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NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE

1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

November 30, 1990

Dear John -

I thought this statement on Iraq's nuclear potential, which I submitted to Senate Armed Services, would be of special interest to you.

I hope we might discuss this subject further.

Best wishes,

P



NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE

1000 CONNECTICUT AVE NW SUITE 704 WASHINGTON DC 20036 202-822-8444

For Immediate Release
Friday, November 30, 1990

PRESENT ASSESSMENTS UNDERSTATE
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS POTENTIAL

Official and unofficial estimates that it would take Iraq at least six months and probably years to build an atomic bomb are "dangerously ill-informed," according to Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute.

These estimates, Leventhal said, do not take into consideration that the time needed to convert the uranium-aluminium fuel that Iraq now possesses for a research reactor into pure uranium fuel for a bomb is only one to three weeks. These estimates also do not take into consideration evidence that Iraq has been designing and developing the non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons in advance of having the essential nuclear ingredients---highly enriched uranium or plutonium---ready to place in them. Finally, these estimates do not consider the plausibility of Iraq now acquiring or having already acquired substantial quantities of these weapons materials by clandestine means from poorly protected civil nuclear facilities in other countries---especially in western Europe and Japan---or even possibly from willing suppliers in the Third World.

"It is remarkable," Leventhal said, "that non-proliferation experts inside and outside the U.S. government have been so fast to trash President Bush's statements about Iraq's short-term nuclear potential as nothing more than political opportunism. It is ironic that when the White House finally wakes up to the long-neglected proliferation danger in Iraq, unnamed non-proliferation officials in the government, as well as former senior officials and independent experts, downplay the danger by suggesting that the President is merely playing to public concerns reflected in opinion polls."

Leventhal said that the new U.S. intelligence assessment, which apparently provides the basis for the President's concerns and for Defense Secretary Cheney's estimate of Iraq being as close as six months to a bomb, may itself be flawed.

"This U.S. assessment appears to contain a worst-case scenario of Iraq needing six months to build a bomb from the time it seizes the French-supplied research reactor fuel that is now

Strategies for stopping the spread and reversing the growth of nuclear arms.

under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)," Leventhal said. Six months represents the time span between routine visits to Iraq by IAEA inspectors to make sure the fuel is still there, but the IAEA officially states---based on the advice it gets from an international team of safeguards experts---that the time needed to convert this reactor fuel into weapons fuel is only one to three weeks. If Iraq has the components of an implosion device---save the nuclear core---completed and ready to be assembled, Iraq could have a bomb within the one-to-three-week conversion time.

Iraq now has 12.3 kilograms (27 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium contained in the uranium-aluminum fuel plates provided by France for use in the French-built Osirak research reactor. The fuel has been in storage near Baghdad ever since Israel destroyed the reactor with a bombing raid in 1981 before the reactor went into operation. This amount of highly enriched uranium is enough for at least one implosion device. An additional 18.7 kilograms (41 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium would be needed for a crude gun-type device utilizing two critical masses of this material weighing a total of 31 kilograms (68 pounds). (This is the amount of 93%-enriched uranium that would be needed, utilizing a beryllium reflector. See attached analysis.)

There is ample evidence that Iraq is designing and building components of nuclear weapons, Leventhal said. A Congressional investigation disclosed that Iraq had received, by June 1989, 18 reports from U.S. national laboratories relating to the detonators and chemical explosives used in nuclear weapons. U.S. and British customs officials have stopped illegal exports of electronic capacitors and a vacuum furnace applicable to building nuclear weapons, but Saddam Hussein later displayed Iraqi capacitors (high-speed electronic triggers needed for an implosion device) based on an American capacitor that he suggested was smuggled successfully from the U.S.

"The bottom line question," Leventhal said, "is whether Iraq now has enough material to build nuclear weapons. If Iraq does, it would be foolhardy to assume that it lacks the technical wherewithal to explode nuclear weapons with it. Only a year ago, U.S. experts were caught by surprise and expressed disbelief when Iraq claimed to have launched a three-stage rocket capable of carrying satellites into space, only to have to eat their words when U.S. intelligence confirmed the launch. We cannot afford to be caught off guard again, this time by Iraqi nuclear weapons.

"It is clear that Iraq has enough highly enriched uranium for one implosion device. What is not clear is whether it has obtained enough uranium or plutonium for a few or several such devices, or enough uranium for less sophisticated gun-type devices (which require more material but are easier to detonate). Expert assessments have focused almost exclusively on Iraq's nascent industrial capacity to produce its own bomb material---a capacity that apparently has not grown sufficiently to produce such material in quantities needed for weapons. These assessments

have ignored the possibility that Iraq could use or may already have used its highly sophisticated clandestine purchasing networks, or its terrorist surrogates, to obtain bomb-grade uranium and plutonium from abroad.

"If indeed there is no evidence of diversions of nuclear bomb materials to Iraq, this does not mean such diversions have not occurred---only that none has been detected. By definition, a successful diversion of plutonium or highly enriched uranium from an IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facility is one that goes undetected.

"The Achilles heel of the global non-proliferation regime is the legitimate place that bomb-grade uranium and plutonium have been given in civilian nuclear programs despite the inadequacy of international safeguards and national protective measures on this material.

"Because of measurement uncertainties, hundreds of kilograms of plutonium are 'unaccounted for' in large civilian nuclear fuel facilities each year, but always the IAEA determines, in the absence of evidence of a diversion, that none of the unaccounted-for material has been diverted. The materials accounting measures used by IAEA inspectors are supposed to detect the loss of one weapons quantity of plutonium---8 kilograms (17.6 pounds)---in a year, but the IAEA admits that it cannot meet its own detection goal in large plutonium plants. The best it can do in meeting its own goal of a 95% confidence level of detection and only a 5% probability of a false alarm is to detect a loss of about 250 kilograms (550 pounds) of plutonium a year in such a plant. Any loss less than that could go undetected.

"Thus, the undetected loss of a very small percentage of the total inventory of plutonium in a major industrial state like France, Germany or Japan---where plutonium is processed and stored in multi-ton quantities---would represent a very substantial amount of bomb material for Saddam Hussein. It is by no means implausible that a plant worker or manager, acting under duress or by reason of bribery or ideology, could successfully remove substantial quantities of plutonium from a safeguarded plant into the hands of an Iraqi agent.

"A number of civilian facilities, known as critical assemblies, contain large amounts of pure plutonium and highly enriched uranium in metallic form---the ideal material for nuclear weapons that, according to the IAEA, can be converted into weapons components in as little as 7 to 10 days. The material is often stored in the form of many thousands of foil-thin metal coupons, which present IAEA inspectors with a materials-accounting nightmare.

"At one such facility, the fast critical assembly in Japan, there are some 325 kilograms (715 pounds) of plutonium metal and 180 kilograms (396 pounds) of 93%-enriched uranium metal acquired from the U.S. defense program for breeder fuel experiments. A few years ago, U.S. inspectors became so alarmed by lax physical

protection measures at the facility that the Sandia National Laboratory was called upon to develop a crash improvement program.

"Beyond the possibility of undetected diversions of bomb material to Iraq from civil nuclear programs in Europe and Japan, there is also the possibility that Third World countries with advanced nuclear programs---such as China and Pakistan---might have supplied highly enriched uranium to Iraq. Such friendly clandestine transfers would be more likely to be detected by intelligence methods, however."

Leventhal said present assessments of Iraq's nuclear potential "reflect the dangerous tendency to 'mirror-image' the adversary---that is, to assume that he will act the way we act. In this case, the assumption is that he will not have nuclear weapons until he has done what we and every other weapon state have done: build an industry to produce the needed material. Thus, too much emphasis has been placed on analyzing how far Iraq has gone in importing essential industrial materials and components and building the gas centrifuges of a uranium enrichment plant; too little emphasis has been placed on the possibility that Iraqi agents have acquired bomb materials undetected from abroad."

"In this regard," Leventhal said, "present assessments of Iraq's nuclear weapons potential are dangerously ill-informed."

Short of military intervention now being considered by the Bush Administration, Leventhal proposed a number of remedial measures:

First, the frequency of IAEA inspections in Iraq should be increased to coincide with the conversion time of the highly enriched uranium fuel---that is, inspections should take place weekly, or at least once every three weeks, to verify that the material has not been removed from safeguards for use in a bomb.

Second, the IAEA should exercise its "special inspections" safeguards authority to seek out and enter facilities where fissionable material might be located.

Third, all civilian nuclear facilities in the world possessing weapons quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be placed on special alert, and extraordinary measures should be taken to protect against diversions.

Fourth, Iraq, now a party in good standing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be condemned in a resolution signed by the 140 other parties to the Treaty for its blatant disregard of its pledge not to seek or to develop nuclear weapons.

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Uranium Requirements for a Gun-Type Device

In this analysis, a gun-type nuclear device is based on the assembly of two critical masses of highly enriched uranium metal. The uranium components in the gun-type design are surrounded by several inches of metal to reflect neutrons and reduce the quantity of uranium that is needed. Beryllium, natural uranium or tungsten are possible reflectors. The Hiroshima (gun-type) bomb used a tungsten carbide reflector.

The amount of uranium in a reflected critical mass depends on the enrichment of the uranium and the choice of reflector. With a 4-inch thick beryllium reflector surrounding a sphere of 93-percent enriched uranium, the critical mass of the enriched uranium is 15.5 kilograms, or 31 kilograms in two critical masses. For either a tungsten or natural uranium reflector, the reflected critical mass of 93-percent enriched uranium is about 25 kilograms, or about 50 kilograms for two critical masses.

A compact gun-type weapon would use beryllium as the preferred reflector material, but use of beryllium, a highly toxic material, is probably beyond the capability of a terrorist group. The extent of Iraq's activities to acquire and use beryllium are not known. Iraq is known to have a sizeable stock of natural uranium.

The nominal yield of the gun device is about 10 kilotons, equivalent to ten thousand tons of TNT. The minimum or "fizzle" nuclear yield is probably on the order of some several hundred tons of TNT.

Iraq's Needs Using Various Enrichments

Iraq is known to have 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium in Osirak reactor fuel that currently is under International Atomic Energy safeguards. Should Iraq withdraw this fuel from safeguards and recover the highly enriched uranium metal, it would have enough material for an implosion device. To make a less sophisticated gun-type device, Iraq would need to acquire the following additional quantities of highly enriched uranium to make up two critical masses for a beryllium-reflected gun-type weapon:

93-percent enriched. Iraq would need an additional 18.7 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium to make up two critical masses totalling 31 kilograms.

80-percent enriched. Iraq would need to add 24 kilograms of 80-percent enriched uranium to the 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent enriched from the Osirak fuel to obtain two reflected critical masses totaling 36.3 kilograms of net 84.4-percent enriched uranium. Iraq is reported to have about 10 kilograms of 80-percent enriched uranium on hand in fuel for a Soviet-design research reactor.

36 percent enriched. Iraq would need to add 82 kilograms of 36-percent enriched uranium to the combined 12.3 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium and 10 kilograms of 80-percent enriched uranium to obtain two reflected critical masses totalling 104.3 kilograms of net 47-percent enriched uranium. Iraq is understood to have at least several kilograms of 36-percent enriched uranium in research reactor fuel.

For a gun-type device using a tungsten or natural uranium reflector, Iraq would need to acquire an additional 37.7 kilograms of 93-percent enriched uranium to make up two critical masses totaling 50 kilograms. Correspondingly larger quantities of 80-percent and 36-percent uranium would be required to make up two critical masses.

The values given here do not take into account possible uranium conversion and fabrication losses which in some cases may be as high as ten percent.

Milton Hoenig
November 29, 1990

HALEY BARBOUR

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has seenPOST OFFICE BOX 980
YAZOO CITY, MISSISSIPPI 39194
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800 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
(202) 333-8787MEMORANDUM

TO: GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: HALEY BARBOUR *Haley B*

DATE: NOVEMBER 30, 1990

RE: AUSTRALIA VIEWS AND CONCERNS ON THE PERSIAN GULF

=====

For the last two weeks I have been in Australia as a guest of its government and have met with a variety of Australian elected officials, party leaders and journalists. The Persian Gulf situation came up in virtually every meeting. I want to share with you what I heard in these meetings.

The Hawke Government considers itself firmly committed to our and the U.N.'s positions in the Gulf. The Opposition Coalition is, if anything, even more strongly in favor of our Gulf position than Labor, so Hawke's only opposition, still muted, is from the left wing of his own ALP. Conversations with Senator Evans, the Foreign Minister, other Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials and both government and opposition politicians convince me that they are there to stay, even if there is a fight.

The Aussies seem concerned about the U.S. While one finds very little concern about the President's own resolve, I was repeatedly asked about Congress and the apparent opposition to the Gulf effort or, at least, the attempt to question the President's actions. The Australian media gives substantial coverage to this Congressional activity, and the politicians fear the President will somehow get hamstrung by it.

There is a view that Hawke would take some flack if a shooting war started, and more than just the fullblown pacifists may question what role Australian forces would play in such a conflict. All in all, however, with strong Opposition support, I feel the Hawke government will stay the course as long as the U.S. is resolute.

HB/ds

cc: John Sununu

HALEY BARBOUR

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MEMORANDUM

TO: SECRETARY CLAYTON YEUTTER

FROM: HALEY BARBOUR *Haley Barbour*

DATE: NOVEMBER 30, 1990

RE: IMPRESSIONS OF AUSTRALIAN VIEWS ON GATT AND
FARM SUBSIDIES

For the last couple of weeks I have toured Australia as a guest of its government. Since agricultural policy was frequently brought up to me, I want to share a couple of impressions that may be of value to you.

First, the Australian politicians, journalists and farm leaders with whom I met feel the U. S. has genuinely and aggressively sought to achieve the proper agreements on farm subsidies in GATT, and they are appreciative. While they believe we still subsidize agriculture too much, the anger so evident a few years ago has subsided to a fraction of its former level.

Second, senior officials at the Australian Wheat Board are not optimistic about getting the right kind of ag agreement out of GATT. For this they blame the EC, especially France. They have not given up on GATT, but feel the odds are against us and the Cairns group.

Third, they feel the failure to achieve a good GATT resolution may lead to renewed and perhaps intensified U. S. farm subsidies, with Australia and similarly situated exporters being caught in the middle between us and the EC.

Finally, the financial situation of Australia's agriculture sector is bad and getting worse, perhaps much worse. While they apparently don't have as much farm debt burden as we, the collapse of the wool market coupled with weak wheat prices has driven the ratio of farm revenue to expense to the lowest level in history. The papers are full of very discouraging and worsening farm economic statistics. The urban economy is softening significantly and quickly, and most budgets are extremely tight. The Commonwealth has a budget surplus, but it has a huge wool surplus hanging over its head. It is hard to find a silver lining for their farmers especially if they don't get GATT relief.

This is not to elicit any action by you or our government; I simply wanted to pass along to you the information and impressions I received in Australia.

HB/ds

cc: John Sununu

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1990

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

6-9
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SUNUNU

FROM:

FRED MCCLURE 

SUBJECT:

Congressional Hearings on the Persian Gulf

Below for your review is an outline of the hearing schedule for the rest of the year. Rob is working with Public Liaison and NSC to help with witnesses and outreach efforts in key Congressional districts.

We have recently learned that Sam Nunn may want to reconvene the Senate Armed Services Committee sometime this month to hear from Jim Baker. Finally, we have heard that the Constitution Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee may want to hold a hearing on the War Powers Act and other separation of powers issues.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR DEB AMEND
LEIGH ANN METZGER

FROM: ROB PORTMAN *RP*

SUBJECT: Desert Shield Hearings Scheduled for December

1. SENATE:

The Senate Armed Services Committee has completed its round of hearings that began last week. The Foreign Relations Committee is holding hearings today, Wednesday and Thursday. Below is a tentative witness list:

Tuesday December 4, 1990

Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
Judith Kipper, the Brookings Institution
Sam Zakhem, former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain

J. Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard University
Gary Hufbauer, Georgetown University
Melvin Conant, Conant Associates

Wednesday, December 5, 1990

Secretary of State Jim Baker
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor

Thursday, December 6, 1990

Roger Fisher, Harvard University
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
George Rathjens, MIT
Charles Floweree, former U.S. Ambassador to UN for Arms Control

Reverend Jesse Jackson, Shadow Senator
Archbishop Roach, Conference of U.S. Catholic Bishops
Dr. Dale Bishop, National Council of Churches

There are no other Senate hearings scheduled at this time.

2. HOUSE:

The House Armed Services Committee also begins hearings today. Hearings are expected to go into next week, and perhaps the week after next. Below is a tentative witness list for this week:

Tuesday, December 4, 1990

James Akins, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Judith Kipper, the Brookings Institution
Phoebe Marr, National Defense University
Dr. Jerrold Post, George Washington University,
formerly with the Central Intelligence Agency

Wednesday, December 5, 1990

William Webster, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Thursday, December 6, 1990

Janna Nolan, the Brookings Institution
Brad Roberts, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Leonard Specter, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
James Bill, William and Mary College
Martin Indyk, the Washington Institution for Near East Policy
William Quandt, the Brookings Institution

Friday, December 6, 1990

Secretary Dick Cheney
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

For outreach purposes, attached is a list of House Armed Services Committee Members and their districts, including all major urban areas.

A previously scheduled Thursday House Budget Committee hearing on the budgetary impact of Desert Shield has been cancelled. However, Thursday morning there will be a general hearing on the U.S. economy, at which time the Persian Gulf may be discussed.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee will hold a hearing on Thursday, with Secretary Baker testifying. Foreign Affairs Subcommittees may hold further hearings.

The House Intelligence Committee will hold a closed door hearing Wednesday with Administration witnesses.

We are aware of no other House hearings scheduled at this time.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

DEMOCRATS:

Les Aspin, Chairman. (Wi.-1) - Racine, Kenosha, Janesville, Beloit

Charles E. Bennett (Fla.-3) - Northeast Jacksonville

G.V. Montgomery (Ms.-3) - Meridian, Laurel, Rankin County, Columbus, Starkville

Ronald V. Dellums (Cal.-8) - Berkeley, Oakland, near Alameda County Coliseum and Oakland International Airport

Patricia Schroeder (Co.-1) - Denver

Beverly Byron (Md.-6) - Hagerstown, Cumberland, Frederick

Nicholas Mavroules (Ma.-6) - North Shore, Lynn, Peabody, Salem, Gloucester, Haverhill

Earl Hutto (Fla.-1) - Northwest Pensacola, Panama City

Ike Skelton (Mo.-4) - Kansas City suburbs, Jefferson City, Sedalia, Warrensburg

Marvin Leath (Tx.-11) - Waco, Killeen, Temple

Dave McCurdy (Ok.-4) - Southwest part of Oklahoma City, Lawton, Norman

Thomas M. Foglietta (Pa.-1) - South and Central Philadelphia

Roy Dyson (Md.-1) - Eastern Shore, Southern Maryland, Waldorf

Dennis M. Hertel (Mi.-14) - Northeast Detroit, Warren, Hamtramck

Marilyn Lloyd (Tn.-3) - Chattanooga, Oak Ridge

Norman Sisisky (Va.-4) - Chesapeake, Portsmouth

Richard Ray (Ga.-3) - West Central Columbus, Plains, Warner Robins

John Spratt (S.C.-5) - Sumter, Rock Hill, Lancaster

Frank McCloskey (In.-8) - Southwest Evansville, Southern
Bloomington

Solomon Ortiz (Tex.-27) - Gulf Coast, Corpus Christi, Brownsville

George Darden (Ga.-7) - Northwest Rome, Marietta, Cobb County
(Suburbs of Atlanta)

Albert Bustamante (Tex.-23) - San Antonio suburbs, Laredo

George Hochbrueckner (N.Y.-1) - Long Island, Eastern Suffolk
County, Montauk, Southold, Sag Harbor, Shelter Island, Stony
Brook

Joseph Brennan (Me.-1) - South Portland, Augusta, Biddeford,
Saco, Waterville

Owen Pickett (Va.-2) - Norfolk, Virginia Beach

Martin Lancaster (N.C.-3) - Goldsboro; Wayne, Onslow, and
Johnston Counties

Lane Evans (Il.-17) - Rock Island, Moline, Galesburg

James H. Bilbray (Nv.-1) - Las Vegas

John Tanner (Tn.-8) - Jackson, Frayser area of Memphis, Northern
Shelby County, Madison County

Michael McNulty (N.Y.-23) - Hudson and Mohawk Valleys, Albany,
Schenectady

Glen Browder (Ala.-3) - Anniston, Opelika, Tuskegee, Auburn

Gene Taylor (Ms.-5) - Hattiesburg, Bay St. Louis, Biloxi

REPUBLICANS:

William Dickinson (Ala.-2) - Montgomery, Dothan

Floyd Spence (S.C.-2) - Columbia, Orangeburg

Bob Stump (Az.-3) - Glendale, Flagstaff, Sun City, Suburbs west
of Phoenix

Jim Courter (N.J.-12) - Morristown, Princeton, Hackettstown, Far
Hills, Peapack

Larry Hopkins (Ky.-6) - North Central Lexington, Frankfort

Bob Davis (Mich.-11) - Upper Peninsula, Northern Lower Peninsula,
Sault Ste. Marie, Charlevoix, Petoskey, Escanaba, Manistique

Duncan Hunter (Cal.-45) - Imperial Valley, Eastern suburbs of San Diego (Chula Vista, El Cajon and Lakeside), Coronado

David Martin (N.Y.-26) - Plattsburgh, Watertown

John Kasich (Oh.-12) - Northeast Columbus and Suburbs, Bexley, Whitehall,

Herb Bateman (Va.-1) - Newport News, Hampton, Williamsburg, Jamestown, Yorktown

Ben Blaz (R-Gu.) - Guam

Andy Ireland (Fla.-10) - Central Lakeland, Winter Haven, Bradenton

Jim Hansen (Ut.-1) - Ogden, Rural Utah, Washington, Millard, Weber, and Davis counties

John Rowland (Ct.-5) - West Waterbury, Danbury

Curt Weldon (Pa.-7) - Southwest Philadelphia Suburbs

Jon Kyl (Az.-4) - Northeast - Northern Phoenix, Scottsdale

Arthur Ravenel (S.C.-1) - Charleston, Beaufort County, Hilton Head

Robert Dornan (Cal.-38) - Northwestern Orange County, Western half of Anaheim, Santa Ana, Garden Grove

Joel Hefley (Co.-5) - Colorado Springs; Jefferson, Arapahoe, Douglas, and Elbert Counties

Jim McCrery (La.-4) - Shreveport, Bossier City

Ronald Machtley (R.I.-1) - Part of Providence, Pawtucket

Robert Smith (N.H.-1) - Manchester, Portsmouth

6

Suggested List of Baker/Cheney/Member Consultation Meetings
For December 3, 1990 - January 3, 1991

Foley/Mitchell

Dole/Michel

Gephardt/Fascell/Hamilton

Gingrich/Broomfield/Dickinson/Hyde

Lugar/Cohen/Kassebaum/Kasten

Pell/Sarbanes/Boren/Leahy

~~Biden/Glenn/Inouye/Moynihan/Robb~~

~~Stevens/Hatfield/Warner/Rudman~~

~~Conte/McDade/Myers/Edwards~~

Gray/Hoyer/Obey/McHugh

Berman/Levine/Weber/Gilman

Metzenbaum/Lieberman/Specter/Mack

(Note: Cheney to meet with Murtha and Aspin separately)

How can you be helpful?

Wallop

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1990

90 NOV 30 AM 8:53

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM CICCONI

Assistant to the President and
Deputy to the Chief of Staff

FROM:

Ronald Geisler
RONALD GEISLER
Executive Clerk

SUBJECT: Recalling the Congress into Session

Under Article II, section 3 of the Constitution, the President may, "on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them,".

The last time the Congress was recalled from a sine die adjournment -- the situation we would have today -- was in 1939. The first session of the 76th Congress adjourned sine die on August 5, 1939. The next session was to have commenced on January 3, 1940. Pursuant to Proclamation 2365 of September 13, 1939, the Congress was required to reconvene on September 21, 1939, to consider the repeal of the embargo provisions of the neutrality law. The second session of the 76th Congress -- the special session -- did convene on that date and adjourned sine die on November 3, 1939. The third session (which ordinarily would have been the second session) convened on January 3, 1940.

Pocket Vetoes

During the 5 1/2-week intersession adjournment between August 5, 1939, and the commencement of the special, second session on September 21, 1939, the President pocket vetoed 40 bills. None of those pocket vetoes were invalidated by the return of the Congress. The Congress could not override the bills since they were not in session to receive returned vetoes at the end of the 10 days.

The second session of the 101st Congress adjourned sine die on Sunday, October 28, 1990. The President has thus far pocket vetoed four bills. When these bills were pocket vetoed, the 101st Congress had adjourned sine die (the 102nd Congress will convene on January 3, 1991). We consider these vetoes to be "classic" pocket vetoes, which will remain unaffected by a Presidential recall of the Congress. We note that the last day for action on the two remaining pending bills is November 30, 1990, for S. 2834, Intelligence Authorization, Fiscal Year 1991, and December 1, 1990, for H.R. 5316, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.

Recess Appointments

Article II, section 2, clause 3, of the Constitution provides that:


The President shall have the Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. (emphasis added)

My predecessor in this office told me that in 1939 he had to deal with the question of whether or not the calling of a special session of the Congress would terminate, at the end of such special session, recess appointments made prior to the convening of that session. A determination was made in the affirmative. A quick search of our records shows that about 15 recess appointments were made before the convening of the special session. For example, on August 11 and September 1, 1939, the President granted recess appointments to James W. Young, of New Mexico, to be Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, and George A. Malcolm, of Michigan, to be Attorney General of Puerto Rico, respectively. On November 4, 1939, the day after the adjournment of the special session, those gentlemen again were given recess appointments, their first having expired at the end of the special, second session. It should be noted, however, that the law in effect in 1939 would have, in my opinion, prohibited payment to an individual who received successive recess appointments (I could not determine whether or not these recess appointees received pay).

Since the adjournment on October 28, 1990, President Bush has issued no recess appointments. If the President were to issue recess appointments during this sine die adjournment, prior to the commencing of a special, third session of the Congress, I believe these recess appointments would expire at the end of the special, third session. I also believe that, if given a second recess appointment, after the third session has adjourned, these appointees would not be eligible for pay while serving under a second, consecutive recess appointment (5 U.S.C. 5503(a)(2)).

Because this pay matter is not free from doubt, I recommend that you obtain an opinion from Counsel's Office if the Congress is to be recalled and the President is contemplating making recess appointments prior to the recall.


Gulf



From the desk of
George Bush

To Bob Dole

Batten down the
hatches!



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2303

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

11-29-90

November 28, 1990

of

Dear President Bush:

I supported you when you joined with leaders of other United Nations member states in economic sanctions against Iraq, aimed at forcing its withdrawal from Kuwait and its release of hostages. So did the vast majority of Minnesotans.

I supported you when you deployed American troops in Saudi Arabia, in what you promised would be a "wholly defensive" posture. So did the vast majority of Minnesotans.

But suddenly you changed your tune--renouncing the sanctions and diplomacy approach before it had a chance to succeed, building up a patently offensive force and threatening to start a war.

Before the war option is chosen, the people of this democracy should know the likely consequences of that choice--the enormous estimates of civilian and military casualties, the disastrous consequences to the U.S. and the global economies, the irreparable damage to prospects for resolving the most serious long-term problems in the Middle East.

And before the choice is made, people should also know the likely consequences of vigorously and patently pursuing the sanctions and diplomacy option--its excellent chances of achieving our short-term national objectives in the Persian Gulf and of setting the stage for truly productive negotiations about the long-term political and military stability of the region.

Taking democracy seriously means that the people of this country must engage in an urgent informed national debate this December; and must ultimately decide whether we will go to war.

I am going back to begin that debate in Minnesota. Starting next week, I will hold town meetings around the state, aimed at informing people, letting them know where I stand and listening to what they have to say. I urge my colleagues in the Senate and House to do the same. And I further urge you or members of your staff to join me at any of these town meetings.

With such meetings in congressional districts throughout the country, we could have the historic December Debate this grave situation warrants and we could return to Washington in January with a mandate from the American people, prepared to make the ultimate decision the Constitution requires of us.

Mr. President, I respectfully request that you support and participate in this historic debate. It is the mark of a great nation that it is strong enough to listen to its people.

There is still time to stop the momentum towards war. We can suspend the current troop build up and return to a policy based on stringent economic sanctions coupled with vigorous and creative diplomatic initiatives. I strongly advocate that path and if we have an informed nationwide debate, I am confident that is what the vast majority of American will demand.

Sincerely,

Paul

Paul David Wellstone
Senator-Elect

DRAFT

Whereas the Congress recognizes the historic action taken by the United Nations Security Council on November 28, 1990, in passing Resolution 678, which "authorizes member states ... to use all necessary means" to "restore international peace and security" in the Persian Gulf region.

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That:

1. The United States, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 678, is prepared to use all necessary means to achieve the goals outlined in Resolution 678 and the ten earlier resolutions on the Persian Gulf crisis passed by the Security Council since August 2, 1990, and articulated by the President of the United States in his Address to the Nation of [DATE].

2. The President shall continue to consult with the Congress on decisions on the means necessary to achieve those goals.

President—Oops, Sen.—Nunn Sides With Gulf Doves

President Bush has persuaded Mikhail Gorbachev, won over Deng Xiaoping, cajoled the Europeans and coopted Syria's brutal Assad. So what's wrong with Sen. Sam Nunn?

Something like that is the question being asked privately at the White House this week. At the usually treacherous United Nations, the world is telling the U.S. it can use force against Iraq. But back on this side of the water's edge, the Georgia Democrat is holding hearings in Congress that are building a case for war not with Saddam Hussein, but with George Bush. Mr. Nunn may be making that domestic war—with Mr. Bush—all but inevitable.

Other Democrats plan to hold hearings too, but the ones that matter are Mr. Nunn's. He's the most prominent Defense Democrat, the Bigfoot of any bipartisan ship. If he's on board with the president, such lesser critics as Rep. Dick Gephardt don't count for much. If he's not, the senator's political credibility gives cover to everyone in the Democratic Party's Pat Buchanan-Ramsey Clark wing. Right now he's casting the shadow of a condor.

Republicans, naturally, suspect politics. Sen. Malcolm Wallop, the forthright Wyoming, says the hearings and criticism are designed to advance Mr. Nunn's 1992 presidential ambition. And Virginia Sen. John Warner, Mr. Nunn's usually reliable GOP alter ego, began his hearing remarks with the Freudian slip, "Mr. President—excuse me—Mr. Chairman . . ."

It's also true that the White House hasn't handled him well. Mr. Nunn likes to

Potomac Watch

By Paul A. Gigot

be consulted, and lately President Bush hasn't done his legendary schmoozing. Mr. Nunn learned about this month's decision to add troops to the Gulf only hours before Mr. Bush announced it, in a phone call from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. But in meetings only a day earlier, the senator hadn't received even a hint of the bigger deployment. He was clearly irked.

By now, though, the rift looks bigger than any lack of private consultation. It's become a public dispute over policy. To his credit, Mr. Nunn isn't merely debating procedure; he's going right at the substance. President Bush wants to build up the threat of war, and perhaps even fight a war, to compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait. Mr. Nunn has begun to suggest that he sides with the doves who want to give economic sanctions time to do that job, perhaps as long as 18 months. In short, Mr. Nunn is offering his own judgment as a second commander-in-chief.

The Nunn hearings threatened to be a long argument for this emerging position, until Henry Kissinger showed up. Democrats had fawned all over earlier wittnesses, especially dovish former generals. But the former secretary of state spoiled the love-in. He sounded like a realist among innocents.

Mr. Kissinger told them that economic sanctions won't do the job they expect. "I would like to believe what so many here believe, that the sanctions will work," he said politely, much to the consternation of Democrats. But what did they mean exactly by sanctions "working"? He said he doubts sanctions will force Saddam from Kuwait, and they certainly won't disarm his missiles or nuclear weapons.

It's true, he said, that sanctions might get Saddam to talk. But Mr. Kissinger, who remembers Vietnam, added that "if one studies almost every conflict in which the U.S. was involved, there is a period in which the impression is created that talk is its own objective." In other words, Saddam and some U.S. "special envoy" will repair to Geneva, and proceed to fight over the shape of the table.

Meanwhile, said Mr. Kissinger, support will erode for Mr. Bush's delicate anti-Saddam coalitions, domestic and international. The Mideast isn't Europe; its culture and politics won't sustain a long-term U.S. ground force deployment. As for fading domestic support, Mr. Kissinger said, wryly, that "you gentlemen" are in a better position to judge that—though the senators' own questions proved his point.

Mr. Nunn and his allies didn't seem convinced, but at least Mr. Kissinger forced them to face the risks of U.S. failure in the Gulf. So far the public debate has focused largely on the risks of war. If Saddam can claim to have stood down the world, said Mr. Kissinger, the result would undermine moderate Arabs, damage U.S. influence and lead to another Arab-Israeli war, perhaps in two or three years.

President Bush is debating whether to call Congress into session to declare support for the use of force, and the risk is great. If Congress rejected a declaration, the U.S. would face a "debacle" in the Gulf (Mr. Kissinger's word), and Mr. Bush's leadership would be crippled.

But by now the question is whether the White House has a choice if it's going to succeed in the Gulf. The congressional fuss may have convinced Saddam that the U.S. consensus will fracture as it did in Vietnam. By now only a congressional mandate may convince Saddam that the U.S. really would fight a war.

If Congress does vote a declaration down, then at least Mr. Nunn and his allies will have to accept responsibility for what happens next in the Gulf. Perhaps the Senate has a plan to dispatch Jesse Jackson to negotiate the release of the hostages? Or maybe Paul Warnke is ready to negotiate an arms control treaty with Saddam, complete with "on-site inspection" of his nuclear sites? Unlike hearings in a debate with a vote Congress would have to answer questions, too.



Sam Nunn

Charles Krauthammer

Make Congress Choose

Enough earnest questions, idle talk and stacked hearings.

Three days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, former secretary of defense James Schlesinger rushed into print to declare that "there is no effective policy option available to respond to the seizure of Kuwait." An oil embargo? That would be so ruinous to us that Saddam "could be assured that any threat not to buy his oil would be an idle one." The United States, wrote Schlesinger, is "now attempting to persuade all nations not to buy Iraqi oil." But other nations will cheat, and thank goodness for it: "Other nations will be buying Iraqi crude at knockdown prices, but that is better than our being successful in our attempt [at embargo], for that would be devastating."

Four months later, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) kicks off the national debate on war and peace in the Gulf by calling as his lead witness the same James R. Schlesinger. Schlesinger's message? That the embargo on Iraq is such a smashing success ("the most successful ever achieved aside from time of war") that it must not be interfered with by any precipitous military action.

Schlesinger's, er, flexibility on this issue did not seem to bother the senators. In four hours of hearings, not one was so indelicate as to ask the Schlesinger of November about the Schlesinger of August. Why? Because for most members of the committee, today's Schlesinger is a most useful witness: a reputed hard-liner who makes the case they want to make—the case against war—without their having to make it.

The Democrats' agenda in these hearings is clear: (1) To raise enough doubts about U.S. policy to give them cover if it fails. But (2) to stop short of openly voting for their preferred policy—indefinite sanctions—because that would make them responsible for its success or failure. Hence the choice of Schlesinger—followed by two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs—to present their victory-through-embargo line.

As part of the choreography, Sen. Nunn began the hearings in utmost modesty, not with answers but with questions. "What are our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region?" "Will United Nations economic sanctions force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait?" "How durable is the multinational coalition?"

Important questions, all. But they are not new; everybody who has been thinking about the Gulf has been struggling with them for the past four months. Moreover, the reason that these questions are still around after four months is that they have no definitive answer. There are simply too many unknowns: the stability of the Saudi regime, the morale of Saddam's troops, the staying power of the American public, the rate of breakdown of Iraqi equipment and the rate of breakdown of the allied coalition. And war itself is a maelstrom of contingencies.

Nunn is not going to get clear answers to his questions. And questions alone are cheap unless in the end one is prepared to make a judgment. In an atmosphere of unavoidable uncertainty, the president is going to have to make a decision. So should Congress.

Simply holding hearings is a way for Democrats in Congress to put themselves in a no-lose position. If the president chooses war and it turns out badly, they can say I told you so. If the president chooses war and wins, who will then remember the questions and the doubts amid the general euphoria?

After all, we've just won the Cold War, and all those defeatists who had urged that we sue for peace now act as if nothing had been said. If the McGoverns, the Fondas, the


freezeniks of the world have been chastened, I've missed it. In fact, many are back with free advice on the Gulf. The Catholic bishops met earlier this month and once again deplored war and contraception.

The Gulf battle lines today are becoming clear and quite partisan. Republicans (most, for now) support the president as he marches toward a winter war. Democrats tend toward a sanctions and no-war policy. But most prefer to have others say it for them.

Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, holds his own set of Gulf hearings next week with a stacked witness list. Apart from Secretary of State James Baker, eight witnesses have been chosen by the Democrats. (Minority witnesses have not yet been announced.) Not one has expressed support for the president's war policy. Zbigniew Brzezinski counsels containment. The National Council of Churches counsels withdrawal. In between are such Democratic doves as Arthur Schlesinger, Robert McNamara and John K. Galbraith. And, of course, the bishops. No anti-war parlay is complete without them.

At the opening of the Nunn hearings, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) complained that for Congress to approve in advance the use of force would be to give the president a blank check. But what is any declaration of war if not a blank check? What did Congress give FDR in December of 1941 if not a blank check? The Constitution is quite clear. On war, Congress decides whether. The commander-in-chief then decides how.

The choice between containment and war is agonizingly difficult. The outcome for each is highly uncertain. But choosing in contingent circumstances is the essence of policy making. Questions and stacked hearings will not do. Congress has to decide. The president should call Congress back into session immediately, present it with a resolution authorizing the use of force and make the gutless wonders choose.



BY MARGARET SCOTT

Page 4 ROLL CALL Thursday, November 29, 1990.

ROLL CALL

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Established 1955

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President Bush Should Reconvene Congress

From Sen Dole

The Persian Gulf crisis has presented Democrats in Congress with a dilemma — one that Senate Majority George Mitchell (D-Maine) appears, at least for now, to have finessed as beautifully as he finessed the capital-gains tax cut earlier in the 101st Congress. The dilemma is this: On the one hand, Congress wants to assert its right to declare war. On the other hand, many Democrats don't want to go on the record either for or against the use of troops against Saddam Hussein. The solution, as crafted by Mitchell and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is to snipe, to grouse, and to complain — but not actually to vote on either a declaration of war or a resolution that clearly takes a stand on Gulf strategy and tactics. We think that this solution, while it makes temporary political sense, in the long run hurts the institution. It's also dishonest. Congress has every right to debate the proper US role in the Gulf, but that debate should revolve around a serious resolution or a declaration of war. The resolution could resemble the one that the United Nations Security Council will consider today: permitting the use of force to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Or, as columnist Charles Krauthammer suggested last week, it could simply be a reaffirmation of the

Carter Doctrine, enunciated Jan. 23, 1980. That doctrine declares that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

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Our guess is that, when the roll is called, Members will stop playing games. They will vote history, future, and conscience. But the problem is that politics seems to dictate that the roll not be called any time soon. We have a solution: Since the leaders of the House and Senate do not appear ready to bring Congress back into session, we urge the President to do so. "He may," says the Constitution in Article II, Sect. 3, "on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses." Let him do so next week, so we can at last have an up-or-down vote on the most important issue facing this nation.

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42 LINES

PM-Dole-Gulf,360<

Dole Supports Sending Secretary of State to Iraq<

By BARRY MASSEY=

Associated Press Writer=

WASHINGTON (AP) Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, R-Kan., said today it was a "positive step" for President Bush to open a high-level diplomatic channel to Iraq.

"I think it's another indication that the president wants a peaceable settlement," Dole said in a telephone news conference with broadcasters in Kansas.

Dole also renewed his call for Congress to convene a special session to vote on a resolution that would authorize the use of military force if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein fails to meet a deadline for withdrawing occupation forces from Kuwait.

The senator's comments followed Bush's announcement that he would dispatch Secretary of State James Baker III to Baghdad to discuss an ending to the Gulf crisis and that the Iraqi foreign minister would be welcome in Washington for consultations the week of Dec. 10.

Dole said the president's action would help ensure Iraq understood U.S. intentions on using military force and that the nation was united in its demand for an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Dole complained that "Saddam Hussein has probably been getting mixed messages" in part because of congressional divisions over U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf.

"This will make it very clear to Saddam Hussein that the president is firm, he's not going to back off," Dole said of the secretary of state's mission to Iraq.

Dole said he would continue to urge the president to call Congress back into session to vote on a Persian Gulf resolution. He said it would "complete the circle" if Congress would approve a resolution similar to one endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, which set a Jan. 15 deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Dole predicted bipartisan support for a resolution if Congress takes up the issue.

"I think you would find a lot of these members in both parties, a big majority supporting the United States of America and our young men and women because they want a peaceful resolution of this crisis," Dole said.

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*→ Saddam
give a chance to work out approach*

*Wagon
good idea
Now vs. 3rd floor
strong points Today
Hearings won't go well
close to deadline*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

November 30, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY *cmh*

SUBJECT: President's Statements on A Special Session of Congress

As you requested, I have looked at the President's statements in this morning's press conference about the possibility of a special session of Congress in light of the constitutional procedure for reconvening Congress. Under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, only the President can convene a session of Congress on a date other than a date that has been fixed by law for Congress to convene. Thus, the procedure in Congress's adjournment resolution purporting to give the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate authority to reconvene Congress on a date of their choosing is not, strictly speaking, constitutional.

I would interpret the President's statements this morning to mean that if, because of developments in the Persian Gulf, the Speaker and the Majority Leader decide to invoke the procedure contained in the adjournment resolution, he will consider their action a request that he reconvene Congress under Article II, Section 3, and in this instance he will grant that request.

12/3 Andy, Ed, Marlin, Demarest, Porter, Cicconi

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


Date: December 2, 1990

FOR: GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: **ED ROGERS**

- Action
- Your Comment
- Let's Talk

~~XXX~~ FYI



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
Decision making information
for intelligent choices

CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT

NATIONAL TRACKING SUMMARY

November 27, 1990

#5332-12



CITIZENS FOR A FREE KUWAIT National Tracking Summary

Tuesday November 27, 1990

The Wirthlin Group

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
OVERVIEW

Recent events relating to the crisis in the Gulf, including Secretary of State Baker's visit to United Nations countries, President Bush's visit to the American troops in the Gulf and the recent emphasis on a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, have had a marked impact on Americans' attitudes toward the crisis.

- Nearly one-third (29%) of Americans cite the Middle East Situation as the Most Important Problem currently facing the nation. This represents a 10 percentage point increase over the course of one month.
- Moreover, one-in-five Americans (21%) have spoken to someone "today" about the events in the Middle East. This indicates that the saliency of the issue is again on the rise.
- **President Bush's thermometer score has reached its highest point (66) in nearly two months.**
- Following last week's drop of 8 percentage points, overall approval of Bush's handling of the Mideast crisis has risen 6 percentage points to 61%.

Americans hold steadfast to their opinions regarding a possible conflict and its consequences:

- By a margin of nearly three to one, Americans continue to believe that the conflict in the Middle East will be resolved military (70%) as opposed to peacefully (26%). An overwhelming majority of Americans (72%) continue to believe that "we are still very far away from a solution" to the crisis in the Gulf.
- Six-in-ten (61%) agree that "given everything that has happened, the U.S. is justified in launching an attack against Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait."



- A small majority (52%) agree that "we have arrived at the time for the United States to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait." The proportion of Americans who agree has dropped marginally (4 points) since last reported.
- Despite the hawkish sentiments of Americans, nearly seven-in-ten (68%) continue to agree that "the death of American soldiers in a fight with Iraq is too high a price to pay in this Middle East conflict."

MOOD OF THE COUNTRY


Although Americans remain twice as pessimistic (64% Wrong Track) as optimistic (28% Right Direction), the proportion of Americans who say the country has "pretty seriously gotten off on the Wrong Track" has declined 8 percentage points over the past two weeks.

- The most optimistic subgroups include: Americans residing in the South (32%), self-identified Republicans (36%), Americans earning over \$30,000 (34%), those with a College Education or more (39%), Men 18-34 (40%), Middle-Aged Men (33%), and Information Elites (33%).

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- Nearly one-third (29%) of Americans cite the Middle East Situation as the Important Problem currently facing the nation. This represents a 10 percentage point increase over the course of one month.
 - Self-identified Republicans (34%), those earning between \$15,000 and \$25,000 (38%), Young Women (40%) and Middle-Aged Women (32%) are more likely than other subgroups to cite the Middle East Situation as the Most Important Problem currently facing the nation.
- One-in-five Americans (21%) have spoken to someone "today" about the events in the Middle East.

However, Americans continue to cite Pocketbook/Economy issues (27%) and Social issues (22%) as important problems that are currently facing the nation. This is the lowest level of concern about Pocketbook/Economy issues since the weeks immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.



SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT BUSH & U.S. POLICY

As last week's events had an impact on American perceptions toward the importance of the situation in the Middle East, they have also had a positive impact on American support for President Bush and U.S. policy.

- **President Bush's thermometer score has reached its highest point (66) in nearly two months.**
- Following last week's drop of 8 percentage points, overall approval of Bush's handling of the Mideast crisis has risen 6 percentage points to 61%. The intensity of this support remains evenly divided -- 31% "strongly" approve; 31% "somewhat" approve.

American perceptions of the degree of severity of American actions in the Gulf remain on par with previously reported results. A plurality of Americans (43%) feel U.S. actions in the Gulf have been "just about right"; a slightly smaller proportion (39%) feel U.S. actions have not been tough enough.

ATTITUDES TOWARD KUWAIT


Although awareness of the Kuwaiti government has eroded to the level reported one month ago (39%), support for the Kuwaiti government remains relatively robust (57% agree that the legitimate, constitutional government of Kuwait is worth fighting for).

Furthermore, Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah's thermometer score has risen 6 points to 37.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONFLICT

By a margin of nearly three to one, Americans continue to believe that the conflict in the Middle East will be resolved military (70%) as opposed to peacefully (26%). It is hypothesized that last week's decline in the proportion of Americans who believed the crisis would be resolved military was reversed by recent events, specifically the pending UN resolution authorizing the use of military force in the Gulf.

An overwhelming majority of Americans (72%) continue to believe that "we are still very far away from a solution" to the crisis in the Gulf. However, this proportion has eroded 6 percentage points since last reported. Concurrently, the proportion of Americans who believe that a "solution is close" has increased to 22%.



Americans hold steadfast to their opinions regarding a possible conflict and its consequences:

- Six-in-ten (61%) agree that "given everything that has happened, the U.S. is justified in launching an attack against Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait."

By a margin of two to one, Americans "strongly" support (41%) launching an attack against Iraq.


Subgroups most likely to express a hawkish sentiment include: Americans earning between \$25,000 and \$30,000, Younger Men (70%), those who feel the country is going in the Right Direction (71%), and those who approve of Bush's management of the Gulf Crisis (76%).

- However, a small majority (52%) agree that "we have arrived at the time for the United States to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait." The proportion of Americans who agree has dropped marginally (4 points) since last reported.

Subgroups most likely to believe that now is the time to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait include: Americans earning between \$30,000 and \$40,000 (62%), Younger Men (67%), Younger Women (63%), those who approve of Bush's management of the Gulf crisis (63%) and those who express a hawkish sentiment (71%).

- Despite the hawkish sentiments of Americans nearly seven-in-ten (68%) continue to agree that "the death of American soldiers in a fight with Iraq is too high a price to pay in this Middle East conflict."


Americans most likely to agree that the death of American soldiers is too high a price to pay include: Blacks (84%), self-identified Democrats (75%), Americans earning between \$15,000 and \$25,000 (80%), those with a High School Education or less (75%), Younger Women (84%), Women 55+ (80%), those who disapprove of Bush's management of the crisis (84%), those who express a dovish sentiment (87%), and those who believe the country has gotten off on the Wrong Track (73%).



METHODOLOGY

- Universe:** Americans aged 18 and over living in the continental United States
- Sample Size:** 100 interviews are completed each night
- For the purposes of analysis, data will be aggregated into weekly.
- Confidence Interval:** ± 4.00 in 95 out of 100 cases ($p = .5$)
- Mode of Interview:** Computer Assisted Telephone Interview
- Interview Length:** 10 minutes
30 closed-end questions


Mood of the Country: Right Direction - Wrong Track



—■— Right Direction

—+— Wrong Track


-*- No Opinion




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"Generally speaking, would you say that things in this country are going in the right direction, or have they pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?"

Most Important Problem




- Social
- *— Foreign Policy/Peace
- +— Pocketbook/Economy
- Middle East




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"What would you say is the single most important problem facing the United States today?"

Conversations About the Middle East





—●— Yes —+— No



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"Did you happen to speak with anyone today
about the events in the Middle East?"

World Leaders Thermometers





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—●— George Bush —+— Kuwaiti Emir —*— Saddam Hussein

1 - 100 scale. 1 means NOT AT ALL FAVORABLE
10 means EXTREMELY FAVORABLE.

How Bush is Handling Middle East Situation


Approve -- Disapprove




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"From what you have heard or read, do you approve or disapprove of the way President Bush is handling the situation in the Middle East?"

U.S. Action in the Middle East: Too Tough -- Not Tough Enough




—■— Too Tough —+— Not Tough Enough * Just About Right




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"What do you think about the actions the U.S. has taken so far in the Middle East? Do you think U.S. actions have been..."

Amount of Kuwaiti Resistance




—■— Great Deal/Fair Amt. —+— Not Very Much * None At All




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"To date, how much resistance would you say the Kuwaitis remaining in Kuwait since the invasion have mounted against the Iraqi invaders?"

Legitimate Kuwaiti Government Still Functioning Outside of Kuwait





—●— Total Agree —+— Total Disagree



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"The legitimate Kuwait government is still functioning and active outside of Kuwait."

Legitimate, Constitutional Government is Worth Fighting For





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—●— Total Agree —+— Total Disagree



"The legitimate, constitutional government
of Kuwait is worth fighting for."

"The Legitimate, Constitutional Government of Kuwait is Worth Fighting For."



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
Conflict in the Middle East -- Peaceful Negotiations/Military Conflict




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"From what you have heard and read, do you believe the conflict in the Middle East will be resolved through peaceful negotiation or a military conflict?"

Very Close to a Solution vs. Still Very Far from a Solution





—●— Solution is Close —+— Solution is Far Away



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Some people feel that we are very close to a solution to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Other people feel that we are still very far from any solution.

U.S. Justified to Launch Attack Against Iraq





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—●— Total Agree —+— Total Disagree



"Given everything that has happened, the U.S. is justified in launching an attack against Iraq to drive them out of Kuwait."

"We have arrived at the time for the United States to use military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait?"



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Death of American Soldiers Too High a Price to Pay



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—●— Total Agree —+— Total Disagree
"The death of American soldiers in a fight with Iraq is too high a price to pay in this Middle East conflict."