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
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Full

DATE:

12-15-90

FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO:

Brent/JS

Re: SOLARZ Group

We need to get a relatively formal
structure of work with this
group...

OP-Eds

Testimony

Phone Calls of Individual MC'S
ETC.

Please discuss.



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 JAN -8 PM 8:15

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

January 8, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: EDE HOLIDAY 

SUBJECT: Endorsement by Veteran's Groups of Gulf Policy

Secretary Derwinski requested that I bring the attached letter to your attention. It will be signed by the commanders of eleven national veterans organizations and will be released tomorrow to each member of Congress. As you can see, they express their support for your policy in the Gulf in very strong terms.

Attachment

VETERAN'S ORGANIZATIONS ENDORSE PRESIDENT'S GULF POLICY

A coalition of Veterans Organizations urges the United States Congress to support and allow President Bush's Gulf Policy to work. In a statement aimed at each member of Congress, the Veterans asked that Congress join with the President and present a united front to Iraq. The coalition consisting of American Ex-Prisoners of War, Catholic War Veterans, USA, Inc, Jewish War Veterans of the USA, Legion of Valor of the USA, Inc., Marine Corps League, Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA, Inc., Non Commissioned Officers Association, Polish Legion of American Veterans, USA, Fleet Reserve Association, The Retired Enlisted Association, and National Association for Uniformed Services, urged that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, be allowed the latitude to determine the military strategy required to force Iraq's compliance with the United Nations mandates, to include the January 15th deadline for withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The Veterans emphasized they are not urging the President go to war, but rather that he be supported fully by all branches of Government and the American people to take the action he deems appropriate for American interests. Should war commence, the veterans stressed that the United States and allied military forces must be permitted to pursue victory using all reasonable means and must not be constrained by borders from striking the enemy wherever necessary. Such constraints in prior conflicts have cost American lives and impeded victory.

We the undersigned unanimously support the prompt action previously taken by President Bush. We continue to support his efforts to resolve the crisis in the Persian Gulf and urge the members of Congress and the American people to give the President the latitude to take any action necessary to insure that Iraqi aggression in Kuwait is reversed and that Kuwait be restored to its rightful government.

American Ex-Prisoners of War

Non Commissioned Officers Assoc.

Catholic War Veterans, USA, Inc.

Polish Legion American Vets USA

Jewish War Veterans of the USA

Fleet Reserve Association

Legion of Valor of the USA, Inc.

The Retired Enlisted Association

Marine Corps League

National Asso. Uniformed Svcs.

Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA, Inc.



THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

TO: Governor John Sununu
FROM: Victor Ajlcuny
DATE: January 4, 1991
RE: Possible Effects of Gulf Crisis on Future Presidencies

Much can be said about the pros and cons of the different courses of action available to President Bush. His decision is not an easy one and I thank God that I am not in his shoes. We have faith that the President will do what he believes is best for the country. I have spent much of the last three months speaking to students and various service organizations and I believe that the longer the war and the greater the casualties, the lower the possibility of President Bush's re-election. The President has been quoted as saying his re-election will not be a deciding factor. However, I believe that his failure to be re-elected could have adverse effects on future presidencies. My fear is that when the next strong man emerges, (God only knows he will) the President of the United States will be paralyzed, remembering what the Gulf Crisis did to the Bush Presidency. What will we have gained?

May God protect and guide all of you during these crucial times.

Personal & Urgent



Center for War/Peace Studies

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Richard Hudson

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Publisher of Global Report

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

FAX TRANSMISSION
COVERSHEET

Date: January 8, 1991

To: John Sununu
The White House
1-202-456-2413 (or 2883)

From: Richard Hudson, Executive Director
Center for War/Peace Studies

FAX #(212) 260-6384

Pages to Follow 2

Any problems with FAX, please call (212) 475-1077.

The attached draft Security Council resolution, now in its fourth revision since October 1, is being sent to U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, President George Bush, President Saddam Hussein, Secretary-General Abdulla Bishara of the Gulf Cooperation Council, permanent representatives to the U.N. of all members of the Security Council and of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Yugoslavia, Germany, and Japan, among many others, as well as many other governmental and non-governmental people. Most of these transmittals will be done by telefax today.

This resolution, which was known in its earlier form in U.N. circles as the "Humpty Dumpty resolution," is now offered in the hope that if last-minute efforts to avoid war in the Persian Gulf appear doomed to failure, it can be laid on the Security Council table and adopted unanimously on Monday, January 14, as the clock strikes midnight.

Richard Hudson

The President and
Scowcroft have
recieved identical
copies

Document Originally
Attached to
Previous Page

Document Originally
Attached to
Previous Page

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

REAFFIRMING its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990), and 678 (1990);

CONDEMNING again the aggression of Iraq against the sovereign member state of Kuwait;

FEARING that a cataclysmic war is impending as the result of Iraq's failure to withdraw from Kuwait as ordered by the Security Council;

FEARING ALSO that such a war would have unpredictable but certainly catastrophic consequences not only in the area, but for the entire world, in terms of human lives and property, international political stability, and the global environment;

CONVINCED that this organization and this body now face a historic test without parallel, and that we have the choice between our greatest success, or our greatest failure;

CONVINCED FURTHER that if we succeed in avoiding war and restoring an honorable peace in the Persian Gulf crisis, we will be able to build on this accomplishment to carry the concept of world rule of law to new levels of effectiveness;

NOTING that while general references to international law have been widely made during the current crisis, few specific proposals have been offered to settle Iraq-Kuwaiti disputes in accordance with legal norms;

ACTING under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. DEMANDS that forces of Iraq begin to withdraw from Kuwait within 48 hours;
2. GUARANTEES that when this withdrawal begins, and is verified by U.N. observers, the international blockade on imports of food, medical supplies and other humanitarian items will be lifted;
3. GUARANTEES further that when this withdrawal has been completed, and is verified by U.N. observers, the international blockade will be lifted in its entirety;
4. DECLARES that within 48 hours all military forces in the Persian Gulf area, except those within their own national boundaries, shall either begin to be withdrawn or be placed under the direct command of the U.N. Security Council, with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee, as directed by Article 47 of the United Nations Charter;
5. ESTABLISHES the Iraq-Kuwait Binding Arbitration Panel (IKBAP), with the mandate to produce a comprehensive settlement of all issues between the two countries, to be constituted in the following manner:

(a) IKBAP shall consist of seven members, with two each to be selected by the governments of Iraq and Kuwait within seven days. These four members will have seven additional days to agree on three neutral members, including the chairman. In the event that they cannot do so within this period of time, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall name the three neutral members, who shall choose their own chairman, within the succeeding seven days. The panel will then have 30 days to hear arguments from all parties and lay down a comprehensive settlement of all issues between Iraq and Kuwait.

(b) In the event that IKBAP, functioning on the basis of consensus, cannot agree on such a comprehensive settlement after 30 days of deliberations, the panel will enter into a "last best offer" phase. Within seven days, the three neutral members will lay down what they consider a reasonable compromise for a comprehensive settlement. Unless this is acceptable to both sides, each side will be invited to submit its "last best offer" to the neutral three members. IKBAP will then make a final decision on a settlement based on a majority vote, which will be binding, and enforceable by the Security Council.

6. EXPRESSES the fervent hope that this process will lead to a peaceful, just, and productive solution to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, and RESOLVES to continue with new vigor toward a settlement of all other issues in the area in accordance with applicable Security Council resolutions.

Drafted by Richard Hudson, Center for War/Peace Studies

Original, October 1, 1990; third revision, October 29, 1990;
fourth revision, January 8, 1991

News from Senator

BOB DOLE



(R - Kansas)

SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
JANUARY 4, 1991

CONTACT: WALT RIKER
(202) 224-5358

PERSIAN GULF

THE BEST CHANCE FOR PEACE

I HAVE A CERTAIN SYMPATHY FOR BOTH SIDES IN THE SPIRITED DISCUSSION WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE SENATE FLOOR YESTERDAY.

I STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE EFFORT OF THE MAJORITY LEADER TO ESTABLISH SOME REALISTIC GUIDELINES ON HOW WE PROCEED TO DEBATE AND VOTE ON THE CRITICAL ISSUES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

THESE ARE CRITICAL DAYS -- DAYS IN WHICH EVENTS AND DECISIONS COULD PRODUCE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE GULF CRISIS, OR COULD PROPEL US INTO WAR.

LET'S JUST STOP AND THINK FOR A MOMENT.

IRAQIS ACCEPT BUSH OFFER

THE PRESIDENT, JUST YESTERDAY, MADE ONE MORE PROPOSAL FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION -- PROPOSING THAT SECRETARY BAKER AND IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ MEET.

HAPPILY, THE IRAQIS HAVE TODAY RESPONDED POSITIVELY, AND A BAKER-AZIZ MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE NEXT WEDNESDAY.

NO ONE KNOWS WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THOSE TALKS CAN ACCOMPLISH.

BUT DON'T WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO WAIT AND SEE?

DON'T WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO GIVE SECRETARY BAKER A CHANCE TO DELIVER HIS MESSAGE TO AZIZ, OR TO SADDAM, OR WHOEVER -- WITHOUT HAVING THAT MESSAGE DISTORTED OR DROWNED OUT BY THE CONFLICTING VOICES OF A HUNDRED SENATORS, HERE ON THE FLOOR.

"GIVE PEACE A CHANCE" HAS ACHIEVED CLICHE STATUS. BUT IT HAS REAL, CONCRETE MEANING IN THIS SITUATION.

NOT TIME FOR DIVISIVE DEBATE

LET'S GIVE THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE A CHANCE. LET'S NOT INADVERTENTLY COMPROMISE OR KILL IT, BY ENGAGING IN A BITTER AND DIVISIVE DEBATE THAT -- FOR ALL ITS GOOD INTENTIONS -- WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY SADDAM.

WE CAN DEBATE ALL WE WANT TO ABOUT OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITY -- BUT ISN'T IT ALSO OUR RESPONSIBILITY -- AS SENATORS AND AS AMERICANS -- TO ACT RESPONSIBLY BY GIVING THIS LAST, BEST HOPE FOR PEACE A CHANCE?

HAVING SAID ALL THAT, THOUGH, LET ME SAY AGAIN: I AM ALSO SYMPATHETIC TO THE FRUSTRATION THAT IS BEING EXPRESSED THAT THE CONGRESS IS NOT DOING ITS JOB. FOR MONTHS, WE HAVE BEEN STANDING ON THE SIDELINES, MAKING ALL KINDS OF SPEECHES -- BUT TAKING NO RESPONSIBILITY.

YESTERDAY, AN ABC-NEWSWEEK POLL INDICATED THAT 70% OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BELIEVE THE CONGRESS HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE DEAD RIGHT.

THE A.W.O.L. CONGRESS

WHILE THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN PROVIDING THE LEADERSHIP A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF MUST PROVIDE: WHILE OUR YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN HAVE BEEN SWEATING IT

CHIEF MUST PROVIDE; WHILE OUR YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN HAVE BEEN SWEATING IT OUT -- FIGURATIVELY AND LITERALLY -- IN THE SANDS OF SAUDI ARABIA; WHILE EVEN THE U.N. HAS MUSTERED THE WILL TO TAKE STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION -- CONGRESS HAS BEEN A.W.O.L.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DON'T LIKE THAT. AND THEY ARE DEAD RIGHT.

I HAVE BEEN HAMMERING AWAY AT THIS POINT FOR WEEKS. THROUGHOUT NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, I CALLED FOR A SPECIAL SESSION -- JUST SO CONGRESS COULD DEBATE, AND IF NECESSARY VOTE, IN THOSE DAYS WHEN OUR POLICY WAS BEING FORMULATED.

I FELT THEN, AND I FEEL NOW -- WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO MORE THAN CHEER-LEAD, OR SECOND-GUESS, OR WRING OUR HANDS.

WE GET A SALARY FROM THE TAXPAYERS, TO DO A REAL JOB. WE DO HAVE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON EXACTLY WHAT THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE SENATE IS. BUT I DON'T THINK THAT ANY SENATOR BELIEVES WE HAVE BEEN ELECTED, AND ARE BEING PAID, JUST TO MAKE SPEECHES.

(MORE)

2

WE ARE HERE TO DO A JOB; WHEN NECESSARY, TO STAND UP AND BE COUNTED; TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY.

SO, AGAIN, WHILE I SUSPECT I DISAGREE IN SUBSTANCE ALMOST TOTALLY WITH THE SENATOR FROM IOWA AND THE SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON -- I SHARE TO SOME DEGREE THE FRUSTRATION THEY DISPLAYED YESTERDAY. AND I ALSO THINK THAT WE ARE PROCEEDING FROM THE SAME BASIC MOTIVE -- NOT ONLY I, AND THE SENATORS FROM IOWA AND WASHINGTON; BUT ALL OF US IN THE SENATE.

WE DON'T WANT WAR. WE WANT PEACE.

SOLDIERS AND PARENTS, SPOUSES, CHILDREN

YOU CAN'T LOOK INTO THE FACES OF THOSE YOUNG AMERICANS -- MEN AND WOMEN -- IN SAUDI ARABIA, WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL DANGERS AND CHALLENGES EACH OF THEM WILL FACE; WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT THEIR FAMILIES -- THEIR FATHERS AND MOTHERS, THEIR SPOUSES, THEIR YOUNG CHILDREN; WITHOUT IMAGING THEIR FEARS AND ANGUISH.

WE ALL WANT PEACE.

OUR DISAGREEMENT -- AND IT IS A REAL AND SINCERE ONE -- IS HOW DO WE MINIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR WAR? HOW DO WE MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE?

IN MY VIEW, THERE IS ONLY ONE CHANCE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION.

SOMEHOW -- SOMEHOW SOON -- WE MUST CONVINCE SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT HE WILL NOT SUCCEED, HE WILL NOT ACHIEVE ANY REWARD, FOR HIS AGGRESSION. WE MUST SOMEHOW DELIVER TO HIM, LOUD AND CLEAR, THE MESSAGE: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD WILL NOT TOLERATE -- IT'S NOT RHETORIC, OR A BLUFF -- WE WILL NOT TOLERATE HIS CONTINUED SAVAGE SUBJUGATION OF A SOVEREIGN NATION, WHICH DIRECTLY THREATENS VITAL AMERICAN INTERESTS.

THAT BOTTOM LINE IS NOT A MATTER FOR COMPROMISE OR NEGOTIATION. HE WILL BE THROWN OUT OF KUWAIT, AMERICAN VITAL INTERESTS, WILL BE PROTECTED -- ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

HE MUST GET THAT MESSAGE, AND HE MUST BELIEVE IT IS CREDIBLE.

SECRETARY BAKER WILL TRY TO DELIVER THAT MESSAGE NEXT WEDNESDAY. WE ALL HOPE AND PRAY THAT HE WILL SUCCEED.

BUT THE RECORD TO DATE STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT, IF SADDAM HAS ANY DOUBT, IF HE HAS ANY STRAWS TO GRASP, IF HE PERCEIVES ANY WIGGLE ROOM -- HE IS JUST NOT GOING TO GIVE IN.

AND IF HE DOESN'T GIVE IN ON THIS BASIC POINT, THERE WILL BE WAR.

THE END GAME

WE ARE GETTING CLOSE TO AN END-GAME.

WE CAN'T TURN THE SCREWS ANY TIGHTER ON SANCTIONS. AND, FRANKLY, OVER TIME, THE LEAKS IN THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO NOW IN PLACE ARE GOING TO TURN INTO GUSHERS.

WE CAN'T REALISTICALLY EXPECT ANY MORE INTERNATIONAL OR U.N. SUPPORT THAN THE EXTRAORDINARY DISPLAY OF UNITY THAT WE HAVE ALREADY AMASSED.

THERE IS NO BASIS TO BELIEVE THAT THE SANCTIONS, OR ANYTHING ELSE, WILL ERODE SADDAM'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES, OR MAKE HIM AN EASIER TARGET, ANYTIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ON THE CONTRARY, EVERY DAY HE DIGS IN DEEPER; EVERY DAY HE HAS THE CAPACITY TO BUILD UP HIS FORCES EVEN MORE.

WE MUST FACE UP TO THE BOTTOM-LINE TRUTH. ONCE WE GET TO THE POINT WHERE WE HAVE OUR FORCES IN PLACE, A CHILLING FACT SETS IN.

EVERY DAY THEREAFTER THAT WE WAIT, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CAPACITY TO KILL AND MAIM MORE AND MORE AMERICAN TROOPS GROWS. EVERY DAY WE WAIT, OUR CASUALTY LIST PROBABLY GROWS.

WE HAVE WAITED MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS.

DOES ANY SENATOR WANT TO STAND UP AND MAKE THE CASE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CAPACITY TO KILL AMERICAN SOLDIERS, OR TERRORIZE AMERICANS AROUND THE WORLD, HAS DECREASED ONE TOTA, IN ALL THOSE MONTHS?

CAN ANYONE GIVE A COMPELLING REASON, BACKED UP BY REAL FACTS, THAT HIS CAPACITY FOR DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IS GOING TO DETERIORATE IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD?

EVERYTHING AND EVERYBODY IS IN PLACE, TO SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN -- THE STRONG STAND OF OUR PRESIDENT, OUR ARMED FORCES, THE

SANCTIONS, THE UNPRECEDENTED U.N. ACTION, AND NOW THE BAKER-AZIZ TALKS.

EVERYBODY BUT THE CONGRESS

EVERYTHING AND EVERYBODY IS IN PLACE, I SHOULD SAY, EXCEPT THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

MAYBE IT IS TOO LATE TO AVOID WAR. I HOPE NOT -- BUT, CANDIDLY, I'M NOT SURE.

BUT I AM SURE OF THIS. IF WE DO HAVE A WAR, IT IS NOT BECAUSE GEORGE BUSH, OR THE UNITED STATES, OR THE UNITED NATIONS DIDN'T TRY HARD ENOUGH TO AVOID WAR.

IT IS NOT BECAUSE OUR SIDE -- AND OUR SIDE HAPPENS TO INCLUDE PRACTICALLY EVERYONE IN THE WORLD EXCEPT SADDAM HUSSEIN -- IT'S NOT BECAUSE OUR SIDE DIDN'T SHOW ENOUGH PATIENCE.

(MORE)

3

IT IS FOR ONE OF TWO REASONS.

THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS GOING TO HAVE HIS WAR, REGARDLESS.

OR BECAUSE HE SOMEHOW --- DESPITE EVERYTHING -- HAS FAILED TO GET THE MESSAGE OF AMERICAN UNITY, AND RESOLVE, AND STRENGTH.

I CAN'T GUARANTEE -- NO ONE CAN GUARANTEE -- THAT A STRONG EXPRESSION OF CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE U.N. ACTION TO DATE, FOR PRESIDENT BUSH, AND MOST OF ALL FOR OUR TROOPS IN THE GULF WILL SUCCEED IN PENETRATING SADDAM'S OBVIOUSLY RATHER DENSE CRANIUM.

BUT DON'T WE HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO AT LEAST TRY? THE IRAQIS NOW TRY TO MAKE THE CASE THAT, IN A MEETING WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR JUST BEFORE THEIR INVASION, THEY GOT THE IDEA THAT AMERICA WOULDN'T TAKE SIDES IN AN IRAQI-KUWAITI DISPUTE.

MIXED MESSAGES

I HAPPEN TO THINK IT'S A PRETTY BOGUS ARGUMENT, BUT IT IS A CASE THEY ARE MAKING. AND WITHOUT SUGGESTING FOR A MOMENT THAT THERE IS CREDIBILITY IN THE PROPOSITION THAT THEY SOMEHOW PERCEIVED A "GREEN LIGHT" --- HOW DO WE KNOW, FOR SURE, EXACTLY WHAT MESSAGES THEY DO TAKE FROM WHAT WE DO? AND DOESN'T IT MAKE SENSE, IN THIS CRITICAL PERIOD, TO BE ESPECIALLY PRUDENT AND JUDICIOUS IN ALL OUR ACTIONS AND WORDS?

SOMEONE IN OUR S-407 BRIEFING YESTERDAY ASKED SECRETARY BAKER A VERY GOOD QUESTION: HOW DO WE REALLY KNOW HOW SADDAM REACTS TO WHAT IS GOING ON, EITHER IN THE GULF, BACK HERE, OR ANYWHERE ELSE? HOW GOOD IS OUR INTELLIGENCE?

I'M CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO DETAIL THE SECRETARY'S ANSWER, BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU OF THIS: NO ONE CAN BE CERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT INFORMATION SADDAM RECEIVES, OR HOW HIS THOUGHT PROCESSES WORK.

BUT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT HE PAYS AN EXTRAORDINARY AMOUNT OF ATTENTION TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN THIS CITY, AND IN THIS BUILDING.

DOES ANYONE HERE WANT TO WAKE UP TOMORROW, AND FIND -- IN SOME POST MORTEM ON A WAR -- THAT SOME WELL-INTENTIONED ACTION OR COMMENT HERE IN THE SENATE HAD BEEN TOTALLY MISUNDERSTOOD IN BAGHDAD, AND HAD GIVEN SADDAM THE IDEA HE COULD DRAG THINGS ON A BIT LONGER?

THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE DO OR SAY NOTHING.

GO THE EXTRA MILE

IT DOES MEAN THAT, JUST AS PRESIDENT BUSH HAS GONE THE EXTRA MILE IN OUR DEALINGS WITH IRAQ, WE SHOULD GO THE EXTRA MILE IN INSURING THAT WE NOT SEND THE WRONG MESSAGE TO SADDAM.

AND, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, IT DOES MEAN THAT WE SHOULD JOIN THE PRESIDENT, AND THE REST OF THE CIVILIZED WORLD, IN SENDING THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO SADDAM.

THAT IS THE BEST WAY TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE.

THAT IS THE BEST WAY TO MINIMIZE THE CHANCES OF WAR.

THAT IS THE BEST WAY TO MEET OUR RESPONSIBILITY -- BOTH TO THE CONSTITUTION, AND TO THE YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN WHO NOW STAND, WATCHING AND WAITING, IN THE SANDS OF SAUDI ARABIA.

###

DAF

**POTENTIAL IMPACTS
OF
IRAQI USE OF OIL
AS A
DEFENSIVE WEAPON
(DRAFT WORKING PAPER)**

Prepared by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A preliminary study was performed using a multi-disciplinary team to determine the potential atmospheric optical effects, ecological stresses, and reservoir damages that would result from the demolition of wellheads situated in Kuwaiti oil fields and from the discharge or ignition of oil from non-reservoir sources such as oil storage tank farms, man-made oil-filled trenches, pipelines, and oil tankers. Base-case and worst-case scenarios for the oil fields were considered: in the base-case scenario, one-third of all wellheads in Kuwait were destroyed and half of these were ignited; in the worst-case scenario, all 900 wellheads were destroyed and 80% of these were ignited. The approach taken in this study was to perform a series of time-phased analyses, each stage of which generated not only immediate results, but also the requisite inputs, or source terms, for the succeeding stage. Hence, reservoir analyses provided source terms for combustion analyses in addition to estimates of reservoir damage; combustion analyses defined combustion products, posed oil-filled trench issues, and provided source terms for atmospheric processes; atmospheric analyses generated potential optical effects and provided source terms for ecological analyses that, in turn, provided estimates of ecological stresses.

In the base-case and worst-case scenarios, midday light levels are expected to be on the order of 1/1000th of a moonlit night due to extinction of sunlight by soot within corridors tens of kilometers wide downwind (probably Southeast) from burning oil sources. Maximum degradation of visibility is expected in the region between ground level and 2 km altitude at distances of 5 to 30 km from the sources. Reduced visibility will exist at distances in excess of 100 km from the sources. Major degradation is also expected in the infrared region of the spectrum; consequently, electro-optical instrumentation will be affected. Use of a line source rather than a two-dimensional array of wells is a source of uncertainty (a factor of 2 or 3 in optical depth) in these estimates as are meteorological conditions.

In all scenarios, airborne pollutants created by burning oil are not expected to significantly affect major population centers. Oil spilled over the ground will kill vegetation and is a threat to shallow aquifers and coastal wells. Most vegetation is expected to recover within a year. Oil (77 times the amount of the Exxon Valdez spill) discharged from tankers, pipelines, or on-shore storage tanks into the Gulf will cause major damage to the marine ecology, to the fishing industry, and to desalination facilities in four countries. Detailed quantitative aspects of the damage are uncertain.

Extensive, irremediable losses due to reservoir damage are not expected. However, oil losses due to uncontrolled flow could amount to as much as 7 - 10 Mbbl/day in the worst-case scenario and 5 - 6 Mbbl/day in the base-case scenario. Uncertain is the number of wells affected as well as the time required to regain control of them.

Given the Iraqi Pipeline to Saudi Arabia (IPSA) as the only source of oil, anti-tank trenches may not be fillable based on current estimates of oil seepage. If not, IPSA-limited burning is expected to take place in trench-bottom feeder lines at about one-sixth the intensity of oil-filled trenches, resulting in still significant concentrations of pollutants and degradation of visibility. Most uncertain are soil properties (seepage rates) from the trenches and the potential for use of added sources of oil (e.g., Southeast Field).

encountered in the vicinity of the trench. Downwind dispersion estimates for a trench burn reveal that soot concentrations in excess of 10 mg/m^3 could be encountered at points 5 to 30 km downwind from the trenches. Such soot concentrations would clearly constitute IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) conditions at lower altitudes, and would undoubtedly adversely impact the performance of various electro-optical weapons systems. It is not unlikely that the plumes from the burning trenches would superimpose on the downwind plume from the West oil field further reducing visibility downwind from that region.

The most dramatic optical effect expected, however, is not visibility degradation in the horizontal. It is sunlight extinction in the vertical. One finds that the optical depths of some of the plumes for the base-case scenario may be greater than 20. That corresponds to an attenuation of sunlight by a factor of 4.8×10^8 . At noon, light levels under the plumes may be as low as 1/1000th that of a moonlit night. Even if the optical depth were only half as large, the light levels would still be not much greater than a moonlit night. Thus corridors of darkness tens of kilometers wide can be expected downwind of the major oil fields in the base-case scenario and downwind of the trench system in all scenarios (see Figure III-1). In scenario #1, the effect would be considerably less severe, with light levels perhaps being comparable to twilight. Because of low light levels, artificial light sources (flashlights, etc.) might be used, but even with these, extinction in the horizontal would limit the visual range.

An additional source of visibility-reducing aerosol could arise from breached, non-burning wellheads in the various oil fields of interest. Droplet size analysis of the oil exiting from the pipe reveals that oil droplet size would be in the range of under 5 microns for the higher pressure wellheads (Appendix A, Section 2). As a result, these small particles would remain suspended and would be found in a low-level plume very close to the ground since, in the absence of combustion and heat release, no significant plume rise would occur. On an equal mass basis the light extinction efficiency of oil mist is about 3 times less than that of soot. Large sources of oil mist, particularly in the vicinity of non-burning, venting high pressure wells in the Southeast field could contribute to a local visibility problem. However, the problem would be localized in the vicinity of the breached non-burning wellheads because of droplet evaporation. The effects of the vaporized organic species on extinction in the infrared region, however, would be widespread.

It is important to note that all optical effects would be reduced by high winds especially downwind of burning pools or trenches.

LONG-TERM CLIMATIC EFFECTS

An estimate of the total weekly smoke yield from all combined burning oil fields, trenches, and oil storage facilities for the four burn scenarios considered in this

analysis is given in Table III-3. The base-case burn scenario results in a weekly release of about 0.34 Tg (10^{12} g) of smoke from the uncontrolled burning wells in the various oil fields. If the assumption is made that the wells burn uncontrolled for




Figure III-1. Map of Kuwait showing location of principal oil fields and trenches of interest. Modeled line sources are shown superimposed on the smoke sources and oriented normal to the expected wind direction. Expected plume dimensions are shown with dotted lines. Note that the plumes are artificially terminated here, but would actually continue on until completely dispersed. It is also important to note that on any given day, the expected wind direction may not occur. Hence, the areas affected may be quite different from those shown here.

Table III-3. Total Smoke Injection for Burn Scenarios

Burn Scenario	Total Smoke Production (Tg)			
	All Fields per week	Trench	Storage	Total Release for 8 weeks
No. 1	0.09	0.21	0.31	1.3
No. 2	0.34	0.21	0.31	3.2
No. 3	0.11	0.21	0.31	1.4
No. 4	0.49	0.21	0.31	4.5

Notes:

All calculations assume a constant release rate over an 8-week interval with no drop-off in wellhead pressure.

The smoke release from trench and storage burning is added into the final column.

a period of 8 weeks, the total smoke yield is about 2.7 Tg. Adding in the smoke release from the trench and storage facility burning (0.5 Tg) results in a total smoke release of about 3.2 Tg over the 8-week interval. This calculation assumes that the oil and gas flow rate at the wellhead remains constant over the 8-week period. The result would clearly be less if the well pressure drops off over the period of uncontrolled venting. A similar calculation for the worst case scenario results in a total release about 4.5 Tg which includes emissions from burning trenches and oil storage facilities. Total smoke injection into the atmosphere resulting from all combustion activities on earth is estimated to be about 200 Tg/yr (Seiler and Crutzen, 1980).

Thus, for as long as the fires burn at the estimated rates, they would add about 10% to the world's smoke production during the same period. The climatic effect of this smoke would be roughly doubled by the fact that crude oil smoke absorbs light very efficiently in comparison to most urban, industrial and agricultural burning smokes.

A recent assessment of the potential for climatic change that would arise from smoke injection into the atmosphere from mass fires following a 1,000 megaton nuclear exchange between the Superpowers established a baseline smoke injection mass of 180 Tg (National Academy of Sciences, 1985). This assessment further

assumed that intense urban fires would result in smoke injection heights up to and beyond the tropopause (10-15 km above ground), where the smoke would persist and ultimately be dispersed over the northern hemisphere. For an 8-week burn interval at constant well production rates, the worst-case smoke-release scenario examined in this analysis is below the baseline nuclear winter assessment by about a factor of 40. The majority of the smoke produced from the Kuwait oil fires would be injected into the lower atmosphere where such atmospheric phenomenon as cloud formation and precipitation would facilitate smoke removal. In light of these differences in total mass release and injection height, it is reasonably clear that major long-term climatic effects would not result from Kuwait oil fires. Prolonged burning for up to a half year at the rates used in Table III-3 would still not inject enough smoke to cause major climatic changes on a global scale because atmospheric removal processes in the lower atmosphere would significantly reduce the total mass of smoke injected into the atmosphere over the release interval. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that measurable climatic effects would be created at least on a regional, if not on a global scale.

ECOSTRESSES

Oil releases from damaged Kuwaiti oil fields, storage tank farms, and offshore tankers can potentially disrupt both terrestrial and marine ecology. Unburned oil, flowing over and pooling on the ground, will have toxic effects on native desert vegetation near the oil fields; it can pollute nearby shallow freshwater aquifers which are important to Kuwait's agriculture (which is quite limited); and the hydrogen sulfide release can have toxic effects on people and animals near oil fields. If the oil is burning, it can affect vegetation, humans, and animals because of SO₂, CO, soot, and heavy metals in the combustion products. Unburned oil released near the coast can damage salt marshes and the marine ecology.

TERRESTRIAL EFFECTS

Oil discharged across the desert's surface will kill vegetation by smothering and poisoning. The destruction will be limited to areas immediately around the oil fields. Some recovery is expected over time because seeds will survive the oil and germinate when conditions become favorable. In most places, the oil will not penetrate to deep aquifers because of hard pan (gatch); however, shallow coastal wells fed by percolating rainwater could be polluted by releases from the Burgan field or coastal storage tanks. The huge groundwater field at Raudhatain has a nearby main, shallow, freshwater aquifer at a depth of 30-60 ft, which is partially recharged annually by rainfall and which could become polluted by oil flow from the northern oil field. Also, large areas of beach sand marshes southeast of the Burgan oil fields would be destroyed by an oil covering.

For short-term exposure (hours or days), SO_2 from burning wells would be expected to cause visible damage to vegetation up to a distance of 20 km from the source. For long-term exposure (years), SO_2 from as few as 60 burning wells would be expected to cause some damage up to a distance of 100 km. Thresholds for destructive effects are difficult to quantify, but assuming that long term SO_2 concentrations of 0.5 mg/m^3 and above are destructive, then as few as 100 burning wells would be expected to produce destructive effects up to at least 20 km. The nature of desert vegetation tends to minimize air pollution damage. The most sensitive vegetation would be irrigated crops and city landscaping. Little or no effect would be expected from acid rain. Kuwait does have some irrigated agriculture, east of the Burgan Field and in the north, mostly dates with some vegetables. The agriculture is not extensive, and Kuwait imports most of its food.

Based on our airborne concentration analyses and toxicity data, the effects of airborne contaminants are expected to be small. Carbon monoxide, carcinogens and heavy metals are not expected to have a significant effect. The largest effect is expected from SO_2 . Some increased mortality in a small sensitive population is expected, and will be most severe at 10 km from a burning field. The largest effect will come if the wind is from the south, putting Kuwait City in the path of combustion products from the Burgan Field. Winds from the south occur infrequently. Even with winds from the south, SO_2 concentrations are not expected to be large enough for a serious effect on nonsensitive people in Kuwait City. Hydrogen sulfide is expected to have a negligible effect since its concentrations are toxic only in the immediate vicinity of the oil fields.

MARINE EFFECTS

Based on information we have received, a twenty million barrel crude oil spill to the Persian Gulf is possible near Kuwait's coast. Ten million barrels could be released in the first 24 hours followed by another ten million in the next 36 hours. The potential source is a combination of tankers and on-shore storage tanks located near Kuwait's coast. The magnitude of this potential oil spill is 77 times that of the Exxon Valdez. Such an oil spill could disrupt the important fishing industry in the gulf, shut down water desalination plants in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar which supply a large share of the area's water, and cause long term damage to the gulf's ecology.

The Nowruz spill, tied for the world's largest, put 4 million barrels into the Persian Gulf over several months in 1983. We have been unable in the short term of this project to obtain accounts of scientifically determined quantitative effects from this spill, but news articles reported a paralyzed shrimp industry and suspended operation of two Saudi desalination plants. Damage from this spill was probably minimized because it was in the northeastern part of the gulf and a combination of

northwesterly wind and currents carried the oil down the Iranian coast away from the Saudi coast.

We estimate that a 20 million barrel spill off Kuwait can spread to cover an area 50 miles wide and will probably travel south along the Saudi coast due to natural Gulf circulation patterns. It will probably interfere with the operation of several desalination plants along the Saudi coast and in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. These areas are dependent on desalinated water.

An oil spill in the Persian Gulf will have relatively serious effects on marine life because the gulf is small, shallow, has slow circulation, and is very biologically productive. The Arabian Sea, which includes the Gulf, is the highest marine life productivity area in the world. Much of the oil will degrade by biodegradation or photochemical reactions relatively quickly (over a few days) because of warm temperatures. Oil sediments, on the other hand, will persist for a long time and will enter the food chain through species such as shrimp which feed on the gulf bottom. Thus, there is the potential for long term fishing industry as well as general ecological disruption.

It is possible that the oil spill will be ignited. Burning the oil is probably better for marine ecology than not burning it because burning helps remove the most volatile oil compounds which are the most soluble in water and hence the most toxic. Dispersants, while effective in deep water, should not be used in the shallow Gulf water or over reefs because they are more toxic than the oil.

White House News Summary

Monday, December 10, 1990

ABC's GOOD MORNING AMERICA
excerpts on Iraq/hostages

7 a.m.

MIKE SCHNEIDER: For more than 160 Americans who have been trapped in Iraq and occupied-Kuwait, the ordeal is finally over. They're coming home. They stopped in Frankfurt, Germany, where they changed planes and told reporters of life as they have known it for the past four months, life under Saddam Hussein's regime.

(HOSTAGE MAN: "Kuwait City does no longer exist, for all practical purposes. The buildings are still there, the greenery and everything is gone. The people mostly are gone.")

REPORTER: "Do people assume there's going to be a war, sir?"

HOSTAGE MAN: "People are waiting, they're hoping to God that somebody's going to come in help them out.")

(HOSTAGE MAN: "We're welcoming a military invasion. Please, do something. Just don't vacillate back and forth.")

(REPORTER: "The Kuwaitis want the United States to come in and save them?"

HOSTAGE MAN: "Without a doubt, to a man and to a woman and to a child."

REPORTER: "Even if it means the destruction of their country?"

HOSTAGE MAN: "Even if it means they're under a rain of bombs, just like we would have been.")

SCHNEIDER continues: Those people are only part of the first wave. In Baghdad this morning, hundreds of other hostages are gathering at the airport, fighting their way through the Iraqi bureaucracy and hoping to be on one of the other flights that are planned for later this week.

KAREN BURNES reports on those left behind: This morning, the British are getting their exit visas, preparing to board a plane for London. Nearly 200 Americans and over 1,000 detainees have left this country in the last two days, swept up by the heady sense of imminent freedom. But in their wake are still hundreds more. Some chose to stay behind.

(HOSTAGE MAN: "I'm not leaving because, a humanitarian request. I have to go back to Kuwait to sell a -- make a decision about my future with this lady in Kuwait who has helped me through a crisis. I need to help her through a crisis now.")

Officials estimate that several hundred Americans have become integrated into Iraqi society and will remain here. But there are those still tangled in bureaucracy, like this American who is married to a Kuwaiti woman and cannot obtain exit visas for his family. Officials believe people are still hiding in Kuwait, having not heard the news that it was safe to leave. They hope to fly them out by Wednesday. In the meantime, the U.S. Government will pay all the air fares of American hostages leaving, which means paying the Iraqi government to fly them out.

-more-

White House News Summary

Monday, December 10, 1990 -- 2

7:30 a.m.

SCHNEIDER: More than 160 former American hostages are now on their way out of Iraq and headed back home. But during a stopover in Frankfurt, Germany, they told grim stories about life in hiding after Iraq invaded Kuwait. Some say the Kuwaitis who helped them were executed, and that thousands of Kuwaitis are being held in prison camps. Others say the Kuwaitis are praying now for a U.S. military invasion to save them and their country.

8:00 a.m.

ABC's BARRIE DUNSMORE reports from the airport at Frankfurt: If there had been a war at any time in the past four months, almost certainly these people would have been among America's first casualties. Whether in hiding in Kuwait or held as human shields at Iraqi military sites, their chances of survival would have been slim to none. It was notable, then, that so many of this group approved the use of force.

(HOSTAGE MAN: "The people are waiting. They're hoping to God that somebody's going to come in and help them out.")

Michelle Richards worried about what was happening to the Kuwaitis.

(RICHARDS: "They have been murdered, brutally murdered. Women have been raped. There are thousands still in POW camps.")

Dennis Mosher (sp?) strongly supported the President's policy of threatening force.

(MOSHER: "I'm saying President Bush did a hell of a job, and I doubt seriously if the United States could have gotten a better person to do -- he got me out of here, okay? I'm alive, no Americans died. He did a great job.")

Ernest Alexander said it was demoralizing to hear talk of relying simply on sanctions.

(REPORTER: "The Kuwaitis want the United States to come in and save them?"

ALEXANDER: "Without a doubt, to a man and to a woman and to a child."

REPORTER: "Even if it means the destruction of their country."

ALEXANDER: "Even if it means they are under a rain of bombs, just like we would have been.")

After an elaborate breakfast this morning, most of the Americans will be returning home later today, happy to have survived and hoping that Americans at home do not now think the crisis is over.

###

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 4, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU

FROM: Boyd Hollingsworth/Rob Portman **RP**
SUBJECT: Senate Consideration of a Persian Gulf Resolution

Senator Mitchell has cleared an agreement on his side of the aisle, allowing debate for the remainder of today and pro forma sessions next week, with the Senate returning in full session on January 14. Under the agreement, simple Senate Resolutions which are not binding could be introduced today but would be referred to committee. These Resolutions would have to deal with the Persian Gulf. On January 14, the full range of legislation could be introduced.

Mitchell's proposed agreement essentially trades an afternoon and evening of debate today for ten more days without any Senate action. It is probably as good a deal as we can get. If Republicans object, Mitchell could simply allow debate today anyway and there is nothing we can do to stop it.

Senator Dole has been asked for his concurrence, and has said he wants to talk to the President first (at lunch today?).

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

10 January 1991

Gulf
The Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is in response to your letter of January 9, 1991, in which you ask for an updated assessment of the impact of sanctions on Iraq and on the policies of Saddam Hussein subsequent to my testimony before your committee in December. In that testimony, as you accurately noted, I observed that the sanctions were effective technically and that they were being felt economically and eventually would be felt militarily in some areas. I also testified that there was no evidence that sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior and that there was no evidence when or even if they would force him out of Kuwait.

You now ask me to: (1) address the impact of the sanctions on the economy and populace of Iraq and on the operational effectiveness of its military if left in place for another six to 12 months; (2) address the question of how Iraq's defensive abilities might be affected by the sanctions on the one hand and by having additional time to prepare on the other if sanctions are allowed to work for another six to 12 months; and (3) address the likelihood that sanctions, again if left in place for another six to 12 months, could induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

UN sanctions have shut off nearly all Iraq's trade and financial activity and weakened its economy, but disruptions in most sectors are not serious yet. The impact of sanctions has varied by sector. The most serious impact so far has been on the financial sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve or raise even small amounts of foreign exchange. For the populace, the most serious impact has been inflation.

The ability of the Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next six to twelve months even if effective sanctions can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period. Iraq's infantry

and artillery forces--the key elements of Iraq's initial defense--probably would not suffer significantly as a result of sanctions. Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically. Moreover, these forces will have additional opportunity to extend and reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border, thereby increasing their defensive strength. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces will be degraded somewhat from continued sanctions. The number of inoperable Iraqi armored and other vehicles will grow gradually and the readiness of their crews will decline as Baghdad is forced to curb its training activities. Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies, however, which will ameliorate the effect of these problems. On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications. While the military, especially the army, has been protected from the impact of sanctions by stockpiling and minimal usage, during a military action the impact would be more profound as equipment and needed parts are expended.

Iraq's Air Force and air defenses are likely to be hit far more severely than its Army, if effective sanctions are maintained for another six to twelve months. This degradation will diminish Iraq's ability to defend its strategic assets from air attack and reduce its ability to conduct similar attacks on its neighbors. It would have only a marginal impact on Saddam's ability to hold Kuwait and southern Iraq. The Iraqi Air Force is not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait.

In December, during my appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, I noted that while we can look ahead several months and predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is more difficult to assess how or when these conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior. Our judgment remains that, even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional six to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq. The economic impact of sanctions is likely to be increasingly serious, with conspicuous hardships and dislocations. Nevertheless, Saddam currently appears willing to accept even a subsistence economy in a continued attempt to outlast the international resolve to maintain the sanctions, especially if the threat of war recedes significantly. He probably continues to believe that Iraq can endure sanctions longer than the international coalition will hold and hopes that avoiding war will buy him time to negotiate a settlement more favorable to him.

We have seen little hard evidence to suggest that Saddam is politically threatened by the current hardships endured by the

populace. Moreover, Saddam has taken few actions that would indicate he is concerned about the stability of his regime. Assessing the populace's flash point is difficult, but we believe it is high because Iraqis have borne considerable hardship in the past. During its eight-year war with Iran, for example, Iraq endured a combination of economic difficulties, very high casualties, and repeated missile and air attacks on major cities without any serious public disturbances.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William H. Webster", with a stylized flourish at the end.

William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence



FROM

JAMES D. JOHNSTON

VICE PRESIDENT
INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

January 10, 1991

TO

The Honorable John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
Office of the President

I believe you will be interested in the attached GM statement which says that: "GM is fully supportive of the President and will do whatever is necessary to support national security requirements."

James D. Johnston

JDJ/clh
Attachment

GM SPOKESPERSON STATEMENT IN REPLY TO MEDIA QUERIES CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S
ISSUANCE OF AN EXECUTIVE ORDER ON NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIVENESS,
OR THE POSSIBLE IMPACT ON GM OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

President Bush's issuance Wednesday of an executive order on National Security Industrial Responsiveness is a reasonable and prudent move by the Administration to set priorities for key strategic materials, such as food, energy, steel, tires, and construction materials, in the event they would be needed for national security. The order has no immediate impact on GM operations.

We remain hopeful that that there will be a peaceful resolution to the Middle East crisis and we have urged the Administration to use all diplomatic means available to accomplish this. We are not going to speculate on how GM operations might be impacted in the event of war. GM is fully supportive of the President and will do whatever is necessary to support national security requirements.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 JAN 10 PM 8:19

January 10, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: EDE HOLIDAY 

SUBJECT: Veterans Groups Support of Gulf Policy

I wanted to provide you with four additional expressions of support for your Gulf strategy from some of the nation's veterans groups. Included among these is a letter from the National Commander of the American Legion--the largest veterans service organization--addressed to each member of the House.

Attachment

cc: David Demarest
Fred McClure
Deb Amend

The American Legion



OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL COMMANDER

★ WASHINGTON OFFICE ★ 1808 'K' STREET, N. W. ★ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 ★

January 10, 1991

Dear Representative:

The American Legion urges you to vote for legislation authorizing the President to take any necessary actions to resolve the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

As an organization of three million men and women who have experienced firsthand the pain and sacrifice of wartime service, The American Legion hopes that a peaceful solution can be found. However, we know that diplomacy cannot succeed if our nation's leadership is divided.

Any failure by Congress to offer its full bipartisan support to the President could have catastrophic consequences. We are convinced that Saddam Hussein, the world community and other members of the multinational force in Saudi Arabia would see such disunity as a lack of U.S. resolve.

Additionally, a divided national leadership would produce a serious morale problem among our own troops who have been deployed in Saudi Arabia. I had the privilege ten weeks ago to visit those men and women, and I was impressed by their patriotism, confidence and resolve. They accept the potential risks of their mission, but they need to be assured that the Congress and the American people fully support them in carrying out that mission.

This international crisis is clearly a test of our national will. The upcoming congressional debate will be scrutinized by the entire world. It is critical that the decisions Congress reaches show the world, particularly the Iraqi aggressors and all potential aggressors, that the United States is willing to set aside partisan interests to endorse the President's authority as our nation's Commander-in-Chief.

We urge you to vote for legislation authorizing the President to take any necessary actions to deal with the crisis at hand and supporting the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, for which the United States has already expressed its support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Robert S. Turner".
ROBERT S. TURNER
National Commander

TREA RECEIVES WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING

TREA Deputy Executive Director for Government Affairs, John Adams, attended a briefing on Operation Desert Shield at the White House on Friday, December 14, 1990. Presentations were made by Mr. Haass, Ph.D. of the National Security Council, followed by President Bush.

In attendance were: Secretary Derwinski, D'Wayne Gray, Allen Clark and Ed Timperlake, representing the Department of Veteran Affairs, General P. X. Kelly, USMC (Ret) and representatives from the DAV, VFW, American Legion, NCOA, MOPH, BVA, TROA, Gold Star Mothers, American Ex-POW's, Army-Navy Union, Legion of Valor and Vietnam Veteran's Association.

In addition to giving specifics on atrocities in Kuwait, President Bush pointed out that although he may be criticized for sending additional troops and hardware to Saudi Arabia at great expense, it is worth it if even one life is saved in the event of hostilities. President Bush stated that he wants to ensure that he has done everything possible to protect the lives of our Service

Men and Women if in fact we do go to War with Iraq. The President believes that the American public is behind his actions and will share those views with their Members of Congress. Congress must uphold all United Nations Resolutions passed thus far. After being briefed on the current Desert Shield situation, TREA National President George Smith stated, "TREA supports world opinions as expressed in the twelve UN Resolutions, including the UN Counsel Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990. Furthermore, TREA supports our Commander-In-Chief as elected by the American Public. To handcuff the Commander-In-Chief in such perilous times could well result in unnecessary loss of life and limb and would undermine the morale and well being of the outstanding Men and Women of our Armed Forces.

Although TREA does not have total access to the intelligence and diplomatic communities, we do believe that the best interest of the armed forces would not be served if the 535 members of Congress were to engage in a lengthy debate over whether or not they agree with World opinion. As former

career military men and women, we are very much aware that....should we eventually go to war with Iraq, each day we delay, allows Iraq that much more time to strengthen their defensive position."



American Ex-Prisoners of War

CONGRESSIONALLY CHARTERED

NATIONAL CAPITOL OFFICE

OFFICE (202) 208-1800 / FAX (202) 289-6040 / FTS 268-1800
941 NORTH CAPITOL STREET • Room 9109 • Washington, DC 20421

December 19, 1990

TO: SVC KREJCI, JVC BEARISTO, MINIETTA, AND CHOMA,
NATIONAL DIRECTORS, AND LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE

FROM: FRANCIS W. AGNES, COMMANDER

SUBJECT: *Francis W. Agnes*
DESERT SHIELD

Within the last week, the President of the United States, two Cabinet members and one of our supporters in the House of Representative have approached us asking that we support the Administration in Desert Shield.

To my knowledge, Veterans Service Organizations universally support the Administration in Desert Shield and I believe we should let those in authority know we are behind them. Our thoughts and prayers are with the loved ones and the families of those service men and women in the desert during this difficult time.

I would like you to immediately contact all Department and Chapter Commanders in your area, and to ask them to contact each member. Letters of support should go from every member to the President, both Senators, and your Representative. Letters should be in your own words and make it clear that the President has your support.

I appreciate the level of support each member can give to this important matter.

"WE EXIST TO HELP THOSE WHO CANNOT HELP THEMSELVES"

AMVETS

Vaughn L. Brown, Sr.
National Commander

National Headquarters

4647 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, Maryland 20706 9901
(301) 459-9600

Dec 19.90 8:41

December 18, 1990

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,


I would like to take this opportunity to inform you that AMVETS wholeheartedly supports the actions you have taken concerning the situation in the Persian Gulf. As veterans, we recognize--perhaps better than most--the necessity to deter aggression where and when it arises. The challenge our country faces today is no exception.

I applaud your resolve to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis and am hopeful that it can be attained. If, however, the only option left is the use of force, then AMVETS stands behind you.

We fully support our brave men and women serving in the Middle East and trust in your promise that their service will not parallel the prolonged agony of Vietnam. When our forces return home, AMVETS will work to ensure that they receive every entitlement their dedication deserves. We are confident that you will pursue with equal vigor the preservation of these entitlements. Meanwhile, our national service officers stand ready to assist their families during this trying time.

Because of your commitment to freedom, America continues to be a beacon of hope for oppressed people everywhere. The decisions you have made underscore that and will contribute to a future where we all may know true peace on earth.

Sincerely yours,


Vaughn L. Brown, Sr.
National Commander

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Fwd'd to P COS
by Staff Secy Office*

*4:00
PM*

91 JAN 11 PM 4:04 1/11/91

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRED McCLURE *fm*
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

- ☒ FYI
- ☐ Comment
- ☐ Action

Pressler called me before sending
and asked that you see it im-
mediately, which I promised
to do. ~~He~~ I told him I thought
you would find the content
okay, and promised to get
back to him after your review.
Please let me know as soon
as possible. — Thanks.

Fred

CLARONS HILL, SHADON ISLAND, CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

January 11, 1991

The President
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I will vote to support you on the upcoming Persian Gulf resolution because I strongly oppose going to war with Iraq. I reach this decision with strong reservations, however, which I would like to share with you in advance of the vote.

First, I would oppose a Declaration of War at this point. I believe that the use of military force would be premature, and that it would be a grave mistake to engage in military action on January 16. Please do not interpret my vote as support for prompt military action. I do not think the people of this nation would support such action. I certainly do not. But I think it is essential to let Saddam Hussein know you have that authority if he continues his brutal, lawless actions. I am convinced he understands your resolve. Unfortunately, however, I think the wrong signal from Congress now would not only strengthen his hand, but would make loss of life a more likely consequence later.

Assuming the two options will be the current Solarz-Michel Resolution you asked for and the Mitchell-Nurn Resolution, I have come to believe that the Mitchell option presents the greatest possibility of combat and the loss of life. My conclusion is based largely on my faith in your leadership and belief in your strongly worded public statements expressing your desire to avoid the use of force. I believe your commitment to exhaust all alternatives before you would exercise such an extreme option. It is for that reason I felt it necessary to convey to you the premise for my conclusion.

The Mitchell Resolution makes very clear that "Congress is firmly committed to reversing the brutal and illegal occupation of Kuwait." But it relies exclusively on "international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq," and reserves "authorizing the use of force at a later time." But it is wholly ambiguous as to when or under what conditions the use of force would be authorized. I interpret the "firmly committed" language at face value. If "international sanctions and diplomatic efforts" fail, force will be authorized. My problem with this language is that by its "no possibility of force now" language it gives Saddam exactly what he wants -- the comfort of not fearing further reprisals and a commitment that he will have ample notice before we give him yet another deadline. And by its ambiguity as to when or under what conditions force will be authorized, the resolution undercuts the ability of "sanctions and diplomatic efforts" to work. It assures Iraq that it need not

fear until a public, time certain Act of Congress. Thus assured, it most definitely will not withdraw and will continue to stonewall any diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. That is the clear history and stated policy of Iraq. In short, the Mitchell resolution will only delay -- not avoid -- use of force if it is required.


By voting to give you the option and thus eliminating Saddam's certainty and peace of mind concerning force, my opinion is that Congressional authorization now is more likely to convince him of America's resolve than if we delay it. My vote is to remove that certainty and protection for Saddam. It is meant as a vote for strengthening your diplomatic hand, and that of the United Nations General Secretary or any other intermediary.

Having said that, let me make it very clear that I strongly oppose using force on January 16 given present circumstances. I am not convinced that all diplomatic options have been exhausted. I do not believe it is possible to fully exhaust them without this authorization. Saddam Hussein's actions and words throughout this crisis convince me that the only possibility of successful diplomacy requires giving George Bush a strong hand. George Bush's actions and words throughout this crisis convince me that he will use that strength only if it is truly a last resort.

I do not believe George Bush will commit this nation to military action on January 16 because I think he recognizes that all diplomatic options have not been exercised. You have not yet had the full opportunity to negotiate from a position where Saddam Hussein knows you have the authority to use force. One or two days is not enough time to do that. I have faith in your judgment on this. I will be bitterly disappointed if my calculation is incorrect, and urge you in the strongest possible terms to continue diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis after January 16 to find the political solution I believe can be found as long as Saddam Hussein knows you have the authority to match your resolve.

You have my support on this vote, and my prayers for a successful diplomatic solution.

Sincerely,



Larry Pressler
United States Senator

LP:ks

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 JAN 11 PM 12:09

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

JANUARY 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST ^W ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG, ^{BK} DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC LIAISON
JEFF VOGT ^{JW} ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC LIAISON

SUBJECT: BUSINESS LEADERS' SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S GULF POLICY

Attached are three letters from association officials, business leaders and attorneys, each voicing support for the Administration's Gulf policy. The business community is actively working on the Hill on our behalf.

The first letter to you represents over 130 association and business leaders, spearheaded by the five signatories as listed on the front page which include: Wayne Valis, Dirk Van Dongen, Jerry Jasinowski, Red Cavaney and David Parker. In addition to the letter to you, every Member of the House and Senate received an individualized letter last evening. Jasinowski simultaneously issued a press release with the letter which is also attached.

The second is a letter to Congress from the Business Roundtable's Chairman, Drew Lewis, on behalf of the 200 member corporate CEOs, and an accompanying release, expressing the Roundtable's support for your Gulf policy. The letter and press statement encourages Members of Congress to show American resolve and unity through support of the bipartisan Joint Resolution. Every Member of the House received this letter and they pledge to do the same in the Senate as it takes up the Resolution.

Also, a letter to you from over 175 attorneys is attached voicing similar support for your stand in the Gulf. This was also released to the press.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

BUSINESS GROUP EXECUTIVES SUPPORT PRESIDENT ON GULF

Washington, D.C., January 10, 1991 -- The top executives of about 120 business organizations today issued a statement of support for U.S. efforts to "halt aggression in Kuwait."

"We agree that letting aggression go unchecked merely encourages more aggression, " the letter (attached) said.

"Saddam Hussein's reprehensible efforts at international economic blackmail are a threat to the international community and to America's national security," the letter continued.

"Iraq's illegal invasion also damages the world economy, particularly those developing nations around the globe."

Speaking for those who signed the letter, National Association of Manufacturers President Jerry Jasinowski said, "We feel very strongly, as we wrote here, that 'the Iraqi regime should understand that Americans are united' and that the United States is fully prepared to 'use the means necessary to expel their troops from Kuwait.'"

"We must not forget that people around the world are suffering from Saddam's brutal and immoral actions," he said. "Needless human hardship and economic strains are being felt, not only in our country, but, just as important, in the Third World countries and newly born democracies," Jasinowski said.

"Saddam Hussein has damaged this life-supporting fabric with naked aggression. We support the international efforts to restore Kuwait, and we applaud the President's leadership in helping

January 10, 1991

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned, pledge support for your courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is vitally important for all Americans to unite behind your pursuit of justice and your plan to halt aggression in Kuwait. Your work in creating an historic international coalition against Iraqi aggression is an important first step in creating a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.

We agree that letting aggression go unchecked merely encourages more aggression. Saddam Hussein's reprehensible efforts at international economic blackmail are a threat to the international community and to America's national security. Iraq's illegal invasion also damages the world economy, particularly those developing nations around the globe.

Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting, has been condemned by the world community. We believe the various United Nations Resolutions must be fully carried out. The Iraqi regime should understand that Americans are united behind your leadership and are prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and to establish stability in the Gulf.

We urge you to continue your efforts toward peace and stability in the Gulf and we pledge our support to you.

Sincerely,

Red Cavaney
American Paper Institute
(212) 340-0676

Jerry Jasinowski
National Assoc. of Manufacturers
(202) 637-3106

Dave Parker
The Aluminum Association
(202) 862-5100

Dirk Van Dongen
National Assoc. of
Wholesaler-Distributors
(202) 872-0885

Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates
1747 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, #850
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 833-5055

Paul C. Abenante
American Bakers Association

Donald G. Agger
DGA International

Jack Albertine
Albertine Enterprises, Inc.

E. T. "Bill" Altman
Hardwood Plywood Manufacturers Association

Wendy Baer
International Hardwood Products Association

A. William Bailey
Independent Insurance Agents of America

Joe M. Baker
Association of Wall & Ceiling Industries

William Ball
National Soft Drink Association

Robert G. Bartlett
National Stone Association

John Bauer
Basic Industries Coalition

James C. Barr
National Milk Producers Federation

J. Carter Beese, Jr.
Alex Brown & Sons, Inc.

Judy Black
International Council of Shopping Centers

Steven H. Blackwell
Management Consulting Services

John R. Block
National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association

Jack E. Bobo
National Association of Life Underwriters

Walter G. Bohrer
Amusement & Music Operators Association

Lawrence W. Bory
American Consulting Engineers Council

G. Stewart Boswell
American Apparel Manufacturers Association

Joseph W. Bow
Foodservice and Packaging Institute

J. Patrick Boyle
American Meat Institute

Glenn E. Braswell
Flexible Packaging Association

James N. Burroughs
National Propane Gas Association

Nicholas J. Bush
Natural Gas Supply Association

James H. Carrington
Seasonair, Inc.

Brian E. Cartier
National Shorthand Reporters Association

Henry C. Cashen
Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin

Red Cavaney
American Paper Institute

Robert Cave
American Public Gas Association

Anna C. Chennault
TAC International

Phillip R. Chisholm
Petroleum Marketers Association of America

W. Dewey Clower
National Association of Truck Stop Operators

Kent W. Colton
National Association of Home Builders

James D. Cope
Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association

Derrick Crandall
American Recreation Coalition

John P. Cregan
U.S. Business and Industrial Council

Richard C. Creighton
American Cement Alliance

E. J. Criscuoli, Jr.
American Society for Industrial Security

James B. Currie
Coldwell Banker Real Estate Group

John M. Damgard
Futures Industry Association

Regis Delmontagne
National Printing Equipment & Supply Association

Gary W. Donnelly
National Lumber & Building Material Dealers Association

John A. Doyle
National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities

Stephen Driesler
National Association of Realtors

R. Hartley Edes
Insulation Contractors Association of America

Bernard H. Falk
National Electrical Manufacturers Association

William Farrell
American Hardware Manufacturers Association

Don Fuqua
Aerospace Industries Association

Walter E. Galanty, Jr.
National Association of Brick Distributors

John Paul Galles
National Small Business United

Kristine Garland
Composite Can & Tube Institute

Joseph G. Gerard
American Furniture Manufacturers Association

Brian W. Gill
Master Printers of America

James D. Gormley
General Aviation Manufacturers Association

John M. Grau
National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc.

Malvern J. Gross, Jr.
National Aeronautic Association

Paul T. Haluza
Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association

Clifford J. Harrison
National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.

Charles E. Hawkins
Associated Builders and Contractors

John T. Healy
National Wooden Pallet & Container Association

Steven B. Hellem
United States Advanced Ceramics Association

Fred H. Holt
Animal Health Institute

Hal W. Howes
Aerojet

Walter C. Hunt
Institute of Certified Business Counselors

Charles C. Irions
American Movers Conference

Philip J. James
National Glass Association

Jerry Jasinowski
National Association of Manufacturers

Frank L. Jensen, Jr.
Helicopter Association International

Carl T. Johnson
Compressed Gas Association

Jonathan L. Kempner
National Multi Housing Council

John A. Knebel
American Mining Congress

Tom Kuhn
Edison Electric Institute

Richard L. Lawson
National Coal Association

Richard L. Leshner
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Jim Mack
National Machine Tool Builders Association

John M. Martin
Dairy & Food Industries Supply Association

Wm. H. McCredie
National Particleboard Association

M. Richard Melliand
Melliand Associates

Albert W. Moore
NMTBA--The Association for Manufacturing Technology

Allen Moore
National Solid Wastes Management Association

Robert M. Moore
International Banana Association, Inc.

William C. Morrison
Meat Importers Council of America, Inc.

Russell N. Mosher
American Boiler Manufacturers Association

L. Manning Muntzing
Doub, Muntzing & Glasgow

Roy W. Muth
International Snowmobile Industry Association

Philip Nowers
Association of Reproduction Materials Manufacturers, Inc.

Paul T. O'Day
American Fiber Manufacturers Association

Tom O'Day
Alliance of American Insurers

Karl Ottosen
U.S. Federation of Small Business, Inc.

Dave Parker
The Aluminum Association

Robert D. Pavey
National Venture Capital Association

Gus Pede
Oakton, VA

James C. Pennington
National Association for Uniformed Services

J. Wm. Peterson
Construction Industry Manufacturers Association

Gilbert G. Pollock
American Amusement Machine Association

Thomas W. Power
Foodservice and Lodging Institute

Carlyle C. Ring, Jr.
Atlantic Research Corp.

Robert A. Roland
Chemical Manufacturers Association

Robert M. Reeves
Institute of Shortening & Edible Oils

Richard Richards
Washington, DC

Ray Roper
Printing Industries of America

Samuel R. Sacco
National Association of Temporary Services

Ronald A. Sarasin
National Beer Wholesalers Association

Robert C. Schwarze
National Food Brokers Association

John Thomas Sheehan
Sheehan Associates, Inc.

Hal Shoup
American Association of Advertising Agencies

David Stahl
Urban Land Institute

E. P. Stansbury
Composite Can & Tube Institute

Bud Stiles
Independent Bakers Association

Chris Stinebert
American Subcontractors Association

John J. Stocker
Shipbuilders Council of America

Robert Strawn
Recreation Vehicle Dealers Association

R. William Taylor
American Society of Association Executives

Larry Thomas
Society of the Plastics Industry

C. Richard Titus
Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers Association

Kenneth R. Tobin
National Aggregates Association

George Troutman
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.

Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates

Dirk Van Dongen
National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors

Joseph Volpe, Jr.
The Parsons Corporation

Herbert C. Wamsley
Intellectual Property Owners

Richard S. Ward
ITT Corporation

George D. Webster
Webster, Chamberlain & Bean

Steven A. Wechsler
National Realty Committee

John C. Whitaker
Union Camp Corporation

Frank E. Wilcher, Jr.
Industrial Safety Equipment Association

Laurence D. Wiseman
American Forest Council

Bob Woodson
National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise

Hugh Young
Garrett Allen

James H. Burnley IV
Potts, Pittman, Shaw & Trowbridge

(affiliations listed for identification purposes only)

January 10, 1991

The Honorable Barbara Mikulski
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mikulski:

We, the undersigned, have sent the enclosed letter to President Bush pledging support for his courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is important for all Americans to unite behind the pursuit of justice and the President's efforts to halt aggression in Kuwait. We applaud the President's efforts to create an historic international coalition against Iraqi aggression and we urge the Congress to join the President in helping to create a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.

We believe that letting aggression go unchecked merely encourages more aggression. Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting has been condemned by the world community. We believe the various United Nations Resolutions must be fully carried out.

We hope you will join the President in making the Iraqi regime understand that Americans are united behind the President's leadership and are prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and to establish stability in the Gulf.

Thank you for considering our views on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

The Undersigned
(see enclosed list)

January 10, 1991

The Honorable Bill Emerson
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Emerson:

We, the undersigned, have sent the enclosed letter to President Bush pledging support for his courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is important for all Americans to unite behind the pursuit of justice and the President's efforts to halt aggression in Kuwait. We applaud the President's efforts to create an historic international coalition against Iraqi aggression and we urge the Congress to join the President in helping to create a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.

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We hope you will join the President in making the Iraqi regime understand that Americans are united behind the President's leadership and are prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and to establish stability in the Gulf.

Thank you for considering our views on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

The Undersigned
(see enclosed list)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

**THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE URGES CONGRESS TO SUPPORT BIPARTISAN
RESOLUTION ON USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ**

Washington, D.C. -- January 10, 1990 -- In a letter delivered today to the Speaker and to the Republican Leader of the House of Representatives, Business Roundtable Chairman Drew Lewis urged support for President Bush's policy in the Gulf. The letter specifically urged support for the bipartisan resolution introduced by Representatives Fascell, Michel and others which would empower the President to use military force, if necessary, in order to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

Excerpts from the letter follow:

"The chief executives of The Business Roundtable believe that the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.

"In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having mobilized the international community behind a policy of unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.

"Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell, Michel and others.

"We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war, and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own employees and their family members.

"But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East

but around the world, would be harmed were the United States Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at this time.

"For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution."

The Business Roundtable is an association of 200 major corporations whose chief executive officers examine public issues and develop positions which seek to reflect sound economic and social policy.

###

Contact: Dick Anthony, 212-682-6370

**The Business Roundtable**

Drew Lewis
Chairman

James T. Lynn
Cochairman

James D. Robinson III
Cochairman

January 10, 1991

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker,

The chief executives of the Business Roundtable believe that the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.

In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having mobilized the international community behind a policy of unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.

Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell, Michel and others.

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But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East but around the world, would be harmed were the United States Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at this time.

For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution.

Very truly yours,


Drew Lewis

New York
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166
(212) 682-6370 FAX (212) 682-0194

William L. Lurie
President

Richard W. Anthony
Executive Director-Public Information

Richard F. Kibben
Executive Director-Construction

Washington
1815 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 672-1260 FAX (202) 466-3509

Samuel L. Maury
Executive Director

**The Business Roundtable**

Drew Lewis
Chairman

James T. Lynn
Cochairman

James D. Robinson III
Cochairman

January 10, 1990

Honorable Robert H. Michel
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Michel,

The chief executives of the Business Roundtable believe that the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.

In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having mobilized the international community behind a policy of unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.


Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell, yourself and others.

We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war, and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own employees and their family members.

But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East but around the world, would be harmed were the United States Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at this time.

For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution.

Very truly yours,


Drew Lewis

New York
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166
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William L. Lurie
President

Richard W. Anthony
Executive Director-Public Information

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Washington
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Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 872-1260 FAX (202) 466-3509

Samuel L. Maury
Executive Director

January 10, 1991

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned attorneys-at-law, wish to express our support, in the strongest terms, for your responsible and courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We are unequivocally united behind you in your determination to halt and reverse the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait consistent with the United Nations resolution. Your success in forming a coalition of the nations of the world in opposing the aggressive posture of Saddam Hussein is precedent-setting. It begins a structure of peace following the Cold War era.

The events that led to World War II proved that aggression unchecked merely encourages further aggression. Saddam Hussein's heinous international blackmail is not only a threat to the international community, but also to America's security. The illegality of the Iraqi invasion is underscored by the ruthlessness of Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror against the people of Kuwait. Appeasement in the form of delay will only prolong the horrors of occupation, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting, that have been reported from Kuwait on almost a daily basis.

We firmly support your leadership and are convinced that we represent a majority of our colleagues in the legal profession and, indeed, a majority of the American people as well. Sadly, we do understand the implications of the use of force; however, we are united behind you and are prepared to support America's use of all appropriate means necessary to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

We pledge our support and commend your determination to exercise every effort to achieve peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Bruce D. Goodman
Robert J. Horn
Jim Burnley

Contact: Bruce Goodman
(202) 775-7169

Charles Ablard
John Austin
Sheila C. Bair
John W. Barnum
John H.C. Barron, Jr.
Michael J. Bartlett
Walter Bates
Peter L. Baumbusch
George Beall
Bruce A. Beam
Glen A. Bellinger
Arthur Lee Bentley, III.
Jerome K. Blask
Thomas Hale Boggs, Jr.
Gary Born
Edmund C. Brickfield
Jon A. Brilliant
Raymond J. Briscuso, Jr.
Edward Brown
E. Edward Bruce
Christopher H. Buckley, Jr.
Bobby R. Burchfield
Geoffrey Calkins
Daniel Q. Callister
John Carbone
Mike Casale
Henry C. Cashen, II.
Charles Catrillo
Robert P. Charrow
Roger A. Clark
Ty Cobb
J. Marshall Coleman
Sterling D. Colton
William J. Cople, III.
Mark D. Cowan
William Dabaghi
Rhett Dawson
Jill B. Deal
David DeBari
William D. DeGrandis
Joseph F. Dennin
Tracey Dinese
Mark S. Dreux
G. Richard Dunnells
Samuel Efron
Saad S. El-Fishawy
Lewis A. Engman
John R. Erickson
Clark Kent Ervin
Robert S. Faron
Gregory Feldman
Douglas A. Fellman
Baruch A. Fellner
Andrea Fischer
James W. Fonteno
Antonio R. Franco
Robert E. Freer, Jr.

Paul L. Friedman
Roger P. Furey
W. Payton George
Gerald E. Gilbert
Nicholas D. Giordano
Robert Glaser
Allen B. Green
David A. Hartquist
Edward Hayes, Jr.
Laurence F. Henneberger
Michael Hoffman
James H. Hulme
John Irving
R. Christian Johnson
Neil B. Kabatchnick
Craig M. Kabatchnick
Donald Kaufman
Roger Kephart
William J. Kilberg
Elizabeth Kluger
Conrad N. Koch
Harvey Koch
James A. Koerner
Andrew Kulick
Stephen Kurzman
Nick Laird
James Laurenson
Dennis J. Lehr
Morris I. Leibman
Gerard Leval
Seth Levine
Timothy Lockhart
Coralyn G. Mann
Nancy Manougian
Bruce Markowitz
Margot Bester Markowitz
April McClain-Delaney
Robert McDowell
Donald C. McLean
Mary Martha McNamara
Laurence G. Meyer
Laurie L. Michel
Warren L. Miller
John A. Mintz
Luke Mitti
Joseph Mitti
Joseph A. Morris
R. Crawford Morris
Scott Muller
L. Manning Muntzing
Karen L. Neal
Nancy Nord
Edward P. Nordberg, Jr.
Kevin P. O'Brien
Gerald E. Oberst
Deanna Tanner Okun
Theodore B. Olson

Stephen F. Ornstein
George J. Pantos
Martha Priddy Patterson
Donald H. Pearlman
Tim L. Peckinpaugh
Vincent A. Pepper
Matthew S. Perlman
Jeffrey L. Perlman
Matthew S. Perlman
Howard Pyle, III.
Patrick M. Raher
John Reinartz
R. Randall Ricardo
Timothy A. Riedel
Gregory Romano
Eugene P. Rossides
Arthur J. Rothkopf
Robert Ruggeri
Thomas Salley, III.
Eric A. Von Salzen
Ralph F. Scalera
Richard D. Siegel
Mark E. Solomons
Steven M. Sprenger

Robert F. Stankey
Benjamin Stanziale
Allan R. Swendiman
Daniel J. Swillinger
Richard P. Taylor
Joseph R. Thornton
Kenneth P. Troccoli
James U. Troup
Albert W. Turnbull
Wayne Vance
David J. Vandermeulen
James William Walker
Donald Wallace, Jr.
George D. Webster
Eric R. Weiss
Arnold R. Westerman
Alexander W. Whitaker
Beth Whitmore
Richard K. Willard
Ronald J. Wiltsie, II.
Susan Wing
Hugh F. Young, Jr.
Lynne K. Zusman