-4 was of likely voters.


Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post.

Going to War: Attitudes Over Time and...

Democrats were less supportive of the decision to go to war than Republicans, but both groups were positive.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the United States having gone to war with Iraq?

Approve of the United States having gone to war with Iraq



Approve of the United States having gone to war with Iraq


	All	Rep.	Dem.
Jan. 16, 1991	76%	NA	NA
18*	83	90%	79%
20	76	90	63
23-27	75	86	64
Feb. 1-5	78	91	69
8-12	78	93	69
14	78	90	66
18	81	92	74
22	81	92	71
24	84	96	75

Note: * = ABC News poll. NA = Not available.
Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post.

Question: Do you think the United States did the right thing in starting military actions against Iraq, or should the United States have waited longer to see if the trade embargo and other economic sanctions worked?

United States was right to start military action

	All	Black
Jan. 17, 1991	79%	52%*
Jan. 18	73	—
Jan. 19	74	43
Jan. 20	76	44
Jan. 27-28**	70	35
Feb. 12-13	68	33




Note: * = January 17 and 18 responses combined. ** = CBS News poll.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times.

Among Different Groups

By October, doubts that sanctions would work were mounting, and support for the use of force was increasing. Of those who disapproved of George Bush's handling of the crisis in November, more than four in ten said that he was moving too *slowly*.

Question: **Now that U.S. forces have been sent to Saudi Arabia and other areas of the Middle East, do you think they should engage in combat if Iraq refuses to leave Kuwait and restore its former government?**

U.S. forces should engage in combat if Iraq refuses to leave Kuwait and restore its former government




Jan. 10-11, 1991 Subgroups



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, latest that of January 10-11, 1991.


Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling the situation caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait?**



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, November 14-15, 1990.

Question: **Most of the world's countries are participating in an economic boycott of Iraq. The boycott is designed to put economic pressure on Iraq so that it will withdraw from Kuwait. Just your best guess. Do you think the economic boycott will make Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, or not?**

Economic boycott will make Iraq withdraw from Kuwait



Dec. 9, 1990* Subgroups




Note: * = ABC News poll.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of December 9, 1990.

Question: **From what you have heard or read about Saddam Hussein, do you believe that he will surrender when it is clear that he cannot win, or do you think he will fight to the very end?**

Saddam Hussein will fight to the very end, not surrender




Source: Survey by the Wirthlin Group, January 21-23, 1991.

The costs of war weighed heavily on Americans, as they have in past conflicts. A bare majority of women and Democrats, and only four in ten blacks, said that war would be worth the sacrifice. But more than seven in ten in the public overall said consistently that U.S. involvement wasn't a mistake.

Question: **Given the loss of life and other costs of war in the Persian Gulf, do you think the war to defeat Iraq is likely to be worth the cost or not?**


War to defeat Iraq will be worth the costs



Note: * = CBS News poll.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of February 12-13, 1991.


Question: **The United Nations has authorized the use of force in the Persian Gulf only to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. What do you think the United States should do? Should the U.S. stop fighting when Iraqi troops leave Kuwait, or should the U.S. continue fighting until Saddam Hussein is removed from power?**

The United States should continue fighting until Saddam Hussein is removed from power



Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times.



Question: **Do you think war between the United States and Iraq would be a relatively short war lasting a few weeks or months or do you think such a war would last for a long time, a year or more?**



Note: * ABC News poll.
Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post.

Question: **Do you think the United States made a mistake getting involved in the war against Iraq, or not?**

United States did not make a mistake getting involved in the war against Iraq




Note: * = CBS News poll.
Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of February 12-13, 1991.

Confidence In the Military


Since 1973 when the question shown below was first asked, confidence in the military has been relatively high. The military (85%) outranks churches (62%) and all other principal social institutions in terms of confidence in it.

Question: **How confident are you in the capabilities of the American military forces in the Persian Gulf winning a war against Iraq—are you very confident, somewhat confident, or not very confident, or not confident at all in the capabilities of the American military forces winning a war against Iraq?**



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, January 8-12, 1991.

Question: **In general, how would you rate the U.S. military's performance?**




Note: *Poor = 0%

Source: Survey by Gordon S. Black Corporation for *USA Today*, February 24, 1991.


Question: **I'm going to mention the names of some institutions in American society. Would you tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one: a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?**

Great deal/quite a lot of confidence in ...



1991* — Selected subgroups

Great deal/quite a lot of confidence in the military




Note: * = *Washington Post* only.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of January 23-27, 1991.

The Country's Mood


The conduct and conclusion of the Gulf War has left most Americans with feelings of satisfaction. This upswing in the public's mood should not, however, be seen as involving any fundamental shift in judgments about the society—where general public confidence was high throughout the 1980s as it has been historically.

Question: **Do you have confidence in Ronald Reagan's ability to deal wisely with a difficult international crisis, or are you uneasy about his approach?**




Note: Survey conducted after Grenada invasion.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, April 15, 1986.

Question: **Do you have confidence in George Bush's ability to deal wisely with a difficult international crisis, or are you uneasy about his approach?**



Note: In October 1988, 44% had confidence in him, 50% did not.
Source: Survey by CBS News, August 7-8, 1990.

Question: **Do you think George Bush did everything he should have to avoid war, or should he have done more?**




Note: Forty-five percent of black respondents said that George Bush did everything he should have to avoid war, 46% said he should have done more.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 20, 1991.

Compiling data for a comprehensive examination of public opinion on a topic like the Persian Gulf situation can be very difficult, and we owe thanks to a number of people who helped us enormously. In the United States, we would like to thank Graham Hueber and John Zeglarski (Gallup), Sharon Warden and Richard Morin (*Washington Post*), Gary Langer (ABC News), John Aronsohn and Julie Faber (CBS News), Michael Kagay (*New York Times*), and Fred Chestnut (NBC News).

International opinion data was compiled with the help of Richard Burkholder and David Banas (Gallup), Robert Worcester and Sarah Green (MORI, U.K.), Anita Jones (Social Surveys Ltd., U.K.), Richard Glendinning and Nick Moon (NOP, U.K.), Pierre Giacometti (BVA, France), and Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Werner Süßlin at the Institut Für Demoskopie Allensbach (Germany).


The Editors

Question: **Would you say you feel proud about what the U.S. is doing in the Persian Gulf or not proud about what the U.S. is doing?**




Source: Survey by CBS News, February 24, 1991.

Question: **In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the United States at this time?**



Note: * = Gallup poll for *Newsweek*.
Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

Question: **All in all, do you think things in the nation are generally headed in the right direction, or do you feel that things are off on the wrong track?**




Source: Surveys by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*.

International Opinion


International support for Allied actions in the Gulf—like support in the U.S.—was strong. In France, high approval of the decisions of Presidents Mitterrand and Bush and for launching of the ground war illustrated French resolve. Three-fourths of the French public viewed Saddam Hussein as an obstacle to peace.

Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the decisions of (François Mitterrand, President of the Republic/George Bush President of the United States) concerning the crisis in the Gulf?**




Note: In the February 24 BVA poll, 53% approved of the decisions of Mikhail Gorbachev, 35% disapproved.
Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, latest that of February 24, 1991.


Question: **Do you approve of the launching of the ground war by the allies?**



Question: **The leaders of the principal countries of the coalition rejected the Soviet peace plan envisaging a [Iraqi] withdrawal from Kuwait. In your opinion, were they right or wrong to reject this plan?**




Question: **Do you think that the fall of Saddam Hussein is an indispensable condition for reestablishing peace in the region?**



Note: The Communists, Socialists and Greens are parties of the left in France; the UDF, RPR, and the National Front are parties of the right. Sample size for the Communist and National Front are too small to be statistically reliable.
Source: Survey by Brulé Ville Associés, latest that of February 24, 1991.

Britons were convinced early of the need to use force in the Gulf, and more than six in ten said they would support the use of force to topple Saddam Hussein. The British and American governments' handling of the situation in the Persian Gulf met with growing approval among Britons.

Question: **Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the (British government/American government) is handling the crisis in the Gulf?**



British respondents satisfied with

	British handling	American handling
Sept. 1990	65%	63%
Oct.	54	54
Nov.	48	43
Dec.	54	46
Jan. 1991	64	51
Feb.	78	69


Note: Disapproval of the way the American government is handling the situation was 24% in September, 29% in October, 36% in November, 35% in December, and 41% in January. The MORI question asked about "the situation" in the Gulf.

Source: Surveys by NOP (U.K.) for the *Sunday Times*, September 1990-December 1990 and February 9-13, 1991; by Market and Opinion Research International Ltd. for the Free Kuwait Campaign, January 9-10, 1991.

Question: **There are a number of different purposes for which British Forces might be used in the present Gulf crisis. Could you tell me for each of the following whether you would support the use of British Forces or not?**

British respondents

- Would support use of British Forces to restore independence to Kuwait
- Would not support
- Don't know




Note: Not all choices shown.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, U.K. affiliate, Social Surveys Ltd.

Question: **There are a number of different purposes for which British Forces might be used in the present Gulf crisis. Could you tell me for each of the following whether you would support the use of British Forces or not?**

British respondents


- Would support use of British Forces to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq
- Would not support
- Don't know



Note: Not all choices shown.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, U.K. affiliate, Social Surveys Ltd.

Question: **If Iraq pulled out of Kuwait but remained in the two Gulf islands and in the disputed oil field in Kuwait, do you think Allied forces should be used against Iraqi troops in the area, or not?**



Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research International, Ltd. for the Free Kuwait Campaign, January 9-10, 1991.

Those who identify with the out-of-power parties in Britain were less approving of Allied policies and of the launching of the ground war, but, still, solid majorities of them approved.

Question: **Taking everything into account, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's handling of the situation in the Gulf?**

British respondents

■ Satisfied with the government's handling of the situation in the Gulf
■ Neither ■ Dissatisfied

All respondents 75% 8% 17%

By party

Conservatives 88%
Labour 66%
Liberal Democrats 71%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, U.K. affiliate, Social Surveys Ltd., February 8-11, 1991.

Question: **Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with President Bush's handling of the situation in the Gulf?**

British respondents

■ Satisfied with President Bush's handling of the situation in the Gulf
■ Neither ■ Dissatisfied

66% 10% 2%

80%
56%
63%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, U.K. affiliate, Social Surveys Ltd., February 8-11, 1991.

Question: **Do you think America, Britain and the other allies were right or wrong to launch an assault on Iraq once the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait had passed?**

British respondents

■ America, Britain and other allies were right to launch assault on Iraq once UN deadline for withdrawal had passed
■ Wrong ■ Don't know/no answer

76% 18% 6%

88%
68%
78%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, U.K. affiliate, Social Surveys Ltd., February 8-11, 1991.

Question: **Some say that the U.S.A. should only continue its military operation until Iraq states that it will withdraw from Kuwait, as was laid down in the resolution of the UN. Others think that the U.S.A. should go further than the UN resolution and continue to fight until Saddam Hussein is expelled or his military power is destroyed. What is your opinion on that?**

Dutch respondents

U.S.A. should stop military operation after Iraq withdraws from Kuwait 55%
Continue until the military power of Saddam Hussein is destroyed 38%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, Dutch affiliate, Gallup Holland/NIPO, February 16-18, 1991.

Question: **What is your opinion of President Bush?**

Dutch respondents

Opinion of President Bush

Very/mainly favorable 78%
Mainly/very unfavorable 12%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, Dutch affiliate, Gallup Holland/NIPO, February 16-18, 1991.

Question: **How do you think the United States of America and the allies should handle the conflict at this moment?**

Belgian respondents

Try to negotiate with Saddam Hussein 38%
Continue the military fighting until Kuwait is liberated 24%
Continue the military fighting until Saddam Hussein is eliminated 36%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, Belgian affiliate, Gallup Belgium/DIMARSO, January 26-27, 1991.

Evaluation of U.S. President Bush's Gulf crisis policy

Turkish respondents


I approve President George Bush's policy 52%
I don't approve President George Bush's policy 48%

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, Turkish affiliate, Gallup Piar for SABAH Publications, Inc., January 28-31, 1991.

After German reunification, differences in opinion east and west are striking. Reports of antiwar demonstrations were widespread in Germany; but majorities in the former Federal Republic said the war was warranted and viewed it as just, while only minorities in the new Federal States held these views.


Question: **There have been demonstrations and prayer vigils against the Gulf war in numerous cities and towns. What was the situation in your town, have there been activities against the war here?**

There have been demonstrations against the war in your town




Note: *Formerly East Germany. Twenty percent of 16-29 year olds in the former Federal Republic indicated that they had participated in demonstrations, as did 19 percent of those in the new federal states. Forty percent of Green identifiers in the former Federal Republic said they had participated, but fewer than 10 percent in the other three major parties (CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD) said they had.

Question: **Should Kuwait have been ceded to Iraq in order to avoid war, or is it right to wage war in this case?**




Note: *Formerly East Germany. Among 16-29 year olds, 12% in the former Federal Republic said Kuwait should have ceded, 55% said it was right to wage war, and 33% were undecided. In the new Federal States, among the same age group, responses were 22%, 42%, 36%.

Question: **Now, aside from your opinion: What do you think, do most people here in the Federal Republic believe that the Gulf war is a just war or don't you think so?**




Note: *Formerly East Germany.

Question: **A question on the American president, George Bush: Generally speaking, do you have a good opinion of George Bush or not a good opinion?**



Note: *Formerly East Germany. NA=Not available.

Question: **If Saddam Hussein gives in and withdraws from Kuwait, should the West sign a treaty with him and end the war, or should we see to it that Saddam Hussein is overthrown?**




Note: *Formerly East Germany. Majorities of all age groups in the Former Federal Republic felt that the West should see to it that Saddam Hussein is overthrown. A majority of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party thought he should be overthrown. A plurality of Free Democrats (FDP) did, while the Greens felt that a treaty should be signed, by 45-41%.

Source: Survey by the Institut Für Demoskopie Allensbach (Germany), latest that of January-February, 1991.

WOMEN AND THE USE OF FORCE


For as long as polls have been conducted, they have shown women less disposed than men to favor the use of force. Nearly half of the women polled described themselves as "doves" during the Vietnam War (only 33% of men did), and far fewer women would favor the use of U.S. troops if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe.

Question: **Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?**



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 25-October 1, 1988.

Question: **People are called "hawks" if they want to step up our military effort in Vietnam. They are called "doves" if they want to reduce our military effort in Vietnam. How do you describe yourself—as a "hawk" or as a "dove"?**



Note: Forty-one percent of the national sample described themselves as "hawks," 41% as "doves."
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, April 4-9, 1968.


Question: **There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about some situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if ...**




Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, October 23-November 15, 1990.

The war in the Persian Gulf displayed the "gender gap" on the use of force again. Still, support among women for U.S. policies has been consistently high: solid majorities backed the U.S. decision to send troops and viewed military action as necessary.


Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the United States having gone to war with Iraq?**



Question: **Given the loss of life and the other costs of the war in the Persian Gulf, do you think the war to defeat Iraq is likely to be worth the cost or not?**




Question: **Should American bombers attack all military targets in Iraq including those in heavily populated areas where civilians may be killed, or should American bombers attack only those military targets that are not in heavily populated areas?**



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, January 16, 1991.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, January 18, 1991.


Question: **In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Saudi Arabia, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Saudi Arabia, or not?**



	All	Men	Women		All	Men	Women
Aug. 16-19, 1990	75%	86%	66%	Nov. 1-4	67%	75%	61%
Aug. 23-26	76	86	68	Nov. 8-11	68	76	60
Aug. 30-Sep. 2	76	85	68	Nov. 15-18	65	72	59
Sep. 10-11	76	82	70	Dec. 6-9	66	75	60
Sep. 14-16	73	80	67	Jan. 3-6, 1991	61	71	52
Sep. 27-30	73	77	68	Jan. 11-13	65	75	55
Oct. 3-4	71	80	64	Jan. 17-20	80	84	76
Oct. 11-14	68	79	58	Jan. 23-26	77	83	72
Oct. 18-21	67	76	59	Jan. 30-Feb. 2	79	84	75
Oct. 25-28	71	78	66	Feb. 2-7	76	85	69

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization.

Question: **Do you agree or disagree that the United States should take all action necessary, including the use of military force, to make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait?**




	All	Men	Women
Aug. 8, 1990	66%	72%	60%
Aug. 17-20*	76	80	73
Sep. 6-9	75	80	70
Oct. 10-14	70	76	65
Nov. 2-4*	70	77	63
Nov. 14-15	65	75	57
Nov. 30-Dec. 2	67	74	60
Jan. 4-6, 1991	68	76	61
Jan. 9	75	82	69

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Washington Post.

Women in Combat


Unease about women in combat in the Gulf was clear, despite solid support for the idea that women should have a say in this decision. Men (64%) and women (62%) approved of women's involvement in combat during the Panama incident, but men (45-45%) and women (49-37%) were split on women in combat in the Gulf.

Question: **If women are drafted, should they be required to take combat roles as men are, should they be given combat roles only if they volunteer for them, or should they not be eligible for combat?**




Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for *Newsweek*, January 31-February 1, 1980.

Question: **About 11 percent of the armed forces are women. Right now, they can serve in support positions, but not in combat units. Do you think women members of the armed forces should be allowed to serve in combat units if they want to, or don't you think so?**




Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, January 13-15, 1990.

Question: **And do you feel it is acceptable or unacceptable for the United States to send women on military missions where they may be involved in combat?**




Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, September 15-18, 1990.

Question: **Under current law, women are not allowed to hold combat jobs in the U.S. armed forces. Do you think women should or should not be allowed to hold combat jobs in the armed forces?**




Source: Survey by NBC News/*Wall Street Journal*, July 14-15, 1986.

Question: **On a different subject, during the invasion of Panama, American women were involved in active combat for the first time. Do you approve or disapprove of this?**



Source: Survey by Market Opinion Research, January 25-31, 1990.


Question: **If there is ground fighting in the war, do you think women members of the armed forces there should participate in combat, or not?**



Source: Survey by CBS News, January 27-28, 1991.

WHAT WE THINK ABOUT THE ECONOMY

Recent steep declines in consumer confidence mirror those observed during past recessions. Signs that consumer confidence may be rebounding are visible in recent upticks in the University of Michigan and Conference Board indexes.



MICHIGAN INDEX OF CONSUMER SENTIMENT

The Index of Consumer Sentiment is a composite number that takes into account the answers to this series of questions:

1. Would you say that you and your family are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?
2. Now, looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you and your family will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same?
3. Now, turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the next twelve months, we'll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?
4. Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole, we'll have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread unemployment, or depression, or what?
5. About the big things people buy for their homes—I mean furniture, home furnishings, refrigerator, stove, television, and things like that. In general, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy such household items?

Note: For data prior to 1962 the base is Fall 1956 = 100. In 1962 and later years, the base is February 1986 = 100, a date selected because the index value on the old base happened to be 100 in February 1986, thus linking the two sets of data.

Source: Surveys by Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of February, 1991.

CONFERENCE BOARD CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDEX



The Consumer Confidence Index is a composite number that takes into account the answers to this series of questions:

1. How would you rate the present general business conditions in your area? Good, normal, or bad?
2. Six months from now, do you think they will be better, same, or worse?
3. What would you say about available jobs in your area right now? Plenty, not so many, or hard to get?
4. Six months from now, will there be more, same or fewer?
5. How would you guess your total family income to be six months from now? Higher, the same, lower?

Note: Survey is a mail survey. 1985 = 100.

Source: Survey by National Family Opinion, Inc. for the Conference Board, latest that of February, 1991.

The recession has affected all regions, but negative reports from the Northeast stand out.




	Northeast	North Central	South	West
J 1990	91	94	94	92
F	82	88	92	95
M	90	86	93	102
A	76	96	100	101
M	80	97	88	100
J	85	92	86	92
J	83	93	85	90
A	67	78	79	80
S	65	74	70	86
O	60	64	65	68
N	64	67	65	68
D	56	69	68	65
J 1991	63	69	68	66
F	64	76	71	71

Source: Surveys by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, latest that of February, 1991.

National v. Personal Expectations


People tend to see their own finances as better than the state of the nation's economy. In February 1991, 50% of respondents reported that their personal finances were good or excellent, down from 59% in January 1990. Over the same period, the number saying that the nation's economy was good or excellent fell from 40% to 17%.

Question: **Would you describe the state of the nation's economy these days as excellent, good, not so good, or poor?**



Note: Four-week rolling averages ending last week of each month shown.
Source: Surveys by ABC News/Money.

Question: **Would you describe the state of your own personal finances these days as excellent, good, not so good, or poor?**




Note: Four-week rolling averages ending last week of each month shown.
Source: Surveys by ABC News/Money.

THE BUSH BAROMETER

Bolstered by extraordinarily high ratings for his handling of the Persian Gulf situation, President Bush's ratings far exceed those of his predecessors at the same point in their terms.

Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president?**



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 28-March 3, 1991.

		Approve		Disapprove	
First Rating					
1989 Gallup	1/24-26	51%		6%	
Last Six Months					
1990 ABC/WP	9/6-9	75		21	
Gallup	9/10-11	76		16	
Gallup	9/14-16	73		17	
Wirthlin	9/17-19	75		19	
NBC/WSJ	9/15-18	75		15	
Gallup	9/27-30	67		20	
Gallup	10/3-4	66		25	
ABC/WP	10/5-7	65		31	
CBS	10/7	62		27	
CBS/NYT	10/8-10	60		20	
ABC/WP	10/10-14	56		40	
Gallup	10/11-14	56		33	
Gallup	10/18-21	53		37	
NBC/WSJ	10/19-21	59		32	
Gallup	10/25-28	54		36	
NBC/WSJ	10/30-31	56		32	
CBS/NYT	10/28-31	52		37	
Gallup	11/1-4	59		32	
ABC/WP	11/2-4	59		38	
Gallup	11/8-11	58		33	
CBS/NYT	11/13-15	55		33	
LA Times	11/14	61		34	

		Approve		Disapprove	
Gallup	11/15-18	54%		33%	
ABC/WP	11/30-12/2	63		33	
Gallup	11/29-12/2	63		33	
Gallup	12/6-9	58		33	
Gallup/Newsweek	12/7-8	63		28	
CBS/NYT	12/9-11	61		27	
NBC/WSJ	12/8-11	57		36	
LA Times	12/8-12	64		29	
CBS/NYT	12/9-11	61		27	
1991 Gallup	1/3-6	58		31	
CBS/NYT	1/5-7	62		27	
LA Times	1/8-12	67		27	
Gallup	1/11-13	64		25	
CBS/NYT	1/11-13	66		25	
NBC/WSJ	1/23	77		15	
Gallup	1/23-26	83		13	
ABC/WP	1/23-27	79		19	
YCS/Time/CNN	1/24	82		12	
Gallup	1/30-2/2	82		15	
Gallup	2/7-10	79		18	
CBS/NYT	2/12-13	78		13	
Gallup	2/14-17	80		14	
LA Times	2/15-17	82		14	
Gallup	2/21-24	80		13	
CBS/NYT	2/24-25	85		10	
NBC/WSJ	2/26-27	85		11	
NYT	2/28-3/1	86		10	
Gallup	2/28-3/3	89		8	

BUSH AND HIS PREDECESSORS


	After 6th Month	After 12th Month	After 25th Month
Truman (4/45 took office)	75%*	50%	54%*
Eisenhower (1/53)	71	68	71
Kennedy (1/61)	71	77	70
Johnson (11/63)	75	69	63
Nixon (1/69)	65	61	50
Ford (8/74)	39	46	—
Carter (1/77)	67	52	37
Reagan (1/81)	60	47	40
Bush (1/89)	66	80	89

Note: * = ratings after 7th and 26th months in office.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 28-March 3, 1991.

Support for the president varies little by age. The difference between whites and blacks in presidential approval may have been heightened by the Gulf crisis, though the poll-to-poll volatility—e.g., compare the November and December 1990 results—raises questions as to what the differences really are.

Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president?**




Note: Ratings are taken from first survey of each month.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 7-10, 1991.

Bush approval by age

	All	18-29	30-49	50+
J/89	51	54	50	50
F/M	63	63	68	56
A	58	62	61	53
M	56	63	59	49
J	70	71	67	71
J	66	67	68	64
A	69	70	70	69
S	70	71	72	67
O	68	71	70	63
N	70	74	70	66
D	71	70	72	72
J/90	80	79	84	76
F	73	73	75	71
M	68	68	71	66
A	68	69	70	63
M	65	68	68	62
J	67	68	71	61
J	63	68	67	57
A	74	73	76	72
S	76	76	79	73
O	66	72	70	59
N	58	65	59	54
D	58	62	62	49
J/91	59	59	64	54
F	79	78	83	73

Question: **Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling his job as president?**



Note: * = Non-white, January 1989-January 1990; Black, February 1990-February 1991. Ratings are taken from first survey of each month.


Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of February 7-10, 1991.

Bush approval by race

	All	White	Non-White/Black*	White-Black Diff.
J/89	51	52	51	1
F/M	63	64	53	11
A	58	59	47	12
M	56	58	46	12
J	70	72	55	17
J	66	70	47	23
A	69	71	57	14
S	70	72	54	18
O	68	69	58	11
N	70	72	51	21
D	71	73	61	12
J/90	80	82	66	16
F	73	75	58	17
M	68	71	52	19
A	68	70	52	18
M	65	67	57	10
J	67	69	45	14
J	63	66	42	24
A	74	76	58	18
S	76	78	63	15
O	66	67	51	16
N	58	62	25	37
D	58	59	44	15
J/91	59	63	28	35
F	79	82	43	39


FAMILY DEMOGRAPHICS

The past two decades have witnessed an unprecedented deterioration of the two-parent family across all groups, but it has been most striking among blacks. This erosion has coincided with sharp increases across groups in the incidence of female-headed families.



Note: NA=Not available. Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

In recent decades, the number of married-couple families with any children and the number of large families have declined. Men and women have been entering first marriages later in life, and many more women have entered the paid work force.




Median age at first marriage

	Men	Women
1890	26.1	22.0
1900	25.9	21.9
1910	25.1	21.6
1920	24.6	21.2
1930	24.3	21.3
1940	24.3	21.5
1950	22.8	20.3
1960	22.8	20.3
1970	23.2	20.8
1980	24.7	22.0
1989	26.2	23.8


Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Married-couple families with ...



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Household size



Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

The link between family status and poverty is illustrated by the data below. Incomes of female-headed families lag far behind those of married-couple families, especially among blacks and Hispanics. The incidence of poverty among female-headed families is many times higher than among married-couple families, across all groups.


Median Income of Families, 1989

	Married-couple families	Female householder, no husband present
All	\$38,547	\$16,442
White	39,208	18,946
Black	30,650	11,630
Hispanic*	27,382	11,745

Note: * Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

Families below poverty level, 1989




Note: * Persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

The deterioration of two-parent families also has implications for crime. The data below show that only 22% of young blacks and 36% of young whites incarcerated in long-term juvenile facilities grew up in a household with both of their parents.

Youthful offenders, 1987



Source: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Coming in the May/June issue... The Demographics of Marriage

**PARTISAN REALIGNMENT:
TWO NEW SURVEY MEASURES**


**Analysis by the
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research**

University of Connecticut

May, 1991

STRONG GENERATIONAL PATTERNS

**The Depression Generation Went Democratic...and Stayed There.
The Eighties Generation is Republican.**



Source: Combined Gallup polls (done for Newsweek), October 1989-March 1991. The proportions of each age group describing themselves as "independent" can be determined by subtracting the combined Republican and Democratic percentages from 100.

CHANGES IN THE PARTIES' STANDING IN PARTY ID, 1980-1991

The View from Six Leading Survey Organizations

[% Democratic is subtracted from % Republican; hence minus numbers indicate Democratic lead, positive numbers Republican lead]

	ABC/WP	CBS/NYT	NBC	Gallup	Roper	Time/Yankelovich
1980	NA	- 19	NA	- 2 2	- 2 4	- 2 4
1981	- 1 4	- 1 1	- 7	- 1 4	- 1 8	- 2 4
1982	- 1 6	- 1 6	- 8	- 1 9	- 2 2	- 2 1
1983	- 1 5	- 1 7	- 7	- 2 0	- 2 3	- 2 0
1984	- 1 3	- 1 1	- 7	- 9	- 1 8	- 1 4
1985	- 8	- 6	0	- 4	- 1 8	- 1 4
1986	- 5	- 8	0	- 7	- 1 5	- 1 4
1987	- 9	- 8	- 2	- 1 0	- 1 5	- 1 5
1988	- 9	- 7	- 6	- 1 3	- 1 2	- 1 1
1989	- 9	- 4	- 6	- 5	- 9	- 9
1990	- 6	- 4	- 6	- 3	- 1 0	- 9
1991 (through April)	- 3	- 4	- 5	+ 2	- 1 1	- 7
<u>With "leaners" included:</u>						
1990	- 5	- 3	- 5			
1991	+2(1 poll only)	- 3	- 3	+ 9		

Note: Party ID distributions from all national polls by each organization were compiled; the margin separating the parties (R-D) was then computed for all polls, and from these data a yearly average margin was determined for each organization.

August 29, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Bob Teeter

Attached are the results of a poll done last night for the NBC/Wall Street Journal. These results will be on NBC tonight and in the Wall Street Journal tomorrow.

It is pretty straight forward but here are a few observations:

- o Overall, Americans look on the events and changes very favorably. They believe that the world will be more stable as a result of these events, that relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will improve, that the Cold War is over, and that this represents the beginning of the end of Communism as a world force.
- o However, when it comes to U.S. policy, with the exception of the question on recognition of the Baltics, attitudes are much more cautious and really haven't changed much since before these events. They don't want to cut U.S. spending more than planned, they don't want to divert defense spending to economic aid, and continue to be opposed to both high-technology transfer and direct economic aid.

They are overwhelmingly in favor of U.S. recognition of the Baltics, but are split about evenly on the question of whether it is better for the United States for the Soviet Union to stay together or for a number of the republics to break off.

- o They have favorable attitudes toward both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, but are much more familiar and favorable to Gorbachev. A large plurality prefer that he remain head of the Soviet Union but 61% think that he will not be a year from now.

THE CHIEF OF STATE
HAS READ

- o Your approval rating is up 3% from a month ago to 70% and the approval of your handling these events is 74%. A majority (58%) think you handled the various factions before these events with about the right amount of balance.
- o These events at least temporarily resulted in a shift in opinion on whether the country is headed in the right or wrong direction. A plurality now think the U.S. is headed in the right direction.

However, there has been virtually no change since July in what the country thinks your most important priority should be. Forty-five percent (45%) think they should be domestic issues, 36% dealing with the economy, and only 12% think your top priority should be foreign policy. In my view this does not mean there should be a dramatic shift to domestic policy, but simply that we need to find ways in which to emphasize and illustrate how important dealing with foreign policy is -- possibly going back to my favorite theme of combining it with economic policy -- and obviously, put some increased emphasis on domestic policy.

- o Overall, very good results, for the U.S. and you.

3. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the job George Bush is doing as president?

		7/91	6/91	5/91	3/91	2/91	1/91	12/90	10/30-	10/19-
Approve	70	67	76	74	81	85	77	57	56	59
Disapprove	21	25	21	19	13	11	15	36	32	32
Not sure	9	8	3	7	6	4	8	7	12	9
		9/90	7/90	5/90	4/90	3/90	1/90	11/89	9/89	
		75	67	72	75	69	71	67	67	
		15	22	21	15	19	19	22	17	
		10	11	7	10	12	10	11	16	

4. In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling the situation in the Soviet Union?

Approve	74
Disapprove	13
Not sure	13

5. Thinking about our relations with the Soviet Union over the past few years, some people say that President Bush should have done more to support President Gorbachev. Other people say that President Bush did not pay enough attention to other reform leaders in the Soviet Union such as Boris Yeltsin. Which comes closest to your point of view--that President Bush should have done more to support President Gorbachev, that he should have paid more attention to other reform leaders such as Boris Yeltsin, or do you think he balanced the various factions in the Soviet Union about right?

Should have done more to support Gorbachev	13
Should have paid more attention to other reform leaders	19
Balanced factions about right	58
Not sure	10

6. Let me read you a number of areas that the president of the United States deals with as part of his job. Which one of the following do you think should be the president's most important priority? (READ CHOICES. ACCEPT ONLY ONE RESPONSE. ROTATE ORDER OF ITEMS.)

Dealing with the U.S. economy	36	7/91
Dealing with national security and U.S. foreign policy	12	37
Dealing with domestic issues such as education, health care, and the environment	45	13
Other (VOL)	1	43
All of these equally (VOL)	5	-
None of these (VOL)	-	6
Not sure	1	-

2. All in all, do you think things in the nation are generally headed in the right direction, or do you feel that things are off on the wrong track?

		<u>7/91</u>	<u>6/91</u>	<u>5/91</u>	<u>3/91</u>	<u>2/91</u>	<u>12/90</u>	<u>10/90</u>	<u>9/90</u>	<u>7/90</u>	<u>5/90</u>	<u>4/90</u>	<u>3/90</u>	<u>1/90</u>	<u>11/89</u>	<u>9/89</u>
Right direction	41	33	40	40	55	65	28	22	45	40	42	47	44	49	41	42
Wrong track	38	50	44	38	26	22	51	59	40	37	38	32	31	29	35	34
Mixed (VOL)	15	12	13	17	15	9	15	14	10	18	16	13	20	17	19	19
Not sure	6	5	3	5	4	4	6	5	5	5	4	8	5	5	5	5

11. Do you think that recent events in the Soviet Union do or do not signal the end of communism?

Do signal the end of communism	59
Do not signal the end of communism	33
Not sure	8

12a. As a result of recent events in the Soviet Union, do you think relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?

Get better	59
Get worse	7
Stay about the same	31
Not sure	3

12b. If Boris Yeltsin becomes the leader of the Soviet Union, do you think relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?

Get better	36
Get worse	15
Stay about the same	36
Not sure	13

13a. Do you think the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is still going on, or is it mostly over?

		<u>5/90</u>	<u>3/90</u>	<u>12/89</u>	<u>11/89</u>
Still going on	34	44	41	46	46
Mostly over	60	49	51	40	46
Not sure	6	7	8	14	8

13b. When Ronald Reagan was president he said that the Soviet Union was an evil empire and the focus of evil in the modern world. Would you agree or disagree with this statement today?

Agree	24
Disagree	69
Not sure	7

14. If President Gorbachev is no longer the leader of the Soviet Union, do you think the Soviets could be trusted more, less, or about the same to live up to agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union?

		<u>5/91</u>
Trusted more	11	3
Trusted less	27	37
Trusted about the same	51	47
Depends (VOL)	5	8
Not sure	6	5

15a. Do you think it would be better—for the United States—if the republics that form the Soviet Union remain together as one nation, or if they break apart and form separate nations?

Better if republics stay together	43
Better if republics break apart	40
Both equally (VOL)	2
Neither (VOL)	1
Not sure	14

7. I'm going to read you the names of some people who are active in public affairs. I'd like you to rate your feelings toward each one as either very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, or very negative. If you don't know the name of a person, please just say so. (READ EACH NAME AND REPEAT CHOICES. START FROM THE BOTTOM AND WORK YOUR WAY UP ON EVERY OTHER INTERVIEW.)

	Very Positive	Somewhat Positive	Neu- tral	Somewhat Negative	Very Negative	Don't Know Name/ Not Sure
Mikhail Gorbachev	20	45	20	9	3	3
June 1991	16	42	22	10	7	3
May 1991 *	13	34	25	13	7	8
March 1991	10	32	23	17	11	7
February 1991	7	32	30	18	8	5
July 1990	22	43	17	8	5	5
May 1990	19	40	19	10	6	6
December 1989	15	36	26	11	6	6
November 1989	13	41	20	10	8	8
Boris Yeltsin	21	29	20	9	3	18
June 1991	8	25	19	4	1	42
July 1990	2	10	14	5	3	66

* Asked of one-half the respondents.

8. Do you think recent events in the Soviet Union will make the world more stable, less stable, or not really affect the stability of the world?

More stable	43
Less stable	31
Not really affect the stability of the world	15
Not sure	11

9. Based on what you know, do you think President Gorbachev will or will not still be the leader of the Soviet Union one year from now?

		7/91	6/91	3/91	5/90 *
Will still be the leader ...	29	53	49	42	51
Will not still be the leader	61	34	42	45	23
Not sure	10	13	8	13	13

* In May 1990, this question read "From what you know, do you think President Gorbachev will or will not still be the leader of the Soviet Union two years from now?"

10. Who would you like to see as the leader of the Soviet Union--(READ CHOICES. ROTATE.)?

		6/91 ¹
Mikhail Gorbachev	47	63
Boris Yeltsin	27	24
Neither (VOL)	5	3
Not sure	21	11

¹In June, question only asked of respondents who could rate their feelings toward Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Results for August reported above based on all respondents. August figures for voters who could rate their feelings: Gorbachev (46%), Yeltsin (30%), Neither (5%), Not sure (19%).

- 15b. Do you think the United States should or should not recognize the independence of the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have been part of the Soviet Union?

Should recognize	76
Should not recognize	9
Wait and see (VOL)	5
Not sure	10

- 16a. Do you feel that the United States should or should not help the Soviet Union to strengthen its economy?

		7/91	6/91	7/90	5/90	12/89
Should	51	52	51	38	38	45
Should not	36	39	38	45	50	40
Depends (VOL)	10	5	7	11	6	8
Not sure	3	4	4	6	6	7

- 16b. Would you approve or disapprove of using some funds from the U.S. defense budget to help the Soviets with their economy?

Approve	31
Disapprove	63
Not sure	6

17. Let me read you a list of several ways in which the United States could aid the Soviet Union's economy. For each one, please tell me whether you favor or oppose this idea. (READ EACH ITEM AND REPEAT CHOICES. ROTATE.)

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Not Sure</u>
Allow American companies to sell high-technology products to the Soviet Union even if they have potential military usage	18	78	4
June 1991	16	81	2
December 1989	17	77	6
Allow the Soviet Union to join international lending institutions so they could borrow more money from the West	58	36	6
June 1991	54	40	6
December 1989	45	48	7
Provide direct economic aid to the Soviets	39	56	5
June 1991	34	61	5
December 1991	26	66	8

18. Prior to the recent events in the Soviet Union, the United States had planned to reduce its military spending by about 25 percent by the year 1995. In light of the recent events in the Soviet Union, do you think the United States should reduce its military spending by a smaller amount in the neighborhood of 10 percent, by about the original amount of about 25 percent, or by a larger amount in the neighborhood of 40 to 50 percent?

Smaller amount of 10 percent	38
Original amount of about 25 percent	44
Larger amount of 40 to 50 percent ..	13
Not sure	5

19. How concerned are you that the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union may no longer be controlled by the leaders of the central government--extremely concerned, quite concerned, just somewhat concerned, or not that concerned?

Extremely concerned	35
Quite concerned	22
Just somewhat concerned	27
Not that concerned	14
Not sure	2

FACTUALS: Now I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes only.

- F1. In politics today, do you generally consider yourself to be very liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, very conservative, or haven't you thought much about it?

Very liberal	7
Somewhat liberal	17
Moderate	24
Somewhat conservative	27
Very conservative	11
No thoughts	12
Not sure	2

- F2. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or something else?

(IF "DEMOCRAT" OR "REPUBLICAN," ASK:) Would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican or a not very strong Democrat/Republican? (IF "NOT SURE," CODE AS "NOT STRONG DEMOCRAT/REPUBLICAN.")

(IF "INDEPENDENT," ASK:) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party, closer to the Democratic Party, or do you think of yourself as strictly Independent? (IF "NOT SURE," CODE AS "STRICTLY INDEPENDENT.")

Strong Democrat	16
Not strong Democrat	17
Independent/lean Democrat	6
Strictly Independent	15
Independent/lean Republican	9
Not strong Republican	17
Strong Republican	15
Other	3
Refused	1
Don't know/nothing	1

- F3. How old are you? (IF REFUSED, ASK:) Well, can you tell me which age group you belong to? Are you in the age group 18 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39, 40 to 44, 45 to 49, 50 to 54, 55 to 59, 60 to 64, or 65 and over?

18-24	9	45-49	8
25-29	9	50-54	7
30-34	12	55-59	8
35-39	11	60-64	7
40-44	12	65 and over	17
		Not sure/refused	

361041

ROBERT M. TEETER
880 COLLISTON ROAD
ANN ARBOR, MICH. 48105

August 5, 1991

The Honorable Governor John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
The United States GOvernment
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear John:

Fred Steeper has been doing some polling for the timber industry in Washington and Oregon and sent me the enclosed memo which I thought you would find interesting. I'm also including a few summary tables to prove the point.

If you think it would be helpful, I'll have Steeper meet with anyone you think would be appropriate (possibly Reilly).

Best regards,

B. L.

TO: Bob
FROM: Fred
RE: The Spotted Owl Issue
DATE: August 31, 1991

The spotted owl issue in Washington and Oregon gives the President an excellent opportunity to carry these two states in 1992. The timber interests have won the issue by a two-to-one margin. Moreover, the voters feel very strongly about the issue and the potential loss of jobs in their states if the entire range of the owl is protected. It is definitely a voting issue.

If the President is perceived as stepping in to save timber jobs, he could put together a coalition of the traditional Republicans with non-Republican blue collar voters which would carry these two states.

If he allows the U.S. Fish and Wildlife proposal to protect an additional 12 million acres to stand or to be modified only a little, he can kiss Washington and Oregon good-bye.


If he took the timber industry's side of the issue, our concern would be if this issue damaged his environment image, nationally. It doesn't need to.

It is not often that we find a single issue that has the weight to carry a state. The owl issue is such an issue and it covers TWO states, both of which, of course, we lost in 1988. Moreover, both of these states have been downgraded in our electoral vote assessments for 1992 based on national issue themes. The owl issue gives us a chance to snatch them based on a local issue not assessed in the model we use.


Mike McGavick can fill in the details. Phone: 206-443-8846

Mike gave permission to share the report with the White House. Should I send a copy to someone there? (There are some decisions pending on the issue over the next week; and more later this year.)

Perceptions of Various Groups & Organizations



Perceived Importance of Issues to State and Federal Government



**Perceived Importance of State and Federal Issues
by Selected Demographics
(Mean 0 - 10)**

	Protecting the Owl	Protecting the Forest	Protecting Old Growth Forests	Protecting Timber Jobs	Protecting Col. River Salmon	N =
Total	5.0	6.4	7.0	7.3	7.7	(800)
States						
Washington	5.3	6.7	7.2	6.9	7.8	(422)
Oregon	4.7	6.1	6.5	7.7	7.6	(280)
N. California	4.8	6.5	7.4	7.7	7.2	(98)
Political Regions						
Seattle	6.0	7.0	7.6	6.7	8.2	(141)
Bal. Washington	4.9	6.5	7.0	7.1	7.6	(280)
Portland	5.3	6.7	7.0	7.3	8.3	(119)
Bal. of Oregon	4.2	5.6	6.2	8.0	7.1	(161)
Urban/Rural						
Urban MSA	5.7	6.9	7.4	7.0	8.2	(287)
Other MSA	5.0	6.6	7.0	7.2	7.5	(284)
Non-MSA	4.1	5.8	6.5	7.8	7.2	(230)
Gender						
Men	4.8	6.2	6.7	7.1	7.7	(394)
Women	5.2	6.7	7.3	7.5	7.7	(407)
Age						
18-29	6.2	7.3	7.6	6.7	8.1	(169)
30-39	5.8	6.6	7.2	6.9	7.5	(200)
40-64	4.3	6.0	6.8	7.6	7.5	(294)
65+	3.9	6.1	6.4	7.9	7.7	(133)

	Protecting the Owl	Protecting the Forest	Protecting Old Growth Forests	Protecting Timber Jobs	Protecting Col. River Salmon	N =
Total	5.0	6.4	7.0	7.3	7.7	(800)
Education Less than H.S. H.S. Grad/Vocat. Some College College Graduate	5.6 4.2 5.1 5.8	6.6 6.1 6.5 6.8	7.7 6.5 7.2 7.3	7.7 7.9 7.2 6.6	7.9 7.6 7.7 7.8	(53) (279) (249) (218)
Timber Industry Timber Household Timber Related Household Non-Timber Household	3.5 4.2 5.3	5.0 5.8 6.7	5.7 6.2 7.3	8.7 8.0 7.0	7.2 7.3 7.8	(80) (87) (663)
Union Union Member Teachers' Union Non-Union	4.3 6.1 5.0	5.9 7.4 6.4	6.9 7.3 7.0	7.5 6.6 7.3	7.6 8.3 7.6	(80) (59) (661)
Party Identification Republican Democrat	4.6 5.5	6.1 6.8	6.7 7.3	7.4 7.2	7.3 8.0	(350) (357)
Environmentalist Yes, active Yes, passive No	6.6 5.9 3.6	7.5 6.9 5.7	7.9 7.6 6.1	6.6 6.7 8.1	8.3 8.2 7.0	(142) (301) (357)

Market Strategies, Inc.

Q11. The Endangered Species Act is the law that tries to protect those plants and animals that have a high risk of extinction. Which ONE of the following TWO statements about the Endangered Species Act do you most agree with?

The Endangered Species Act is working well in saving animals from man's indifference, and needs to keep working just as it is.	27%
The Endangered Species Act is well meaning, but it needs to be revised to give greater consideration to its impact on people, such as loss of jobs.	70
Don't know	2
Refused/NA	1

Q12. As you may know, a species recently listed under the Endangered Species Act, is the Columbia River Salmon. In the case of the salmon, two species, the Coho and the Chinook (SHIN-UK), have been declared threatened or endangered on the Columbia River, even though those species are abundant in other river systems in the Northwest.

Which ONE of the following TWO statements on this issue do you most agree with:

We ought to do everything necessary, including raising power rates for everyone in the Northwest, to save the Columbia River salmon.	56%
It is alright to let the wild runs on the Columbia River die out so long as these salmon are doing well elsewhere.	27
Neither/Depends (VOLUNTEERED)	14
Don't know	2
Refused/NA	1

Q13. Which one of the following answers best describes how much you are willing to pay per month in additional charges for electricity to protect Columbia River salmon? (ROTATE READING CODES 1 to 6 TOP TO BOTTOM, BOTTOM TO TOP)

More than \$50 per month in additional charges for electricity to protect the Columbia River salmon	1%
Between \$20 and \$50 per month	7
Between \$10 and \$20 per month	21
Between \$5 and \$10 per month	20
Between \$1 and \$5 per month	25
Not willing to pay any additional charges for electricity to protect the Columbia River salmon	25
Don't know	1
Refused/NA	1

Northwest Issues
Question Results
July 13-18, 1991
N=800

Q1. Do you feel things in your state are generally going in the right direction, or do you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?

Right direction.	50%
Wrong track	44
Don't know	5
Refused/NA	*

Here are some issues. Please tell me how important you think each one is for the state and federal government. We'll use a zero to ten scale with ten meaning EXTREMELY IMPORTANT and zero meaning NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT. You can use any number, the higher the number, the more important you think the issue is.

	6-10 Imp.	5 Neut.	0-4 Not Imp.	Average
Q5. Protecting the Columbia River salmon from extinction	78%	13	8	7.7
Q2. Protecting jobs in the timber industry in your state	71%	17	10	7.3
Q4. Protecting the ancient or old growth forests in your state from commercial logging	66%	17	17	7.0
Q6. Protecting the general forest environment in your state from commercial logging	59%	18	20	6.5
Q3. Protecting the spotted owl from extinction	42%	16	41	5.0

Here are some groups and organizations. Please tell me if your general impression is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable?

	Very Fav	Smwt Fav	Smwt Unfav	Very Unfav	DK/ Ref	Total Fav	Total Unfav
Q9. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service	36%	47	9	4	4	83%	13
Q8. The timber industry	31%	42	19	6	2	73%	25
Q7. Environmental groups	21%	42	21	14	2	63%	36
Q10. Leaders of environmental groups	11%	38	25	19	6	49%	45

Market Strategies, Inc.

Q14. Different users of the Columbia River will pay different amounts if the salmon is to be saved. Which ONE of the following SIX users do you think should pay the MOST?

Q15. Which ONE do you think should pay the LEAST?

	Pay Most	Pay Least
Public power utilities, who own some of the dams on the river.	25	5
Aluminum companies, who buy their power directly from the Bonneville Power Administration.	17	4
Private power utilities, who buy power from Bonneville Power Administration and from public utilities	16	3
Commercial fishermen, who may kill some of these fish.	14	11
Irrigators and other agricultural interests who use the water for irrigation and for moving barges of grain.	8	18
The average ratepayer.	5	55
Don't know	11	4
Refused/NA	4	1

Q16. The Endangered Species Act protects threatened species of PLANTS as well as animals. Since jobs may be lost where any species is protected, do you believe threatened plants should be protected more strictly, about as strictly, or less strictly than threatened animals?

More strictly	5%
About as strictly	49
Less strictly	43
Don't know	3
Refused/NA	1

Logging in the Northwest is another issue in the news...

Q17. Thinking about the forests of the Pacific Northwest, do you think they are protected too much, protected about the right amount, or not protected enough?

Too much	23%
About right	40
Not enough	35
Don't know	2
Refused/NA	*

Market Strategies, Inc.

Q18. Now, please think about how much of the forests of the Pacific Northwest you think SHOULD BE available for commercial logging and jobs and how much should be protected from any logging - just roughly, what percent of ALL the forests SHOULD BE protected FROM ANY logging that is, left just as they are?

Q19. Just roughly, what percent of the forests of the Pacific Northwest do you think ACTUALLY ARE protected FROM ANY logging?

	Should Be	Actually
0-49	38%	47%
50	20	13
51-100	28	15
Mean (Average)	46.5	36.2
Don't know	14	25
Refused/NA	1	*

Q20. Thinking about what are called old growth forests or ancient forests - Some people say it is important to preserve the old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest. Others say the second growth forests are just as good, if not better than, the old growth forests. What is your opinion - do you care if there are old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest, are the second growth forests just as good, or is this a distinction you are not familiar with?

Care if there are old growth forests	51%
Second growth forests just as good	25
Not familiar with distinction	20
Don't know	3
Refused/NA	1

Q21. Just roughly, what percent of the existing old growth forests do you think SHOULD BE protected FROM ANY logging, that is, left just as they are now?

Q22. What percent of the existing old growth forests do you think ACTUALLY ARE protected FROM ANY logging?

	Should Be	Actually
0-49	35%	40%
50	13	13
51-100	42	19
Mean (Average)	56.2	41.4
Don't know	9	28
Refused/NA	1	*

Q23. Are you satisfied or not satisfied with REPLANTING as a general solution to preserving the forest environment of the Pacific Northwest?

Satisfied	73%
Not satisfied	25
Don't know	1
Refused/NA	*

Market Strategies, Inc.

Q24. To your knowledge, how much of the cut timber areas in the Pacific Northwest are replanted - all, most, some, or none?

All	16%
Most	42
Some	37
None	1
Don't know	4
Refused/NA	*

Q25. Are you satisfied or not satisfied with that level of replanting as a solution to preserving the forest environment of the Pacific Northwest?

Satisfied	52%
Not satisfied	46
Don't know	2
Refused/NA	*

Q26. How familiar are you with the spotted owl controversy in the Pacific Northwest - very familiar, somewhat familiar, not very familiar, or not at all familiar?

Very familiar	32%
Somewhat familiar	56
Not very familiar	9
Not at all familiar	3
Don't know	*
Refused/NA	--

Q27. (If familiar) In this controversy, do you find that your sympathies are more with (ROTATE: protecting the spotted owl or more with protecting logging and lumber product jobs)?

Protecting the spotted owl	31%
Protecting logging and lumber product jobs	57
Both equally (VOLUNTEERED)	10
Neither (VOLUNTEERED)	2
Don't know	1
Refused/NA	--

Q28. When considering your vote for a candidate for U.S. Congress, please tell me how important their position on the spotted owl and logging will be in your considerations. On a scale of zero to ten, with ten meaning their position will be your most important consideration and zero meaning you won't consider their position at all, how important do you rate the issue of the spotted owl and logging when voting for Congress?

0-4	21%
5	16
6-10	62
Mean (Average)	6.3
DK/Refused	1

Market Strategies, Inc.

Q29. Are you aware or not aware of a recent federal government proposal to stop logging on an additional 12 million acres of forest to protect the spotted owl from extinction?

Aware	66%
Not aware	33
Don't know	1
Refused/NA	--

Q30. (If aware) Do you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of this proposal?

Strongly approve	17%
Somewhat approve	23
Somewhat disapprove	23
Strongly disapprove	35
Don't know	2
Refused/NA	*

Collapsed

Approve	40%
Disapprove	58
DK/Refused	2

Q31. If the federal government does stop logging on 12 million acres of forest, how serious a problem do you think that would be in the LOSS OF JOBS in your state - extremely serious, very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

Q32. If the federal government does stop logging on 12 million acres of forest, how serious a problem do you think that would be in the LOSS OF TAX REVENUE for your state - extremely serious, very serious, somewhat serious, or not very serious?

	Loss of Jobs	Loss of Tax Revenue
Extremely serious	35%	27%
Very serious	35	31
Somewhat serious	25	32
Not very serious	4	7
Don't know	1	3
Refused/NA	--	--

Collapsed

Serious	70%	57%
Not very serious	29	40
DK/Refused	1	3

Market Strategies, Inc.

Q33. Because it has been listed as a threatened species, current government policy is to protect all the spotted owls throughout northern California, Washington, and Oregon, no matter what the effect on jobs. Do you basically support or oppose this policy?

Support	32%
Oppose	64
Don't know	3
Refused/NA	1

The spotted owls' central living area is in old growth or ancient forests...

Q34. Which one of the following TWO STATEMENTS do you most agree with?

The harvest of old growth timber should be substantially reduced in order to protect the habitat of the spotted owl, even if it means the loss of jobs in the forest products industry.	41%
---	-----

Jobs in the forest products industry must be protected even if it means increasing the risk of extinction of the spotted owl.	50
---	----

Both equal (VOLUNTEERED)	5
Don't know	2
Refused/NA	2

Q35. In order to protect spotted owls, thousands of jobs in the forest products industry may be lost. Which one of the following answers best describes how far you would be willing to go in order to protect the spotted owl? (ROTATE READING CODES 1 TO 6 TOP TO BOTTOM, BOTTOM TO TOP)

Risk more than 30,000 jobs in the forest products industry to protect the spotted owl	8%
Risk between 20,000 and 30,000 jobs	6
Risk between 10,000 and 20,000 jobs	13
Risk between 5,000 and 10,000 jobs	15
Risk less than 5,000 jobs	22
Risk no jobs in the forest products industry to protect the spotted owl	30
Don't know	3
Refused/NA	2
