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1998-0004-F[2]

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H. W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files

OA/ID Number: 29189
Folder ID Number: 29189-005

Folder Title:
Martinez (Drug Policy) [1991]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	25	6	6

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	From Bob Martinez to John Sununu Re: Peru (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
01b. Memo	From Bob Martinez to John Sununu Re: Peru (2 pp.)	9/27/91	(b)(1)	
02. List	Successes of the Drug War (1 pp.)	n.d.	P-5	
03. Note	From POTUS to Bob Martinez Re: Martinez's 8/23 Report (2 pp.)	8/25/91	P-5	
04. Memo	From Bob Martinez to POTUS Re: Update on Drug Suppression Efforts in Latin America (3 pp.)	8/23/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	From Bob Martinez to POTUS Re: Presidential Mission to Guatemala (4 pp.)	7/22/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	From John Sununu to Bob Martinez Re: Anti-Drug Events for the President (2 pp.)	7/8/91	P-5	
07. Memo	From Ede Holiday to John Sununu Re: Proposed Presidential Mission from Director Martinez (with memo from Martinez to Holiday Re: Proposed Presidential Mission to Guatemala) (4 pp.)	6/17/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Martinez (Drug Policy) [1991]

Pinksheet Number: KO0847
OA/ID Number: 29189-005
Date Closed: 1/3/2005
FOIA/Sys Case #: 1998-0004-F[2]
Re-review Case #: 2005-0426-S
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

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
Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
08. Memo	From Brian Waidmann to John Sununu Re: Nomination of Governor Bob Martinez to be the President's Drug Policy Director (2 pp.)	2/25/91	P-2, P-5	
09. Memo	From William Canary to John Sununu Re: Support for the Nomination of Governor Bob Martinez as National Drug Control Policy Director (1 pp.)	1/23/91	P-2, P-5	
10. Memo	From Ede Holiday to John Sununu Re: National Drug Control Strategy III (1 pp.)	10/16/90	P-5	

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PARTNERSHIP FOR A DRUG-FREE AMERICA

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

JAMES E. BURKE
Chairman

TO: MR. JOHN SUNUNU, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
MR. RICHARD DARMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

FROM: JIM BURKE

DATE: NOVEMBER 14, 1991

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION FOR WHITE HOUSE DRUG POLICY INITIATIVES.

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS WITH TOM BROKAW 7 PM - SEPTEMBER 4, 1991

On the eve of the second anniversary of President Bush's drug war, there is some good news. Casual drug use is down...However supplies are up...it turns out that while America was winning the war in the gulf...it was losing the war against drugs.

(After several minutes of footage demonstrating that we were losing...all over the country.)

Lisa Myers closing statement that the war was often...one step forward and two steps back..."despite progress in some areas...the past year overall...was one step back."

ABC THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY 11:30 A.M. - OCTOBER 20, 1991

"We spent billions on a war against drugs...and lost."

There is a growing perception that we are losing the so-called "war against drugs" because the availability of drugs appears to be undiminished, and the number of addicts, as well as drug related violence continues to be at very high levels.

The reality is that a profound cultural shift has been occurring in the country in both attitudes toward and usage of illegal drugs, and consumption is down dramatically in all population groups by age, income and ethnicity.

America is truly "turning off drugs" and there are three major catalysts for this remarkable reduction in demand:

- media attention
- workplace programs
- community action

Confirmation of these positive trends is expected when the data is reported from the 1991 NIDA Household Survey and the High School Senior Survey, at least as it relates to 12 to 18-year-olds.

However, presidential leadership is required if these trends are to continue, and if the country is going to deal more effectively with the serious outcomes of more than a generation of drug abuse.

SUGGESTED INITIATIVES

1. Announce a bi-partisan agreement for a major shift in federal resources -to local community programs, promoting strong user-accountability and expanding and improving prevention and treatment.

The appropriate place for such an announcement would be the leadership forum luncheon when over 400 community coalitions meet in Washington on January 10 (the President is already scheduled to speak).

2. Announce a bi-partisan business/labor initiative to eliminate drugs in the workplace.

We estimate about 80% of the FORTUNE 500 companies have comprehensive workplace programs and we know they are effective and why.

At the Camp David meeting on November 15, a program will be presented designed to reach the 75% of American workers employed by those companies with less than 5,000 employees.

I would urge the White House to embrace this program with a joint announcement at the White House with leadership from business and labor present (I have discussed this possibility with labor leadership, including Lane Kirkland).

3. Emphasize that drug-free schools are a key bi-partisan goal of "Education 2000."

I have spent considerable time with Lamar Alexander and David Kearns, and we are in agreement that "turning off drugs" and "education reform" have much in common.

I believe that the President should always talk about drugs when he talks about education, and that he should always talk about education when he talks about drugs.

The President can thank children for staying in school...working hard...and giving up drugs...emphasizing how important that is to the nation..."we can not compete successfully in the world unless our schools are drug-free."

The President can also remind young people in high school and colleges that this admonition applies to the workplace as well and that "soon there won't be any jobs in America for people who use drugs!"

4. Announce the U.S. meeting of the Andean nations as a bi-partisan or international event.

It is important that the meeting of the "grower" nations be seen, in part, as a response to their urging us to reduce demand for drugs in the U.S. We have made great progress in that regard and it should provide an important preamble to the meeting.

Miami, Florida might provide the best possible location for this meeting because improvement there has been notable on all fronts (including a dramatic reduction in crack addicted babies).

SUMMARY


Americans still see drugs as of extraordinary importance to the nation because they know that this problem is imbedded in every other social problem we are dealing with...crime...health care...education...the homeless...and competitiveness. Drugs make all social problems more difficult to solve.

I am fully aware that any bi-partisan effort will be difficult to achieve in a political year. But I refer you to a sentence near the close of the President's speech to the nation on drugs on September 5, 1989: "This is the toughest domestic challenge we've faced in decades. And it's a challenge we must face -- not as Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives -- but as Americans. The key is a coordinated, united effort."

Bi-partisanism is also a worthwhile goal because it will ensure the media coverage so necessary if the public is going to gain an understanding of this problem and a sense of how they can participate in the solution.

Drugs Use by Friends

(Age 9 - 12)




Source: Partnership ATS

Cocaine Use


Three study comparison

use - last year




Cocaine

Perception of risk/availability



Source: Univ. Michigan H.S. Seniors

74 Million Americans have used illicit drugs*



*NIDA Household
Survey 1990

Past Year

Past Month
(Down 10 MM)

DUF, U.S. Dept. of Justice



6 MM "In Trouble"

What's the No. 1 problem?

On some New York Times/CBS News polls, respondents are asked: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today? Choices are not suggested to the respondents; poll takers write down whatever they answer and later break the answers down into categories that can be described in one word. These issues were the most frequently mentioned. Charts are based on 21 telephone surveys conducted nationwide Jan. 1985 through Oct. 1991.

Drugs

Invention of crack reported.

President Bush announces he will give a prime time speech on drugs. After 2 weeks of news coverage, he declares war on drugs.

Nuclear war

As power of Soviet Union ebbs and Eastern Europe breaks apart, fear of war wanes.

The deficit

Despite the 1985 Gramm-Rudman law, deficits have remained at more than \$150 billion. Budget debates and votes take place in the fall.

Unemployment

Unemployment at a 14-year low.

The economy

Dow Jones drops a then-startling 141 points 2 weeks before poll.

Economists begin warning that a recession is likely.

Mideast/Persian Gulf

U.S. protects gulf shipping in Iran-Iraq war. Missile strikes frigate Stark.

Iraq invades Kuwait. U.S. sends troops.

The poor/the homeless/hunger

Poll takers say concern for the homeless peaks in winter time.

Terrorism/hostages

Terrorists strike in '85-'86: Shootings at Rome and Vienna airports, TWA hijacking, Achille Lauro incident.

CAMPAIGN '92

AMERICA'S
BIGGEST
WORRIES

What are Americans really worried about one year before the 1992 election? To find out, The Washington Post and ABC News asked 4,012 randomly selected adults whether they worry a great deal, a good amount, just a little or not at all about more than 50 problems confronting the nation. Here's what Americans said are their greatest concerns:

How to read this chart: The problem is listed in the first column. The percentage of those who said they worry "a great deal" about that problem appears in the second. The percentage who would vote for President Bush among those who worry a great deal about the problem is shown in the third column. The percentage who would vote for the Democratic presidential nominee is shown in the fourth column. Among all of those interviewed, Bush held a 47 percent to 31 percent lead over the unspecified Democratic candidate, with 22 percent undecided.

Figures are based on four separate Washington Post-ABC News surveys conducted during consecutive weeks in October. A total of 1,003 randomly selected adults were interviewed in each survey, or 4,012 in all. Margin of sampling error for reported results is plus or minus 3 percentage points, meaning that differences greater than about 3 percentage points can be said to be statistically significant. ICR Survey Research Group of Media, Pa., conducted the interviewing.

Drugs and Crime



THE WASHINGTON POST

Q. How much do you worry that:

	Percent who worry a "great deal"	% would vote for Bush	% vote for Democrat
1. Crime will increase	69	48	33
2. The use of illegal drugs will increase	68	47	34
3. A good college education is becoming too expensive	65	44	31
4. AIDS will become more widespread	62	41	37
5. The country's elected leaders aren't paying attention to the long-range needs of the country	57	42	32
6. Pollution and other environmental problems will get worse	57	39	40
7. You or your family won't be able to afford adequate medical care	54	42	39
8. The welfare system rewards people for not working	53	49	27
9. The American education system will get worse instead of better	53	49	33
10. Waste in the government will grow	52	49	33

11. The medical benefits you and your family now receive will be reduced	52	40	40
12. Nobody is looking out for the interests of the middle class	52	40	34
13. The country faces more economic bad times	50	44	38
14. People in this country have lost their spiritual values	49	41	32
15. The country's elected leaders just don't care about people like you	49	37	36
16. The budget deficit will grow	49	44	36
17. Your family's income won't keep up with prices	48	40	39
18. It costs too much to buy a home	47	39	40
19. Government isn't working as well as it used to	47	38	35
20. Special interest groups have too much influence over elected officials	47	43	37
21. Today's children will not have the same opportunities you did	46	46	36

Medical Issues



THE WASHINGTON POST



OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500

September 27, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: GOVERNOR MARTINEZ

RE: Peru

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. Martinez", written over the typed name "GOVERNOR MARTINEZ".

In short, this is the situation. There is over \$90 million in FY 1991 foreign assistance set aside for Peru's anti-narcotics programs. Capitol Hill, Senator Leahy in particular, has told us that we cannot release that money because of concerns over human rights abuses of the Peruvian military. We were prepared to accept a compromise to reduce the level of military assistance and condition such assistance on human rights progress. The House Democrats were willing to accept such a compromise. Senator Leahy has refused and is insisting that we provide no lethal assistance and we provide no training for the Peruvian military. Therefore, we have two apparent options:

1. We accept Leahy's position, which provides a good deal of economic assistance to Peru, a country which desperately needs such aid. Or,
2. We reject Leahy and tell him that the whole purpose of the aid program was the United States' national interest in fighting drugs, therefore, we want military assistance or we want nothing. This option should be accompanied by calls to key Democrats on the Hill warning them that if there is no acceptable aid package to Peru -- the blame is on them for losing the drug war in South America.

I can only advise the President on the drug policy implications of this issue. There are serious economic, strategic and political issues involving Peru which go beyond drug policy. NSC and State Department views should be carefully considered on these other matters, particularly their views about the Peruvian economy. From strictly a drug policy perspective, I believe Leahy's offer would doom our anti-drug effort in Peru and commit the prestige of the President's Andean Strategy to a totally unworkable program. It will be a program in which we cannot provide security for areas in which we are supposed to be planting alternative crops and fighting drug traffickers. Without adequate security, it is naive to assume this effort can work.

I want you to know that I will back the President one hundred percent in whatever decision he makes. This is not an easy choice.

But as his drug policy advisor, I do not believe we should trust the heretofore success of the President's anti-drug policies to the inclinations of Senator Leahy and his staff. Their plan will not diminish drug trafficking in Peru and may even place President Fujimori at risk from his own military, which is expecting some assistance.



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02. List	Successes of the Drug War (1 pp.)	n.d.	B-5	

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Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JF (NLGB) on 10/28/05

Date Closed: 1/3/2005	OA/ID Number: 29189-005
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AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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SUCSESSES OF THE DRUG WAR

- o Our success on the drug issue is the President's greatest domestic victory. We should do more to exploit it.
- o Four years ago, the nation was wracked with fear that we had a drug epidemic out of control. The drug policy director's job was labeled as "hopeless." Today, the fear is gone.
- o Today, there is a sense that the drug war is being won. Attitudes have shifted in our direction, and it is no longer fashionable to take drugs.
- o We have many concrete successes we can point to:
 - We've driven drug use down to its lowest level since the government started collecting these figures in the early 1970's.
 - + Current use of any drug has dropped from 23 million people in 1985 to 12.9 million in 1990.
 - + Reported drug related emergency room visits were down to 33,000 in 1990, after having climbed from 26,000 in 1985 to 40,000 in 1988.
 - + Occasional use of cocaine has dropped from 8.6 million people in 1985 to 4.1 million in 1990.
 - Recently, even drug crime has begun to turn down. Drug arrests are down by 14 percent, indicating that the tide has begun to turn in the inner cities.
 - We set ambitious goals in the President's first Drug Strategy, and we've met them (see attached.)
- o The President has committed huge, unprecedented resources to fighting drugs:
 - Funding has increased by 82 percent under President Bush (\$11.7 billion for FY 1992.)
 - We've added over 22,000 agents, attorneys, prevention and treatment specialists and others to the Federal effort.
 - National treatment capacity has expanded by 43 percent, so that 2.2 million Americans can now be treated for their drug dependency.
- o On the drug front -- a very important issue to the American people -- we've achieved a great, unquestionable victory, and the opposition is on the run.

**Walker's Point
Kennebunkport, Maine**

August 26, 1991

NOTE FROM THE PRESIDENT

TO: John Sununu
Brent Scowcroft

Please read Martinez's paper and
let's discuss. We must not neglect
the drug fight.

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WALKER'S POINT
KENNEBUNKPORT, MAINE

8-25-91

Dear Bob,

I read your Aug 23rd
report. I will talk to Gen
Scowcroft and John Sununu
on this - then when I return
we can discuss what to do


WALKER'S POINT
KENNEBUNKPORT, MAINE

The Honorable Bob Martinez

on a possible "Cartagena II"
and other matters.

Keep up the good
work -

Cy Bul



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AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

Date: July 9, 1991

TO: KATHY SUPER

FROM: KATIE WINKELJOHN

Governor Sununu and Andy talked about
the attached and would like Martinez's
requests put through long range scheduling.

cc: Ede Holiday

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	From John Sununu to Bob Martinez Re: Anti-Drug Events for the President (2 pp.)	7/8/91	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Martinez (Drug Policy) [1991]

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 10/28/05

Date Closed:	1/3/2005	OA/ID Number:	29189-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500

AC/ER

JUL - 8 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GOVERNOR BOB MARTINEZ *Bob Martinez*
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

SUBJECT: Anti-Drug Events for the President

Several months ago, we discussed the need to highlight the success of the President's National Drug Control Strategy. I would like to suggest several possible events which the President might attend in order to accomplish this purpose.

1. Treatment Center Visits -- Current trends indicate that the hard core addict population will be the next significant challenge. The Administration has a story to tell on this issue as we have put forth several innovative programs in this area. The President could cut the ribbon to a new Administration-sponsored treatment unit at St. Elizabeth's hospital. I also think a visit to a famous New York treatment facility, such as Phoenix House, would be a valuable event this summer. There are several Members of the New York congressional delegation who have been critical of the President on the treatment issues, yet who seem unable to convince their colleagues to meet the President's budget request for treatment programs.

2. Drugs and the Environment -- As you may know, drug production causes substantial environmental damage. Methamphetamine laboratories use toxic chemicals and are expensive to clean up; marijuana plots are booby trapped to deter law enforcement, causing danger in our National forests; coca leaf farming requires slashing and burning tropical forests; and, cocaine producers use large amounts of toxic chemicals which are usually dumped into rivers or ground water. To highlight these issues, I suggest that the President, Administrator Reilly and myself visit a drug laboratory which has been seized and is in the process of being cleaned up. The obvious dangers of these laboratories are apparent when you see DEA agents in toxic waste suits cleaning up a site which is strewn with chemical drums and dirty test tubes.

3. Community Prevention -- Voluntary, grass roots activism to fight the drug war in communities has taken off under the President's leadership. It continues to be the most effective way of preventing drug use and dissuading traffickers in American communities. There are several worthwhile programs the President could visit this summer.

4. Drug-Free Workplace Site -- The private sector response to the drug crisis has been vigorous. For purposes of safety and productivity, many companies have initiated drug-free workplace programs which not only prevent future losses, but also help employees who may be in trouble with drugs. A visit to a construction site or other workplace which is drug-free would help promote this important trend. In this regard, it is also important that small businesses develop mechanisms to promote a drug-free workplace. There is a danger that as large corporations adopt vigorous policies and drug testing, chronic drug users will be attracted to small businesses for employment. This would slow the productivity of the most efficient and innovative sector of the economy. In this regard, the Atlanta area is putting together a program to combine the resources of small businesses to promote the drug-free workplace. By early fall, we think this program would be ready for some increased publicity to highlight the concept nationwide.

Let me be frank. I do not think there is any other area in which the President's domestic programs have enjoyed such success as in the drug policy area. Congressional Democrats are consciously avoiding a discussion of this topic because our success has been so dramatic. The politics of the drug issue has shifted from who gets the blame for the problem to who gets the credit for the improvements. We need to make certain that the President is associated with the improvements.

cc: Edith E. Holiday
Assistant to the President and
Secretary of the Cabinet

David F. Demarest, Jr.
Assistant to the President for
Communications

Sigmund A. Rogich
Assistant to the President for
Public Events and Initiatives

Ronald C. Kaufman
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Political Affairs

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: EDE HOLIDAY *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Mission from Director
Martinez

Director Martinez asked me to forward the attached proposal to you.

cc: General Scowcroft

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

3/5/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(With ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Washington, D.C. 20500
Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR EDE HOLIDAY
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND SECRETARY OF THE CABINET

FROM: BOB MARTINEZ
DIRECTOR



SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Mission to Guatemala

Attached is a memorandum describing a proposed Presidential Mission that President Bush has asked me to lead on his behalf. It will take place June 24-26. I would be grateful if you could forward it to Governor Sununu for consideration.

Thank you.

Attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
SCS 7/5/15

UNCLASSIFIED (With ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(With ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Washington, D.C. 20500
Attachment)

JUN 17 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BOB MARTINEZ
DIRECTOR



SUBJECT: Request for a Presidential Mission to Guatemala

I am seeking your formal approval for a Presidential Mission that President Bush has asked me to lead to Guatemala June 24-26. The President asked me to lead this delegation after talking with President Jorge Serrano Elias who expressed his deep concern about the drug problem in his country.

The purpose of the trip is to cultivate our mutual drug control interests in Guatemala and to emphasize our efforts to counter the flow of illicit drugs.

I believe that designating this trip as a Presidential Mission is important to increasing the credibility of the United States' efforts to develop both regional and international consensus against the trafficking and use of drugs.

Attachment

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REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

SCS 7/6/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Notional Travel Schedule
Director Martinez**

June 24	Monday	7:00PM	Depart Washington for Guatemala City
		9:00PM	Arrive Guatemala City
			Overnight
June 25	Tuesday	AM	Meet with Embassy officials
		PM	Meet with Guatemalan government officials
			Press Conference
			Overnight
June 26	Wednesday	7:00AM	Depart Guatemala City for Washington
		1:00PM	Arrive Washington

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SCS NARA, Date 7/6/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY: ONDCP/ONSA
T. GRABOWSKY/COORDINATOR
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memo	From Brian Waidmann to John Sununu Re: Nomination of Governor Bob Martinez to be the President's Drug Policy Director (2 pp.)	2/25/91	P-2, P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Martinez (Drug Policy) [1991]

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February 25, 1991

AC/ER

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU

THROUGH: Fred McClure *FM*
FROM: Brian Waidmann, *BW* Special Assistant for
Legislative Affairs
SUBJECT: Nomination of Governor Bob Martinez to be the
President's Drug Policy Director

Governor Martinez faces a difficult confirmation hearing before the Judiciary Committee tomorrow (Tuesday) at 10:00 a.m. This first hearing will set the stage for what may become a tough confirmation fight. Below is a briefing on the issues that have been and will be raised regarding the nomination.

Since the announcement of the Martinez nomination, there have been a number of negative newspaper articles and TV shows. Although the stories have raised either old or seemingly spurious allegations, some if not all of these allegations are expected to be raised at Martinez's confirmation hearing.

The allegations include that Governor Martinez was bribed while serving as the mayor of Tampa, that he lacks law enforcement experience necessary to serve as the nation's drug czar, that he received campaign contributions from at least one person who was later convicted of major drug trafficking offenses, that he lacks the management skills necessary to handle this tough job, and that he has not done enough on the demand side of the drug problem. The Washington Post and New York Times are expected to publish what are described as "unflattering" profiles of Martinez on Tuesday. One such article appeared today in the Wall Street Journal (attached).

A Florida newspaper may publish new allegations that Governor Martinez served on the Board of Directors of a bank that loaned money to people later identified as drug traffickers. We do not yet know all the facts of this new story.

Governor Martinez and his staff, plus staff at the White House and the drug control policy office, have researched the allegations that have surfaced and prepared thorough rebuttals and responses. We also researched, wrote and distributed a comprehensive fact sheet on the Governor's solid drug fighting record in Florida. We shared this information with committee Senators and their staffs. Governor Martinez has also met personally with committee staff and most Committee Senators. He has been extensively briefed on the President's Drug Control Strategy and how best to respond to questions that may be raised at the hearing.

We have worked closely with the Press Office (Steve Hart), Media Relations (Deb Amend), Public Liaison (Leigh Ann Metzger), and Intergovernmental Affairs (Bill Canary and Lanny Griffith) on the nomination.

I recommend you call Governor Martinez Tuesday morning prior to his 10:00 a.m. hearing. This is both to bolster the Governor's spirits and to counter the impression left by at least one newspaper report that the White House is not fully supportive of the nomination.

ACTION:

Attachment

Bob Martinez, Bush's Proposed New Drug Czar, Is Criticized as Lacking Some Key Qualifications

By PAUL M. BARRETT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Bob Martinez seems to possess two obvious qualifications to be the new drug czar: He has good White House connections, and he needs a job.

But some liberals and conservatives alike say the former Florida governor, who faces a Senate confirmation hearing tomorrow, lacks some other key qualifications for the post, primarily expertise on the drug issue.

He "is purely a political choice, with a... dismal drug-control record," charges

Arnold Trebach, a liberal criminologist at American University.

Tommy Thomas, a former Florida Republican Party chairman who had a bitter political falling-out with Mr. Martinez, calls him "the Dan Quayle of the drug war," and adds: "I like George Bush, and I can understand a political payoff, but this guy is a loser and a real lightweight."



Bob Martinez

Mr. Martinez has declined to comment before his confirmation hearing. But Mr. Bush calls his nominee "a leader who has earned his stripes on the front lines of the drug war," and some grass-roots anti-drug groups applaud Mr. Martinez for heading a governors' task force on the problem.

Still, both supporters and detractors say the appointment signals the downgrading on the Bush political agenda of the drug issue, which was the subject of Mr. Bush's first nationwide address in September 1989 after becoming president. Mr. Martinez has demonstrated "little technical knowledge" about the drug issue and "has to be seen as [a] purely political selection," says Robert Dupont, who was drug adviser to President Richard Nixon.

Links to Bush Clan

Administration officials say privately that Mr. Martinez owes his selection primarily to patronage and personal friendship with the Bush clan. The president

campaigned personally for Mr. Martinez in his losing re-election bid last fall. The president's son, Jeb, served as Martinez campaign chairman after being a member of the former governor's cabinet.

Senate Democrats, who have themselves fumbled in proposing coherent solutions to the drug problem, acknowledge that they don't have the political will to defeat, or even seriously challenge, the Martinez nomination. But they are eager at least to embarrass the nominee on his way to a likely confirmation. "Unfortunately, Mr. Martinez lacks the background and record to suggest that he is well suited for this task," contends Judiciary Chairman Joseph Biden of Delaware, who will wield the gavel at tomorrow's hearing.

A Democrat-turned-Republican, the 56-year-old Mr. Martinez has spent nearly a quarter-century in public life. An image of political fecklessness is mostly attributable to Mr. Martinez's four shaky years as governor. He managed to anger both Republicans and Democrats, for example, by pushing for and winning passage of an expanded state sales tax on services. Later, he was accused of waffling when in the face of public opposition, he called a special legislative session and substituted a more modest tax measure.

After the U.S. Supreme Court in 1989 allowed states to regulate abortion more aggressively, Mr. Martinez called another special legislative session, only to see a series of anti-abortion measures he proposed die before getting out of committee.

Likely Ghosts

Other Florida ghosts are likely to haunt Mr. Martinez at his hearing tomorrow. Democrats are expected to resuscitate an unproven allegation that, during his successful 1979 mayoral campaign, Mr. Martinez took an illegal contribution from a cable television operator seeking favorable treatment. (The allegation, made by a Reagan-appointed federal prosecutor, never led to an indictment, and Mr. Martinez has angrily denied it.)

Also likely to prompt questions is Mr. Martinez's effort as governor to encourage federal officials to approve a drug-testing

product in which several of his financial backers had invested. Aides have defended the plug for the drug test as legitimate.

From a theatrical perspective, Mr. Martinez has a tough act to follow as drug czar. William Bennett, who resigned in November, grabbed media and public attention by demonizing BMW-driving yuppie coke-heads and boosting all manner of draconian punishment. (He once even defended the notion of beheading dope dealers.) Although drug use by the middle class had begun to level off before he took office, Mr. Bennett could plausibly brag that things didn't get worse, and possibly even improved, during his watch.

Mr. Martinez lacks his predecessor's

panache. "He has talents," the Miami Herald editorialized, "but persuasiveness is not high among them."

Moreover, while Mr. Bennett in effect deflected attention from the persistence of heavy drug use in the inner cities, Mr. Martinez won't be as easily able to avoid facing the problem. The staff of the currently czar-less White House drug office just this month acknowledged that the administration had been underestimating the size of the addict population.

Sticking to what he knows, Mr. Martinez almost certainly will stress a punitive program. As governor, he replaced tough "law-and-order" remedies with even tougher ones: stiffening sentences for drug crimes, doubling the state's prison capacity and signing over 130 death warrants.

To be sure, Florida's location makes it an attractive narcotics-importation center. But the Martinez crackdown doesn't seem to have had much effect. Florida continues to have one of the highest crime rates of

FAA to Toughen Scrutiny as Airlines Hit Hard Times

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON—Airlines are facing tougher scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Administration because of the agency's concern that some airlines might cut corners in maintenance to save money during the industry's current downturn.

"For as long as these difficult times continue, we in the FAA are going to step up our airline surveillance activities all across the country," James Bussey, FAA administrator, told the agency's annual forecasting conference.

FAA officials and industry analysts stressed that they didn't have any evidence that financially strapped carriers were taking short cuts that might jeopardize safety.

At the conference, predictions for the industry were positive despite record losses last year and consumer fears spurred by the Persian Gulf war.

The FAA forecast from 1991 to 2002 predicts an annual growth of passenger boardings on domestic U.S. flights of 3.8%, from 419.3 million to 666.9 million. The FAA also expects a 4.1% annual increase in total passenger miles from 335.4 billion to 551.5 billion miles a year in 2002.

But the outlook for 1991 is not so rosy. Boardings and miles are both expected to drop 1.1%. "It's a blip, though," said Gene Mercer, manager of forecasting for the FAA. He blamed the drop on travelers' fears of terrorism and on a surge in jet fuel prices.

all states. And even with thousands of new prison cells, Florida is granting early release to droves of violent offenders. The reason: The state's lock-ups are over-

crowded with drug-possession violators. Says Mark Kleiman, a Harvard University drug expert: "People don't look to Florida as a model for drug policy."

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: Jan. 2, 1991

TO: Governor Sununu

FROM: **EDE HOLIDAY** *EH*
Assistant to the President
and Secretary of the Cabinet

FYI. Attached are two new clips reporting on the success of recent marijuana eradication efforts.

Attachment

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

LOS ANGELES TIMES JAN 1 1991

DRUGS

Hawaii Drive Destroys Most of Outdoor Marijuana Crop

New type of pinpoint herbicide spraying is highly effective. State turns from a major exporter to importer of pot as prices soar.

By SUSAN ESSOYAN
SPECIAL TO THE TIMES

A5

HONOLULU—Finding 54 pounds of marijuana hidden in cardboard boxes at a busy airport is hardly unusual. What caught people by surprise was which airport: Honolulu International.

"It's like taking coals to Newcastle," chuckled Bill Paty, director of the state Department of Land and Natural Resources. "Except," he added quickly, "this isn't Newcastle any more."

The shipment, which arrived at Honolulu International Airport last month from Phoenix, signaled a reversal, officials say. For years, Hawaii has been a prime marijuana grower and exporter. Hawaiian marijuana, prized for its potency, is marketed across the country under names like "Kona Gold" and "Puna Butter," after the districts where it flourished.

"Hawaii was either the largest or the second largest producer in the nation throughout the last decade," state Atty. Gen. Warren Price said. "For a little bitty state, we were certainly doing our share."

No longer. A herbicide spraying program, known as Operation Wipeout, has so reduced home-grown supplies of the illicit weed that dealers have resorted to importing it. The state says it destroyed nearly 800,000 marijuana plants, worth more than \$1 billion, in a six-month blitz that ended in November. That represents 80% of 1990's outdoor crop, which was already shrunk by heavy rain, Price said.

"Our objective was to break the back of the industry, and I think we've done that," he said in an interview.

The key to the eradication program is a locally designed spray rig that is dangled from a helicopter. As the chopper hovers 100 feet overhead, the ball-shaped steel drum sprays each plot with glyphosate, a common weed-killer. Unlike aerial malathion spraying, which blankets large areas, the glyphosate spraying is targeted and has sparked little opposition.

"We are looking into making that device available in other areas now that we've used

it without environmental harm," said Stanley Morris, deputy director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy in Washington, D.C.

Although claims of Operation Wipeout's success are difficult to verify, the local marijuana market clearly has been affected. Marijuana, known locally as *pakaiole*, is so scarce that prices have skyrocketed. On the street, a pound of top-grade marijuana, which fetched \$1,800 three years ago, now commands more than \$5,000.

"They're selling stuff they could never sell before: seeds, stems and immature leaves," said one source. "It's expensive and it's no good."

On the Big Island, whose vast tracts of undeveloped land have proved irresistible to marijuana growers, Operation Wipeout hit like "a sledgehammer," said Roger Christie, a spokesman for the Marijuana Political Action Committee.

"Some [growing] operations have been spurted out of business," he said. "It's devastating to the local economy." Pot cultivation, a back-yard hobby in Hawaii in the 1970s, swelled into a multimillion-dollar annual industry in the last decade. Marijuana patches as large as a quarter of an acre dotted state forests to the point where some hikers worried about encountering booby traps and armed guards in remote areas. Other growers hid their illegal crops in sprawling sugar cane fields.

Air Force reconnaissance jets methodically photo-mapped the entire state to identify marijuana plots.

The state then hired sightseeing helicopters to crisscross the islands and shoot each patch with glyphosate. The herbicide, commonly sold as Rodeo and Roundup, was spiked with red dye to let people know the plants had been poisoned.

Officials say the spray guns have pinpoint accuracy and use only a tiny fraction of the herbicide that is employed annually by state road crews and farmers for weed control. "We were spraying marijuana in the midst of sugar cane fields, and we had people on the ground observing, and we didn't get one drop on the cane," Price said.


About a dozen residents, mostly in rural areas of the Big Island's Puna district, called a state hot line to complain about helicopter noise from Operation Wipeout. Others expressed concern about herbicide drift and possible contamination of water tanks. Rona

BURRELLE'S

NEWSPRESS

PAGE 4 OF 21

1/2



Associated Press

A copter trails an effective new spraying device in Hawaii's drive to wipe out pot.

Lee Kleiman, a Pahoa resident who is chemically sensitive, said she and her family suffered from headaches and stomach problems.

"We were poisoned," she said in a telephone interview. "They would spray, and then we'd get sick. Who wants to breathe this stuff in?"

But officials said they found no evidence of health problems associated with the spraying.

Heartened by the results, the Drug Enforcement Administration is preparing a video for distribution to other states. It plans also to further refine the spray rig to laser-direct and videotape each spray.

Meanwhile, local officials are bracing for the next crop. "To succeed, we have to keep up the pressure," Price said. "They have already begun replanting. And we will get it sprayed just about as fast as they can plant it."

BURRELLE'S

NEWS EXPRESS

PAGE 5 OF 21
2/2

LOS ANGELES TIMES JAN 1 1991

Pot Supply, Demand Dropping, U.S. Reports

■ **Drugs:** Law enforcement is driving growers indoors. Claim of reduced demand is disputed as prices soar.

By RONALD J. OSTROW
TIMES STAFF WRITER

A4

WASHINGTON—The battle to eliminate marijuana, still America's most abused drug, is entering a new phase: State and federal drug fighters are scoring major hits against marijuana growers, while, at the same time, both the supply of and demand for pot are dropping, U.S. officials report.

Some marijuana advocates challenge government figures showing reduced demand. But virtually no one disputes that prices are soaring, due in part to stepped-up law enforcement.

Drug Enforcement Administration officials say that the war on marijuana is far from over and cite increasing use of indoor cultivation and other "amazing horticulture." But they point optimistically to trends of reduced supply and demand, rising prices and victories by law enforcement agencies.

There is "a hardened public attitude toward drugs—a moving away from the casual view toward marijuana that let us slide into the drug acceptance period of the 1970s," said Stanley E. Morris, the federal drug czar's deputy director for supply reduction, in an interview Monday.

Because the United States is second only to Mexico in pot production—and produces the highest quality substance—the enforcement successes increase the "credibility of U.S. leadership" in the international drug war, he said.

"The best news is the [increased] number of indoor operations seized in California and Hawaii," Morris said. He explained that both states are prime areas for growing outdoors and that indoor growing is much more expensive. The fact that growers are being forced indoors shows that law enforcement agencies are "taking the drug business out of the hands of Mom and Pop, casual entrepreneurs."

"As the little guy gets out, the opportunity to build a hardened public attitude grows," Morris added.

ed. "The more organized grower makes for less sympathetic jury cases. You can really hammer them."

Mark Kleiman, an expert on narcotics at Harvard's John F.

Kennedy School of Government, sees a dark side to "domestic marijuana production becoming more like a criminal enterprise than a hobby. You're going to see [more] violence and corruption" as a result, he predicted.

Recent enforcement successes have included major eradication efforts in Hawaii and in Kentucky's Daniel Boone National Forest and the seizure in the Mohave Valley near Bullhead City, Ariz., of one of the nation's largest underground pot-growing operations.

Also, the Los Angeles County sheriff, alerted by an abnormally high power bill, uncovered a massive underground growing operation near Lancaster in November. The raid netted 8,000 marijuana plants grown in a high-tech operation in a 7,000-square-foot basement. With four harvests possible, the growers could net an estimated \$75 million a year.

Stepped-up enforcement activity along the U.S.-Mexican border over the last year has tripled recent marijuana seizures at official crossing points, officials said. From mid-October through mid-December in 1990, pot seizures at those sites totaled 33,058 pounds versus 9,999 pounds during the same period in 1989.

But those successes took place against a drop in overall marijuana seizures, according to the DEA—from 632,862 kilos in fiscal 1988 to 450,251 in fiscal 1989 to 175,457 in the last fiscal year.

"I don't think it's because we're not doing a good job," said Steven P. Cummings, deputy chief of DEA's cannabis investigations section. "Big loads [of pot] are just not coming out of Colombia or Southeast Asia."

He cited the interruption of "mother ships" from Thailand that

unload pot to smaller vessels for delivery to the western United States, including Seattle and San Simeon and San Luis Obispo in California.

The shut-off of foreign sources, including the intensified interdiction efforts along the U.S.-Mexican border, leads to "the void being filled from domestically grown marijuana," Cummings said in a recent interview.

BURRELLE'S

NewsExpress

PAGE 3 OF 21

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	From William Canary to John Sununu Re: Support for the Nomination of Governor Bob Martinez as National Drug Control Policy Director (1 pp.)	1/23/91	P2, P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Martinez (Drug Policy) [1991]

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 10/28/05

Date Closed:	1/3/2005	OA/ID Number:	29189-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

AC/ER

January 23, 1991

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: DAVID F. DEMAREST, JR. *AD*
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS

DEBRA R. ANDERSON *DR*
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

FROM: WILLIAM J. CANARY, JR. *WJ Canary*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR THE NOMINATION OF GOVERNOR BOB
MARTINEZ AS NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY DIRECTOR

Tom Cochran, Executive Director of the United States Conference of Mayors has assumed a very proactive role in support of Governor Martinez's nomination as National Drug Control Policy Director.

Among other things, he'll be hosting a dinner for Governor Martinez with Mayors and has agreed to help generate bipartisan endorsements from within the Conference of Mayors in the way of letters and phone calls to various Senators on the Judiciary Committee.

The attached package was prepared for wide distribution and sent to all appropriate constituents groups including the United States Conference of Mayors.

REACTION TO THE MARTINEZ NOMINATION

"I think no one will understand the problems of Florida better than Governor Martinez. I would like to see him appointed."
Governor Lawton Chiles (D-FL)

"I think it will be advantageous to Florida...and I believe he is qualified to perform this job." **Senator Bob Graham (D-FL)**

"I know Bob Martinez and I like him, and certainly he had a lot of experience with drugs at the state level. ...What we desperately need all over the country is help at the city and state level, because that's where you fight the drug war." **Governor Mario Cuomo (D-NY), interview with Larry King, November 30, 1990**

"The job that Bush wants Martinez to do -- bringing together diverse federal bureaucracies for a coordinated mission -- calls for talents that Martinez has displayed throughout his career."
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"Congress should have no trouble recognizing that Bob Martinez is qualified to lead the nation's war on drugs."
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"We have worked with Bob Martinez through all of his years as mayor and Governor. He has been an active member and strong supporter of the Conference of Mayors, the leader of the nation's governors on the drug issue. He has been a tough fighter against the drug traffickers in Florida, a strong anti-drug leader from the earliest days of the drug scourge. And as an educator he knows that the fight against drugs must begin with our children."
Thomas Cochran, Executive Director, U.S. Conference of Mayors

GOVERNOR BOB MARTINEZ THE PRESIDENT'S CHOICE FOR NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY DIRECTOR

"Few areas of our society have been left untouched by the tragedy of drug abuse and the attendant crime that follows. All of us, regardless of our race, religion, or political beliefs have an obligation to end this menacing problem. I am excited at the challenge of leading the federal anti-drug efforts. President Bush's National Drug Control Strategy is one for all Americans to use and a blueprint for success. Using the skills I have learned as a school teacher, businessman, mayor, and Governor, I look forward to making things better for all Americans and helping to deliver on a promise the President made nearly two years ago when he said: 'This scourge will end.'"

- Bob Martinez

On November 23, 1990, President George Bush announced his intention to nominate Florida Governor Bob Martinez as the second National Drug Control Policy Director. The President called the appointment, "a battlefield promotion...for a leader who has earned his stripes on the front lines. As a former Governor and mayor, Bob (Martinez) will be especially effective in joining hands with state and local leaders. As a teacher who has spent seven years in the classroom, he knows the long-term key to winning this effort is to stop drug use before it starts."

As the southernmost point of the continental United States, Florida has been besieged by illegal drug smuggling and the problems resulting from drug-related crime and use. As Governor, Martinez vigorously responded to the crisis in Florida with some of the nation's most innovative anti-drug policies. His "hands-on" experience at both the state and local levels make him uniquely qualified to tackle the problem at the national level.

Standing on a strong and committed record, Governor Martinez will be a challenging national commander in the fight against drugs, a leader capable of uniting federal, state, and local governments behind an effective and balanced anti-drug strategy.

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LEADERSHIP

- Martinez was the first Governor to appoint a state "drug czar" to coordinate anti-drug activities and agencies in Florida. He appointed Douglas Hughes to the job in 1988, a Miami police officer who is applauded as a strong proponent of education and treatment initiatives.

- Martinez was appointed by President Reagan to the White House Conference on a Drug-Free America in 1987, where national leaders gathered to discuss the fight against drugs. Among other initiatives proposed by the Conference, their recommendations to increase capacity and accountability in the treatment system, drug test throughout the criminal justice system, and enforce a drug-free schools policy with clear sanctions were subsequently included in President Bush's National Drug Control Strategy.
- As the National Governors Association's lead Governor on substance abuse and drug trafficking issues, Martinez presented President Bush with a ten-point plan for anti-drug efforts. Released in August 1989, the plan included a drug summit with Latin American leaders, drug-free workplace policies for state and local government workers, and a doubling of federal penalties for the use of a semi-automatic firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug felony.
- Martinez presided as Governor of Florida when the state was evaluated by federal agencies in November 1990 as one of the nation's role models in the drug battle. The exemplary Florida policies include the formal training of teachers in substance abuse education, the use of boot camps as an alternative form of incarceration, and channeling of asset forfeiture funds back into law enforcement activities.
- Martinez led Florida in implementing the nation's first comprehensive Drug-Free Workplace program for state government workers. He inaugurated the program by taking the first drug test himself.
- Understanding drugs as a security threat, Martinez was one of the first state leaders to bring the resources of the National Guard into the drug fight to assist other agencies in cargo inspections, air reconnaissance, observation and transportation.
- Martinez coordinated drug information exchanges with other southern state governors and New York Governor Cuomo, who went to Florida "seeking guidance" because of the "extraordinary success" of Florida's laws.
- The Spanish-speaking Governor traveled to Colombia, Bolivia, and Panama to meet with their leaders and support their efforts, especially the Colombian crackdown against the drug lords. He encouraged President Bush to lend full U.S. assistance to the Colombian effort.

BOB MARTINEZ'S FLORIDA RECORD ON FIGHTING DRUGS

Treatment and Prevention

- During Governor Martinez's tenure, Florida was in the top ten states for per capita spending on drug treatment.
- Between 1987 and 1989, all states increased government support of drug treatment by an average of 23%. Florida increased support for drug treatment by 33% in the same period.
- Between 1986 and 1989, total Emergency Room (ER) drug mentions around the country increased by 33%, while Miami increased by only 9%. Similarly, total Medical Examiner (ME) mentions increased by 19%, at the same time Miami drug deaths decreased by 52%.
- In 1989, Florida drug treatment operated at 91.6% of capacity, much higher than the nationwide utilization rate of 79.4%.
- Under Governor Martinez, Florida has been in the forefront of efforts to develop comprehensive plans and promote interagency coordination of prevention services at both the state and local levels.
- Florida's school children have a safer, healthier learning environment after Governor Martinez created Florida's Drug-Free Zones and then expanded the concept by imposing mandatory minimum sentences on individuals convicted of drug activity near public parks and playgrounds, public housing facilities, colleges and universities.
- Governor Martinez recognized the state's responsibility to protect children from drug-related abuse and neglect by approving a change in the statutory definition of child abuse so that drug-exposed infants would be afforded the same protections as other abused children.
- The Governor also responded to an increase in drug-related AIDS cases by establishing an AIDS Office within the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Currently, 21 drug treatment facilities provide AIDS counseling, testing, and referral services through a cooperative partnership with the state's AIDS Office.

Criminal Justice and Drug Testing

- Governor Martinez doubled the state's prison capacity, constructing more beds than in the previous 20 years and increasing the prison budget from \$417 million to \$1 billion.
- The Governor encouraged using prisoners to build over 14,000 new prison beds, raze crack houses, and maintain highways and parks. This program saved the Florida taxpayers over \$359 million. At the same time, he developed alternative forms of incarceration for non-violent offenders, including boot camps with 47% of the prisoners successfully completing the program and returning back to their communities.
- The Governor proposed the expansion of the death penalty provision to include major drug traffickers. This penalty, similar to the Bush Administration's proposal, permits the use of the death penalty for traffickers of large amounts of cocaine and heroin.
- Governor Martinez strengthened the criminal justice system by targeting career criminals. His plan, which was passed by the state legislature, resulted in stiffer penalties for repeat offenders. He also fought successfully for the rights of victims through a Victim's Rights Constitutional Amendment.
- In addition to substantial increases in drug treatment for all prisoners, the Governor implemented a three-phased treatment program for non-violent offenders. These phases included residential treatment, employment experience, and probationary supervision.
- Governor Martinez supported drug testing in a number of areas including prescreening for drivers' licenses, testing of parolees and probationers, as well as truck drivers and state government employees.
- He proposed and worked with the state legislature to pass tough user sanctions such as denial of drivers' and professional, business and occupational licenses to felony drug offenders.
- The Governor also proposed reduced workers' compensation premiums for employers that implemented drug-free workplace policies and called for a denial of government sector jobs to drug users. He favored the award of government contracts to companies with drug-free workplace programs.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUMDATE: 1/7/90ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 1/8/90 4:00 PMSUBJECT: TALKING POINTS RE GOVERNOR MARTINEZ

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MCCLURE	☒	☒
SUNUNU	☒	☒	NEWMAN	☐	☐
SCOWCROFT	☐	☐	PORTER	☒	☐
DARMAN	☒	☐	ROGICH	☐	☐
CARD	☐	☒	UNTERMAYER	☐	☐
CICCONI	☐	☒	ROGERS	☐	☒
DEMAREST	☒	☐	WINSTON	☐	☒
FITZWATER	☐	☒	ONDCP	☒	☐
GRAY	☒	☐		☐	☐
HAGIN	☐	☐		☐	☐
HOLIDAY	☒	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please forward any comments directly to Rob Portman, 2Fl., WW, x2230, no later than 4:00 PM, Tuesday, January 8, with a copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

James W. Cicconi
 Assistant to the President
 and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
 Ext. 2702

GOVERNOR BOB MARTINEZ: NEXT NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY DIRECTOR

On November 23, 1990, President George Bush nominated Florida Governor Bob Martinez as the second National Drug Control Policy Director. The President called the appointment, "a battlefield promotion...for a leader who has earned his stripes on the front lines."

As the southernmost point of the continental United States, Florida has been besieged by illegal drug smuggling and the problems resulting from drug-related crime and use. As Governor, Martinez vigorously responded to the crisis in Florida with some of the nation's most innovative anti-drug policies. His "hands-on" experience at both the state and local level make him uniquely qualified to tackle the problem at the national level.

"Few areas of our society have been left untouched by the tragedy of drug abuse and the attendant crime that follows. All of us, regardless of our race, religion, or political beliefs have an obligation to end this menacing problem. I am excited at the challenge of leading the federal anti-drug efforts. President Bush's plan is one for all Americans to use and a blueprint for success. Using the skills I have learned as a school teacher, businessman, mayor, and Governor, I look forward to making things better for all Americans and helping to deliver on a promise the President made nearly two years ago when he said: 'This scourge will end.'"

Standing on a strong and committed record, Governor Martinez will be a challenging national commander in the fight against drugs, a leader capable of uniting Democrats and Republicans behind an effective and balanced anti-drug strategy.

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"As a former Governor and mayor, Bob (Martinez) will be especially effective in joining hands with state and local leaders. As a teacher who has spent seven years in the classroom, he knows the long-term key to winning this effort is to stop drug use before it starts."

President George Bush

"I think no one will understand the problems of Florida better than Governor Martinez. I would like to see him appointed."

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increase capacity and accountability in the treatment system, drug test throughout the criminal justice system, and enforce a drug-free schools policy with clear sanctions were adopted by the National Drug Control Strategy.

- As the National Governors Association's lead Governor on substance abuse and drug trafficking issues, Governor Martinez presented President Bush with a ten-point plan for anti-drug efforts which was incorporated into the President's National Drug Control Strategy. Released in August 1989, the ten-point program included a hemispheric drug summit, drug-free workplace policies for state and local government workers, and a doubling of federal penalties for the use of a semi-automatic firearm during the commission of a violent crime or drug felony.
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From: John Walters
Status of Drug Strategy III

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

INTRODUCTION

President Bush presented his first National Drug Control Strategy to the Congress -- and to the American people -- on September 5, 1989, at a time of unprecedented concern over illegal drugs, epidemic levels of addiction, and drug-related crime. There had been highly publicized Presidential initiatives against drugs in the past, of course: periodic law enforcement crackdowns over the years, major Federal public awareness and treatment campaigns, and more recent attempts to police and seal our national borders against drug smugglers. But the President's Strategy marked a clear and bold departure from all such previous attempts to grapple with the problem.

For the first time, the Federal government had attempted to develop and publicly articulate a complete, sophisticated, and finely differentiated understanding of drugs as a public policy issue. The National Drug Control Strategy clearly acknowledged the visible effects of widespread drug use: rising rates of violent crime, serious damage to the nation's health and economy, and strains on vital relationships with overseas allies, for example. And the Strategy's proposed program -- now largely ratified and funded by Congress, and in place, up and running -- included major new initiatives in these and other areas.

But at the same time, the President's Strategy advanced a vigorous argument against continuation of the largely reactive, uncoordinated, and piecemeal efforts of past anti-drug campaigns. There would be no faddish search for a single, overriding answer to drug addiction and its attendant miseries. And there would be

no radical swings back and forth among policy extremes, as one after another was inevitably discredited.

Instead, the National Drug Control Strategy sought to come to terms with the drug problem not as a collection of random and frightening symptoms, but in its essence: use itself. The President's first Strategy described drug use as a broad epidemiological phenomenon, progressing in individuals and passing through sectors of the population at different rates, in different degrees, with different effects. The Strategy also described drug use as the product of a market, in which the variable "supply" of drug sellers and the variable "demand" of drug buyers meet in a combustible mix. Arrayed against these complicated, interrelated cycles must be a series of complicated, interrelated responses, each designed to complement the other, each designed to achieve maximum disruption of the drug market and the epidemic it feeds.

Neither the original National Drug Control Strategy nor its January 1990 companion proceeds from the assumption that the Federal government's programs and money can solve the drug problem in a vacuum. Both documents offer extensive attention and advice to State and local governments, private civic and service organizations, schools, churches, businesses, families, and individuals -- all of whom must devote concentrated and persistent effort to the drug problem in their particular spheres.

But at the same time, the President's Strategy has explicitly identified -- and welcomed -- a hugely expanded Federal role in the war against drugs. Federal departments and agencies maintain

exclusive responsibility for drug-related diplomatic and border security programs; major responsibility for large-scale criminal investigations, and long-term scientific and epidemiological research; and they provide information and partial funding support to local law enforcement, treatment, and prevention programs. The President has already requested and been granted sizeable budget increases in each of these areas, and the Fiscal Year 1993 budget included in this document, if approved and enacted, would bring total Federal drug spending to \$x.x billion, xx percent higher than when he took office.

Progress to Date: Quantified Two- and Ten-Year Objectives

Section 1005 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 requires that each National Drug Control Strategy include "long-range goals for reducing drug abuse in the United States," along with "short-term measurable objectives which the Director determines may be realistically achieved in the two-year period beginning on the date of the submission of the Strategy."

That rather vague and little-discussed legal instruction has developed into the National Drug Control Strategy's most important programmatic innovation. Since it first satisfied the goal-setting requirement in an appendix to the September 1989 Strategy, the Administration has purposefully and firmly rejected most of the criteria against which drug policy success and failure have historically been judged. No matter how many people we treat for addiction, how many traffickers we arrest and convict, how many

students we educate and warn, how many drug shipments we find and seize -- it all means nothing if drug use fails to recede.

So the National Drug Control Strategy lays out nine detailed goals and objectives, all with specific numerical and proportional targets, and almost all of which directly address the most urgent drug use problems. If levels and rates of national drug use don't fall, the Strategy is a failure -- a test this document continues to invite. As available data permits, progress to date against stated goals, along with necessary future projections and revisions in each category, are discussed in detail below.

Current Overall Drug Use. The National Institute on Drug Abuse's Household Survey -- now being conducted and published annually -- tracks drug use in several broad categories (e.g., lifetime use, past year use, and past month use). Past month or "current" use is the most widely cited of NIDA's statistical samples, and it has become a common shorthand indicator of the state of our problem with drugs. The 1985 Household Survey identified an estimated 23 million current drug users in America. That number fell 37 percent to 14.5 million current drug users in 1988, the year the next Survey was conducted.

On the epidemiological assumption that this sharp decline reflected success with those users easiest to treat or otherwise persuade, and that further progress would therefore likely prove more difficult and less dramatic, the Administration's first National Drug Control Strategy established the following goals for

reductions in the number of current drug users (below 1988 figures): 10 percent (to roughly 13 million) in two years, and 50 percent (to roughly 7.25 million) in ten years.

Now, 17 months later, data from the 1990 Household Survey indicates that current drug use has decreased by 10.6 percent, to an estimated 12.9 million Americans -- consistent with Strategy goals, and slightly ahead of schedule.

Because further reductions in current drug use remain a high national priority, this Strategy projects forward its existing relevant goals for an additional year at the same rate, as outlined in the following chart and box.

[Add chart of current overall drug use figures and goals, from 1988 baseline through 2001.]

1993 Objective:	a 20 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting any illegal use of drugs in the past month.
2001 Objective:	a 60 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting any illegal use of drugs in the past month.

Current Adolescent Drug Use. As noted above, the 1988 Household Survey indicated significant decreases in current drug use since 1985. These decreases held across all age groups in the population, but the smallest proportional decrease obtained for adolescents (those ages 12 through 17). Because this particularly vulnerable group remains a major concern for the future, the first National Drug Control Strategy established the following goals for reductions in the number of current adolescent drug users (below the 1988 estimate of 1.9 million): 10 percent (to roughly 1.7

million) in two years, and 50 percent (to just under one million) in ten years.

Now, 17 months later, data from the 1990 Household Survey indicates that current adolescent drug use has decreased by 13 percent, to an estimated 1.6 million -- again, slightly better than Strategy goals, and ahead of schedule.

This Strategy projects forward its existing goals in this category for an additional year at the same rate, as outlined in the following chart and box.

[Add chart of current adolescent drug use figures and goals, from 1988 baseline through 2001.]

1993 Objective:	a 20 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of adolescents reporting any illegal use of drugs in the past month.
2001 Objective:	a 60 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of adolescents reporting any illegal use of drugs in the past month.

Occasional Cocaine Use. Because drug use in individuals follows unpredictable patterns -- and any cocaine use may lead to addiction -- even relatively infrequent cocaine use is cause for concern. The 1988 Household Survey estimated that, compared to 1985, 2.8 million fewer people were using cocaine on a less-than-once-a-month basis. Again on the epidemiological assumption that this sharp decline reflected success with those users easiest to treat or otherwise persuade, and that further progress would therefore likely prove more difficult and less dramatic, the Administration's first National Drug Control Strategy established the following goals for reductions in the number of occasional

cocaine users (below the 1988 estimate of 5.8 million): 10 percent (to just over 5.2 million) in two years, and 50 percent (to roughly 2.9 million) in ten years.

Now, however, 17 months later, data from the 1990 Household Survey indicates that progress against occasional cocaine use has slowed only slightly, and that the original two-year goal in this category has already been met and significantly surpassed. Fewer than 4.1 million Americans are estimated to have been less often than once-a-month cocaine users in 1990. Accordingly, though future reductions in occasional cocaine use may still prove more difficult, this Strategy has revalidated and revised upward its relevant objectives, as outlined in the following chart and box.

[Add chart of occasional cocaine use figures and goals, from 1988 baseline through 2001.]

1993 Objective:	a 40 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting less often than once-a-month cocaine use in the past year.
2001 Objective:	a 60 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting less often than once-a-month cocaine use in the past year.

Frequent Cocaine Use. Frequent or addictive cocaine use continues to represent the nation's most serious and difficult short-term challenge. Among Household Survey respondents reporting any cocaine use in the preceding twelve months, the percentage reporting weekly or more frequent use doubled between 1985 and 1988, an alarming increase probably reflecting the prevalence of crack. The first National Drug Control Strategy established goals designed to reflect the need for a sharp near-term break in this

upward spiral, and an eventual sharp reversal of its course: a 50 percent-reduced rate of increase in the number of people reporting weekly or more frequent cocaine use after two years, and a 50 percent reduction in the absolute number of people reporting such use after ten years.

Now, however, 17 months later, data from the 1990 Household Survey indicates progress against frequent cocaine use far exceeding that originally anticipated. Though the relatively small percentage of survey respondents who fall within this category presents certain methodological difficulties, it appears that recent dramatic increases in frequent cocaine use have now been halted, and have actually been abruptly reversed. Estimated numbers of frequent cocaine users have declined 23.2 percent, from 862,000 in 1988 to 662,000 in 1990. Accordingly, this Strategy has revalidated and revised upward its relevant objectives, as outlined in the following chart and box.

[Add chart of frequent cocaine use figures and goals, from 1988 baseline through 2001.]

1993 Objective:	a 30 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting weekly or more frequent cocaine use.
2001 Objective:	a 65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting weekly or more frequent cocaine use.

Current Adolescent Cocaine Use. Between 1985 and 1988, the rate of current (past month) cocaine use by adolescents fell only 0.4 percentage points -- the smallest decrease recorded for any age group. Because special concern is warranted in this area, the

first National Drug Control Strategy established its most ambitious goals for reductions in the number of current adolescent cocaine users (below the 1988 estimate of 225,000): 20 percent (to roughly 180,000) in two years, and 50 percent (to roughly 112,500) in ten years.

Now, however, 17 months later, data from the 1990 Household Survey indicates that the number of current adolescent cocaine users has already fallen by 49 percent, to an estimated 115,000 -- far better, and years faster, than originally anticipated. Accordingly, though further necessary reductions in current adolescent cocaine use may prove more difficult, this Strategy has revalidated and revised upward its relevant objectives, as outlined in the following chart and box.

[Add chart of current adolescent cocaine use figures and goals, from 1988 baseline through 2001.]

1993 Objective:	a 60 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of adolescents reporting past month cocaine use.
2001 Objective:	a 75 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of adolescents reporting past month cocaine use.

Drug-Related Medical Emergencies. The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) compiles statistics concerning the frequency with which illegal drug use is mentioned by patients admitted to hospital emergency rooms. DAWN statistics are generally understood to measure the health consequences of drug use, and to provide perhaps the most important short-term picture of trends in addictive behavior. Between 1985 and 1988, DAWN mentions rose 360

percent for cocaine, 96 percent for marijuana and hashish, 51 percent for "dangerous drugs" (e.g., LSD), and 40 percent for heroin. The first National Drug Control Strategy established the following goals for reductions in the number of total DAWN mentions: 10 percent after two subsequent years (or eight quarters) of data collection, and 50 percent after ten subsequent years (or 40 quarters) of data collection.

DAWN has recorded dramatic decreases in emergency room drug mentions since late 1989. Over the most recent four quarters for which data is available, from the second quarter of 1989 (before these declines began) to the second quarter of 1990, cocaine mentions have dropped by 33 percent, marijuana and hashish mentions by 16 percent, and heroin mentions by 23 percent. For all drugs combined, DAWN mentions have dropped by 18 percent over this period. This figure meets and exceeds the goal originally established for this category. Accordingly, this Strategy has revalidated and revised upward its relevant objectives, as outlined in the following chart and box.

[Add chart of total DAWN mentions figures and goals, with data points at second quarter 1989, second quarter 1992, and second quarter 2001.]

1993 Objective:	by second quarter 1992, a 30 percent reduction below the second quarter 1989 level in the number of emergency room mentions for cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and dangerous drugs.
2001 Objective:	by second quarter 1992, a 60 percent reduction below the second quarter 1989 level in the number of emergency room mentions for cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and dangerous drugs.

Drug Availability. Our two best indicators of drug availability are: first, estimated amounts of foreign-manufactured drugs currently entering the United States; and second, reports by survey respondents concerning the ease with which drugs may be obtained in their neighborhoods. Reduced availability can have an important, beneficial effect on drug demand. As it becomes more difficult to search for, find, and purchase drugs -- and as their price goes up because of it -- then fewer people (non-addicts especially) are likely to continue using them. A drop in basic availability indicators remains a focus of national effort. Consequently, the first National Drug Control Strategy established two sets of availability objectives: a 10 percent reduction in estimated amounts of drugs entering the United States after two years; a 10 percent reduction after two years in the number of people reporting that drugs are easy to obtain in their communities; and 50 percent reductions in both preceding categories after ten years. The second National Drug Control Strategy subsequently revised these ten-year objectives slightly upward.

There is strong secondary evidence of recently reduced drug availability: significantly higher wholesale cocaine prices, and significantly lower wholesale cocaine purity, for example. But reported drug availability paints a mixed picture. [Awaiting NNICC data for imports.] And the annual NIDA-sponsored High School Senior Survey indicates 7 percent drops since 1988 in the number of students reporting that cocaine and marijuana are "readily available" in or around their schools. The Household Survey will

add a question about perceived availability to its 1991 program, which should additionally refine our understanding of this indicator.

Because further reductions in drug availability remain a high priority, this Strategy projects forward its existing relevant goals for an additional year at the same rate, as outlined in the following chart and box. [Assumes NNICC data does not necessitate rate revision.]

[Add charts of NNICC estimates and HSSS responses plotted against the goals, from appropriate baselines through 2001.]

- 1993 Objective:**
- 1) a 20 percent reduction below the 1988 level in estimated amounts of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and other dangerous drugs entering the United States; and
 - 2) a 20 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting that cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and dangerous drugs are easy to obtain in their communities.
- 2001 Objective:**
- 1) a 65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in estimated amounts of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and other dangerous drugs entering the United States; and
 - 2) a 65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting that cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and dangerous drugs are easy to obtain in their communities. [Assumes no change in rate.]

Domestic Marijuana Production. Domestic production now supplies 10 percent of the marijuana available in the United States, and in absolute quantity it has been growing in recent years -- up 20 percent from 1988 to 1989, for example. Necessary American anti-drug initiatives overseas are undercut by the growth of domestic marijuana production. We cannot expect foreign

countries to undertake vigorous anti-drug efforts inside their borders if we ourselves fail to do likewise.

The first National Drug Control Strategy established the following goals for reductions in domestic marijuana production (below [year] estimates of [weight]): 10 percent (to roughly [weight]) in two years, and 50 percent (to roughly [weight]) in ten years. The second National Drug Control Strategy subsequently revised the ten-year objective slightly upward. [Awaiting recent data necessary for a judgment of progress or failure.]

Because further reductions in domestic marijuana production remain a benchmark of national anti-drug resolve, this Strategy projects forward its existing relevant goals for an additional year at the same rate, as outlined in the following chart and box. [Assumes no change in rate.]

[Add chart of domestic marijuana production figures and goals, from appropriate baseline through 2001.]

1993 Objective:	a 20 percent decrease below the [baseline] level in estimated domestic marijuana production.
2001 Objective:	a 65 percent decrease below the [baseline] level in estimated domestic marijuana production. [Assumes no change in rate.]

Student Attitudes Toward Drug Use. A necessary precondition for further national progress against drugs is that illegal use increasingly be seen (particularly by young people) as unacceptable behavior. In recent years, the NIDA-sponsored High School Senior Surveys have indicated that more and more students view illegal drug use unfavorably. Still, effective education and prevention

efforts are needed to help drive down the ever-lower percentage of young people who do not yet hold unfavorable views of illegal drug use.

In 1988, an estimated 728,000 high school seniors reported that they did not disapprove of occasional marijuana use; 305,000 reported similar attitudes experimental cocaine use; and 107,000 responded the same way about regular cocaine use. Based on this data, the first National Drug Control Strategy established the following goals for reductions in the number of seniors reporting such attitudes: 10 percent in each category after two years, and 50 percent in each category after ten years.

Data from the 1990 High School Senior Survey indicates that the number of seniors failing to report disapproval of occasional marijuana use has dropped by 30 percent (to an estimated 512,000); of experimental cocaine use by 27 percent (to an estimated 223,000); and of regular cocaine use by 18 percent (to an estimated 87,000). In each case, these figures meet and exceed Strategy goals for student attitudes.

The second National Drug Control Strategy had already revalidated and revised upward its objectives in this area; this third Strategy similarly recasts relevant goals, as outlined in the following chart and box.

[Add chart of HSSS figures and goals, from 1988 baseline through 2001.]

1993 Objective: a 40 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of high school students who report that they do not disapprove of illegal drug use.

2001 Objective: a 65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of high school students who report that they do not disapprove of illegal drug use.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memo	From Ede Holiday to John Sununu Re: National Drug Control Strategy III (1 pp.)	10/16/90	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Martinez (Drug Policy) [1991]

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 10/28/05

Date Closed:	1/3/2005	OA/ID Number:	29189-005
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1990

AC/ER

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM:

EDE HOLIDAY ~~AK~~

SUBJECT:

National Drug Control Strategy III

new file

We are about to begin consideration of the annual National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy III) in the DPC process. We have just this morning received drafts of the first two chapters of Strategy III (Criminal Justice and Interdiction) from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The DPC Working Group on Anti-Drug Policy will meet on Monday, October 22, to begin consideration of the two chapters.

I wanted to bring to your early attention three important and extremely controversial issues included in the draft chapters, all three of which may be candidates for ultimate resolution by the President:

1. DoD's Interdiction Role: In the draft of Strategy III, ONDCP proposes granting the lead role in interdiction to the Department of Defense, thus uniting efforts of DoD, Customs, and the Coast Guard under DoD's command structure. ONDCP does not expect Coast Guard opposition. Customs can be expected to lodge strong objections. Defense has not yet indicated its position.
2. Shootdown: As drafted by ONDCP, Strategy III calls for shootdown of drug-smuggling aircraft under certain conditions. Several bills in Congress have proposed a shootdown policy. The Federal Aviation Administration has always been strongly opposed to any such initiative. NSC staff indicated that they are comfortable having this issue dealt within the DPC process.
3. Revocation of Driver's Licenses: ONDCP once again proposes legislation that would withhold five percent of Federal highway funds from any State that does not enact a law revoking the driver's license of a convicted drug offender. In August 1989, the President decided against including a similar proposal in Strategy I.