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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Issues Files

OA/ID Number: 29166
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Folder Title:
Persian Gulf War 1991 [6]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
August 7, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY *CMG*

SUBJECT: Potential Significance of a Declaration of War
Against Iraq

As you requested, I have looked at the advantages and disadvantages that would follow from a declaration of war against Iraq. For the reasons set forth below, there are few legal advantages to a declaration of war unless you anticipate serious and sustained hostilities with Iraq requiring wartime mobilization of the American people and economy. If you anticipate a more modest military commitment to the Persian Gulf region, depending on the size of the commitment, its likely duration, and the risk of involvement in hostilities, you can proceed either without any formal congressional approval at all, or seek a joint resolution of Congress endorsing your action.

International Law

Under customary international practice, declarations of war serve to (1) notify neutral powers of the existence of a state of war, (2) prepare the nation's political structure and populace for war, and (3) publicly explain the circumstances necessitating the declaration.

Declaring war is one way that a state can acquire belligerent status under international law. States with such status acquire belligerent rights, including the rights to intern enemy aliens and confiscate enemy property found within their territory, blockade enemy ports, and seize enemy shipping. Of course, states against whom war is declared acquire these same rights against the declaring state. This would mean that if Iraq acquired belligerent status by virtue of a U.S. declaration of war, Iraq would have a strong basis under international law for interning U.S. citizens for the duration of the conflict. Belligerent status can also be acquired by engaging in acts of war, however, and throughout history many if not most conflicts have been fought without formal declarations of war.

Constitutional Issues

Under our Constitution, Congress has the power to declare war and the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has the power to conduct it. The records of the constitutional convention suggest that an important purpose of this division was to afford the President

flexibility to respond quickly to aggression, while ensuring that Congress approved of any decision to commit aggression against other countries. Obviously this distinction is easier to draw in theory than in practice. Because we believe that the United States does not initiate aggression, the Executive branch has generally held that the President can order U.S. forces into combat without a declaration of war. Accordingly, we have proceeded without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization when it was politically tenable to do so, as in Grenada and Panama.

Congress, on the other hand, has sometimes taken a more restrictive view of the President's authority. Because the U.S. cannot long sustain military commitments without the support of Congress and the American people, other mechanisms have been resorted to when politically expedient and a declaration of war was not desired. The most commonly used mechanism is the joint resolution. The two most recent examples are the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was adopted at President Johnson's request in 1964 in furtherance of his policy in Viet Nam, and the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, which Congress insisted on enacting in 1983 in order to preserve its position concerning application of the War Powers Resolution to Lebanon.¹

Consequences Under U.S. Law

If you order a U.S. military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it will be immaterial under U.S. law whether that response is unilateral or undertaken under auspices of the United

¹Another example, arguably relevant to the current situation, is the Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, adopted in 1957 in support of President Eisenhower's intervention in Lebanon. This resolution, which remains in effect and is currently codified at 22 U.S.C 1961-1965, provides in pertinent part:

. . . the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism . . .

This resolution would appear to provide congressional authorization for the deployment of U.S. forces to the Middle East in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait only if we could plausibly claim that Iraq is a "country controlled by international communism."

Nations. In either case, your legal options and the legal consequences under U.S. law of your actions will be the same.

A declaration of war would have limited effect under existing statutes. It would fully satisfy the requirements of the War Powers Resolution², thereby eliminating the need to report certain force deployments to Congress and providing congressional authorization to continue deployments into hostile situations for more than 60 days. A joint resolution of Congress would also provide authorization to continue such deployments, however, though the requirement that certain deployments be reported to Congress would remain in effect. In the absence of either a declaration of war or a joint resolution, we would be subject to both the War Powers Resolution's reporting requirement and its requirement -- which we regard as unconstitutional -- to terminate deployments into hostile situations after 60 days.

A declaration of war would also allow us to invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act against the assets of Iraq and its citizens in the United States. The principal advantage of this Act over the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (which we have already invoked against Iraq) is that it would permit us not only to freeze Iraqi assets, but to confiscate them as well.

A declaration of war or national emergency by Congress empowers the President to call up all members the reserves for the duration of the war or emergency plus six months. However, the President already has statutory authority to call up 1,000,000 members of the Ready Reserve for 24 months upon issuing his own declaration of national emergency. In addition, he has authority to call up 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for 90 days if he determines that doing so "is necessary to augment the active forces for any operational mission."

²The War Powers Resolution provides that the President is to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" prior to introducing U.S. military forces into hostilities or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent. It also requires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours any deployment (1) "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated," (2) "into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat," or (3) "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation." The Resolution further provides that, with respect to the first category of deployments (into hostilities or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent), the forces must be withdrawn after 60 days unless Congress has declared war or enacted a joint resolution authorizing continued deployment.

Various other statutes empower the President to reclaim U.S. title to former military facilities in the event of war. These statutes vary, but as a general rule they give the President greater authority to reclaim title in the event of a congressional declaration of war or emergency than in the absence of such a declaration. Another statute authorizes the President to require communications common carriers to give priority to national security communications "during the continuance of a war in which the United States is engaged." This provision probably could be invoked even in the absence of a declaration of war, but its availability would be clearer in the event war was declared.

The most important consequences of a declaration of war arise not under any statute, but under the Constitution. During states of war, Presidents have been able to assume extraordinary authority over American society under the Commander-in-Chief clause. During World War II, for example, President Roosevelt created dozens of Executive branch agencies to oversee the economy, and those agencies were generally successful in compelling private sector compliance with their edicts, even in the absence of authorizing legislation. The internment of Japanese-American citizens was first ordered by Roosevelt pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority, though Congress had ratified this action prior to the Supreme Court decision upholding it. The President also gains extraordinary authority over the military in times of war. He can, for example, direct the military to requisition property and compel services of citizens and aliens, irrespective of the availability of appropriated funds.

Conclusion

In the event that the United States undertakes any sort of military response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, you will have three options: (1) proceed on your inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief without seeking congressional authorization, (2) seek a joint resolution of Congress approving your action, or (3) request a declaration of war. We believe it is legally sufficient to proceed with no formal congressional authorization at all. However, if U.S. forces will be involved in hostilities or situations where involvement in hostilities is imminent and you wish to avoid a dispute over the War Powers Resolution, or if a congressional endorsement would be useful in gaining public support for your action, you should consider seeking a joint resolution approving your action. A declaration of war would give you greater authority to wage war against Iraq and undertake massive intervention in the U.S. economy, but the principal benefits of such a declaration are ones that you are not likely to need -- or indeed want -- in the current situation. Further, because of the implications under international law, such a declaration could play into Iraq's hands.

MITCHELL'S DESCRIPTION OF DEMOCRAT RESOLUTION

1. Condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
2. Demands Iraq's departure from Kuwait.
3. Commends President's use of diplomacy and economic sanctions (not sure whether or how it addresses the question of deployment of U.S. forces) -- does not preclude the use of force, but urges continuation of reliance on sanctions, rather than the use of force.
4. Says that, to use force, the President must certify to Congress that sanctions have failed and force is necessary, and must get authorization to use force. Puts in place expedited procedures for Congress to deal with resolution authorizing use of force.

from Bond.

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

August 8, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We support your decision to send U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia to help deter further Iraqi aggression in the Middle East.

We believe that American interests merit such action. We are hopeful that this action will successfully prevent an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia and help convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait.


We expect that your decision to send U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia will result in a Presidential report submitted within the next forty-eight hours to Congress under Section 4(a)1 of the War Powers Resolution. As you know, U.S. law requires the submission of such a report to Congress when U.S. forces are introduced into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

We believe that in this time of challenge, it is important for Congress and the Executive branch to be united in support of American interests. Compliance with the War Powers Resolution will certainly promote this unity of purpose and resolve.

We look forward to receiving your report and supporting your efforts to successfully protect American interests in the Persian Gulf.

Sincerely,


George J. Mitchell


Thomas S. Foley

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Letter	Richard Nixon ^{from} POTUS RE: Assessment of Gulf Crisis (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John H.
Subseries: Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Persian Gulf War 1991 [6]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By MLC (NLGB) on 1/18/2000

Date Closed:	12/12/2002	OA/ID Number:	CF00472-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0099-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	98-0099-F/1(52)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	White House Guidelines	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	1/18/2000	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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17 5/10/00

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Dear Mr. President:

I would like to share with you my assessment of the Gulf crisis, both where we are and where we may be heading. As you know, we now have in hand a resolution passed overwhelmingly by the UN Security Council authorizing us after January 15 to use "all necessary means" to achieve the established goals of Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all hostages. We are also busy improving our military posture--and by "our" I refer to U.S. and allied--in order to make the option to use force credible. And we are preparing for meetings in the near future with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz here and President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Needless to say, we are approaching a key juncture in the crisis.

From the outset, we have sought to build and lead a global alliance that isolates Iraq politically, economically and militarily. We have sought also to increase steadily the political and economic costs for Saddam Hussein of holding onto Kuwait. We have made clear our preference for a peaceful solution, but this will depend on Saddam Hussein. We need to make him understand that one way or another he will have to withdraw from Kuwait--and that means he has to understand that we and our partners will use force if need be. Iraq's preferred strategy is to rely upon its formidable ground forces to deter an attack, to try to drive wedges between members of the coalition in the hope it will fracture, and to play for time in the expectation that the resolve of the United

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States and the coalition will weaken. Our immediate efforts are directed at increasing the pressure brought to bear on Iraq. Moreover, should Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, we will still have the task of restricting Iraq's military capabilities and constructing security arrangements to ensure stability in the Gulf.

The Military Balance

Since August 2, 27 countries have deployed land, air or naval forces to counter Iraqi aggression. U.S. forces in the region number over 230,000 and in conjunction with other coalition forces now have the capability to defend successfully against any further Iraqi aggression. As announced recently, U.S. forces will increase substantially to ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should one be required to achieve our goals. I took this additional step out of conviction that the best possibility of obtaining Saddam's compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions lies in convincing him that the threat of a devastating U.S.-led offensive is genuine.

Arab and Islamic forces within the international coalition number about 140,000 with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt and Syria in the lead. Other major troop contributors are the United Kingdom and France. Allied forces in the Gulf were significantly strengthened by the deployment of two Egyptian divisions and a Syrian armored division in November. We have received commitments to increase contributions from many of our partners.

The Iraqi army is in defensive positions, but could shift to the offensive with little delay. Iraq has moved almost half (the best half) of its ground forces to Kuwait and southeast Iraq. Fifteen divisions are committed to Kuwait operations with an additional 11 divisions reinforcing. Personnel total more than 460,000 men. The Iraqi Air Force is relatively sophisticated, but it is untested against a western air force. One can never predict with

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certainty the course of any conflict, but it is our view that U.S. and allied forces could act to inflict a decisive defeat upon Iraq. As I made clear November 30, no one should assume that a war in the Gulf would bear any resemblance to Vietnam.

Sanctions Prognosis

Compliance with the UN-mandated embargo is nearly complete. Iraqi exports have virtually stopped and are at two percent of the pre-crisis level. Lost oil revenue is costing the Iraqis over \$2 billion a month at current oil prices. Imports have been drastically reduced. The naval interception effort has challenged more than 2,700 ships, boarded over 280 and diverted 11 with cargoes that violated the U.N. embargo. Some smuggling across land borders continues, but leakage is relatively slight. Jordan has markedly improved its sanctions performance; Iran is for the most part enforcing UN sanctions.

Some evidence of shortages in the Iraqi economy, particularly in the industrial sector, is now appearing. Iraq's abortive gas rationing decision evidenced serious Iraqi government concerns about grumbling reported among the populace and even in the military. There are credible reports that some Iraqi industries have shut down. We cannot predict, however, whether and if so when shortages will translate into political pressure on Saddam Hussein who, in any case, will continue to divert resources as necessary to protect his army and power base. Indeed, the most recent assessment by the intelligence community concludes that sanctions-induced hardships are not significant enough to force Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait and that there is no hard evidence we will ever arrive at such a point.

Responsibility Sharing

The economic foundation of our international coalition is our successful effort to distribute the economic burden of confronting Iraq. Three Gulf states--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United

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Arab Emirates--have agreed to contribute \$12 billion to this effort in 1990. Japan has pledged \$4 billion, Germany \$2 billion, the European Community \$670 million along with member state commitments of an additional \$1.3 billion, and South Korea \$220 million. Consultations are underway regarding contributions for the next calendar year. We are also succeeding at persuading oil producers with excess capacity to increase output, thereby easing the upward pressure on prices. So far, the increase in prices is a result of psychology and fears for the future rather than any actual shortage.

Diplomacy

As you can see, we are stepping up our diplomacy. The offer to meet directly with the Iraqi leadership was something of a shift in tactics and is something of a risk. Nevertheless, it is one well worth taking given what is at stake and what we may be asking of our men and women in uniform. Moreover, it is an essential step to take to highlight that the choice of peace or war is Saddam's to make. Jim Baker and I will speak as plainly as possible so that Iraq's leadership will understand exactly what is required of them and exactly what consequences they will face if they continue to defy the Security Council. By the meetings' end, I am confident that Saddam and his inner circle will have fewer illusions about the reality that their aggression has brought about. There will be no negotiations, no concessions, no attempts at face-saving, no partial solutions, and no linkage. In short, we will go the extra mile, but everything we do will be within the parameters established by Security Council Resolution 678 and its predecessors. As of this writing, we are still trying to work out mutually agreeable dates for the meetings, with the Iraqis pressing to hold the Baghdad meeting as close to January 15 as they can in an effort to erode the certainty of the Security Council's deadline.

This offer to meet directly with the Iraqis was extended in the aftermath of the Security

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Council's historic vote. What Resolution 678 does is provide additional legal and especially political sanction for the use of force should we so determine; what we hope of course is that the resolution, coupled with our military preparations, will persuade Saddam that the time to withdraw has come. What the resolution also does is symbolize just how far we have come--with our coalition, with the Soviets, and with the United Nations. "Watershed" is not too strong a term for what has been accomplished.

All of this took place against a backdrop of November trips to the region and elsewhere by Jim Baker and myself to meet with key coalition partners. These consultations revealed strong opposition to any "partial solutions," a continued willingness to share the economic and military burden, and increased readiness to contemplate the use of force to achieve the goals set out by the international community and in the twelve resolutions thus far passed by the Security Council. Our task was made somewhat easier by the failure of Soviet envoy Primakov and others to elicit reasonable Iraqi behavior. Iraqi interest in diplomacy thus far has been tactical, designed to weaken the coalition against it rather than find a settlement consistent with what the United Nations has declared. Fortunately, Iraq's transparent attempts to divide the international coalition--including its cynical treatment of hostages--have been recognized and rejected for what they are.

Hostages and the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait

Iraq has declared that it will release all hostages, including our fellow Americans. Many have already departed, including Americans held as human shields; we expect the remainder of those who wish to leave will soon follow. I believe Saddam's decision to release these innocent people was a result of our resolve and determination, timed cynically to take propaganda advantage in advance of the Tariq Aziz and Baker meetings.

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With regard to our Embassy in Kuwait, we will keep it open, but unmanned. Its mission, protecting our citizens trapped there, has been accomplished now that all the hostages are getting out. Until the legitimate government in Kuwait is restored, we will have no official business to conduct. The final departure order will be given as soon as I am convinced that our citizens are truly on their way to freedom.

Domestic Politics

I believe there is widespread support in the Congress and the public at large for our basic objectives, just as there is equally strong understanding of what is at stake. Where there are continuing concerns are with war powers, where many in the Congress want to have the opportunity to decide whether force is used, and on the policy of whether and if so when to move from sanctions to a policy of liberation by force.

My opposition to the war powers resolution is well known. But we will continue to consult, since we appreciate the concerns of the Congress. Circumstances permitting, we will be more than happy to have Congress go on record supporting the use of force. Regarding the question of timing, we are less willing than many on the Hill to eschew the use of military force and allow sanctions to continue for another year or even longer. We and the world already are paying a real price--economic, human, political and strategic--for Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. Waiting also could raise the costs of a military option should one be necessary. On balance, it is not at all clear that we have the luxury of waiting for sanctions to prove decisive, which they might never be.

In any event, the combination of remarkably candid consultations and explanations we have offered seems to have had a calming effect. That said, we are under no illusions on this

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score; managing the congressional and domestic account will, as ever, prove one of our major challenges. I hope that the statement at my press conference of November 30, the Administration's testimony last week at Congressional hearings, and our stepped up public diplomacy efforts will shore up public support.

I hope this letter has shed some light on our efforts. Please feel free to contact me directly if questions remain or you have any counsel to offer.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Wood Cliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Chart	Re: Oil Production [SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL.] (1 pp.)	08-09	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John H.
Subseries: Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Persian Gulf War 1991 [6]

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**"Records temporarily restricted in accordance with the
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Interim
Guidelines on Classified National Security Information
Directive No. 1 (32 CFR Part 2001), Section 2001.13(e)
Concerning Re-review of Previously Declassified Records
at the National Archives."**

AUG 10 '90 12:03 FROM IACP USDA

PAGE.002



The Under Secretary of Agriculture
for
International Affairs and Commodity Programs
Washington, DC

August 10, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE EDE HOLIDAY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND SECRETARY OF THE CABINET
THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM: *RR* Richard T. Crowder

SUBJECT: Outlook for Food Supplies to Iraq

Governor Sununu asked Secretary Yautter about the outlook for food supplies in Iraq and current movements of food into Iraq. Attached is a memo prepared by my staff for me that addresses most of the key issues.

Obviously, there are a lot of holes in the information and we will continue to update the situation. However, the memo does identify the key issues, including some of the areas for "leakage."

Please let me know if you or Governor Sununu have any additional questions.

Attachment

cc: Secretary Yautter, USDA
CofS-Gary Blumenthal, USDA

AUG 10 '90 12:04 FROM IACP USDA

PAGE.003

United States
Department of
AgricultureForeign
Agricultural
ServiceWashington, D.C.
20250

10 AUG 1990

INFORMATIONAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

FROM: *CS* R. E. Anderson, Jr.
for Administrator

SUBJECT: Outlook for Iraq to Obtain Food Supplies

Summary: There is little firm evidence of agricultural commodities continuing to move into Iraq aside from scattered small shipments already en route. High stocks mean that the embargo on agricultural shipments will have a significant effect only if maintained for several months and if strictly enforced by Iraq's land neighbors. It will be harder to pressure Iraq by denying food than by blocking oil exports.

Present Movements: Careful checking with the CIA, trade/industry sources and agricultural counselors has developed no evidence of substantial quantities of agricultural commodities en route to Iraq from major suppliers. The European Community and Canada have already taken steps to cut off commodity exports. Australia has announced it will comply with the food ban, and Argentina is expected to do so August 9. From Europe, 100,000 tons of wheat did move at the end of July, but since then the EC Commission has instructed traders not to respond to an Iraqi invitation for bids expected to be announced August 9. On August 7, Canada stopped a grain cargo that was loading at Vancouver. About 60,000 tons of U.S. corn was shipped in late July. Iraqi trade with Latin America has been small.

The Agriculture Office in the USEC Mission in Brussels relayed an unconfirmed report of wheat sales to Iraq from Bulgaria, and it may be that shipments from countries such as Bulgaria and Vietnam continue. Many shipments have been caught in various stages of completion, some loading or on the water. These include at least one U.S. rice shipment and a 55,000-ton Australian wheat shipment. Many companies, including in the United States, will request licensed exceptions to the embargo to complete shipments, providing they believe payment will somehow be forthcoming. Most of these will probably not get through.

Dependency: Iraq is heavily dependant on food imports. Estimates run as high as 70 percent. For bulk grains, imports range from 38 percent of consumption for barley to 27 percent for wheat and 88 percent for rice, the two chief staples. The country imports over half its cotton and beef, but is relatively self-sufficient in fruits and vegetables, and poultry. The latter, however, would be adversely affected by an end to imported feedgrains. Altogether, Iraq's dependency on food imports is surprising for an autarchic war economy -- perhaps reflecting the luxury of oil income, the large portion of manpower tied up in the armed forces, and the lack of capital to invest in reclaiming salinated land. Major suppliers have been the United States, the European Community, Turkey and -- going back a year or two -- Canada, Australia and Brazil, and Argentina for meat.

AUG 10 '90 12:04 FROM IACP USDA

PAGE.004

-2-

Most agricultural shipments to Iraq have been moving through Aqaba, Jordan and Iskenderun, Turkey with little through Basra and other war-torn Iraqi ports. Commodities then move by sophisticated truck relays on to Iraq. As with oil outflow, there are essentially three key faucets for the inflow of commodity (see "Effectiveness" below).

Stocks: Given Iraq's decade-long status as a war economy, a policy of high stockholding is not surprising. In the grains area stocks currently range from 6 to 8 months supply if the recent domestic harvest is included. Supplies of feedgrains and vegetable oil are reportedly low, so control of access of these commodities is particularly important. Malaysia is reportedly considering a 250,000-ton sale of palm oil.

Effectiveness of the Embargo: The history of embargoes on fungible agricultural commodities is not encouraging, although there has rarely been the unified commitment that seems to be forming in the present Iraqi case. It would appear to FAS analysts that two factors are key: (1) the commitment of major suppliers of Iraq's chief imports -- grains, sugar, meat products, and fruits and vegetables; (2) the porousness of borders -- in this case land borders.

(1) Nearly all of Iraq's major suppliers have now committed themselves verbally to banning food shipments to Iraq, including the United States, the European Community, Australia, and Canada. Major questions remain regarding the rice suppliers Thailand and Vietnam.

(2) Considerable question remains regarding the effectiveness of the ban on food shipments to Iraq because of possible transshipments through Jordan and Turkey (even perhaps Iran if the price warrants). Both countries have announced adherence to sanctions, but there is some question as to their interpretation of U.N. sanction language on food for humanitarian purposes. Jordan's closure of Aqaba will be easier to monitor since grain shipments are dependent upon a floating silo/discharge facility and a 900-mile desert truck route. However, some level of cross-border trade is automatic and irrepressible in this part of the world. In cases of official neglect this may reach the level of hundreds of thousands of tons -- truck convoys moving nocturnally based on local bribes of customs officials. The hills of Turkey and deserts of Jordan offer surveillance difficulty and plenty of opportunity. Official efforts will likely contain this to reasonable levels -- a few thousand tons moved on draft animals. Official neglect will permit significant flows.

To summarize, control of large-scale food inflows will be similar to controlling oil outflow, in that Iraq is dependent on three key channels. However, the cross-border trade will continue at some level and could reach significant proportions unless strictly enforced, making a total cutoff unlikely.

Leverage opportunities exist for influencing both Turkey and Jordan to strengthen enforcement. Turkey, with desires and plans to join the European Community, is best approached on the basis of European unity in the face of the aggression. Jordan is a major recipient of U.S. assistance, including food aid.

AUG 10 '90 12:05 FROM IACP USDA

PAGE.005

-3-

Key Questions: We are actively seeking further information in several areas:

- (1) Status of shipments en route;
- (2) Thai and Malaysian commitment to the U.N. sanctions;
- (3) Vietnamese exportable rice supplies and proclivity to supply Iraq;
- (4) Strictness of enforcement efforts by Jordan and especially Turkey.

Reviewed by: _____

AUG 10 '90 12:03 FROM IACP USDR

PAGE.006

IRAQI 1990/91 GRAIN REQUIREMENTS

Based upon current stocks, imports to date, and this year's grain harvest, Iraq is estimated to have about an eight month supply of grain on hand. When the projected domestic grain supply is considered together with imports to date, the Iraqi's will have 4.2 million tons available for consumption in 1990/91. Possible humanitarian grain shipments and potential Iraqi efforts to circumvent the embargo may increase grain availability.

**IRAQI 1990/91 GRAIN AVAILABILITY AND REQUIREMENTS
(1,000 Metric Tons)**

	Wheat	Coarse Grain	Rice (1)	Total
Total Domestic Supplies 1800 (Prodn. & Stocks)		1330	200	3330
Imports to Date (2)	400	100	330	830
Est. Availability	2200	1430	530	4160
Avg. Monthly Consumption	275	178	54	507
Months Covered	8	8	10	8 - 10

1) Jan-Dec 1990

2) Grain already contracted for & believed shipped.

JULY/JUNE MARKETING YEAR/1	IRAQ GRAIN (MILLION METRIC TONS)		SITUATION		
	BEGINNING STOCKS	PRODUCTION	TOTAL IMPORTS	TOTAL EXPORTS	TOTAL USE
89/90					
--WHEAT	1,085	491	3,400	0	3,900
--BARLEY	306	663	550	0	1,428
--CORN	0	100	600	0	700
--SORGHUM	0	6	0	0	6
--RICE	202	150	600	0	600
TOTAL	1493	1210	5250	0	6754
90/91					
--WHEAT	1,085	1,000	2,000	0	3,000
--BARLEY	81	1,400	400	75	1,500
--CORN	0	100	640	0	621
--SORGHUM	0	6	0	0	6
--RICE	152	150	600	0	650
TOTAL	1218	2656	4440	75	5287
91/92					
--WHEAT	1,083	732	3,400	0	3,700
--BARLEY	103	742	585	0	1,300
--CORN	43	61	610	0	603
--SORGHUM	0	6	0	0	6
--RICE	48	150	430	0	540
TOTAL	1277	1691	4625	0	5161
92/93					
--WHEAT	993	1,036	2,800	0	3,700
--BARLEY	402	1,046	0	145	1,300
--CORN	5	55	530	0	545
--SORGHUM	0	6	0	0	6
--RICE	6	146	120	0	611
TOTAL	1406	2289	3450	145	5128
93/94					
--WHEAT	1,307	1,406	2,700	0	2,300
--BARLEY	70	1,331	0	70	920
--CORN	94	41	300	0	430
--SORGHUM	0	6	0	0	6
--RICE	12	140	300	0	600
TOTAL	1483	2924	3300	70	5128

*Adopted Sept. 20, 1990
by NAAA Board of Directors*

from Tele. Room

FAX (202) 456-2397

*Attn: Linda Casey
Katie
Gov. Sununu*

RESOLUTION ON GULF CRISIS

RESOLVED:

- (1) The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA) supports President Bush's deployment of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia in support of the U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- (2) The NAAA believes that the fundamental principle underlying the current Gulf crisis is the principle adopted in the United Nations Charter in 1945: that no nation should ever again be permitted to seize or occupy the territory of another by force of arms. Over 50,000 Americans died for this principle during the Korean War of 1950-1953.
- (3) Implementation of this principle not only requires that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait be ended, but it also requires that Israel's occupation of Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian territory be ended. It is useless and perilous to seek to resolve the Gulf problem if we do not also spend every effort to solve the Palestinian problem in a timely manner. Twenty-three years have elapsed since the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 calling for Israel's withdrawal from the lands occupied in the 1967 war. It is time that the United States insist on Israeli compliance with Resolution 242.
- (4) A major factor complicating the U.S. role in the Gulf crisis has been U.S. acquiescence in, and indeed U.S. financial support of, Israel's occupation of Arab territories since 1967 in violation of U.N. Resolution 242. The U.S. is perceived as being guilty of a double standard in demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, but not doing so in the case of Israel's occupation of Arab lands.
- (5) NAAA therefore urges the U.S. Congress to suspend military aid to Israel until Israel withdraws from the Occupied Territories.
- (6) The NAAA believes that it is imperative that the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons in the Middle East be stemmed and that the new accord between the United States and the Soviet Union should be used to implement regional security agreements requiring that all Middle East nations divest themselves of chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

**NAAA Board Resolution
September 20, 1990
Page 2**

- (7) Recognizing the new relationship of friendship and cooperation between the major superpowers, the NAAA urges that an international conference be convened by the United Nations Security Council to seek a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with the Palestine Liberation Organization invited to participate as an equal partner to other parties to the conflict.



Department of Social Development and World Peace

3211 4th Street N.E. Washington, DC 20017-1194 (202) 541-3180 FAX (202) 541-3339 TELE 7400424

Des

November 7, 1990

The Honorable James Baker
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I write as Chairman of the International Policy Committee of the U.S. Catholic Conference to share several concerns and criteria regarding possible use of U.S. military force in the Persian Gulf. As Catholic bishops we are deeply concerned about the human consequences of the crisis -- the lives already lost or those that could be lost in a war, the freedom denied to hostages, the victims of aggression and the many families divided by the demands of military service. As religious teachers, we are concerned about the moral dimensions of the crisis -- the need to resist brutal aggression, to protect the innocent, to pursue both justice and peace, as well as the ethical criteria for the use of force. As U.S. citizens, we are concerned about how our nation can best protect human life and human rights and secure a peaceful and just resolution to the crisis.

Our Conference has thus far emphasized five basic issues in addressing the crisis:

- 1) The clear need to resist aggression. We cannot permit rations to simply overwhelm others by brutal use of force.
- 2) The need for broad-based, international solidarity which seeks effective and peaceful means to halt and reverse aggression. We strongly support the United Nations actions and the international pressure which has effectively halted Iraqi aggression and offers hope for the peaceful liberation of Kuwait.
- 3) The need to condemn the taking of hostages and the mistreatment and killing of civilians. We deplore the cynical and intolerable actions of the Iraqi government in taking innocent civilians against their will and using them for protection or propaganda, as well as, the brutal treatment of civilians in Kuwait.

Page Two
November 7, 1990

- 4) The essential need to distinguish between the leaders of Iraq and the civilians of Iraq and Kuwait. In the carrying out of the embargo and other actions we need to take care so that innocent civilians are not deprived of those essentials for the maintenance of life, i.e., food and medicines.
- 5) The imperative to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis and pursue legitimate objectives by non-violent diplomatic means. We continue to call for effective solidarity, perseverance and patience in the search for a peaceful and just outcome to the crisis.

It is on this last point, the persistent pursuit of a peaceful solution, that I write to you now. As the Administration assesses the military and geopolitical implications of initiating combat, we also ask you to carefully assess the moral consequences of resort to war.

Our country needs an informed and substantive discussion of the human and ethical dimensions of the policy choices under consideration. In the Catholic Community, there is a long history of ethical reflection on these issues and diverse points of view. As Chairman of this committee, I share these reflections with you, not to offer a definitive judgement but to suggest some essential values, and raise some key questions which must be considered as the U.S. explores its options. We hope they will contribute to the necessary and growing public debate about whether the use of military force could be morally justified and under what, if any, conditions. We specifically seek to draw attention to the ethical dimensions of these choices, so that they are not ignored or neglected in a focus on simply military and geopolitical considerations.

In our tradition, while the use of force is not ruled out absolutely, there is a clear presumption against war. The right to self-defense or to repel aggression is restricted and governed by a series of moral principles, often called the "just war" theory. These criteria spell out the conditions which have to be met for war to be morally permissible. Among the major criteria are:

(a) Just Cause: Is there "a real and certain danger" which can only be confronted by war? Several objectives have been put forth for US policy: to deter and repel aggression, to safeguard human rights, to assure adequate and affordable energy supplies, to advance a new international order, to overthrow a hostile dictator. In order to meet the just cause criteria US policy would have to clarify its precise objectives, measure them by

ethical values and demonstrate that they can only be achieved through the use of force.

(b) Competent Authority: This principle asks who in this case is the competent authority to authorize the use of force. The President acting alone, the President and Congress, the UN which has played an indispensable role in securing international condemnation of Iraq? This principle is crucial given past conflicts in our own country about who has such powers.

(c) Right intention: Are the reasons set forth as a just cause for war the actual objectives of military action?

(d) Last Resort: Have all peaceful alternatives been fully pursued before war is undertaken? Can the international economic and political pressure on Iraq bring about a just solution over time without resort to violence?

(e) Probability of Success: Is the prospect of success sufficiently clear to justify the human and other costs of military action?

(f) Proportionality: Is the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war proportionate to the objectives to be achieved by taking up arms? In this case are the expressed values at stake so important i.e., the survival of Kuwait, repelling aggression, etc., that they justify the resort to force and the consequences of the use of force? Will war with Iraq leave the people of Kuwait, the Middle East and the world better or worse off?

In addition to these criteria, there are others which govern the conduct of war. These principles include proportionality and discrimination, i.e. the military means used must be commensurate with the evil to be overcome and must be directed at the aggressors, not innocent people. For example, the Second Vatican Council declared

"any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation".

Page 4
November 7, 1990

Military action against Iraq would have to be restrained by these two principles, necessarily ruling out tactics and strategies which could clearly target civilian lives. This means this war would have to be a limited war, raising again the criteria of the probability of success and the price to be paid given the hostile physical environment, the fragility of the anti-Iraq alliance and the volatility of regional and domestic political support.

These considerations lead me to strongly urge that the US, in continued cooperation with the United Nations, the Soviet Union, Arab states and other nations, stay the course of persistent, peaceful and determined pressure against Iraq. A resort to war in violation of these criteria would jeopardize many lives, raise serious moral questions and undermine the international solidarity against Iraq. We understand that a strong military presence can give credibility to a vigorous pursuit of non-violent solutions to the crisis. My concern is that the pressure to use military force may grow as the pursuit of non-violent options almost inevitably become difficult, complex and slow. Strength, creativity and persistence are virtues required for a peaceful and just conclusion of this crisis. They may also open the door for a new, broader and more imaginative dialogue concerning the deep-seated and long-standing problems which have contributed to the current situation.

We pray for the safety and welfare of the peoples of that troubled region. We pray for the liberation of the hostages and the people of Kuwait. We pray that the American men and women deployed in the Gulf may by their presence support a peaceful resolution of the crisis and return home safely and soon. And, finally, we pray that our leaders and all other parties concerned will have the persistence, wisdom and skill to resolve the current crisis in peace and with justice.

Sincerely yours,



Most Reverend Roger M. Mahony
Archbishop of Los Angeles
Chairman
International Policy Committee

American Petroleum Institute
1220 L Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20005



ME
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

10/17
GNV -
API received this letter
this A.M. - thought it
might be of interest to
you - sch.

FACSIMILE

COVER SHEET

DATE: 10/17/90

TO: Jackie Kennedy
afc of the Chief
of Staff
The White House

URGENT: _____

CALL FOR PICKUP UPON RECEIPT.

NORMAL: _____

FROM: Mary Ellen Joyce
Federal Agencies

PAGES TO FOLLOW 4 + COVER.

PLEASE CALL (202) 682-8024 IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THE TRANSMISSION.

Ref: DM / 214

date: 22 /9/1990

Dear Sirs,

We would like to seize this opportunity to elaborate on certain factors that have been dominating the world arena lately.

Its well-known that through experience, you are well aware of the long-established relations existed between Iraq and the world community; be they Western or Eastern, Europeans or Africans. Such relations were firmly enhanced through reciprocal protocols signed between parties concerned and which Iraq had bouned them always.

The US was no exception, doors were always opened to American traders and companies to deal and work in Iraq. Such activities were also conducted through joint agreements and common understanding, whereby the oil sector probably has taken the lion's share of those agreements and cooperations.

Regretfully , and since the 2nd of Aug.1990,when Kuwait came back to its roots, the US Administration have imposed the cruelest decisions that have ever been adopted against any other country in the whole world. The problem of Kuwait as you might know is an internal affair and if there is a historical or a geographical misunderstanding in the area , it could be tackled through dialogue, we think the people of the region can understand their problems better than others.

We have done no harm for the US Administration, however, a severe oil embargo, food , baby milk and medicine have been imposed against Iraq which has always been keen to avoid oil price hikes and to achieve stability in the world market through coordinated policies.


Meanwhile, we would like to remind you of the statement made by the US president T. Jeaphersson in 1770 that "all people born equal " and that every one has the right to live, the right to freedom and the right to prosperity; but unfortunately the US Administration did not abide by these immortal statements which have been well known to American people since then.

It is hard to beleive how the Zionist lobby is actively working to reshape the foreign policies of the US to serve Zionist interests and the US Administration has been lately degrading the Arabs through their strategic policies of defending the interests of Zionist people regardless of the human rights of the Arabs whose homeland was snatched from them by force.

The world has been through critical moments during the past forty years and wittnessed heavy loss of human lives such as the Korean war, the Vietname and Combodia wars, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US invasion of Grenada island, Lebanon and Panama, British invasion of Faulkland Islands; therefore, we hope that your voices are raised against the US Administration policies in the Gulf crisis, in order to avoid bloodshed among innocent people. Let them understand the real position in the region, and that any foolish act would definitely lead to nothing but destruction and bloodshed.

We hope that through you and other friends, we could let our attitudes reach the US administration in order that we may work together to serve a noble objective through joint efforts and peaceful initiatives.

Kind Regads



Dr. Sammi Sherif



Deputy Minister of Oil
Baghdad-Iraq

BY AIR MAIL

AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
1220 L ST
NORTH WEST, WASHINGTON
D.C 20005 USA

DR. CANES

Handwritten signature/initials



Dennis J. Picard**Raytheon**

September 21, 1990

John 

I have fully briefed Senators Pell, Warner, Rudman, Kennedy and Inouye, and Senator Kerry's staff, on the need for full support for Patriot in Saudi Arabia. Senator Pell is favorably disposed toward Patriot because it is a defensive system. Senator Warner indicated strong support for the system for Saudi Arabia and Senators Kennedy and Rudman and Senator Kerry's staff had no objection. Other key members of the House and Senate have been briefed with generally favorable reception and no indication of rejection of the system.

I impressed upon everyone we spoke with the long term need for tactical ballistic missile defense and air defense that the system can immediately provide to for Saudi Arabian cities and their oil fields.

Long term delivery of Patriot is not an issue. The Saudi Arabians have agreed that, if the United States concurred, they would keep existing U.S. assets now in country and give the U.S. the newer equipment. They are also willing to directly purchase the new Patriot hardware which they require and retain the new hardware for their own use.

The same need that Saudi Arabia has for this important system applies equally to Israel. I've assured the members of Congress whom I've briefed that Raytheon is fully prepared ready to assist the Israelis with Patriot systems, either leased or acquired in the future.

We have been advised that the Saudi requirement for air and TBM defense is so acute that they will go to other countries to acquire this capability if we cannot provide Patriot.

We stand ready to provide you with any additional information or assistance that you require on this important matter.

Sincerely,



FOR DISCUSSION 8/20/90

(A) ECONOMIC RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE IRAQ SITUATION

(1) The economy was soft before the Iraqi invasion, bordering closely on recession. In the earlier phase of the Bush Presidency, economic indicators were often mixed -- with some suggesting stronger growth and others weaker growth. In recent weeks, however -- pre-Iraq -- almost all indicators suggested sluggishness and weakness (private payrolls, down; money growth, low; housing starts, down 6 straight months; DJI, down; autos, down sharply; consumer confidence, below prior 6 months; manufacturing utilization, down; etc.)

(2) The near-term Iraqi situation only increases the risk of recession -- with conventional wisdom tending to shift from "whether" to "how deep" or "how long."

-- Several outside economists have now shifted their forecasts to negative growth for the next two quarters (while assuming \$24-28 oil). \$ 21.

-- Econometric models suggest \$25 oil would reduce real GNP by 0.4 to 0.8 percent -- yielding close to zero growth. Higher than \$25 oil prices (associated with disruptions greater than 2 million barrels/day) would virtually certainly mean recession. NOTE: West Texas crude was at \$28.70 on Friday.

-- Econometric models may slightly underestimate the economy's capacity to adapt to oil import reductions. But they may also underestimate the potential adverse compounding effects of a shift in psychology -- from what has been a period of relative optimism to what threatens to become a period of pessimism, concern, uncertainty, hesitancy.

-- Both the stock market and the dollar reflect significant worry about the future. (On Friday, the dollar hit a record low against the mark.)

(3) Unfortunately, the problem arises in a context where adaptive or corrective policy flexibility is limited:

-- Baseline fiscal deficits of over \$225 billion (before adjusting for Iraq) leave little room for fiscal stimulus. (A significant downturn could send the deficit to \$300 billion!)

Growth Package
Energy
Nuclear
Aid

70 B
x 2
\$14 B
5,000.
\$25

-- Because debt and deficits are high, the Fed cannot ease significantly without risking adverse effects on long-term rates and/or a major weakening of the dollar (which has held against the yen, but fallen relative to the mark). (The Fed would have more freedom if there were a credible, multi-year deficit-reduction program.)

-- The financial system itself is already under stress -- with visible S&L problems, selective Wall Street problems, and increasing banking problems. All these stresses (and costs) will only increase if (as) the economy weakens.

(4) The longer-term economic (and other) costs of failing to straighten out the Iraqi situation would be even higher than the short-term costs noted above -- hence the "vital interest." The practical question is not whether to seek to reduce the long-term risk. That must be done. While doing so, the practical question of interest is how best to manage the near-term and intermediate-term economic risks. From this perspective, expected near-term DoD costs (barring a protracted ground war) are not as significant a concern as:

(a) providing a context in which the Fed can ease;

(b) enacting a responsible multi-year deficit reduction program; and

(c) assuring that the composition of such a program is not anti-growth.

(5) The latter three concerns are inter-related. They do still require a significant reduction in 5-year defense costs as discussed below.

NOTE: If it were argued that 5-year defense costs could no longer be projected to decline substantially, then a larger tax increase would likely be necessary to protect long-term fiscal responsibility -- but at the risk of a significant adverse effect upon near- and intermediate-term growth.

(B) DEFENSE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAQ

(1) FY'90: The additional DoD costs for FY'90 (which ends September 30) are now estimated by DoD-OMB to be about \$1.2-1.3 billion (outlays). This increment could be financed by some combination of the following:

-- \$200 million in reprogramming from deferrable discretionary operating accounts; and \$530 million in transfers from investment accounts (with informal Congressional approval);

-- contributions from allies (as, e.g., for in-theater fuel costs of \$400 million, or for full incremental costs -- NOTE: Oil revenue increase to S.A. and U.A.E. is greater than incremental cost of U.S. involvement);

-- "Feed and Forage Act" use -- as in the Berlin and Cuban crises -- subject to subsequent appropriations.

(2) FY'91: Estimates for FY'91 are more uncertain. They depend upon events and decisions not yet known. A 200,000 troop commitment for six months, with a residual presence of 50,000 troops (financed by selected allies) would cost an incremental \$3.8 billion plus \$700 million in DoD oil price increase effects (OMB estimates). This number would roughly double if there were significant conflict.

The attached table shows OMB estimates of incremental costs associated with a range of possible troop levels and durations of commitment to the Gulf. How much of this will be offset by financial contributions from Japan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, et al. remains to be determined.

(C) DEFENSE LEVELS FOR BUDGET AGREEMENT

The Budget Summit is scheduled to resume September 7,8,9 (at Andrews Air Force Base!). It will be necessary to include defense numbers in the Administration's offer and in any compromise agreement. In considering defense numbers, these contextual points seem relevant:

-- Just prior to the Iraqi invasion, the President informed the Congressional and defense committee leadership that he could accept the Nunn level for defense. The Nunn level is a cut (from the current services baseline) of \$9.5 billion (outlays) in FY'91 and about \$185 billion (outlays) over 5 years.

-- Both the House and Senate defense appropriations committees were marking to even lower levels (deeper cuts) for defense than Nunn.

-- Many Democrats will argue that the Iraq situation should not change the 5-year defense path (except, perhaps, for FY'91). They may note that force reductions derive from the change in U.S.-Soviet relations, a change that continues to apply; and that the remaining (reduced) force is intended for just such regional problems as the Iraqi situation. They may argue further that any upward adjustment beyond '91 would seem to assume a protracted ground war in Iraq -- a highly arguable assumption.

-- It will be difficult (perhaps impossible) to achieve \$500 billion in 5-year deficit reduction without substantial savings from defense.

Proposed defense levels: [to be discussed]

(D) BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR EARLY SEPTEMBER

Do we want to go with the 7/26/90 Republican offer modified as follows:

- defense as discussed in light of above [TBD];
- fees at 5.6 (chosen from proposed list of 6.9);
- non-Social-Security-federal-retirement COLAs at CPI-1 rather than freeze;
- all else unchanged(?) -- including state and local income (?), booze(?), Medicare(?)

NOTE: With defense at 6/120, the total could still meet the 50/500 test -- if the Democrats would agree!

Attachments:

- FY'91 -- Incremental Defense Costs
- Potential Offer for Budget Summit (Revised)

August 19, 1990

ESTIMATED INCREMENTAL COST OF PERSIAN GULF DEPLOYMENT AND INCREASED FUEL COSTS
SUMMARY OF 1991 COSTS
(\$ IN BILLIONS)

<u>FORCE REDUCTIONS START AFTER</u>	<u>DEPLOYMENT SIZE</u>				<u>ADDITIONAL DOD COSTS FROM INCREASED FUEL COSTS</u>	
	<u>160,000</u>		<u>200,000</u>		<u>BA</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>
	<u>BA</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>	<u>BA</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>		
(1) Full Year	6.0	4.9	7.4	6.0	1.4	1.1
(2) 9 Months	4.7	3.8	5.9	4.7	1.0	.8
(3) 6 Months	3.2	2.6	4.1	3.3	.7	.5
(4) 3 Months	1.7	1.4	2.3	1.8	.3	.3

Assumptions

- o 160,000 force at start of year.
- o 40,000 reserve call-up.
- o Residual force of about 50,000 (incremental cost of \$130 million per month and full cost of \$400 million) would remain as part of a multinational force paid for by allies.
- o No ground force conflict.
- o Fuel prices remain at \$8 per barrell above pre-invasion level but return to normal after reduction in U.S. force deployment.

OFFER #A-1 -- 7/26/90 Revised
as #A-2 -- 8/17/90

PROVISO: This offer is entirely contingent upon the satisfactory conclusion of a related procedural agreement governing implementation, process reform, and fully credible provisions for enforcement on a multi-year basis. Detailed specifications for enforcement measures are included with this offer.

	<u>Savings</u> (\$ billions)		
	<u>'91</u> <u>OMB</u>	<u>'91-'95</u> <u>OMB</u>	
Entitlements/Mandatories (see attached list)			
-- Savings	15.2	156.4	
-- Losers (child credit/ care outlays)	<u>-0.3</u>	<u>-11.0</u>	
-- Net*	14.9	145.4	
Defense	6.0	120.0	✓ 9.6 180 (NOWN)
Non-defense Discretionary (SBC level for '91; then current services)	4.0	36.0	
Fees (see attached list)	5.6	35.1	
Tax Measures (see attached list)	20.8	102.5	✓
Interest	<u>2.3</u>	<u>70.0</u>	
Total	<u>53.6</u>	<u>509.0</u>	

Attachments: -- Entitlements/Mandatories
-- Fees
-- Tax Measures
-- Enforcement Specifications

* Net mandatory savings do not treat additional RTC expenditures. It is assumed that RTC will be treated as a separate category.

ROBERT K. DORNAN
38TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE
COMBAT READINESS
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

PERMANENT OBSERVER TO
GENEVA ARMS TALKS

CHAIRMAN

REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE



Congress of the United States House of Representatives

August 15, 1990

CHAIRMAN
RSC TASK FORCE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
NATIONAL REPUBLICAN
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH
COMMITTEE

TASK FORCES:
AMERICANS MISSING IN ACTION

BUDGET REFORM
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

DEFENSE HIGH TECHNOLOGY

HISPANIC CAUCUS
HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS

To the Editor
The Washington Times
3600 New York Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20002

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

To the Editor:

I was outraged to read the distortion of my views regarding President Bush's response to the situation in the Persian Gulf ("Tough stance loses support," 15 August). Obviously your reporter had his headline written before I was even interviewed, and instead of changing the headline to fit my remarks, changed my remarks to fit the headline. I did not even speak with the author, but with another reporter who admitted that one of the quotes attributed to me in the "story" was not mine and the others were so badly out of context it essentially put incorrect words in my mouth.

I was especially angered that your Top of the News section chose to characterize me as being "in the forefront among lawmakers questioning why Americans should go in harm's way in defense of oil monarchs." This is 180 degree reverse reporting and in no way reflects my position. I am solidly behind President Bush's masterful handling of this Mideast nightmare.

I don't want to leave your readers confused as to what my position is, so let me set the record straight. I support the President's policy in the Gulf, for four basic reasons. First, the strategic, long-range implications of Saddam Hussein running amok necessitates some response. This dictator would already have nuclear warheads to top off his terror missiles if it weren't for the Israelis taking out the Osirak nuclear reactor (built by the French) in June 1981.

Second, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was an act of piracy, a simple stick-up and an assault on world order. We need to make it clear to the world's other dictators that piracy will not be tolerated. And if the Thief of Baghdad's Stalin-like stunt of subjugating a tiny country can't be comprehended, then maybe people should focus on the human tragedy of raped stewardesses and housewives to get a better idea of what kind of a man we are dealing with.

Third, the Iraqi invasion threatens the Saudi peninsula and its oil pipelines, thus threatening the world economic system and its workers at all levels. It is therefore a vital national interest to protect the free flow of oil from the Gulf region. In this sense the Iraqi attack can be viewed as an attack not only on Kuwait, but on the rest of the world as well.

Fourth, Hussein will use the money from stolen Kuwaiti oil to build more and better missiles to carry poison gas and possibly those nuclear weapons the Israelis denied him for at least a decade. And as long as the liberals in Congress refuse to go forward with deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative, the U.S. will have to take actions like this to stop madmen like Hussein from getting the big bomb.

While there may be some neo-isolationists within the conservative movement, and even more among the liberals, who may start carping the moment the going gets a little tough, you can be sure that Bob Dornan will be sticking with our commander-in-chief for the duration.

Best Regards,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bob Dornan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Robert K. Dornan
U.S. Congressman

ROBERT K. DORNAN
38TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEES
COMBAT READINESS
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

PERMANENT OBSERVER TO
GENEVA ARMS TALKS



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

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HOUSE REPUBLICAN STUDY
COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN
RSC TASK FORCE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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COMMITTEE

FAST FORUMS
AMERICANS MISSING IN ACTION
BUDGET REFORM
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
OFFENSE HIGH TECHNOLOGY
HISPANIC CAUCUS
GRACE COMMISSION CAUCUS

FAX COVER SHEET

DATE: August 17, 1990

TO: GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: CONGRESSMAN DORNAN

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER 3

PLEASE CALL 202-225-2965 IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS WITH THIS FAX

WEEKLY HILL REPORT

11 January 1991

* The votes on the Persian Gulf Resolutions are going to be razor close. Senator Dole's ballpark estimate last Sunday of a 60-40 vote in favor of the authorization of the use of force seems very optimistic today. Starting with 44 Republican Senators, Senators Hatfield and Grassley will probably oppose the authorization of force and Senator Cranston is not expected to vote so the President needs eight Democrats to win a 50-49 vote. Democrats expected to support the use of force include Robb, Johnston, and Lieberman leaving Dixon, DeConcini, Graham, Shelby, Heflin, Gore, and maybe even Sasser in the potential swing group.

* Senate Majority Leader Mitchell expressed his hope that Republicans would not filibuster if passage of the Nunn, Byrd, Pell, Boren, Mitchell, and Levin Joint Resolution seems assured.

* Senator Cohen began his speech by complaining that the President continues to believe that he can initiate offensive operations even if Congress refuses to authorize such actions. Cohen said that if the President initiates offensive operations after Congress denies him this authority, it might spur impeachment hearings in the House of Representatives. The Senator from Maine also suggested that, in order to prevent the President from defying the Congress, perhaps the Nunn et al resolution should include a prohibition on the appropriation of funds for offensive operations. In what appeared to be a 180 degree turn, Senator Cohen then stated that he would vote to authorize the use of force.

* In what could have been a reference to Senator Nunn or Congressman Gephardt, Senator Cohen said we should not question the patriotism or the "political aspirations" of those who oppose the authorization of force.

* On Tuesday HASC Chairman Aspin released a white paper urging the authorization of the use of force. True to his background as one of Robert McNamara's whiz kids, Aspin's analysis of likely scenarios involves number crunching of the sorties, expected casualties, and possible outcomes. It is very much as if Aspin and his staff plugged numbers into an equation which showed that a war can be won with acceptable costs.

* There has been some speculation that Les Aspin's position in support of the use of force represents the Congressman's attempt to show the world that Sam Nunn is not the only influential defense thinker in this town. And as reported earlier, the HASC hearings were more balanced and substantive than the dog and pony show put on by Nunn and the SASC.

Prepared by: Glen Tait

News from Senator

BOB DOLE



(R - Kansas)

SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510-1601

OFFICE OF THE SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

TIME: _____

DATE: 8.9.90

TO: Governor Sununu

FROM: Senator Bob Dole

RE: _____

13 PAGES FOLLOW THIS COVER SHEET

DELIVERY: _____ URGENT - PLEASE HAND CARRY TO ADDRESSEE

_____ IMMEDIATE - PLEASE DELIVER A.S.A.P.

COMMENTS:

SENT BY: _____

(PRESS OFFICE - SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER)
(TELEPHONE: 202/224-5358 FACSIMILE: 202/224-3163)

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

August 8, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to congratulate you for your decisive leadership during the ongoing crisis in the Middle East.

Also, let me applaud your responsible stance on the unreasonable increases in the price of petroleum products, even though any potential shortage in crude oil from Iraq and Kuwait would not affect U.S. refiners or product importers for some time.


As you are aware, America has more than six hundred million barrels of crude oil stored in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I believe we can use this resource as a moderating force in both spot and futures prices of crude oil.

Of course, many steps would have to be taken before any of this crude oil could actually be released to the petroleum industry. For example, the price, transportation, qualifications of bidders, appropriate restrictions on after-sale use are just some of the decisions that would have to be made prior to any disposal of oil from the SPR.

Nevertheless, just directing Secretary of Energy Watkins to begin establishing a system to dispose of SPR oil could, in and of itself, help moderate the price of crude oil and petroleum products. Oil purchasers, whether under contract or on the spot or futures markets, would be forced to calculate the effect that the SPR would have on the price of oil destined for domestic use.

I hope this suggestion will prove to be of some use as you continue addressing the many difficult problems confronting our Nation as a result of the belligerent actions of Saddam Hussein.

Sincerely,


Bob Dole

News from Senator

BOB DOLE



(R - Kansas)

SH 141 Hart Building, Washington, D.C. 20510

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
AUGUST 9, 1990

CONTACT: WALT RIKER
(202) 224-5358

GAS GOUGING

DOLE SENDS TELEGRAMS TO 11 TOP AMERICAN OIL COMPANY C.E.O.'S;
WARNS OF CONGRESSIONAL BACKLASH, POSSIBLE WINDFALL PROFIT TAX

WASHINGTON - Skyrocketing prices at the gas pumps have prompted Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) to send telegrams to the C.E.O.'s of 11 top American oil companies warning of a Congressional backlash from perceived gasoline price gouging.

The text of the telegram is as follows:

Recent events in the Middle East have united Americans behind the President and his decision to defend the interests of the United States and our allies in this vital region.

Certainly, your industry has a primary interest in this affair. In that light, recent significant increases in the price of petroleum products seem to be premature -- at best.

As you are aware, several Congressional Committees have held hearings on these price increases, which have alarmed American consumers. I urge you to heed the advice of President Bush and put any decision on price increases for petroleum prices off until clear and convincing justifications can be presented.

I can assure you that it will be very difficult to stop legislation controlling the prices of petroleum products or taxing profits resulting from these increases should no action be taken by the oil industry. I am concerned this result would far outweigh any temporary benefit that might be realized by the industry.

The telegrams were sent to:

Mr. Richard M. Morrow
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Amoco Corporation

Mr. Allen E. Murray
Chairman of the Board,
President and
Chief Executive Officer
Mobil Corporation

Mr. James W. Kinnear
President and Chief Executive
Officer
Texaco Inc.

Mr. Robert Horton
President and
Chief Executive Officer
BP America, Inc.

Mobil Corporation

Mr. Constantine S. Nicandros
President and
Chief Executive Officer
Conoco, Inc.

Mr. Lawrence G. Rawl
Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
Exxon Corporation

Mr. Frank H. Richardson
President and
Chief Executive Officer
Shell Oil Company

Mr. Richard J. Stegemeier
Chairman, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Unocal Corporation

Mr. James L. Pate
Chief Executive Officer
Pennzoil Co.

Mr. Lodwrick M. Cook
Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
ARCO

Mr. Kenneth T. Derr
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
Chevron Corporation

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You have requested that EIA explain why EIA's scenario 2 shows that a 3.5 MMBD loss of Iraqi/Kuwaiti crude equates to a \$10-\$30 increase in the world crude oil price while a 1 MMBD use of SPR lowers world crude oil by \$4-\$8. You ask if these are proportionate and consistent with each other.

EIA calculated that a disruption of 3.5 MMBD would cause increases in world oil prices of \$10 - \$30 per barrel. The mid-range of this estimate is an increase of \$20 per barrel which equates to an increase of \$6 for each million barrels per day of supply loss. At the same time the use of 1 MMBD of SPR oil would lower prices by between \$4 and \$8 per barrel, the mid point of which is also \$6 per barrel. The ranges of prices for both of these mid-point impact estimates are meant to capture the uncertainties associated with commercial stock behavior (a buildup or drawdown of stocks) and psychological market reactions to a disruption.

Further, you have requested that EIA provide a comparison of what happened in the 1973 oil disruption to what has been projected by EIA for the current period. In the period of October 1973-March 1974 during the Arab-Israeli War, (see attached table) the 1.6 MMBD shortfall in the total free world supply of 47.7 MMBD barrels amounted to 3.4 percent of free world demand. Today the maximum potential shortfall if the Kuwaiti crude is lost and both Iraqi pipelines are closed is 3.5 MMBD off total free world demand of 52 MMBD or 6.7 percent of free world demand. The disruption of free world market supply is potentially twice what it was in 1973.

In 1973 the following resulted from the disruption. The price of crude more than tripled from \$3.04 to \$11.34. Current EIA projections given the disruption outlined above shows oil prices rising from \$18 to between \$28 and \$48. The mid point is \$38 which is slightly more than a doubling of price. Even the high projection of \$48 is a 167 percent increase which in percentage terms is less than the 1973 run up.

The following summarizes the estimated macro economic loss from the 1973-74 disruption.

"The interruption of petroleum supplies during the winter of 1973-74 demonstrated the need for an emergency storage program. The resulting petroleum shortage caused severe economic impacts in the U.S. economy and emphasized our vulnerability to interruptions in imports from the major oil-exporting nations. The repercussions of supply denial and simultaneous price increase of the 1973-1974 oil embargo indicated a loss of \$35-45 billion in gross national product (GNP) and 500,000 jobs. A GNP loss of \$10-20 billion is directly ascribed to the embargo." ("Strategic Petroleum Reserve Plan" US Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 95th Cong. 1st Session, 1977, p3).

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958

98-0099-F/1
NW 13 NOV 02

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EIA's analyses of the current scenario outlined above shows a GNP loss of \$7-\$25 billion and a 0.5 to 1.0 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. EIA's projection for the current scenario are showing a lesser economic disruption from a larger reduction in oil supply. This lesser projected economic impact of the current scenario is due, in part, to an economy which is less dependent on oil. In 1973 we consumed 12.7 thousand BTU of oil per 1982 dollar of GNP. By 1989 this had fallen to 8.3.

EIA's projections include price induced responses:

- fuel switching
- conservation
- secondary effects on the economy

EIA's projections do not include any price induced increases in production which would further reduce the impacts in the long run.

The methodology used by EIA in estimating these impacts was extensively reviewed and approved by the Policy Coordinating Committee for Emergency Mobilization, Energy Subgroup. This methodology has been used for 6 years and is updated and reviewed every 6 months. EIA is prepared to provide a more complete briefing to you or to Governor Sununu on our modeling and its results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN~~

Unclassified

Table 12
World Oil Supply Disruptions
1951-1989
(Million Barrels per Day)

Dates -----	Supply Disruption -----	Gross Shortfall -----	Free World Oil Demand -----	Percent Demand -----
March 1951-October 1954	Iranian Fields Nationalized	0.7	9.9	7.10
November 1956-March 1957	Suez War	2.0	15.8	12.70
December 1966-March 1967	Syrian Transit Fee Dispute	0.7	30.2	2.30
June 1967-August 1967	Six Day War	2.0	31.2	6.40
July 1967-October 1968	Nigerian Civil War	0.5	32.6	1.50
May 1970-January 1971	Libyan Price Controversy	1.3	40.0	3.25
April 1971-August 1971	Algerian-French Nationalization Struggle	0.6	42.1	1.40
March 1973-May 1973	Lebanese Political Conflict	0.5	48.5	1.00
October 1973-March 1974	October Arab-Israeli War	1.6	47.7	3.40
April 1976-May 1976	Civil War in Lebanon	0.3	48.5	0.62
May 1977	Damage at Saudi Oilfield	0.7	48.3	1.40
November 1978-April 1979	Iranian Revolution	3.7	52.8	7.00
October 1980-January 1981	Outbreak of Iran-Iraq War	3.0	50.4	6.00
July 1988-November 1989	UK Piper Alpha Offshore Platform Explosion	0.3	51.3	0.58
December 1988-March 1989	UK Fulmer Floating Storage Vessel Accident	0.2	52.4	0.38
April 1989-June 1989	UK Cormorant Offshore Platform	0.5	49.9	1.00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: August 8, 1990

FOR: GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: **ED ROGERS**

- ☐ Action
- ☐ Your Comment
- ☐ Let's Talk

X ☒ X FYI

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR ED ROGERS

FROM: BRUCE WILMOT/NEWS SUMMARY *BW*
RE: IRAQI INVASION -- REACTION (Memo #2)

SUMMARY

* Reaction from all sides to the President's decision to send forces to Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly positive and comes from all quarters.

* There was also praise for the President for asking oil companies to show restraint, including positive comment from Sen. Lieberman, who had been one of the most vocal in his criticism of the latest gasoline price increases.

* The consensus among those involved in the budget/deficit negotiations is that an increase in energy taxes at this point would probably be unrealistic.

I. CONGRESS/DEMOCRATS

Speaker Foley

"I thought the President spoke well and I think the Congress and the country will support him. I think these have been difficult decisions to take, but I think if we had not taken them -- the President had not taken them -- the situation would only become worse and the possible influence that Saddam Hussein would have over the entire Gulf region and over the international economies, over industrialized countries and the world in general would be simply too great to tolerate." (NBC, following address, 8/8)

Foley stressed during a campaign swing for Democratic candidates in Georgia that it would "be important if we could obtain greater and greater international cooperation and coordination in these efforts not only on the ground but in terms of any potential blockade. The international support is important, I think, to American public feeling that we're not in this alone and that we represent a broader concern," Foley said on the "Today" show.

"I think the policy the President is following is one that's very, very important to our national security interests, and I think he has strong support in the Congress."

(Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

Foley says the option of higher gas taxes as part of the budget summit is more difficult in the face of gas shortages and higher pump prices.

(Hotline, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 8/8)

-more-

Rep. Fascell

"I think the President did what he had to do and he said what he had to say. I don't think there's any question about the vital interests of the United States being involved in the Middle East and that it's in our interest to protect the sovereignty of the Saudis.... The President's call is the kind of thing a president should do. The country must unite behind the President. There's nothing partisan about this at all in any sense.... I think his call also for conservation policy is essential. I think we ought to, right now, the President and the Congress, ask the American people to go on to a real national energy conservation program so that we don't have to draw down our reserves and we don't have to do some other things."

On the War Powers Act: "I don't think there's any question that that will be complied with in spirit if not in the actual letter of the law."
(CNN, following address, 8/8)

Sen. Cranston

"I hope we will not be the 'Lone Ranger' like we were in Vietnam," Cranston said in a telephone interview. (Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

Sen. Lieberman

"I applaud President Bush for his decision to send in American forces to support Saudi Arabia against the threat of aggression from Saddam Hussein. It is not just the Saudis who are at risk: America's national security is at risk as well."

(Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

"I thank President Bush for asking the oil industry to show restraint in this time of national emergency."

(Reuter transcript, 8/8)

Sen. Boren

Boren said the President was doing the right thing. "This action puts U.S. forces in a position to inflict a very punishing attack on Iraq if it should decide to invade Saudi Arabia."

(Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

Sen. Metzenbaum

Metzenbaum said he supported Bush's decision, describing it as in the best interest of the U.S. and the world. "It is disappointing that more of the Arab nations are not standing shoulder to shoulder with the rest of the world in defending the independence and freedom of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia."

(Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

Rep. Skelton

Skelton stressed the importance of a joint operation. "I hope the other Arab states get involved."

(Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

Rep. Aspin

Aspin said if the deployments in Saudi Arabia were taking place as reported, "I think this is the right thing to do.... It discourages Iraq from invading." (Susanne Schafer, AP, 8/8)

Sen. Pell

Pell said the reported deployment would amount to a "clear signal of our commitment to defend Saudi Arabia from a possible Iraqi attack." But he said the U.S. "should not expect that Saudi Arabia will implement United Nations sanctions against Iraq and close the Iraqi oil pipeline through its territory."

(Susanne Schafer, AP, 8/8)

Sen. Nunn

Nunn said an international naval blockade to isolate Iraq is "very likely unless the Iraqis back off and start moving out of Kuwait."

(Susanne Schafer, AP, 8/8)

Sen. Kerry

Kerry said of the oil industry's behavior: "It raises questions even about patriotism and the best interests of the country."

(George Lobsenz, UPI, 8/8)

Rep. Panetta

"Anybody who thinks we're not being forced into a re-evaluation these next few weeks is kidding themselves," said Panetta. But budget bargainers said no reasons have yet surfaced to shoot for a less ambitious deficit-cutting package. (Alan Fram, AP, 8/8)

Rep. Hamilton

Hamilton, appearing on CNN, was positive about the President's address but said we should be placing more emphasis on diplomatic efforts.

II. CONGRESS/REPUBLICANS

Sen. Kasten

"I support the President's decision to dispatch American forces as part of a worldwide effort in defense of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and our other friends in the Persian Gulf. We have a vital interest in standing firm against Iraqi aggression.... I also join with the President in urging oil companies not to gouge the American people with high oil prices -- to use restraint and not to take advantage of the uncertainty of oil markets."

(Reuter transcript, 8/8)

Sen. Dole

Lawmakers rallied behind President Bush's decision to dispatch troops to Saudi Arabia, but cautioned against U.S. forces defending the nation without the help of other countries. "The Arab countries must come to the party, too," Dole told reporters.

Dole, asked about the length of time U.S. forces would participate in the defense of Saudi Arabia, said the President "left the clear impression this morning that this could be quite long."
(Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

Dole told reporters the Administration is still seeking a \$500 billion five-year deficit reduction plan. He added, however, that there is little chance of raising gasoline taxes as part of that plan and questioned how deeply defense spending could be cut in light of U.S. military involvement in Saudi Arabia.

(Alan Fram, AP, 8/8)

On oil company price increases: "Greed."

Many in Congress are demanding that the Administration bring prices down by pumping oil from the strategic petroleum reserve. "That's what it's there for, to make certain that we don't let the price out of hand, we don't have a shortage." The Administration said no.
(NBC, 8/7)

Sen. Cohen

Members of Congress backed President Bush's decision to send U.S. troops and combat planes to Saudi Arabia, saying Bush had to move quickly to block possible further aggression by Hussein. "I think if we were to accommodate Saddam Hussein now, we would invite the inevitability of war later," Foley said on NBC's "Today."

(Jim Adams, Reuter, 8/8)

Rep. Frenzel

Key members of Congress say they see no reason to ease up on efforts to reach a deficit-reduction agreement. "If the economy begins to look really bad, every element of the deficit-reduction package will be threatened," Frenzel said Tuesday. "Right now, the major effect is to make an energy tax less likely."

"I don't think we can see clearly enough into the future to know how much we'll be affected. I think the summiteers ought to go forward with the plan we've been discussing."

(Alan Fram, AP, 8/8)

Sen. Gramm

[Budget] bargainers concede that with fuel prices rising, raising taxes on gasoline or other sources of energy become less palatable. "I think it probably will kill any effort to have a broad-based energy tax."

(Alan Fram, AP, 8/8)

Rep. Broomfield

Broomfield said it was important "that other regional powers understand that the world will not put up with naked aggression." Broomfield said the U.S. should "make an example of Saddam Hussein."
(Donna Cassata, AP, 8/8)

III. OTHERS

Geoff Garin

Democratic pollster Garin sets up the President's political dilemma: "Any time the spotlight moves to foreign policy George Bush is clearly playing to his strength. But gas prices hit people at home in a way that taking down the Berlin Wall doesn't."
(New York Post, 8/8)

Admiral Crowe

"At this juncture, he intends these deployments to be of a defensive character and he's not talking about offensive action. In that regard, I think what they are contemplating -- an intense buildup of air power, a modest buildup of ground forces to protect those air bases -- is exactly appropriate and it puts the President in a very good position."

On the multilateral nature of action thus far: "That is the most remarkable part of the President's effort. He's been very successful and I anticipate he will have some more success in the next few hours."
(ABC, following address, 8/8)

Najeeb Halaby

Some Arab-American leaders said later they dreaded the possibility of an armed clash between U.S. troops and Iraqi forces. Halaby, the former head of Pan Am airlines whose daughter is Queen Noor, wife of Jordan's King Hussein, said he had reminded the President that military measures had failed in Lebanon and urged him to use "economic and political options. We are apprehensive of any military clash."
(Timothy Clifford, Newsday, 8/8)

James Blackwell

Blackwell, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said a naval blockade was "a good way to go" against Iraq. Blackwell and others pointed out that a naval blockade can be risky -- especially in Iraq. Military analysts said a blockade would work in the long term as ships barred export of Iraqi oil or import of supplies. But the longer Iraq resists, the more chance the blockade can fail. "If one or our allies gets starved and tries to cheat, it erodes the blockade," Blackwell said.
(Bryna Brennan, New York Daily News, 8/8)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

Internal Transcript

August 8, 1990

PRESS CONFERENCE BY KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

Amman, Jordan

(IN PROGRESS)

KING HUSSEIN: -- but I believe in logic and common sense and these problems -- (inaudible) -- whatever the situation is such as we face now. No, I have no plans to -- (inaudible) -- that in the immediate future because, although I have been carrying out, in cooperation with some of my colleagues, a sort of a shuttle diplomacy in the recent past, I believe that the time is very short and -- (inaudible) -- to the summit directly. However, if we can get in touch with our brethren to assure that all attend -- I do not know that he will attend personally, but certainly we would like to see Iraq attend the Arab summit. So we'll do whatever we can to -- (inaudible.)

Q (Inaudible.)

KING HUSSEIN: No.

Q -- Mubarak proposed today -- (inaudible.)

KING HUSSEIN: I have no idea what President Mubarak proposed today.

Q (Inaudible.)

KING HUSSEIN: Well, the summit -- (inaudible) -- is obviously the focus of my attention at the moment. And hopefully, he will attend it, and I do believe that if we are responsible at the highest level of authority in the Arab states and in the Arab lands, if we truly represent the feelings and thoughts and hopes and aspirations of our people, if we regard our responsibilities seriously, as I'm sure we do, then obviously we must talk at any moment and estimate our capability to resolve our problems by ourselves. So we'll have to try our best to achieve --

Q A two-part question. First of all, after the declaration of what is called the reunion between Kuwait and Iraq, do you still think the summit would take place? And two, regarding your statement earlier and your clarification before about Jordan not recognizing this new situation, how would that make Jordan's position in relation to its friendship with Iraq?

KING HUSSEIN: In regard to the first part of your question, which was once again -- I can't hear you --

Q The first part of the question was whether the summit would still be held --

KING HUSSEIN: The summit will be held. Otherwise, I wouldn't be saying that the summit will be held.

Q Even after the announcement of the reunion?

KING HUSSEIN: I believe the summit will be held. That's what I'm preparing myself to go to. We feel -- this evening to come and meet, we would have taken -- (inaudible) -- and as regards -- what -- our relations with Iraq? We have stood with our Arab brethren whenever this area was threatened. We have stood and

MORE

contributed, we believe, to a stability in this area. We have given our best and will continue to do so. For cohesion, for resolving problems -- for creating this Arab world, the Arab world we speak about, turning that into reality. Our family, living in cohesion, with trust and confidence amongst its members.

Our dreams are the dreams of our fathers and forefathers. This Arab awakening for the securing of Arab rights, the rights of Arab people to live in peace, to live with dignity, and to see the fulfillment of their hopes and dreams and securing a better future for the generations to come.

There have been many suggestions recently that our relationship with Iraq is -- (inaudible) -- to have caused us to be a part of what happens. We saw the danger coming. We warned against the possibility of the situation developing into a crisis. We have tried over many years in fact, and intensively in the recent past, to arrive at a different conclusion to what has happened between Iraq and Kuwait. It is our duty.

But -- (inaudible) -- Iraq any time in the past, nor we. Fortunately or unfortunately, whichever way you care to describe it -- (inaudible) -- any decision that we took to the approval of the other.

The Iraqis took a course of action that they chose. We were put out, as was the rest of the Arab world, by the physical action. But the signs were there. Nothing could have been clearer than the statement of the President of Iraq at the Arab summit when he warned that Iraq regarded the economic pressures brought to bear against it, specifying certain Arab countries and the question of oil, as an act of war against the Iraqi people.

Following that, we saw the situation deteriorate -- to end our hopes of negotiation. But we were as surprised that morning as everyone else was by the fact of the action.

We are Arab. We belong to this nation. And we, as leaders, bear a great responsibility. Our responsibility is towards Arab people. If we can fulfill our responsibilities with dignity, upholding the Arab peoples' dignity, safeguarding the Arab peoples' interests, then that is what we do and what we have done.

I believe that for eight years Iraq defended the Arab world against an external threat, and gave great sacrifices. This was the act that brought us closer together than ever before.

But we are not subservient to any. And by that, I particularly -- (inaudible.) Life itself is not worth it, if that was the case. We act propelled by our own conscience and what we believe is in the best interest of the Arab people. That's the way we are, and that's the way we'll be.

Q -- great speculation. Are you saying that if there is no success at the forthcoming Arab summit, i.e., if you aren't able to reach some kind of compromise to cool the situation down, are you saying that there is a grave risk of war between President Saddam Hussein, the State of Iraq and the United States?

KING HUSSEIN: I certainly witnessed, as you have, a very rapid escalation and a very rapid deterioration in the situation in this area. And I'm obviously very, very disturbed and very concerned of what may happen if this trend is to continue. So we are doing our best at the Arab -- (inaudible) -- to ensure that -- (inaudible) -- as rapidly as possible.

Q How important do you see this summit --

KING HUSSEIN: I believe it is -- it could be -- (inaudible.)

MORE

Q (Inaudible.)

KING HUSSEIN: I'm proud of this country and of its people and of the Arab nation to which we belong. When I tried to do my best at the very beginning and as I continue to do my best now, to see an Arab resolution of an Arab problem, I am well aware of the feelings of millions of Arabs in the entire Arab world of frustration, of anger, when they feel unable to resolve our own problems by ourselves, and when they see what appears to them to be an attempt to force upon them the will of others from outside this area.

They have the right to live in freedom and with dignity, to secure a better future for themselves and, after all, this is what we are trying to achieve in this life. In any event, we are giving it our best now and will do so at this summit that is coming to deal with the problem as best as we can.

Q Would you permit American airplanes to fly over Jordanian territory if they needed to?

KING HUSSEIN: I can't tell you whether we will or we will not. But more than likely, they will choose some other route.

Q -- looking at an increase -- (inaudible) and possible riots by Jordanians and Palestinians against Americans. Is that something -- (inaudible.)

KING HUSSEIN: I do not believe that there is any danger of that. I cannot forecast what the future will bring and whether Jordanians or Arabs anywhere may feel justified in reacting to new steps that may be taken in this very dangerous game. But I believe the Jordanian people have confidence in the leadership, know its role and know what it's trying to achieve. And when this happens, hopefully, there will be no need for them to manifest their feelings in any other way.

Q Sir, after hearing you describe your close relationship with President Hussein, I want to ask whether it's your impression that he wants to talk. Does he want, at this point, a negotiated solution to this?

(Pause at press conference.)

KING HUSSEIN: -- about the question relating to my relations to any other Arab leader. I've been in this position for 37-plus years. I've had relations of friendship and cooperation wherever possible with all those who were in power and all those who are in power and in positions of responsibility at this time. This is really the operative question.

Q Your Majesty, there is a perception in the outside world that Iraq is a kind of monster, an aberration sort of functioning outside the international system. This does not seem to be the perception that is shared here in Jordan. Would you be good enough to comment on that?

KING HUSSEIN: You're talking about the perceptions of Jordanians?

Q Yes, sir.

KING HUSSEIN: I'd like to say in this regard that we find it very difficult in this part of the world to understand how perceptions can be formulated in this world. The criteria, the reasons, the results. Well, for example, I am now an extremist, and I don't know what other descriptions may fit me in the eyes of many in this world. We are struggling to have the best relations with all in this world. Relations based on mutual respect and a genuine

MORE

desire to cooperate amongst us in the interest of creating a better world for tomorrow.

It seems that the criteria is not very clear.
(Inaudible) -- where at times it seems that we are living in a dictatorship, a universal dictatorship -- or are moving towards that end. I believe the media has a lot to do with that, in creating impressions and perceptions. But more than that, I certainly wouldn't try to live in a world where anyone -- (inaudible) -- the right of any to have their say regarding themselves, regarding their future, regarding their rights.

In this crisis, in particular, I moved to try to resolve it. I have incurred some of the wrath of many in this world. I acted and am acting to fulfill my duties towards my people, the Arab people, and to resolve an Arab problem within the Arab context. So this is an example of what can happen in this world to someone who is not a newcomer, who's lived his years many times over in this very volatile, dangerous, frustrating, difficult part of the world. I suppose -- (inaudible) -- can happen to others. But it is very sad that relations are not all based on mutual respect.

change tape

intentions are, what their hopes are resolve problems wherever they exist; not to jump to conclusions too quickly. It's a time when the globe has become the home of the family. And I hope this will manifest itself in -- (inaudible) -- tolerance and understanding amongst people. And if standards are to be set and principles are to be upheld, and this is what we have been seeking for years and years, then they should be upheld in all cases and for all people.

Q Your Majesty, how concerned are you about the possibility of Israel taking what it would consider preemptive action against Iraq through Jordanian territory? And have you had any assurances or given any assurances to the Israelis through the good offices of the United States or anybody else regarding that possibility?

KING HUSSEIN: Regarding what, sir?

Q The possibility of Israel taking what it would consider to be preemptive action against Iraq through Jordanian territory.

KING HUSSEIN: I hope that everyone knows that Jordan is not a passage for anybody. One way or the other. And if Jordan is set on, we obviously would have to defend ourselves. But at this time, we don't see any possibility of that.

Q And has mutual assurance been given regarding --

Q The Arab League -- (inaudible) -- defend being attacked. (Inaudible.) What will the Arab League do -- help Kuwait that was attacked, or help Iraq that is attacked by outside forces?

KING HUSSEIN: Obviously, I don't go beyond saying that we have an Arab problem and we are trying to resolve it within the Arab context. Obviously, if an outside element attacks an Arab state or Arab states, that is something else that we have to consider.

Q (Inaudible.)

KING HUSSEIN: (Inaudible) -- and we hope to be able to address it in the next day or so adequately and successfully.

Q One of the dangers of -- military action. Another danger in the minds of many is appeasement, appeasing Saddam Hussein. Letting him have something -- people say, well, if you give him something now and you appease him now, he'll only want more later.

MORE

What do you think about that?

KING HUSSEIN: I think that we are trying our best to resolve this problem to the best of our abilities, to contribute towards its resolution within the Arab context -- and immediately.

Q (Inaudible) -- interference from the Americans, particularly?

KING HUSSEIN: I hope it will be a very constructive meeting, it will be a very frank and open meeting, and I hope it will produce some results.

Q Do you, yourself, have a plan to present of this sort --

KING HUSSEIN: I have no plan at the moment. A plan will be formulated by the Arabs, hopefully, as I have said.

Q Your Majesty, do you see the --(inaudible) -- affecting Jordan economically to a great extent?

KING HUSSEIN: I suppose any crisis affects us in this area, one way or the other, and I don't think it's going to be towards a positive end, but anyway, we're a part of this area and we'll take whatever comes to the rest of our area.

Q -- leader in this region -- do you see for yourself a role in explaining Saddam Hussein to the West and trying to bring the two attitudes towards this crisis together?

KING HUSSEIN: Well, I have, in the past, tried to contribute towards creating a better atmosphere of dialogue between many in this part of the world and the outside world, and I'm one of the few -- very few leaders who have been able to create links and friendships with so many throughout the world. I've utilized them to serve the Arab cause and I've utilized them to help others understand what the world feels and sees and to bridge wherever possible gaps that exist and that cause misunderstandings. And I've done so throughout my political life.

Q When are you leaving for Cairo?

KING HUSSEIN: I'm just waiting to hear when we are meant to be there, and will take off.

Thank you very, very much, indeed. And let's see you again, hopefully, in the times ahead and we'll have, hopefully, better news.


END

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 23, 1990

MR. PRESIDENT:

Per Brent's request, I had
the attached letter autopenned
today. He indicated you had
seen and signed off on the
draft already.


Jim Cicconi



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 23, 1990

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of October 15. Let me say at the outset, Mr. Prime Minister, how deeply shocked and grieved I am over the senseless killings of innocent Israelis in Jerusalem during the last several days. I hope you will convey to the families of the victims our condolences and prayers. All Americans share with me the firm conviction that further hatred and killing will only make more difficult the reconciliation between your country and its neighbors that we all want to see evolve.

I wanted to respond quickly to your letter, given the importance of the matter you raised and my firm conviction that we ought to do everything possible to avoid a situation that could damage interests important to each of us. The recent tragedy has deepened my concern.

The United States voted for UN Security Council Resolution 672 because we thought it important to be on record opposing what we believe was unacceptable behavior by Israeli security forces. Although we would have preferred different language in some instances, we concluded that the final version of the text was acceptable and certainly preferable to an alternative being promoted by the PLO.

Our position in the Security Council was motivated by a genuine concern over what had taken place and the desire to see such occurrences avoided in the future. Our position would have been the same had there not been the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Let me add that our support for this resolution implied no criticism of Israel's policy governing access to the holy places, which has been praiseworthy; nor was our

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

vote in any way intended to slight the harm done to those of the Jewish faith whose prayers were interrupted by stones. There are and can be no excuses for that.

Much of your letter focuses upon Jerusalem itself. I am well aware of your position on the subject. I would expect that you are no less aware of positions held by the United States since 1967, including that Jerusalem should never be divided again, that it should remain united, and that its final status should be determined by negotiations.

I also expect that we are not going to be able to eliminate at present any differences between us on the final status of Jerusalem. This said, it is not essential that we do so now, because, as our position states, Jerusalem's future is a matter for negotiation.

I would hope, however, that you would not allow such long term concerns to interfere with the more circumscribed matter at hand, namely, the Security Council's call for the Secretary General to dispatch an envoy to investigate and report on the events of October 8. I would go so far as to express my hope that your government would actually cooperate with this mission. Israel's long and distinguished record in complying with the rule of law, as well as the investigation your own government has commissioned into the events of October 8, should be brought to bear so that the mission receives a full and accurate account of what transpired, in order to better reach any conclusions. It would be ironic, and in the end counterproductive, if the Government of Israel were to transform the issue into one either of the status of Jerusalem or Israel's prerogatives versus those of the UN Security Council. In either case, you would run the risk of placing yourselves, as well as us, in a most difficult and potentially unfortunate position.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Mr. Prime Minister, I believe it is essential that we not lose sight of what ought and indeed must be the focus of the international community at present--Iraq's invasion, occupation, and now destruction of Kuwait. As you yourself note in your letter, both of us share a vital interest in success against Saddam Hussein. It is a common strategic interest, and it is an interest that once fulfilled can pave the way for creating a far more stable, secure, and peaceful Middle East. We both want that, and I know that the people of Israel yearn for that. I would, therefore, ask that your government cooperate with the mission called for by Security Council Resolution 672.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Aqil Bahl". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Aqil" and the last name "Bahl" clearly distinguishable.

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel

*Haass gave
to POTUS*

Opening Statement

I have spoken with Secretary of State Jim Baker, who reported to me on his nearly seven hours of conversation with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Secretary Baker made it clear that he discerned no evidence whatsoever that Iraq was willing to comply with the international community's demand to withdraw from Kuwait and comply with the United Nations Resolutions.

Secretary Baker also reported to me that the Iraqi Foreign Minister rejected my letter to Saddam Hussein. So too did Iraq's Ambassador in Washington. This is but one more example that the Iraqi government is not interested in direct communications designed to settle the Persian Gulf situation through diplomacy. The record shows that whether the diplomacy is initiated by the United States, the United Nations, the Arab League, or the European Community--the results are

unfortunately the same. The conclusion is clear: Saddam Hussein continues to reject a diplomatic solution.

I sent Secretary Baker to Geneva not to negotiate, but to communicate. I wanted Iraq's leaders to understand just how determined we are that Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without condition or further delay. Secretary Baker made clear that by its full compliance with the twelve relevant UN Security Council resolutions Iraq would gain the opportunity to rejoin the

international community. Also made clear was just how much Iraq stands to lose if it does not comply.

Let me emphasize that I have not given up on a peaceful outcome. It is not too late. But now, as before, the choice of peace or war is Saddam's to make.

Now, more than ever, it is essential that the Congress go on record supporting UN Security Council Resolution 678. Everyone should be able to stand with the entire

international community. As I said yesterday in my letters to the congressional leadership, "Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression." It is vital that at this critical time in our history that we transcend partisan politics and centuries-old differences in institutional perspectives.

FACIRAQ01

HLC

[DISCUSSION DRAFT]
January 7, 1991: 5 PM

102^D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. J. RES. ____

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. _____ introduced the following joint resolution, which
was referred to the Committee on _____

JOINT RESOLUTION

→ ~~To express United States policies with respect to Iraqi~~
aggression and to authorize the use of United States Armed
Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution
678.

① Whereas the Government of Iraq without provocation invaded and occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990;

②
Mel Levine
CW, BW
Whereas Iraq's occupation forces have brutalized the population of Kuwait and Iraq has committed numerous other clear violations of international law and the norms of international conduct in connection with its invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council has formulated a coordinated and unprecedented international response to Iraq's aggression through the adoption of twelve resolutions;

Whereas the Congress commends the unparalleled resolve demonstrated by the international community in the face of Iraq's blatant aggression; and

Whereas the Congress affirms its support for the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council regarding Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait; now therefore be it resolved

- 1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
- 2 the United States of America in Congress assembled,

~~1. PURPOSE~~
1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

- 2 This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization
 - 3 For Use of Military Force Against Iraq ^{Resolution} ~~Authorization~~
 - 4 ~~Resolution~~
- ~~1. PURPOSE~~

3 SEC. ²7. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

4 (a) AUTHORIZATION.--The President is authorized, subject
5 to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant
6 to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in
7 order to achieve implementation of Security Council
8 Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, ⁶⁶⁶667, 669, 670, 674, and
9 677.

10 (b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY
11 FORCE IS NECESSARY.--Before exercising the ^{use of force} authority granted
12 in subsection (a), the President shall submit to the Speaker
13 of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore
14 of the Senate a report that--

15 (1) states that the President has determined that the
16 United States has used all ^{appropriate} diplomatic and other peaceful
17 means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United
18 Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsection
19 (a);

20 (2) describes in detail the efforts taken to obtain
21 such compliance by diplomatic and other peaceful means;
22 and

23 (3) explains why those efforts have not been
24 successful in obtaining such compliance, and why, if such
25 efforts were continued, they would not ^{likely to} be successful.
_{are}

1 (c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.--

2 (1) SPECIFIC-STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.--Consistent
3 with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the
4 Congress declares that this section is intended to
5 constitute specific statutory authorization within the
6 meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

7 (2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.--Nothing in
8 this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War
9 Powers Resolution.

10 SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

11 At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit
12 to the Congress a report on the status of efforts to achieve
13 the objectives specified in section 2(a) and to obtain
14 compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United
15 Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.

FACIRAQ01

HLC

[DISCUSSION DRAFT]
January 7, 1991: 5 PM

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1ST SESSION

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
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15 Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.

Iraq/Kuwait Fact Sheet

Tensions have increased between Iraq and Kuwait over production quota violations and longstanding border disputes. Iraq has sent troops to the Iraq/Kuwait border but the action is being considered more "muscle flexing" than threat of invasion. It is estimated that in the first half of 1990 Kuwait (including neutral zone) has violated its quota by about 0.5 million barrels per day (MMBD).



Iraq

In 1989, Iraq produced 2.84 MMBD of crude and liquids. The OECD imported 1.55 MMBD from Iraq; Western Europe 0.87 MMBD, United States 0.45 MMBD, and Japan 0.22 MMBD.

U.S. 1989 imports from Iraq increased by 30 percent over 1988 receipts and represented 6 percent of U.S. net imports and 2.6 percent of U.S. consumption. (See Chart 1)

Iraqi imports averaged 0.61 MMBD for the first 5 months of 1990, less than 2 percent of these imports were petroleum products. Iraq supplied 8 percent of U.S. net imports and 3.6 percent of U.S. consumption. Industry import forecasts indicate an increase in Iraqi imports through August.

Currently, Iraq is the sixth largest supplier of U.S. oil.



Iraq exports most of its oil through pipelines which bypass the vulnerable Strait of Hormuz. Currently, Iraqi pipeline throughput capacity totals 2.5 MMBD and by late 1990 may increase to 3.3 MMBD.

Kuwait

In 1989, Kuwait produced 1.9 MMBD of crude and liquids (including one half of the neutral zone) of which the OECD imported 1.1 MMBD. Western Europe and Japan both imported 0.46 MMBD and the United States imported 0.16 MMBD.

U.S. imports from Kuwait increased 70 percent between 1988 and 1989. Kuwait supplied the United States with an average of 0.12 MMBD of oil during the first 5 months of 1990 which totals slightly over 1 percent of U.S. net imports. Industry import forecasts indicate an increase in Kuwaiti imports through August. (See Chart 2)

Kuwait exports solely through the Strait of Hormuz. During the Iran/Iraq War Kuwaiti oil tankers sailed under U.S. flags to discourage Iranian attacks.



07/25/90

U.S. PETROLEUM DEMAND
FIFTY STATE BASISPERCENT OF
CONSUMPTION PERCENT OF
NET IMPORTS

YEAR	DEMAND	NET IMPORTS	PERSIAN GULF	NET IMPORTS	P.G. IMPORTS	PERSIAN GULF
1973	17.308	6.025	0.838	34.81%	4.84%	13.91%
1974	16.653	5.892	1.027	35.38%	6.17%	17.43%
1975	16.322	5.846	1.149	35.82%	7.04%	19.65%
1976	17.461	7.090	1.837	40.60%	10.52%	25.91%
1977	18.431	8.565	2.438	46.47%	13.23%	28.46%
1978	18.847	8.002	2.215	42.46%	11.75%	27.68%
1979	18.513	7.984	2.066	43.13%	11.16%	25.88%
1980	17.056	6.365	1.518	37.32%	8.90%	23.85%
1981	16.058	5.401	1.218	33.63%	7.59%	22.55%
1982	15.296	4.298	0.693	28.10%	4.53%	16.12%
1983	15.231	4.312	0.440	28.31%	2.89%	10.20%
1984	15.726	4.715	0.505	29.98%	3.21%	10.71%
1985	15.726	4.286	0.308	27.25%	1.96%	7.19%
1986	16.281	5.439	0.909	33.41%	5.58%	16.71%
1987:						
FIRST Q	16.586	5.246	0.852	31.63%	5.13%	16.24%
SECOND Q	16.460	5.516	0.812	33.51%	4.94%	14.73%
THIRD Q	16.710	6.693	1.393	40.06%	8.33%	20.81%
FOURTH Q	16.910	6.176	1.249	36.53%	7.39%	20.22%
1987 AVG.	16.665	5.914	1.076	35.49%	6.46%	18.20%
1988:						
FIRST Q	17.592	6.266	1.366	35.62%	7.76%	21.79%
SECOND Q	16.606	6.517	1.348	39.24%	8.12%	20.69%
THIRD Q	17.083	6.625	1.739	38.78%	10.18%	26.25%
FOURTH Q	17.855	6.938	1.701	38.86%	9.53%	24.52%
1988 AVG.	17.284	6.587	1.539	38.11%	8.90%	23.36%
1989:						
JANUARY	17.269	7.494	1.884	43.40%	10.91%	25.14%
FEBRUARY	17.920	7.157	1.816	39.94%	10.13%	25.37%
MARCH	17.989	6.596	1.533	36.67%	8.52%	23.24%
APRIL	16.624	7.268	1.795	43.72%	10.80%	24.70%
MAY	16.546	6.986	1.705	42.22%	10.30%	24.41%
JUNE	17.497	7.002	1.959	40.02%	11.20%	27.98%
JULY	16.453	7.589	2.045	46.13%	12.43%	26.95%
AUGUST	17.360	7.593	2.237	43.74%	12.89%	29.46%
SEPTEMBER	16.795	7.347	1.939	43.75%	11.55%	26.39%
OCTOBER	17.304	7.511	1.872	43.41%	10.82%	24.92%
NOVEMBER	17.311	7.366	1.934	42.55%	11.17%	26.26%
DECEMBER	18.858	6.512	1.617	34.53%	8.57%	24.83%
FIRST Q	17.726	7.082	1.744	39.95%	9.84%	24.63%
SECOND Q	16.889	7.085	1.820	41.95%	10.77%	25.68%
THIRD Q	16.869	7.510	2.074	44.52%	12.29%	27.61%
FOURTH Q	17.824	7.130	1.808	40.00%	10.14%	25.35%
1989 AVG.	17.327	7.202	1.861	41.56%	10.74%	25.85%
1990:						
JANUARY	16.968	8.437	2.174	49.72%	12.81%	25.77%
FEBRUARY	17.024	7.483	2.224	43.96%	13.06%	29.72%
MARCH	17.083	7.045	1.814	41.24%	10.62%	25.75%
APRIL	16.666	6.997	1.839	41.98%	11.03%	26.28%
MAY	16.843	8.048	2.090	47.78%	12.41%	25.97%
FIRST Q	17.025	7.655	2.071	44.96%	12.16%	27.05%
YR to DATE	16.917	7.602	2.028	44.94%	11.99%	26.68%

Words To Remember

The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: First Reactions

"The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait. And we call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all the Iraqi forces. There is no place for this sort of naked aggression in today's world, and I have taken a number of steps to indicate the deep concern that I feel over the events that have taken place. . . . We're not ruling any options in, but we're not ruling any options out."

—President George Bush, Aug. 2, 1990

"We will turn Kuwait into a graveyard if any outside power intervenes." —Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Aug. 2, 1990

"Instead of staging a coup d'état and installing the so-called free provisional government before the invasion, they got it the wrong way around. They invaded Kuwait and then staged the coup d'état in a blatant and deceitful effort to try to justify their action."

—US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering, Aug. 2, 1990

"We don't stand a chance if we don't get aid from our friends. . . . I appeal to you again for your assistance and help, immediate assistance."

—Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US Sheikh Saud Nasir Al-Sabah, Aug. 2, 1990

"Foreign intervention on the part of imperialist powers is something which we utterly reject because the Arabs are capable of resolving their problems on their own."

—Government of Libya statement, Aug. 2, 1990

"The Iraqi forces will be withdrawn as soon as the situation is settled down and as soon as the free government of Kuwait so wishes."

—Iraqi Ambassador to the US Mohamed Al-Mashat, Aug. 2, 1990

"We will not permit the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan. This has been a longstanding Israeli policy."

—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Aug. 2, 1990

"[Israeli] officials said the crisis should result in an easing of US pressure on Israel to begin negotiations with Palestinians in the occupied territories and revive Israel's role as a 'strategic partner' to Washington in the Middle East."

—Journalist Jackson Diehl, *Washington Post*, Aug. 2, 1990

"I think there's something positive in this matter. Hussein attacked an Arab state, so he won't attack us. It's too bad about Kuwait. But it's a fact."

—Former Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann, Aug. 2, 1990

"[Israeli] government officials seemed relieved that the attention of the United States might be turned away, at least for a while, from the administration's push for Israeli-Palestinian talks. Foreign Minister David Levy is scheduled to visit Washington later this month for discussions on that matter."

—Journalist Joel Brinkley, *The New York Times*, Aug. 2, 1990

"How can Arab blood be shed by Arab hands? How can an Arab country occupy an Arab country?"

—Gulf Cooperation Council Statement, Aug. 2, 1990

"Saddam has a million men under arms. The entire US Army is only 700,000 men. He has 5,500 tanks. That is more than [World War II US, British and German Generals] Eisenhower, Montgomery and Rommel combined had in North Africa and more than the Soviet

Army has in Eastern Europe. . . . By ourselves we can only do relatively little. We will have to coordinate any action with Britain, France, Japan, the Saudis and Turkey."

—Former CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence George Carver, Aug. 3, 1990

"Experienced OPEC-watchers agreed that Saddam's objectives are money and power, not disruption of world oil markets for its own sake. They said that whatever government Saddam permits to emerge in Kuwait is certain to accept his dictates on oil prices, production rates and Persian Gulf security issues."

—Journalist Thomas W. Lippman, *Washington Post*, Aug. 3, 1990

"The key issue is precisely the same as it was in the 1970s and '80s—the United States does not wish to see a major adversary control the assets of the Gulf, whether it is the Russians or the Iranians or now the Iraqis."

—Geoffrey Kemp, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Aug. 2, 1990

"The strongest military power in the Middle East now controls the strongest financial power. It makes a formidable combination."

—Vahan Zanooyan, Petroleum Finance Co. of Washington, DC, Aug. 2, 1990

"The days of Kuwait making independent decisions on oil are over."

—Peter Beutel, Merrill Lynch analyst, Aug. 2, 1990

"Oil prices will go to \$25 a barrel and stay there."

—L. Douglas Lee, *Washington Analysis Corporation* economist, Aug. 2, 1990

"While Washington harshly condemned the invasion of Kuwait, its deeper fears centered on the emirate's neighbor, Saudi Arabia. 'If they go into Saudi Arabia,' said one official, 'hold your hat.'"

—Journalists Dan Balz and Ann Devroy, *Washington Post*, Aug. 3, 1990

"You can bet that Mr. Hussein made some serious calculations of his chances for getting by with his theft of Kuwait, and also that those calculations do not stop with Kuwait. The way to get real leverage on world oil prices, he will surely reason, is to steal Saudi Arabia's oil as well."

—*Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 3, 1990

"None of us can do it separately. We need a collective and effective will of the nations of the United Nations."

—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Aug. 2, 1990

"Saddam Hussein is a man with a large ego. He is a shrewd politician and tactician, has a canny understanding of the political dynamics of his own society and is a survivor who has kept himself and his regime in power for 22 years in a country notoriously difficult to govern."

—Phoebe Marr, Department of Defense Iraq specialist, Aug. 2, 1990

"In one stroke he has done something about the money problem, he has found something for the army to do and his people are very happy to get Kuwait—now they have gotten something out of the war. . . . He seems to prefer to take his risks with the outside world rather than at home."

—Laurie Mylroie, Harvard University, Aug. 2, 1990

basing his strength on the hard-core membership of the Ba'ath party, on the relatively well-paid army and on the ubiquitous secret police."—**Andrew Borowiec, *Washington Times*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"Iraqi and Iranian officials confirmed in interviews at the OPEC meeting last month in Geneva that their officials had met secretly as recently as late July, days before the OPEC session opened, in a half-day meeting... Iran and Iraq crafted their common strategy of squeezing Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to stop violating their quota ceilings on oil production."—**Journalist Youssef M. Ibrahim in *The New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"In attacking an Arab state, Mr. Hussein has assuredly banked on the acquiescence of his neighbors and the covetous passivity of his trading partners. He needs to be proved resoundingly wrong."—***The New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"[Saddam Hussein] must know he has pushed us over the line and that his insistence on the occupation of Kuwait and the threat against Saudi Arabia is an extreme act of provocation that would be met with force."—**Former Presidential Candidate Jesse L. Jackson, Aug. 3, 1990**

"We need to tell Saddam Hussein that an invasion of Saudi Arabia means war. That message needs to be delivered this week while it might influence his decision."

—**Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), Aug. 3, 1990**

"If Saddam Hussein can invade or intimidate the Saudis into not bringing their excess capacity to market, then over a three to five year period there will be enough of a shortage on the world market to substantially drive up oil prices, which is what he is after."

—**Patrick Clawson, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Aug. 3, 1990**

"Israel is his target. He's preparing himself better. But the danger is there for everybody—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria."

—**Ofra Benja, Dayan Institute, Tel Aviv, Aug. 2, 1990**

"He has a giant piggy bank in his hands. Why should he give it back?"—**Naser al-Marri, Kuwait Investment Authority official in London, Aug. 2, 1990**

"I think he has finally convinced everyone that he is incorrigible and a threat to regional peace."—**Michael Dewar, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Aug. 2, 1990**

"Together with our friends in the region, we should consider defensive military measures."—**Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), Aug. 2, 1990**

"You're dealing with a madman here... I'm not sure he's going to respond to sanctions."—**Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT), Aug. 2, 1990**

"Iraq's invasion is the shape of things to come if the US withdraws as a military force in the post-Cold War era. Regional powers, preeminent in their part of the world, will attempt to dominate their weaker neighbors. India has already done this on the Asian subcontinent, but no great US interests are at stake there. The Persian Gulf is different."—**Journalist Paul A. Gigot, *Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"With Iraq having overrun Kuwait, the crisis in the Persian Gulf appears to be turning into a struggle between the United States and Iraq for influence over Saudi Arabia and its vast oil reserves."

—**Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"We cannot remain indifferent to any development which could endanger [Kuwait's] national security and regional stability."

—**Statement by Government of Iran, Aug. 2, 1990**

"We are witnessing a historic shifting of the chessboard in the Middle East... [A move against Saudi Arabia] would result in an absolutely mega-crisis... I find it difficult to imagine that the Iraqis would simply be allowed to cakewalk through the Gulf."

—**West Point Middle East specialist Augustus Norton, Aug. 2, 1990**

"The proper response for now is economic, not military, and international, not unilateral... Without oil money, Saddam will fail. And the world will be safer from the tyrants and terrorists who hope to hold it hostage."—**Editorial in *USA Today*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"[If the Saudis turned off the Iraqi oil exporting pipeline that runs through its territory] Saddam Hussein would see it as aggression and could invade Saudi Arabia before we could do anything about it."

—**Petroleum Analyst G. Henry Schuler, Aug. 2, 1990**

"This is now the Saddam Doctrine—that whenever one of his neighbors does something he does not like, he settles the problem by invading it. We cannot accept the Saddam Doctrine."

—**Former Asst. Sec. of State Nicholas Veliotis, Aug. 2, 1990**

"Militarily the conquest [of Kuwait] is a fait accompli, leaving the United States, the Soviet Union and Arab nations virtually powerless to reverse it."—**Martin Sieff, *Washington Times*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"This shows clearly that utopia is not here, that world peace is not accomplished. We need weapons to deal with the maniacs of this world."

—**Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), Aug. 2, 1990**

"Maybe this blood in Kuwait and the complete swallowing of a nation [with US assets and US workers will forestall the process [of cutting defense spending]."

—**Representative Robert Dornan (R-CA), Aug. 2, 1990**

"With one swift thrust through Kuwait's rich oil fields, Iraq has shaken the world's economies and could push the USA into its first recession in eight years."

—**Mike Memmott, *USA Today*, Aug. 3, 1990**

"In response to this blatant transgression of the basic norms of civilized conduct, the United States and the Soviet Union have each taken a number of actions, including the Soviet suspension of arms deliveries and the American freezing of assets. The Soviet Union and the United States reiterate our call for unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait."

—**Joint US-USSR Statement read by Secretary of State James Baker III, Aug. 3, 1990**

"I support the fact that foreign ministers have met in Cairo. I'm very pleased that there's active diplomacy going on in Saudi Arabia... All that is good... The integrity of Saudi Arabia, its freedom, are very, very important to the United States. And I have made that clear to King Fahd in a very long conversation with him yesterday. General Scowcroft met with the Saudi ambassador today. And I think he's had other meetings with government officials. And we're making sure the Saudis know that. And when you look at vital interests of the United States, the relationship with Saudi Arabia and its independence and its freedom come under the heading of very, very important... I can't divulge the details of the conversations I've had with King Fahd. But if they ask for specific help... I would be inclined to help in any way we possibly can. It's that serious, and all you have to do is look at the energy requirements of the world, plus the direct violation of international law by Saddam Hussein, to understand why I feel so strongly about it."

—**President George Bush, Aug. 3, 1990**

**JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC.**

251 SOUTH LAKE AVENUE PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91101
TELEPHONE (818) 578-6800 TELEX 67 5435

JOSEPH J. JACOBS, Ph.D
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

August 29, 1990

FAX 202/647-6434

Mr. James A. Baker
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You are undoubtedly being inundated with peace plans. I add mine.

Basic idea: Push hard for Israel to agree to peace talks now in an international meeting -- the timing is urgent to eliminate the last prop under Saddam -- his anti-Israeli rhetoric.

To apply maximum pressure:

1. President Bush appoint a group of prominent Jewish Americans to go to Israel quietly, to meet with Shamir, Arens, Peres and Rabin to lean heavily on them to isolate Saddam Hussein even further from other Arabs by volunteering to start peace talks under U.N. or international auspices.
2. Suggest Howard Squadron, Lester Crown, Larry Tisch, Steve Shalom, Bob Arnow, Henry Rasovsky, and possibly others you know, to be in the group. I'm sure President Bush can persuade them to serve their country this way.
3. Their argument: Israel owes us support, and a dramatic move in diplomacy is better than a shooting war, which is a distinct possibility. For Shamir, the role of a "peace maker" rather than "tough guy" ala Menachem Began.
4. Persuade King Hussein to move closer to a constitutional monarchy by appointing a moderate Palestinian as Prime Minister and Chief of State with a charge to negotiate peace in good faith. The reward for successfully negotiating a peace: a constitutional monarchy which will undoubtedly be dominated by Palestinians. I know this is tough, but these are tough times.

JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC.


Secretary of State

-2-

August 29, 1990

5. Go back to incorporation of West Bank into a "Greater Jordan" as proposed several years ago. Possibly include some moderate members of the PLO Central Committee, such as Mohamed Milhem, in the cabinet if they can be persuaded to join. The prospect of a parliamentary government under a constitutional monarchy in "Greater Jordan" after peace has been negotiated may be an incentive.
6. The Jordanian Army, essentially Bedouin and loyal to King Hussein, could be a problem, but this may turn to an asset if they are the police force in "Greater Jordan." They are less likely to allow forces against Israel and will be a deterrent to a Palestinian dominated civil government attempting to dislodge King Hussein completely.
7. Points 4 and 5 will ease the problem for Israel, since they will be dealing with a recognized government.
8. Suggest Tom Pickering be given this assignment, since he was Ambassador to both countries and has additional stature as U.N. Ambassador.

Sincerely,


Joseph J. Jacobs

JJJ:jp

bcc: By FAX
John H. Kelly, Department of State, 202/647-7720
John H. Sununu, The White House, 202/456-2397
Senator George J. Mitchell, 202/224-1430
Senator Robert J. Dole, 202/224-8952
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Affairs, 202/456-2883

National
U.S.-Arab
Chamber
of Commerce



August 21, 1990

1825 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1107
Washington, D.C. 20006
U.S.A.

Telephone: (202) 331-8010
Fax: (202) 331-8297
Telex: 9102507574
Answerback
NATL US ARAB UQ

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to express our support for the position and present actions of the United States in the Gulf crisis.

Our organization is devoted to the promotion of commercial ties between the United States and the Arab World, and the unlawful invasion of Kuwait by Iraq has created a chilling effect on American trade and investments in the region. The Chamber's membership nationally of more than 1,000 companies and individuals shares your concern for America's long-term economic, commercial, and strategic relations with the Gulf states in particular. Moreover, consistent with the Chamber's position elsewhere, we oppose the occupation of any people or country by force.

In support of the United Nations imposed sanctions against Iraq, and in compliance with your Executive Orders, the Chamber has ceased certifying export documents for any transactions with Iraq and no longer promotes any commercial activities related to U.S.-Iraq trade.

Sincerely yours,

Cherif Sedky
Chairman

Jean R. AbiNader
President

cc: John Sununu

National
U.S.-Arab
Chamber
of Commerce



J. R. AbiNader
President

1825 K Street, N.W., Suite 1107
Washington, D.C. 20006

Telephone: (202) 331-8010

Fax: (202) 331-8297

Telex: 9102507574

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① John

ME
Here's the speech I mentioned. As you'll see, Dine misses an opportunity to say something constructive re the Gulf situation & avoids saying anything positive about the President at all. Then he goes on to draw battle lines against the arms sale going forward in late January.

NOT helpful!

Richard H.

② Brew

③ re Ht p/s "The Elections, Congress and Israel"

by

Thomas A. Dine
Executive Director
American Israel Public Affairs Committee

before the

CJP General Assembly
San Francisco, California

November 14, 1990

Thank you, Paul Berger. And thank you for your philanthropic and political leadership on behalf of our community. Of course, it is a pleasure and an honor to share in this program with Mark Talisman.

It has been a remarkable year since we last met in general assembly -- a year full of new tensions in the U.S.-Israel relationship, but also a year in which we achieved some extraordinary advances. Those who do not share our view that close and strong relations between the United States and the one democracy in the Middle East serve the highest national interests of the United States thought that this might be the year that they could drive the wedge through the bonds, thus severing the alliance. The year is, however, ending with some of the most impressive achievements on record. I would like to review with you tonight why this happened and what we learned. I would like to look ahead as well. Israel will, in the future, need more help from its one superpower ally than ever. Because the tensions in the bilateral relationship are far from over, we need together to look forward to the challenge of the coming year.

1990 began with a proposal by Senate Republican Leader Robert Dole of Kansas to cut aid to the five top recipients of American foreign aid by five percent. Senator Dole insisted that his motive was not to target Israel in particular, but rather to free up aid for other recipients by shaving the amounts going to the top five.

The media, however, treated Dole's proposal as a major challenge to Israel, and depicted it as a signal that support for Israel was eroding on Capitol Hill. When, a short time later, 75 Senators -- three quarters of that body -- wrote to Secretary of State Baker to oppose Dole's idea and call for full funding of aid to Israel, the story hardly received any attention in the press. One prominent newspaper that had reported Dole's proposal on its front page, for instance, never even told its readers that the idea had been rejected by an overwhelming majority of his colleagues.

I tell this story in detail because it symbolizes the year. Stories of U.S.-Israel tension are front-page news, while stories that reaffirm close relations between the allies are buried or not carried at all.

The same pattern has been visible in the past few weeks. While the press has been pre-occupied with U.S.-Israel differences at the United Nations and elsewhere, the Congress has been occupied with the constructive task of passing an extraordinary package of legislation to help restore Israel's qualitative edge and help aid in the absorption of Soviet Jewry. The Administration seems to have lost its compass where it comes to the U.S.-Israel relationship. Repeatedly, it has made the

error of attempting to curry favor with Arab coalition partners by distancing the United States from its one permanent ally in the region.

Distancing the U.S. from Israel is a mistake in four ways:

-- First, this tactic can never satisfy Arab demands; instead, it creates more pressure to end the U.S.-Israel relationship altogether. It keeps the issue on the table, instead of getting it off the table. It is time for Arab governments of all stripes to recognize the permanence of the Jewish State.

-- Second, distancing derives from a misconception of Arab interests. Why should the United States pay off Saudi Arabia in order to allow us to sacrifice American lives to defend that country? Saudi Arabia needs its alliance with America for reasons of its own; the monarchy faces today 425,000 Iraqi troops on its border. Last week's Jane's Defence Weekly states that Saudi Arabia cannot and will not be able to defend itself. The U.S. does not have to curry Saudi favor by sacrificing Israel. It is Saudi Arabia that owes the United States.

-- Third, when the United States distances itself from Israel, it hurts the prospects for peace in the region by undermining Israel's confidence that it can count on the U.S. to be an honest broker. An Israel that is diplomatically isolated and vulnerable is not an Israel that can be asked to trust the United States when we return to the peace process.

-- Fourth, and finally, when America distances itself from Israel, it runs the risk of increasing the chances of another Arab-Israeli war. To the degree that potential Arab aggressors think that Israel can no longer count on the United States, Israel's deterrent is weakened and the potential of an Arab attack increases.

There is another American dimension, however, to the U.S.-Israel relationship. That is the Congress of the United States - and it has not strayed from the course. Members of Congress have taken seriously Saddam Hussein's threats to burn half of Israel, and his warnings that, after the invasion of Kuwait, Israel will be the next target. Shortly after the Kuwaiti invasion, Senators and Representatives asked Administration officials in hearings and in private meetings just what steps the President was prepared to take to correct weaknesses in Israel's defense to restore the military balance. The Administration did offer up a few ideas, but Israel's friends on Capitol Hill were not satisfied. For Egypt and Turkey, the Administration proposed billions. For Israel, however, its ideas were on a scale about one-tenth the size. Saudi Arabia was to get the largest arms sale package in history, huge numbers of the most modern arms,

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but Israel's assistance consisted mainly of older, used items in small quantities, and even this with no urgency.

Members of Congress were not satisfied. Led by Senators Dan Inouye of Hawaii and Bob Kasten of Wisconsin, with the active support of Pat Leahy of Vermont and the other members of the Senate's Defense Appropriations and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittees, our friends on Capitol Hill set out to design a package of their own.

This total package passed just before adjournment and is now law. It includes a variety of forms of innovative financial assistance, larger quantities of more modern weapons, and provisions to step up technological cooperation between the United States and Israel. While the package does not completely close the gap, it is a major improvement over the Administration's proposals.

And it passed overwhelmingly. When one of the most powerful U.S. Senators -- Robert Byrd of West Virginia -- introduced a resolution to kill the largest item, authorizing Israel to gain an additional \$700 million worth of American weapons now stored in Europe, he was defeated by an extraordinary vote: 97 to 1. When another amendment was introduced by Bob Dole and Robert Byrd to criticize Israel after the Temple Mount tragedy, it was defeated by a lesser landslide: 90 to 8.

So these are the three numbers to remember from the debate in Congress this year: 75 to 1 against the Dole aid-cutting proposal, 97 to 1 against Byrd's effort to block the additional military assistance package, and 90 to 8 against the Dole-Byrd amendment criticizing Israeli policy. And, perhaps most important, instead of the year ending with a five percent cut in aid to Israel, as some feared, it is ending with a very significant increase -- notwithstanding Gramm-Rudman budgetary restraints, a hostile press, and errors that the Administration has made.

What accounts for these extraordinary successes in this particular period? There are three factors. The first is the American people, who continue to express positive levels of support for Israel's security and well-being in poll after poll. While Americans do not necessarily agree with each and every policy of Israel's government, any more than they give total support to every policy of their own government, they do consistently and with little variation continue to regard Israel as a country deserving of American support for its self-defense needs. And in election after election, American voters have chosen the more pro-Israel candidates and spurned those who based their campaigns on anti-Israel appeals.

The second factor is the leadership of key friends on Capitol Hill. The pro-Israel Congressional coalition today is much larger than it was just a decade ago. But this growing margin still needs leadership to crystalize and define the issues, offer the amendments, and gather the votes. And what an extraordinary group the leaders of the pro-Israel coalition are - in both houses, in both parties, among liberals and conservatives, and on each of the key committees and subcommittees.

The third factor is the Jewish community. We are the bedrock. We are the ones that educate and persuade, that literally stand at the doors of the Senate and House chambers working for and rallying votes, that make sure that the public records of the candidates are known, and ensure the citizenry is well-versed on the issues. We are fortunate to have the support of the majority of our fellow citizens, but that support alone would not translate into success year after year if we did not act as a catalyst to keep the issue alive. The Congressional agenda is jammed. Members are occupied with a panoply of issues. It takes the inspired dedication of a group of citizen advocates -- you and me to go to our friends on Capitol Hill and remind them of our cause. The years of personal relationships between our active community and Members of Congress allow the justice of our agenda to be heard.

When we do act, our efforts are rewarded. The elections held eight days ago were no exception. Twenty-seven of our friends in the Senate were reelected. Three seats had no incumbent candidate; all three open seats resulted in pro-Israel gains: Colorado with Hank Brown, New Hampshire with Bob Smith, and Larry Craig in Idaho. Several reelected Senators are returning to office on stronger pro-Israel platforms than the last time they ran.

This election was unique in that it was the first in which incumbents' pro-Israel voting records were a campaign issue. Three of our friends in the Senate were challenged by their opponents for being too pro-Israel. Lynn Martin tried this against Paul Simon in Illinois, Christine Whitman attacked Bill Bradley in New Jersey; and in Louisiana David Duke, an all too familiar and notorious figure to our community, assailed Bennett Johnston. The voters repudiated the challengers, reelecting our friends.

The Arab American Institute expanded its efforts to discredit the pro-Israel cause. Whereas in 1988 it focused on promoting party platforms and ballot initiatives and negative rhetoric at congressional town hall meetings, in 1990 it targeted four of our friends with negative campaigns: Senators Carl Levin of Michigan, Paul Simon of Illinois, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, and Tom Harkin of Iowa. It assailed their pro-Israel

records at press conferences, picketed their headquarters, and made issue of campaign contributions from American citizens who are Jewish. The director of the AAI promised to make Harkin of Iowa, already rendered vulnerable by the fact that the state has never in the 20th century reelected a Democratic Senator to two consecutive terms, the "Arab Chuck Percy" in 1990. Despite all this, on November 6th, all four friends were handily reelected.

In the House of Representatives, hundreds of friends stood for reelection, and almost all won. Overall, we achieved a net gain of 19 pro-Israel Members in the House. Almost every new Member of Congress met with the pro-Israel community during the campaign; most issued strong pro-Israel position papers. Two new Jewish members were elected in the House: Bernie Sanders in Vermont, and Richard Zimmer in New Jersey.

One electoral result that is not so happy is the loss of Rudy Boschwitz. Rudy is an irreplaceable asset: a true friend of Israel, an active Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, someone whom Republican Senators looked to for education and guidance on Israel-related matters, and a friend to all of us. We look forward to his continued activism in our community.

The victory of his opponent, Senator-elect Paul Wellstone, who is Jewish, brings a new presence to the Senate. Wellstone personally knows leaders in the Minneapolis Jewish community, has advocated aid to Israel, and stated he is a supporter of secure and defensible borders for Israel. We look forward to working with him, exploring issues, and helping him develop community-wide relationships across the country.

Overall, then, this was another excellent election year for friends of Israel. The 102nd Senate will be stronger; the next House will be much stronger. It is proof once again that political action works, and that means you.

And we will need our friends in Congress more this coming year and beyond, more than ever before. Israel's security margin has eroded; much work remains to be done to restore favorably the military balance. At the same time, the absorption of record numbers of Soviet Jews is an historic mission and a blessing, but also an extraordinarily difficult practical problem.

The United States is committed to both maintain the security of Israel and to aid in the vital matter of settling Israel's new citizens. Israel's need for new resources, in particular massive foreign exchange, is quite substantial, but it comes at a time when Congress and the President face the challenge of reducing our federal deficit within the framework of the budget reconciliation agreement. The competition for scarce funds will be intense in this environment, consequently the solidarity and

activism of the American pro-Israel community will be more important than ever during the coming year.

One of the biggest challenges before the 102nd Congress is how to maintain Israel's security in the face of an expected \$15 billion Saudi arms sale in early 1991. This sale would come on top of two recent and very sizable packages to which consent has already been granted.

Reportedly, this enormous package will include 24 advanced F-15 aircraft with offensive capabilities plus huge numbers of other high-technology items. Most of the items in the package would not be delivered for years, well after the current crisis in the Persian Gulf is resolved. The items in the package have much greater offensive potential against Israel than the items already approved.

If, in fact, this package is pushed forward by the Administration early next year in the form that has been described, we expect major opposition in Congress to occur. I certainly urge our community to join and support the effort in the House and Senate to prevent this major new escalation of the arms race in the Middle East.

Further acceleration of the arms race in the Middle East does not serve the national interest of the United States. We armed the Shah against the Soviet Union, but the Ayatollah Khomeini turned these arms against us. The West armed Iraq against Iran, but Saddam Hussein captured many of those arms and has now turned them against us. We armed Kuwait, and now those modern weapons systems are aimed at American forces in Saudi Arabia.

Against whom will Saudi arms be aimed five years from today when F-15s would be delivered? The Administration believes that they would be aimed at Iraq and Iran, but Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the man next in line to the Saudi throne with a lengthy record of anti-American statements, says Saudi forces will be turned against Israel. It is even possible that Saudi arms will be used in opposition to the interests of the United States.

The last thing the Middle East needs is more sophisticated weapons. Israel, for its part, cannot run ever faster on the arms treadmill until it falls exhausted. Israel is a small country -- it cannot endlessly counterbalance everything that oil and money can buy for Saudi Arabia and Iraq and Syria and Libya and the others. It is time to put brakes on the runaway arms race in the Middle East, not time to step on the accelerator and go still faster toward destruction.

Stopping this mad rush to oblivion will be no small effort. The forces arrayed on behalf of the sale will be enormous. Our

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community will have to muster all of its energy and participate politically in every way. This is our right as American citizens. It is our duty as American citizens. It is our responsibility to stop a wrong policy, especially one that would adversely affect our interests. And it is our duty as a community dedicated to the survival and security of the State of Israel to not enhance anti-Israeli engines of war.

Our friends in Congress will be on the hot seat. They will be subjected to every kind of pressure by the Administration, by the Saudi Embassy and its well-paid consultants, and by a highly-mobilized cadre from the defense industries that would profit from the sales. If previous arms sales debates teach any lesson, we know every kind of false accusations will be hurled at opponents of the sale -- from killing jobs and exports to "dual loyalty" to undermining the President's efforts to contain Saddam Hussein.

But such a sale, as currently constructed, is not sound U.S. policy. We hope that this arms package will not be sent to Capitol Hill. We hope that the Administration will consult in advance with Members of Congress and others before arriving at a decision. It is within the power of the President to avoid a controversy that will serve the interest of no one.

But if the Administration does go ahead with the package in its current form, we will have no choice but to oppose, considering the enormity of the stakes involved. We must therefore prepare ourselves in 1991 for one of the most difficult challenges we have ever faced.

This effort will require full participation by every one of us -- by everyone in our community, and by everyone who is committed to a sound foreign policy for the United States.

So let me close by returning to the theme of our own activism, our full participation in America's political processes in the exercise of our constitutional rights as American citizens. We are the guardians of the U.S.-Israel relationship. What we do -- or fail to do, makes the critical difference. When we join together in common cause, we have the wherewithal to achieve great things. Unified, there is no limit to our potential. The American Jewish community, with the strong support of the wider American community, just demonstrated this potential in the 1990 legislative session and in the 1990 election results. We can broaden and deepen that precious relationship between Israel and the United States. We can show our solidarity with Israel by visiting Israel, indeed Jerusalem, in missions. As the spirit in this hall and at this great assembly shows, we are ready, and together, we will meet the challenge.

Governor
Junnun

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July
DATE: 11-12-90

FROM THE PRESIDENT *CS*

TO: Jim Baker

Cardinal Law, at Camp David, gave me this letter which was sent to you by Bishop Mahony.

Much of it is thoughtful, some of it leads to a kind of no-win conclusion.

I think, giving attention to public diplomacy, that ~~this~~ letter needs a very thoughtful reply.

The summary is "stay the course with sanctions"... I think he gives too little consideration to the brutality that's already taken place, the war that's already taken place, the mistreatment of embassies that is taking place.

I would like to see a copy of any reply that goes out to Bishop Mahony.

gb .

Draft #1

Gulf
Whereas the Congress recognizes the historic action taken by the United Nations Security Council on November 28, 1990, in passing Resolution 678, which "authorizes member states ... to use all necessary means" to "restore international peace and security" in the Persian Gulf region.

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That:

1. The United States, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 678, is prepared to use all necessary means to achieve the goals outlined in Resolution 678 and the ten earlier resolutions on the Persian Gulf crisis passed by the Security Council since August 2, 1990, and articulated by the President of the United States in his Address to the Nation of [DATE].

2. The President shall continue to consult closely with the Congress in advance of decisions on the means necessary to achieve those goals.

John -
Dole wanted
you to have this
before the 11⁰⁰ AM
briefing.

Jrn

Sumner

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

George Bush

It is now more than 15 weeks since Iraqi tanks, with little warning and even less mercy, rolled across the once tranquil border dividing Iraq from its neighbor Kuwait. Within three days, 100,000 Iraqi troops controlled the streets of Kuwait City and massed at the borders of Kuwait's neighbor Saudi Arabia. A second invasion, or at the very least, military intimidation, appeared imminent.

Iraq's occupation of Kuwait has been a nightmare. Hundreds of thousands of Kuwaiti men, women and children have been driven from their country; Saddam has brought in tens of thousands of Iraqis and other foreigners to resettle Kuwait in their place. Homes, buildings and factories have been looted. Babies have been torn from incubators; children shot in front of their parents. Disappearances and graphic accounts of torture are widespread.

Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein has not been content with violence against Kuwaitis. Thousands of foreigners are being denied the freedom to leave, in violation of the most basic norms of civilized conduct. Embassies and diplomatic residences are being violated, and their diplomatic personnel are being starved out.

The response of the international community to this cruelty has been immediate and unwavering. The United Nations Security Council has passed ten resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion and occupation, rejecting its annexation of Kuwait, and calling upon Saddam to allow all who wish to leave to do so. To back up these calls for action, the international community has put into place mandatory and comprehensive economic sanctions designed to ensure that Iraq reverses, and does not benefit from, its aggression. I am proud to say that the United States played a key role in building the coalition of nations that has forged this response; American leadership remains a positive and constructive force in this changing world.

Now, as I write this column, more than 200,000 men and women wearing the uniforms of the U.S. armed forces stand guard on the sand and along the shores of the Arabian peninsula, together with the armed forces of more than 25 other countries. Over the next few months, they will be joined by thousands of additional troops from America and other nations.

But why are we there? Why should we be there?

First, the world must not reward aggression. Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait is not just a case of petty aggression. We stand now at a singular moment. The civilized world is now in the process of fashioning the rules that will govern the new world order beginning to emerge in the aftermath of the Cold War. The history of this century shows clearly that rewarding aggression encourages more aggression. If the world looks the other way in this first crisis of the Post Cold War era, other would-be Saddams will conclude, correctly, that aggression pays. We must either be prepared to respond now or face a much greater set of challenges down the road.

Second, our national security is at stake. Can the world afford to allow Saddam Hussein a stranglehold around the world's economic lifeline? That is exactly what would happen if we failed. Armed with thousands of tanks and aircraft, not to mention chemical, biological and perhaps even nuclear weapons, Saddam would dominate the Gulf and the bulk of the world's petroleum reserves. Even now, without an actual shortage of oil, Saddam's aggression has almost doubled oil prices, causing serious problems here at home and throughout the world. Fledgling democracies are at particular risk; the poorest nations are hit hardest. The potential for much greater suffering is real. We cannot allow any tyrant to practice economic blackmail. Energy security is national security, and we must be prepared to act accordingly.

Last, innocent lives are at stake. I want to see a world in which Americans and others can live free from fear. The cynical use of innocent civilians, be it as bargaining chips or as pawns to deter attack, is an affront to civilized behavior. This blackmail will not succeed. At the same time, our citizens and our diplomats must be free.

Many, understandably, counsel prolonged patience. Yet, it is grim reality that with each passing day the consequences of Saddam's aggression grow. Remember, Saddam has not hesitated to use his most terrible weapons -- not merely in time of war, but against his own people. The fact that Saddam is actively developing the most sophisticated weapons of mass destruction known to man -- nuclear and biological weapons -- is ominous indeed. Those who are in hiding or inside our embassy in Kuwait risk capture or surrender. As I write this, Saddam Hussein has callously refused to comply with the UN Resolution that calls for the replenishment of foreign embassies. The potential cost in human lives of what would be needed to break Saddam's grip on Kuwait mounts as do the global economic costs of his aggression.

Our goals have not changed since I first outlined them to the American people last August. First, the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Third, security and stability for the Gulf -- an important national interest of the United States since the time of Harry Truman. And fourth, the protection of American citizens abroad.

Let me make one more thing clear. As I work to realize these goals, I will use every means at my disposal to reach a peaceful solution. We will continue the effective implementation of the United Nations sanctions. There already has been enough violence, suffering and sacrifice.

Lasting and meaningful peace must be founded upon principle. Iraq cannot be rewarded for its blatant aggression. Kuwait must be sovereign; its territory intact. The hostages must be set free. Iraq can never again be in a position to threaten the survival of its neighbors or our vital interests.

With unity and determination, and yes, patience, I am confident that these objectives are within our reach. When we succeed, we will have returned a country to its people. We will have demonstrated that aggression will not be tolerated. We will have invigorated a United Nations that contributes as its founders dreamed. We will have established principles for acceptable international conduct and the means to enforce them. In short, we will have taken a major step toward a community of nations bound by a common commitment to peace and restraint. This is something Americans and peace-loving peoples have long sought. Out of this difficult time of testing, we have the extraordinary opportunity to make this dream a reality.