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Subseries: Issues Files

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Folder ID Number: 29161-005

Folder Title:
Jewish Community 1991

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THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen and
shared with
POTUS

Jacob Stein
15 Winfield Terrace
Great Neck, N.Y. 11023

September 23, 1991

Governor John Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Governor,

As a follow-up to our phone conversation, please consider the following.

The Yom Kippur holiday this past week heard almost every Rabbi denounce the Bush press conference remarks relating to the Jewish group visit to Congress, both the substance and the tone of his remarks. The Rabbis interpreted his request to Congress to wait 120 days before acting on Israels request for a 10 Billion Dollar loan guarantee for humanitarian aid, as linkage to the issue of settlements and the peace conference.

Without dealing with the substance of the issues of guarantees, settlements or peace conference, consider these steps designed to maintain a dialogue with the opinion moulders in the Jewish Community.

- 1-The major Jewish organizations have a Washington office and their representatives meet on a regular basis. Their input to their organizations play an important role in determining the political positions their organizations communicate to their members.

I suggest these representatives have an early meeting with General Scowcroft.

- 2-The religious leaders who through publications and sermons play a major role in communicating political positions, should be invited to a lunch with Vice-President Quayle in New York. This should be with the representatives of the Synagogue Council of America, the umbrella group for the different Jewish groups. The Vice President enjoys a high regard in the community.

- 3-Members of the Conference of Presidents should meet with Secretary Baker for a briefing on his Middle East trip and an assessment of peace conference prospects. To be effective this meeting should not be combined with any other group..

Jacob Stein

Page 2

4-The Jewish Press should be briefed from your office or General Scowcroft's. These papers are widely read and their editorials have been very critical.


I realize that this requires a major effort on the part of many in the administration, but I think it can pay substantial dividends in increasing understanding of the issues, and of the even more difficult issues should peace talks get under way.

I suggest that during this period of tension that there be no group meetings with the President. At the present time they could be counter-productive.

If you wish help in implementing any of these suggestions, I can be helpful. If you don't like these thoughts, there's always the waste basket.

I hope the domestic trip was positive and focussed.

Warmest Regards

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Jacob', with a stylized flourish underneath.

900 Nineteenth Street N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20006
September 13, 1991

The Honorable George J. Mitchell
United States Senate
SR-176 Russell Senate Office Bldg
Washington, D.C. 20510-1902

Dear George:

While we are encouraged by Israel's initiative on the hostage issue, we believe that a successful Middle East peace conference is of overriding importance to the United States and to the people of that troubled region, both Arabs and Israelis. All considerations should be subordinate to that end.

As President Bush explained in his news conference Thursday, September 12, a significant problem has arisen. On the eve of the conference, Israel has requested quick congressional approval of \$10 billion in loan guarantees for immigrant-related housing and other projects.

It is the President's judgment that the peace negotiation will be more successful if consideration of this new Israeli aid package is postponed for 120 days. We believe the President's request is a reasonable and fair one. American public opinion strongly supports his position.

The principal leader in the search for peace in the Middle East is the President, and on this issue we urge that you give him your support.

Sincerely,



George McGovern



Adlai Stevenson III



Charles H. Percy



Edmund S. Muskie



J. William Fulbright




John B. Anderson



Martha Keys



Paul N. McCloskey



David R. Bowen



Paul Findley

Phil, 9/23
The original
was given to
the President.

Jacob Stein
15 Winfield Terrace
Great Neck, N.Y. 11023

September 20, 1991

Neal

Dear Patty,

The Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations will not be in the General Assembly when the President speaks on Monday, because of the Jewish Holiday of Succot.

He asked me to forward his letter to the President, explaining the absence of the Israeli delegation.

Many thanks. Enjoy the weekend.

Jacks



PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

800 SECOND AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

(212)351-5200

Dear Mr. President,

20/9/91

On Monday the 23rd of September Jews all over the world observe the Holiday of Succoth.

This Holiday, known in English as the Feast of Tabernacles, commemorates the wanderings of the Jews in the desert following the Exodus from Egypt.

It is a matter of great personal regret that I and my delegation cannot be present in the General Assembly on that day.

I will follow with interest your remarks as an acknowledged friend of Israel.

I look forward to a year of fruitful efforts in the United Nations during the 46th session of the General Assembly.

With respect and friendship
Yoram Avidor.

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DATE: September 19, 1991

TO: John H. Sununu

FROM: A.H. Moses

ROOM: 1311

2

Pages (including cover)

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NEWS FROM THE Committee



The American Jewish
Committee

Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56 Street
New York, New York 10022
212 751-4000

Morton Yarmon
Director of Public Relations

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; advocates public policy positions rooted in American democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the U.S.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

**THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen**

NEW YORK, Sept. 16 ...The following statement was issued today by Alfred H. Moses, President, and David A. Harris, Executive Vice President, of the American Jewish Committee:

"The American Jewish Committee expresses its revulsion and complete disavowal of the reprehensible attack on President Bush as an 'anti-Semite' and 'liar' by Rehavam Ze'evi, a far-right member of the Israeli Cabinet. President Bush is neither. It is a sad day when honest differences of opinion of major political importance are met with ugliness of this kind. The Israeli Cabinet would be best advised to actively discourage such scurrilous and undocumented language by any of its members in the future. In this regard, Defense Minister Arens' quick repudiation of Ze'evi's outrageous comments was most welcome."

Alfred H. Moses, President and Chair, Board of Governors • Mimi Alperin, Chair, National Executive Council

Bruce M. Ramer, Chair, Board of Trustees • Robert S. Jacobs, Chair, Executive Committee

David A. Harris, Executive Vice President

Washington Office, 2027 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington DC 20036 • Israel Office, P.O. Box 1538, Jerusalem 91410

CSAE 1707

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen - *Bobbie K.*
will finalize

DRAFT

D R A F T

Dear Abe:

Thank you for your letter outlining the recent events that have occurred in the Crown Heights section of New York. I was deeply saddened to learn about the loss of life, and I share your concern for the members of the Lubavitch community who now fear for their safety and well-being.

Misunderstandings too often can lead to intolerance, to bigotry and to racial and anti-semitic hatred. As a Nation and as individuals, we have a moral obligation not to allow ethnic and racial conflicts such as those that occurred in Crown Heights to continue. We must work hard to create a healthy respect and tolerance for the rights of all Americans.

My thoughts and prayers go out to all the citizens of Crown Heights at this most difficult time.

Sincerely,

George Bush

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MARK EDELMAN****Washington Representative
JESSE N. HORDEN****General Counsel
KARLO FORSTER**

September 5, 1991

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Throughout your public life you have always been in the forefront in speaking out against racism and anti-Semitism. Your recent comments at Babl Yar about anti-Semitism and nationalistic bigotry only underscore your commitment to root out this evil. We at the Anti-Defamation League have spent the past 78 years combatting this pernicious form of discrimination. Therefore, I feel I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to write to you now and share with you our concern about recent events in the Crown Heights area of New York City.

As I am sure you know, this area has been a tinderbox since the death of a black child in an auto accident and shortly thereafter the murder of a young Hassidic man. This young Jewish student was viciously attacked solely because he was a Jew.

While some local officials have spoken out and have attempted to ease tension and heal wounds, there has not been a strong outcry by other public officials. Many in the Crown Heights Jewish community, composed primarily of Lubavitcher Hassidim, are stricken by fear for their safety and well being and many feel isolated and under a state of siege in their homes and synagogues.

Unfortunately, outsiders have come into the community with inflammatory rhetoric and have incited what has become an explosive situation. We believe that this kind of verbal poison not only can lead to further violence but can lead to other hatreds, other victims. Today the Jewish community feels threatened, tomorrow other groups may be the victims -- Hispanics, African Americans, Italian Americans or any other identifiable religious or ethnic group.


September 5, 1991

-2-

We believe that it is proper for you to address this issue and as you have in the past set the high moral tone necessary to help calm the tensions and let the world know that we are all interested in and affected by the fight against anti-Semitism and bigotry.

With our high holy days rapidly approaching, I hope you will use this opportunity to voice your concern about this matter and help bring the light of public opinion to bear in this very sensitive and serious situation.

Sincerely,



Abraham H. Foxman
National Director

AHF:lk

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From Bobbie Kilberg to Jose Martinez Re: Delegation to Babi Yar [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (4 pp.)	9/16/91	P2, P5 , (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Jewish Community 1991

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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR JOSE MARTINEZ

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG ^{EK}
SUBJ: DELEGATION TO BABI YAR

In the ten days between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur in 1941, over 33,000 Jews were murdered at Babi Yar. In the 18 months that followed, approximately 22,000 additional Jews were murdered as well as Ukrainians, Gypsies, Russians, Poles, Soviet prisoners of war and the hospitalized handicapped, for a total that may have reached 100,000 people. The following is my recommendation for a Presidential delegation to the 50th anniversary commemoration at Babi Yar:

(b)(6)

2. Miles Lerman

Miles Lerman is a Holocaust survivor who fought as a partisan in Poland during the War. He is a member of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council and is Chairman of the Council's national fundraising campaign for the Holocaust Memorial Museum and also its International relations committee. The Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council (this is a Presidential-appointed Council) is Bud Meyerhoff. Meyerhoff has designated Lerman as the Council's representative to the Babi Yar commemoration.

Meyerhoff cannot attend himself. Lerman resides in New Jersey.



(b)(6)

5. Ben Meed

Ben Meed is a Holocaust survivor who is President of the American Gathering/Federation of Jewish Holocaust Survivors. He is a member of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, Chairman of the Council's Days of Remembrance committee and a member of the museum content committee. He has been very supportive of the President and the President knows him. Meed resides in New York City.

(b)(6)

Office: 212 239-4250




8. The Rev. Dr. John Pawlikowski

(b)(6)

Father Pawlikowski is a priest of Polish descent who is a member of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, Chairman of its church relations committee, and vice-chairman of its education committee. He is a professor of social ethics at Catholic Theological Union and a member of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. In addition, Father Pawlikowski has been very active in fostering Christian-Jewish understanding as a leader of the Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations and is a leading Catholic voice on Holocaust issues. He resides in Chicago.


(b)(6)



10.. Abrahan Foxman

Abe Foxman is a Holocaust survivor and National Director of the Anti-Defamation League. He is personally very supportive of the President and has often acted as an intermediary for us with other Jewish groups and individuals. He represents ADL in meetings with the President in the Oval Office and Roosevelt Room on issues of importance to the Jewish community. He and the President are good friends. Foxman resides in New York City.

Office: 212 490-2525



cc: Governor Sununu ✓
General Scowcroft
Andy Card
Dave Demarest
Connie Horner

(b)(6)



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JEWISH
COALITION**

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Arnold Thaler
Randolph L. White

Executive Director
Matthew Brooks

September 12, 1991

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Throughout your distinguished career, you have spoken out with conviction and compassion on the issue of Soviet Jewry. Your public recognition of America's moral responsibility, combined with your vigorous actions, have helped to bring about this miraculous exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union to the freedom and safety of Israel.

Similarly, your unhesitating actions in support of Ethiopian Jews have made a major contribution to their escape to Israel. History, which remembers the inaction of world leaders who might have prevented the Holocaust, will record that, on your watch, two entire Jewish communities fleeing oppression found freedom in their historic homeland.

In this dramatic context, there is an urgent and pressing need to help Israel carry out the daunting task of absorbing these new immigrants -- providing them with adequate shelter, productive jobs, education for their children, as well as the dignity they deserve. As you know, Israel does not ask the United States to fund this enormous effort, but instead seeks U.S. assistance in guaranteeing the loans that will enable her to complete the process.

These loan guarantees represent the final chapter in America's efforts to save Soviet and Ethiopian Jewry, the ultimate act in a long-term United States commitment to see these people free and safe. Israel is facing the monumental task of absorbing these new immigrants. The need for these loan guarantees is great, and immediate.

Mr. President, this is a humanitarian issue of the highest priority -- assisting people who have left family, careers, and everything they know to find new hope, freedom and opportunity in Israel. As the leader of the free world, committed to helping all people achieve freedom, this commitment deserves your attention. Indeed, in all our conversations with you and the Secretary of State, you have both made clear your understanding of the overriding moral responsibility the United States has assumed. We are grateful for your commitment to provide these people with the opportunity and wherewithal to start anew in Israel.

Frankly, we are now worried that other issues are intruding into consideration of how to realize this humanitarian goal. In the process, it appears as if the United States is wavering in its commitment. Out of our own deep concern for the completion of this historic effort, we urge you to proceed with the provision of the loan guarantees. It is crucial that this humanitarian effort be undertaken independently of other issues, and without delay, for the sake of the thousands of Soviet and Ethiopian Jews who need our help.

Sincerely,

Max M. Fisher
Honorary Chairman

Richard J. Fox
Co-Chairman

George Klein
Co-Chairman

(202) 547-7701
Fax: 544-2434
415 SECOND STREET, N.E.
SUITE 100
WASHINGTON, DC 20002

To: GOVERNOR SUMNU
From: BOBBIE KILBERG
FYI

MEMORANDUM

TO: BOBBIE KILBERG
FAX NO. - 456-1647

FR: LEVI RABINOWITZ

DATE: SEPTEMBER 17, 1991

=====

Last evening Rabbi Moshe Feldman, Chairman of the powerful Budget Committee in the Israeli Keneset, moved to effectively terminate additional settlement activity in Judea and Samaria, at least through the Succot holiday period or until the beginning of October.

Rabbi Feldman, who leads the Ger Hasidic movements political activities in Israel, beat back MP's who support Housing Minister Arik Sharon and Likud representatives on the Budget Committee.

"Emotions are out of control. Historic opportunities are too fragile to do nothing", said Rabbi Feldman. "A cooling off period is absolutely and vitally needed and these actions provide all parties with time to re-think priorities."

"We have life-long friends in America who look to us to take responsible actions now, not later. Blocking additional settlement monies, as has been accomplished, is in the best interests of all people of good faith."

Rabbi Feldman was joined by a coalition of Budget Committee members who pledged themselves to a hiatus in settlement activity. "Settlements cannot be built without money and we have closed the bank, at least for now.", said Feldman.

Rabbi Elimelech Naiman, International Chairman of the Ger Hasidic movement played a major role in Rabbi Feldman's decision to hold-up settlement appropriations. Since President Bush's news conference in which the President asked Congress for a 120 day postponement on loan guarantees for Israel, Rabbi Naiman has exerted his influence on peers in Israel to put the brakes on settlement appropriations.



NEWS FROM THE Committee



The American Jewish
Committee

Institute of Human Relations
165 East 56 Street
New York, New York 10022
212 761-4000

Morton Yarmon
Director of Public Relations

TO: GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM: Bobbie Kilberg
FYI.

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; advocates public policy positions rooted in American democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the U.S.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NEW YORK, Sept. 16 ...The following statement was issued today by Alfred H. Moses and David A. Harris, President and Executive Vice President respectively of the American Jewish Committee:

"The American Jewish Committee notes with concern and regret the escalation of the past several days of the rhetoric between Israel and the United States, which may be misinterpreted in some quarters as a basic conflict. Nothing is further from the truth. Over the years Israel and the U.S. have joined in a confluence of views on many matters and at this moment share the fervent hope that a historic peace conference to settle the problems of the Middle East is just ahead. Both Washington and Jerusalem are working earnestly toward the shared goal of Arab-Israeli talks, and we are encouraged by the reported progress to date. It would only hearten the foes of both Israel and the U.S. for the present charged atmosphere to be allowed to continue. We earnestly hope there will immediately be a pulling back from the precipice so that the overwhelming basic and fundamental interests of Israel and the U.S. can now move forward.

"President Bush's endorsement of the principle of U.S. support for Israel's efforts to absorb hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews is welcome. Efforts must now be made to reach agreement on the aid itself, which is so critical to Israel's ability to resettle hundreds of thousands of Soviet and Ethiopian refugees seeking a new home, and to make clear that this humanitarian aid is not compromised by linking it to other issues."

91960-171

Alfred H. Moses, President and Chair, Board of Governors • Mimi Alperin, Chair, National Executive Council

Bruce M. Ramer, Chair, Board of Trustees • Robert S. Jacobs, Chair, Executive Committee

David A. Harris, Executive Vice President

Washington Office, 2027 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington DC 20036 • Israel Office, P.O. Box 1536, Jerusalem 91410

CSAE 1707



NATIONAL JEWISH COALITION

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In this dramatic context, there is an urgent and pressing need to help Israel carry out the daunting task of absorbing these new immigrants -- providing them with adequate shelter, productive jobs, education for their children, as well as the dignity they deserve. As you know, Israel does not ask the United States to fund this enormous effort, but instead seeks U.S. assistance in guaranteeing the loans that will enable her to complete the process.

These loan guarantees represent the final chapter in America's efforts to save Soviet and Ethiopian Jewry, the ultimate act in a long-term United States commitment to see these people free and safe. Israel is facing the monumental task of absorbing these new immigrants. The need for these loan guarantees is great, and immediate.

Mr. President, this is a humanitarian issue of the highest priority -- assisting people who have left family, careers, and everything they know to find new hope, freedom and opportunity in Israel. As the leader of the free world, committed to helping all people achieve freedom, this commitment deserves your attention. Indeed, in all our conversations with you and the Secretary of State, you have both made clear your understanding of the overriding moral responsibility the United States has assumed. We are grateful for your commitment to provide these people with the opportunity and wherewithal to start anew in Israel.

Frankly, we are now worried that other issues are intruding into consideration of how to realize this humanitarian goal. In the process, it appears as if the United States is wavering in its commitment. Out of our own deep concern for the completion of this historic effort, we urge you to proceed with the provision of the loan guarantees. It is crucial that this humanitarian effort be undertaken independently of other issues, and without delay, for the sake of the thousands of Soviet and Ethiopian Jews who need our help.

Sincerely,

Max M. Fisher
Max M. Fisher
Honorary Chairman

Richard J. Fox
Richard J. Fox
Co-Chairman

George Klein
George Klein
Co-Chairman

(202) 547-7701
Fax: 544-2434
415 SECOND STREET, N.E.
SUITE 100
WASHINGTON, DC 20002

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	From Bobbie Kilberg to POTUS Re: Jewish Community Reaction to Thursday Press Conference on Loan Guarantees Delay (2 pp.)	9/16/91	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Jewish Community 1991

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 4/21/09

Date Closed: 1/4/2005	OA/ID Number: 29161-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0004-F[2]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG *BK*
SUBJ: JEWISH COMMUNITY REACTION TO THURSDAY PRESS
CONFERENCE ON LOAN GUARANTEES DELAY

Since your press conference on Thursday, my office has heard from most of the leaders of the organized Jewish community. We have also received calls from individual citizens of the Jewish faith who are expressing their personal opinions. By Friday afternoon, these calls had a disturbing tone that Governor Sununu and I think you need to be aware of.

In response to reporters' questions during the press conference, you referred to "1,000 lobbyists on the Hill" and to being "up against some powerful political forces" who were opposing the Administration on the timing of the loan guarantees. Those two phrases caused great concern within the Jewish community and have led to unfounded, but nonetheless felt and verbalized, fears that we are challenging the Jewish community's right to express themselves as American citizens. I am attaching Shoshana Cardin's letter to you which addresses that fear which I believe is fairly widespread. *it was 70 I believe*

Today, the Israeli paper HaAraiz reported on a conversation that you supposedly had with one of your "closest Jewish friends". The newspaper is written in Hebrew and George Klein translated the relevant portions of the article for me as follows: "President Bush said that those 1,000 Jewish individuals . . . need to decide if they are American or Israeli. If they are Israeli, then what are they doing here?". I have attached the Anti-Defamation League's Israeli news summary which tracks George's translation pretty closely. This story was also picked up by the American Jewish press. Within that part of the Jewish community that reads the Jewish press, those quotes raised the anxiety level further. ** not printed*

** Bobbie*
** This is a vicious lie. It's a crying shame when this kind of ugly lie is printed - no source, simply "spread the ugliness"*

Bobbie
Thanks for this update. I hate it that you are in such an awkward position. This, too, shall pass - New Year - happy New Year to you - CB

9-17

You need to be aware that for the first time ever individuals have reported to me that they are getting calls accusing us of "country club anti-semitism." I hesitated about even telling you about this but Governor Sununu and I agreed that you need to know about the depth of feeling out there within the Jewish community. On a positive note, Abe Foxman issued a press release on behalf of the Anti-Defamation League that denounces the anti-semitic charges as "highly irresponsible and completely unacceptable" and states they should "have no place in this serious debate."

contrue!!
ugly!!
nasty!!

good
Abe's a
good
man

*E say
this* On another positive note, an outrageous statement by Israeli Cabinet minister Rehavan Zeevi that asserted you were anti-semitic was publicly denounced by major Jewish groups. I have attached the press statements of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the American Jewish Congress, the Orthodox Union and The Anti-Defamation League.

Our request for the loan guarantees delay will most likely be criticized at synagogue services for Yom Kippur on Tuesday evening and Wednesday. We should expect this to occur at Jewish congregations throughout the country.

We are receiving requests for a meeting of Jewish leaders with you. Governor Sununu and I believe that a meeting is premature at this point and we should revisit it when you return from your trip. We do agree that a response to Shoshanna Cardin's letter in which you restate your firm belief in the right of all Americans to express their views would be beneficial at this time.

cc: David Demarest

**CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS**

Shoshana S. Cardin
Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein
Executive Director
September 13, 1991

The Honorable George Bush
President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,


We recognize and appreciate your past and continuing support for the State of Israel and the successful absorption of Soviet Jewish and Ethiopian refugees. We also share your aspirations for the proposed Middle East peace conference and direct negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Because of our commitment to the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews who have arrived in Israel and the countless others who have yet to emigrate, we support Israel's request for loan guarantees to enable these new immigrants to become productive and self-supporting citizens in their new homeland. For that reason more than 1200 Americans representing Jewish communities in 40 states and numerous Christian leaders, came to Washington to meet with their senators and congressmen. They came out of personal conviction to participate in a day of education and dialogue on a matter of great concern -- a matter which has often been misconstrued. They were exercising their right - even obligation - as American citizens, consistent with the democratic process, to advocate their position on this vital humanitarian issue. A position we believe to be consistent with the efforts for peace in the Middle East, with United States national interests, with the needs of our ally Israel and the absorption of Soviet and Ethiopian Jews.

Therefore, I found some of the comments at your press conference on Thursday to be disturbing and subject to misinterpretation. In particular, the references to "1,000 lobbyists on the Hill working the other side of the question" and to the "powerful political forces" trouble me and many others.

Reasonable people can have honest differences on issues. Clearly, we agree on far more than we disagree. We are committed to the same principles, even if we differ on timing or other specific aspects. These differences are best resolved through dialogue and close communication. I am confident that with good will and cooperation on all sides the two goals of achieving a comprehensive Middle East peace and enabling acknowledged pressing human needs to be adequately addressed, can and will be met.

Sincerely yours,


Shoshana S. Cardin
Chairman

ISRAEL OFFICE: 30 King David Street, Jerusalem 94101, Israel

MEMORANDUM

To: A. Foxman, K. Jacobson, J. Ditchak, B. Zuckerbrot, M. Rappaport, M. Kass, J. Hordes, M. Medin
From: ADL Jerusalem - D.W.
Date: Monday, September 16, 1991
Subject: Israel News Summary for Today

1. Baker's meeting with Shamir is at 3:30 p.m. today. He's meeting the Palestinians in the American Colony Hotel (eastern Jerusalem) at 7 p.m. Staying until tomorrow p.m.
2. HaAretz: Bush in private conversation demands to know whether the "1,000 lobbyists" are loyal Americans or Israelis. "And if they're Israelis, what're they doing here?" Bush reportedly said. Attached. Aaron Miller in conversation reported to have accused Israel of providing the U.S. with false reports on settlement activity (Yediot).
3. HaAretz: Shoval recommends that Israel not compromise, at least until Israel wins a partial victory by getting the guarantees approved in the Senate Appropriations Committee. But support for Solars compromise growing. Some papers say that Bush quietly OKs the Solars idea, and Shamir too. Others say that Bush and Shamir still bent on confrontation, without compromise.
4. HaAretz: Egypt & the PLO have brokered an agreement on the composition of a Palestinian delegation which might be acceptable to Israel. Would include Eli Abu Hilal, the deportee from Abu Dis who was allowed to return last week. Abu Dis used to be part of eastern Jerusalem, but isn't today. Abu Hilal may join the Baker meeting today.
5. With Baker, Israel to raise Arafat's involvement in last week's terrorist attempt (in which 1 U.N. soldier was killed). See attached Jerusalem Post story. HaAretz speculates that Arafat is increasing terrorist activity to cover his flank, while offering diplomatic compromises regarding a Palestinian delegation.
6. All papers: New terrorist threat to Soviet Jews at European transit points. Mossad dispatches additional security teams.
7. Attack on IDF patrol near Jenin kills one Israeli soldier. Significant increase in use of firearms by Palestinians in the territories.

Attached: 4 pages of clippings.

DW

HAARETZ
16 SEPT '91

בוש: לגבי אלף יהודים

כיום חוקקו שלו במסיבת התקשורת
בית המדרש העברי
על בונה ה נספר למנהיגים ישראליים
רבים במאסיבתם, במסיבות עם
שגרירי המדינות של בוש והוא
הדלגה לעיתונות אנטישמית והוא
הוא "המאסיבה" שיש לה, והוא
בקשרי התקשורת עם המפלגה והוא
במסיבות, והוא על מנתו ה של
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הוא האנטישמי, ולנכד העניין זה

"האנטישמי" שיש לו ויהא כי
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בוש: לגבי אלף יהודים

בארה"ב הנשיא הוא לא כלום

תקף בתריפות את ראשי יהדות ארה"ב

הוא ענין אחר

נשיא ארה"ב ג'ורג' בוש, תקף במסיבת התקשורת שבדכדו את
ראשי יהדות ארה"ב בשם מסיבות הנכד, שהם מסיבות לנכד
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Abel
Ken
Blumen

SUP-16-91 MON 17:25

P.01



Contact: Richard Cohen Associates **For Immediate Release**
CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS
OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

Shoshana S. Cardin
Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein
Executive Director

CHAIRMAN OF PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE ASSAILS
'SLUR' BY ISRAELI AGAINST PRESIDENT BUSH

In a statement issued today (Monday, Sept. 16), Shoshana S. Cardin, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said:

"The attack against President Bush by the head of a tiny fringe party in Israel is an unacceptable and reprehensible slur. President Bush has played a crucial -- indeed, vital -- role in winning freedom for hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union and tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews who have been able to emigrate to Israel in large part because of his personal efforts in their behalf.

"We deplore and dissociate ourselves from the slanderous statement reported in this morning's press. It does not reflect the view of the American Jewish community, nor -- I am confident -- that of the people of Israel.

"We endorse the condemnation of that statement as expressed yesterday by Israel's Minister of Defense, Moshe Arens, in reflecting the view of the Israel government."

9/16/91

X

X

X



SIMON WIESENTHAL CENTER

Phone: (213) 553-9036

Telefax: (213) 553-8007

CONTACT: Avra Shapiro, Director of Communications
Michele Elsmann, Assistant

PRESS INFORMATION

September 16, 1991

WIESENTHAL CENTER DENOUNCES ISRAELI CABINET MINISTER'S REMARK

The Simon Wiesenthal Center denounced Israeli Cabinet Minister Rehavan Zeevi's assertion that President George Bush is an antisemite.

"Antisemites don't go out of their way to rescue Ethiopian Jews and send them to Israel and antisemites don't shed tears when they visit Auschwitz and Babi Yar, said Rabbi Marvin Hier, Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center. While I strongly disagree with the President's refusal to move ahead with the \$10 billion loan guarantee - even after the 120 days he requested - and while I was dismayed by some of the terminology the President used which can be fodder for antisemites, calling the President of the United States an antisemite is absurd and false," he added.

For more information, contact the Center's Communications department, (213) 553-9036.

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AJ Congress

* * *

American Jewish Congress
Stephen Wise Congress House
15 East 84th Street
New York, NY 10028
212 879 4500 • Fax 212 249 3672

News

Contact: Andrea Binder
Associate Director of Communications
212-360-1541

For Immediate Release
September 16, 1991

**AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS PRESIDENT CALLS ISRAELI
CABINET MINISTER'S REMARKS INEXCUSABLE
Urges His Removal From The Cabinet**

The following statement was issued by Robert K. Lifton,
president of the American Jewish Congress:

Rehevan Ze'evi's offensive remarks about President Bush are inexcusable. We strongly support the Israeli request for U.S. loan guarantees. However, to ascribe anti-Semitism to President Bush because he disagrees with an aspect of Israel's policy is a terrible injustice to the President and calls for a clear repudiation by Prime Minister Shamir.

Ze'evi represents no significant opinion within the government or the people of Israel. His remarks are doubly repugnant coming from someone who advocates the ugly idea of "transfer," the forceful expulsion of Palestinians from the territories. Ze'evi is surely just about the last person to lecture President Bush, or anyone else for that matter, on how to respond to humanitarian needs.

At the time that Ze'evi was appointed to the Cabinet earlier this year, the American Jewish Congress described the appointment as "reprehensible." Even members of the Likud found it appalling, and Knesset member Benjamin Begin called it "political pollution." In light of this most recent outrageous statement by Ze'evi, Prime Minister Shamir should remove him forthwith from the cabinet.

-end-



MARK A. EDELMAN
Director, Media and Marketing

RICH KLEIN
Manager, Media Relations

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

New York, NY, September 16...Charges that President Bush is an anti-Semite because he requested that Congress delay for 120 days discussion about loan guarantees to Israel are "highly irresponsible, completely unacceptable" and "have no place in this serious debate," the Anti-Defamation League asserted today.

In a statement issued here, Melvin Salberg, ADL's national chairman, and Abraham H. Foxman, the League's national director, said:

"Accusations of anti-Semitism should never be made lightly. We are all deeply concerned with the Administration's current position regarding Israel's request for loan guarantees and we publicly communicated our concerns about the President's unfortunate tone last week. But to describe President Bush as an anti-Semite is without foundation and weakens the meaning of the term."

#

D R A F T

Dear Abe:

Thank you for your letter outlining the recent events that have occurred in the Crown Heights section of New York. I was particularly touched and moved by your kind comments on my longstanding opposition to racism and anti-semitism. I was deeply saddened to learn about the tragic deaths of Gavin Cato and Yankel Rosenbaum. I share your concern for the members of the Lubavitch community. No one living in Crown Heights, or any community in America, should fear for their safety and well-being because of their race or religion.

Misunderstandings too often can lead to intolerance, to bigotry and to racial and anti-semitic hatred. As a Nation and as individuals, we have a moral obligation not to allow ethnic and racial conflicts such as those that occurred in Crown Heights to continue. We must work hard to create a healthy respect and tolerance for the rights of all Americans.

My thoughts and prayers go out to all the citizens of Crown Heights at this most difficult time.

Sincerely,

George Bush

**OFFICERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION**

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MELVIN SALBERG

National Director
ABRAHAM H. FORMAN

Chairman, National
Executive Committee
DAVID H. STRAUSSER

Associate National Director
JUSTIN J. FINGER

Executive Associate National Director
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KENNETH JACOBSON

Leadership
Assistant to the National Director
MARVIN S. RAFFAPORT

Media and Marketing
MARK EDELMAN

Washington Representative
JESS M. HORDIS

General Counsel
ARNOLD FORSTER



September 5, 1991

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Throughout your public life you have always been in the forefront in speaking out against racism and anti-Semitism. Your recent comments at Babi Yar about anti-Semitism and nationalistic bigotry only underscore your commitment to root out this evil. We at the Anti-Defamation League have spent the past 78 years combatting this pernicious form of discrimination. Therefore, I feel I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to write to you now and share with you our concern about recent events in the Crown Heights area of New York City.

As I am sure you know, this area has been a tinderbox since the death of a black child in an auto accident and shortly thereafter the murder of a young Hassidic man. This young Jewish student was viciously attacked solely because he was a Jew.

While some local officials have spoken out and have attempted to ease tension and heal wounds, there has not been a strong outcry by other public officials. Many in the Crown Heights Jewish community, composed primarily of Lubavitcher Hassidim, are stricken by fear for their safety and well being and many feel isolated and under a state of siege in their homes and synagogues.

Unfortunately, outsiders have come into the community with inflammatory rhetoric and have instigated what has become an explosive situation. We believe that this kind of verbal poison not only can lead to further violence but can lead to other hatreds, other victims. Today the Jewish community feels threatened, tomorrow other groups may be the victims -- Hispanics, African Americans, Italian Americans or any other identifiable religious or ethnic group.

September 5, 1991

-2-

We believe that it is proper for you to address this issue and as you have in the past set the high moral tone necessary to help calm the tensions and let the world know that we are all interested in and affected by the fight against anti-Semitism and bigotry.

With our high holy days rapidly approaching, I hope you will use this opportunity to voice your concern about this matter and help bring the light of public opinion to bear in this very sensitive and serious situation.

Sincerely,



Abraham H. Foxman
National Director

AHF:lk

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	From POTUS to John Sununu, Brent Scowcroft Re: Phone Call from Jack Stein (1 pp.)	9/13/91	P/5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Jewish Community 1991

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 4/21/08

Date Closed: 1/4/2005	OA/ID Number: 29161-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0004-F[2]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



September 13, 1991

To: John S and Brent

Re: Phone call from Jack Stein.

Jack raised two points of concern:

1. Community feels I labeled them all "lobbyists" and implied that they didn't have a right to 'petition' their MC's as just plain citizens. He drew a distinction between Lobbyists such as AIPAC and just plain citizens lobbying. Many felt that my comments somehow put all in the class of 'lobbyists' AIPAC belongs there, but many people didn't.

I told him I'd be glad to clear this up. Shoshana Cardin (sp?) will send me a letter on this point only and I will reply telling her that everyone has a right to petition their Congressmen etc. (I told Jack this seemed a little defensive on their part but glad to try to correct this).

2. Separate the Peace Process from "Humanitarian Aid". We agreed this is very tough but that nice if a way could be found.

In sum, Stein was his friendly, loyal, constructive self. I told him I felt badly he had these worries over the holidays. ewtc.

07

FROM THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG^{BK}
KATHY JEAUVONS^{KJ}

SUBJECT: Jewish community reaction to lifting sanctions
against South Africa

Both the Anti-Defamation League and B'nai B'rith have issued statements supporting your decision to lift trade sanctions against South Africa. Their press releases are attached.

cc: General Scowcroft
David Demarest

BARBARA WALDEN
Director, Communications Division

NEWS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

New York, NY, July 10...The Anti-Defamation League today expressed its support for President Bush's decision to lift U.S. sanctions against South Africa.

In a statement issued here, Melvin Salberg, ADL's national chairman, and Abraham H. Foxman, the League's national director, said:

"We accept the President's assessment that South Africa has met the conditions for change embodied in the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. It represents an important step in encouraging further changes toward racial equality.

"The League will continue to monitor the conduct of the South African government to ensure that progress continues and that a democratic society based on racial equality emerges."

#

BP;BIG-50; FAX (mc): WHITEHOUSE,COLUMNISTS,ISRAELI -91

B'nai B'rith

-NEWS

From the World's Largest Jewish Organization

1640 Rhode Island Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 857-8536
Press Office: 7th Floor • Fax (202) 296-1092

Date: July 10, 1991

No. 91-54

Release: Immediate

Contact: Buzzy Gordon

B'NAI B'RITH SUPPORTS LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST PRETORIA

WASHINGTON, DC -- B'nai B'rith today expressed its support for the suspension of U.S. trade sanctions against South Africa, as announced by President Bush.

B'nai B'rith President Kent E. Schiner noted that much remains to be accomplished in the struggle to dismantle apartheid: the efficacious implementation of recent legislation, and the enfranchisement of the black population. "Nevertheless," Mr. Schiner said, "verifiable progress has been made, and the U.S. administration's decision is certainly correct, proper, and in compliance with the law.

"We believe," Mr. Schiner added, "that the continuation of sanctions at this stage would only complicate reform efforts and create further economic hardship for all South African citizens, especially the black community."

B'nai B'rith has more than 500,000 members in 47 countries, including South Africa (District 24).

###

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Washington Representative

FRAN N. MOORE

General Counsel

ARNOLD FORSTER



June 26, 1991

The Honorable John Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Sununu:

There have been reports in the press in recent days that you have told several individuals that Jewish groups were working against you or egging on others to work against you. We know that you are sensitive to the consequences such expressions could have, and find it hard to believe that these stories are true.

As reports like these will undoubtedly circulate more widely if not countered, we believe it would be helpful for you to publicly clarify your views on this subject as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Melvin Salberg
Melvin Salberg
National Chairman

Abraham H. Foxman
Abraham H. Foxman
National Director

MS-AHF/nmh



CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

Shoshana S. Cardin
Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein
Executive Director

June 25, 1991

Governor John Sununu
White House Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Fax # 202-456-2397

Dear Governor,

We regret assertions contained in recent articles about you, particularly those in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post. The allusions to the role of supporters of Israel are offensive and without foundation. We trust that you know that these allegations are not true and are confident that they do not reflect your view.

Sincerely yours,

Shoshana S. Cardin

Shoshana S. Cardin
Chairman

Malcolm I. Hoenlein
Malcolm Hoenlein
Executive Director

110 East 59th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 • (212) 318-6111 • FAX # (212) 644-4135

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Committee
American Gathering/Federation
Jewish Holocaust Survivors
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
American ORT Federation
American Sephardi Federation

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B'rith
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Judaism

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Memo	From Kathy Jeavons to Governor Sununu Re: Attached Reuters Article (1 pp.)	6/20/91	P 5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Jewish Community 1991

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 10/28/05

Date Closed: 1/4/2005	OA/ID Number: 29161-005
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Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 6/20/91

ME

TO: Governor Sununu

FROM: KATHY JEAVONS
Associate Director
Office of Public Liaison
Room 129 OEOB, Ext. 7845

FYI. The OU was quite upset
about the misinterpretation.

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America

45 WEST 36TH STREET

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10018 (212) 563-4000
FAX: 212-564-9058

נ"ב

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West Coast

RABBI PINCHAS STOLPER
Executive Vice President

June 12, 1991 .

VIA FAX: (202) 659-5254

Mr. Alan Elsner
Reuters International
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Elsner:

I have just received a copy of your article with respect to the Israeli settlement issue which was the subject of our discussion this morning. I find that I was quoted out of context.

What the President was talking about and what I reported was the President's expectation that monies which were generated by the Loan Guarantees would not be used to settle Soviet Jews in the territories or to build new settlements. Any discussion concerning either of those two items was in the context of the funds to be generated by the Loan Guarantees.

At no time did the President suggest that American aid in general was contingent on Israel's commitment not to construct new settlements or enlarge existing ones.

Would you please issue an appropriate correction.

Very truly yours,


Sheldon Rudoff


1

From: NEWSTAB Delivered: Tue 18-June-91 11:34 EDT Sys 197 (75)
Subject: ISRAEL :israel usa 06 18 0624 am israel usa scheduled u s official wa
Reuters
Mail Id: IPM-197-910618-104270532

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AM-ISRAEL-USA (SCHEDULED)

U.S. OFFICIAL WARNS OF FIGHT WITH CONGRESS OVER ISRAEL AID

By Alan Elsner

WASHINGTON, Reuter - The Bush administration is unlikely to back an Israeli request for \$10 billion in loan guarantees if Israel continues its settlement drive in occupied territories and Mideast peace moves remain blocked, a senior administration official said.

Israel intends to apply for the money in September. It would be paid over a five-year period and used to build housing and infrastructure for Soviet Jewish immigrants flooding into the country.

The official, in an interview with Reuters Monday granted on condition of anonymity, said that unless there were changes in Israeli behavior over settlements, the administration was unlikely to agree to the request.

"If the status quo today existed in September I think you would have a situation where the administration would not be looking favorably," the official said.

He said it was too early to say whether the administration would oppose granting the loans outright or would seek to attach conditions to the use of the money. But a major fight with the powerful pro-Israel lobby in Congress was possible.

"It's ... a possibility that this could be a major issue where the administration and the Congress disagree," the official said.

"Either we're going to have to sit down and talk about it and come to some sort of terms. Or we're going to have a disagreement that could potentially mean a fight in the appropriations process."

The official said the government of Israel's hard-line Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had made clear its disdain for U.S. concerns by actively stepping up its settlement drive to coincide with Secretary of State James Baker's peace efforts.

"The Israelis know that continued pursuit of their settlement policy in the aggressive way that they have pursued it since the start of this latest round of the peace process ... is exacerbating the problem," the official said.

"Everybody knows that we're not happy with their policy and it certainly looks like their message to the world is, 'We don't really give a damn.' It's certainly their message to this administration because they certainly haven't done anything to curb that behavior."

In Congress, many traditional Israel supporters were unhappy

2

with settlements and found they could not justify Shamir's policy, the official said.

President Bush told a delegation of Jewish leaders this month he could not commit himself to endorsing the \$10 billion request unless Israel promised not to settle Soviet immigrants in the occupied territories and stopped building new settlements.

In response, Shamir vowed to continue the settlement drive and dismissed the idea that U.S. aid could be threatened.

The possibility of a fight over the loan requests is already beginning to worry Israel's supporters.

Thomas Dine, executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the pro-Israel lobbying group, recently called on members to fight attempts to link the \$10 billion to Israel's settlement policy.

"We cannot allow anyone to hurt 1 million Eastern Europeans and 40,000 Ethiopian Jews to score an unrelated debating point or express a complaint about an unrelated policy difference. It would not be fair," he told a closed meeting with some major AIPAC donors, according to participants.

Dine said Israel supporters who were unhappy about settlements should "swallow hard, roll up your sleeves and get to work to fight linkage."

He said that without the loan guarantees Israel would have to take commercial loans for periods of not longer than seven years, too short a time to build housing for immigrants.

With U.S. guarantees, it could take 30-year loans.

REUTER



National Conference on Soviet Jewry

FAX COVER SHEET

TO:

BOBBY KILBERG

FROM:

MARK LEVIN

DATE:

5/30/91

NUMBER OF PAGES

2

INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET

MESSAGE:

As Discussed...

*TO: GOVERNOR SUNUNU
FROM: Bobbie Kilberg
FYI*

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

A coalition of forty-seven national organizations and over three hundred local community councils and federations

New York Office: 10 East 40th Street, Suite 1010, New York, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 679-6122 • Fax: (212) 686-1193 • Telex: 237311 NCSJ
Washington Office: 1522 K Street, N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 898-2500 • Fax: (202) 898-0822



National Conference on Soviet Jewry

NEWS RELEASE

CONTACT: Deborah/Jerry Strober
Mark Levin
(202) 898-2500

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NCSJ SUPPORTS ONE YEAR WAIVER OF JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

NEW YORK -- May 30, 1991. . ."Because of the unprecedented numbers of Soviet Jews who have received permission to emigrate to Israel and elsewhere, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry supports a one year waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment for the Soviet Union. We expect that the President has received the assurances for the waiver required by the law.

Since June 1989, when the NCSJ first expressed its support for a Presidential waiver, more than 300,000 Soviet Jews, as well as hundreds of thousands of other Soviet citizens, have been allowed to emigrate. Of the more than 300,000 Soviet Jews, over 50,000 have emigrated in the first four months of 1991. In addition, large numbers of other Soviet Jews are participating in the process of seeking permission to emigrate.

At the same time, the NCSJ expresses its concern regarding inadequacies in Soviet emigration practices. The NCSJ will continue its longstanding commitment to seek unrestricted emigration for those Soviet Jews who are still denied the right to emigrate, particularly the long-term refuseniks and poor relatives. We also express our concerns about new refusals based upon grounds of access to 'state secrets.' In addition, the NCSJ is concerned about difficulties which have arisen recently in the processing of emigration applications to the United States, and which are impacting negatively on the flow to this country.

The NCSJ urges the Soviet government to remove all obstacles to emigration and to allow any Soviet Jew wishing to emigrate from the USSR to do so expeditiously and without restriction. The NCSJ calls upon the Administration and Congress to utilize all appropriate avenues to encourage Soviet officials to continue to build upon the progress which has taken place over the past few years.

NCSJ acknowledges the passage on May 20 by the Supreme Soviet of a statute which provides a legal basis for emigration and which seeks to bring Soviet domestic law into conformity with their international obligations. The new law is scheduled to be fully implemented in January 1993. Its content must be carefully reviewed. Implementing regulations to address existing inadequacies in Soviet Jewish emigration should be promulgated at the earliest possible time. Over the course of the next twelve months, the NCSJ will carefully examine Soviet emigration performance, particularly in the problem areas noted above and where there are questions concerning the implementation of the new emigration law.

we will continue to work with the Administration and Congress, as well as with key Soviet officials, regarding Soviet emigration practices which are inconsistent with international agreements, to which the Soviet Union is signatory, and which guarantee the fundamental human right of each Soviet citizen to emigrate freely without governmental interference.

This decision is based upon a thorough review of the current situation and extensive consultations with the Bush Administration, members of Congress, Soviet Jewry activists, leaders in the Jewish community in the USSR, and NCSJ constituent representatives. The NCSJ represents 48 national Jewish organizations and over 300 local Jewish federations and community councils."

A coalition of forty-five national organizations and over three hundred local community councils and federations

National Office: 10 East 40th Street, Suite 907, New York, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 679-6122 • Telecopier: (212) 686-1193 • Telex: 237311 NCSJ
Washington Office: 1522 K Street, N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 698-2500 • Telecopier: (202) 698-0822





JACOB STEIN
20 Jerusalem Avenue, Hicksville, N.Y. 11801
(516) 938-6012

April 9, 1991

Dear Governor,

Received the enclosed from Shimon Peres. I am sure
it was meant to go beyond me.

It reflects important support for negotiations for
peace including "territory for peace".

If possible I would like to send to Peres some note
that I have passed this on to you.

Cordially



ISRAEL LABOUR PARTY

THE CHAIRMAN

19-MAR-1991

Jacob Stein
20 Jerusalem Avenue
Hicksville, NY 11801
U.S.A.

Dear Jack,

Thank you for your note following our meeting. Since then your anticipation of a need for new thinking in Israel has become an urgent reality.

As you know all too well, this was the focus of Secretary Baker's visit with us and I was most impressed both with his style (public gestures and private diplomacy alike) and with his focus on concrete details and operational approach. He was much more "Tachles" oriented than most observers had predicted.


As I enjoyed our conversation, I was particularly encouraged by his keen interest in exploring our information about mutual interest among authorized Jordanians and Palestinians in moving forward together and in the promise inherent in such a reality to solve some thorny problems of the past. In that context, I was able to report to him that in our best judgement they seem ready for a joint framework both in the process (e.g. a Jordanian - Palestinian negotiating delegation) and the outcome (federated or confederated).

I was equally reassured by our common realization that time was short -- and cannot be wasted. That in the absence of a breakthrough within a few months, electoral politics will consume all energies in both Washington and Jerusalem, thus, by the time both re-focus on this issue we may have a very different setting all around. For if we fail to avail ourselves of this opportunity, the impact of the U.S. military victory will evaporate and the equally dramatic diplomatic reality of the U.S.-led Arab coalition will be replaced with a disappointment-triggered alternative coalition.

Reflecting jointly on the past several years, he agreed that we should not make yet another contribution to the tragic record of Middle East missed opportunities.

It is against this background that I, humbly, pledged to him -- and, obviously, to President Bush -- whatever support is encapsulated in the largest homogenous block in the Knesset -- 54 member strong -- which, I believe, may grow to a critical extent if the U.S. does pursue this hope and meets with inadequate flexibility.

Finally, as I keep in close touch with several of the relevant Arab quarters, I am even more convinced today that from the ashes of the Gulf war, our region can extract more than Persian Gulf security. Whether this happens or not is hardly in our hands.

Sincerely,

Shimon Peres

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: Governor Sununu

FROM: Bobbie Kilberg

Kathy Jeavons

FYI

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen



Union of American Hebrew Congregations

cc: Max Fisher
SERVING REFORM JUDAISM IN NORTH AMERICA

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NEWS RELEASE

For Immediate Release

Contact: Richard Cohen
(212) 758-8989

Comment by Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, President, UAHC On President Bush's Speech to Congress

I am encouraged by the approach taken by President Bush. It is clear that he has instructed Secretary Baker, on his forthcoming mission to the Middle East, to pursue a two-track approach:

- (1) He wants the Arab states to come to the negotiating table with Israel, and
- (2) He wants Israel to be forthcoming in dealing with the Palestinian issue.

I believe the President will have the support of the great majority of the American people -- and the Israeli community as well -- in this regard. Indeed, it closely parallels the approach taken by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, as articulated in his message to the National Leadership Assembly of the Conference of Presidents on Tuesday, when he expressed Israel's willingness -- nay, eagerness -- to negotiate with its Arab neighbors without any pre-conditions.

Also encouraging were (a) the President's condemnation of terrorism -- "the tactics of terror lead nowhere," he said; (b) his statement that the principle of territory for peace "must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition," and (c) his call for an end to the arms race and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them.

Surely the people of Israel, and American Jews as well, will give the President their full support on these issues.

The President clearly appreciates that a resolution of the Palestinian issue cannot come about in a vacuum but only in the context of a full-fledged peace with Israel's Arab neighbors. The successful conclusion of the war in the Gulf, and Israel's admirable restraint and courage in the face of unprovoked attack -- these offer the promise that, nearly 43 years after Israel's independence, the Arab world that surrounds Israel may at last be ready to recognize Israel's legitimate place in the Middle East. Every Jew, every Israeli, can take hope at this prospect.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	From Bobbie Kilberg to John Sununu Re: Elie Wiesel (1 pp.)	2/11/91	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Issues Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Jewish Community 1991

Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)
By JP (NLGB) on 10/28/05

Date Closed: 1/4/2005	OA/ID Number: 29161-005
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0004-F[2]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG BK

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

RE: ELIE WIESEL

As you know, we have the following two requests for POTUS time from Elie Wiesel:

(1) In spring 1990, The Elie Wiesel Foundation For Humanity named President Bush as its 1990 Humanitarian Awardee. The President agreed to accept the award and our scheduling office worked with Wiesel on a number of dates for a presentation at an awards dinner in N.Y.C. None of the dates worked out for 1990 and, on February 6, Wiesel resubmitted the request for a N.Y.C. dinner in 1991. ↑

(2) As a holocaust survivor and as a Nobel Laureate, Wiesel has expressed an interest in meeting privately with the President to discuss the morality of the Gulf war. Wiesel believes it is a just and moral war. He shares the President's view that, if the Allies had stood up to Hitler in Poland in 1939, as we have stood up to Saddam Hussein, millions of lives could have been saved. Wiesel would want to speak publicly about the morality of the war and about his meeting with the President.

RECOMMENDATION: that we invite Elie Wiesel to present the Foundation's Humanitarian Award to the President in the Oval Office; that we provide some time immediately after the presentation for the President and Wiesel to meet privately for a discussion about the morality of the Gulf war. ok

cc David Demarest
Kathy Super ✓

THE ELIE WIESEL FOUNDATION FOR HUMANITY

666 FIFTH AVENUE, 11th FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10103 • (212) 399-4485

February 6, 1991

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have just returned from Israel where I have seen the tragic impact of Saddam Hussein's cruel ambitions. Children with gas masks, babies in sealed tents, traumatized parents. Echoes of the past.

May I tell you of something you surely know? You are beloved in Israel, Mr. President. Like many Americans and people all over the world, Israelis admire your moral stance in implementing the United Nations resolution with regard to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Your historic decision will long be remembered, as will the valor of the American Armed Forces.

Of course, I too had hoped there would be another way to achieve the liberation of Kuwait and make the world a safer place for our children. Of great comfort to many of us, Jews and non-Jews alike, has been your unequivocal condemnation of the missile-strikes on Israel, followed by your decisive defense of the Jewish State.

Long before the Gulf crisis began, you kindly agreed to accept the Humanitarian Award from our Foundation which has, in the past, brought together humanists and scholars, artists and statesmen from around the world, to discuss pressing issues such as indifference to human suffering.

In 1987 we gathered seventy-nine Nobel Laureates in the Elysee Palace in Paris. Our topic was: "On the threshold of the twenty-first century: Threats and Promises." Last August, more than seventy distinguished persons including Presidents Mitterrand and Havel, Nelson Mandela and Prime Minister Jan Syse met in Oslo for a conference, "The Anatomy of Hate", sponsored by our Foundation and the Norwegian Nobel Committee. (I am enclosing some materials which may be of interest to you.)

The Elie Wiesel Foundation will be honored to present our Humanitarian Award to you at a dinner in New York; and we look forward to receiving several convenient dates so that we may begin to plan this important event.

In light of your outstanding world leadership, I am more eager than ever to honor your extraordinary achievements.

with every good wish.

Yours respectfully,

Elie Wiesel
Elie Wiesel

EW/rs
Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 15, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG BK
KATHY JEAUVONS KJ

SUBJECT: Mailings to the Jewish Community on the Situation
in the Gulf

For your information, Gulf mailings were sent to roughly 600 Jewish community leaders around the country on December 17 and January 10. The January 10 mailing contained the latest statements by the President and Secretary Baker rejecting linkage.

cc: David Demarest

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR OPINION LEADERS

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG *BK*
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

KATHY JEAVONS *KJ*
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS AND INITIATIVES WITH
REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN THE GULF

The enclosed packet of information represents a comprehensive chronology of the Bush Administration's policy statements regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its objectives for ending the current crisis, as well as a chronology of the United Nations Security Council actions taken against Iraq.

Also included for your interest is a fact sheet detailing the President's waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

We hope you find the enclosed information useful. Please do not hesitate to contact our office if we may be of further assistance.

THE PERSIAN GULF

Excerpts from President Bush's Press Conference

"We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. And we're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein. We're dealing with a dangerous dictator all too willing to use force who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones, and who desires to control one of the world's key resources -- all at a time in history when the rules of the post-Cold War world are being written.

"Our objectives remain what they were since the outset. We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies; and we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world."

"Yesterday's United Nations Security Council resolution was historic. . . . Until yesterday Saddam may not have understood what he's up against in terms of world opinion. And I'm hopeful that now he will realize that he must leave Kuwait immediately."

"Let me tell you the things that concern me most. First, I put the immorality of the invasion of Kuwait itself. No nation should rape, pillage and brutalize its neighbor. . . .

"I'm deeply concerned about all the hostages -- innocent people held against their will in direct contravention of international law. . . .

"I'm deeply concerned about our own embassy in Kuwait. . . . A handful of beleaguered Americans remain inside the embassy unable to come and go. . . . I am determined that this embassy, as called for under Security Council Resolution 674, be fully replenished and our people free to come home. . . .

". . . I'm also deeply concerned about the future of Kuwait itself. The tales of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting are almost beyond belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say this kind of treatment of people must end, and those who violate it -- the Kuwaiti people must be brought to justice.

"I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors should he possess a nuclear device."

"I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if force is required, we and the other 26 countries who have troops in the area will have enough power to get the job done. . . . I know that there are fears about another Vietnam. Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war."

"I want peace, not war. But if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs. . . . If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win, and then get out as soon as possible, as soon as the U.N. objectives have been achieved.

"I will never -- ever -- agree to a halfway effort. . . . I repeat that we have no desire to keep one single American soldier in the Gulf a single day longer than is necessary to achieve the objectives set out above.

"No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than I do. And, at the same time, no one is more determined than I am to see Saddam's aggression reversed."

"However, to go the extra mile for peace, I will issue an invitation to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to come to Washington at a mutually convenient time during the latter part of the week of December 10th to meet with me. I'll invite ambassadors of several of our coalition partners in the Gulf to join me at that meeting.

"In addition, I'm asking Secretary Jim Baker to go to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein."

". . . [W]ithin the mandate of the United Nations resolutions, I will be prepared, and so will Secretary Baker, to discuss all aspects of the Gulf crisis. . . . I am not suggesting discussions that will result in anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and freedom for all hostages."

Washington, D.C.
November 30, 1990

**Excerpts from Vice President Quayle's speech
to Seton Hall University**

". . . But there is another strategic American objective in the current crisis that is not traditional -- that has only emerged, in fact, as a result of the end of the Cold War. This objective might be described as strengthening the foundations of world order."

"Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-Cold War world. One way or another, it is bound to set a precedent -- either on behalf of greater world order or on behalf of greater chaos. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression, it is likely that his success will embolden other dictators to emulate his example. But if he fails -- and believe me, he will fail -- others will draw the lesson that might does not make right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed.

"That is why President Bush has sought to rally the international community against Iraq's aggression. This is why the U.N. Security Council has passed ten resolutions (sic) condemning Iraq. . . This is why scores of nations have agreed to contribute economically or militarily to the joint effort against Saddam Hussein. . . what is at stake is nothing less than the shape of tomorrow."

"The moral and human implications of war -- any war -- are very grave.

". . . Consider, for example, the fate of the people of Kuwait. With every day that passes, their plight grows more desperate. Being patient with Iraq allows Saddam Hussein to prolong their agony. Is this a moral course of action?

"Or consider the fate of American military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Does patience today risk greater American casualties tomorrow? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

"Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons. Will continued patience with Iraq help make the world vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

". . . I believe that every reasonable effort must be made to resolve this crisis peacefully. I also think that there must be limits to our patience. And those limits are reached when our restraint threatens to undermine other, equally moral goals. . . . ending Kuwait's agony as soon as possible; minimizing American casualties in the event of war; and preventing Saddam Hussein from adding nuclear weapons to his already formidable arsenal of mass destruction."

". . . Saddam has shown that he understand no language other than the language of force. Today's U.N. resolution is our last and best hope for peace -- for a genuine peace.

South Orange, New Jersey
November 29, 1990

**Excerpts of Secretary Baker's remarks
at the United Nations**

"Today's vote marks a watershed in the history of the United Nations. . . . The entire international community has been affronted by a series of brutal acts:

Iraqi forces have invaded and seized a small Arab neighbor.

A once prosperous country has been pillaged and looted.

A once peaceful country has been turned into an armed camp.

A once secure country has been terrorized.

"The nations of the world have not stood idly by. We have taken political, economic and military measures to quarantine Iraq and to contain its aggression.

". . . The twelve resolutions passed by the Security Council have established clearly that there is a peaceful way out of this conflict: the complete, immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all hostages."

". . . If he (Saddam Hussein) should win this struggle, then there will be no peace in the Middle East, only the prospect of more conflict and a far wider war."

"We are meeting here therefore, first and foremost, to dispel Saddam Hussein's illusions. He must know from us that a refusal to comply peacefully with the Security Council Resolution risks disaster for him.

"Members of the Council, we are at a crossroads. Today, we show Saddam that the sign marked "peace" is the direction he should take.

"Today's Resolution is clear. The words authorize the use of force. But the purpose, I truly believe, is to bring about a peaceful resolution."

"By passing today's resolution -- a pause for peace -- we say to Saddam Hussein: "We continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Peace is your only sensible option. You can choose peace by respecting the will of the international community. But if you fail to do so, you will risk all. The choice is yours."

"Members of the Council, we meet at the hinge of history. We can use the end of the Cold War to get beyond the whole pattern of settling conflicts by force, or we can slip into ever more savage regional conflicts in which might alone makes right. We can take the high road toward peace and the rule of law, or Saddam Hussein's path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle.

"Simply put it is a choice between right and wrong."

November 29, 1990
United Nations Security Council
New York, New York

**Remarks by the President at Thanksgiving Dinner with
American Troops**

"And let me say this: Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that's why more and more, your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency.

"You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons, or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use. What we're confronting is a classic bully who thinks he can get away with kicking sand in the face of the world."

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
November 22, 1990

ADMINISTRATION WIRE.....December 4, 1990

PERSIAN GULF

**Excerpts from Chairman Powell's statement before
the Senate Armed Services Committee**

"There can be no doubt that this was one of the largest and most successful deployment operations on our nation's history. No other country could have attempted or even contemplated doing what we have accomplished.

"To put it in some perspective, to date, the United States has airlifted over 200,000 personnel and some 210,000 short tons of equipment. This is comparable to moving the entire city of Richmond, Virginia 8,000 miles to the Saudi desert.

"By the sixth week of Operation Desert Shield, we had already moved by air the equivalent of the entire Berlin Airlift -- an operation which had taken place over 65 weeks. As of today, we have airlifted enough cargo to equal 2 1/2 Berlin Airlifts.

"To provide another comparison, more personnel and equipment were moved in the first three weeks of Operation Desert Shield that were moved in the first 3 months of the Korean conflict."

"Overall, the message this truly unprecedented multinational force has sent to Saddam Hussein has been and remains strong and unwavering. With over 200,000 allied troops en route or in place alongside U.S. forces, a credible collective security force stands ready to defeat Saddam's aggression."

"Our equipment readiness has exceeded expectations and thus, must be considered exceptional, given the harsh demands of the desert environment."

"Desert Shield presented this nation with the first large-scale practical test of the Total Force Policy. . . . Reserve volunteers were vital to the success of the early stages of this operation. . . . [D]uring the early weeks of August some 10,000 reserve volunteers per week provided such critical functions as airlift and tanker support. It is safe to say that without them the swift and efficient deployment of our forces would not have been possible."

"[T]he success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the Total Force concept."

"I have been very proud of the conduct of our troops -- they have been diplomats in the truest sense of the word. Senior Saudi officials, as well as Saudi citizens, have expressed to Secretary Cheney and myself their gratitude and appreciation for our troops' behavior."

Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990

For more information, call the White House Office of Public Affairs at 202/456-2483.

PERSIAN GULF

Excerpts from Secretary Cheney's statement to the
Senate Armed Services Committee

". . . I firmly believe that without this operation (Operation Desert Shield) Iraqi forces would not have stopped short of Dhahran, and we would today be contemplating the liberation of Saudi Arabia as well as the liberation of Kuwait."

"The decision to put young men and women at risk has always been one of the most difficult our nation can make. . . For that reason, it is important that our citizens understand why American troops are in the Gulf."

"The first reason behind the President's policy is the prospect for further aggression."

"Unless Iraq leaves Kuwait, it will pose a continuing threat to Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, and ultimately the United States. Iraq is governed by a regime that will say and do virtually anything to achieve its ends.

"Since the invasion, Iraq has done its best to erase Kuwait as a state and as a culture. Saddam's soldiers have forced Kuwaiti citizens to swear allegiance to Iraq at gunpoint. Kuwaiti citizenship, passports, and currency are no longer recognized.

"Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, was both treacherous and cynical. It was also, and it continues to be, shockingly brutal.

"If Iraq's ambitions are not curbed today they will just grow stronger. . . In the future, Iraq could possess nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver them. Aggression begets aggression. We cannot afford to look the other way."

"The second reason is the danger of Saddam Hussein's domination of world oil supplies."

"The potential for Saddam Hussein to gain a dominant share of the world's oil is quite real. . . There are, in fact, two reasons we must be concerned with Saddam's potential control of the Middle East's oil wealth.

"First, is his control of supply. . . Consider the impact Iraq could have on the world's economies. Threatened disruptions in supply could inspire buying panics, and actual disruptions could move some economies into recession. The mere ability to threaten such disruptions would enable him to blackmail the world.

"The second reason concerns wealth. Iraq has used its wealth to build its military, not its economy, and there is every reason to think that pattern will continue. . . So it is an error to look at our policy in the Gulf and see it as a reaction to oil prices. The fact is, for Hussein, oil is not so much a resource as a weapon of war."

Administration Wire 12/4/90
Page two.

"The final reason we are in the Gulf is that Iraq's destruction of Kuwait strikes at the heart of the kind of world we are trying to build in the post-cold war era."

"We must also be certain we understand what it means to say that sanctions are working. There is a difference, especially in a dictatorship like Iraq, between an embargo having an economic impact, even a severe one, and concluding that the embargo is working. Authoritarian regimes have a significant ability to withstand economic hardship, since popular discontent is easily stifled. Just because the Iraqi people may find certain staples hard to get, does not necessarily translate into a changed attitude on Saddam Hussein's part.

"So we must not create a false dichotomy between sanctions and a military option. They are mutually reinforcing parts of a broad strategy to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

"People sometimes underestimate both the patience and staying power of the American people. The fact that we stayed the course in Western Europe for forty-five years, even through dark periods when the experts said our struggle against communism was hopeless proves that we can persevere when we must.

". . . But having a capacity for patience does not mean we must remain patient when patience is not producing results. We must always have other options, and that is what the new deployments and the recent United Nations action are all about. They will broaden the options of the United States and its Allies and simultaneously narrow those of Saddam Hussein. They are a necessary next step toward the President's and the world's goal of restoring Kuwait to freedom and independence."

Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990

For more information, please contact the Office of Public Affairs at the White House 202/456-2483.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

It is now more than 15 weeks since Iraqi tanks, with little warning and even less mercy, rolled across the once tranquil border dividing Iraq from its neighbor Kuwait. Within three days, 100,000 Iraqi troops controlled the streets of Kuwait City and massed at the borders of Kuwait's neighbor Saudi Arabia. A second invasion, or at the very least, military intimidation, appeared imminent.

Iraq's occupation of Kuwait has been a nightmare. Hundreds of thousands of Kuwaiti men, women and children have been driven from their country; Saddam has brought in tens of thousands of Iraqis and other foreigners to resettle Kuwait in their place. Homes, buildings and factories have been looted. Babies have been torn from incubators; children shot in front of their parents. Disappearances and graphic accounts of torture are widespread.

Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein has not been content with violence against Kuwaitis. Thousands of foreigners are being denied the freedom to leave, in violation of the most basic norms of civilized conduct. Embassies and diplomatic residences are being violated, and their diplomatic personnel are being starved out.

The response of the international community to this cruelty has been immediate and unwavering. The United Nations Security Council has passed ten resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion and occupation, rejecting its annexation of Kuwait, and calling upon Saddam to allow all who wish to leave to do so. To back up these calls for action, the international community has put into place mandatory and comprehensive economic sanctions designed to ensure that Iraq reverses, and does not benefit from, its aggression. I am proud to say that the United States played a key role in building the coalition of nations that has forged this response; American leadership remains a positive and constructive force in this changing world.

Now, as I write this column, more than 200,000 men and women wearing the uniforms of the U.S. armed forces stand guard on the sand and along the shores of the Arabian peninsula, together with the armed forces of more than 25 other countries. Over the next few months, they will be joined by thousands of additional troops from America and other nations.

But why are we there? Why should we be there?

First, the world must not reward aggression. Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait is not just a case of petty aggression. We stand now at a singular moment. The civilized world is now in the process of fashioning the rules that will govern the new world order beginning to emerge in the aftermath of the Cold War. The history of this century shows clearly that rewarding aggression encourages more aggression. If the world looks the other way in this first crisis of the Post Cold War era, other would-be Saddams will conclude, correctly, that aggression pays. We must either be prepared to respond now or face a much greater set of challenges down the road.

Second, our national security is at stake. Can the world afford to allow Saddam Hussein a stranglehold around the world's economic lifeline? That is exactly what would happen if we failed. Armed with thousands of tanks and aircraft, not to mention chemical, biological and perhaps even nuclear weapons, Saddam would dominate the Gulf and the bulk of the world's petroleum reserves. Even now, without an actual shortage of oil, Saddam's aggression has almost doubled oil prices, causing serious problems here at home and throughout the world. Fledgling democracies are at particular risk; the poorest nations are hit hardest. The potential for much greater suffering is real. We cannot allow any tyrant to practice economic blackmail. Energy security is national security, and we must be prepared to act accordingly.

Last, innocent lives are at stake. I want to see a world in which Americans and others can live free from fear. The cynical use of innocent civilians, be it as bargaining chips or as pawns to deter attack, is an affront to civilized behavior. This blackmail will not succeed. At the same time, our citizens and our diplomats must be free.

Many, understandably, counsel prolonged patience. Yet, it is grim reality that with each passing day the consequences of Saddam's aggression grow. Remember, Saddam has not hesitated to use his most terrible weapons -- not merely in time of war, but against his own people. The fact that Saddam is actively developing the most sophisticated weapons of mass destruction known to man -- nuclear and biological weapons -- is ominous indeed. Those who are in hiding or inside our embassy in Kuwait risk capture or surrender. As I write this, Saddam Hussein has callously refused to comply with the UN Resolution that calls for the replenishment of foreign embassies. The potential cost in human lives of what would be needed to break Saddam's grip on Kuwait mounts as do the global economic costs of his aggression.

Our goals have not changed since I first outlined them to the American people last August. First, the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Third, security and stability for the Gulf -- an important national interest of the United States since the time of Harry Truman. And fourth, the protection of American citizens abroad.

Let me make one more thing clear. As I work to realize these goals, I will use every means at my disposal to reach a peaceful solution. We will continue the effective implementation of the United Nations sanctions. There already has been enough violence, suffering and sacrifice.

Lasting and meaningful peace must be founded upon principle. Iraq cannot be rewarded for its blatant aggression. Kuwait must be sovereign; its territory intact. The hostages must be set free. Iraq can never again be in a position to threaten the survival of its neighbors or our vital interests.

With unity and determination, and yes, patience, I am confident that these objectives are within our reach. When we succeed, we will have returned a country to its people. We will have demonstrated that aggression will not be tolerated. We will have invigorated a United Nations that contributes as its founders dreamed. We will have established principles for acceptable international conduct and the means to enforce them. In short, we will have taken a major step toward a community of nations bound by a common commitment to peace and restraint. This is something Americans and peace-loving peoples have long sought. Out of this difficult time of testing, we have the extraordinary opportunity to make this dream a reality.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Santiago, Chile)

For Immediate Release

December 6, 1990

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
AND PRESIDENT PATRICIO AYLWIN
AT PRESS AVAILABILITY

President Aylwin's Residence
Santiago, Chile

1:55 P.M. (L)

Q President Bush, we would like to know your opinion of the political transition of Chile and on the behavior of the armed forces of Chile during this period of transition -- we would like your comments.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, it seems to me that there is great enthusiasm in the United States for this transition, for this solidification of Chile's democracy. And I'm not an expert on how the army and the civilian-controlled government is interacting, but from the United States' standpoint, Chile is projecting a commitment to democracy and a country that is controlled by a popularly-elected President. And that's the signal that is going out all around the world and is being so well received in the United States and in other countries as well.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Mr. Hunt of the A.P.

Q Mr. President, do you view this promise by Saddam Hussein to release the hostages as credible, and will it affect the U.S. war footing in the Persian Gulf?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I hope it is credible.

Do you want to get translation of the question first?
The question was --

Q Do you view the promise by Saddam Hussein to release the hostages as credible, and will it affect the U.S. war footing in the Gulf?

PRESIDENT BUSH: One, I hope it is credible. Two, no single hostage should have been taken in the first place. And I hope that it shows that the strategy is working and that Saddam understands that his hostage policy has incurred the condemnation of the whole world. And we've got to continue to keep the pressure on. And this would be welcomed, if true, but it will not change my thinking on his need to comply 100 percent, without condition to the U.N. resolutions.

Q Mr. President, when you came down at the airport, you really gave a good impression on the economic policy and how efficient is the market economy. However, many products of Chile still have many problems entering into the American markets. How long will the Chileans have to wait until they have real free trade with the United States?

PRESIDENT BUSH: In the first place, the best thing to reduce barriers is to have a successful conclusion of the GATT Round, which now appears to be in trouble because the agriculture question has not been accepted by several key players in this negotiation.

MORE

Secondly, we had good discussions with the President of Chile and his top officials here at lunch on how we can move forward on a trade agreement between the United States and Chile that also would be helpful in reducing barriers to bilateral trade.

Q Mr. President, thank you. I wonder if you'd take the point of what's going on since you got the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force. You know, you made the announcement last week that they were resupplying or helping to resupply the U.S. Embassy. Now the announcement on the hostages. My question, Mr. President, is whether you believe Saddam is serious about diffusing -- or he is playing chess?

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, first, I don't consider a couple of cases of Pepsi Cola a serious release on our beleaguered embassy in Kuwait. I hope, though, in response to the broader aspects of your question, that Saddam Hussein is getting the message -- the message so clearly stated in the last U.N. resolution. And the release of all hostages would be a very good thing, but the problem is the aggression against Kuwait. And the man must leave Kuwait without reservation, without condition. And the whole world is united in this. And I will not speak for Chile, but I believe the Chileans agree with that.

Q President Aylwin -- with the United States is the case of the poisoned grapes. During the lunch with President Bush, did you advance something of that matter? Is he going to have some conversation or ask for a position for the damage done -- and the losses of Chilean exporters?

PRESIDENT AYLWIN: During the luncheon that we had and up to now, we have spoken about many topics related to the world situation and the relationship between Chile and the United States. As President Bush has said, we have progress in the idea of a bilateral treaty of free trade between our two countries.

I have pointed out to the President our satisfaction for the progress -- the position of the United States concerning the topics that were -- as to what is concerning the insurance investment, the General Preference System and the Kennedy Amendment. The topic you're talking about is going to be the subject of some of our conversations in the meeting that we will have this afternoon, President Bush and myself.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Let me say I will be prepared to fully discuss that and to assure the people of Chile that there is no discrimination that was intended, or that is intended, and that I'm glad our country is moving briskly forward on these bilateral trade matters.

Mr. Cochran, NBC.

Q Mr. President, there were reports this morning out of New York, apparently, linking American diplomats to a suggestion that the U.S. might go along with a U.N. resolution backing a Mideast peace conference. This was linked with Saddam's latest statement about the hostages. Since then we understand that Secretary Baker has denied any change in the U.S. position. Certainly you have said there should never be any linkage, and you're aware that Saddam is trying to link them. However, having said that there is no linkage, can you offer any hope that the United States might take a favorable position toward a Mideast peace conference?

PRESIDENT BUSH: The question is the aggression against Kuwait. There will be, and is, no linkage to the Palestinian -- the West Bank question. And to help clarify, I would refer people to Secretary Baker's statement today, to my comments at a press conference in Helsinki with Mr. Gorbachev, and to what I said at the United Nations in my speech. I hope that will make clear there is no linkage. The United States, of course, remains interested in a solution to that other question. But there is no linkage with what has to happen in Kuwait, or what will happen in Kuwait.

MORE

Tough way to make a living. (Laughter.)

Q One of the main people accused of the Letelier crime, General Manuel Contreras, one of the first persons accused of participating in the crime of the death of Letelier -- he said that the people responsible for that crime had to be searched for in the United States. What is your opinion about this particular point?

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'm afraid I don't know the details of what he was referring to, so I just can't help you.

I think the President has moved to try to get that contentious matter cleared up, but I just am sorry, I don't know the details of that enough to know to whom he's referring.

Jim. Excuse me, did you finish? Sorry, I thought you -- too bad. (Laughter.)

Q To bring Mr. Contreras before the civil courts, will that satisfy the United States?

THE PRESIDENT: I know what you're talking about, but I just can't respond on that specific point because I honestly don't know the answer to that question.

Q Mr. President, in making his announcement today, Saddam Hussein said he was moved to release these hostages by what he called, "positive diplomatic changes." Are there any secret negotiations, backdoor negotiations going on now between the Iraqis and the U.S.? And when you sit down with Foreign Minister Aziz, will you be laying down the law, or will you be offering further incentives to encourage Iraq to leave Kuwait?

THE PRESIDENT: One, there are no secret negotiations, direct or indirect, with Iraq over this question. None. And there will be none -- secret negotiations of that nature. Secondly, I am not looking for incentive or further incentive. What I want to do is be sure, by going this last, extra step for peace, that the Iraqis know from me, and Aziz knows from me, and Saddam Hussein knows directly from the Secretary of State what is at stake in this matter and how supportive the United States is of the consolidated U.N. position. And that's what it's about.

And I said that before and I'll keep repeating it, because I don't want any people to think there are secret negotiations going on or that I, on behalf of this worldwide coalition, will even consider making a concession, if you will -- or you can call it incentive -- incentive, if you will. That is not what these meeting are about.

Q President Bush, although President Aylwin has said that you're going to talk about the grapes in private conversations, I would like to know what action would your government be able to take regarding this problem that was originated and that has had a negative effect on Chilean exports? And several studies have proved that they were poisoned in the United States.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will discuss this very sensitive question. I can't tell you what steps my country, if any, will take. I do ask you to understand that the question of poison foods and poison medicines is viewed with great seriousness in the United States.

And I think back to an incident involving no international trade, but an incident involving Tylenol where the company had -- one capsule of Tylenol had been poisoned and that company went to great ends to remove that Tylenol and to change their packaging and to correct this scare. And I cite that so people in Chile will know that it isn't the Chilean grape that was singled out. This is the way, in the United States, we approach matters that can adversely affect the health of our people.

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To show that persistence pays off, I'll recognize this gentleman over here, even though he's not with the North American press.

Q Mr. President, the Initiative for the Americas has been considered as a positive and in an optimistic way by most of the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, there are also strong criticisms concerning the bureaucratic contradictions between your discourse and that of the American Congress, which has meant that there seems to be no real will on behalf of the key agencies of the United States in order to progress in a more speedy way towards integration in our continent.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I think that there is a determination to move forward. Some of these procedures take a long time. And yes, Congress in our system must be brought along as a full partner. And secondly, this Initiative is not going to be an empty slogan; I am determined to follow up on this. And I think the countries with whom I have talked feel that the process is moving forward properly. I wish it could be much faster. But let me gun down, let me shoot down in flames this concept that some bureaucracy in our government will block this Initiative. It will not. This Initiative will be successful.

Q Mr. President, I'd like to come back to John's question about a Middle East peace conference. You've so strongly and your aides have so vehemently denied any intention to move to a Palestinian conference of any sort. Is that because you are simply concerned that Saddam Hussein would say, see, I have extracted something from President Bush? Or, if not, just what conditions remain to be met for you to agree to a Mideast peace conference?

PRESIDENT BUSH: From the very beginning Saddam Hussein has tried to justify his illegal aggression against Kuwait based on an overall Middle East problem that involves the West Bank and the Palestine question. And we are not going to get diverted from the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions in order to give him some face-saving way out of something he shouldn't have gotten into in the first place.

As you know, Jim Baker has been very active up until quite recently in trying to move that whole peace process forward. We continue to be very interested in moving the peace process forward. But it will not be linked in any way with Saddam Hussein's aggression. I don't care about face; he doesn't need any face. He needs to get out of Kuwait without trying to complicate this matter by talking about some Middle East peace settlement or peace conference. It is clear what his ploy is, and that ploy is not going to be successful.

Q My question is for both Presidents. I would like to know how far the United States intends to cooperate in the solution of the Letelier case. Mr. Bush, what do you think -- that this case would go to the civil justice in any case?

PRESIDENT BUSH: That question has a familiar ring.

Q It's different.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Oh, it is? Well, help me, because I don't understand the technical differences here.

Q How far is the United States willing to go in order to --

PRESIDENT BUSH: Get to the bottom of the matter?

Q Yes.

PRESIDENT BUSH: As far as we can. We want to cooperate fully.

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PRESIDENT AYLWIN: On our side, we think that the fact that a civilian court -- an administrator of the court, a special prosecutor that would be appointed at the petition of the government by the Supreme Court, will lead to a full clarification of the responsibilities involved in that case. According to the purpose of the government that in all matters concerned with human rights, there should be a full clarification of truth and justice be made.

We regret that we are just in time -- President Bush has to travel to Valparaiso to meet with Congress. He's got to be there in one more hour.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you, President. (Applause.)

Q -- pass a resolution. There is a report that the Perm Five have basically agreed on an alternative that essentially reiterates the U.S. position.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, let's watch that unfold. There are -- that whole question has been on the table for some time --

Q But you were so adamant in your refusal to grant Saddam even the appearance of linkage there.

PRESIDENT BUSH: There will be no appearance of linkage. There will be no linkage.

Q But you still --

PRESIDENT BUSH: -- very, very clear. And that is the point I want to make. And the United States' position on the other question is well-known, very well-known. There has been no change in it. But the concept of linking -- linking this in to help him save face or to compel him or encourage him to do that which he should have done in August, to correct that which he did in August, is simply unacceptable. Not just to the United States, but to all the members of this coalition. And I will keep driving that point home. There can be no confusion about it. There can be no misunderstanding about it. There is no give on the United States' side on that question. And there will be no give.

And I'm pleased that he -- with the hostage question and the Pepsi Cola to the embassy there seems to be a little movement here and a little move there. But my mission is to have him understand that we are very, very serious about full implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions in full, without condition. And I'm going to keep making the point because every day I get asked questions about some new rumor. And you have to ask them and I have to gun them down because there is no behind-the-scene negotiation. And it looks like we're getting on track, although I can't confirm it, with when Aziz might be coming, but it will not be with some secret agenda going on in one room and something for public consumption in another. It will not be that kind of a --

Q Why did you cancel the Moscow trip, Mr. President?
Mr. President, the Moscow trip -- Moscow is off now in January, is that right?

THE PRESIDENT: -- not totally.

Q Is it off?

THE PRESIDENT: Not as far as I'm concerned.

END

2:27 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

December 12, 1990

FACT SHEET

WAIVER OF THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

The President has decided to waive for the Soviet Union application of the freedom of emigration provisions contained in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (Section 402) to the 1974 Trade Act. The Jackson-Vanik amendment effectively bars access to official credit and credit guarantee programs to countries which restrict emigration. The President made this decision:

- o Based on the liberalization of Soviet emigration policy in recent years by which an estimated 360,000 people will emigrate in 1990;
- o After receiving assurances that this policy will continue; and
- o To make food available to the Soviet Union in the form of up to \$1 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credit guarantees for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products.

The President's waiver will be valid until at least July 1991, at which time he will need to determine whether to extend the waiver.

While the President has taken this action on Jackson-Vanik, he does not plan at this time to send the U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement, signed during the Washington Summit in June 1990, to the Congress. Only when the Trade Agreement is approved by Congress and takes effect could the Soviet Union receive MFN trading status.

The immediate effect of the President's action is to make the Soviet Union eligible for export credit guarantees under the CCC General Sales Manager program for the purchase of American agricultural products. This form of food assistance responds to Soviet requests for credit guarantees and will help the Soviet authorities address current food shortages. The waiver will also restore Soviet eligibility for Export-Import Bank credits and credit guarantees.

- o However, the Stevenson Amendment to the Ex-Im Bank Act and the Byrd Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act limit credits and guarantees to \$300 million, with a subceiling of \$40 million and other restrictions on Ex-Im Bank credits or guarantees in support of the fossil fuel industry.

In accordance with the requirements of Jackson-Vanik, before formally executing a waiver the President will report to Congress his determination that a waiver will substantially promote its freedom of emigration objectives in the Soviet Union. This report will also state that he has received the required assurances on Soviet emigration practices.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR OPINION LEADERS

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG ^{BK}
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

KATHY JEAVONS ^{VJ}
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

SUBJECT: JANUARY 9 STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND
SECRETARY BAKER REJECTING LINKAGE BETWEEN GULF
CRISIS AND ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

The enclosed statements by the President and the Secretary of State were made during two separate press conferences yesterday following the meeting between Secretary Baker and Tariq Aziz. Both statements categorically reject again any linkage between a resolution of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Arab-Israeli peace process.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 9, 1990

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

3:55 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I have a brief opening statement and then I will take a few questions.

I have spoken with Secretary of State Jim Baker, who reported to me on his nearly seven hours of conversation with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Secretary Baker made it clear that he discerned no evidence whatsoever that Iraq was willing to comply with the international community's demand to withdraw from Kuwait and comply with the United Nations resolutions.

Secretary Baker also reported to me that the Iraqi Foreign Minister rejected my letter to Saddam Hussein -- refused to carry this letter and give it to the President of Iraq. The Iraqi Ambassador here in Washington did the same thing. This is but one more example that the Iraqi government is not interested in direct communications designed to settle the Persian Gulf situation.

The record shows that whether the diplomacy is initiated by the United States, the United Nations, the Arab League or the European Community, the results are the same, unfortunately. The conclusion is clear: Saddam Hussein continues to reject a diplomatic solution.

I sent Secretary Jim Baker to Geneva not to negotiate, but to communicate. And I wanted Iraqi leaders to know just how determined we are that the Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without condition or further delay. Secretary Baker made clear that by its full compliance with the 12 relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, Iraq would gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community. And he also made clear how much Iraq stands to lose if it does not comply.

Let me emphasize that I have not given up on a peaceful outcome -- it's not too late. I've just been on the phone, subsequent to the Baker press conference, with King Fahd, with President Mitterrand -- to whom I've talked twice today -- Prime Minister Mulroney and others are contacting other coalition partners to keep the matter under lively discussion. It isn't too late. But now, as it's been before, the choice of peace or war is really Saddam Hussein's to make.

And now I'd be glad to take a few questions.

Q Mr. President, you said in an interview last month that you believe in your gut that Saddam Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait by January 15th. After the failure of this meeting today, what does your gut tell you about that? And in your gut, do you believe that there's going to be war or peace?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't misrepresent this to the American people. I am discouraged. I watched much of the Aziz press conference, and there was no discussion of withdrawal from Kuwait. The United Nations resolutions are about the aggression against Kuwait. They're about the invasion of Kuwait, about the liquidation of a lot of the people in Kuwait, about the restoration of the legitimate government to Kuwait. And here we were listening to a

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45-minute press conference after the Secretary of State of the United States had six hours worth of meetings over there, and there was not one single sentence that has to relate to their willingness to get out of Kuwait.

And so, Terry, I'd have to say I certainly am not encouraged by that, but I'm not going to give up. And I told this to our coalition partners -- and I'll be talking to more of them when I finish here -- we've got to keep trying. But this was a total stiff arm. This was a total rebuff.

Q Let me follow up on that. Let me follow up. Have you decided in your mind to go to war if he's not out of there by the 15th?

THE PRESIDENT: I have not made up my decision on what and when to do. I am more determined than ever that the United Nations resolutions including 678 is implemented fully.

Yes, Helen?

Q Mr. President, Aziz made a pledge that he would not make the first attack. Would you match that? And also, what's wrong with a Middle East conference if it could avoid a bloody war?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I wouldn't make it. And we oppose linkage. The coalition opposes linkage. And the argument with Saddam Hussein is about Kuwait. It is about the invasion of Kuwait, the liquidation of a member of the United Nations, a member of the Arab League. And it has long been determined by not just the Security Council, but by the entire United Nations that this is about Kuwait. And that is the point that was missing from his explanations here today. And so there will be no linkage on these items. And that's been the firm position of all of the allies, those with forces there, and, indeed, of the United Nations -- the General Assembly.

Q So you feel free to attack?

THE PRESIDENT: -- so when he talked about his allies there, I don't know who stood up at the General Assembly of the United Nations and stood against the resolution that so overwhelmingly passed condemning Iraq. So there will be no linkage, put it that way.

Q Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Brit.

Q Tariq Aziz, on the subject of the letter, suggested that it was rude in its use of language and somehow inappropriate to a diplomatic communication. I wonder, sir, if you are willing to release the letter, now that it has been -- it's run its course, apparently? And if, whether you are or not, would you characterize it for us and tell us what it said?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me first describe why I wanted to send a letter. It has been alleged, fairly or unfairly, that those around Saddam Hussein refuse to bring him bad news or refuse to tell it to him straight. And so I made the determination that I would write a letter that would explain as clearly and forcefully as I could exactly what the situation is that he faces. The letter was not rude. The letter was direct. And the letter did exactly what I think is necessary at this stage.

But to refuse to even pass a letter along seems to me to be just one more manifestation of the stonewalling that has taken place. We gave him 15 dates for the Secretary of State to meet with him. And he's off meeting with Mr. A and Mr. B and Mr. C and has no time for that.

So the letter was proper -- I've been around the diplomatic track for a long time -- the letter was proper, it was

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direct, and it was what I think would have been helpful to him to show him the resolve of the rest of the world -- certainly of the coalition.

In terms of releasing it, Brit, I haven't given much thought to that. It was written as a letter to him. But let me think about it. I might be willing to do it; I might not. I just don't know. If I thought it would help get the message out to him in an indirect way maybe it makes some sense, although we've been saying essentially the same thing over and over again that was in the letter.

Q Well, Mr. President, was the refusal by the Ambassador here to even accept the letter -- was that prior to or simultaneous with the refusal of Tariq Aziz? I mean, is it your impression --

THE PRESIDENT: I think it was after he had made that -- I think it was after the letter had been rejected at the table there in Geneva. Just one more effort to try to get this direct communication to him. I'm not sure on that, but I believe that's correct.

Q Mr. President, there are reports that you are considering a call-up of up to a million reservists to reinforce the forces that are serving in the Persian Gulf. What can you tell us about that?

THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you nobody has ever suggested that to me.

Q Is there any reserve call-up being contemplated at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll ask the Secretary of Defense to respond to that question when I get finished here.

Q Can you tell us what your attitude now is about the use of force resolution that you asked for yesterday with the Congress?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I had a good meeting with certain members of Congress. I've talked to all four leaders this afternoon -- Senator Mitchell, Senator Dole, Speaker Foley, Congressman Michel -- I talked to him in person here. And I'm not sure where it stands. We are -- I am anxious to see and would certainly welcome a resolution that says we are going to implement the United Nations resolutions to a tee.

I don't think it's too late to send a consolidated signal to Saddam Hussein. And I think that would be a consolidated signal. I think it would be helpful still. I've told the congressmen back in December, as I think I told everyone in this room, that I would have welcomed a resolution back then, provided it would send this solid signal. But if it can do it today, I would welcome it.

So I don't know exactly where it stands, but I know that there is a good feeling up there. I think people see that the American people are supportive of the policy of this country. I think they see that we have tried the diplomatic track. I hope they know that I am as committed to peace as anyone. But I hope they also know that I am firmly determined to see that this aggression not stand. And I think they're backing me in that.

So maybe that ingredient, which hasn't always been quite as clear as it is now, will help as this debate, proper debate, goes forward in the Congress.

Q Do you think you need such a resolution? And if you lose it, would you be bound by that?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I need it. I think

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Secretary Cheney expressed it very well the other day. There are different opinions on either side of this question, but Saddam Hussein should be under no question on this -- I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolutions.

Q And the question of being bound -- the second part of that?

THE PRESIDENT: I still feel that I have the constitutional authority -- many attorneys having so advised me.

Q Sir, I want to ask you about Francois Mitterrand. But Wyatt's question opens up a whole area. Let me just ask you, you talk about you don't want this to be another Vietnam.

THE PRESIDENT: It won't be another Vietnam.

Q If the Congress of the United States refuses to give you a resolution that -- refuses to even give you a Gulf of Tonkin-type resolution, how can you go to war?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think they're going to refuse.

Q Okay. Let me ask you about Francois Mitterrand. You say the --

THE PRESIDENT: There have been 200 -- I'll just repeat for the record that there have been a lot of uses of force in our history and very few declarations of war. But I have tried. I have done more consultation with the Congress than any other president. Some of these Democratic members have told me that. And I have tried to reach out to them in various ways, and I will continue to do it, because I want to see a solid front here as we stand up against this aggressor.

Q Let me ask you about that solid front --

THE PRESIDENT: And I think it enhances the peace. I really believe, John, that he is living under a delusion. I think he doesn't think that force will be used against him. I think he's misinterpreted the debate. I also think he's under a delusion about what would happen if a conflagration breaks out. I believe that firmly, and I've had many, many people whom I respect tell me that. So I would hope that what we're talking about here would dissuade him from that.

This is a follow-up.

Q You've said that the coalition is united against any linkage on the Palestinian question. You've talked to Francois Mitterrand twice today. But in public he says he is for this international peace conference, and he seems to have no objection at all if Saddam Hussein wants to use that as a fig leaf to pull out of Kuwait. You do have an objection. Mitterrand also says that apparently the European Community foreign ministers are going to meet with Aziz apparently in Algiers. What if they go in there and say, well, we have no objection to an international peace conference on the Mideast?

THE PRESIDENT: The foreign ministers of the EC have been very solid, and so has President Francois Mitterrand, that there will be no linkage. So you're asking me a hypothetical question that I won't have to answer because he's not going to do that.

Q He said today he disagrees with you on the international peace --

THE PRESIDENT: The French government and the United States government over the years have had some differences on how the best way to bring peace to the Middle East is. We had a very active initiative underway by Jim Baker. But that doesn't have anything to do with the invasion of Kuwait. And Francois Mitterrand knows that

it doesn't have to do with the invasion of Kuwait and the aggression against Kuwait. And I know he knows this. And he's been very forthright about it.

But, yes, he's very frank in saying countries have a different approach to how you solve another very important problem. And we've never -- I would simply refer you back to what I've said on that subject. I think you were with us over in the joint press conference with President Gorbachev when I addressed myself to this. But I am going to avoid linkage.

I listened to that Aziz meeting, and all he tried to do is obfuscate, to confuse, to make everybody think this had to do with the West Bank, for example. And it doesn't. It has to do with the aggression against Kuwait -- the invasion of Kuwait, the brutalizing of the people in Kuwait. And it has to do with a new world order. And that world order is only going to be enhanced if this newly-activated peacekeeping function of the United Nations proves to be effective. That is the only way the new world order will be enhanced.

Q You say that Saddam Hussein doesn't understand yet. Why not a meeting face to face? Why refuse any meeting face to face?

THE PRESIDENT: Because he's had every opportunity. And he keeps -- we finally said this is the last step. We tried 15 dates in Baghdad. We tried to set up these meetings. And now we tried this one, and there wasn't one single reason to make me think that another meeting between the United States and Saddam Hussein would do -- and the Iraqis would do any good at all. If I felt it would, fine. But it will not.

I talked to the Secretary General of the United Nations today, and there is a chance that he might undertake such a mission. Certainly we'd have no objection. There's one other reason -- and I cite that because this is not Iraq against the United States. It is Iraq against the rest of the world. It is the United Nations that passed 12 resolutions, not the United States. It is the General Assembly of the United Nations -- a 100-plus countries standing solidly against the dictator. And therefore, it doesn't need to be a bilateral negotiation here. We tried that. And we were stiff-armed by an intransigent foreign secretary.

And so the answer is, if diplomacy can be effective now, let's keep it in the context in which these resolutions were passed. And I would hope that maybe it would have an effect, but I'd have to level with the American people, nothing I saw today -- nothing -- leads me to believe that this man is going to be reasonable. So back to Terry's question, I'm less -- I have less of a feeling that he'll come around. But we ought to keep trying. We ought to keep trying right down to the wire.

Q You've repeated the "keep trying." You've cited the Secretary General of the United Nations. Secretary of State Baker cited him three times. What exactly could his mission be if there is no alternative to what Secretary Baker --

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure. Maybe the whole -- what would a mission of Jim Baker have been? It might have been to convince the man that he is up against an immovable force. He's up against something that is not going to yield. He is up against a situation under which there will be no compromise; and there will be none. But because, you see, Ann, I go back to my point, I don't think he has felt this up until now -- on both points. I don't think he's felt that force will be used against him and I think he has felt that if it were, he'd prevail. He's wrong on both counts.

Q Mr. President, there have been reports that Saddam believes that if it comes to war, even if he's driven out of Kuwait militarily, he can survive in power. Is he wrong?

THE PRESIDENT: I think he's wrong on all of his

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assumptions about what would happen if it came to war -- God forbid.

In the middle, and back here. And then we've got three more, and then I've got to go. These -- Ellen.

Q Would he be killed, Mr. President? Would he be killed if it came to war?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to answer that. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Mr. President, you seem to have ruled out further diplomacy as a --

THE PRESIDENT: No, you missed what I said, ma'am -- Ellen, about the Secretary General, possibly. The EC has tried -- I'll get back to you. Let me finish this one train of thought and then I'll come to your question -- the EC has tried, and, indeed, we see Aziz say, no, he wouldn't meet with the foreign ministers. You've seen President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria to try.

I told the congressmen, I want to see us go the last step for peace. I want to use everything at my power to encourage people to try. And, indeed, there have been. Arab League has tried. Over and over again, people have tried. And they run up against the same answer. I remember the speculation that came out here in our papers in this country about a visit by a French delegate that was going over there. The hopes were raised. Nothing happened. So I just had to argue with the premise because there has been a lot diplomacy and there may be more.

Now, excuse me for interrupting you.

Q Sir, you seem to be very skeptical that further diplomacy would work. And yet you've said here today that you haven't given up on a peaceful solution. I wonder where it is you find this hope for a peaceful solution?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure I have great hope for it. But I think when human life is at stake, you go the extra mile for peace. And that's what we have tried to do. And I will continue to think of reasons -- I told President Mitterrand, I said, look, if you think of a new approach, or I do, please, let's one or the other get on the phone and try. But we remain determined that these resolutions are going to be complied with. I am very concerned that sanctions -- I know sanctions alone aren't going to get this job done. And so we're pushing here, and that's what the Baker meeting with Aziz was about. I'm not going to give up, though.

Karen.

Q A lot of people, in looking at the situation, on the outside will say, there must be more than this. There must be some back-channel diplomacy. There must be something going on. You can't be rushing headlong into war this way. Can you tell us that there is nothing, that it is what appear to be getting -- that Saddam isn't going to move and we're going to war?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to use that phrase. I am going to say, if Saddam doesn't move, we are going to fully implement Resolution 678. And it will be fully complied with.

But I wish I could tell you I'm more hopeful. There is no back channel. We've tried it directly. I've had to level, and properly so, with our coalition partners as to what I'm doing, and they've leveled with us -- leveled with the United Nations Security Council members who are not involved in the coalition with force; for example, the Soviets. A lot of avenues have been tried. But I can't tell you that there's any hidden agenda out there, secret negotiations -- there is not. And it wouldn't be right for us to be off telling you one thing openly here and then going around behind the corner with some secret channel. So I would like to say if

MORE

there's any feeling that that's happening, it isn't happening.

Q So the entire hope for peace then rests on Saddam backing off from his --

THE PRESIDENT: And it has since August 2nd -- exactly. Because this aggression is not going to stand. And there's an awful lot at stake in terms of the new world order that it doesn't stand. And there's a lot at stake in terms of a lot of human life in Kuwait that it doesn't stand. And there's a lot at stake in terms of how the coalition looks at this that it doesn't stand. So it won't.

Q Mr. President, you said that when you first proposed high-level talks between Iraq and the United States that it was because you were convinced the message had not gotten through, had not gotten across. Are you now convinced that the message had gotten across?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I did listen carefully to Mr. Aziz, who I thought spoke quite well. I didn't agree with what he was trying to do, obviously, to confuse the issue by refusing to discuss the point at hand, which is the invasion of Kuwait, but I thought he did it well. (Laughter.) I thought he kind of sent a signal that they do understand what's up against them, but I still don't believe that they think the world coalition will use force against them. I may be wrong, but that's what I think in here. And I also still believe, as I said earlier, that he somehow has this feeling that he will prevail or that he will prolong. This will not be that. I've heard some wild predictions on this horrible human equation that might be involved if force were used, and I would say I don't agree with some who are arguing the loudest because it's putting the worst case out in terms of loss of human life; I must say that. I don't know. I think Aziz understands it, but I'm not sure that Saddam Hussein does.

Q If I could follow, Mr. President --

THE PRESIDENT: A follow-up question. I'm sorry, I'm going to have one more, and then Charles -- I told him, and then I'm leaving. Thank you very much, though.

Q When you were listening to Foreign Secretary Aziz, did you get any kind of particular feelings of anger or --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I didn't. I thought it was a very rational presentation, but wrong. I must say, I thought his style was good. From talking to Jim Baker, I thought he -- I mean, when I talked to Jim, he said, look, the man presented his case. Clearly, we didn't agree with it. I thought he was quite complimentary of the way the Secretary of State did it. So the atmospherics, I think, were all right, but he doesn't have it. He doesn't understand it. At least from what he said, he doesn't. Because this is not about some other question of linkage. This is about the invasion and the aggression about Kuwait -- the dismantling of Kuwait, the brutality about Kuwait. So I didn't get a sense of security from listening to that. But I will say that I thought that he presented his views in a reasoned -- reasonable way. He had a tough agenda. He had some tough talking points there. He works for a tough man.

Q What exactly are you trying to convey here to Saddam Hussein on what he does have to lose? Is it the decimation of his society? Is it the liquidation of his military? Is it losing his own power? Can you be specific on that?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't be more specific, but I can be -- that he will get out of Kuwait, and he will get out of Kuwait entirely, and he will get out of Kuwait without concession. That, I think, is the underlying part of the message.

Q Mr. President, a question on Israel. Tariq Aziz was emphatic that if Iraq is attacked, Israel will be attacked. What are your obligations to Israel? Are you prepared to fight a war

throughout the Middle East?

THE PRESIDENT: That is too hypothetical a question for me to answer. We are prepared to do what we need to do to implicate -- to fully implement 678. And I would think that he'd think long and hard before he started yet another war. There is one war on -- that's his war against Kuwait. That's his aggression against Kuwait. And I don't think he wants to start another one. So I'm not going to buy into that hypothesis that the United States would obviously feel that that was a most provocative act, most provocative.

Q If I may, I don't believe it was a hypothetical question. The question was, what are your obligations to Israel?

THE PRESIDENT: We have friends all over the world. We have friends in this coalition. And I'm determined that the United States will fill our obligations there. Clearly, if a friend in that area was attacked, wantonly attacked for no cause whatsoever, not only the United States, but I think many people around the world would view that as a flagrant provocation. And I'll leave it stand right there.

Thank you all very much. Thank you.

Q Secretary Cheney --

SECRETARY CHENEY: The question as on possible additional reserve call-up authority. Under the authority that we're currently using, I'm authorized by a delegation of the President to use up to -- to call up to 200,000 reservists for up to 180 days. That authority for some of those reservists who have been called begins to expire in February. And so what we currently have in the works is a provision that would use a different provision of the statute to allow us to keep reservists on active service for as long as two years and to call under that provision up to one million additional reservists. We have no intention of calling one million reservists, but that's the provision that's available for me to be able to extend those people in critical skills whose services are now being utilized and whom we would like to keep for the period of times that we don't have to release them immediately back to the reserve status.

Thank you all very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

4:25 P.M. EST

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
Geneva, Switzerland

For Immediate Release

January 9, 1991

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III

Intercontinental Hotel
Geneva, Switzerland
Wednesday, January 9, 1991

SECRETARY BAKER: Ladies and Gentlemen, I have just given President Bush a full report of our meeting today. I told him that Minister Aziz and I had completed a serious and extended diplomatic conversation in an effort to find a political solution to the crisis in the Gulf. I met with Minister Aziz today not to negotiate, as we have made clear we would not do--that is, negotiate backwards from United Nations Security Council resolutions--but I met with him today to communicate. And communicate means listening as well as talking. And we did that, both of us.

The message that I conveyed from President Bush and our coalition partners was that Iraq must either comply with the will of the international community and withdraw peacefully from Kuwait, or be expelled by force.

Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen, I heard nothing today that, in over six hours, I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

There have been too many Iraqi miscalculations. The Iraqi government miscalculated the international response to the invasion of Kuwait, expecting the world community to stand idly by while Iraqi forces systematically pillaged a peaceful neighbor. It miscalculated the response, I think, to the barbaric policy of holding thousands of foreign hostages, thinking that somehow, cynically doling them out a few at a time would somehow win political advantage. And it miscalculated that it could divide the international community and gain something thereby from its aggression.

So let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again. The Iraqi leadership must have no doubt that the 28 nations which have deployed forces to the Gulf in support of the United Nations have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait. If it should choose--and the choice is Iraq's--if it should choose to continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have devastating consequences for Iraq.

I made these points with Minister Aziz, not to threaten but to inform. And I did so with no sense of satisfaction, for we genuinely desire a peaceful outcome. And as both President Bush and I have said on many occasions, the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. I simply wanted to leave as little room as possible for yet another tragic miscalculation by the Iraqi leadership.

And I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is still a confrontation that Iraq can avoid. The path of peace remains open, and that path is laid out very clearly in 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted over a period of over five months. But now the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership. The choice really is theirs to make. And let us all hope that that leadership will have the wisdom to choose the path of peace.

Q: What do your allies plan to do next to bring this message home?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, you say what do the allies plan to do next? I think it's important for everyone to note that this is a coalition. This is not Iraq versus the United States. This is Iraq versus the international community. This happens to have been the first time that we've had an opportunity to find agreement on meeting, U.S. and Iraq. So I don't know what the next steps are, Jim. I do know this, that time is running on, as I said a day or so ago. After five months and 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions, it seems to me that it is almost evident that the time for talk is running out. It's time for Iraq to act, and to act quickly by getting out of Kuwait.

But this is a coalition, and we are seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the United Nations. And so perhaps there may be a way that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use his good offices here, in the remaining six or so days that we have left.

I will say that -- I have already mentioned that I didn't hear anything that to me demonstrated flexibility. Nor did I hear any new proposals. But I would like to take note of the fact that the Minister did restate their proposal that the United States pick a day for him to come to the United States, and Iraq pick a day for me to go to Baghdad. Those of you who have been traveling with us know what our answer is to that. We have given it over the past four or five days, and I gave it to the Minister tonight. We offered 15 separate days for a visit to Baghdad. The President of the United States made the proposal for face-to-face discussions. We are glad that Iraq accepted this one because we did have six hours, during which we could make our position known to them and they could make their position known to us.

But as far as next steps are concerned, it seems to me that, because we are talking about a coalition and we are talking about implementing resolutions of the United Nations, that perhaps there could be--I don't know what the position of the government of Iraq would be on this--but perhaps there would be some room for us to seek the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did the Iraqi Foreign Minister reiterate his demands for what he calls justice and fairness for the Palestinians? And was there any wavering in the U.S. position, as you may have expressed it to him, that the two issues are not related, are not linked?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, there was -- he expressed his position. There was no change in our position, which is that the two issues are not linked. I did make the point that I don't think many people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to help the Palestinians. And if they did, it was another miscalculation because it hadn't helped the Palestinians. I think most people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait for Iraq's own aggrandizement. And I think most people realize that Iraq is trying to use the Palestinian issue to shield its aggression against Kuwait, which, in my view at least, remains an obstacle to broader peace in the region rather than a catalyst for achieving that broader peace.

And I made the point, as well, that rewarding Iraq's aggression with a link to the Arab-Israeli peace process would really send a terrible signal, not only to genuine peacemakers in the region but also to other would-be aggressors at what we think is a defining moment in history.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you willing--is the United States willing--to talk again to Iraq before the January 15 deadline? And did you discuss with the President the possibility that you may still go to Baghdad?

SECRETARY BAKER: I had already discussed that with President Bush, and I had already told you what our view was, and the President himself, I think, said there will be no trip to Baghdad. The proposal which he originally made was in effect rejected by Iraq. We offered 15 separate days. They continued to insist upon only one, the 12th of January, which we think was and still is an obvious effort to avoid the deadline of January 15. And we are not interested in that. We think this deadline is real, and our coalition partners think the deadline is real. I reported fully to the President, of course.

Q: Could you run through for us -- You spoke for six hours. Could you give us a sense of how the discussions evolved over those six hours: what did you begin with, what did he counter with, why did you feel it necessary after two hours to call the President?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we broke for lunch. And I think this meeting is sufficiently important that I should call the President. And so I did, just as I did as soon as we were finished.

I began by saying that I was here not to negotiate but to communicate, as I've just told you. That I was here for a serious dialogue in an effort to find a political and peaceful solution, but that they should not expect that we would be prepared to walk backwards from U.N. Security Council resolutions, that the terms of those resolutions had already been set. And I told the Minister I wanted to handle the meeting in whatever way he wanted, and I gave him the choice and he chose for me to go first, just as I gave him the choice as well as to how to report to you, and he suggested that I come down here first.

So that's how we got where we are here tonight. But let me say that I talked to him about how we saw the situation, about the history of the Security Council resolutions, about what I thought could happen in the event of observance of those resolutions, and what I feared would happen in the event of Iraq's non-observance of those resolutions. He then presented the position of the government of Iraq, and he will be down here in a few moments and he can -- now we can't run through six hours of dialogue here, or nobody else will get to ask any questions.

Q: How detailed were you about the extent of force that would be used against Iraq if it does not comply with the U.N. resolutions by January 15?

SECRETARY BAKER: I didn't get into things that would properly be in the realm of operational security matters. I hope I effectively made the case with respect to what, at least, our opinion was of the 28-nation multinational force that is there in the Gulf.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the United States interested in any sort of phased withdrawal, be it one supervised by the United Nations? And if this withdrawal begins by January 15, will the United States guarantee there will be no military attack on Iraq?

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me say--I should have said this in answer to Tom's question--I assured the Minister that if they implement the United Nations resolutions and if they withdraw from Kuwait and permit the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, that I could assure him that there would be no military action by the United States. And that I felt that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action by any other elements of the international coalition.

On the first question, the United Nations resolutions speak for themselves. We are not here -- After all, we are part of an international coalition. We are part of 28 countries--even more countries that have been helping financially and economically--and it is not up to us to walk backwards from solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said in the past that you would seek approval for the use of force at the highest levels. Are you now at that stage in the process in which you will be seeking the use of force from other governments?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, but the clock is ticking on, and I made that point to the Minister today. As far as we are concerned, we have not taken -- the President of the United States, who alone in our executive branch, under our system, can make that decision, has not taken that decision. And I am not aware that any other governments have.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in the remaining six days before the U.N. deadline, would you welcome an initiative by some other European allies, or even Arab countries such as Algeria, that would perhaps include sending a European foreign minister to Baghdad to seek a peaceful resolution?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, this is an international coalition--let me say it one more time. And therefore, as I have just indicated to you, it's an international coalition seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the world's peacekeeping and security body. And therefore, there might, it seems to me, be some useful purpose served by perhaps the Secretary-General's good offices.

But I said last night and I have said for months, we welcome any and all diplomatic efforts to solve this crisis peacefully and politically. We want it solved peacefully and politically. I am disappointed, of course, that we did not receive any indications today whatsoever of any flexibility in the position of Iraq.

So we would welcome any and all diplomatic efforts. We do think if they are efforts by members of the international coalition, that the message should be uniform, as it has been for five months, and it should not be a mixed message. But we want a peaceful and political solution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us -- you keep saying you saw no indication of flexibility. Did the Foreign Minister actually tell you that Iraq intends to keep Kuwait and will not withdraw from Kuwait?

SECRETARY BAKER: He did not make that statement, but he did not indicate that there was any chance that they would withdraw. But I did not see, frankly, any flexibility in their position. You can ask him questions when he gets down here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss in answer to any of the discussion about the problems raised elsewhere in the Middle East, by the Iraqi Foreign Minister--did you discuss the efforts the United States has made in the past to seek Arab-Israeli peace, to persuade Iraq that the United States was serious--genuinely interested in resolving those problems?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, we went through a good bit of the history of the personal efforts that I made for 14 months to bring about a dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis. We went through the experience of the United States in bringing about the Camp David Accords and in bringing about peace between Israel and Egypt. We had a full discussion of that issue, a complete discussion of it.

I want to make it clear that I made it very clear throughout that there would be no linkage here of that issue to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. And we would not agree, as a condition of their withdrawing, to any subsequent specific steps to be taken with respect to that. But we did have -- they brought it up and we had a very full discussion.

Q: What was your answer?

SECRETARY BAKER: We disagree. We frankly disagree with respect to that, as I think you know. And I have already told you why I think linkage is a bad idea. I think that it will not tend to promote peace in the region. It will tend to be read as a reward for aggressors and it would jeopardize future peace in the region.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what did you tell the Foreign Minister about the willingness of the American people to go to war and the impact, the political pressure, on the President's decision-making?

SECRETARY BAKER: I said don't miscalculate the resolve of the American people, who are very slow to anger, but who believe strongly in principle, and who believe that we should not reward aggression, and that big countries with powerful military machines should not be permitted to invade, occupy and brutalize their peaceful neighbors.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you've told us what you didn't hear. You didn't hear any flexibility and you told us that there was quite a bit of discussion of history. Could you tell us what you did hear--did you hear justifications from the Foreign Minister? Did you hear a repeat of what they've been saying in public for some time?

SECRETARY BAKER: I heard some things that I quite frankly found very hard to believe, but I'll let him go into the detail here. But I heard, for instance, that their action in invading Kuwait was defensive in nature, that they were being threatened by Kuwait. And I will tell you the same thing I told the Minister, which is, I find it very hard to believe that any nation in the world will believe that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, even though you did spend six hours here today talking to Foreign Minister Aziz, in the past five and a half months you haven't had much contact with Iraq. What's to prevent the historians of this conflict from concluding that there was a failure of diplomacy here--we slid toward war without trying?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, there've been a lot of conversations with the leadership of Iraq, all to no avail. The Secretary-General's already had one failed mission. There have been any number of Arab efforts to solve this crisis, all to no avail. There have been efforts by others, other Western governments. The Soviet Union has tried very hard; they've had

meetings. We have now had a meeting. And so, you know, people can write whatever they decide they might want to write. But the truth of the matter is, we have been very--I think, the international coalition--very responsible and measured in our approach to this. We have not, as some might suggest, gone off half-cocked. We have gone through the United Nations, patiently, working for consensus within the Security Council. And it is only after five and a half months and the passage of 12 Security Council resolutions that we find ourselves at the point of use of force.

So I think there's been more diplomacy exercised in this crisis than in almost any that I can think of. And the one thing I would ask you all not to do is to equate diplomacy and appeasement. We made that mistake in the Thirties. At least for our part, we don't intend to make it again.

Q: In a sense, two questions: did the Foreign Minister suggest Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if there were linkage as, let us say, the French have suggested, or others have suggested? And if he did, is linkage, the principle of linkage, and insistence on that principle, a reason for the loss of lots of lives?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't think he said that explicitly. I think perhaps it was implicit in his comments. But he'll be here, and you can ask him. But it's more than just the principle of linkage, as I understand their position. There would have to be agreement to conferences and that sort of thing, that get you beyond just the simple fact of linkage.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did Minister Aziz make a specific proposal under which Iraq would get out of Kuwait, however unacceptable it was to you--was there a specific proposal?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, there was no specific proposal. He restated the positions that Iraq has stated publicly in the past. He defended their action in invading and occupying Kuwait. He explained how he feels that was justified. And again, he'll be down here and you can ask him yourself.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you made it clear that you were not going to Baghdad. But did you and the Foreign Minister talk about future diplomatic contacts at your level between the United States and Iraq, or did this one six-and-a-half-hour meeting represent the completion of diplomatic initiatives by the United States?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we will maintain our diplomatic contacts through our charge in Baghdad until the twelfth of January. I asked for and received the personal assurance of the Minister that Joe Wilson and the four other Americans in our embassy there will be permitted to leave Baghdad on January 12, and will not be restrained from so doing.

Q: Mr. Secretary, your mood, if I may say, seems pretty somber at this point. Can you kind of describe your state of mind and your mood after what has occurred today?

SECRETARY BAKER: Somber. You've got it.

Q: Are you advising evacuation?

SECRETARY BAKER: I am not saying that. I am telling you that we had asked for and received assurances for our remaining five diplomatic personnel to leave on the 12th of January, which is a date that you all know is very close to the January 15 deadline and happens to be the date that Iraq has been insisting on for three weeks for the meeting.

Q: What about other Americans, Sir?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think most all Americans are out of Iraq. All that want to leave are gone, as far as I know.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us now about the letter from President Bush? Was it in fact in Arabic? What was the tone of it? Did it contain graphic military scenarios intended to intimidate?

SECRETARY BAKER: I regret to inform you that the Minister chose not to receive the letter from President Bush. He read it, very slowly and very carefully, but he would not accept it. Nor would the Iraqi embassy in Washington accept an Arabic courtesy translation. You will have to ask the Minister why he did not accept the letter. My own opinion, for what it's worth--and it's only an opinion--was that he came here only authorized to accept a letter that walked away from the United Nations resolutions, which is something that we cannot, and of course, will not do.

Q: Have you discussed the possibility of convening the United Nations again to discuss the Gulf crisis? You know that President Mitterrand has proposed that most probably a new discussion is possible, it might be helpful. Have you discussed this eventuality with the Iraqi Minister?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, it did not come up in my meeting today with the Iraqi Minister. I did speak to that question and to that issue a day or so ago, and I believe that President Bush has spoken to it as well. I don't know what an additional Security Council meeting at this stage could do. Because what we are talking about here is faithful implementation of resolutions of the Council, the last one of which says that if Iraq does not withdraw by midnight on January 15, force can be used to effect that withdrawal. We have had 12 resolutions of the United Nations Security Council...

Q: But what President Mitterrand is suggesting...

SECRETARY BAKER: I can't answer your question. I would refer you to President Mitterrand. But I have just said that perhaps there would be some utility in trying to use the good offices of the Secretary General.

Q: Do you have any reason to believe there is any way to avoid a war as of right now?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I hope there is. There has been no decision taken for that eventuality. And I would simply refer you to my opening statement, where I made the point that I hope we do not have yet one more miscalculation by the government of Iraq. I would also refer you to the statements which President Bush and I and other members of the coalition have made over the course of the last several days or weeks, and which I repeated today to the Minister--not in a threatening way, but simply so that he would know where our head is, and how we feel and what we think. And that is, that this January 15 deadline in our minds, is real. Iraq can choose to believe that or not, but it is real in our minds and in the minds of our coalition partners. We hope that they will believe that we think it's real, and that they will act to implement the solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you regret that you would have still liked to go, even on the 12th, and meet, instead of Mr. Tariz, Saddam himself? Still a difference of three days.

SECRETARY BAKER: The 12th -- We've said for the last three weeks, the 12th of January was unacceptable to us because it is just an effort to avoid the deadline. It's obvious that's why the 12th was originally suggested. We have said for a long time that date is unacceptable to us. It remains unacceptable to us.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you spell out your vision of what the Gulf would look like if they withdrew peacefully? In other words, some of the restrictions that you have talked about that must be imposed upon Iraq, even if they did withdraw. Did you lay that plan out for him in some way?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I did in my original presentation this morning. I don't have time to go through all of that with you now, but that falls right in the category of the assurance that there would not be military force used against Iraq by the United States if they withdrew from Kuwait and permitted the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.

Q: Did you talk about the nuclear weapons, the chemical weapons, the size of the Iraqi military--things that are a concern to many in the Western coalition, beyond the occupation of Kuwait?

SECRETARY BAKER: We had a full discussion of questions about weapons of mass destruction. I pointed out the interest of the United States, as we have expressed before, in addressing that issue and addressing that subject. And we talked about the presence, the multinational presence there, and the fact that President Bush has said that we do not desire nor want a permanent military ground presence in the Middle East--I mean in the Gulf. That we want to see our troops come home just as fast as the security situation will allow. Those are the kinds of things that we discussed, as you might expect.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you please just describe to us the point at which the meeting broke off--why and how did it happen? Was it that you finished it off? Did Mr. Aziz finish off, or was there just nothing to talk about anymore? Please describe that.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it was simply a case, I think, that after over six hours of discussion we both had pretty well made the points that we had come to make, and that was it. I don't believe that there was anything left unsaid. He said everything I think he came to say, and I had said everything that I had come to say. I think frankly it lasted longer than many of you might have anticipated at the beginning.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you are going to pull back the American diplomats. Were you also asking Iraqi diplomats to leave the United States on January the 12th?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, we will ask the Iraqi government to draw down their diplomatic presence in the United States on the 12th. But as I indicated to the Minister, we would be willing to permit the presence of a small diplomatic contingent in Washington.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that if you would have accepted the fact of the linkage, there could have been a proposition of Iraq retiring from Kuwait?

SECRETARY BAKER. I don't know. Why don't you ask the Minister that, because when you say "accepted linkage," I'm not at all sure exactly what you mean. Do you mean if we had indicated a willingness to go to an international conference to handle the question in the Middle East? Ask him the question. It would be very interesting.

You know what our position has been for a long time. It would set an extraordinarily unfortunate precedent, we think, and would not in the long run contribute to peace in the region, but would contribute to instability because aggressors would be seen to be rewarded for their aggression. Something we simply cannot consider.

Q: Mr. Secretary, was there any single issue on which the difference between the United States and Iraq was narrow during this six and a half hours?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well let me say that I think that the discussion, as I have already indicated, was a serious one. I think that the tone of it was as good as you could expect under the circumstances. We weren't pounding the table and shouting at each other. It was a very reasoned, and I think, responsible discussion by two diplomats who really would like to find a peaceful and political solution to this problem. But I've already said to you, I did not detect flexibility in the position of Iraq, as they have stated it over the past several days.

Again, I invite you to my opening statement. We still have six days. I just hope that they will think about this meeting, that they will focus on it, that when Foreign Minister Aziz gets back and reports to his President, that perhaps there could be some change in their position. But there cannot be a negotiation here, because the terms of the United Nations Security Council resolutions were worked out in the debate in the United Nations. And the international coalition is bound to those resolutions.


One last question.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to meet Saddam somewhere else apart from Baghdad if you...?

SECRETARY BAKER: That was not discussed. It has never been proposed by Iraq. The Iraqi proposal, as you know, for some weeks has been "we pick a date for Baker to come to Baghdad, you pick a date for Aziz to come to Washington, and we'll work it that way." That's been out there for a long long time. There's never been any suggestion of the other.

Thank you.

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Dr. Ruth R. Miller
Herman Sarkowsky
Diane Sembler
Joy Silverman
Albert H. Small
Robert N. Snyder
Cliff Sobel
Arnold Thaler
Randolph L. White

Executive Director
Matthew Brooks

December 28, 1990

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the leadership and membership of the National Jewish Coalition, we are writing to express our deep concern and profound disappointment in the Administration's support for UN Resolution 681.

We are in full support of your strong and decisive policy in the Persian Gulf crisis. We commend your steadfast resolve and leadership in standing up to the naked aggression of Iraq. The lessons of the 1930's have taught us that aggression must be stopped at its inception.

However, we feel that the United States' alliance with Arab states against Saddam Hussein is being furthered at the expense of our long standing moral and strategic commitment to Israel.

The pattern of American votes against Israel in the United Nations has increased Israel's isolation in the world and will only exacerbate the problem of finding a solution to the Israel-Palestinian problems. Our actions are sending the wrong signal to Israel's friends and enemies. We fear that this trend of U.S. votes in the UN will cast doubts upon your commitment to a secure Israel.

Mr. President, we are writing to you as friends and supporters. You know that we stand strongly behind you in your efforts to resolve the Gulf crisis. As leaders in the Jewish community who are strongly committed to the success of your Presidency, we urge you to consider the full implications that our votes in the UN have here at home. We strongly believe that these actions may erode a critical component of the domestic coalition which supports your Gulf policies at this critical time.

We would like to discuss this situation and its implications with you in greater detail, if you deem it important.

Our best wishes to you and your whole family for a happy and healthy New Year

Sincerely,

Richard Fox
Co-Chairman

George Klein
Co-Chairman

Max Fisher
Honorary Chairman

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen