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Persian Gulf Working Group

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Nov 28

TO: John Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Bob Gates
Andy Card
David Demarest
Deb Amend

FROM: Richard Haass 

Attached are the following for today's 1 pm meeting on public diplomacy and the Gulf:

1. Public Diplomacy themes
2. List of Administration speakers
3. List of background material for briefing books

Public Diplomacy Themes

Why are we in the Gulf?

- to counter aggression and establish acceptable patterns of international relations in post-Cold War era
- to deny an anti-American, anti-Western tyrant from gaining control over bulk of world's energy supplies and through them over world's economy; energy security is national security
- to act to protect US citizens and embassies
- US asked to assist by Saudi Arabia, and essential that US demonstrate will and ability to come to aid of its friends lest friend and foe alike conclude we are no longer reliable
- to protect interests considered vital by every President since Harry Truman
- any one of these concerns would be enough to justify our action; collectively, they make an unassailable case

What are our goals?

- immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from all of Kuwait
- restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government
- security and stability of Gulf region
- protection of American lives

What is our policy?

- in UN, to gain international support for our goals
- with US and other forces, deter additional Iraqi aggression
- with sanctions, deny Iraq benefits of aggression
- gain a peaceful settlement if possible
- act to ensure we have credible options, including military
- use force only if necessary to achieve goals at minimum cost

Why not just allow sanctions more time to work?

- not certain that with time sanctions will work
- no evidence Iraq prepared to give up Kuwait
- we pay a price for waiting:
 - ...Iraqi forces increase and dig in
 - ...Iraq producing more chemical and biological weapons
 - ...Iraq developing nuclear weapons
 - ...world economy already suffering effects of high oil prices
 - ...new democracies at risk

...hostages denied basic human right
 ...US embassy in Kuwait under siege
 ...Kuwait being destroyed/resettled

Why is the President so worried about the US embassy?

--Saddam's attempted closure of our embassy is an effort on their part to erase Kuwait's sovereignty and must be resisted.

--Saddam's treatment of our diplomats, which includes starving them out, is barbaric. It is inhumane and runs contrary to all the norms of international law and civilized behavior.

--The United Nations has rightly condemned this pressure; we reserve the right to take steps to come to the aid of our diplomats and those others held against their will

Aren't we risking the lives of the hostages?

--President's concern for hostages deep and personal; we are doing everything possible to bring about their immediate and unconditional release

--At same time, we cannot allow hostages to determine our policy, or we would be forced to give in to Saddam and in the process only encourage more hostage-taking in the future

--Although we will not stand in their way, we do not believe that individuals should travel to Baghdad even for the purpose of getting hostages released; all of this is a cynical attempt by Saddam to use the hostages for his purposes of distracting attention away from his aggression.

Why is the US doing so much/Why aren't others doing more?

--from outset, this has been a truly international effort

--US one of 27 countries committing military forces

--wealthy countries such as Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paying billions to offset cost of Desert Shield and/or impact of sanctions/higher oil prices on most affected states

--US is taking lead for only US has strength to counter Iraqi armed forces

--US leadership is justified by stakes and what we can accomplish

Why are we getting into another Vietnam?

--We are not. The differences are key:

...US interests/stakes critical and clear in Gulf

...US has support of almost entire international community

...US position has strong UN backing

...unlike North Vietnam, Iraq is not receiving massive outside assistance

...If we must use force, it will be decisive from the outset. We are here to succeed.

Why isn't the administration giving Congress its fair role?

- the administration has been working closely with the Congress from the outset
- consultations and hearings are frequent
- the administration has kept the Congress (or at a minimum the leadership) fully informed
- the administration will continue to act with the Congress as we proceed
- the administration appreciates fully its political and legal authority as well as obligations under the Constitution
- the specific form of cooperation (ie, joint resolution, declaration of war, etc) will depend upon circumstances

Why is the US working to help corrupt, undemocratic sheikhs?

- the US is above all working to keep Saddam from imposing his domination on the region
- we continue to support steps toward democracy and pluralism in the region
- we believe the best way to make progress is by working with existing governments
- it is difficult to see how destroying Kuwait in any way contributes to democratic prospects in the area
- also difficult to see how brutal, dictatorial Saddam has right to impose democracy on anyone

Why does the US refuse to negotiate directly with Saddam?

- this is not a confrontation between Saddam and the US. It is between Saddam and Kuwait and between Saddam and the world
- 10 UNSC resolutions make this clear
- these same resolutions spell out for Saddam what is required for there to be a peaceful settlement
- there is no special US agenda and hence no need for special talks
- we continue to maintain an embassy in Baghdad should Saddam wish to communicate anything of importance to us
- there is no evidence at all that Saddam is prepared to comply with the will of the international community

Why is US against linking this to the Palestinian problem?

- Iraq's aggression against Kuwait demands immediate attention.
- Saddam's attempts to link these two conflicts is only a tactic

to distract attention and dilute international pressure on him
 --best way to promote new opportunities for peace between Israel and Arabs is to settle this dispute, as President indicated in his UNGA speech

--would be understandably difficult to achieve progress on Arab-Israeli front if aggression shown to pay and if Iraq emerges as most powerful state in the region

--two situations entirely different: Kuwait was peaceful state invaded by Iraq without cause; Israel has been rejected/invaded by most Arab states since its inception.

--US goal for Middle East is based upon UNSC resolutions 242 and 338, involving the principles of territory for peace, the right of all states of the region, including Israel, to live in peace, and the satisfaction of legitimate political rights for Palestinians

What will US do if Israel is attacked by Iraq?

--Iraq would be foolish to do so, as it already has more than it can handle arrayed against it

--the US commitment to Israel's security is well-known.

--the US would consult with Israel and take the necessary steps

Why is the administration panning to sell more arms to Arabs?

--the US has longstanding relations with many of the Arab states of the region, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia

--Providing means for security is an essential element of an overall relationship.

--It is also necessary to give our friends the means for contributing to their own self-defense so that future Desert Shields less likely/less demanding

--Our friends have a good history of complying with US laws that arms provided by the US are to be used only in self-defense and transferred to a third party only with US authorization

Why is the President meeting with Assad?

--It is important to work to bring about the strongest and broadest possible coalition against Saddam

--Syria is a key Arab country that borders on Iraq and that has already contributed more than 7,000 troops to Saudi Arabia's defense with pledges of more

--We do have important concerns with Syrian policy vis-a-vis terrorism, Lebanon, human rights and the peace process. Meeting with Assad does not mean we are ignoring these differences but it does give us a forum for raising them in a constructive manner

Why didn't administration do more to prevent Iraqi invasion?

--At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the administration sought to develop an improved relationship with Iraq, one of the key states of this critical region

--toward this end, the US made available limited economic assistance

--as it became increasingly clear that Iraq was not prepared to act with restraint, the administration moved to limit this already modest relationship

--based upon assurances we had received not simply from Iraq but from our friends in the region, we did not believe that Iraq would invade much less occupy Kuwait as it has done

--even had we concluded otherwise, it is not at all apparent that we could have prevented Iraq's invasion given our own limited presence in the region at the time and the prevailing view among our friends

What is our thinking about post-crisis security arrangements?

--the US has had a permanent military presence in the region for more than four decades

--depending upon the nature of the threat we face, we will need to build security arrangements in the Gulf that are militarily effective yet politically acceptable to our friends in the region

--the precise nature of these arrangements, as regards such things as military forces, guarantees, the involvement of outside states, limits on armaments, and so on, will be a matter for consultation

--Safeguards on Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs will be essential

--as the President has said, we are not looking to maintain US forces in Saudi Arabia any longer than is necessary

Gulf: Selected Background Material

- President's speech to marines in Saudi Arabia (Nov 22)
- "Why We Are in the Gulf," Newsweek (Nov 26 issue)
- Presidential statement of Nov 8 (troop increase announcement)
- Sec. Baker speech of Oct 29 (LA World Affairs Council)
- President's speech to UNGA, Oct 1
- Presidential address to jt session of Congress, Sept 11
- President's August 9 Oval Office Address

also:

- weekly CIA unclassified sanctions report
- updated press guidance
- unclassified chronology

GULF SPEAKERS LIST

CABINET LEVEL: Baker, Cheney, Watkins, Powell, Sununu,
Scowcroft, Webster

SUB-CABINET: Gates, Atwood, Eagleburger, Card, Kerr

OTHER:

--DoD: Wolfowitz, Rowan, Hadley, DASD Art Hughes, Office
Dir. Fred Smith

--State: Kimmitt, Ross, Kelly, Bartholomew, Clarke, Amb-Des
Gnehm, DAS Covey, Mack, Burns, Office Dir. Edmund
Hull

--NSC/WH: Haass, Kilberg, Welch, Charles

42930

AC/ER

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECEMBER 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
DAVID DEMAREST

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

FROM: DEB AMEND ~~DA~~
RE: GULF WORKING GROUP STATUS REPORT

Today's meeting included an update from the hearings on the Hill. Reportedly, Secretary Cheney's testimony went better than expected. Copies of testimony (Cheney and Powell) were given to the group for distribution. We'll excerpt key parts for a mass mailings.

A package of background material -- talking points, chronology of events, speech excerpts, key clippings -- was distributed as well. All offices have been instructed to send mailings with this material to all their groups.

Bill Kristol attended a "principals" meeting at the White House this afternoon and shared thematic suggestions with the group, which we will incorporate into our communications efforts. He emphasized the "patience vs the threat of force" theme which was articulated on the Hill today, and the need to defend our objectives in the coming weeks.

Governor Sununu will participate in tomorrow's meeting; General, we'd like you to meet with us on Thursday. All meeting participants have been given specific assignments and will be prepared to report tomorrow.

Action Steps

With your approval, we'd like to get the message out to religious leaders that the troops will indeed be able to participate in religious services at Christmas. There is apparently much confusion on this point. Leigh Ann Metzger will develop a plan for this.

General, attached is an updated OP/ED for your signature we'd like to send to the Washington Post tomorrow.

"In the works"

Tomorrow we'll hear an update on our "grass roots" plan, a communications program to compliment the legislative agenda, public liaison briefings, OP/ED schedule, and expanded surrogate media program.

President Bush's announcement on Friday of direct high-level talks with Iraq was the extra step needed after the U.N. Security Council's endorsement of the use of "all means necessary" against Saddam Hussein should he not leave Kuwait by January 15. Through eleven resolutions, the U.N. Security Council has made its position clear: to pursue a peaceful solution by all means at our disposal, yet to preserve the option of using "all means necessary" to end Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait.

Saddam Hussein apparently has not gotten the message. There should be no mistaking the aim of Secretary Baker's mission: to take the United Nation's message directly to the leadership in Baghdad. When Secretary Baker meets with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, our demands at the table will be the same as those articulated by the President on the first day of the Persian Gulf crisis: the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the protection of American citizens abroad, and the security and stability of the Gulf region.

The President has continued to emphasize his determination to seek a solution through international diplomacy and economic sanctions. Throughout, he has emphasized our commitment to containing aggression that threatens the free world economically, and potentially militarily through the proliferation of chemical, biological, and -- ultimately -- nuclear weapons.

As the debate here at home unfolds, three points about our purpose in the Persian Gulf demand more attention.

First, it is important to avoid attempts to force a false choice between pragmatism and principle. America's interests and ideals, far from being mutually exclusive, are in fact threads of the same cloth. There is no single "bumper-sticker" slogan explaining what's at stake in the Gulf.

The crisis caused by Iraq is in part (but not wholly, as some cynically suggest) a conflict over oil -- but not for the sake of big oil companies and lower prices at the pump.

In the hands of Saddam Hussein, oil is not a resource -- it is a weapon. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait delivers into the hands of a dictator control of a fifth of the world's proven oil reserves -- and an additional fourth lies just beyond his reach in Saudi Arabia. An aggressor's grip over such a substantial share of the world's oil supply is enough to hold the economies of the industrialized world hostage indefinitely, and make life even more difficult for the developing world and struggling democracies.

Second -- far beyond the truism that energy security is national security, and quite apart from the cost of oil to the world -- a more potent threat is the benefit that resource brings to the aggressions of a dictator. The world cannot afford to subsidize a war chest of menacing dimensions, and accelerate development of more sophisticated weapons systems in more aggressive hands.

We must remember Saddam's repeated willingness to turn every resource at his disposal to military ends. The long and destructive war with Iran, the invasion of tiny Kuwait, the willingness to use the most terrible weapons at his disposal not just in war, but against his own people -- all argue against a complacent solution that allows him to conclude that aggression pays.

Third, it is important to resist reductive comparisons to past conflicts. Columnists and commentators should be as wary as generals are about "fighting the last war." Rather than focus on false analogies, far better to recognize the singular circumstances prevailing now.

The geopolitical world is now moving in an unprecedented and largely positive direction. The principles that have defined our history and will determine our future are at stake.

For the first time in the post-war era, regional conflict is not the linchpin of a larger superpower conflict. The odds of a Third World clash leading to an East-West conflagration are remarkably reduced.

Also unique in the post-war era, the strength of the international community (and in particular, the United Nations) expands as East-West tensions contract. In fact, in this case, Iraq's isolation from the rest of the world is virtually complete, thanks to a remarkable world alliance.

Finally, for the first time in the post-war era, the world has an opportunity to deliver in practice the long-held promise

of a new world order -- where the ruthless resort to force goes unrewarded, and individual aggression meets collective resistance.

For that reason, a united response to Saddam's invasion will be a critical test, crucial to crafting a more stable world order. His cynical disregard for international norms and the rule of law must not themselves be rewarded with cynicism. Our response must stand as a stern warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, contemplating outlaw aggression.

This is the burden of leadership. America must lead, as we always have, and as only America can. But equally important, America must work with an international coalition, turning the face of the world against aggression, toward an enduring legacy of peace for generations to follow.

To assure a bright and prosperous future for the industrialized world and the fledgling democracies; to ensure that the lion's share of the world's oil resources don't finance the further aggressions of a tyrant; and to ensure that the dawn of a more stable world order isn't cut short -- that is why American men and women are standing firm in the Persian Gulf.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: November 23, 1990 (Cairo)

FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO: John Sununu
Brent Scowcroft

How much of this has been done?
What more can be done?

Let's discuss next week.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1990

Brent / John
How much of this has been done
90 NOV 14 AM 9:40

What more can be done.
Let's discuss next week
11-24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: DAVID DEMAREST
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS

SUBJECT: COMMUNICATIONS PLAN FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

Here is an outline of some possible communications activities which you and key senior Administration officials could perform over the next three weeks to strengthen public support for Operation Desert Shield.

This communications plan would reassure the American people as to the objectives and purpose of our deployment, and would revolve around your Thanksgiving trip to Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the plan would include three stages: before, during and after the trip.

PRE-TRIP

- o Op-ed pieces with leading foreign policy experts in support of Desert Shield. We are working with Secretary Cheney (for the Wall Street Journal), General Scrowcroft (Washington Post), former President Nixon (New York Times), and possibly General Powell, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cy Vance, and Howard Baker. Op-eds would then be collected and distributed to our key constituent leaders.
- o A Q & A with General Scrowcroft for U.S. News & World Report.
- o An op-ed for Time magazine.
- o A bylined article for Newsweek by you.
- o A half-hour interview by CNN, which would be focus on your personal views of the crisis.
- o A satellite media tour with the Vice President, Secretary Cheney, Governor Sununu, General Powell, General Scrowcroft, and Secretary Baker.

DURING TRIP

- o All speeches (Europe and Middle East) are clearly cross-linked with the theme of the new world order.
- o Press conference in Paris, and press availability in Egypt, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.
- o You deliver USO-sponsored T-shirt and scroll containing the names of 14,000 supportive citizens in Los Angeles to Armed Forces.
- o Op-eds are recirculated among the largest newspapers and news wires.

POST-TRIP

- o A live, 10-minute address to the nation which would be a personal reflection of the Gulf situation, and would talk about the troops, and their dedication and sense of purpose. This would take place immediately upon your return on Friday, November 23rd, at 9:00 p.m.
- o A regional reporters briefing, which would include Secretary Cheney, General Powell, General Scrowcroft, Bob Gates or other senior Administration officials.
- o A "White House on the road" concept, which would involve senior Administration officials working Desert Shield speeches into existing beyond-the-beltway travel plans. Possible venues would include local American Legion and VFW halls, civic and business organizations, and conferences and conventions.
- o Several Roosevelt Room briefings for key constituent leaders to brief them on your trip, and to allow them the opportunity to express reservations and concerns to you directly. Various groupings would include religious, business, labor, and ethnic leaders.

✓ PRES. HELICOPTER TO NORFOLK -
XMAS EVE SERVICE - !

NSC → SEND SOMEONE TO BRIEF
+ EX-PLCS

SATELLITE OUTREACH

December 3, 1990

COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE FOR GULF POLICY
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER

Monday, December 3 (The President in South America thru Dec. 8)

9:00 a.m. -- Secretary Cheney testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee

9:00 a.m. -- General Powell testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee

Mailing/faxing of talking points and briefing materials to surrogates

Op eds updated for distribution this week for the Washington Post by General Scowcroft, the New York Times by Secretary Baker and the Wall Street Journal by Secretary Cheney

Tuesday, December 4

Secretary Cheney travels to Warsaw and Brussels, speaks to the NATO nuclear planning group

General Powell addresses the British Parliamentary group, London

Clippings and background sent out to surrogates

Wednesday, December 5

Secretary Baker testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

General Powell address the Royal United Services Institute, London

Thursday, December 6

Secretary Baker testifies before the House Foreign Relations Committee

Secretary Watkins speaks to the New York Navy League Dinner

Friday, December 7 (Pearl Harbor Day)

Secretary Cheney Press Conference, Brussels

Secretary Watkins addresses the Council of Foreign Relations and the New York Academy of Science, Science Policy Association

Saturday, December 8--Sunday, December 9

Cabinet members booked on weekend public affairs shows

Secretary Cheney addresses the Cody, Wyoming, Chamber of Commerce

Secretary Derwinski addresses the First Serbian Unity Congress Banquet, Cleveland, Ohio

Monday, December 10 (Human Rights Day)

The President meets with Iraq Foreign Minister Aziz (some point this week)

10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Congressional Leaders, Cabinet Room

Vice President Quayle speaks to Republican Governors Association, Pinehurst, North Carolina

Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Houston, Texas

Secretary Cheney speaks to the American Defense Preparedness Association (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium)

General Powell interview with USA Today (tent.)

Office of Public Liaison constituent briefings

Tuesday, December 11

The President tapes Christmas Holiday message to the troops

The President meets with Prime Minister Shamir at the White House

Governor Sununu speaks at National Press Club

Wednesday, December 12

The President meets with Foreign Minister Shevernaze

11:30 -- The President addresses Hanukkah Celebration, Room 450 OEOB

Noon -- The President speaks to the Jobs for American Graduates First Annual Governors Leadership Awards luncheon at the National Press Club

2:00 p.m. -- The President and key officials speak to regional reporters briefing, Room 450 OEOB

Wednesday, December 12 (cont.)

2:00 p.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Second Annual Holiday Reception with Commanders of 23 veterans organizations

Thursday, December 13

8:30 a.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Annual Secretary's overview to veterans organizations

4:30 p.m. -- White House briefing with National Association of Manufacturers, Dr. Haass as tentative briefer

Secretary Cheney participates in a National Guard Birthday celebration

Friday, December 14

Secretary Cheney and General Powell testify to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee (tent.)

Saturday, December 15 -- Sunday, December 16

Cabinet members booked for weekend public affairs shows

Presidential interview with David Frost, Oval Office, Sunday

Monday, December 17

Secretary Baker travels to Brussels for NATO Ministerial (thru Tues. Dec. 18)

General Scowcroft Q and A interview appears in U.S. News and World Report

Secretary Cheney speaks to Council on Foreign Relations, New York City

Tuesday, December 18

10:30 a.m. -- Presidential meeting with Cabinet members

Noon -- The President lunches with Black Newspaper Editors, Roosevelt Room

1:30 -- The Vice President speaks to the Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference

"12/3/90"

December 3, 1990

Completed Activities

Friday, November 30

- Presidential Press Conference
- Presidential interview with People Magazine
- Presidential meeting with Kuwaiti Refugees
- Briefing with the National Association of Arab Americans, Board of Directors with Ambassador Mack and Arthur Hughes, Indian Treaty Room
- Presidential meeting with Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership
- Undersecretary Robert Kimmitt appears on MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour
- Talking points on U.N. vote distributed
- Distribution of the President's remarks to all state chairmen, key political contacts, Republican press secretaries on the Hill and key Public Affairs officials

Saturday, December 1

- Secretary Watkins in the Middle East (thru Dec. 5th)
- The Vice President appears on CNN Evans and Novak
- Deputy National Security Advisor Bob Gates appears on CNN "Newsmaker"

Sunday, December 2

- Secretary Baker appears on "Meet the Press"
- Secretary Cheney appears on "This Week with David Brinkley"
- Senator McCain appears on McLaughlin "One-on-One"
- General Scowcroft appears on "Face the Nation"

Secretary Derwinski attends services aboard U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt with VA Chaplins, in Norfolk, VA

Friday, December 7

Assistant Secretary John Easton addresses the Annual Meeting of the Western Regional Conference, Phoenix, Arizona

Deputy Secretary Moore travels to Texas, California, and Arizona for RNC Eagles Events (thru Dec. 13)

General Alfred M. Gray, CMDT, USMC speaks to Norwich University Symposium in Northfield, Vermont

Sunday, December 9

Deputy Secretary Moore addresses the Bureau of Wholesale Sales in Phoenix

"addendum"

December 3, 1990

Communications Timeline Addendum:

Monday, December 3

Assistant Secretary Robert Gentile, (DOE) addresses Interstate Oil Compact Commission, Phoenix, Arizona

David Welch, Director of the NSC office of Near East and South Asian affairs addresses the Jewish Community Relations Council of Philadelphia, Room 450, OEOB

Tuesday, December 4

Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President (NSC), addresses the National Realty Committee

Deputy Secretary Atwood (DOD) addresses the National Security Industry Association in Dallas Texas and appears before the Dallas Morning News Editorial Board

James Williams, ISA Country Director (DOD) speaks to FEMA in Emmitsburg, Maryland

Tom Miller, NEA (Dept. of State), speaks to the Mid-America Arab Chamber of Commerce, Chicago Illinois

Wednesday, December 5

Edward Gnehm, NEA (Dept. of State), address the World Affairs Council in Portland Oregon

Thursday, December 6

Deputy Assistant Secretary George Helland (DOE) addresses the American Business Council, Singapore

Administrator Calvin Kent (DOE) addresses the 2nd Session of the Conference on Business and Economic Policies, Washington, D.C. and the Conference for Journalists on the Oil Crisis, Washington Journalism Center

Edward Gnehm, NEA (Dept. of State), addresses the World Affairs Council/World Trade Center in Tacoma, Washington

AC/ER

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1990

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

*Set up mtg
with Deb to
amend to
discuss to
attached*

Memorandum for Governor Sununu

From: David Demarest *DD*

Subject: Presidential participation with outside groups

During the next two years, the time available for the President to cultivate, thank, listen to, highlight, garner support from, and reach out to outside groups will be in short supply. I believe that we need to set some parameters that will guide our scheduling decisions -- parameters that have your support, and that of the President's.

The groups listed below would be given the highest priority for time with POTUS. I would propose that any scheduling request with a group other than those listed would require initiation by you or the President. Obviously, more flexibility can be assumed on simple photo-ops, and exempted from this discussion are Cabinet, Congressional, and foreign policy events.

Base Groups: Political

Republicans
Conservatives
Republican office holders
Bush Supporters

Base Groups: Ethnic/Demographic

Asians
European 1st-4th generation
Northern Catholics
Younger voters

Base Groups: Geographic

California, Texas, Southern states
Rocky Mountain States
New England (sans R.I.)

Base Groups: Issue-oriented

Law enforcement/drugs/crime groups
Veterans, national defense groups
Teamsters, conservative union members
Social Value Groups, i.e. MADD, Right-to-life, etc.
Small business, entrepreneurs
Corporate and trade association CEO's
Conservationists
Evangelicals
Anti-tax organizations

Target Groups: Political
Conservative Democrats

Target Groups: Ethnic/Demographic
Blacks
Hispanics
Seniors

Target Groups: Geographic
Industrial Midwest

Target Groups: Issue-oriented
Parents/students/teachers/education reformers
Service Organizations/Points of Light groups/Celebrities
Disability Community
Farm organizations
Sports/fitness/health groups

Agree _____ Disagree _____ Discuss Seems Reasonable


Agree but add/delete the following groups:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET AND AGENCY CONTACTS

FROM: MICHAEL P. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR CABINET LIAISON 

SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Policy -- Communications Package #1

Attached for your information and use is a package of background materials on the Gulf crisis. It includes four items:

1. An "Administration Wire" document that contains excerpts from pertinent speeches by the President, the Vice President and Secretary Baker.
2. A chronology of the eleven United Nations Security Council actions on the Gulf.
3. A four-page "Chronology of Events in the Persian Gulf" -- a brief overview of key events and dates.
4. Testimony delivered yesterday by Secretary Cheney and General Powell to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This package is the first in a series of communications that Cabinet Affairs will send you during the next weeks to provide the Cabinet, agency heads and senior Administration officials with timely information about the Gulf.

Because of the extraordinary importance of these issues, we ask you to ensure that this package and future installments in this series are used well and distributed quickly. Please make them available quickly to your department or agency head and all senior staff, including all PAS officials.

Administration spokespersons should be encouraged, where appropriate, to make use of this material in public remarks. Although we are not trying to mint hundreds of foreign policy spokespersons, it is important that those who do speak on behalf of the Administration are apprised of recent developments and are able, for example, to articulate clearly the four objectives the international community is pursuing in the Gulf (the President's summary is reprinted in attached "Administration Wire").

If you need additional information, do not hesitate to ask. Thanks in advance for your help.

Attachments

PERSIAN GULF

**Excerpts from Chairman Powell's statement before
the Senate Armed Services Committee**

"There can be no doubt that this was one of the largest and most successful deployment operations on our nation's history. No other country could have attempted or even contemplated doing what we have accomplished.

"To put it in some perspective, to date, the United States has airlifted over 200,000 personnel and some 210,000 short tons of equipment. This is comparable to moving the entire city of Richmond, Virginia 8,000 miles to the Saudi desert.

"By the sixth week of Operation Desert Shield, we had already moved by air the equivalent of the entire Berlin Airlift -- an operation which had taken place over 65 weeks. As of today, we have airlifted enough cargo to equal 2 1/2 Berlin Airlifts.

"To provide another comparison, more personnel and equipment were moved in the first three weeks of Operation Desert Shield that were moved in the first 3 months of the Korean conflict."

"Overall, the message this truly unprecedented multinational force has sent to Saddam Hussein has been and remains strong and unwavering. With over 200,000 allied troops en route or in place alongside U.S. forces, a credible collective security force stands ready to defeat Saddam's aggression."

"Our equipment readiness has exceed expectations and thus, must be considered exceptional, given the harsh demands of the desert environment."

"Desert Shield presented this nation with the first large-scale practical test of the Total Force Policy. . . Reserve volunteers were vital to the success of the early stages of this operation. . . [D]uring the early weeks of August some 10,000 reserve volunteers per week provided such critical functions as airlift and tanker support. It is safe to say that without them the swift and efficient deployment of our forces would not have been possible."

"[T]he success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the Total Force concept."

"I have been very proud of the conduct of our troops -- they have been diplomats in the truest sense of the word. Senior Saudi officials, as well as Saudi citizens, have expressed to Secretary Cheney and myself their gratitude and appreciation for our troops' behavior."

Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990

PERSIAN GULF

**Excerpts from Secretary Cheney's statement to the
Senate Armed Services Committee**

"... I firmly believe that without this operation (Operation Desert Shield) Iraqi forces would not have stopped short of Dhahran, and we would today be contemplating the liberation of Saudi Arabia as well as the liberation of Kuwait."

"The decision to put young men and women at risk has always been one of the most difficult our nation can make. . . .For that reason, it is important that our citizens understand why American troops are in the Gulf."

"The first reason behind the President's policy is the prospect for further aggression."

"Unless Iraq leaves Kuwait, it will pose a continuing threat to Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, and ultimately the United States. Iraq is governed by a regime that will say and do virtually anything to achieve its ends.

"Since the invasion, Iraq has done its best to erase Kuwait as a state and as a culture. Saddam's soldiers have forced Kuwaiti citizens to swear allegiance to Iraq at gunpoint. Kuwaiti citizenship, passports, and currency are no longer recognized.

"Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, was both treacherous and cynical. It was also, and it continues to be, shockingly brutal.

"If Iraq's ambitions are not curbed today they will just grow stronger. . . .In the future, Iraq could possess nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver them. Aggression begets aggression. We cannot afford to look the other way."

"The second reason is the danger of Saddam Hussein's domination of world oil supplies."

"The potential for Saddam Hussein to gain a dominant share of the world's oil is quite real. . . .There are, in fact, two reasons we must be concerned with Saddam's potential control of the Middle East's oil wealth.

"First, is his control of supply. . . .Consider the impact Iraq could have on the world's economies. Threatened disruptions in supply could inspire buying panics, and actual disruptions could move some economies into recession. The mere ability to threaten such disruptions would enable him to blackmail the world.

"The second reason concerns wealth. Iraq has used its wealth to build its military, not its economy, and there is every reason to think that pattern will continue. . . .So it is an error to look at our policy in the Gulf and see it as a reaction to oil prices. The fact is, for Hussein, oil is not so much a resource as a weapon of war."

Administration Wire 12/4/90

Page two.

"The final reason we are in the Gulf is that Iraq's destruction of Kuwait strikes at the heart of the kind of world we are trying to build in the post-cold war era."

"We must also be certain we understand what it means to say that sanctions are working. There is a difference, especially in a dictatorship like Iraq, between an embargo having an economic impact, even a severe one, and concluding that the embargo is working. Authoritarian regimes have a significant ability to withstand economic hardship, since popular discontent is easily stifled. Just because the Iraqi people may find certain staples hard to get, does not necessarily translate into a changed attitude on Saddam Hussein's part.

"So we must not create a false dichotomy between sanctions and a military option. They are mutually reinforcing parts of a broad strategy to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

"People sometimes underestimate both the patience and staying power of the American people. The fact that we stayed the course in Western Europe for forty-five years, even through dark periods when the experts said our struggle against communism was hopeless proves that we can persevere when we must.

". . . But having a capacity for patience does not mean we must remain patient when patience is not producing results. We must always have other options, and that is what the new deployments and the recent United Nations action are all about. They will broaden the options of the United States and its Allies and simultaneously narrow those of Saddam Hussein. They are a necessary next step toward the President's and the world's goal of restoring Kuwait to freedom and independence."

Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990

For more information, please contact the Office of Public Affairs at the White House
202/456-2483.

December 4, 1990

**COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE FOR GULF POLICY
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER**

Tuesday, December 4

Secretary Cheney travels to Warsaw and Brussels, speaks to the NATO nuclear planning group

General Powell addresses the British Parliamentary group, London
Clippings and background sent out to surrogates

Wednesday, December 5

Secretary Baker testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

General Powell address the Royal United Services Institute, London

Thursday, December 6

Secretary Baker testifies before the House Foreign Relations Committee

Secretary Watkins speaks to the New York Navy League Dinner

Friday, December 7 (Pearl Harbor Day)

Secretary Cheney Press Conference, Brussels

Secretary Watkins addresses the Council of Foreign Relations and the New York Academy of Science, Science Policy Association and the Jewish Community Relations Council

Saturday, December 8--Sunday, December 9

Cabinet members booked on weekend public affairs shows

Secretary Cheney addresses the Cody, Wyoming, Chamber of Commerce

Secretary Derwinski addresses the First Serbian Unity Congress Banquet, Cleveland, Ohio

Monday, December 10 (Human Rights Day)

The President meets with Iraq Foreign Minister Aziz (some point this week)

9:30 a.m. -- The President meets with Mother Teresa in the Residence

10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Congressional Leaders, Cabinet Room

2:00 p.m. -- The President meets with President Vytautas Landsbergis of Lithuania, Oval Office

Vice President Quayle speaks to Republican Governors Association, Pinehurst, North Carolina

Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Houston, Texas

Secretary Cheney speaks to the American Defense Preparedness Association (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium)

General Powell interview with USA Today (tent.)

Office of Public Liaison constituent briefings

Tuesday, December 11

The President tapes Christmas Holiday message to the troops

10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Prime Minister Shamir at the White House, Oval Office

Governor Sununu speaks at National Press Club

Wednesday, December 12

The President meets with Foreign Minister Shevernaze

11:30 -- The President addresses Hanukkah Celebration, Room 450 OEOB

Noon -- The President speaks to the Jobs for American Graduates First Annual Governors Leadership Awards luncheon at the National Press Club

2:00 p.m. -- The President and key officials speak to regional reporters briefing, Room 450 OEOB

2:00 p.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Second Annual Holiday Reception with Commanders of 23 veterans organizations

Thursday, December 13

8:30 a.m. -- Secretary Derwinski hosts Annual Secretary's overview to veterans organizations

4:30 p.m. -- White House briefing with National Association of Manufacturers, Dr. Haass as tentative briefer

Secretary Cheney participates in a National Guard Birthday celebration

Friday, December 14

Secretary Cheney and General Powell testify to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee (tent.)

Saturday, December 15 -- Sunday, December 16

Cabinet members booked for weekend public affairs shows

9:30 a.m. -- Presidential interview with David Frost, Oval Office, Sunday

Monday, December 17

3:00 p.m. -- The President participates in a diplomatic credentialing ceremony, East Room

Secretary Baker travels to Brussels for NATO Ministerial (thru Tues. Dec. 18)

General Scowcroft Q and A interview appears in U.S. News and World Report

Secretary Cheney speaks to Council on Foreign Relations, New York City

Tuesday, December 18

10:30 a.m. -- Presidential meeting with Cabinet members

Noon -- The President lunches with Black Newspaper Editors, Roosevelt Room

1:30 -- The Vice President speaks to the Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference

December 4, 1990

Completed Activities

Friday, November 30

- Presidential Press Conference
- Presidential interview with People Magazine
- Presidential meeting with Kuwaiti Refugees
- Briefing with the National Association of Arab Americans, Board of Directors with Ambassador Mack and Arthur Hughes, Indian Treaty Room
- Presidential meeting with Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership
- Undersecretary Robert Kimmitt appears on MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour
- Talking points on U.N. vote distributed
- Distribution of the President's remarks to all state chairmen, key political contacts, Republican press secretaries on the Hill and key Public Affairs officials

Saturday, December 1

- Secretary Watkins in the Middle East (thru Dec. 5th)
- The Vice President appears on CNN Evans and Novak
- Deputy National Security Advisor Bob Gates appears on CNN "Newsmaker"

Sunday, December 2

- Secretary Baker appears on "Meet the Press"
- Secretary Cheney appears on "This Week with David Brinkley"
- Senator McCain appears on McLaughlin "One-on-One"
- General Scowcroft appears on "Face the Nation"

Secretary Derwinski attends services aboard U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt with VA Chaplains, in Norfolk, VA

Monday, December 3 (The President in South America thru Dec. 8)

-- Secretary Cheney testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee

-- General Powell testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee

-- Mailing/faxing of talking points and briefing materials to surrogates and copies of testimonial statements distributed

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NOVEMBER 28, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: DAVID DEMAREST 

RE: COMMUNICATIONS PLAN -- OPERATION DESERT SHIELD ✓

Objective:

- o Reassure the American people as to the objectives and purpose of our deployment and strengthen public support for Operation Desert Shield. Ultimately, our goal is broad, grass-roots support for the President's initiative.

Strategy:

- o Coordinate and focus all the appropriate resources of the Administration to get our message out to the American people.
- o Establish a White House/agency communications working group to manage a sustained effort, aimed at delivering a consistent message and developing appropriate events. (Designed after Souter/S&L working groups.)

Message:

- o Thematically, we need to tell people why we are there and what we mean to achieve. Specific information on details of our involvement, purpose, international and UN support, etc., should be updated regularly and as events dictate.
- o As time passes, the President's critics will become more vocal. The message that the President has gone to historic lengths to avoid war (economic embargo and ten UN resolutions) and garnered unprecedented international support should be a fundamental component of all outreach activity.


Target Groups:

- o Potential surrogates (groups and individuals) who already support the President should be given immediate priority. With proper briefing material and talking points, veterans groups, key business leaders, Members of Congress, foreign policy experts, friendly columnists, administration officials and party leaders can give the President's message resonance almost immediately.

- o Opinion leaders of every stripe should be targeted for special and appropriate attention. This would include the "inside the beltway" foreign policy experts, minorities, veterans, religious and ethnic leaders, the business community, educators, labor leaders and elected officials.
- o Media, including editorial boards, national publications, columnists, regional and specialty press.

Tactics:

Immediately:

- o Keying off the UN vote on Thursday:
 - Offer up key administration spokesmen (Sununu, Cheney, Baker, Powell) for satellite interviews on Thursday. Radio interviews as well.
 - Presidential news conference in the briefing room on Thursday immediately after the UN vote.
 - Roosevelt Room meeting with the President and big gun foreign policy experts (former Presidents, former Secretaries of State and Defense, former National Security Advisors).
 - Presidential meeting with the recently escaped citizens from Kuwait who are testifying at the UN.
- o Covering the weekend news:
 - Offer up all senior administration spokesmen for the various weekend public affairs shows.
- o Focus on next week's publications and news:
 - A Q & A interview with General Scowcroft for U.S. News and World Report (Monday).
 - A Q & A interview with General Powell for USA Today (Monday).
 - Distribute OP/EDs by Secretary Cheney, General Scowcroft and Secretary Baker to the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and New York Times, respectively, on a timeline. Prepare guest editorials for LA Times and "Time" Magazine.
 - National Press Club speech by top administration official. 

Between now and Christmas:

- o Encourage the formation of a major grass-roots effort in support of the President's efforts in the Middle East.
- o While the President is in South America, mail and fax out talking points, favorable clippings and background material to all potential surrogates, from Cabinet officials to local interest groups leaders.

- o Once a week for at least the next eight weeks we should send out appropriate material to what will no doubt be an extensive list of opinion leaders across the country.
- o Fred McClure mailing to Members of Congress with appropriate background material; Presidential briefing with Members after the South America Trip. We are already lining up Members of Congress to write OP/EDs. List of potential surrogates will be provided by legislative affairs.
- o Pearl Harbor Day will no doubt receive great attention this year; ABC's Nightline has already announced an expanded program on December 7th to talk about the Gulf crisis. All administration spokesmen should be prepared to talk about our objectives in Saudi Arabia that day.
- o December 10 is Human Rights Day. Hold a White House event to sign proclamation and make a statement about human rights violations by Iraq.
- o The Vice President is speaking to the annual meeting of the Republican Governors Association next weekend. He can use this speech (and other forums) to articulate the President's objectives in the Middle East.
- o It should be made clear to all Cabinet members (and other administration officials) that they should seek out opportunities to get the President's message across. The President should meet with the Cabinet the week of December 10 to articulate this.
- o Schedule regional media luncheon with reporters and editors from across the country during the week of December 10, 1990. Schedule proposal attached.
- o Invite Mrs. Thatcher to the White House for a visit. Schedule her in key foreign policy forums while she is in the United States.
- o Schedule both Roosevelt Room and room 450 briefings for a variety of constituent groups. These would include:
 - Top CEOs from across the country
 - Religions Leaders/Minority Groups
 - Foreign Policy Group/Veterans Groups
 - Business Leaders/oil executives
 - Labor leaders/Educators/Ethnic Groups

- o Target key media markets across the country for exclusive interviews, OP/EDs by appropriate surrogates and speeches by administration spokesmen. Suggested "White House on the Road" concept from original Demarest plan.
- o The President had Thanksgiving with the troops in Saudi Arabia; we'd like him to share part of the Christmas season with the families they left behind by taking a Christmas Eve trip to a large military base or hosting an event with military families here at the White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE

AC/ER

WASHINGTON

DECEMBER 2, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID DEMAREST

RE: STATUS REPORT - GULF WORKING GROUP

Our Gulf Working Group is up and running, with representatives of all concerned agencies and the various offices of the White House meeting daily to coordinate our communications effort.

Attached is a timeline of confirmed events and activities related to the Gulf. This will be updated for your use daily. I'll be on the trip this week. In my absence, Deb Amend will chair the working group and will write a brief status report for you every day highlighting actions steps for your approval and outlining plans in the works but not yet confirmed on the timeline.

Action Steps

1. We'd like to get the four former President's more involved. We may need to send NSC representatives out to brief them, and we'd like to propose that the President invite them here to the White House for a luncheon meeting before Christmas. (The President has never met with all the former Presidents at one time before.)

2. There was unanimity among the members of the group that the President and Mrs. Bush share part of the Christmas season with the families of the service men and women in the Gulf. We'd like to schedule an event of some sort to highlight the President's concern for the families. Among our ideas: a trip to a large military base to attend Christmas Eve services or host an event with them here at the White House.

"In the Works"

Talking points have been staffed for clearance on Monday. OP/EDs by Secretaries Cheney and Baker and General Scowcroft are being updated to include information about Friday's announcement and will be ready for placement in the major papers next week.

With the President in South America this week, we will focus on surrogates:

-- We'll schedule high-level administration officials for interviews, satellite feeds, etc.

-- Highlights of the congressional testimony of Secretary Baker, Cheney and General Powell will be distributed widely, as will the assorted briefing material we are assembling.

-- We'll fax and mail material to an extensive list of surrogates both in and outside the Administration.

-- Fred McClure will mail a package of briefing material to Members of Congress.

-- We will develop a briefing package for the Republican Governors meeting in North Carolina next weekend.

Bobbie Kilberg, Sichan Siv and Leigh Ann Metzger will be working on a proposal for White House constituent group briefings (presidential and non-presidential) over the next two months.

Leigh Ann Metzger will be working with representatives of the VA this week to develop a plan for a major grass-roots effort centered around the veterans organizations across the country.

David Carney and Bill Sittman will be talking with Kuwaiti representatives here to determine the willingness of the Kuwaiti officials to make speeches, write OP/EDs, and give media interviews.

December 2, 1990

**COMMUNICATIONS TIMELINE FOR GULF POLICY
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER**

Sunday, December 2

10:30 a.m. -- Secretary Baker appears on "Meet the Press"

10:30 a.m. -- Secretary Cheney appears on "This Week with David Brinkley"

12:30 p.m. -- Senator McCain appears on McLaughlin "One-on-One"

1:00 p.m. -- General Scowcroft appears on "Face the Nation"

Secretary Derwinski attends services aboard U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt with VA Chaplins, in Norfolk, VA

Monday, December 3 (The President in South America thru Dec. 8)

9:00 a.m. -- Secretary Cheney testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee

9:00 a.m. -- General Powell testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee

Mailing/faxing of talking points and briefing materials to surrogates

Op eds distributed for the Washington Post by General Scowcroft, the New York Times by Secretary Baker and the Wall Street Journal by Secretary Cheney

Tuesday, December 4

Secretary Cheney travels to Warsaw and Brussels, speaks to the NATO nuclear planning group

General Powell addresses the British Parliamentary group, London

Clippings and background sent out to surrogates

Wednesday, December 5

Secretary Baker testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

General Powell address the Royal United Services Institute, London

Thursday, December 6

Secretary Baker testifies before the House Foreign Relations Committee

Secretary Watkins speaks to the New York Navy League Dinner

Friday, December 7 (Pearl Harbor Day)

Secretary Cheney Press Conference, Brussels

Secretary Watkins addresses the Council of Foreign Relations and the New York Academy of Science, Science Policy Association

Saturday, December 8--Sunday, December 9

Cabinet members booked on weekend public affairs shows

Secretary Cheney addresses the Cody, Wyoming, Chamber of Commerce

Secretary Derwinski addresses the First Serbian Unity Congress Banquet, Cleveland, Ohio

Monday, December 10 (Human Rights Day)

The President meets with Iraq Foreign Minister Aziz (some point this week)

10:00 a.m. -- The President meets with Congressional Leaders, Cabinet Room

Vice President Quayle speaks to Republican Governors Association, Pinehurst, North Carolina

Secretary Baker meets with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Houston, Texas

Secretary Cheney speaks to the American Defense Preparedness Association (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Symposium)

General Powell interview with USA Today (tent.)

Office of Public Liaison constituent briefings

Tuesday, December 11

The President tapes Christmas Holiday message to the troops

The President meets with Prime Minister Shamir at the White House

Governor Sununu speaks at National Press Club

Wednesday, December 12

The President meets with Foreign Minister Shevernaze

Noon -- The President speaks to the Jobs for American Graduates First Annual Governors Leadership Awards luncheon at the National Press Club

2:00 p.m. -- The President and key officials speak to regional reporters briefing, Room 450 OEOB

Secretary Derwinski hosts Commanders Call with Senior Veterans Officials

Thursday, December 13

4:30 p.m. -- White House briefing with National Association of Manufacturers

Secretary Cheney participates in a National Guard Birthday celebration

Friday, December 14

Secretary Cheney and General Powell testify to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee (tent.)

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Secretary Cheney speaks to Council on Foreign Relations, New York City

Tuesday, December 18

10:30 a.m. -- Presidential meeting with Cabinet members

Noon -- The President lunches with Black Newspaper Editors, Roosevelt Room

1:30 -- The Vice President speaks to the Foreign Policy Research Institute Conference

December 2, 1990

Completed Activities

Friday, November 30

- Presidential Press Conference
- Presidential interview with People Magazine
- Presidential meeting with Kuwaiti Refugees
- Briefing with the National Association of Arab Americans, Board of Directors with Ambassador Mack and Arthur Hughes, Indian Treaty Room
- Presidential meeting with Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership
- Undersecretary Robert Kimmitt appears on MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour
- Talking points on U.N. vote distributed
- Distribution of the President's remarks to all state chairmen, key political contacts, Republican press secretaries on the Hill and key Public Affairs officials

Saturday, December 1

- Secretary Watkins in the Middle East (thru Dec. 5th)
- The Vice President appears on CNN Evans and Novak
- Deputy National Security Advisor Bob Gates appears on CNN "Newsmaker"

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECEMBER 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE GULF COMMUNICATIONS WORKING GROUP

FROM: DEB AMEND *DA*

RE: BRIEFING MATERIAL ON THE GULF

Attached is a package of background material on the Gulf for your use and distribution. It includes a fact sheet; the UN Security Council resolutions; a chronology of events; as well as recent clippings, editorials, and highlights of recent speeches by the President, the Vice President and Secretary Baker. This material will be updated regularly.

Gulf Fact Sheet

- o The President's goals in the gulf are clear; they are the goals of the world community. With the backing of twelve United Nations Resolutions, armed forces from 26 countries, and 50 countries helping financially, the international community seeks:
 - Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.
 - Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
 - The release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies.
 - Security and stability of the Gulf region.
- o With unprecedented international support, the United Nations Security Council has authorized the use "of all necessary means" to stop Saddam Hussein, as of January 15, 1991.
- o The stakes in letting Saddam's actions go unchecked are very high. At a time in history when the rules of the post-cold war are being written, Saddam:
 - Is a dangerous dictator unafraid of using force to achieve his political goals.
 - Has weapons of mass destruction and is ambitiously pursuing development of nuclear weapons technology.
 - Desires to control one of the world's critical resources--oil.
- o We must stop Saddam Hussein now or face greater and even more dangerous challenges from him and those who would emulate him in the future.
- o Comprehensive economic sanctions currently in place may not be enough to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Despite evidence of economic hardship in Iraq, it is indeterminable whether the sanctions will achieve the stated goals.
- o The cost of waiting for the sanctions to achieve our goals increases as time marches on. With each passing day:
 - Saddam introduces more forces into Kuwait and Southern Iraq while reinforcing those already there. He is also producing more chemical and biological weapons.

- Iraq gets closer to possessing nuclear weapons capability.
- The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe and developing countries everywhere are being severely damaged by the economic effects of Saddam's actions.
- And on a human level, Kuwait and its citizens are being brutally mistreated, hostages remain held, and our embassy in Kuwait remains under siege.
- o Any one of these concerns is enough to justify our action; collectively, **they make an unassailable case.**
- o **The world wants a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the Persian Gulf. The best way to get one is to make clear to Saddam that the alternative is much more threatening.**
- o **The time between now and January 15, 1990 provides a real chance for diplomacy to work so long as it is consistent with the U.N. Resolutions.**
- o **In an extraordinary effort to reach a peaceful settlement--go the extra mile--the President has:**
 - Offered to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, in Washington, DC.
 - Announced he will send Secretary Baker to meet with Saddam in Baghdad.
- o **These meetings will only be conducted within the mandates of the U.N. resolutions. The purpose is not to negotiate; nor is it to reward Iraq in any way for its aggression or to discuss related issues. The purpose is to impress upon Iraq's leadership the determination of the world that Iraq withdraw, and the consequences for Iraq if it does not.**

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to Saddam Hussein:

"We continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Peace is your only sensible option. You can choose peace by respecting the will of the international community. But if you fail to do so, you will risk all. The choice is yours."

-- Secretary Baker at the United Nations
November 29, 1990

The Gulf Crisis: UN Security Council Actions

International Community Condemns Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Within the forum of the United Nations, the international community condemned Iraq's unprovoked invasion of Kuwait. Since August 2, the UN Security Council has passed 11 resolutions condemning the invasion and calling for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

- ▶ **August 2—Resolution 660.** Condemns invasion. Demands unconditional and immediate withdrawal. Vote: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Yemen).
- ▶ **August 6—Resolution 661.** Imposes economic sanctions. Authorizes non-military measures to enforce trade sanctions. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).
- ▶ **August 9—Resolution 662.** Declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **August 18—Resolution 664.** Condemns Iraq for holding foreign nationals hostage and demands their immediate release. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **August 25—Resolution 665.** Outlaws all trade with Iraq by land, sea, and air. Bars financial dealings with all UN members. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).
- ▶ **September 13—Resolution 666.** Limits humanitarian food supplies to Iraq and occupied Kuwait and empowers Security Council to determine when such shipments are justified. Vote: 13 for, 2 opposed (Yemen and Cuba).
- ▶ **September 16—Resolution 667.** Condemns Iraq for violence against foreign embassies and diplomats in Kuwait. Demands protection for diplomatic and consular personnel. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **September 24—Resolution 669.** Agrees to consider exceptions to Resolution 661 for shipment of humanitarian supplies and authorizes examination of requests for economic assistance under Article 50. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **September 25—Resolution 670.** Tightens embargo on air traffic and authorizes detention of Iraq's merchant fleet. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **October 29—Resolution 674.** Holds Iraq responsible for all financial losses resulting from invasion and seeks evidence of human rights abuses by Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Calls for the release of third-country nationals and the provision of food to those being held against their will. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).
- ▶ **November 29—Resolution 678.** Authorizes "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold the above resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991. Vote: 12 for, 2 against (Yemen and Cuba), 1 abstention (China). ■



CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

- July 18 Saddam Hussein accuses Kuwait of driving down the price of crude oil and reasserts Iraqi claims to oil in a disputed border area inside Kuwait.
- July 25 Iraq builds-up its military stationed on the border with Saudi Arabia.
- U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, meets in Baghdad with Saddam who asserts his hopes for a peaceful resolution to the situation with Kuwait through talks, not violence.
- August 1 Talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapse.
- August 2 Iraqi troops cross the border into Kuwait and gain control of the country by seizing oil fields and forcing the royal family to flee to Saudi Arabia.
- President Bush signs an Executive Order blocking Kuwaiti Government property, and an Executive Order blocking Iraqi Government property and prohibiting transactions with Iraq.
- The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives endorse President Bush's embargo and condemn Saddam's aggression.
- The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 660 which condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demands the unconditional, immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and calls on both countries to negotiate.
- August 6 King Fahd invites forces into Saudi Arabia to reinforce its defenses.
- Iraqi troops gather British and American citizens in Kuwait and transfer them to Iraq.
- The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 661 which imposes a trade and financial embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait, establishes a special sanctions committee to implement the resolution and asks U.N. members to protect Kuwaiti assets in their country.
- August 8 In a nationally televised address to the nation, President Bush announces the deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf, condemns Saddam's aggression, and sets out the four principles guiding U.S. policy for the crisis.

Iraq announces the annexation of Kuwait.

- August 9 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 662 which declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void.
- August 10 President Bush signs an Executive Order blocking Kuwaiti Government property and prohibiting transactions with Kuwait.
- Twelve members of the Arab League vote to send a peacekeeping force to Saudi Arabia.
- August 16 President Bush orders the U.S. Navy to intercept shipping to and from Iraq and Kuwait.
- August 18 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 664 demanding the immediate release of foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait and the right of diplomats to visit their nationals. This Resolution also insists that Iraq rescind its order closing diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.
- August 25 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 665 authorizing "measures as may be necessary," such as the use of Western navies, to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq.
- August 28 Iraq officially "designates" Kuwait as its 19th governate.
- August 29 President Bush addresses the Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf by taped radio message.
- September 7 The U.S. puts Iraq on list of states sponsoring terrorism.
- September 11 President Bush addresses a Joint Session of Congress, reiterating the message that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait "immediately and without condition." Twenty nations' navies agree to enforce the U.N. blockade of Iraq.
- September 12 President Bush tapes an eight minute message to the Iraqi people.
- September 13 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 666 which reaffirms Iraq's responsibility for the safety and well-being of all foreign nationals.
- September 16 Iraqi television shows President Bush's videotaped speech to the Iraqi people explaining the reasons for the world's condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

- The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 667 condemning Iraqi aggression against diplomats and diplomatic compounds in Kuwait. This Resolution also demands the immediate release of all foreign nationals.
- September 24 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 669 emphasizing that only the special sanctions committee (established by Resolution 661) has the ability to authorize humanitarian aid shipments to Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
- September 25 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 670 which requires each member state to impose an air transport embargo against Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
- October 1 The Senate passes a resolution supporting President Bush's efforts "to deter Iraqi aggression."
- October 5 Secretary of Defense Cheney announces that 25 nations have contributed to the air, naval or ground force deployments.
- October 25 Secretary Cheney announces that the U.S. may order additional American troops to the Gulf.
- October 29 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 674 aimed at forcing Iraq out of Kuwait by demanding an end to hostage taking and calling on Iraq to ensure basic necessities to protect Kuwaitis and third country nationals. This Resolution also served as a reminder to Iraq that it is liable for all damages to foreigners or their property resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
- November 2 The White House announces that President Bush will spend Thanksgiving Day with the U.S. forces deployed in the Gulf and will confer with Saudi, Egyptian and Kuwaiti leaders on the situation.
- November 8 President Bush announces that additional land, sea and air forces will be deployed to the Gulf.
- November 9 The General Committee of the U.N. General Assembly refuses a request from Iraq to place the U.S. military concentration in the Gulf as a threat to peace. Instead the members label Iraq as the threat to peace in the region, brand Iraq as the aggressor and accuse Baghdad of obstruction of U.N. procedures.
- November 22 President and Mrs. Bush celebrate Thanksgiving with the U.S. forces deployed in the Gulf.

- November 26 A draft text of a U.N. Security Council resolution giving Iraq "one final opportunity" to withdraw its forces from Kuwait or face the consequences of a possible armed conflict was released. This resolution was drafted due to Iraq's refusal to comply with previous resolutions demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
- November 27 Ambassador Mohammed A. Abulhasan, the Kuwaiti Permanent Representative to the U.N., and six individuals who fled Kuwait since the Iraqi invasion appeared before the U.N. Security Council to give eyewitness reports of the atrocities of the Iraqi military.
- November 28 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 677 condemning Iraq's destruction of Kuwaiti civil records and Iraq's attempts to change Kuwait's demographic composition.
- November 29 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 678 which gives Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw its troops from Kuwait or face the possibility of military action by any member states.
- November 30 In a nationally televised press conference, President Bush outlines the Administration's four objectives in the Gulf: "We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies; and we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world," and announces his willingness to go the extra mile by inviting Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to Washington to meet with him during the week of December 10th. Additionally, President Bush announces that he will ask Iraq's President to receive Secretary of State Baker in Baghdad at a mutually convenient time between December 15th and January 15th of 1991.

Bush Has Made the Right Moves, So Far

By Caspar W. Weinberger

WASHINGTON

I believe President Bush is doing what has to be done in the Persian Gulf and is doing it very well. That was clearly the majority view of the nation immediately after Saddam Hussein's conquest of Kuwait, but since then there has been disarray and confusion.

In sending James Baker to Baghdad and inviting Iraq's Foreign Minister to Washington, Mr. Bush has struck the right note. It is well that he warned Mr. Hussein not to misread our motives. The trips must not be viewed as involving standard negotiations in which both sides give a little to achieve an agreement. The only peace acceptable is a peace under which Mr. Hussein gives up what he has stolen, makes reparations for his theft and is left without the ability to steal again.

Before Mr. Bush's announcement, he had encountered increasing opposition and questions, claims that our goals are not clear, contentions that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are not worthy of being defended, and cries for a negotiated peace. There have even

Caspar W. Weinberger was Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Defense.

been demonstrations by a few moth-eaten relics of the Vietnam peace movement, which despite their small size have been given undue prominence on TV news.

There are Americans who not only support our being in the gulf but want us to attack immediately. There are still others who think the embargo will not work but content themselves with saying that and with professing "profound pessimism" or some equally helpful analysis.

There really is and should be no confusion about why Mr. Bush sent the troops to the gulf. We are there to prevent a particularly brutal aggression that, if successful, would have badly crippled a large part of the world and left us subject to continual blackmail by one of the world's most miserable leaders. President Bush's Thanksgiving speech to our troops in Saudi Arabia made that crystal clear.

That we have not always acted with such dispatch and effectiveness every time some aggression has occurred is beside the point, and hardly an argument for not trying to establish the rule of law globally now.

To say we are in the gulf only because of oil is to trivialize the great role we are playing. Of course oil is important to our civilization — just how important we'd easily know if Saddam Hussein had been allowed to carry out his plan to march through

Saudi Arabia and take the United Arab Emirates, thereby securing control of at least 70 percent of the world's known oil reserves.

The troops know why they are in the gulf even if many opponents profess to be "unclear" and "puzzled." The troops appreciate that aggressors cannot be allowed to keep what they steal. By protecting the world from continual blackmail and relieving it of the incalculable cost of clawing Mr. Hussein out of Saudi Arabia and the emirates, we achieve complementary goals: preventing aggression from succeeding and from undermining the quality of life Americans and millions of others enjoy.

As for the specious argument that we should not oppose Iraqi aggression because Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are not as pure as some would like, let's remember when we heard a similar argument: "We should not support the Shah of Iran because his Government has done repressive things." But that overlooked the alternative: the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. So, are we going to let Mr. Hussein keep Kuwait because Kuwait is not everything its critic want?

What is this negotiated peace so many want? Some advocates tip their hands when they talk of Iraq's "historical claims" to Kuwait. But no one can contend that Kuwait invaded Iraq. If some country's claims on

another justify a brutal invasion, freedom and the rule of law are dead. What kind of negotiated settlement can we reach with a mass murderer who suppressed Iraqi Kurds seeking some small measure of freedom? What would be the terms of such a compromise or negotiations?

Would we let him keep half of Kuwait? Or "to save Saddam's face," which seems to be the goal of some who talk compromise, would we let him retire gracefully from Kuwait, welcome his generosity, express gratitude for the return of hostages — and watch him repeat the whole murderous scenario when he chooses?

None of this is to say that we should commit our forces to combat now. I believe the economic sanctions, enforced by a tight air and sea blockade and supported by some 21 other countries, including every major Arab country, is succeeding. It will bring Iraq to its knees if we and our allies have the patience to keep it tightly in place, and the willingness to wait until its full effect is felt.

Of course we must keep our own military strength, joined by more than 130,000 allied troops, in place and ready to be used if necessary. The objections to President Bush's recent strengthening of our force make little sense: If we are in the gulf because we have to be, every military consideration dictates that we should be there with overwhelming power.

I do object, however, to the policy of no rotation for our troops. It would help morale if they were rotated home after some months' service in the harsh desert. This could be done without any loss in strength, and without sending any signal to Saddam Hussein other than that we have the best interests of our troops in mind.

I hope this great opportunity to enforce the rule of law globally is not watered down, compromised and weakened. We must preserve the military option. But let us see if patience and strength will give us victory without committing troops to combat. [1

The President Rings True



His speech was on target because he seemed to be voicing his own convictions—not those of others

I have been working on a theory of George Bush for about three years now. Each of my provisional conclusions has had a shelf life of about two months. After that it becomes apparent to me that I still don't have it. Too much about him is unaccounted for; too many odds and ends are still sticking out of the box; the lid won't close. The president's gulf-policy speech in the White House pressroom on the morning of Nov. 30 constituted his latest disruption of my thinking. I found the speech not only right in content, but also sure-footed and reassuring. Hey, where did those sentiments come from? And whatever happened to Mr. Read My Hips? It's back to square one.

If you believe, as I do, that it's a cop-out simply to proclaim the existence of a different Bush every few months—a good one, a bad one, a good one, etc.—in the hope that no one will notice where you have been, then you have your work cut out for you. The question is: how do all these different performances relate to one another? How can they coexist? My December 1990 theory (use before 2/1/91, as they say at the supermarket) is that Bush has great respect and feeling for one part of his job and something approaching contempt for another. The first is the conduct of foreign policy, the second is the conduct of politics. In between, all mucked up, is the conduct of the nation's domestic business, which all too often he subcontracts out to his more politically minded advisers, asking only that they buy him the popular approval he needs to get on with the other part of the job, the part that interests him and which he is schooled in and good at.

At best, Bush is not a word guy. The poetry never scans, and sometimes the sentences can't be parsed; when he reaches for the inspirational, you begin to worry that the final note of exaltation is going to be flat, a clinker or a kind of falling-out-of-the-second-story-window thud. But from time to time he achieves true eloquence and authority—a capacity to move. And it seems to me this is almost invariably on the subject of international relations, almost never on the subject of domestic policy and absolutely never on politics.

Most of Bush's most infelicitous public statements have been in the political realm and generally they have had an unconvincing, inauthentic tough guy/wise guy edge to them. This has been true from his pokes at Geraldine Ferraro to his "read my hips" silliness, with stops in between for the bravado of the 1988 campaign. When Bush the patriot seeks to identify with the plebeians and speak what he takes to be their language, it sounds embarrassingly like

what used to be called slumming and it is a linguistic and cultural disaster, except for the ever-alert writers of the late-night gag shows.

Likewise a certain amount of his domestic agenda seems borrowed and not quite comfortable for him, again part of a political accommodation believed to be necessary to get where he can do the work that really engrosses him. I am one of those—it may be terminally naive of me—who still believe that on civil rights and some of the social issues that come before him, Bush's instincts are much better than the policies he eventually espouses. This is not exactly a compliment, since it implies a pretty cynical attitude, but not, I suppose, if you regard it as the unfortunate price of conducting the foreign policy you believe is of paramount importance.

Consider the difference between the Bush who dithered all over the place during the late great deficit-reduction follies of this autumn and the man who knew what he was talking about and what he wanted and why in addressing the gulf crisis on the 30th. The budget business clearly hurt him politically. I would argue that that was precisely because he began to swerve and dodge and trim on what he actually knew to be necessary and that he did this to appease the political gods who, as usual, repaid this kind of flip-flopping propitiation with a drop in the polls. The trouble began way back when Bush, who has always known what was voodoo economics, signed on as a practitioner for the duration of the Reagan administration and then for his own campaign. The twistings and turnings ever since have been political murder. People don't believe him. This is because he somehow conveys that he doesn't quite believe the voodoo himself.

The right things: Contrast all that with the pressroom speech of the 30th. I don't suggest it was the Gettysburg Address, but for me it was Bush at his best. He conveyed self-confidence and mastery of the material. He said the right things. He indicated that he also cared about the right things, not just the large principles or interests at stake in the gulf, but also the terrible individual anxieties of those with kids, spouses or other family serving in the gulf. He knew what was at stake on every level and gave the strong impression that he had worked his way through the thicket of competing claims and was prepared to take responsibility for his actions. He was, in short, presidential.

I don't think anybody—surely not I—is prepared to take on faith whatever Bush recommends be done in the gulf, and no one can feel easy about the situation we have got in there. But doubts and anxieties are much greater when a president is unable to convey (because it is not there to be conveyed) that he has command of the material he is dealing with, that he knows what he is doing and believes his own arguments. People can't draw reassurance from him. For a president or any public leader will always betray his uncertainty and lack of conviction. And people will sense these weaknesses, much as animals—the dog who is growling at your approach, the bear who has decided to visit your campsite—are said to sense your fear.

You hear that Bush's political gurus, who are so accomplished at getting him in trouble, are now gearing up for an exploitation of the racial tensions that are so prominent, so raw these days. They have something clever planned. It works on paper. I'll bet a dime that after an early success it will blow up in their faces, for it will put Bush in his least convincing role as a ventriloquist for acquired instincts and not quite believed notions—and all this the public ultimately discerns and rejects. The president's advisers should understand this. The gulf statement showed him at his most plausible because he was speaking out of conviction—his, not theirs.

The Washington Post

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1990

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

'Going the Extra Mile'

TO THE NEW U.N. resolution endorsing force after Jan. 15 if Iraq does not quit Kuwait, President Bush has now added the offer of early direct high-level talks with Iraq. By this thoughtfully conceived, skillfully executed one-two sequence, he has put in place a coherent strategy, strengthened military and diplomatic options alike and, we believe, substantially improved chances that the crisis will be resolved peacefully and on United Nations terms. He has also, we think, gone a good way to allay the anxieties of those who had feared his policy was spinning out of control.

Until last Friday Mr. Bush had rejected Baghdad's repeated calls for high-level dialogue, demanding prior Iraqi respect for U.N. resolutions. He had relied on others to explore (unavailingly) the diplomatic terrain. Even many of those who accepted the logic of his military buildup wondered if he was fulfilling his obligation to exhaust all diplomatic possibilities before sending American forces into battle.

Friday, a day after the U.N. had acted, Mr. Bush filled this gap. The price is cheap, the timing deft. He changed course, Mr. Bush said, to make sure that an isolated Saddam understands what he's up against. Saddam Hussein is no doubt isolated, and he comes out of a political

tradition where eye-to-eye discourse at the top is what counts. For Secretary of State James A. Baker to go to Baghdad and for his Iraqi counterpart to come to Washington enables the requisite full exchange as the clock ticks down to Jan. 15.

Full Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions is the core American demand that the Bush administration will take into the talks. Mr. Bush sees no reason to compromise, and there is none. President Hussein, who yesterday accepted the talks, could not have failed to notice that the call for his removal is not on the short list of U.N. objectives President Bush pledges the United States to achieve and that Mr. Bush's openness to eventually discussing "all aspects of the Gulf crisis" points toward a broader regional agenda.

Without stepping back, as we read it, the president has moved to solidify both foreign and domestic support at a moment when the question of war and peace hangs in the balance. Mr. Bush has, as he claims, "gone the extra mile." He has earned broad domestic support, to match the international support he already has, for his effort to win Iraqi respect without conditions or contingencies for the resolutions undertaken at the United Nations.

THE PERSIAN GULF

Excerpts from President Bush's Press Conference

"We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. And we're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein. We're dealing with a dangerous dictator all too willing to use force who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones, and who desires to control one of the world's key resources -- all at a time in history when the rules of the post-Cold War world are being written.

"Our objectives remain what they were since the outset. We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies; and we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world."

"Yesterday's United Nations Security Council resolution was historic. . . . Until yesterday Saddam may not have understood what he's up against in terms of world opinion. And I'm hopeful that now he will realize that he must leave Kuwait immediately."

"Let me tell you the things that concern me most. First, I put the immorality of the invasion of Kuwait itself. No nation should rape, pillage and brutalize its neighbor. . . .

"I'm deeply concerned about all the hostages -- innocent people held against their will in direct contravention of international law. . . .

"I'm deeply concerned about our own embassy in Kuwait. . . . A handful of beleaguered Americans remain inside the embassy unable to come and go. . . . I am determined that this embassy, as called for under Security Council Resolution 674, be fully replenished and our people free to come home. . . .

". . . I'm also deeply concerned about the future of Kuwait itself. The tales of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting are almost beyond belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say this kind of treatment of people must end, and those who violate it -- the Kuwaiti people must be brought to justice.

"I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors should he possess a nuclear device."

"I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if force is required, we and the other 26 countries who have troops in the area will have enough power to get the job done. . . . I know that there are fears about another Vietnam. Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war."

Administration Wire 12/3/90

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"I want peace, not war. But if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs. . . . If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win, and then get out as soon as possible, as soon as the U.N. objectives have been achieved.

"I will never -- ever -- agree to a halfway effort. . . . I repeat that we have no desire to keep one single American soldier in the Gulf a single day longer than is necessary to achieve the objectives set out above.

"No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than I do. And, at the same time, no one is more determined than I am to see Saddam's aggression reversed."

"However, to go the extra mile for peace, I will issue an invitation to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to come to Washington at a mutually convenient time during the latter part of the week of December 10th to meet with me. I'll invite ambassadors of several of our coalition partners in the Gulf to join me at that meeting.

"In addition, I'm asking Secretary Jim Baker to go to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein."

". . . [W]ithin the mandate of the United Nations resolutions, I will be prepared, and so will Secretary Baker, to discuss all aspects of the Gulf crisis. . . . I am not suggesting discussions that will result in anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and freedom for all hostages."

Washington, D.C.
November 30, 1990

**Excerpts from Vice President Quayle's speech
to Seton Hall University**

". . . But there is another strategic American objective in the current crisis that is not traditional -- that has only emerged, in fact, as a result of the end of the Cold War. This objective might be described as strengthening the foundations of world order."

"Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-Cold War world. One way or another, it is bound to set a precedent -- either on behalf of greater world order or on behalf of greater chaos. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression, it is likely that his success will embolden other dictators to emulate his example. But if he fails -- and believe me, he will fail -- others will draw the lesson that might does not make right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed.

"That is why President Bush has sought to rally the international community against Iraq's aggression. This is why the U.N. Security Council has passed ten resolutions (sic) condemning Iraq. . . This is why scores of nations have agreed to contribute economically or militarily to the joint effort against Saddam Hussein. . . what is at stake is nothing less than the shape of tomorrow."

"The moral and human implications of war -- any war -- are very grave.

". . . Consider, for example, the fate of the people of Kuwait. With every day that passes, their plight grows more desperate. Being patient with Iraq allows Saddam Hussein to prolong their agony. Is this a moral course of action?

"Or consider the fate of American military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Does patience today risk greater American casualties tomorrow? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

"Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons. Will continued patience with Iraq help make the world vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

". . . I believe that every reasonable effort must be made to resolve this crisis peacefully. I also think that there must be limits to our patience. And those limits are reached when our restraint threatens to undermine other, equally moral goals. . . ending Kuwait's agony as soon as possible; minimizing American casualties in the event of war; and preventing Saddam Hussein from adding nuclear weapons to his already formidable arsenal of mass destruction."

". . . Saddam has shown that he understand no language other than the language of force. Today's U.N. resolution is our last and best hope for peace -- for a genuine peace.

South Orange, New Jersey
November 29, 1990

**Excerpts of Secretary Baker's remarks
at the United Nations**

"Today's vote marks a watershed in the history of the United Nations. . . . The entire international community has been affronted by a series of brutal acts:

Iraqi forces have invaded and seized a small Arab neighbor.

A once prosperous country has been pillaged and looted.

A once peaceful country has been turned into an armed camp.

A once secure country has been terrorized.

"The nations of the world have not stood idly by. We have taken political, economic and military measures to quarantine Iraq and to contain its aggression.

". . . The twelve resolutions passed by the Security Council have established clearly that there is a peaceful way out of this conflict: the complete, immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all hostages."

". . . If he (Saddam Hussein) should win this struggle, then there will be no peace in the Middle East, only the prospect of more conflict and a far wider war."

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"We are meeting here therefore, first and foremost, to dispel Saddam Hussein's illusions. He must know from us that a refusal to comply peacefully with the Security Council Resolution risks disaster for him.

"Members of the Council, we are at a crossroads. Today, we show Saddam that the sign marked "peace" is the direction he should take.

"Today's Resolution is clear. The words authorize the use of force. But the purpose, I truly believe, is to bring about a peaceful resolution."

"By passing today's resolution -- a cause for peace -- we say to Saddam Hussein: "We continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Peace is your only sensible option. You can choose peace by respecting the will of the international community. But if you fail to do so, you will risk all. The choice is yours."

"Members of the Council, we meet at the hinge of history. We can use the end of the Cold War to get beyond the whole pattern of settling conflicts by force, or we can slip into ever more savage regional conflicts in which might alone makes right. We can take the high road toward peace and the rule of law, or Saddam Hussein's path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle.

"Simply put it is a choice between right and wrong."

November 29, 1990
United Nations Security Council
New York, New York

**Remarks by the President at Thanksgiving Dinner with
American Troops**

"And let me say this: Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that's why more and more, your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency.

"You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons, or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use. What we're confronting is a classic bully who thinks he can get away with kicking sand in the face of the world."

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
November 22, 1990

Let me again set out our reasons for sending forces to the Gulf:

((make it concise))

We are not alone, etc.


U.N. has decreed the international law to deal with this problem.

Can be no compromise with this aggression.

We have forged an historic coalition.

We have used the diplomatic course in an unprecedented way.

Then on to yesterday's resolution



will have

the U.N. objectives have been achieved

effort.

Photocopy-GB Handwriting

Bennett

I have been asked why I ordered more troops to the Gulf.

I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if force is required we and our 26 (?) allies who have forces in the area will have enough power to get the job done. In our country there are fears about "another Vietnam." Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war. The forces arrayed are different, the opposition is different, the re-supply of his force would be very different, the countries united against him in the U.N. are different, the topography of Kuwait is different, and the motivation of our all volunteer force is superb.

I want peace, not war. But if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs. There will, I pledge to you, be no murky ending. If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win, -- win quickly -- and get out as soon as the U.N. objectives have been achieved.

I will never, ever agree to a half-way effort.

Photocopy-GB Handwriting

Yesterday's U.N. Security Council Resolution was absolutely necessary, and I am delighted that once again the U.N. Security Council has enhanced the legitimate peace-keeping function of the United Nations. Until yesterday, I have been uncertain about Saddam Hussein's understanding of what he is up against in terms of world opinion. I am hopeful that he will now realize he must leave Kuwait in a timely fashion.

I am continually asked: "How effective are the U.N. sanctions put into effect on _____(Date)" I do not know the answer to that question. Clearly, the sanctions are having some effect, but I cannot tell you that the sanctions alone will get the job done. Thus, I welcome yesterday's U.N. action. Many small countries are being driven to their knees, already, by the increases in the price of oil. As Chairman Alan Greenspan testified the other day, the increase in oil prices resulting directly from Saddam's invasion are hurting our country too. Our economy is, at best, in a serious slowdown; and if uncertainty remains in the energy markets, the slowdown will get worse.

The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe are getting severely damaged by the economic effects of Saddam's actions. The Third World countries of Africa, and in our our hemisphere, are being victimized by the dictator's rape of his neighbor, Kuwait. Those who feel that there is no downside to waiting for months & months must consider the devastating damage being done everyday to the fragile economies of those countries that can afford it lease.

No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than I do. At the same time, no one is more determined than I am to see ALL hostages free; Saddam's aggression reversed; the legitimate rulers returned to Kuwait; and the establishment of whatever mechanisms are required to guarantee the peace and stability of the Gulf and the territorial integrity of all member states of the U.N.

Let me repeat -- we have no argument with the people of Iraq -- indeed, we have only friendship for the people there. Further, I repeat that we have no desire to keep one single American soldier in the Gulf a single day longer than is necessary to achieve the objectives set out above.

I have spelled out, once again, our reasons for sending troops to the Gulf. Let me tell you the things that concern me most: First, the imorality of the invasion of Kuwait itself. No nation should rape, pillage, and brutalize its neighbor. No nation should be able to wipe a member state of the U.N. and a member state of the Arab League off the face of the earth.

I am deeply concern about all the hostages -- innocent people held against their will in direct contravention of international law. And then there is this cynical and brutal policy of forcing people to beg for their release -- parcelling out human lives to families and travelling emissaries like so much chattel. I am

deeply concerned about our own Embassy in Kuwait. Our flag is still flying. A handful of beleaguered Americans are inside the Embassy cut off from all foods, all medicines. This violation of our embassy violates every civilized principle of diplomacy. It demeans our people. It demeans our country, and I am determined that this embassy, as called for under Security Council Resolution _____ be replenished and our people free to come home unharmed. What kinds of precedent will this treatment of our embassy set for the future if Saddam's violation of international law goes unchallenged. I am deeply concerned about the future of Kuwait itself. The tells of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and of rampant looting are almost beyond belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say this kind of treatment of people must end and those who violated the Kuwaiti people must be brought to justice. I remember the Nurenburg trials. I wonder if Saddam Hussein does.

I am deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors would he possess a nuclear device. We have seen him use chemical weapons on his own people. We have seen him take a country that should be wealthy and prosperous and turn it into a poor country -- all because of his insatiable appetite for military equipment.

draft 1/haass/ 1350/Nov.29

Presidential Statement on the Gulf

Just eight days ago Barbara and I were fortunate enough to share our Thanksgiving with some of the finest men and women this or any country has to offer. We have much to be thankful for. At desert sites with little more than sandbags for chairs and the open sky for cover, these Americans in uniform were proud to be where they were and anxious to get on with the job at hand.

And that is what I wish to speak to you about today, the job at hand. I refer, of course, to the Persian Gulf. I would like to address three questions that I know many of you have on your minds. First, just why are we in the Gulf? Second, why is there a sense of urgency? And third, where do we go from here now that the United Nations has again acted?

I want to begin by explaining why we are in the Gulf. The world must not and can not reward aggression. I recently travelled to Europe, where I joined with 35 other heads of state to declare the Cold War to be a thing of the past. But how we respond to this new act of aggression will go a long ways toward determining the shape of the world to come. Will it be a future of might or right? What a waste if we allowed intimidation and violence, that is, Saddam's way, to become the way of the future.

Our national security is at stake by any measure. Saddam

Hussein controls 10% of the world's oil; control over Kuwait doubles his share. And domination of the Gulf, which would surely follow if this aggression is left to stand, would give him a stranglehold over the price and availability of a commodity that is vital to the world's economic health. This we cannot have.

This is not a concern new to this administration. It was Jimmy Carter who declared that "any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." Iraq may not be an outside force in the geographic sense, but the threat it poses is no less real. And let me remind you that every President beginning with Harry Truman has maintained U.S. military forces in the region.

Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are at stake. As I speak, Saddam is holding hundreds of our fellow countrymen hostage and starving out our diplomats. No American business or tourist, no American embassy or consulate, would be safe if we capitulated here. And so we cannot.

Any one of these concerns would in my view justify a strong U.S. response. Together, they make a powerful case that we must be prepared to act on behalf of interests that are truly vital.

I would expect that many of you would agree with what I've said, and would agree as well that the United States does have a huge stake in seeing that Saddam's aggression is neither

tolerated nor rewarded. Let me then turn to the second question posed: Why a sense of urgency?

It is true that we have in place economic sanctions designed to deny Saddam the fruits of aggression and indeed inflict a price on him for his violent occupation of Kuwait. Yet it is not clear that sanctions will ever be able to compel Saddam to withdraw. Unfortunately, nearly four months since Saddam first invaded Kuwait, I can point to no evidence suggesting that Iraq is ready to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations. To the contrary, and despite the sanctions, he continues to call up more troops, now numbering more than 450,000 in Kuwait and southern Iraq alone.

Meanwhile, Saddam is using every day that passes to increase and fortify his forces in and around Kuwait. He is producing chemical and biological weapons. He is on a crash program to produce nuclear weapons. What all of this means is that if conflict does come, it promises to be more costly in lives and treasure if we wait the months or years that some suggest.

But even without conflict we pay a real price for allowing time to pass. Saddam's aggression has increased the price of oil, in the process threatening economic growth and in some instances the chances of new democracies. Saddam's holding of hostages and starving of embassies exacts a terrible cost in human terms. And his rape and plunder of Kuwait threatens an entire nation.

So to those who counsel patience I ask only that they

consider the real and potential costs of what they are advocating. The status quo is not acceptable; neither is it tolerable. That said, there are no inexpensive or painless courses before us. Being President means being called upon to make difficult choices. This I am prepared to do.

And now the last question, where do we go from here? The resolution passed overwhelmingly by the United Nations Security Council yesterday sends the clearest of messages. It tells Saddam that he must leave Kuwait without condition lest he face the combined weight of the world community. Together with the British, the French, the Soviets and eight (?) other countries, we supported this resolution not because we want war, but because we don't. But we know of no better way to let Saddam know that we are serious and that he must withdraw or face the most awful of repercussions. It is not a declaration of war, but it is a declaration of resolve.

So let me say to Saddam that I hope you will take advantage of the opportunity contained in this twelfth resolution and heed the words of the world. It is not too late for diplomacy, but do not assume that one day it will not be.

Our goals are modest but fair. We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. We seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies. And we seek the stability and security of a region critical to us all.

These are by no means our goals alone. These are the goals

of virtually the entire world community. The fact that we have 12 UN resolutions, armed forces from 27 countries, and more than 50 states helping financially with this effort speaks volumes.

Let me conclude with one last thought. There comes a time in every generation, just as there comes a time in every presidency, when unanticipated challenges arise that define us and our principles. Who we are and what kind of world we seek. This is one of those times. Yes, it is a time of risk. But it is also a time of opportunity.

The world conscience has spoken with this latest UN resolution. The United Nations is beginning to act as a true force for peace. This did not happen by itself, but in large part because of American leadership. Leadership brings with it influence, but also responsibilities. We must show ourselves willing to bear the costs if we wish to harvest the benefits.

draft 3/haass/0815/Nov.30

Presidential Statement on the Gulf

Last night, the United Nations Security Council voted overwhelmingly to demand that Iraq end its brutal occupation of Kuwait. Twelve times the international community has condemned Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against a peaceful neighbor and called upon him to withdraw.

Now, the United Nations has acted to implement these resolutions. With unprecedented and broad international support, the UN has authorized the use of all necessary means to end this terrible crime against a whole people. This was a historic event, one that holds within it the promise of a new world order where violence will not be tolerated.

Today, I will review answers to three questions very much in the minds of the American people. Why are we in the Gulf? Why is there a sense of urgency? And where do we go from here?

We are in the Gulf because the world must not and can not reward aggression. Appeasement does not work. I recently travelled to Europe, where I joined 34 other heads of state to declare an end to the Cold War. At this historic moment, how we respond to Iraq's aggression can shape the world to come. The United States should not be the world's policeman. And we won't. But we will condemn aggression, and when it threatens our vital

interests and those of our friends, we will act. Our vital interests are at stake in the Gulf. We are dealing with a brutal dictator all too willing to use force, who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones, one who desires to control one of the world's key regions--all at a delicate moment in history. If Saddam is not stopped now, we will need to stop him again some day at much greater cost.

Here are the facts: Iraq owns 10% of the world's oil; control over Kuwait doubles that share. Domination of the Gulf, *of nearly 1/4* which would surely follow if this aggression is left to stand, would give Saddam a license for economic blackmail--not just of the United States, but of poor countries and fragile emerging democracies as well. This is clearly unacceptable.

The United States must defend its vital interests. That's why every President beginning with Harry Truman has maintained U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf. The threat posed by Saddam Hussein to our vital interests is serious and real.

Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are in jeopardy. Saddam is holding thousands of foreign nationals hostage and starving out diplomats. Hundreds of Americans are in hiding in Kuwait, hungry and living in terror of discovery. If we fail to stand up to Saddam's brutality, no American tourist or businessman, no American embassy or consulate, will be safe. And then there are the horrors being visited upon Kuwait and its people. Eyewitness accounts of babies pulled from incubators and left to die on hospital floors. Children executed in front of

their parents. Homes, neighborhoods, factories--all looted. Saddam is attempting to erase a people and a country from the earth. Each day, more Kuwaiti men, women and children die by Iraqi hands--some for the crime of harboring Americans and other foreigners. By yesterday's vote, the UN has said enough. Enough brutality. Enough terror. Enough time.

Any one of these concerns justifies a strong U.S. response. Together, they make a powerful case that we must be prepared to act. But why a sense of urgency?

It is true that the UN has enacted comprehensive economic sanctions to deny Saddam any profit from his aggression and inflict on him a stiff price for his invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Yet, as effective as they are, it is not clear that sanctions alone will be able to compel Saddam to withdraw. It appears that sanctions are hurting Iraq's economy. But there is no evidence suggesting that Iraq is any more ready than it was four months ago to comply with the UN's resolutions. More important, there is no evidence suggesting that another 6 or 12 months will change Saddam's mind. To the contrary, Saddam seems intent to endure.

Every day that passes allows Saddam to increase and fortify his forces in and around Kuwait, now numbering more than 450,000 in Kuwait and southern Iraq alone. He is producing chemical and biological weapons. He has a crash program to develop nuclear weapons. This means that if conflict does come, it will be far more costly if we wait the months or years.

Done and done quickly

[Handwritten scribbles]

So to those who counsel patience I say we've been patient. All agree that the status quo is not acceptable. All agree that there are no easy answers. But being President means making tough decisions. This I am prepared to do.

So where do we go from here? The resolution just passed by the Security Council sends a clear and precise message. It tells Saddam that he must leave Kuwait immediately and without condition or face the combined weight of the world community. Together with the British, the French, the Soviets and eight other countries, we supported this resolution not because we want war, but because we don't. We seek a peaceful outcome. But we know of no better way to let Saddam know that we are serious and that he must withdraw.

So I say to Saddam: take advantage of the opportunity contained in this historic resolution and heed the words of the world. It is not too late for diplomacy, but time is running out.

Our goals remain what they have been since the outset. We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. We seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies. And we seek the stability and security of a region.

These are by no means our goals alone. These are the goals of virtually the entire world community. The fact that we have 12 UN resolutions, armed forces from 27 countries, and more than 50 states helping financially with this effort speaks volumes.

Let me conclude with one last thought. There come times in life when challenges arise that define us and our principles. Who we are and what kind of world we seek. This is one of those times. It is a time of risk. But it is also a time of enormous opportunity.

The conscience of the world speaks in this latest UN resolution. The UN is at last acting as a true force for peace. This happened in large part because of American leadership. Leadership brings with it influence, but also responsibilities. Now we must show ourselves willing to bear the costs if we wish to achieve a better, safer world for ourselves and our children. I am confident the American people and their representatives are up to the task.

draft 2/haass/1930/Nov.29

Demarest
Marking

30 Nov
0700

Presidential Statement on the Gulf

Last night, the United Nations Security Council voted overwhelmingly to demand that Iraq end its brutal occupation of Kuwait. Twelve times now the international community has condemned Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against a peaceful neighbor and called upon him to withdraw.

Now, the United Nations has acted to implement these resolutions. With unprecedented and broad international support, the UN has authorized the use of all necessary means to end this terrible crime against a whole people. *This vote* It was a historic event, one that holds within it the promise of a new world order where potential aggressors will know violence will not be tolerated.

Today, I will review answers to three questions very much in the minds of the American people. Why are we in the Gulf? Why is there a sense of urgency? And where do we go from here?

We are in the Gulf because the world must not and can not reward aggression. *Appeasement does not work.* I recently travelled to Europe, where I joined 34 other heads of state to declare *and end to* the Cold War ~~to be a thing of the past.~~ At this historic moment, how we respond to *Iraq's* ~~this new act of aggression will go a long ways toward determining~~ *can* the shape of the world to come. What a tragedy it would be if we *rewarded the brutality and intimidation* ~~allowed intimidation and violence, that is, Saddam's way, to~~ *the acts of a dangerous dictator,*

We cannot allow aggression to

become the pattern of the future.

The United States should

And we won't be.

~~We cannot and will not be the world's policeman.~~ But we

will condemn aggression, and when it threatens our vital

interests and those of our friends, we ^{must} will act. ~~And have no~~

~~doubt:~~ our vital interests are at stake in the Gulf. Iraq owns ^{here are the facts}

10% of the world's oil; control over Kuwait doubles that share.

Domination of the Gulf, ^{by Saddam Hussein is a} ~~which would surely follow if this~~

~~aggression is left to stand, would give Saddam a stranglehold~~ ^{license for economic blackmail}

~~over the price and availability of a commodity that is vital to~~ ^{not just of the United States but of developing poor countries}

~~and emerging democracies as well.~~

~~the world's economic health.~~ This is clearly unacceptable.

fragile

~~Security of the Gulf is not a concern that began with this~~

~~administration. Every President beginning with Harry Truman has~~ ^{America must defend her vital interests. That's why}

~~maintained U.S. military forces in that crucial region.~~ ^{the Persian Gulf}

~~President Carter declared that "an attempt by any outside force~~

~~to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an~~

~~assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,~~

~~and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,~~

~~including military force." Iraq may not be an outside force in~~

~~the geographic sense, but the threat it poses~~ ^{by Saddam Hussein to America's vital interests} ~~is no less serious.~~ ^{US Sec}

Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are

in jeopardy.

~~at stake.~~ Saddam is holding thousands of foreign nationals

hostage and starving out diplomats. Hundreds of Americans are in

hiding in Kuwait, hungry and living in terror of discovery. ^{If we reward} ~~Saddam's~~ ^{brutality}

no ~~American businessman or tourist, no American embassy or~~

~~consulate, would be safe if we capitulated.~~ ^{will} ~~And we won't.~~ ^{That too is unacceptable.}

~~And let us not forget the horrors being visited upon Kuwait~~ ^{then there are}

Egyptian accounts have verified: Babies pulled from incubators and left dead on hospital floors. Children executed in front of their parents. Homes, neighborhoods, churches anything of value trucked back to Baghdad.

and its people. [^] Saddam is attempting to erase a people and a country from the earth. Each day, more Kuwaiti men, women and children die by Iraqi hands--some for the crime of harboring Americans and other foreigners. By yesterday's vote, the UN has said enough. Enough brutality. Enough terror. ~~indicated the limit of its patience for Saddam's reign of terror.~~

Any one of these concerns justifies a strong U.S. response. Together, they make a powerful case that we must be prepared to act, ~~on behalf of interests that are truly vital.~~ But why a sense of urgency?

It is true that we ~~have in place~~ ^{the U.N has enacted} comprehensive economic sanctions ~~designed to deny Saddam the fruits of aggression and to inflict a price on him for his violent occupation of Kuwait.~~ ^{any profit from his invasion}

Yet, as effective as these ~~sanctions~~ ^{are}, it is not clear that ~~they~~ ^{Sanctions} alone will be able to compel Saddam to withdraw. ~~Despite it appears~~ evidence that sanctions are hurting Iraq's economy, ~~I can point~~

^{but there is} to no evidence suggesting that Iraq is any more ready than it was four months ago to comply with the UN's resolutions. ^{More importantly, there} ~~Nor is there~~ ^{is no} evidence suggesting that another 6 or 12 months will change ~~Saddam's mind.~~

~~matters.~~ To the contrary, and ~~despite the sanctions,~~ Saddam ~~seems~~ ^{intent} appears able to endure, ~~still able~~ ^{and} to call up ~~more~~ ^{even} more troops, now numbering more than 450,000 in Kuwait and southern Iraq alone.

~~Saddam is using~~ ^{Every} day that passes ^{allows Saddam} to increase and fortify his forces in and around Kuwait. He is producing chemical and biological weapons. He has a crash program to develop nuclear weapons. ~~What all of this means is~~ that if conflict does come, it promises to be far more costly ~~in lives~~

~~and treasure~~ if we wait the months or years that some suggest.

But even without conflict we pay a real price for allowing time to pass. Saddam's aggression has increased the price of oil, in the process threatening economic growth and in the survival of new democracies. Saddam's plunder of Kuwait, holding of hostages and starving of embassies, exacts a terrible cost.

So to those who counsel patience ^{I say, we've been patient. Now} ~~I ask only that they~~

~~consider the real and potential costs of what they are advocating.~~ ^{All agree that} The status quo is not acceptable; ~~neither is it or~~

tolerable. ^{All agree that} ~~That said,~~ there are no ^{easy answer.} ~~inexpensive or painless~~

^{However} ~~courses before us.~~ Being President means ~~being called upon to~~ make ^{tough decisions -} ~~difficult choices.~~ This I am prepared to do.

So where do we go from here? The resolution just passed by the Security Council sends ^{a very and precise} ~~the clearest~~ of messages. It tells Saddam that he must leave Kuwait ^{immediately or} ~~without condition~~ lest he face the combined weight of the world community. Together with the British, the French, the Soviets and eight other countries, we supported this resolution not because we want war, but because we don't. We seek a peaceful outcome. But we know of no better way to let Saddam know that we are serious and that he must withdraw. It is not a declaration of war, but it is a statement of resolve.

So I say to Saddam ^{that} ~~that I hope you will~~ take advantage of the opportunity contained in this historic resolution and heed the words of the world. It is not too late for diplomacy, but time is running out.

~~Our goals are modest but fair. We seek Iraq's immediate and~~

unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. We seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. We seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies. And we seek the stability and security of a region critical to us all.

These are by no means our goals alone. These are the goals of virtually the entire world community. The fact that we have 12 UN resolutions, armed forces from 27 countries, and more than 50 states helping financially with this effort speaks volumes. And when we succeed, our troops and many others will depart, but they will leave behind a Middle East more stable and peaceful.

Let me conclude with one last thought. There comes a time ~~in every generation, just as there comes a time in every~~ presidency, when ~~unanticipated~~ challenges arise that define ~~us~~ and ~~our principles~~. Who we are and what kind of world we seek. This is one of those times. ~~Yes, It~~ is a time of risk. ^{And} it is ~~also~~ a time of enormous opportunity. ^{Opportunity to do what is right} ~~The world conscience has spoken with this latest UN~~ ^{Conscience of the} resolution. The UN is at last acting as a true force for peace. This ~~did not~~ ^{not} happen ~~by itself, but~~ in large part because of American leadership. ~~Leadership brings with it influence, but~~ ^{Now} also responsibilities. We must show ourselves willing to bear ~~the costs if we wish to reap the benefits.~~ ^{responsibilities are to achieve a better, safer world for our children.} I am confident the American people and their representatives are up to the task.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

**STAFF MEETING AGENDA
FRIDAY, November 30, 1990**

I. Schedule Review

- A. Quick review of trip next week

II. Press Office Report - Marlin

- A. News of the Day
- B. Review of Weekend News Shows

III. Daily Initiatives - Key Remarks - Rogich/Demarest

- A. Gulf Commission Plan update

IV. Legislative Report - McClure

- A. Today's meeting

V. Economic Report - Boskin

VI. Scowcroft Comments

- A. UN Action
- B. Bulgaria

II. Darman Comments

VIII. JHS Comments

- A. DPC/EPC - Holiday
- B. VP Activities - Kristol

draft 3/haass/0815/Nov.30

Presidential Statement on the Gulf

Last night, the United Nations Security Council voted overwhelmingly to demand that Iraq end its brutal occupation of Kuwait. Twelve times the international community has condemned Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against a peaceful neighbor and called upon him to withdraw.

Now, the United Nations has acted to implement these resolutions. With unprecedented and broad international support, the UN has authorized the use of all necessary means to end this terrible crime against a whole people. This was a historic event, one that holds within it the promise of a new world order where violence will not be tolerated.

Today, I will review answers to three questions very much in the minds of the American people. Why are we in the Gulf? Why is there a sense of urgency? And where do we go from here?

We are in the Gulf because the world must not and can not reward aggression. Appeasement does not work. I recently travelled to Europe, where I joined 34 other heads of state declare an end to the Cold War. At this historic moment, respond to Iraq's aggression can shape the world to come. United States should not be the world's policeman. An But we will condemn aggression, and when it threaten

interests and those of our friends, we will act. Our vital interests are at stake in the Gulf. We are dealing with a brutal dictator all too willing to use force, who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones, one who desires to control one of the world's key regions--all at a delicate moment in history. If Saddam is not stopped now, we will need to stop him again some day at much greater cost.

Here are the facts: Iraq owns 10% of the world's oil; control over Kuwait doubles that share. Domination of the Gulf, which would surely follow if this aggression is left to stand, would give Saddam a license for economic blackmail--not just of the United States, but of poor countries and fragile emerging democracies as well. This is clearly unacceptable.

The United States must defend its vital interests. That's why every President beginning with Harry Truman has maintained U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf. The threat posed by Saddam Hussein to our vital interests is serious and real.

Nor can we forget for even a moment that innocent lives are in jeopardy. Saddam is holding thousands of foreign nationals hostage and starving out diplomats. Hundreds of Americans are in hiding in Kuwait, hungry and living in terror of discovery. If we fail to stand up to Saddam's brutality, no American tourist or businessman, no American embassy or consulate, will be safe. And then there are the horrors being visited upon Kuwait and its people. Eyewitness accounts of babies pulled from incubators and left to die on hospital floors. Children executed in front of

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Every day that passes allows Saddam to increase and fortify his forces in and around Kuwait, now numbering more than 400,000 in Kuwait and southern Iraq alone. He is producing chemical and biological weapons. He has a crash program to develop nuclear weapons. This means that if conflict does come, it will be far more costly if we wait the months or years

So to those who counsel patience I say we've been patient. All agree that the status quo is not acceptable. All agree that there are no easy answers. But being President means making tough decisions. This I am prepared to do.

So where do we go from here? The resolution just passed by the Security Council sends a clear and precise message. It tells Saddam that he must leave Kuwait immediately and without condition or face the combined weight of the world community. Together with the British, the French, the Soviets and eight other countries, we supported this resolution not because we want war, but because we don't. We seek a peaceful outcome. But we know of no better way to let Saddam know that we are serious and that he must withdraw.

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