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Folder Title:
Persian Gulf War 1991 [5]

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August 9, 1990
Daily Report on Iraq-Kuwait Developments

The following countries have announced they will impose the U.N. sanctions against Iraq/Kuwait:

South Korea, Poland, Portugal, Chile, Uruguay, Hong Kong, Taiwan
Argentina (announcement came after Irag ambassador indicated
Argentina's current and future interests would be
"prejudiced" by the decision)

Jordan has given strong indications it will impose sanctions

Financial Assets

- Australia has announced a freeze on all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets
- Brazil banned financial transfers to Iraq or Kuwait
- Malaysia's national bank informally freezes Kuwaiti assets, formal Cabinet ratification expected soon

Legal Aspects

- At London meeting EC reps indicate that the community's regs will cover goods transactions but regulation of services and financial transactions up to individual EC members
- In U.K., Queen's consent to Orders in Council provides legal authority for imposition of U.N. sanctions
- Japanese Ministry of Finance expects to have all legal measures in place on Friday
- Austrian officials concerned by country's lack of legal provisions for asset freeze; requested USG assistance in determining legitimate Kuwaiti officials

Other news

- Arab Summit in Cairo delayed until tomorrow; some leaders have yet to arrive
- By unanimous vote, U.N. Security Council declares Iraqi annexation of Kuwait "null and void"
- A number of countries indicate they will follow U.S. practice and exempt Kuwaiti commercial entities from asset freeze while maintaining prohibition on transfers to Kuwait/Iraq
- Venezuela President Perez indicated that he wants to confer with other OPEC countries before increasing oil production or prices
- U.S. Embassy in Bahrain reports run on Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait (classified as Category II by Foreign Asset Control) due to concern the U.S. will freeze its assets on August 18.
- EC President Delors proposed in a radio interview that G7 Finance Ministers meet quickly to coordinate strategy
- France regulates price of petroleum products; will set ceiling which will be adjusted to reflect world prices

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958

2-23-00 GF
98-0099-F

Note: Information drawn from a variety of news sources and cables

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOOTNOTES

Yes = action already taken or explicitly decided upon.

- (1) Official assets only.
- (2) Prohibits travel and transportation.
- (3) Assumes that action will be taken as a result of the EC decision.
- (4) Assumes that action will be taken based on U.N. Resolution.
- (5) Suspends capital transactions and trade finance; exports of military equipment Constitutionally prohibited.
- (6) Denies trade preferences and technology and scientific cooperation.
- (7) Banned maritime transport; official credit guarantees suspended.
- (8) Iraq is off-cover for official export credit guarantees.
- (9) Prior approval of all financial transactions.
- (10) Also forbidden: provision of funds or loans to public/private in Kuwait and Iraq, transportation of merchandise.
- (11) Bans: credit, dealings in securities or property, maritime transport.
- (12) Provides administrative guidance to banks but no official freeze.

NOTE: Information in this table is drawn from several sources (i.e., Treasury Financial Attaches; State reporting cables; and press reports) and is subject to change as additional information is received.

August 9, 1990

August 9, 1990, as of 4:00 p.m.

SUMMARY OF KUWAITI/IRAQI ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Freeze Assets of</u>		<u>Embargo</u>	<u>Oil</u>	<u>General Trade</u>		<u>Suspend Credits (or Guarantees) to Iraq</u>	<u>Suspend Arms To Iraq</u>	<u>Other Action</u>
	<u>Kuwait</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Imports from Kuwait</u>	<u>from Iraq</u>	<u>Embargo on Kuwait</u>	<u>on Iraq</u>			
U.S.	Yes (1)	Yes (1)	Yes	Yes	(4)	Yes	Yes	Yes	(2)
Japan	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	(5)
EC	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		?	Yes		(6)
U.K.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		(3)	
France	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	(7)
Germany	Yes (1)	Yes (1)	(4)	Yes	(4)	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Italy	Yes (1)	Yes (1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	(8)
Luxembourg	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	(9)
Belgium	Yes	(3)	(3)	(3)				(3)	
Netherlands	Yes	Yes	(3)	(3)				(3)	
Denmark	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)				(3)	
Greece	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)				(3)	
Ireland	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)				(3)	
Portugal	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)				(3)	
Spain	Yes (1)	Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	
Switzerland	Yes (1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	(10)
Canada	Yes (1)	Yes (1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			(11)
Austria	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	
Singapore	(12)	No							
Bahamas	?	?							
Hong Kong	Yes	Yes							
Netherlands Antilles									
Norway	Yes						Yes		
Australia	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes				
USSR	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	Yes		
China	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	(4)	Yes	Yes	
Brazil	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	
Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Sweden	Yes (?)	Yes (?)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	
Finland	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Malaysia	No	No							

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM TO JOHN H. SUNUNU

FROM: Nicholas E. Calio *NEC*

THROUGH: Fred McClure

gulf
RE: Attached letter/Persian Gulf Resolution from Duncan
Hunter

I thought you should see the attached since word of our "help" in drafting the resolution is out. I had been taking a "go-slow" attitude with Duncan in the belief that we did not want a lot of proposed resolutions coming up that we could not control.

How do we want to handle this?

cc: Andy Card
Rob Portman

*Brent is aware of this and, according to
Gunny Zampley, may call Duncan.*

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December 28, 1990

The Honorable Nicholas E. Calio
 Deputy Assistant to the President
 for Legislative Affairs
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Nick:

The enclosed letter to General Scowcroft will hopefully be self explanatory. Congressman Sonny Montgomery spent the weekend at Camp David, and the President and General Scowcroft made changes in the text of the Resolution.

As the letter indicates, this Resolution will not be introduced in either the House or Senate unless we have first secured a solid bi-partisan majority. I would still like a statement from the President, and anything you can do to assure Buddy Darden of White House support would be greatly appreciated. If I am not available please contact my Legislative Director, Vicki Middleton, and I want to do everything possible to support Operation Desert Shield.

Cordially,

Duncan Hunter, M.C.
 Co-Chairman
 National Security Caucus

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 WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, ALABAMA

December 28, 1990

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
 Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 The White House
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

Congressman Sonny Montgomery has relayed to me your concerns about our Concurrent Resolution on the Persian Gulf (John McCain and Richard Shelby are gathering support for a similar resolution in the Senate). The changes you recommended (regarding "the employment of all necessary measures to achieve them") will obviously be made in both resolutions.

I also share your concerns about the possibility that these resolutions could be defeated. That would be the entirely wrong message to send to Baghdad, and I want to assure you these resolutions will not move forward in the House and Senate until we have achieved a solid bi-partisan majority of co-sponsors. If we do not have sufficient co-sponsors we will simply abandon this effort.

The primary motive of the original co-sponsors is to support the President, and if this is not helpful we will immediately stop. I believe we have an excellent opportunity to gather a solid majority because our effort is being supported by over 20 prominent private sector organizations. They are all planning to contact lawmakers regarding the Resolution, but once again, we only want to do things that will assist you.

With this in mind it would certainly boost our efforts to gather co-sponsors if we had a statement of support from the President that we could circulate to our colleagues. Also, please do not hesitate to let us know of any other assignments that would assist your efforts.

If I am not available please have your office contact my Legislative Director, Vicki Middleton, and I am looking forward to hearing from you.

Cordially,

Duncan Hunter, M.C.
 Co-Chairman
 National Security Caucus

DECEMBER 19, 1990

102d CONGRESS
1st Session

H. CON. RES. _____

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Hunter submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on _____

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress concerning Operation Desert Shield in the Persian Gulf region.

Whereas, on August 2, 1990, military forces of the Republic of Iraq, under the direction of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, invaded the small nation of Kuwait,

Whereas, in an effort to promote peace and regional stability in the Persian Gulf region, President Bush has deployed troops of the United States Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf region, in Operation Desert Shield, and has undertaken diplomatic initiatives;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 678, authorizing the use of military force if Iraqi forces do not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991;

Whereas, if the objective of Resolution 678 is to be achieved without war, Saddam Hussein must realize that the United States is steadfast in its determination to use the military force authorized by the resolution, if such action becomes necessary;

Whereas Saddam Hussein has been led to believe that there exists opposition in the United States to the use of military force against Iraq and may believe that the steadfast determination of the United States will erode with the passage of time; and

Whereas Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait must be answered in a swift and appropriate manner: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress --

(1) expresses its support for bipartisan efforts to bring a just and meaningful peace to the Persian Gulf region;

(2) expresses its support for the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by President Bush, the deployment of troops of the United States Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf region, and the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 678;

(3) expresses its support for the goals and objectives of Operation Desert Shield and for the employment of all necessary measures to achieve them; and

(4) urges the United States Armed Forces to develop a strategy to achieve a quick, decisive victory in the event the use of military force against Iraq becomes necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 3, 1991

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Gulf

More than one month ago, on November 30, I proposed that Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz travel to Washington to meet with me late in the week of December 10, to be followed shortly thereafter by a trip to Baghdad by Secretary of State James Baker. I did so "to go the extra mile for peace" and to demonstrate our commitment to all aspects of U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, including its "pause for goodwill" designed to give Iraq one final opportunity to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait on or before January 15.

While I offered 15 days during which Secretary Baker was prepared to travel to Baghdad, including Christmas, Saddam Hussein showed himself to be more interested in manipulating my offer to his advantage than in a serious response. He was not too busy to see on short notice a wide range of individuals, including Kurt Waldheim, Willy Brandt, Muhammad Ali, Ted Heath, John Connolly, and Ramsey Clark, but he was too busy to find even a few hours to meet with the Secretary of State of the United States. Today marks the last of the fifteen dates we suggested and that effort is therefore at an end.

Secretary Baker is departing on January 6 for several days of close consultations with coalition partners as the UNSC date of January 15 approaches. While I am not prepared to repeat my previous offer, rejected by Saddam Hussein, I am ready to make one last attempt to go the extra mile for peace. I have therefore offered through CDA Joe Wilson in Baghdad to have Secretary Baker meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in Switzerland during the period January 7 - 9, while he is travelling on his consultations.

This offer is being made subject to the same conditions as my previous attempt: No negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at face-saving and no rewards for aggression. What there will be if Iraq accepts this offer is simply and importantly an opportunity to resolve this crisis peacefully.

#

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday
November 28, 1990

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen


Just

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT

FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
JOHN SUNUNU
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
FRED MCCLURE

I called Pat Moynihan today regarding the attached letter. He wants to meet with me and I agreed to do so. As you know, he is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations. We had a very pleasant conversation.

193503



*Frank P. Moynihan
New York*
G. Burnham
cc. F. McChesne

*United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
November 26, 1990*

Dear Mr. President:

✓ Dick Lugar has told me of your telephone call to him and that settles the matter so far as I am concerned. I would, however, like to note the comment of the Administration official in the Washington Post on November 15, to the effect that "[the President] expects [members of Congress] to tell him their concerns before they run to 'Good Morning America'."

Fair enough, I never called you. But I did spend much of September and October near to pleading with Administration officials to help draft a resolution of support for your policy. Thus, September 24 on the floor:

As the human toll begins to rise, the President may well find his popularity ratings slumping and his congressional support evaporating.... How much better it would be if the Congress and the President take this opportunity to state that in this crisis we stand together in opposing this illegal invasion and enforcing the resolutions of the Security Council.



It happens I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations and necessarily involved with the issue. I had a theory of the case. Namely that the United States was acting, as required by Article 25 of the Charter, to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, to pursue "measures not involving the use of armed force" as provided in Article 41. The issue of war powers did not arise and we could agree on a Joint Resolution endorsing our actions. I grant that there was not a great deal of support for this theory among my colleagues, but there was some. There was, however, none in the Administration. The attitude as conveyed to me was that no Congressional endorsement was required or desired.

We have been friends long enough for me to hope you will see this letter and understand why I have sent it.

Best,



The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: November 23, 1990 (Cairo)

FROM THE PRESIDENT



TO: John Sununu
Boyden Gray
Fred McClure

The attached were given to
me by Bob Dole and Bob Michel
at the last Leadership meeting.

Gulf

fr

Some Presidential Authorities Available Under A Declaration of War

A declaration of war would satisfy the War Powers Resolution, trigger the Trading with the Enemy Act, permitting the seizure of enemy assets, permit the call-up of all reserves for the duration of the conflict plus 6 months, and suspend certain ceilings on the number of officers and enlisted personnel on active duty. In addition, the following authorities are among those that would be available to the President:

- Would grant wide authority to "recapture" real estate formerly part of military installations
- Would grant wide authority to direct that manufacturing plants meet military needs before other needs
- Would authorize arming of civilian ships and aircraft (war or determination by the President that the security of the United States is threatened)
- Would authorize the President to take control of any transportation system for purposes related to the emergency
- Would permit immediate condemnation of private property for certain identified war purposes
- Would permit suspension of laws governing retention and reappointment of CJCS, commissioned officers, reserve units, enlistments
- Would grant wide authority on control of travel by aliens (war or national emergency declared by the President) and the apprehension, restraint, or removal of enemy aliens
- Would grant wide authority to authorize military construction
- Would permit suspension of maximum rental or leases of building (war or national emergency declared by the President or by Congress)
- Would permit sale of war materiel to foreign governments on our side in war
- Would give government the right of first refusal on all natural resources
- Would permit suspension of leases on continental outer shelf (war or national emergency declared by the President or by Congress)
- Would grant wide authority with respect to communications (may suspend or amend regulations, close facilities or stations, authorize use by any department of any facility)

-- Would permit contracting for war materiel and enforcement of contracts through plant seizures

-- Would authorize contracts for war materiel, changing contracts, seizing plants, ships, and war material

-- Would suspend restrictions on CBW (war or national emergency declared by the President or by Congress)

-- Would authorize licensing use of enemy patents, trademarks, and processes

Bases: The President may suspend the normal procedures for closing military installation if he certifies to Congress that closure is necessary for reasons of national security or military emergency. (Note: This provision probably does not waive applicable provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).)

Memo to the President
November 14, 1990

from Michel

Oil

One of the criticisms that has been made about the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia is that we are there to fight for "oil" and that oil isn't worth fighting for.

The argument, insofar as it goes, is correct: oil, in and of itself, is not worth fighting for. Oil has no intrinsic value. It is the value human beings place on it that gives it meaning in our lives. And in the entire world, the meaning of oil is enhanced freedom: freedom of movement for hundreds of millions, freedom from ancient rituals of drudgery in the workshop and on the farm, freedom of opportunity for those fortunate enough to live in nations whose industrial progress is based on an assured supply of oil.

Oil has been called "black gold", but in fact oil is worth more than gold to average human beings, because gold's value results from what people think about it, but oil's value lies in what people can do with it in expanding freedom, in their personal lives and in the workshop and on the farm.

Condemn the use of oil, but remember that hundreds of millions of ordinary human beings depend on it to give them the kind of life that only a few generations ago could be lived only by a relative handful of the very, very rich.

The argument that it is demeaning to fight for oil is rooted in the idea that wars must be fought only for abstract principles like justice or freedom of honor.

But these abstractions have no meaning unless they in turn are rooted in the realities of everyday life, in how people work, what they value, etc. To say that we will not allow the oil fields of Kuwait and of Saudi Arabia (and, by extension, of the entire Middle East) to become the private property of an aggressive dictator with delusions of grandeur, is not some exercise in economics, or in energy production, but, instead, a firm and unmistakable commitment to defending a way of life whose material basis is inexorably linked with oil as an energy source.

*Patty
take
from Bob Michel
handed to
we at
I don't
meet in
Cab. room
Leadership
↓*

Some intellectuals may detest the American way of life, saying it is too materialistic, too crude, for their delicate tastes, and that oil is not worth fighting for. But Mr. President, your swift decision to rush American troops to the Middle East, had complex motivations as you have enumerated them and one is the realization that oil is, for good or ill, at the heart of the economic progress of our nation.

Many of those who scold us for relying too much on oil are precisely those who tell us nuclear power is bad, coal destroys the environment, and that the best our civilization can do is settle for less, the old Jimmy Carter malaise scenario. But if the "American Dream" means anything at all, it means a certain way of life, based on certain optimistic assumptions about material progress. That way of life, that progress, in the United States and in the western world, are based on oil.

If it is argued that Europe and Japan depend on Middle East oil more than we do, and that there should be more European soldiers and Japanese soldiers over in Saudi Arabia, I would agree, but American interests should not and cannot be linked with the actions or inactions of our allies. The choice we face is not one between intervention and isolation, but between intervention and decline. Arguments showing how we could "easily" survive without mid-east oil, and on how Saddam would be "forced" to sell us oil because he would need the money are ingenious. Saddam's control of mid-east oil would be the prologue to a new age in the Middle East, in which a latter-day Nasser, the "new Saladin" looked for by Muslims, would stride the Middle East like a Colossus. He'd quickly show the world what oil is worth.

We have troops in the Middle East for a number of inter-related reasons--one of them is keeping all that oil out of the hands of someone who would use it as a weapon against our values and our very way of life. We should not apologize for that. Every time you argue the case for your decision, Mr. President, you should list the various reasons for doing what you did, and included among them should be an unapologetic defense of our decision to keep oil from the hands of Saddam Hussein, in our own national interest.

###

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE:

11-29-

FROM THE PRESIDENT

To; John S and Brent

TO:

Latest on Possible Congressional
Action on Gulf.

Lunch with Foley and Michel
Both strongly oppose
special "lame duck" session.
They fear out of control House,
with lame duck people being
bad and newly elected feeling
left out. Can't narrow agenda,
thus there will be veto over ride
attempts and chaos.

Simpson calls in. He talked to Dole. Tomorrow
AM, Lugar, Kassebaum, Dole Simpson
will meet. They FAVOR lame duck
session. They will try to draft a resolution.
They worry Republicans are being branded
with "war" label. Confident
agenda can be narrowed to business of
Gulf Resolution. Can get accurate whip
count.

John McCain told me today he favors
"Special session now".



December 21, 1990

AIPAC

The American Israel
Public Affairs Committee
America's Pro-Israel Lobby

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, DC 20500

410 First Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 639-5200

Dear Mr. President:

During our last meeting on November 8, each of us expressed strong support for your goals in the Persian Gulf crisis. Let us assure you that we--as well as virtually the entire organized Jewish community--continue to support and admire your firm stand against Saddam Hussein's aggression. We agree with you that Iraq cannot be rewarded for its aggression, that Iraq's withdrawal must be unconditional, and that any linkage between the Gulf issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict must categorically be ruled out.

It is for this reason that we deeply regret the U.S. vote yesterday in favor of the latest Security Council resolution, an issue we also discussed in our November 8th meeting. We are aware that our UN delegation fought hard to remove some of the most egregious clauses from the nonaligned draft resolution; we appreciate those efforts. Nonetheless, the resolution remains unbalanced. We are particularly troubled by the Council's decision to "deplore" Israel's intention to deport four Palestinians, whereas the reference to the assassination of three Israeli workers by Palestinian terrorists which led to Israel's deportation decision is couched in vague and ambiguous terms. We are also disappointed by the depiction of Jerusalem as part of "the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967;" by the inauguration of a process leading to the convening of the Fourth Geneva Convention signatories; by the expansion of the mandate of UN personnel in the territories to include monitoring of the situation there; and by the support for the idea of an international conference in the Security Council Presidential Statement.

We know that you remain firmly opposed to Saddam Hussein's demand that linkage be established between the Gulf crisis and the situation in the territories. We are, however, concerned that the vote at this time in favor of an unfair resolution denouncing Israel will be widely interpreted as implicit U.S. acquiescence in such linkage.

Turning to another matter that we discussed in November, we hope the Administration will refrain from submitting to Congress a massive new arms deal with Saudi Arabia. As presently constituted, the sale would be irrelevant to the current crisis because delivery of the proposed equipment would take years. It would strain our commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative edge, and would further exacerbate the dangerous and debilitating arms race in the

- President:
Mayer Mitchell, AL
- Chairman of the Board:
Edward C. Levy, Jr., MI
- Chairmen of the Board,
Emeritus:
Robert H. Asher, IL
Lawrence Weinberg, CA
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Edward Sanders, CA
Morton Silberman, FL*
Lawrence Weinberg, CA
(*Deceased)


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Thomas A. Dine
- Operations Director:
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- Jerusalem
Richard Fishman
- Florida
Naomi Lauter
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Sam Witkin
- Southwest
Murray Wood
- Southern Pacific

Middle East. A Saudi arms sale would not advance U.S. interests in this most volatile of regions.


We continue to admire your steadfast approach to the Persian Gulf crisis and wish you success in reversing Iraq's aggression. At the same time, we ask that you move to repair the bruised U.S.-Israel relationship. Your friendly meeting with Prime Minister Shamir was an important step toward putting that vital relationship back on track. We are aware of your desire to make these meetings meaningful and successful. For the benefit of both countries, we ask that you continue on that path.

Finally, we wish you and your family a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. May 1991 be a year of peace with stability and security around the world.

Sincerely,



Mayer Mitchell
President



Thomas A. Dine
Executive Director

The members of the Security Council reaffirm their determination to support an active negotiating process in which all relevant parties would participate leading to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict through negotiations which should be based on resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security Council and which should take into account the right to security of all states in the region, including Israel, and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people.

In this context they agree that an international conference, at an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

→ However, the members of the Council agree that the appropriate time for such a conference will need to be decided by the parties to it. ~~remains to be discussed.~~

*Amir
Finnella ok*

In the view of the members of the Council, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait must be addressed independently each on its own merits.

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

is unique and must be addressed independently and on its own merits.

To: GOVERNOR SUNUNU
From: Bobbie Kilberg

Finnish Draft
12/18/90
00:30 a.m.

Shuf
The Security Council,

Reaffirming the obligations of member states under the United Nations Charter,

Reaffirming further the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war set forth in Security Council Resolution 242 (1967),

Having received the report of the Secretary-General submitted in accordance with Security Council Resolution 672 (1990) on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation and in particular taking note of paragraphs 20 - 26 therein (S/21919),

Taking note of the interest of the Secretary-General to visit and send his envoy to pursue his initiative with the Israeli authorities, as indicated in paragraph 22 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/21919), and of their recent invitation extended to him,

Gravely concerned at the dangerous deterioration of the situation in all the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and at the violence and rising tension in Israel,

Taking into consideration ^{the methods and approaches for} the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 17 December 1990 concerning an ~~international~~ ^{active negotiating process} for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict,

Recalling its resolutions 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 (1989) and 641 (1989) and alarmed by the decision of the Government of Israel to deport four Palestinians from the occupied territories in contravention of its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report contained in document S/21919,
2. Expresses its grave concern over the rejection by Israel of Security Council resolutions 672 (1990) and 673 (1990),
3. Deplores the decision by the Government of Israel, the occupying power, to resume deportations of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories,

4. Urges the Government of Israel to accept de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, to all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the said Convention;

5. Calls on the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel, the occupying power, for its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention in accordance with Article 1;

6. Requests the Secretary-General in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross to develop further the idea from the report of the Secretary-General (S/21919) of convening a meeting of the high contracting parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and to discuss possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention and for this purpose to invite these parties to submit their views on how the idea could contribute to the goals of the Convention as well as on other relevant matters and to report to the Council;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to monitor and observe the situation regarding Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation, making new efforts in this regard on an urgent basis, and to utilize and designate or draw upon the United Nations and other personnel and resources present there in the area and elsewhere needed to accomplish this task and to keep the Security Council regularly informed;

8. Requests further the Secretary-General to report on the progress in the implementation of this resolution ~~by (note: date to be determined in consultations with the SC))~~ and decides to remain seized of the matter.

by end of Feb/end of Mar

periodically every 4 months OK

9. Decides

193503

Frank P. Moynihan
New York

G. Burnette
Mr. F. MacClure

United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
November 26, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

Dick Lugar has told me of your telephone call to him and that settles the matter so far as I am concerned. I would, however, like to note the comment of the Administration official in the Washington Post on November 15, to the effect that "[the President] expects [members of Congress] to tell him their concerns before they run to 'Good Morning America'."

Fair enough, I never called you. But I did spend much of September and October near to pleading with Administration officials to help draft a resolution of support for your policy. Thus, September 24 on the floor:

As the human toll begins to rise, the President may well find his popularity ratings slumping and his congressional support evaporating.... How much better it would be if the Congress and the President take this opportunity to state that in this crisis we stand together in opposing this illegal invasion and enforcing the resolutions of the Security Council.

It happens I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of Foreign Relations and necessarily involved with the issue. I had a theory of the case. Namely that the United States was acting, as required by Article 25 of the Charter, to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, to pursue "measures not involving the use of armed force" as provided in Article 41. The issue of war powers did not arise and we could agree on a Joint Resolution endorsing our actions. I grant that there was not a great deal of support for this theory among my colleagues, but there was some. There was, however, none in the Administration. The attitude as conveyed to me was that no Congressional endorsement was required or desired.

We have been friends long enough for me to hope you will see this letter and understand why I have sent it.

Best,



The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1990

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

GWf
NOTE TO: WHITE HOUSE STAFF

FROM: BILL KRISTOL *JK/BK*

Here's the text of the speech the Vice President is delivering today at Seton Hall University. The speech discusses U.S. Persian Gulf policy in the broader context of our strategic objectives in the Middle East for the past 40 years, and addresses some of the moral issues at stake.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Embargoed until delivered -- 12:00 p.m. EST, November 29, 1990

PREPARED TEXT OF REMARKS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY
South Orange, New Jersey

Thank you. As always, I am happy to once again talk with the student body of an outstanding American University -- I did so last month at DePauw. As Vice President, I do a lot of international travel. Nothing makes me more proud than to hear the international community rave about America's colleges and universities.

Our finest schools have kept firmly in mind what Dr. Samuel Johnson, the great eighteenth century British man of letters, termed the "supreme end of education: expert discernment in all things -- the power to tell the good from the bad, the genuine from the counterfeit, and to prefer the good and the genuine to the bad and the counterfeit."

I am honored to have the opportunity to address the Seton Hall community -- a community which truly strives to promote "expert discernment in all things." Since your founding in 1856 by Bishop James Roosevelt Bayley, you have understood that questions of good and bad, right and wrong, are not just minor add-ons to the serious business of life. Rather, they constitute its very core. As the eighth largest Catholic university in the U.S., you have drawn on a rich tradition to promote a greater sense of moral discernment throughout your community and your

country. Your motto puts it in perspective: "Advance despite difficulties."

As all of you know, our country, along with the rest of the international community, currently faces a grave crisis in the Persian Gulf. This crisis carries with it the risk of war. Some in this country have questioned whether the U.S. has any interest in the Gulf that is worth fighting for. Today, I would like to step back a bit from the current debate. I'd like to speak to the larger perspectives of the subject that is too often presented in ten second soundbites on television. Why is the region so important? What have the strategic goals of U.S. Middle East policy been over the last forty years? And how do these goals apply in the current crisis?

The Middle East, as everyone knows, is the source of much of the oil on which the industrialized world and developing nations depend. It is a region of striking contrasts: Vast wealth and grinding poverty; secular radicalism and religious fundamentalism; hatred of the West and emulation of the West. Most importantly, perhaps, the Middle East is caught up in a vast process of change, as ancient societies and cultures strive to adapt to the modern world. This process of adaptation, which entails much turmoil and instability, is what makes the Middle East such an interesting place. Unfortunately, it also makes the Middle East a dangerous place.

Since the onset of the Cold War, the United States has had three strategic objectives in the region. The first objective

was to contain Soviet expansionism. In 1947, the Soviet threat to one regional state, Turkey, played a role in President Truman's decision to issue the doctrine that bears his name. Thirty-three years later, the threat of Soviet encroachment on another region of the Middle East -- the Persian Gulf -- led President Carter to proclaim the equivalent of the Truman Doctrine for the Gulf. The Carter Doctrine, which was also reinforced by President Reagan, warned that, "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

But the Cold War is over. And because it is over, because one of America's strategic objectives has been realized, some commentators have assumed that all of our objectives have been realized. They could not be more mistaken. For in addition to containing the Soviets, American foreign policy has traditionally pursued two other strategic objectives in the Middle East. It has sought to prevent any local Middle East power from achieving hegemony over its neighbors; and it has sought to secure the uninterrupted supply of oil at a reasonable price. Let me describe both of these objectives in greater detail.

Today, all the states of the Middle East face a major threat in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Saddam's ambitions are not confined to Kuwait. Rather, his goal is to dominate the Persian Gulf region and use its vast wealth to become the greatest Arab hero of

modern times, the leader of a new Arab superpower. To that end, he spent some fifty billion dollars on arms imports during the 1980's alone. He has launched two wars of aggression during this period, against Iran and against Kuwait, at a cost of some one million lives -- thus far. He has built the sixth largest military force in the world. He has acquired a sizeable stockpile of both chemical and biological weapons, and is estimated to have employed several thousand tons of chemical agents against Iranians and against his own people -- Iraqi Kurds -- in the 1980's. And he has launched a massive program to acquire nuclear weapons.

The United States opposes Saddam Hussein's bid for regional hegemony for the same reasons that we have opposed other bids. We do not think any government has the right to impose its political will on other countries through subversion or conquest. We do not think Israel's existence, or the existence of other friendly regional states, should be threatened. And, of course, the prospect of Saddam Hussein strutting across the world stage at the head of a malevolent global power, armed to the teeth with weapons of mass destruction, and controlling a large portion of the world's energy supplies, is something no sane person would welcome. That is why we are working to contain Saddam Hussein's bid for hegemony today -- just as we worked to contain other bids for hegemony yesterday.

Of course, no discussion of America's strategic objectives in the region is complete without mention of oil, so let me turn

to that issue now. A key strategic goal of U.S. Middle East policy has been to assure the uninterrupted flow of oil at reasonable prices. This does not mean, as some cynics have suggested, that we are risking war to prevent the price of oil from going up a few cents a gallon. During the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, and during the 1979 oil price shock that came in the wake of the Iranian revolution, the price of oil went up much more than that. But we never thought of going to war because the price of oil was too high. We were confident that market forces would eventually bring the price of oil down -- and we were right.

We did prepare for all contingencies, however, when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, coupled with instability in Iran, brought Soviet forces within striking distance of the Persian Gulf -- hence the Carter Doctrine. For if "any outside force", as the Carter Doctrine put it, could control the flow of Persian Gulf oil it would, as President Bush said, place our independence and way of life at risk. No nation should be willing to tolerate such a state of affairs, just as no individual should be willing to allow anyone to hold a gun to his or her head.

That is why President Carter was willing to commit the United States to preventing a single power -- the Soviet Union -- from controlling the Gulf. And that is why President Bush has dispatched American troops to Saudi Arabia to prevent another power -- Iraq this time -- from doing likewise. Neither President was prepared to jeopardize American security by

permitting, in President Bush's words, "a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless" -- either Leonid Brezhnev of Moscow, or Saddam Hussein of Baghdad.

So far, I have talked about traditional U.S. strategic objectives in the Middle East. But there is another strategic American objective in the current crisis that is not traditional -- that has only emerged, in fact, as a result of the end of the Cold War. This objective might be described as strengthening the foundations of world order. Let me explain what I mean.

When the Cold War was still raging, any regional crisis in the Third World contained within it the seeds of a possible Soviet-American confrontation. That is why, in the Middle East and elsewhere, both the United States and the Soviet Union often made significant efforts to restrain their clients from rash behavior. These efforts were part of the unwritten "rules of the game" that prevented Soviet-American competition from getting out of hand during the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, the chances of a Soviet-American clash in any Third World conflict, including the Middle East, have greatly diminished. Unfortunately, so have the traditional restraints that the superpowers used to impose on their regional clients. As a result, unless the U.N. Charter's rules about using force are not reaffirmed and defended fairly quickly, we face the dangerous prospect of a new, post-Cold War world that is actually more anarchic, and more violence-prone, than the world which preceded it.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-Cold War world. One way or another, it is bound to set a precedent -- either on behalf of greater world order or on behalf of greater chaos. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression, it is likely that his success will embolden other dictators to emulate his example. But if he fails -- and believe me, he will fail -- others will draw the lesson that might does not make right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed.

This is why President Bush has sought to rally the international community against Iraq's aggression. This is why the U.N. Security Council has passed ten resolutions condemning Iraq, and is considering yet another resolution today. This is why scores of nations have agreed to contribute economically or militarily to the joint effort against Saddam Hussein. And this is why twenty-seven nations have sent troops or military materiel to the Persian Gulf. Everyone recognizes that this is a test case. Everyone can see that, beyond America's traditional objectives in the region, what is at stake is nothing less than the shape of tomorrow.

None of these considerations, of course, frees us from the responsibility to proceed carefully. The moral and human implications of war -- any war -- are very grave. No reasonable effort should be spared in the quest for a peaceful solution. That is why, despite the use of American hostages as human shields, despite the outrages against our embassy, despite Iraq's

continued barbarism in Kuwait, we have refrained from military action against Saddam Hussein.

But even as we exercise patience and restraint, we must also be alert to the moral costs of such a course. Consider, for example, the fate of the people of Kuwait. With every day that passes, their plight grows more desperate. Being patient with Iraq allows Saddam Hussein to prolong their agony. Is this a moral course of action?

Or consider the fate of American military personnel in Saudi Arabia. The longer we refrain from action against Iraq, the more time Saddam Hussein has to tighten his grip on Kuwait, and the harder it may be to break that grip, if and when war comes. Does patience today risk greater American casualties tomorrow? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons. As President Bush told American troops in Saudi Arabia during Thanksgiving, "Each day that passes brings Saddam one day closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal...And we do know this for sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use." Will continued patience with Iraq help make the world vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

Please don't misunderstand me. I believe that every reasonable effort must be made to resolve this crisis peacefully. I also think that there must be limits to our patience. And those limits are reached when our restraint threatens to

undermine other, equally moral goals. These goals, as I said, include ending Kuwait's agony as soon as possible; minimizing American casualties in the event of war; and preventing Saddam Hussein from adding nuclear weapons to his already formidable arsenal of mass destruction. It is in order to prevent Saddam Hussein from thwarting these goals that the U.N. Security Council is expected to adopt a resolution today endorsing the use of force against Iraq if Saddam does not withdraw his forces from Kuwait.

The challenge the civilized world faces today is very grave. But it is not unprecedented. In 1936, the world faced a rather similar challenge when Adolf Hitler, who had only recently come to power, moved German troops into the Rhineland, in open defiance of the treaties of Versailles and Locarno. British and French leaders faced a major dilemma. To confront Hitler militarily could mean war. Not to confront him meant acquiescing in a cynical breach of international law. What to do?

But while British and French leaders vacillated between their hopes and their fears, one voice rang out loud and clear. On March 13, 1936, Winston Churchill called on the League of Nations to take tough action against German aggression. His words deserve to be quoted at some length:

"If no means of lawful redress can be offered to the aggrieved party," Churchill wrote, "the whole doctrine of international law and cooperation upon which the hopes of the future are based would lapse ignominiously..."

But the risk! No one must ignore it. How can it be minimized? There is a simple method: the assembly of an overwhelming force, moral and physical, in support of international law...If the forces at the disposal of the League of Nations are four or five times as strong as those that the aggressor can yet command, the chances of a peaceful and friendly solution are very good...

The constabulary of the world is at hand. On every side of Geneva stand great nations, armed and ready, whose interests as well as whose obligations bind them to uphold, and in the last resort enforce, the public law. This may never come to pass again. The fateful moment has arrived for choice between the New Age and the Old."

Tragically, most leaders did not see the stakes as clearly as Churchill did. They did not force the issue to a head in the League of Nations. Instead, they acquiesced in Hitler's aggression. When, many years later, Churchill called World War II the "unnecessary war", it was the failure of British and French statesmanship during the Rhineland crisis that he had in mind.

Today, the U.N. Security Council stands poised at an historic juncture not unlike that faced by the League of Nations in 1936. We are hopeful -- indeed, we are confident -- that it will not fail the test. Some will thoughtlessly say that a vote for today's U.N. resolution is a vote for war. We reject this idea. Saddam has shown that he understands no language other than the language of force. Today's U.N. resolution is our last and best hope for peace -- for a genuine peace, not the false peace that is only a prelude to another "unnecessary war."

Thank you, and God bless you.

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