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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ED ROGERS *ER*
SUBJECT: RECENT POLLING DATA - GULF

I met with Sam Zakhem today. He is very enthusiastic and energetic, and is motivated, I believe, in large part by his affection for you.

Attached please find a copy of a poll that his new organization, The Freedom Task Force, commissioned last month. Unlike other data that we've seen lately, this sample is composed of likely voters only (as opposed to all adults). Also, Tony Fabrizio is well-known as a good pollster. In short, the poll offers some very encouraging information. They plan to publicize these results starting next week.

Zakhem has abandoned his former group, and Citizens for a Free Kuwait is now defunct, but he has kept David Keene and Craig Shirley as his consultants.

FYI: Zakhem is working closely with Representative Stephen Solarz, and has provided funding for much of Solarz's committee's operations.

Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM:

TO : AMBASSADOR SAM ZAKHEM, CHAIRMAN
THE FREEDOM TASK FORCE

FR : TONY FABRIZIO

RE : SUMMARY OF NATIONAL VOTER SURVEY:
PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE MIDDLE EAST

DATE : DECEMBER 21, 1990

OVERVIEW:

On December 11, 1990, Fabrizio, McLaughlin & Associates were commissioned by The Freedom Task Force to conduct a national survey of voter attitudes regarding current U.S. policy in the Middle East. Following the methodology statement is a summary of these findings.

METHODOLOGY:

This survey of political attitudes was administered to voters who are registered and intending to vote in the November 1991 elections. A single report was tabulated of 800 general election voters nationwide. Interviews were conducted between December 12 and 14, 1990.

All interviews were conducted by professionally trained interviewers. Interview selection was random within predetermined election units structured to statistically correlate with actual voter distributions in national elections.

This survey of likely general election voters has an accuracy of +/- 3.46% at the 95% confidence interval.

SUMMARY:

At present, public attention is clearly focused on the Iraq/Kuwait situation. When asked to cite the most important issue facing the country today, over one third (35.9%) name the Iraq/Kuwait situation.

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"What is the single most important issue facing the United States today?"

	All Voters -----
Iraq/Kuwait	35.9%
Budget	12.3
The Economy	11.1
War/Peace	8.5
Don't Know	4.0
Drugs	3.6
Homeless	2.8
Environment/Pollution	2.4
Education	2.4
Taxes	2.0

In fact when coupled with those respondents who cited "War/Peace" concerns, the total Middle East related mentions total 44.4% of the overall responses.

"Please tell me whether you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of George Bush. If you have no opinion or have never heard of him just say so. (If said favorable or unfavorable ask: And would that somewhat favorable/unfavorable or very favorable/unfavorable?)"

	All Voters -----	Approve Bush Handling Mid East -----	Disapprove Bush Handling Mid East -----
Very Favorable	37.9%	49.5%	6.1%
Somewhat Favorable	35.9	37.6	28.3
Somewhat Unfavorable	10.5	5.5	26.7
Very Unfavorable	9.0	2.8	29.4
No Opinion	6.6	4.5	9.4
Never Heard Of	0.1	0.2	0.0

Clearly, President Bush's handling of this situation has significantly bolstered voter opinion of him. President Bush is viewed favorable by 73.8% and unfavorably by 19.5% of all voters. Among those respondents who approve of the

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way President Bush is handling the Iraq/Kuwait situation, the President's favorability increases to 87.1%. Conversely among those who disapprove of his handling of the Iraq/Kuwait situation, the President's favorability rating plummets to 34.4% while his unfavorability rating soars to 56.1%.

"Do you approve or disapprove of George Bush's handling of the Middle East crisis involving Iraq and Kuwait? (If said approve or disapprove ASK: And would that be strongly approve/disapprove or somewhat approve/disapprove?)"

	All Voters -----
Strongly Approve	37.3%
Somewhat Approve	35.3
Somewhat Disapprove	11.8
Strongly Disapprove	10.8
Don't Know/Refused	5.0

"Do you approve or disapprove of President Bush's recent decision to send additional troops to the Middle East? (If said approve or disapprove ASK: And would that be strongly approve/disapprove or somewhat approve/disapprove?)"

	All Voters -----
Strongly Approve	35.1%
Somewhat Approve	24.9
Somewhat Disapprove	12.3
Strongly Disapprove	21.9
Don't Know/Refused	5.9

Coupled with his broad popularity, the President currently enjoys wide support for his Middle East policies. At present, 72.6% of the respondents approve of the President's handling of the Middle East situation with only 22.6%

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disapproving. Further, by slightly less than a two to one margin the respondents approve (60.0%) of the President's recent decision to send additional troops to the Middle East over those who oppose (34.2%) this action.

"In your opinion, was President Bush too cautious, just about right, or not cautious enough in his response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait?"

	All Voters -----
Too Cautious	16.1%
Just About Right	56.3
Not Cautious Enough	19.5
Don't Know/Refused	8.1

Further, by a decisive margin the respondents feel the President's response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was "just about right".

"Overall, would you say that you support or oppose current U.S. military involvement in the Middle East? (If said support or oppose ASK: And would that be strongly support/oppose or somewhat support/oppose?)"

	All Voters -----
Strongly Support	44.5%
Somewhat Support	28.0
Somewhat Oppose	9.4
Strongly Oppose	13.6
Don't Know/Refused	4.5

Presently 72.5% of all the respondents support the "current U.S. military involvement in the Middle East" with 23.0% opposed to our involvement.

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"As you may have heard, the U.N. recently passed a resolution demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15th. At that time, President Bush has three options. Which option do you personally favor?"

	All Voters -----
Act Militarily	37.8%
Continue Diplomatic Negotiations	45.0
Withdraw from the Region Completely	11.0

"Some people want to appease Saddam Hussein by giving him some Kuwaiti territory now under his control to avoid war. Others feel we should confront Saddam Hussein and force him to completely leave Kuwait, even if it leads to war. Which statement comes closest to your opinion:?"

	All Voters -----
Avoid War by giving Hussein some Kuwaiti Territory	22.6%
Force Hussein to leave Kuwait even if it leads to War	65.0
Don't Know/Refused	12.4

A slim plurality (45.0%) of respondents favor continuing diplomatic negotiations after the January 15th U.N. deadline versus 37.8% of the respondents who favor U.S. military action. Further, when asked whether we should "appease" Saddam Hussein or Force him out of Kuwait even in the face of war, a commanding majority (65.0%) favor forcing Hussein from Kuwait even if it leads to war.

"If the election for President were held today, and the candidates were George Bush, the Republican, and Mario Cuomo, the Democrat, for whom would you vote?"

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	All Voters -----
George Bush	53.1%
Mario Cuomo	27.3
Undecided	19.6

"If the election for President were held today, and the candidates were George Bush, the Republican, and Sam Nunn, the Democrat, for whom would you vote?"

	All Voters -----
George Bush	52.3%
Sam Nunn	21.8
Undecided	26.0

Presently, President Bush defeats both of the leading Democrats tested in our survey. He defeats Mario Cuomo and Sam Nunn by a 25.8% margin and 30.5% margin respectively.

CONCLUSION:

At this juncture, it is clear that President Bush enjoys a wide base of support for his policies regarding Iraq and Kuwait. Further, this support has positively impacted the voter's overall opinion of the President. While economic concerns such as "Budget" and "The Economy" combined represent nearly a quarter of the overall open-ended issue responses, they are not as great a short term concern to these respondents. Their immediate concerns revolve around the Iraq and Kuwait situation.

While the respondents aren't eager to fight a war with Saddam Hussein, they will support military action, particularly if all diplomatic channels have been exhausted. Given the choice between appeasing Hussein or forcing him out of Kuwait, these respondents cite forcing him out as their overwhelming choice.

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The short term issue agenda clearly favors President Bush. The Iraq/Kuwait situation presents an opportunity for the President to solidify his base well into 1992 and beyond. Even without the benefit of a resolution of this conflict, the President easily defeats two of his leading Democratic opponents, Mario Cuomo and Sam Nunn.

APPENDIX - KEY DEMOGRAPHICS:

Party Affiliation:

Democrat	37.5%
Republican	35.8
Independent	20.9
Other	1.8
Don't Know/Refused	4.1

Annual Income:

Under \$10,000	7.5%
\$10,000 - \$20,000	13.5
\$20,001 - \$30,000	16.6
\$30,001 - \$40,000	15.1
\$40,001 - \$50,000	12.4
Over \$50,000	18.6
Don't Know/Refused	16.3

Ancestry:

German	22.8%
Polish	4.3
Italian	6.3
English	14.0
Russian	1.8
Irish	16.6
French/French Canadian	2.5
Hispanic	2.6
Greek	0.6
Afro-American	7.0
Asiatic	0.8
Other European	10.6
Other	2.8
Don't Know/Refused	7.6

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Religion:

Protestant	57.3%
Catholic	26.1
Jewish	3.1
Atheist/Agnostic	6.0
Other	1.9
Don't Know/Refused	7.6

Age:

18 to 24 years	5.5%
25 to 34 years	17.1
35 to 49 years	32.4
50 to 54 years	7.9
55 to 64 years	16.4
Over 65 years	19.0
Refused	1.8

Race:

White	86.9%
Black	8.1
Hispanic	1.5
Other	2.0
Refused	1.5

Gender:

Male	48.3%
Female	51.7

Region:

Northeast	21.9%
Midwest	26.9
South	30.9
West	20.4

Demarest

Draft one
1/10/91

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON IRAQ AND KUWAIT

When I sent our troops to Saudi Arabia to stop Iraq's aggression, I knew America's sons and daughters were at the doorstep of harm's way. That's why I wanted to be with our brave men and women this past Thanksgiving -- ~~before~~ I made a decision to order them into battle. I wanted to break bread with them, laugh with them, listen to their stories, pray with them -- I wanted to look them in the eye.

I don't think what I saw will surprise you. I saw tremendous pride -- in themselves and in their mission. I saw anxiety and I saw some fear. But I also saw remarkable hope, optimism, and faith -- faith in our country, and faith in God.

They wanted straight talk. I gave it to them. They wanted to know why we were there. I told them. They wanted to know when they were going fight. That I couldn't tell them, then. I did tell them that we would exhaust every opportunity for peace before resorting to war. And we have.

War is a dirty, bloody business -- I know because I've seen it -- I've been there. In the name of religion, it can be man at his most profane. In the name of peace it can be man at his most violent. In the name of civilization it can be man at his most savage. We're not kidding ourselves about the glory of war.

Our men and women in the Saudi desert are under no illusions, and neither am I. No one is in a rush to send young Americans into battle. I know -- war is brutal and unforgiving.

I've always known that the decision to go to war is the most fateful decision any President can make. Every President hopes it is a decision never made.

Tonight [today, yesterday] I have made such a decision. Under the authorization of the United Nations, Units of the [AF, Army, Marines] and the armed forces of [26] other nations have [action TBD].

Their mission is clear and precise, as it has been every day since August 7th -- the day the extraordinary international coalition joined together to stop Iraq's aggression.

First, their mission is to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Second, we will restore Kuwait's legitimate government. Finally, we will ensure the security and stability of the Gulf region, and eliminate the threat of future aggression.

I believe most Americans understand why our troops were called upon to perform this mission, and why they are standing shoulder to shoulder with forces of so many other nations in the sands of the Persian Gulf. The reasons are simple and straightforward.

We Americans don't like bullies. We don't like the idea of a country brutalizing its weaker neighbor. Now that the Cold War is over, we can see Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as the first assault on the new world order. This new world order is founded

upon the rule of law, not the law of the jungle. It is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations, with a profound respect for human rights. Appeasing Iraq is absolutely senseless, if we really believe that we can create a better world for our children to inherit.

The United Nations, invigorated with a new sense of purpose, is in full agreement. The U.N. Security Council has endorsed twelve resolutions to condemn Iraq's unprovoked invasion and occupation of Kuwait, to implement tough economic sanctions to stop all trade in and out of Iraq, and to authorize the use of force to restore the Kuwait's legitimate government and re-establish the stability of the Persian Gulf region.

Saddam Hussein has tried every way he knows how to make this a fight between Iraq and the United States. He has failed. Forces of twenty-six other nations -- XXX thousands of troops, tanks and planes are in Saudi Arabia side by side with our forces. Many countries are also sharing the financial burden of this commitment.

Of course, the United States has always borne a disproportionate share, not only of costs but of leadership as well. And that's how it should be. The United States is unique. Only the United States of America can bear this responsibility. Not Europe, not the Soviet Union, not Japan. We are the one nation on this earth that can stand between the forces of aggression and the forces of peace. Among the nations of the

world **only** the United States of America has both the moral standing and the means to back it up.

However, this does not alter the fact that it is not the United States against Iraq, **it is Iraq against the world**. There has never been a clearer demonstration of a world united against appeasement and aggression.

Americans also don't like to be blackmailed. It angers me when I hear talk about 'blood for oil', as if this was about Americans paying a nickel or a dime more at the gas pump. You and I both know that's not what America is about.

Let me remind those who hold that cynical view that when oil prices doubled, and redoubled in the 1970's we didn't go to war -- even though our economy suffered severe damage. Instead we began to focus on energy conservation, we developed alternative energy sources, we tried to increase our domestic energy production. To be sure, there's a lot more we need to do to ensure that we cannot be held hostage to unreliable suppliers of energy. But back in those days of oil price shocks we tightened our belts and took our economic lumps, and it was tough on all Americans -- damn tough: Remember the elderly whose heating bills tripled? Whole industries lost their competitive edge. Thousands of workers lost their jobs when economic growth slowed to a crawl. Still, through it all, America kept her powder dry.

Today, however, we are facing a brutal dictator who seeks to seize control of a huge proportion of the world's oil supply by force. **That is simply unacceptable**. Already the skyrocketing

oil prices are choking the most fragile economies -- economies in those newly emerging democracies around the world -- where freedom is just now beginning to take hold. For many of them, and for us, energy security is national security. And once again it is the world demanding an end to Saddam Hussein's outrageous attempt at economic blackmail.

The irony here is that the beneficiaries of Saddam Hussein's appetite for economic and military domination of the Middle East are not the Iraqi people. Iraq with its own oil resources should be a wealthy country. But it's not. For Saddam Hussein, oil is not a resource, it's a weapon. That's because the cash from Iraqi oil sales has gone straight into the Iraqi military machine -- now the sixth largest in the world -- and most ominously into Saddam's crash program to develop nuclear weapons.

To protect his military, to shield his efforts to build these horrible weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein brought the cold-hearted horror of hostage-taking to a shameful and callous depth. You know, Americans more than any other of the world's citizens, perhaps, have been victimized by terrorism. When Iraq used human beings as pawns, forcing innocent civilians to be shields for potential military targets, and cynically manipulating their anguished families through the media -- all of this violated even the most basic norms of civilized behavior. But because of America's resolve and that of so many of our coalition partners, Saddam's hostage-taking didn't pay off, and

now there are no foreign nationals held against their will in Iraq or Kuwait.

Unfortunately that has not signalled an end to the brutality in Kuwait. Nor can it redress the brutality already inflicted on the Kuwaiti people. The report of Amnesty International documents in tragic detail the horror: babies pulled from incubators, left dead on hospital floors; children executed in front of their parents; men, women, and children by the hundreds subjected to unspeakable forms of torture. Homes and neighborhoods torched. Anything of value shipped back to Baghdad. And it is still going on. A defenseless, sovereign nation systematically sacked and swallowed whole. Iraq has committed the rape of Kuwait.

Some have suggested, 'give the sanctions more time to work. In time Saddam Hussein will come to his senses and withdraw'. To them I say, it's been five long months since Iraqi tanks rolled across the Kuwaiti border, and Saddam has done nothing but dig in deeper. To them I say, think about the children of Kuwait and the terror being visited upon them and the terror being visited upon their parents and their homeland. To those who counsel further patience, I say, think also about those new democracies now struggling mightily under the weight of rising oil prices.

Finally, not once has there been any sign of conciliation coming forth from Bagdad. There has been none, none whatsoever. The conclusion is obvious: sanctions alone will not drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

Some others have suggested a different course, they say 'give Iraq the islands of [Bubayo?] or some of Kuwait's oil fields, some concession to allow Saddam Hussein to save face'. In other words, appease him -- reward his aggression. Let there be no doubt about the consequence of such a course: appeasement would mean the end to our hope for a new world order; it would mean the end of the peacekeeping function of the United Nations, and it would signal the end the American leadership and credibility around the world.

Still, some will ask, maybe the mother of one of our kids in the Gulf, is it worth it? Is it worth one American life? How many casualties are acceptable? Let me tell you, those are the toughest questions of all. It's a painful, wrenching search to find an adequate answer. All I can say is that it is a decision only the President can make. And once it's made, it is my responsibility to do everything in my power to guarantee every one of those kids over there the best chance to come home safely. I promise you tonight that I have fulfilled that trust. (PAUSE)

This century has been marked by violence of proportions never before seen by mankind. Every decade has been marked by the carnage of civil war -- from the frozen steppes of Russia to the sweltering rice fields of China, across the great plains and jungles of Africa to the once peaceful villages of Central America. Each with its own imprint -- each with its own justification, all with a tremendous toll in human suffering. We've witnessed small and great conflagrations between sovereign

nations as well: the slaughter in the muddy fields of World War I, the blitzkrieg and the holocaust, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Korea, and Viet Nam. And in the last twenty years we've witnessed a new kind of war -- a war against the most innocent among us -- a war called terrorism.

But perhaps in this last decade of this violent century, perhaps we can see the outline of a new century -- blessed by peace. Millions born into tyranny now live in freedom. The Cold War has ended. Superpower competition is giving way to superpower cooperation. The United Nations is beginning to fulfill the visions of its founders as a catalyst for peace.

This is a profound moment in history. We cannot allow ourselves to become numb to brutality and terror. We cannot allow ourselves to turn our eyes away because of the horror we have already seen. We have come too far, suffered too long, sacrificed too much along the way for us to surrender our hopes for a better world.

I can assure the American people and her friends around the world as Winston Churchill did on Christmas eve in 1941, when he said that "no greed for the land or wealth of any other people, no vulgar ambition, no morbid lust for material gain at the expense of others, [has] led us to the field....[that our] children shall not be robbed of....their right to live in a free and decent world."

This President and the American people, the principled nations who have joined in this unprecedented coalition standing

against aggression, and most of all the brave soldiers, sailors, airmen, coastguardsmen, and marines in the Persian Gulf -- we stand together against aggression. Our mission is clear, and with God's help we will complete it.

I ask you tonight for your support. I ask you tonight for your prayers. Good night and God bless the United States of America.

#

Short announcement for
Press room or daytime Oval.

McGroarty
January 9, 1990

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: XXXX
XXXX

X hours ago, American troops -- along with members of the multi-national forces stationed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf -- took action against Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait, and military installations inside Iraq. //

Tonight, I come to you to report on the situation -- to lay out the reasons for this action; our aims, and our objectives.

The reasons trace back to a single act and its bloody aftermath: the aggression of August 2nd -- Iraq's unprovoked and unwarranted invasion of Kuwait -- and its systematic assault on that nation and its people. //

The world has met Iraq's invasion with a chorus of condemnation: Twelve resolutions in the United Nations. 28 nations -- not just the United States, but countries from 5 continents: Europe and Asia, Africa and the Arab League -- sent forces to the region, to serve side by side in the Gulf, as a clear signal of international solidarity and commitment. Finally, in recognition of the ultimate limits of diplomacy, the UN Security Council approved the use of all means necessary to end Iraq's illegal occupation.

Today, after more than five months of close and continuous consultations with our allies and with the Congress -- I determined that circumstances would permit no further delay --

that the time had come to use all means necessary to drive Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. //

On November 29, the UN set a deadline of January 15 for Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal. That date has come and gone -- and still we waited, anxious to achieve our objective without resort to arms. //

The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. In every case, Saddam Hussein -- a tyrant whose chosen tools are force and terror -- took this striving for peace as a sign of weakness. //

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. //

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein made hostages of thousands of men, women and children -- turned them into bargaining chips -- human pawns in an inhuman game. //

While the world waited, Saddam tightened his grip on Kuwait, and continued his quest to acquire an arsenal of infinitely more dangerous weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear weapons. //

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open contempt. //

For five months, the world waited -- in vain. Now, the waiting is over. The world is acting -- in unison -- against a dictator unmoved by human decency. Against an aggression that cannot stand. //

Vital interests are at stake -- for America, and for the world. Every President beginning with Eisenhower has made clear that -- as a matter of American policy -- the dominance by a hostile power of such a significant source of the world's energy supply constitutes a direct and indisputable threat to our national security. We know that in the hands of Saddam Hussein, oil is not a resource -- it is a weapon. //

We know as well the lessons of history -- lessons written in our lifetimes in blood, suffering and sacrifice -- that aggression feeds on appeasement -- and that the man who rules Iraq, responsible for so much death, destruction and deprivation, has not exhausted his capacity to create human misery. //

But what is ultimately at stake goes beyond these vital interests -- and points the way forward to a chapter in the history of human endeavor bright enough to eclipse even this century's darkest days. After four decades of Cold War and conflict -- after more than forty years of armed and uneasy peace between East and West -- we have in this past year made great progress towards ending the tensions that for so long divided a world in two. We have before us the opportunity to forge, for ourselves and for future generations, a new world order -- a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. //

This vision -- the vision that has guided America's conduct in the world from the days of Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan -- is now threatened by the actions of Saddam Hussein. // We will

not allow one man to deny the dream so many millions share -- of a world's best prospect for peace. //

None of us -- not the American people, and certainly not this President -- welcomes war. // I believe it is clear to all that responsibility for this conflict does not rest with America, with its friends, or with any of the forces acting together under UN auspices. Nor does responsibility rest in any real sense with the people of Iraq. Responsibility for the current conflict rests with one man, and one man alone: Saddam Hussein -- and the forces who follow his dictates. ///

As President of a people who cherish peace, I held out hope the past five months for a way to end this crisis without further conflict. That hope of peace proved the ultimate victim of a dictator bent on war. //

Now, having determined that force is necessary -- I am equally determined that force will be decisive. //

Many times during this crisis, I promised that I would never send American servicemen and women in harm's way with anything less than total support. As Commander in Chief -- as one of many millions of Americans who has seen first-hand the face of battle -- I will use all means at my disposal to achieve our objective as quickly as possible -- to keep our own casualties to an absolute minimum -- and to ensure the swift and complete defeat of Saddam Hussein and the forces under his command. //

As we meet, our forces fight. // There is no joy in the victory of war -- but there would be untold tragedy in defeat.

In the operation now underway, there is no room for hesitation, or half-way solutions. We will settle for nothing short of success -- and we shall not stop until all of our objectives are achieved. Let me say to all of you: The operation is unfinished -- but the outcome is not in doubt. ///

Tonight, I ask all Americans to set aside whatever differences divide us -- to call to mind the bravery, the courage and the dedication of our sons and daughters. And to support with a single voice not just the United States -- but all nations united in defense of shared ideals and interests that remain mankind's best hope for peace.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY *cm*

SUBJECT: War Powers Resolution

Attached is the copy of the War Powers Resolution that you requested. Sections 3, 4, and 5 are the heart of the Resolution.

On August 9 the President provided a report "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution notifying Congress of the introduction of U.S. forces into the Persian Gulf region, and on November 16 the President provided an additional report updating Congress on the situation. As is customary, neither report specified the relevant section of the Resolution, but the first report was consistent with section 4(a)(2) (concerning introductions of U.S. forces into foreign countries), and the second was consistent with section 4(c) (concerning periodic reports to Congress).

We have consciously avoided notifying Congress consistent with section 4(a)(1) that hostilities in the region are imminent, because this would trigger the Resolution's 60-day clock under section 5(b). Once the clock was triggered, the President would be required by the Resolution to terminate the deployment of U.S. forces to the region unless Congress passed legislation specifically authorizing the deployment within sixty days.

We believe that the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to allow Congress to compel the withdrawal of U.S. forces through inaction, but no President has wanted to jeopardize congressional support for his actions by defying the Resolution. It often falls to Executive branch lawyers to develop a legal theory permitting the President to avoid triggering the clock. Congress also has been reluctant to permit the President to act in defiance of its interpretation of the Resolution. In the only case where the President's legal interpretation could not be reconciled with Congress's (Lebanon in 1983), Congress enacted legislation specifically authorizing the U.S. deployment, but subjecting that authorization to numerous restrictions designed to limit the President's freedom of action.

In the current situation, the Resolution would not require notice to Congress prior to the initiation of hostilities. While we could choose to provide prior notice, I would counsel against doing so. Such notice would trigger the 60-day clock, and set an unwelcome precedent for future military operations.

Attachment

Tab A War Powers Resolution

1. War Powers

a. War Powers Resolution

Public Law 93-148 [H.J. Res. 542], 87 Stat. 555, 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548, passed over President's veto November 7, 1973

JOINT RESOLUTION Concerning the war powers of Congress and the President.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

Section 1.¹ This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

PURPOSE AND POLICY

Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

CONSULTATION

Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

¹ 50 U.S.C. 1541.

REPORTING

Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced—

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace of waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;

the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ²

Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Com-

² See also sec. 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (Public Law 98-164, 97 Stat. 1062) which read as follows:

"EXPEDITED PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN JOINT RESOLUTION AND BILLS"

"Sec. 1013. Any joint resolution or bill introduced in either House which requires the removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories, without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization shall be considered in accordance with the procedures of section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, except that any such resolution or bill shall be amendable. If such a joint resolution or bill should be vetoed by the President, the time for debate in consideration of the veto message on such measure shall be limited to twenty hours in the Senate and in the House shall be determined in accordance with the Rules of the House."

For text of sec. 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, see vol. I, page 476.

mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR
BILL ²

Sec. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pend-

ing business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective House in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION

Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

(d) Nothing in this joint resolution—

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing treaties; or

(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

Sec. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

Sec. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1991

Governor -
- This might
be of interest
to you
XX

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: DAN MC GROARTY *DMG*

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS -- 4 CRISES

The following takes a look at four instances since 1950 when American forces were introduced into combat operations, and examines the form and timing of Presidential statements or speeches on those operations.

The general pattern that emerges is that initial comment takes the form of a statement -- whether televised (Pres. Johnson) or in written form -- on or within the first day of operations, followed at some remove by a televised speech.

In the four instances examined here, the televised speech takes place on Day 1, 2, 4 and 23 of hostilities. In the case of the Lebanon operation of 1958, Eisenhower's televised address takes place the first evening of the operation, with a second radio address 4 days later. In the case of the Korean War, Truman's televised speech follows his initial statement by 23 days, and the introduction of American troops by 19 days.

In comparing these instances to the present case of Iraq, several facts must be recognized:

In no case was the warning time or run-up to hostilities as long as in the present case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

In each case, the need to protect American lives (Grenada, Lebanon and Dominican Republic) or respond to immediate attack existed (Korea).

With the exception of Korea, each operation examined here was of small scale and short duration -- with the prospect of early success and an end to hostilities in view even as the President delivered his TV speech.

Several observations:

In no case did the President deliver his "first word" on the hostilities in a major, set-piece speech.

The advent of the "information age" may make the initial written statement obsolete. In the event of hostilities with Iraq, it is hard to imagine President Bush issuing a short written statement as Eisenhower and Truman had done, and then retreating into silence. To take the most recent case, even in a small-scale operation like Grenada President Reagan delivered in person an early public statement.

Likewise, it is impossible to imagine a lag of 23 days, as in Truman's case, before the President shares with the Congress and country a full exposition of his views on the conflict.

In the present case, the long build-up since August 2 and the high level of press and public attention on the crisis argues for an early, short but still substantial statement after the onset of hostilities (whether in the Oval Office or the Press Room), followed by a lengthier TV speech on the evening of the first or second day of the conflict.

KOREA

North Korea invades: June 25, 1950.

June 26 -- Truman issues short **statement** (200 words).

June 27 -- Truman issues second **statement** (350 words).

June 30 -- Truman orders U.S. troops from Japan to Korea.

July 19 -- Truman issues **written report** to Congress and delivers **radio and TV address.**

LEBANON

July 14, 1958 -- Lebanese Government requests U.S. assistance.

July 15 -- Eisenhower issues **statement** (approx. 500 words), notifying Congress and public that troops have been sent.

July 15 -- Eisenhower sends Special Message to Congress (800 words).

July 15 -- Eisenhower records a **statement for TV and radio**, broadcast on July 15 (1400 words).

July 19 -- Eisenhower records a **statement on film and tape**, broadcast over Armed Forces Radio, July 19.

****No** U.S. Servicemen died in the action.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Coup attempt begins, Apr. 24, 1965.

Apr. 28, 1965 -- U.S. puts troops ashore to protect/evacuate American citizens. Ultimately, 19,000 troops take part.

Apr. 28 -- Johnson reads **televised statement** (approx. 250 words) from White House Theater reporting that U.S. troops have been dispatched.

Apr. 30, 1965 -- Johnson delivers **televised statement** (450 words) from Theater.

May 1 -- Johnson releases two **statements** (175 and 400 words).

May 2 -- Johnson delivers evening **TV address.**

****27** U.S. Servicemen died in the action.

GRENADA

U.S. Forces begin operation Oct. 25, 1983.

Oct. 25 -- Reagan makes **statement** (750 words) at press conference with Dominica's Eugenia Charles.

Oct. 25 -- Reagan releases **letter** (800 words) to the Speaker of the House.

Oct. 27 -- Reagan delivers **televised address** on Lebanon and Grenada. (Barracks bombing in Beirut had occurred Oct. 23, 1983.)

All "major combat operations" completed on Oct. 27.

****18** U.S. servicemen died in the action.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 9, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID DEMAREST

FROM: DAN MC GROARTY *DMG*

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND SPEECH

A few thoughts, given the 8 hour time difference with Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait.

1 a.m. to 4 a.m. Saudi time = 5 p.m. to 8 p.m. EST.

If the most likely window for action falls at this time, and we build a two to three hour delay into any initial statement we might wish to make, our "window" puts us in the evening: 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. EST.

That creates the possibility for an initial statement, followed 24 hours later by a more detailed speech.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/6/91

TO: Governor Sununu

FROM: Bobbie Kilberg

Jeff Vogt *[Signature]*

For your information

*Fast food restaurant CEO
Operation Desert Storm support
letter*

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

February 5, 1991

President George W. Bush
THE WHITE HOUSE
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned, stand united in support of our American men and women who have dedicated themselves to upholding the United States' commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.

We believe it is vitally important for all Americans to unite behind your pursuit of justice. Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, violations of the Geneva Prisoner of War Accords, and intentional attacks on civilian populations have been condemned by the world community. We want the Iraqi regime to understand that countless Americans are united behind our men and women and your leadership in stopping this aggression and establishing stability in the Persian Gulf.

In honor of all those who have given the last full measure of devotion in upholding their Nation's commitment, we urge you to remain steadfast and resolute.

Sincerely,

Charles Bernstein
Editor
NATION'S RESTAURANT BUSINESS

Norman Brinker
Chairman of the Board
CHILI'S, INC.

President George W. Bush
February 5, 1991
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President George W. Bush
February 5, 1991
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President George W. Bush
February 5, 1991
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