

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
1998-0004-F[2]

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:	Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:	Cabinet Agencies Files

OA/ID Number:	29187
Folder ID Number:	29187-006

Folder Title:
Cheney (Defense) [1991] [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	25	6	4



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION
1625 K STREET, N.W. SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006-1604
202-653-0823

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:
WILLIAM L. BALL, III
HOWARD H. CALLAWAY
GEN. DUANE H. CASSIDY, USAF (R)
ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.
JAMES SMITH II, P.E.
ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

July 1, 1991

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, we are pleased to submit a report containing both a review of the Defense Secretary's April 12 list and our recommendations for the closure or realignment of U.S. military installations.


In preparing this report, the Commission reviewed thousands of pages of oral testimony and written documentation. All of our work was subject to public scrutiny. We held 28 hearings across the United States, visited 47 military installations and met face-to-face with hundreds of representatives in surrounding communities. Among the many people who presented expert testimony were members of Congress and officials representing the Pentagon, the General Accounting Office and the Environmental Protection Agency.


Ultimately, this report reflects the independent judgment of the Commission's seven members. Not one of our decisions was easy. Each of the installations recommended for closure enjoys a proud history of service to the United States. Moreover, we recognize that base closure creates economic hardship that only time and initiative can overcome. Nevertheless, budget constraints, coupled with changing national security requirements, compel the United States to reduce its military overhead costs. I am convinced that our recommendations will strengthen this country's ability to meet its international responsibilities.


Respectfully yours,


Jim Courter
Chairman


William L. Ball, III
Commissioner


Robert D. Stuart, Jr.
Commissioner


James C. Smith II, P.E.
Commissioner


Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Commissioner



Howard H. Callaway
Commissioner


Gen. Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (R)
Commissioner

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

R e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t

1991



Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Report to the President

1991



DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

1625 K STREET, N.W. SUITE 400

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006-1604

202-653-0823

JIM COURTER, CHAIRMAN

July 1, 1991

COMMISSIONERS:

WILLIAM L. BALL, III

HOWARD H. CALLAWAY

GEN. DUANE H. CASSIDY, USAF (RET.)

ARTHUR LEVITT, JR.

JAMES SMITH II, P.E.

ROBERT D. STUART, JR.

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mr. President:


On behalf of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, we are pleased to submit a report containing both a review of the Defense Secretary's April 12 list and our recommendations for the closure or realignment of U.S. military installations.


In preparing this report, the Commission reviewed thousands of pages of oral testimony and written documentation. All of our work was subject to public scrutiny. We held 28 hearings across the United States, visited 47 military installations and met face-to-face with hundreds of representatives in surrounding communities. Among the many people who presented expert testimony were members of Congress and officials representing the Pentagon, the General Accounting Office and the Environmental Protection Agency.


Ultimately, this report reflects the independent judgment of the Commission's seven members. Not one of our decisions was easy. Each of the installations recommended for closure enjoys a proud history of service to the United States. Moreover, we recognize that base closure creates economic hardship that only time and initiative can overcome. Nevertheless, budget constraints, coupled with changing national security requirements, compel the United States to reduce its military overhead costs. I am convinced that our recommendations will strengthen this country's ability to meet its international responsibilities.

Respectfully yours,


Jim Courter
Chairman


William L. Ball, III
Commissioner


Robert D. Stuart, Jr.
Commissioner


James C. Smith II, P.E.
Commissioner


Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Commissioner


Howard H. Callaway
Commissioner



Gen. Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (Ret.)
Commissioner

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	EX-1
Chapter 1: History of Base Closures	1-1
Chapter 2: Department of Defense Procedures to Develop Recommended List	2-1
Chapter 3: The Role of the General Accounting Office	3-1
Chapter 4: The Work of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission	4-1
Chapter 5: Closure and Realignment Recommendations of the Commission	5-1
Chapter 6: Communities and Base Reuse	6-1


Appendices

A. Public Law 101-510, Title XXIX	A-1
B. Force-Structure Summary	B-1
C. Selection Criteria for Base Closures and Realignments	C-1
D. Department of Defense's Closure and Realignment Recommendations	D-1
E. Commissioners' Biographies	E-1
F. Commission Staff	F-1
G. Hearings	G-1
H. Site Visits	H-1
I. Menu of Options	I-1

Executive Summary

On November 5, 1990, President George Bush signed Public Law 101-510, Title XXIX (the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990), establishing the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to ensure a timely, independent, and fair process for closing and realigning U.S. military installations. This statute required the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed military base closures and realignments to the Commission by April 15, 1991. In accordance with the statute, these recommendations were to be based upon a force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the Department of Defense (DoD) budget request for fiscal year (FY) 1992 and selection criteria developed by DoD with public comment. Anticipated levels of funding for defense in the FY 1992-97 period and a reassessment of the probable threats to the United States drove the force-structure plan. The present administration viewed changing world order as an opportunity to implement measured defense reductions. However, Congress has seized upon the reduced threat to our national security and mandated a sharp decline in defense funding. The graph on the next page showing DoD's budget authority depicts

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission



this dramatic decline in funding since the mid-1980s.

The Commission's purpose was to ensure that the proposals submitted by DoD did not deviate substantially from the force structure and the eight selection criteria. Where it identified such deviations, the Commission was authorized to add or delete bases. The Commission's founding legislation calls for this process to be repeated in 1993 and 1995.

The end of the Cold War, evidenced by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, fundamentally altered the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its

allies. These events had dramatic impacts on U.S. military requirements. In addition, the growing U.S. budget deficit provided an impetus to cut U.S. military spending. Therefore, DoD is planning to decrease the U.S. military by approximately 25 percent over the next five years.

Clearly, fewer forces require fewer bases. By eliminating unnecessary facilities, limited dollars can go to vital military needs. Balancing the base structure with the new force-structure plan will make DoD more efficient, streamline the defense infrastructure, and enhance national security.

Executive Summary

This Commission differs from previous base-closure efforts; its purpose was to make independent recommendations to the President based on its review of the Secretary of Defense's April 1991 proposal to close 43 bases and realign 29. The 1988 DoD Commission, on the other hand, developed its own list of proposed closures, which it presented to the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) was involved closely in the process. It acquired data from DoD and prepared a review of DoD's proposals, which was forwarded to Congress and the Commission on May 16, 1991. It also assisted the Commission in its own review of data by detailing staffers to the Commission and providing assistance from field staff.

The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations emerged from a uniquely open process, in which testimony and viewpoints were heard from community and congressional leaders. This process insulated the Commission from partisan politics. All meetings were open to the public. Transcripts of hearings and data received by the Commission were available for public review. Furthermore,

every major site proposed for closure was visited by at least one commissioner. These visits enabled the commissioners to gain a firsthand look at the installations. Commissioners also heard from members of the public about the effect that closure would have on local communities.

The Commission also received public testimony in Washington, D.C., from members of Congress, DoD officials, and other expert witnesses. Public hearings, providing community leaders an opportunity to comment, were held at 14 other locations across the country.

The Commission recognizes that some communities depend greatly on these installations. It notes, however, in the long term, and with effort and initiative, communities can overcome the hardships caused by base closures. In fact, history has shown many post-closure economies are stronger and more stable.

According to a survey by DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA), between 1961 and 1990 approximately 158,000 new jobs had been created to replace nearly 93,000 jobs lost as a result of base closures. The OEA has also been working with 21 communities located near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Commission and has provided \$1.6 million in grants to help develop reuse plans.

Since the Commission wanted to devote its entire effort to considering the bases under study for closure or realignment, an after-action report will be prepared and forwarded to the President and Congress. The report will offer the Commission's guidance for improving the base-closing process.

Based on the Commission's review-and-analysis and deliberations process, it is recommending to the President that 36 bases be closed and 43 bases be realigned. These actions will result in FY 1992-97 savings of \$2.3 billion, with one-time costs of \$4.1 billion. The savings from these actions will total \$1.5 billion annually. The following list summarizes closure and realignment actions of the 1991 Commission.

Recommended for Closure:

Department of the Army

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN

Fort Devens, MA

Fort Ord, CA

Sacramento Army Depot, CA

Harry Diamond Lab Woodbridge

Research Facility, VA

Department of the Navy

Construction Battalion Center,

Davisville, RI

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station

Treasure Island, CA

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA

Naval Air Station Chase Field, TX

Naval Air Station Moffett Field, CA

Naval Station Long Beach, CA

Naval Station Philadelphia, PA

Naval Station Puget Sound, Sand Point,

WA

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA

7 RDT & E Engineering and Fleet Support
Activities

Department of the Air Force

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX

Carswell Air Force Base, TX

Castle Air Force Base, CA

Eaker Air Force Base, AR

England Air Force Base, LA

Grissom Air Force Base, IN

Loring Air Force Base, ME

Lowry Air Force Base, CO

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH

Executive Summary

Williams Air Force Base, AZ
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI

Recommended for Realignment:

Department of the Army

Army Corps of Engineers
Aviation Systems Command/Troop
Support Command, St. Louis, MO
Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Dix, NJ
Fort Polk, LA
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Rock Island Arsenal, IL
10 RDT&E Laboratories
7 Medical Laboratories

Department of the Navy

Midway Island Naval Air Facility
7 RDT&E Engineering and Fleet
Support Activities

Department of the Air Force

Beale Air Force Base, CA
Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX
MacDill Air Force Base, FL
March Air Force Base, CA
Mather Air Force Base, CA

Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID

Recommended to Stay Open:

Department of the Army

Fort McClellan, AL


Department of the Navy

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA

Department of the Air Force

Moody Air Force Base, GA

1991 BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS



Closures and Realignments

1. Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), Washington
2. Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho
3. Beale Air Force Base, California
4. Mather Air Force Base, California
5. Sacramento Army Depot, California
6. Naval Station Treasure Island (Hunters Point Annex), California
7. Naval Air Station Moffett Field, California
8. Castle Air Force Base, California
9. Fort Ord, California
10. Naval Station Long Beach, California
11. Naval Air Facility Midway Island, Midway
12. Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California
13. March Air Force Base, California
14. Williams Air Force Base, Arizona
15. Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado
16. Carswell Air Force Base, Texas
17. Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas
18. Naval Air Station Chase Field, Texas
19. Fort Polk, Louisiana
20. England Air Force Base, Louisiana
21. Fort Chaffee, Arkansas
22. Eaker Air Force Base, Arkansas
23. Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, Missouri
24. ASC/Troop Support Command, Missouri
25. Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois
26. Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan
27. Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana
28. Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana
29. Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio
30. Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania
31. Loring Air Force Base, Maine
32. Fort Devens, Massachusetts
33. Construction Battalion Center Davisville, Rhode Island
34. Fort Dix, New Jersey
35. Philadelphia Naval Station, Pennsylvania
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Pennsylvania
36. Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina
37. MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

NOT PICTURED ON MAP

- 17 Realignments and 7 Closures of Naval Research, Development, Testing & Engineering, Engineering & Fleet Support Activities
- Realignment of Combat Materiel Research Lab and Medical Lab 21

Chapter 1:

History of Base Closures

In the early 1960s, then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara closed many bases to reduce military overhead. Secretary McNamara created within DoD the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to ease the economic impacts of closures on affected communities and to allow the reuse of former bases. In the early 1970s, and in response to the end of the Vietnam War, hundreds of military facilities across the country closed.

In the 1960s and again in the 1970s, accusations were widespread that base closures were being used by the executive branch to punish uncooperative legislators. This sentiment prompted Congress in 1977 to pass section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, which required DoD to notify Congress if an installation became a closure candidate, and it also applied the National Environmental Policy Act to base-closure recommendations. These stipulations, combined with Congress's reluctance to close military bases, effectively prevented DoD from closing any major military installation.

The 1980s saw a rapid military expansion as a result of a dramatic increase in defense spending. In 1985, Senator Barry Goldwater recognized the need for DoD to rid itself of excess base

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

capacity. He asked Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to submit an "illustrative" list of military bases for closure. A hearing was held to discuss the twenty-two bases on Secretary Weinberger's list, but no further action was taken.

former Congressman Jack Edwards, recommended that 86 bases be closed fully and 59 others be closed partially or realigned. These changes would, according to commission estimates, generate an annual savings of \$693.6 million.

1990 DoD Proposals

1988

Commission

By 1988, while the structure of the U.S. armed forces had changed, the base structure remained unaltered. Therefore, on May 3, 1988, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, ordering it to conduct an independent study of the domestic military base structure and to recommend installations for realignment and closure. In October 1988, Congress passed and President Reagan signed Public Law 100-526, the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act.

The 1988 commission, chaired by former Senator Abraham Ribicoff and

In an effort to reshape and reduce the military infrastructure, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney in January 1990 proposed closing 36 bases in the United States. The congressional response was reminiscent of the base-closing rounds of the 1960s and 1970s. Congressional critics claimed that the list unfairly targeted districts represented by Democrats. Others charged that Congress again was institutionally incapable of making decisions that were good for the country but painful for some congressional districts.

The list was not acted upon by the Congress, but the groundwork was laid for a second base-closing commission.

1991 Base Closure and Realignment Commission

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (see Appendix A) intends, as the law says, "to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States."

The process was built around the following standards:

- The force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the DoD budget request for fiscal year 1992 (see Appendix B)
- Eight selection criteria finalized by DoD after public comment (see Appendix C)

Of the eight criteria, the first four concerned military value, which were to receive preference.

- Current and future mission requirements
- Availability and condition of land,

facilities, and air space

- Contingency and mobilization requirements
- Cost and manpower implications

The remaining criteria were

- Return on investment
- Local economic impact
- Impact on community infrastructure
- Environmental impact

The Commission received DoD's proposed list of closures and realignments after the following process: First, the Army, Navy, and Air Force analyzed their own base structures, comparing them against the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The services then submitted their proposals to Secretary Cheney, who on April 12, 1991 sent DoD's recommendations to the Commission. The Commission was required to send its recommendations to the President by July 1, 1991.

The statutory test to be applied by the Commission in justifying modifications to DoD's recommended list involves "substantial deviation" from the force-structure plan and selection criterion. The Commission could recommend changes for

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

those bases where a substantial deviation was established.

realign those installations listed in the report within two years and complete the action within six years.

Approval by the President and Congress

The law requires the President to approve or disapprove the Commission's recommendations by July 15, 1991. An approved report will be sent to Congress. If the President rejects the report, it will be returned to the Commission for revision. The Commission must submit to the President by August 15 a revised report. The President then has 15 days to approve or disapprove the report. The President must send an approved report to Congress by September 1, 1991. If he does not approve the report, the closure process for 1991 comes to an end with no action.

Once the Commission's recommendations are approved by the President, the Congress has 45 legislative days, or until it adjourns for the session, to consider them. Changes to the approved recommendations are not allowed. Unless Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving the Commission's proposals, the Secretary must begin to close or

Differences between the 1988 and 1991 Commissions

Both commissions were set up to overcome the political paralysis that had prevented the closure of bases during the previous decade. The recommendations of the 1988 commission were driven largely by the need to size a bloated base infrastructure to a reduced threat and force structure. The 1991 commission was driven by further reductions in DoD budgets and dramatic changes in Eastern Europe.

Structurally, the differences between these two commissions are significant. The 1988 commission was chartered by and reported to the Secretary of Defense. Congress codified the authority of that commission when it passed Public Law 100-526. The 1991 commission, on the other hand, was established by law from the outset. Its members were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

History of Base Closures

the outset. Its members were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Other differences between these two commissions resulted primarily from the lessons learned in the congressional debate that followed the 1988 base closure and realignment recommendations.

After publication of the 1988 list, affected members of Congress leveled three major charges against the commission process. First, they contended the process had been secretive. In fact, hearings had been closed and information on the ranking of facilities and transcripts of commission meetings were hard to obtain. Second, Congress noted many of the affected facilities had not been visited by commissioners. Such visits, believed the legislators, might have helped the commissioners verify information included in the staff reports. Finally, they complained that faulty data had been used to reach the final closure recommendations. Congress believed GAO or another independent organization should have reviewed the information and data for accuracy.

Commission members and legislators also said that the panel's mandate to recover the cost within six years was too

restrictive and had prevented the closing of several obsolete installations.

Congress, through Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510, established the 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to redress these issues. The process is open, commissioners have visited all major affected bases, and GAO has been an integral part of the process.

Composition of the 1991 Commission

The commissioners were chosen for their distinguished legislative, business, military, and diplomatic backgrounds. Six were appointed by President Bush--four in consultation with House and Senate majority leaders and two with the advice of House and Senate minority leaders. The other appointments were made independently by the President. All commissioners required Senate confirmation.

The staff was drawn from back-

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

Environmental Protection Agency. Under the Commission's founding legislation, no more than one-third of the staff could be detailed from DoD. Divisional directors (including the staff director) were civilians hired directly by the Commission. The Commission also hired independent consultants from the Logistics Management Institute, who helped design and participated in the review and analysis of the services' recommendations.

Chapter 2:

Department of Defense Procedures to Develop Recommended List

On April 12, 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney presented to Congress and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission a list of military installations proposed for realignment or closure. The list recommended 43 base closures and 29 realignments and was the product of an extensive DoD review of military bases.

DoD began its review of bases on December 10, 1990, by establishing policy guidance for all services to follow. A DoD steering committee developed the final eight base-evaluation criteria for congressional approval and issued several implementing memoranda. Within this general framework, each service was allowed the flexibility to design an analysis plan around its unique missions and structure.

Four additional memoranda were issued to clarify the DoD review process.

Army

In November 1990 the Secretary of the Army established the Total Army Basing Study and tasked this study group to recommend potential closures and realignments.

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

The Army divided its installations into seven main categories and analyzed each category quantitatively using five existing measures of merit, which were then defined in terms of DoD's selection criteria 1-4 (military value) and criterion 7 (community infrastructure). Each measure was weighted to reflect the Army's view of its importance. The measures of merit and attributes were used to determine the military value of the installations. These rankings served as a point of departure from which the analysts applied their military judgment to recommend closures and realignments.

The Army applied the return-on-investment and impact criteria to bases that ranked low in military value.

Senior Army staff reviewed the Army's final proposals and recommended the list for approval. The Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff approved this list.

Navy

The Secretary of the Navy established a six-member Base Structure Committee in December 1990 to determine the Navy's closure and realignment candidates.

The Base Structure Committee used information from a study originally known

as the VCNO (Vice Chief of Naval Operations) study. It was later called the OpNav Study because it was initiated in February 1990 by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The Base Structure Committee grouped all of its installations into categories and determined which categories contained excess capacity. There, it searched for closure and realignment options.

The Base Structure Committee had intended to use the study prepared by the OpNav group, but the committee members were not satisfied with the total utility of the data or weights used in the OpNav study. The Base Structure Committee used the data from the OpNav study as a starting point and began a series of hearings, in which senior Navy officials briefed the committee on their respective activities.

The committee members combined their professional military judgment with the data gleaned from these interviews and existing data from the OpNav study to arrive at their base-closure recommendations. As a result, these judgments sometimes differed from the assessments one might make using the raw empirical data.

The Navy assigned color codes to bases in the categories with excess capacity. The color codes were assigned to a base by assuming that it could be closed and assessing what impact its closure would have on the Navy's mission. Like the Army, the Navy considered community support (criterion 7) in its analysis of the military value of bases.

Once the Base Structure Committee had selected bases for possible closure or realignment, it evaluated criteria 5, 6, and 8 for these proposals.

The Base Structure Committee presented its nominations to the Secretary of the Navy, who recommended to the Secretary of Defense naval installations for closure or realignment.

Air Force

The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group of five general officers and five senior-executive-service officials.

The Air Force collected data by distributing standard questionnaires--general, environmental, and air space--to each Air Force base. The executive group sorted the Air Force bases into five categories and ten subcategories, and examined each to identify excess capacity.

Unlike the Army and Navy, Air Force analyzed all bases according to all eight selection criteria. The executive group developed 80 subelements to provide specific data points for each criterion.

The Air Force prepared color ratings for the subelements and used these ratings to rank and group bases. The Secretary of the Air Force selected bases for closure from the options developed by the executive group.

Chapter 3:

The Role of the General Accounting Office

The General Accounting Office did not become involved in the 1988 process until after that commission published its report. Then Congress called upon GAO to examine the commission's methodology, findings, and recommendations.

GAO's recommendations addressed ways to ensure data accuracy, which cost factors and economic impacts should be considered, how to develop specific criteria, and how to measure employment impacts.

To ensure GAO's role during the 1991 commission's analysis, Congress gave GAO a clear role in the 1991 process.

Under section 2903 (d)(5) of Title XXIX, Public Law 101-510, Congress called on the Comptroller General to do two things: assist the Commission in its review of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations; and transmit an independent report to Congress and the Commission containing GAO's analysis of DoD's proposals and processes.

At least one GAO professional served on each of the Commission's Army, Navy, and Air Force review-and-analysis teams. These individuals were fully integrated into all review-and-analysis efforts.

GAO also helped the Commission's researchers verify the data used by the

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

services. GAO field personnel visited some 39 bases to gather firsthand information and verify data selected by the Commission.

The GAO Report

GAO released its report, titled *Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures and Realignments*, on May 16, 1991. The Assistant Comptroller General testified before the Commission on May 17. GAO's findings paralleled much of the Commission staff's work up to that time, but provided detail--especially on costs and savings.

GAO found that the Army and Air Force could document their use of the force-structure plan and the military-value criteria. While there were differences in the way the services developed military-value rankings, these differences were insignificant. Therefore, GAO concluded in its report, the recommendations by the Army and Air Force were "adequately supported."

However, GAO concluded that the Navy did not offer enough documentation to prove whether or not its process followed the force structure and the selection criteria, preventing GAO from evaluating specific Navy recommendations. GAO analyzed the

Navy's ship-berthing capacity to decide how many naval stations the Navy needs to support its fleet. If only the recommended bases are closed, concluded GAO, the Navy would still have significant excess ship-berthing capacity. GAO did not evaluate the Navy's methodology for air stations, shipyards, or labs.

GAO conducted a "sensitivity check" on DoD's estimation of the number of years it would take to recover closing costs. This entailed projecting a 50 percent and 100 percent increase in one-time costs. While the payback periods for many of DoD's recommendations changed little, there were some closure or realignment proposals where a 50 percent increase in one-time costs would increase the number of years for payback from 4 to 100 years.

GAO also discovered inconsistencies in service costs, savings estimates, and payback calculations. Despite DoD guidance to the contrary, the Army, Navy, and Air Force used budget data for other than 1991 dollars as their baselines. The result of these inconsistencies were overstatements of estimated annual savings and a shortening of the payback period for several closures.

Chapter 4:

The Work of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

The Commission was empowered to ensure that the DoD recommendations did not deviate substantially from Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510. The law also required the Commission to conduct its proceedings in public and open its records and deliberations to public scrutiny.

Four concurrent activities provided the Commission with information. First, the Commission held 15 hearings in Washington, D.C., to receive information from DoD, legislators, and other experts. Second, the Commission encouraged public comments by holding 14 regional and site hearings, where it received testimony on bases being considered for closure or realignment. Third, the commissioners visited the major facilities proposed for closure. Finally, the Commission's research staff reviewed the services' processes and data to help commissioners arrive at their recommendations and to ensure that they had adhered to the statutory standards.

The input from communities potentially affected by base closures was tremendous. Community and elected leaders were tireless advocates for their military installations. In the two and a half months the Commission conducted its business, it received more than 143,000 letters and more than 100 phone calls a day. This level of input uncovered

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

for Commissioners every possible argument that could be proffered on behalf of potential impact bases.

The Commission set up review-and-analysis teams--Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special--to evaluate the services' processes. The Commission's teams focused on the process each service used to adhere to legislative requirements.

The Army team's review paralleled the Army's process. The team determined whether the Army considered all bases and whether its categorization of bases and use of attributes were sound. The Commission did this by comparing the major activities on Army bases with the "measures of merit" and attributes developed by the Army to ensure that all eight criteria were addressed. The Commission then looked at the Army's proposals in terms of the capacity needed to house its forces in 1995 as envisioned by the force-structure plan.

The Navy presented a special challenge to the Commission. Its selection process was more subjective and less documented than that of either the Army or the Air Force. To determine whether the Navy complied with the law, the Commission's staff held a series of meetings with members of the Navy's Base Structure Committee and other high-ranking naval officers--including the heads of naval aviation, surface warfare, person-

nel, and training. These individuals responded to questions and supplied information to the Commission. The Commission studied this data to determine whether the Navy's compliance with selection criteria and the force-structure plan was adequate.

The Navy provided additional explanation for its decisions. The Commission, with GAO's help, obtained and analyzed several hundred items of data from some 29 naval installations across the country. Moreover, the Commission examined the Navy's berthing capacity in detail.

The Commission's Air Force team first checked to see that the Air Force had studied its facilities by identifying all Air Force bases and checking updated manpower documents. Second, the team examined the categories and subcategories used by the Air Force to compare bases. Third, the team checked the Air Force's analysis of capacity within categories and for individual facilities. The team also reviewed decisions to exclude certain categories from further consideration due to a lack of excess capacity. Then the team checked the Air Force application of the eight criteria to the remaining bases. In this step, the team first examined the individual bases that were excluded as "militarily or geographically unique or mission essential." Finally, the team considered the application of the eight

The Work of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

selection criteria to the remaining 72 bases.

These activities provided the Commission with the information it needed to arrive at its recommendations in accordance with the standards mandated in the law. The commissioners used it to develop a "menu of options"--potential additions and substitutions to the DoD proposals (see Appendix H). The Commission's final recommendations are presented in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5:

Closure and Realignment Recommendations of the Commission

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has completed its review and analysis of the Department of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments, as transmitted to the Commission on April 12, 1991, by the Secretary of Defense. This chapter contains the recommendations made by this Commission.

In recommending to the services where to move their units, missions, or forces, the Commission recognizes that the military must retain some flexibility. The force-structure plan itself is not a rigid document because it reflects a world that is changing rapidly.

Aside from recommendations on the status of particular bases, the Commission also made two general recommendations.

First, the Commission observed, it is DoD policy to operate military hospitals primarily to support active-duty military personnel. Congress established the Civilian Health and Medical Program of

the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) to care for the medical needs of non-active-duty beneficiaries. Closures of military hospitals normally follow closures of bases with active-duty populations served by those hospitals, with CHAMPUS covering the beneficiaries in that area. In addition, assignments of active-duty health-care specialists are tied directly to support of active-duty forces. The Commission recommends that DoD confer with Congress regarding these policies and report to the Commission in time for the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission to consider the issue of hospital closures.

Second, with the closure of bases bearing the names of American heroes such as President Benjamin Harrison; Ira C. Eaker, astronaut Virgil "Gus" Grissom, and World War I pilot, Eddie Rickenbacker, the Commission urges the President to find some other means to honor the contributions of these great Americans.

Detailed information on each of the Commission's base-closure-and-realignment decisions is presented below, including the rationale for each recommendation. Substantial deviations from the application of the force-structure plan and the final criteria have been identified, where applicable.

Fort Ord, California

Category: Fighting (Maneuver)

Mission: 7th Infantry Division

Costs to Close: \$150.8 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-38.8 million; Annual: \$70.4 million

Payback: 2 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Fort Ord and relocate the 7th Infantry Division (Light) from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis, Washington.

The Army currently can house 13 divisions in the United States, but in 1995 will have 12 divisions. Fort Ord ranks relatively low in its category. Moving the 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis reduces excess capacity, maintains flexibility, and capitalizes on the operational deployability and security attributes at Fort Lewis.

Community Concerns:

The community asserted that Fort Ord was penalized in the Army's ranking for being small, but that it is perfectly suited to train a light division. The community argued that the Army could build (or enhance) an airfield at Fort Ord for approximately \$60-\$120 million. The

community stated that closing Fort Ord would increase unemployment by 25 percent. The community also argued that the land value included in DoD's recommendation was overstated. Finally, the community asserted that adequate family housing existed at Fort Ord for all of the soldiers assigned to the installation.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that all installations in this category were treated fairly. It also found that moving the 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis optimizes the use of Fort Lewis. The Commission also found that there will be an excess capacity of two installations in the category at the end of 1995. The Commission finds that the community assertion for deployability has some merit; however, stationing the division at Fort Lewis does enable the division to use nearby McChord Air Force Base for its deployment. Currently, the 7th Infantry Division uses a civilian airport or travels 150 miles to Travis Air Force Base. The Commission found that building an airfield at Fort Ord (or enhancing the existing airfield) will cost approximately \$97 million; however, environmental concerns may prevent the construction.

The Commission agreed that the land value was overstated, but the issue

was not a factor in the Army's recommendation. The Commission found that family housing is limited and expensive. There are currently 1,365 families inadequately housed at Fort Ord. The Commission also found that training for the division, while readily available, is split among three different installations--Fort Ord proper, Fort Hunter-Liggett, and Camp Roberts.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends the closure of Fort Ord, California; and the movement of the 7th Infantry Division from Fort Ord to Fort Lewis, Washington. This recommendation does not impact on the status of Fort Hunter-Liggett. Fort Hunter-Liggett therefore remains open and is still recognized as a valuable asset to the Army and DoD.

Fort Polk, Louisiana

Category: Fighting (Maneuver)

Mission: 5th Infantry Division (5 MX)

Costs to Close: \$303 million

Savings: 1992-97: None \$-34.2 million; Annual: \$22.9 million

Payback: 5 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to Fort Hood, Texas, from Fort Polk, Louisiana; move the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, to Fort Polk. Realign the 199th Separate Motorized Brigade (SMB) from Fort Lewis, Washington, to Fort Polk.

This realignment allows the Army to station the JRTC at the installation best suited to its requirements (Fort Polk) and to house two divisions at its finest fighting installation (Fort Hood). Realignment of the 199th SMB from Fort Lewis to Fort Polk to serve as the opposing force for units training at the JRTC enhances the JRTC capabilities and opens space at Fort Lewis for the 7th Infantry Division (Light).

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the DoD recommendation would create excess capacity at Fort Polk. It also stated that unemployment would increase six to eight percentage points as a result of the combination of the Fort Polk recommendation and the Air Force's proposal to close England Air Force Base.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that excess capacity will exist at Fort Polk after completion of the recommended realignment. However, it also found that the Army will likely use this excess capacity to house forces that may return from overseas or to station other Army or DoD activities. Additionally, the Commission finds that Fort Polk does not have enough training facilities or maneuver acreage to support both a division and the JRTC at Fort Polk. The Commission estimates that the unemployment impact will be severe.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends the realignment of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) from Fort Polk to Fort Hood, the JRTC from Fort Chaffee to Fort Polk, and the 199th SMB from Fort Lewis to Fort Polk.

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

Category: Major Training Areas

Mission: Major Maneuver and Training

Costs to Close: \$303 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-34.2 million; Annual: \$22.9 million

Payback: 5 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Fort Chaffee, retaining the facilities and training area to support the Reserve Component. Station the current Active Component tenant, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), permanently at Fort Polk, Louisiana (outlined in DoD's recommendation for Fort Polk).

Community Concerns:

The community argued that economic impacts will extend farther than DoD stated.

Additionally, the community claimed that Fort Chaffee provides a more challenging, versatile training environment than Fort Polk and that Fort Polk was never considered as a candidate for the JRTC. The local citizens also argued that DoD overstated costs for facilities to support the JRTC. For example, a hospital and housing are available in the community and need not be constructed. Finally, the community argued that World War II facilities can be rehabilitated to meet the needs of JRTC at a cost of \$79 million rather than the DoD estimate of \$224 million.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that both Forts Chaffee and Polk were evaluated as potential sites for the JRTC. The selection of Fort Polk as the site for JRTC is the result of an Army stationing study that evaluated alternative locations.

The Commission also found that unemployment will increase by four percentage points. The counties of Sebastian, Crawford, and Franklin, which are immediately adjacent to Fort Chaffee, will incur 90 percent of the increase. The Commission also finds there are no permanent facilities at Fort Chaffee and the Army would incur substantial military construction costs in preparing Fort Chaffee to be the permanent home of the JRTC.

The Commission found that Fort Chaffee currently has an active component garrison and that the garrison will continue to exist at Fort Chaffee after JRTC is moved to Fort Polk and Fort Chaffee reverts to primarily supporting of reserve component training. This has been confirmed with DoD.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. The

Commission, therefore, recommends that Fort Chaffee be returned to its semi-active status with an Active Component garrison to be used in support of Reserve Component training and that a permanent Joint Readiness Training Center be established at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Fort Dix, New Jersey

Category: Fighting (Major Training Areas)

Mission: Reserve Component Training

Costs to Close: \$30.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$60.5 million; Annual: \$25.3 million

Payback: 0 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Fort Dix, relocating active organizations that do not directly support the Reserve Component (except those that cannot be relocated elsewhere). Retain only those facilities and training areas necessary to support Reserve Component training. This proposal changes the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to maintain Fort Dix in a semi-active status. It is driven by a desire to reduce base operations and real-property-maintenance costs by eliminating excess facilities and relocating tenants that do not support the Reserve Component.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the land value included in DoD's recommendation (\$82.6 million) was overstated. The community also argued that Fort Dix could be used for many alternate purposes, including the U.S. Army Reserve Command headquarters, a Reserve Center of Excellence for training, or the site of other DoD activities that are now in leased space in the Washington, D.C., area.

The community asserted that the unemployment impact would be large and that the word "close" in DoD's recommendation was not clear. The community was concerned that the word "closure" would preclude Fort Dix from being available as a potential receiver of other Reserve Component training missions or as a potential receiver of other DoD activities. The community further argued that Fort Dix, while ranking second in its category based on military-value calculations, was selected for closure because of potential savings.

The community asserted that Fort Dix was not given full credit for its quality-of-life attributes, such as family housing.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that DoD did not treat all installations in this category equally. Four other lower-ranked

bases were deferred from further consideration because of uncertainty in the Reserve Component force structure and because the results of a study addressing the Reserve Component training strategies and management of major training areas were not known.

The Commission found that, while the land value may have been overstated, it had no impact on the final decision.

Moving certain active missions off Fort Dix to better align its role as a Reserve Component training center is reasonable, but the Army should not declare facilities excess without determining what role Fort Dix will play in the future Reserve Component force structure.

The Commission further encourages DoD to study the benefits of the collocation of Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base for mobilization.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation deviates substantially from the force-structure plan by not allowing for the uncertainties in the future reorganization of Reserve Component division forces. The recommendation also deviates substantially from selection criterion 1.

The Commission recommends that Fort Dix be realigned to support the Reserve Component force structure through retention of an Active Component garrison and essential facilities (which include essential portions of Walson Army Hospital and housing facilities), ranges, and training areas to support Reserve and Active Component training. The Commission also recommends that the Defense Medical Facilities Office (DFMO) determine the medical facilities requirement to support the Fort Dix and McGuire Air Force Base area and ensure implementation of the most effective solution.

Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

Category: Initial Entry Training/Branch School

Mission: Army Soldier Support Center;

Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Cost to Close: \$206 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-123.8 million; Annual: \$36.9 million

Payback: 4 years

Department of Defense

Recommendations:

Close Fort Benjamin Harrison and realign the Soldier Support Center from Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, to initiate the Soldier Support Warfighting Center.

Relocate U.S. Army Recruiting Command from Fort Sheridan to Fort Knox rather than Fort Benjamin Harrison. This part of the proposal is a revision to the 1988 BRAC recommendations. Retain Building 1 for the continued use by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and retain part of Fort Benjamin Harrison for the Army reserves.

Fort Benjamin Harrison was rated lowest in its category. It has limited expansion capability, high operating costs, and high real-property-maintenance costs.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the Army Soldier Support Warfighting Center would be more suitable at Fort Benjamin Harrison. Moving the two branch schools from Fort Jackson to Fort Benjamin Harrison would be easier than sending six schools from Fort Benjamin Harrison to Fort Jackson. The community also claimed that closing Benjamin Harrison would cause significant job loss. Fort Benjamin Harrison has been a major source of employment for the handicapped and minorities and serves thousands of retirees.

The community also argued that Building 1 is currently underused, thus DoD should relocate functions currently in leased space to Building 1.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that Fort Jackson is a more economical location for the Army Soldier Support Warfighting Center than Fort Benjamin Harrison. It found that the missions at Fort Benjamin Harrison do not require extensive facilities, and thus can be easily realigned at minimal costs.

The Commission found that Building 1 is underused. Building 1 is the current home of a branch Defense Finance and Accounting Service responsible for the Department of the Army. The Commission is aware of an ongoing Defense Management Review initiative to consolidate and streamline DoD's Finance and Accounting Services. DoD should look closely at using adequate excess government-owned facilities when evaluating its overall facility requirements.

Recommendation:

The Commission recommends to the President the closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison; the realignment of the Soldier Support Center to Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and the retention of the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Indianapolis Center. We also recommend the revision of the BRAC 1988 recommendation, relocating the U.S. Army Recruiting Command

(USAREC) from Fort Sheridan to Fort Knox rather than Fort Benjamin Harrison. The Commission also recommends an adjustment in the DoD recommendation. We find that the Secretary deviated substantially from criterion 2, the availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations. Because of this, the Commission recommends to the President the closure of Building 1.

The Commission further recommends that DoD submit its consolidation plan of Defense Finance and Accounting Service to the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Fort McClellan, Alabama

Category: Initial Entry Training/ Branch School

Mission: Army Military Police School, Army Chemical School and Defense Polygraph Institute.

Costs to Close: N/A

Savings: 1992-97: N/A

Payback: N/A

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Fort McClellan and realign chemical and military police schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to create the Maneuver Support Warfighting Center. Move the Defense Polygraph School from Fort McClellan to Fort Huachuca,

Arizona, to be collocated with the Intelligence School.

Retain the Pelham Range for use by the Alabama National Guard. Retain the Special Operations Test Site and a reserve enclave. Put Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) in caretaker status.

Fort McClellan was recommended for closure because it is the home of the smallest Army training center, and most of its missions and facility requirements can be met elsewhere.

Community Concerns:

The local community contended that DoD did not accurately assess the military value of live-agent training at Fort McClellan. The decision to place the CDTF in caretaker status was not predicated upon military value, but rather on budgetary constraints. The loss of use of the CDTF could be detrimental to all three services' chemical readiness and national security. The CDTF is the only known live-agent training facility in the free world.

Local officials claimed that environmental impediments and resulting costs will prevent the CDTF from being replicated at another installation.

Finally, closure of Fort McClellan could result in a CHAMPUS cost of \$278 million by the year 2007.

Commission Findings:

The Commission questioned maintaining the CDTF in caretaker status because it could contribute little if any to chemical defense preparedness. The CDTF could not be reactivated quickly. Moreover, the Army would have to obtain environmental permits for reactivation if the facility is shut down for more than one year, and start-up costs could range from four to seven million dollars. Furthermore, depending upon the environmental and regulatory standards, the permitting process is currently estimated to require three to five years.

The Commission basically agreed with experts in the chemical field that CDTF has high military value. The Commission also agreed with the commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center that if a new CDTF cannot be built at the receiving base, then relocating the chemical school should not be implemented.

The Commission has not received any indication that another CDTF can be duplicated at any other installation. Duplicating the CDTF would require

compliance with stringent environmental laws.

The Commission recognized the value of live-agent training in chemical defense.

Recommendation:

The Commission found a substantial deviation from criteria 1 the current and future mission requirements and the impact of operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force and criterion 2, the availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations. Thus, the Commission recommends that Fort McClellan remain open.

Fort Devens, Massachusetts

Category: Command and Control

Mission: 10th Special Forces Group

Cost to Close: \$160.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$30.8 million; Annual: \$55.2 million

Payback: 0 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Fort Devens, retaining only those facilities to support Reserve Component training. Create a small Reserve enclave on Fort Devens's main post and retain approximately 3,000 acres for use as a regional training center.

Retain the Headquarters, Information Systems Command (ISC) and supporting elements at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and relocate selected ISC elements from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Fort Ritchie, Maryland, or another location in the national capital region (a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendations). Relocate the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) from Fort Devens to Fort Carson, Colorado.

The Army will soon need fewer command-and-control installations. Fort Devens ranked ninth out of eleven installations in its category and is not critical to either the midterm management of the Army's build down or the long-term strategic requirements of the Army's command-and-control installation structure.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the DoD recommendation violates the law because it changes the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation, which never was enacted. It also claimed that the Army would be better served by having the Headquarters, ISC located nearer to a "center of high technology." The community argued that closing Fort Devens will remove the active Army presence in New England. The community

also claimed that the training ranges were adequate to support the 10th SFG. Finally, the community argued that the proposed closure will have a significant impact on the local economy and that the Army overstated the expected land value of the properties to be sold.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that all installations in this category were treated fairly. It also found that the change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to leave the ISC at Fort Huachuca, Fort Monmouth, and the National Capital Region does not violate the law. Additionally, a 1989 GAO report revised the 1988 Commission's findings regarding recurring savings, from \$21 million to \$8.1, million and the payback periods from 0 years to a range of 43 to 200 years. The Commission also found that because the Headquarters, ISC had not left Fort Huachuca, the mission may best be continued there, avoiding construction costs of approximately \$74 million at Fort Devens.

The Commission found that the training area at Fort Devens could not adequately support the 10th SFG training. It has insufficient maneuver space, a small drop zone, limits on demolition training,

and limits on weapon firing. The proximity to a civilian airport also affects high-altitude, low-opening operations. Army presence will remain in New England for Reserve Component support, recruiting, and other activities.

The Commission also found that the Army will retain 4,600, not 3,000 acres for Reserve Component training. This has been confirmed with the Department of the Army. The Commission found that Fort Devens has newly constructed facilities and that DoD should make maximum use of these facilities in future stationing decisions. The Commission estimates civilian unemployment would increase by two percentage points. The Commission did not include any proposed land sale in its calculations and found that this did not change the Army's decision.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission, therefore, recommends the closure of Fort Devens and the retention of 4,600 acres and those facilities essential to support Reserve Component Training requirements; and realignment of the 10th SFG to Fort Carson. Instead of moving Headquarters, ISC and supporting elements

to Fort Devens from Fort Huachuca, Monmouth and Belvoir, and leased space in the National Capital Region as recommended by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, retain Headquarters, ISC at Fort Huachuca and support elements at Fort Monmouth, and relocate selected ISC elements from Fort Belvoir to Fort Ritchie or another location in the national capital region.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Category: Corps of Engineers

Mission: Military and Civil Works

Costs to Close: \$266 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$238 million; Annual: \$112 million

Payback: 2 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Consider reorganization of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under legislation separate from that which established the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (PL 101-510). The Corps of Engineers conducted a reorganization study and submitted it as a part of the Department of the Army's recommendation to DoD. The Secretary of Defense removed the Corps of Engineers

from his submission to the Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Community Concerns:

The communities argued that the study had not been properly reviewed by congressional committees charged with oversight of the Corps of Engineers. They also argued that reducing the number of divisions from ten to six had no rational foundation and that the boundaries that describe these new divisions and districts were not determined in a consistent manner. The communities stated that the great distances between these new divisions and district headquarters and their respective field offices would create inefficiencies. Finally, the communities argued that the proposed realignment would have a significant impact on the local economies and regions.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the Corps of Engineers reorganization plan is based on a business-like approach. It combines like functions at the division level where area coverage can be provided, thus relieving the districts of some of their administrative functions. The number of divisions selected was based on four options. Each option considered command and control factors and balanced the

workload. The boundaries for the new divisions were based on watershed locations and optimizing customer support. The selection of division headquarters was based solely on the ranking of existing headquarters. The number of districts and their headquarters were based primarily on their military ranking and their civil works rankings. In some cases, selections did not follow the rankings to account for needed geographic dispersion and unique capabilities.

The Commission found that the unemployment impacts would increase by no more than two percentage points in any one area; however, these rates are independent of any other action that may be occurring in the respective areas. The implementation costs may be overstated because it is not known exactly how many personnel will elect to retire or quit as opposed to relocating.

The Commission also found that 6,600 authorized positions would be transferred and an additional 2,600 authorized positions would be eliminated. This represents approximately 22 percent of the Corps of Engineers total work force and 47 percent of the work force available for reorganization.

These transfers and eliminations occur at the district and division level. Four division and fourteen districts headquarters

are eliminated to reduce the span of control and increase operational efficiencies. However, project and construction offices in support of the districts are not affected by the reorganization.

Recommendations:

The Commission recommends the realignment of the Army Corps of Engineers. We find that the Secretary deviated substantially from criterion 1, current and future mission requirements and criteria 4, cost and manpower implications. Such realignment will be accomplished primarily through the elimination of a number of Corps of Engineers division and district management headquarters located in the United States. The realignment will not be initiated until July 1, 1992 and will conform to the 1991 Corps of Engineers Reorganization Study, unless legislation is enacted by the Congress providing an alternative realignment by July 1, 1992, in which event the Secretary will initiate the realignment as determined by the legislation.

Realign Army Laboratories (Lab 21 Study), Adelphi and Aberdeen, Maryland

Category: Industrial-Commodity Oriented Installations

Mission: Research, Development and Testing

Costs to Realign: \$281.8 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-106.0 million; Annual: \$44.7 million

Payback: 4 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Establish the Combat Material Research Laboratory (CMRL), at Adelphi, Maryland. The Army Material Technology Laboratory (AMTL), now in Watertown, Massachusetts, not be split among Detroit Arsenal, Michigan; Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey; and Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Instead, realign the AMTL to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland. Collocate the Structures Element at NASA-Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia. This proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

Community Concerns:

The Community argued the Base Closure and Realignment Commission should wait for the recommendations on laboratory realignments from the Advisory Commission on consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and

Development Laboratories. The latter commission is an advisory group established by law to provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how to effectively reorganize the research and development structure. The community also argued portions of the realignment were not cost effective and would adversely impact readiness.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found the industrial-commodity oriented installations were treated equally. The Commission found that the DoD studies and Defense Management Review Decision regarding laboratory realignments were creditable and rational. The Army reviewed ten scenarios for the realignment of the laboratories and this proposal was cost effective. The realignment of the Army Material Technology Laboratory functions to a single site was determined to have operational and cost advantages over the triple-site option recommended by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds DoD's recommendations did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the criteria. The Commission

recommends the closure of Harry Diamond Laboratory in Woodbridge, Virginia, and realignment of the laboratories to establish the Combat Material Technology Laboratory at Adelphi, Maryland, and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The following specific realignments are included:

- Move the Army Research Institute MANPRINT function from Alexandria, Virginia, to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland.
- Move the 6.1 and 6.2 materials elements from the Belvoir Research and Development Center, Virginia, to APG, Maryland.
- Move the Army Materials Technology Laboratory (AMTL) (less Structures element) from Watertown, Massachusetts, to APG, Maryland (change to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission).
- Move the AMTL structures element to the Army Aviation Aerostructures Directorate collocated at NASA-Langley Research Center at Hampton, Virginia, and expand the mission at that site to form an Army Structures Directorate (change to

the recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission).

- Move the Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and Applied Research element of the Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Adelphi, Maryland.

- Move the Electronic Technology Device Laboratory from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Adelphi, Maryland.

- Move the Battlefield Environment Effects element of the Atmospheric Science Laboratory from White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, to Adelphi, Maryland.

- Collocate the Ground Vehicle Propulsion Basic and Applied Research from Warren, Michigan, with the Army Aviation Propulsion Directorate, at the NASA-Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio. They will form the Army Propulsion Directorate.

- Move the Harry Diamond Laboratories Woodbridge Research Facility element to CMRL, Adelphi, Maryland, and close/dispose of the Woodbridge, Virginia, facility.

- Move the Fuze Development and Production Mission (armament related) from Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi, Maryland, to Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey.

- Move the Fuze Development and Production Mission (missile related) from Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi, Maryland, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

The Secretary of Defense must defer implementation until January 1, 1992 in order to consider the recommendations and findings of the Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories and consult with the appropriate committees of the Congress thereon.

Aviation Systems Command and Troop Support Command, St. Louis, Missouri

Category: Industrial-Commodity Oriented Installations

Mission: Logistics Support

Costs to Realign: \$6.4 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$33.5 million; Annual: \$22.5 million

Payback: Immediate

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Merge Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) and Troop Support Command (TROSCOM) in St. Louis, Missouri, as part of the Defense Management and Report decision to consolidate the inventory control point.

Community Concerns:

There were no formal expressions from the community.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found the consolidation of inventory control points and resultant elimination of an inventory control point was a rational approach to management efficiencies. The cost efficiencies of merging AVSCOM and TROSCOM support the DoD proposal.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission recommends the merger of AVSCOM with TROSCOM as proposed. Also, the Commission recommends that the Army evaluate the relocation of those

activities from leased space to government-owned facilities and provide appropriate recommendations to the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Category: Industrial-Depot

Mission: Depot Maintenance

Costs to Realign: \$36.4 million

Savings: 1991-97: \$27.0 million; Annual: \$17.7 million

Payback: Immediate

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign the Headquarters; Depot Systems Command, including the Systems Integration Management Activity (SIMA), from Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania, to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, and merge it with the Armaments Munitions and Chemical Command to form the Industrial Operations Command. Realign the Materiel Readiness Support Activity from Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky, and the Logistics Control Activity from Presidio of San Francisco, California, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The latter proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, which relocated Materiel

Readiness Support Activity to Letterkenny Army Depot.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the Depot Systems Command need not be relocated in order to form the Industrial Operations Command. The new command could operate effectively in a split configuration. Additionally, the community believed that the SIMA was a separate entity that supported a variety of customers. Relocating that activity would result in an unwarranted up-front cost and an additional operational cost to support to the entire customer base. The community was also concerned that the realignments would degrade the mission because experienced personnel would not move.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the depots were treated equally. The formation of the Industrial Operations Command and resultant reduction of the number of subordinate commands was a rational approach to management efficiencies.

The Commission did consider alternative ways to form the Industrial Operations Command and to realign each

of the activities designated for relocation. The Commission determined that the formation of the Industrial Operations Command in a single location was operationally more effective. The realignments of Depot Systems Command, the Materiel Readiness Support Activity, and the Logistics Control Agency were also determined to be economical. The relocation of SIMA was operationally expedient in the long term and beneficial to the economy at the receiving location (Rock Island Arsenal), which is losing a large number of employees because of other base realignment and closure actions.

Recommendations:

The Commission finds the DoD recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD realign Depot Systems Command with the Systems Integration Management Activity to Rock Island and form the Industrial Operations Command. Additionally, it recommends that the Materiel Readiness Support Activity and the Logistics Control Agency be realigned at Redstone Arsenal as proposed. This proposal is a revision to the recommendations of the 1988 Base

Closure Commission which directed Material Readiness Support Activity to relocate from Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot to Letterkenny.

Tri-Service Project Reliance Study, Various Locations

Category: Commodity-Oriented Installation

Mission: Research, Development and Testing

Costs To Realign: \$24.3 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$71.0 million; Annual: \$6.9 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Execute the Tri-Service Project Reliance medical research study by reducing the number of Army medical research labs from nine to six.

Disestablish the Letterman Army Institute of Research (LAIR), Presidio of San Francisco, California (change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation); disestablish the U.S. Army Institute of Dental Research, Washington, D.C.; and disestablish U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory, Fort Detrick, Maryland. Consolidate the Army's trauma-research and medical-materiel-development with existing Army

medical research, development, test, and evaluation facilities. The proposal also recommends the collocation of seven Tri-Service medical research programs at existing Army, Navy, and Air Force medical laboratories as follows: the Army blood research with the Navy; the Army combat dentistry with the Navy; Army directed energy (laser and microwave) bioeffects with the Air Force; elements of the Army and Navy biodynamics with the Air Force; Navy and Army toxicology (environmental quality and occupational health) with the Air Force; Navy infectious disease research and Air Force environmental medicine (heat physiology) with the Army.

Community Concerns:

The various communities argued that the Commission should wait to recommend laboratory realignments until the Federal Advisory Commission on the Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories has finished its study. The latter Commission is an advisory group established by law to recommend to the Secretary of Defense how to reorganize the research-and-development structure.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found the disestablishment of LAIR and realignment of its residual functions offers more operational and cost advantages than the option recommended by the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

The Commission determined that its jurisdiction did include authority to recommend realignment and closure of laboratories without the input of the Federal Advisory Commission.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission recommends the disestablishment of the LAIR and realignment, as explained under "Department of Defense Recommendations," of the associated medical functions to the locations specified below. Specific actions and realignments are:

Disestablish LAIR as part of the closure of the Presidio of San Francisco. Cancel the design and construction of the replacement laboratory at Fort Detrick,

Maryland. Realign LAIR's research programs in the following manner (change to recommendations of the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission):

- Move trauma research to the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

- Collocate blood research with the Naval Medical Research Institute, (NMRI), Bethesda, Maryland.

- Collocate laser bioeffects research with the Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.

Disestablish U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and transfer medical material research to the U.S. Army Medical Material and Development Activity at Fort Detrick. Collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Disestablish the U.S. Army Institute of Dental Research, Washington, D.C., and collocate combat dentistry research with the Naval Dental Research Institute at Great Lakes Naval Base, Illinois.

Move microwave bioeffects research from Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, (WRAIR), Washington, D.C., and collocate with Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.

Collocate infectious disease research at NMRI with WRAIR.

Move biodynamics research from U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Fort Rucker, Alabama, and collocate with Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Paterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Move heat physiology research from USAFSAM [now called Armstrong Laboratory at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas] and collocate with U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, Natick, Massachusetts.

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

Category: Industrial-Commodity Oriented Installations

Mission: Production

Cost to Realign: \$65.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-18.2 million; Annual: \$38.8 million

Payback: 1 Year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign of the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command from Rock Island

Arsenal, Illinois, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, as part of the Defense Management Review's inventory control point consolidations.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the Army miscategorized Rock Island Arsenal as a production installation. The community also noted that Rock Island Arsenal had excess administrative space and consolidation could occur at Rock Island instead of Redstone Arsenal. The community also noted that the workforce at Rock Island had a higher skill-level base and private-sector pay rates were lower.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the industrial-commodity oriented installations were treated equally. The Commission found the consolidation of inventory control points would yield cost efficiencies that support the DoD realignment proposal.

The Commission found categorization of Rock Island Arsenal was debatable, but did not affect the proposed realignment. Rock Island Arsenal does have excess capacity, but it is inefficient to consolidate

the inventory control point at Rock Island. Redstone Arsenal has a slightly higher skill-level base and lower government pay rate.

The Commission did consider alternatives such as splitting the inventory control point or separating the inventory control point from its parent command. However, it determined the DoD realignment to be more operationally sound and cost effective.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. The Commission recommends that the Army realign the Armaments, Munitions, and Chemical Command as proposed and form a single inventory control point at Redstone Arsenal.

Sacramento Army Depot, California

Category: Industrial-Depot

Mission: Logistics Support

Costs to Close: \$84.9 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$33.4 million; Annual: \$55.8 million

Payback: Immediate

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Sacramento Army Depot. Transfer the ground communication's electronic maintenance workload from Sacramento Army Depot, California, to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Red River Army Depot, Texas; Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania; and Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas. Retain 50 acres for Reserve Component use.

Community Concerns:

The community agreed with the closure of Sacramento Army Depot, but disagreed with the transfer of all workload outside the Sacramento area. The community argued about the personnel disruption following closure and said that the DoD proposal did not contain a sufficient degree of DoD-wide interservice consolidation. It proposed an alternative plan that consolidated all ground communications electronics in two centers: Tobyhanna Army Depot on the East Coast and Sacramento Air Logistics Center at McClellan Air Force Base (Sacramento, California) on the West Coast.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that all industrial-depots were treated equally. There was excess maintenance capacity for ground communications electronics and Sacramento Army Depot ranked the lowest of the installations with communications-electronics maintenance capability.

DoD did consider the alternative proposal of consolidation of the ground communications electronics at Tobyhanna Army Depot and McClellan Air Force Base. The Commission found that the DoD decision not to use McClellan Air Force Base was due to the high man-hour rates that resulted in higher costs for depot level maintenance work.

The Commission found that both the DoD proposal and the community counterproposal were rational approaches to the distribution of the ground communications electronics maintenance workload after closure of the Sacramento Army Depot. The Commission also developed modifications of the community plan. The DoD approach provided the larger savings, and the Commission's modification of the community proposal required fewer people to relocate.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that DoD deviated substantially from criterion 5. Therefore the Commission recommends the closure of Sacramento Army Depot and the realignment of its workload by competition to ensure the most cost-effective distribution of work. The Secretary of Defense will develop statements of work and a plan to conduct a public-public competition. This competition will determine how best to distribute the workload currently performed at Sacramento Army Depot, among those depots in the DoD plan (Tobyhanna Army Depot, Anniston Army Depot, Corpus Christi Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Letterkenny Army Depot) and the Sacramento Air Logistics Center at McClellan Air Force Base. The implementation plan will include the logical groups of items to be competed, a time-phased schedule, and source selection criteria. The competition will begin as soon as possible. The Communications Systems Test Activity from Sacramento Army Depot will be realigned to Fort Lewis, Washington. As much as 50 acres of Sacramento Army Depot may be retained for Reserve Component use. The residual supply mission at Sacramento

Army Depot will be transferred to the Defense Depot West at Sharpe Depot or Tracy Depot.

Naval Station Long Beach, California

Category: Naval Station

Mission: Support Homeported Ships and Shipyard

Costs to Close: \$118.6 million

Savings: 1992-97: 201.8 million; Annual: \$85.2 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Naval Station Long Beach and the supporting Naval Hospital Long Beach. Transfer ship-support functions and a parcel of land to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Reassign ships to other Pacific Fleet homeports.

The Navy has considerable excess pier capacity on the West Coast and will be able to accommodate its 1997 force structure at the more essential ports of San Diego and Everett. Long Beach rated low in military value because its facilities are deficient and require military construction, the location is expensive, and, unlike San Diego, it lacks capacity to homeport all

Southern California ships. Finally, the closure would produce significant savings.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the Navy's Base Structure Committee overturned an earlier recommendation by the OpNav working group not to close Long Beach. The community claimed the Base Structure Committee was intent on protecting new strategic homeports, specifically Naval Station Everett, Washington, currently under construction. The community maintained that a draft GAO report on strategic homeports, now released, advocated deleting Everett and keeping Long Beach open. The community claimed that the Navy overstated berthing capacity.

The community also asserted that the station supports a large regional reserve presence, has excellent access to open sea and Southern California training areas, can homeport a nuclear-powered carrier, and provides critical support for the shipyard.

The community stated that the economic impact of closure would be high, claiming that Navy ships constitute 97 percent of local private repair work. Finally, the community believed the Navy underestimated the military construction

required at receiving locations, thus understating the actual payback period.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the OpNav group recommendation was not definitive, the Navy did in fact evaluate its homeports, and the GAO report did not compare the homeports against other naval stations as the community alleged. Halting construction at Everett would remove too little of the Navy's excess berthing capacity.

The declining force structure enables San Diego and Everett to provide all the naval station berthing required in 1997. The declining number of Naval Reserve ships enables the Navy to relinquish the support provided by Long Beach.

The Commission found that closing Long Beach would eliminate more than two-thirds of the Navy's excess berthing capacity on the West Coast. However, the Navy will have to continue to use San Diego piers classified as inadequate until funds become available to meet its stated requirement to replace them.

While most piers are classified as substandard, only \$17 million would be required to make them adequate.

Currently Long Beach piers do not serve a nuclear carrier. Upgrading one of its pier's to homeport a nuclear carrier would cost \$75 million.

The Commission found that the potential savings from closure are high. The Navy should expand the San Diego homeport area to include private repair facilities now in the Long Beach area in order to ameliorate local job loss, which is projected to be only two-tenths of one percentage point.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds the DoD recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Naval Station Long Beach and the supporting Naval Hospital Long Beach. Ship support functions and a parcel of land will be transferred to the naval shipyard. Ships assigned to the naval station will be reassigned to other Pacific Fleet homeports. Alternate use of the hospital facilities should be explored by the Veterans Administration, Public Health Service, state and local governments and the community.

Naval Station Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Category: Naval Stations

Mission: Support Shipyard and Assigned Ships

Costs to Close: \$53.5 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$55.9 million; Annual: \$40.4 million.

Payback: Less than 1 year.

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Naval Station Philadelphia. Reassign ships to other Atlantic Fleet homeports, close the naval base, and move the Naval Damage Control Training Center to the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. Transfer remaining tenants to other bases or retain them in leased space. Retain the regional brig.

Naval Station Philadelphia was graded low in military value because of significant facility deficiencies that would require construction to correct, its high-cost location, and the elimination of the requirement to support the naval shipyard, which DoD is also recommending for closure.

Community Concerns:

The Philadelphia community believes the naval shipyard should remain open, and therefore the naval station must also remain open to support it. The community

further believes that the Navy failed to consider costs at receiving bases, the high cost of environmental cleanup after closure, and the ability of assigned Naval Reserve ships to tap the large local reserve pool.

Commission Findings:

The naval station has no piers. Assigned ships are berthed at the shipyard, which the station supports. Closing the shipyard will remove the station's primary mission. Assigned ships must steam a relatively long distance to reach the open ocean, which can lengthen reserve drill weekends and affect retention. Closure will account for a relatively small fraction of the overall local job loss resulting from closing the entire naval complex. Closure will produce significant savings.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Naval Station Philadelphia.

Ships assigned to the Naval Station will be reassigned to other Atlantic Fleet homeports. The office of Commander,

Naval Base Philadelphia will close. The Naval Damage Control Training Center, a major tenant, will move to the Naval Training Center at Great Lakes, IL. Other tenants will transfer to other bases or remain in leased space. The regional brig will remain.

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, California

Category: Naval Stations

Mission: Support Tenant Activities

Costs to Close: 0

Savings: 1992-97: \$325,000; Annual: \$319,000

Payback: Less than 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Hunters Point Annex. Outlease the entire property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space by Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning, Engineering, Repair, and Alterations Detachment; and a contractor-operated test facility. This is a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation.

Hunters Point Annex has low military value because of significant encroachment that will result from Congressionally-mandated outleasing to the city of San Francisco. The infrastructure at the base is deficient. Moreover, this closure will have little impact on the economy or environment of the San Francisco area. Implementation costs will be minimal.

Community Concerns:

The community is anxious to gain use of the land that Hunters Point occupies and thus did not argue against closure.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that few tenants use the facilities and that the piers are not in use. Closure removes 15,900 feet of excess berthing capacity. The outlease obligation renders the large Dry Dock 4 unusable for emergent repairs.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds the DoD proposal did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing the Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island. Outlease the entire

property, with provisions for continued occupancy of space by Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair; Planning, Engineering, Repair, and Alterations Detachment; and a contractor-operated test facility. This is a change to the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission recommendation.

Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), Washington

Category: Naval Station

Mission: Support Staff and Tenant Activities

Costs to Close: \$28.4 million

Savings: 1992-97 \$-22.9 million; Annual: \$1.6 million

Payback: 100 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point). Relocate most functions and activities to Everett, Washington. Retain the regional brig and a small surrounding parcel of land. Dispose of the rest of the property. This changes the 1988 Base Realignment and Closure Commission's recommendation to partially close this base.

Sand Point received a low grade for military value because previous functions and missions had been reduced,

culminating in the loss of almost one-half of the property. Commander, Naval Base Seattle, the Navy's Pacific Northwest regional coordinator, will move to Submarine Base Bangor, consistent with his concurrent responsibilities as Commander Submarine Group Nine. Commanding Officer, Naval Station Puget Sound, will move to Naval Station Everett when construction there is completed. Since most existing Sand Point billets will remain in the area and since new billets will be added at Everett, economic impacts will be slight.

Community Concerns:

The community did not argue against the closure of Sand Point. The local government plans to use the land for park expansion and has proposed additional community uses. The main community concerns were expeditious cleanup of the site and the incompatibility of the remaining Navy brig with planned park use.

Commission Findings:

Naval Station Sand Point has no mission, its facilities are poor, and it cannot contribute significantly to meeting surge requirements. The major tenants are

relocating. The current small overhead explains the long payback period.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that DoD's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Puget Sound Naval Station (Sand Point). A majority of the functions will be relocated to Everett, Washington. The regional brig and a small surrounding parcel of land maybe retained by the Secretary after study. The Navy will dispose of the remainder of the property. This is a change to the 1988 Base Closure Commission recommendation to partially close the installation.

Naval Air Station Chase Field, Beeville, Texas

Category: Naval Air Stations

Mission: Naval Aviation Training

Costs to Close: \$47.7 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-7.5 million; Annual: \$24.7 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Naval Air Station Chase Field, retain the capability to be operated as an outlying field (OLF), and retain the air operations personnel necessary to operate it. Disestablish air training squadrons and all other tenants. Expand air training squadrons at Naval Air Station Kingsville, Texas, and Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi, to handle any increased student output. Improve Kingsville runways for safety and efficiency with additional flight operations.

Projected reductions of carrier and air wing force structure reduces the annual strike pilot training rate (PTR) requirement, creating an excess of approximately one base. Chase Field graded lower in military value because of infrastructure deficiencies identified as facility construction required for the introduction of the T-45 trainer. Chase Field was determined to more readily function as an OLF than Naval Air Station Kingsville, and Naval Air Station Meridian. Finally, realignment of Chase Field is more easily reversible should force-structure increase to the point where base reconstitution may become required.

Community Concerns:

The community principally argued that the Navy plan was excessively wasteful, inflicted economic and environmental damage, ignored real savings, and was predicated on false information, doubtful data, and improbable projections. The community asserted that Naval Air Station Chase Field was the most productive strike training base, suggesting that Naval Air Station Meridian was the most logical choice for closure due to its lower productivity and greater savings achieved by consolidation of training in South Texas. The community also made issue of superior airspace and zoning ordinances that insured long term freedom from both land and airspace encroachment.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendation was consistent with projected force-structure reductions with the exception that the requirement for an outlying field is not fully supported by projected PTR requirements. The surge requirement for 600 PTR was revised to 450 by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

The Commission assessed that issues of relative productivity, airfield design,

airspace, encroachment, and weather were not significant enough to be a basis for a closure recommendation. The relevant issues were determined to be relative cost and military value.

The Commission found that DoD underestimated the costs to relocate the T-45 from Naval Air Station Kingsville to Naval Air Station Chase Field.

Naval Air Station Kingsville was considered too expensive to relocate. Naval Air Station Meridian and Naval Air Station Chase Field became the potential candidates for closure. Geographical diversity and cost were predominant factors in retaining Naval Air Station Meridian.

Recommendations:

The Commission agrees with the DoD recommendation to close Naval Air Station Chase Field. However, the Commission finds that, in recommending the retention of an OLF, the DoD substantially deviated from the force structure plan. Projected reductions of carrier and air wing force structure reduce Navy-wide pilot training rate requirements to a level that does not require retention of the Chase Field as an OLF.

The Commission also found that the DoD substantially deviated from criterion 6 in that realignment to retain an OLF imposes significantly greater adverse economic impact on the local community than closure of the entire air station.

The Commission therefore recommends the complete closure of Naval Air Station Chase Field, including the OLF.

Naval Air Station Moffett Field, California

Category: Naval Air Stations/Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Mission: Maritime Patrol Aircraft Support

Costs to Close: \$112 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$104.8 million; Annual: \$72.4 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Moffett Field, decommission three active-duty maritime patrol squadrons, and redistribute the remaining squadrons among Naval Air Stations Jacksonville, Florida; Barbers Point, Hawaii; and Brunswick, Maine. Consolidate the P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron operations at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida.

Moffett Field ranked low among all naval air stations and lowest among the

four bases in the maritime patrol aircraft subcategory. The base suffers from severe ground and airspace encroachment. There is no potential for increased aircraft operations. Moffett Field is located in a high-cost area. Finally, a force-structure reduction of 25 percent results in an excess of one base in this subcategory.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the benefits afforded by Moffett Field are essential to the San Francisco Bay Area economy and to the nation. The long-term coexistence between businesses and the naval air station is profitable to the federal government. If the naval air station were to close, the base should remain federally operated and maintained so that defense contractors can continue to use the air facilities. While Moffett Field may no longer meet national military needs, it remains a crucial part of the high-technology and aerospace industries.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendation was consistent with projected force-structure reductions. It was also consistent with the aircraft-relocation plan proposed by DoD and with

recent military construction that supports it. Under that plan, the maritime patrol force will move from its traditional 50-50 split between fleets to a new deployment strategy with 40 percent of the force in the Pacific Fleet and 60 percent in the Atlantic Fleet. The Commission found that ground and airspace encroachment at Naval Air Station Moffett Field and quality of life problems for Navy personnel in the San Francisco Bay Area are significant.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Naval Air Station Moffett Field did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing Naval Air Station Moffett Field; transferring assigned P-3 aircraft to Naval Air Stations Jacksonville, Brunswick, and Barbers Point; and consolidating P-3 Fleet Replacement Squadron operations at Naval Air Station Jacksonville. Additionally, the Commission suggests that the base remain in federal custody in support of non-DoD agencies and industry. The Secretary should consult with NACA on possible use.

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington

Category: Carrier Airwing Support

Mission: A-6 attack and EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft

Costs to Close: N/A

Savings: N/A

Payback: N/A

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Whidbey Island and the supporting Naval Hospital Oak Harbor. Transfer aviation activities to Naval Air Station Lemoore, California. Retain the ranges in Navy custody.

Force-structure reductions in aircraft carriers and carrier airwings, and the imminent departure of the A-6 Intruder medium-attack aircraft from the Navy's inventory argued for the closure of Whidbey Island. Lemoore, where the Navy wants to consolidate all West Coast attack squadrons, has available capacity. Whidbey's single-runway configuration limits operational flexibility and future growth. Whidbey's outlying field is encroached.

The economic consequences will be the most severe of any proposed closure, a 58.3 percent loss in jobs.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the economic impact would be devastating--almost 84 percent unemployment after closure. The community argued that the base's mission is not diminishing, since the A-6E is being rewinged.

Whidbey actually has two runways, optimized for variable winds, and the base offers flexible training with its outlying field.

Moreover, the EA-6B will be unable to perform its electronic warfare mission at Lemoore, which lacks the ranges. The airspace at Lemoore is too limited for receipt of all Whidbey's aircraft. Further, DoD underestimated the construction costs a move to Lemoore would entail.

Finally, the closure of Whidbey Island would leave a demographic void with regard to the Naval Reserves.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the A-6 force structure reduces at a rate no greater than that associated with projected carrier-air-wing force-structure reductions. While the A-6 aircraft is reaching the end of its operating service life, major aircraft modifications are being incorporated that extend its wing life until 2005, when a

replacement aircraft should become available.

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island operates from two runways with only one being operational at a time. This affects operational flexibility and growth in that it limits the ability to conduct field carrier landing practice. The functional wing commander conducts this training through use of the Outlying Field Coupeville. While this optimizes training and enhances the single runway operations, noted in the DoD recommendation, it exacerbates the encroachment at the outlying field. The encroachment issue at outlying field Coupeville is significant. The A-6 and EA-6B aircraft are two of the loudest aircraft in the Navy inventory. The local community has not passed any zoning ordinances that preclude development near the airfield. The community has organized an aggressive campaign focusing on abating the noise. The Commission found that the noise and encroachment issues are moderate relative to other Navy bases. Expansion of the base is possible. With the exception of Naval Air Station Lemoore, all carrier support naval air stations rate worse than Naval Air Station Whidbey Island with respect to encroachment on air installation

compatible use zone management. This issue can be resolved without closing the base.

The Spectrum Aviation Division of the Federal Aviation Administration documented projected impacts to operating and training the EA-6B aircraft in California. The interference to national airspace system will degrade air safety and efficiency.

The Commission found that while excess capacity exists at training ranges in California and Nevada, no coordination was conducted with DoD, other federal agencies, and local governments toward facilitating the 100 percent growth in tactical aircraft in the Central California operating areas. The need to perform this coordination was recommended in the Navy analysis, *An Analysis of Naval Airspace Utilization and Requirements (Project Blue Air Update)* of November 2, 1987. The report documented the traffic-flow problems through choke-point corridors between the California and Nevada operating areas. The congestion imposes severe limits on the number of aircraft that can be handled as well as significant traffic-flow management problems for the Federal Aviation Administration.

The Commission found excess capacity at Naval Air Station Lemoore, the relocating base for the Whidbey Island aviation tenants. But not enough capacity exists to preclude DoD's estimate of more than \$300 million in military construction to accommodate the aircraft from Whidbey Island. Based on varying accounts of the construction requirements by Navy organizations, the Commission found the estimate could well grow. The Commission found the return on investment to be high.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that DoD deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and from criteria 1 and 3 by not accurately focusing on the current and future mission requirements of the carrier medium-attack mission, it also inaccurately assessed the availability of land, facilities and airspace at the current location and the full impacts on facilities and airspace at Naval Air Station Lemoore. Therefore the Commission recommends that Naval Air Station Whidbey Island and the supporting Naval Hospital Oak Harbor remain open.

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, California

Category: Marine Corps Air Station

Mission: Support Marine Corps Aviation

Costs to Close: \$590.4 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$56.8 million; Annual: \$0.4 million

Payback: 100 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Tustin, retaining family housing and related personnel facilities to support MCAS El Toro, California. Combine Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 16 with MAG 39 from Camp Pendleton and transfer the combined MAG, along with the Tustin's headquarters components and related units, to a new air station to be built at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California.

Before relocation, MAG 16 and MAG 39 at MCAS Camp Pendleton, California, will be combined. Projected requirements necessitate restructuring aviation support to complement combined-arms training. Only MCAS Yuma, Arizona, which has a unique mission, ranked lower than Tustin in military value. The air station and its air space are being encroached. The aging facilities have many deficiencies. Moving

helicopter support to Twentynine Palms integrates it more closely with training for Camp Pendleton ground forces.

Helicopter facilities at Camp Pendleton are located too far from training areas at Twentynine Palms to permit MAG-39 to play an integral role in ground-force training.

Community Concerns:

The community supports closure of MCAS Tustin so the property can be commercially developed, thereby increasing the community tax base. The community also supports eliminating helicopter noise pollution. There is a minor economic impact of 0.1% to 0.3%.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that there was not a significant force-structure reduction dictating the closure of a MCAS; however, MCAS Tustin has only a slight excess capacity. There is significant community encroachment and there are increasing limitations on airspace used by low-flying helicopters. The same factors that limit the base's military value provide MCAS Tustin with an unusually high redevelopment value.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on MCAS Tustin deviated substantially from criterion 2, availability and condition of land and facilities at receiving locations, and criteria 4, cost implications.

Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of MCAS Tustin and the retention of the family housing and related personnel support facilities in support of MCAS El Toro. It further recommends MAG 16 be composited with MAG 39 and relocated to Marine Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both and with MAG 39 continued tenancy at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton.

Further, the Secretary of Defense shall propose for consideration in the fiscal year 1992 or 1993 Defense Authorization Bill a fair-market exchange of land and facilities for construction of military facilities at Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton. If a fair exchange is not authorized in fiscal year 1992 or 1993, then the Secretary of Defense should proceed with the relocation to Twentynine Palms or Camp Pendleton or both, utilizing the Defense Base Closure Account.

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Pennsylvania

Category: Naval Shipyards

Mission: Repair, Maintenance, and Overhaul of Navy Ships

Costs to Close: \$102 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$38.1 million; Annual: \$36 million

Payback: 2 years

Department of Defense**Recommendation:**

Close Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and preserve for emergent requirements. Retain the propeller facility (shops and foundry), Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, and Naval Ship System Engineering Station in active status on shipyard property.

Changes in the force structure will reduce ship-repair requirements and terminate the carrier service life extension program (CV-SLEP). Closure of a naval shipyard is necessary to balance the Navy's industrial infrastructure with this reduced workload. Maintaining the shipyard in mothball status will allow its use for unplanned requirements or its reconstitution if future needs are greater than now anticipated.

Community Concerns:

The community stated that Philadelphia provides the skilled workforce

and facilities that the Navy will need to repair its large conventional ships in the future. It believes that the shipyard is particularly well suited to repair Aegis-equipped ships because of specialized public and private industrial facilities in the area. The community also claimed that Philadelphia is the most cost-effective and efficient public shipyard, with the lowest man-day rate and highest productive ratio. This, along with its facilities for repairing large ships, justifies keeping the facility open during the 1990s, even at a reduced workload level, until the conventional ship workload increases.

The community pointed to the recent congressional decision to require the aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy* to undergo a CV-SLEP in Philadelphia, as a reason not to consider the shipyard for closure--the planned schedule runs too close to the end of the required closure milestone date.

The impact on the city of Philadelphia would be severe, particularly when added to proposed closures of other Philadelphia-area bases. The community believes that this is too large an impact for any single region to bear. If Philadelphia Naval Shipyard is closed and mothballed, the community stated that it would vigorously

pursue legislative relief to force reversion or outleasing of shipyard property to the city.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the overall public shipyard workload is falling significantly because of force reductions and budget limitations. The projected workload in nuclear shipyards during the 1990s was found to limit the potential for closing any nuclear shipyard until the late 1990s.

The largest portion of Philadelphia's recent workload has been CV-SLEP, which the Navy desires to terminate. However, Congress has passed legislation that requires a CV-SLEP at Philadelphia. The Commission found that this CV-SLEP should be completed in mid-1996, about a year before the required closure date.

Workload is available that could be diverted from public and private East Coast shipyards to Philadelphia to bring its activity up to levels that justify keeping it open. However, this would limit the Navy's ability to meet its target of putting 30 percent of its repair work in private yards. It may increase costs at public shipyards, such as Norfolk, which would lose workload. The Commission found that

retaining Philadelphia active at a low employment level, such as the 1,200-person option considered by the Navy, would increase the cost for work performed at Philadelphia over the cost for the same work performed at a public shipyard with a traditional staffing level.

The Commission found that the combination of carrier-capable drydocks at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Newport News Shipbuilding, and the mothballed drydocks at Philadelphia provide capacity for unplanned requirements.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure and preservation of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard for emergent requirements. The propeller facility, Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance Facility, and Naval Ship System Engineering Station will remain in active status on shipyard property.

Naval Training Center Orlando, Florida

Category: Training

*Mission: Recruit Training, Service School Command,
Nuclear Power Schools*

Cost to Close: N/A

Savings: N/A

Payback: N/A

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Naval Training Center (NTC) Orlando and the supporting Naval Hospital Orlando. The recruit training will be absorbed by NTC Great Lakes, Illinois, and NTC San Diego, California. The nuclear training function and all "A" schools will be relocated.

Force-structure reductions decrease requirements for basic recruit and follow-on training. As a result, slightly over two Recruit Training Commands (RTCs) can accommodate future requirements, leaving an excess capacity of approximately one RTC. Major savings can only be realized by closure of a complete NTC.

NTC Orlando was graded lowest in military value for the following key reasons: First, the Navy wants to retain the NTC in San Diego because of its collocation with major fleet concentrations. Second, significant capital is invested in

complex, sophisticated, and expensive training devices, systems, and buildings at NTC Great Lakes. Third, NTC Great Lakes has expansion and surge capability; NTC Orlando does not. And finally, Naval Hospital Orlando was identified for closure as a "follower" because of its reduced support to the active-duty population in the area.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that the Navy improperly rated NTC Orlando lowest in expansion capability. The community also argued that one of the reasons for excluding NTC Great Lakes from consideration for closure was the estimated cost to relocate its extensive training devices, but that the training devices are not recruit related.

The community argued that the major reason for not proposing the closure of San Diego was, its collocation with the fleet, which is not recruit related. Also, the Navy omitted the infrastructure costs at Great Lakes to accommodate the Orlando move. The community also noted that extensive pharmacy costs had been omitted from the hospital COBRA computations. And finally, the community claimed that failure to consider Orlando's mobilization

capacity adversely affected its overall ranking.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that DoD based its closure recommendation of NTC Orlando on the basis of excess capacity in the recruit training assets. The Commission found that although NTC Orlando has excess capacity in recruit training, this excess did not carry over to the other training schools. The Commission also found that DoD based its closure recommendation of Orlando on an overall low military rating and that this rating was significantly influenced by a low rating for criterion 3. Further, the Commission found that NTC Orlando had more surge capacity than NTC San Diego which received a high rating for criterion 3. The Commission also found that Orlando has much more land than NTC San Diego, on which to develop additional facilities in the event of mobilization requirements.

The Commission found that the Navy's analysis was very sensitive to one-time costs due to the sizable military construction (MILCON) required to relocate the Orlando schools to NTC Great Lakes. The original COBRA submitted by

the Navy yielded a 12-year payback and a \$57.1 million annual savings. An updated COBRA submitted by the Navy indicates a 20-year payback and a 35.5 million dollar annual savings after six years. The Commission's COBRA run on NTC Orlando yielded a cost to close of \$423.2 million and a payback period of 100 years.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that with regard to the DoD recommendation to close Naval Training Center Orlando the Secretary deviated substantially from criteria 3 and 5 by not considering he significant surge capacity as required for mobilization and by overestimating return on investment. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Naval Training Center and the Naval Hospital Orlando remain open.

Construction Battalion Center Davisville, Rhode Island

Category: Construction Battalion Centers

Mission: Mobilization and Logistics Support to Reserve Seabees

Costs to Close: \$36.6 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-12.8 million; Annual: \$5.5 million

Payback: 10 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Davisville and relocate three sets of equipment and tools for Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (RNMCB) and other prepositioned war reserve material stock to the other Construction Battalion Centers at Gulfport, Mississippi, and Port Hueneme, California.

The projected reduction of RNMCBs and ability of the other construction battalion centers to provide required mobilization support enables reduction in the Naval Construction Force support infrastructure. The personnel-support facilities at Davisville are deteriorated and the facility will no longer be designated as a site for mobilizing reserve personnel.

Community Concerns:

The community stated that Davisville had historically been critical for support of the Seabees and that the support is still needed, particularly for storage space and equipment repair. The community questioned the need to build new warehouse space when existing Davisville buildings could continue to be used. The community also was concerned about the loss of jobs in an economically depressed area.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that many of the facilities at Davisville are deteriorated and unusable. The ability of the other two construction battalion centers to support the major Naval Construction Force effort during Desert Shield/Storm demonstrated the ability of these bases to provide required support without Davisville.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Construction Battalion Center Davisville did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure

of Construction Battalion Center Davisville.

Naval Air Facility Midway Island

Category: Naval Air Stations/Other - Unique

Mission: Logistic Support

Costs to Close: \$7.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$33.8 million; Annual: \$6.9 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

Department of Defense**Recommendation:**

Realign Naval Air Facility Midway Island. Eliminate the mission. Retain caretaker presence to support intermittent joint special operations.

Naval Air Facility Midway Island was a likely candidate for realignment because the site-specific mission requirements are reducing and the degradations to joint operations are acceptable.

Community Concerns:

The Naval Air Facility Midway Island's civilian population is comprised of 230 contract personnel. The community expressed no concerns with regard to the realignment.

Commission Findings and

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends realigning Naval Air Facility Midway Island. Eliminate the mission and operate under a caretaker status.

Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Engineering, and Fleet Support Activities

Category: Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation

Mission: Research and Engineering Facilities

Costs to Consolidate: \$513 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-119 million; Annual: \$107 million

Payback period: 2-6 years (varies by warfare center)

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close 10 and realign 16 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Engineering and Fleet Support Facilities as part of a facility consolidation plan. Create four centers: Naval Air Warfare Center; Naval Command, Control

and Ocean Surveillance Center; Naval Surface Warfare Center; and Naval Undersea Warfare Center.

Community Concerns:

The communities argued that implementing the consolidation plan would disrupt the RDT&E, engineering, and fleet-support functions these activities perform. Much of this disruption, they claimed, would result from the loss of key scientists and engineers who would be unwilling to relocate.

Communities expressed concern that the Navy underestimated the costs of the consolidation, that it failed to evaluate all alternatives, and that the new warfare centers would not emphasize research and development sufficiently. The communities requested the Commission to wait for the completion of the DoD Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories study before making any recommendations.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the DoD did not adequately examine the availability of alternative facilities for the location of the East Coast In-Service Engineering

Directorate, which the DoD proposed to be located in Portsmouth, VA. Existing facilities may be available in Charleston, SC, elsewhere in the Norfolk metropolitan area, or at other locations. Additionally, the Committee found that development in the Portsmouth area could affect the Navy's ability to conduct tests on radars and communications equipment. While the Commission found inaccuracies in the DoD cost and savings estimates, these errors were insignificant.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that, with one exception, the Secretary's proposal for closure and realignment of RDT&E, Engineering, and Fleet Support Activities did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the selection criteria.

In its recommended establishment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center's East Coast In-Service Engineering Directorate in Portsmouth, VA., the Commission finds that the Secretary deviated substantially from criteria 2 and 4 by not examining fully all available alternatives for location of the Directorate.

The Commission recommends the following closures and realignments.

Closures:

Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility,
San Diego, CA
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering
Center, San Diego, CA
Naval Electronic Systems Eng. Center,
Vallejo, CA
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity,
Yorktown, VA
Naval Space Systems Activity,
Los Angeles, CA
Naval Ocean Systems Center Detachment,
Kaneohe, HI
Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility,
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Realignments:

David Taylor Research Center
Detachment, Annapolis, MD
Naval Air Development Center,
Warminster, PA
Naval Air Engineering Center,
Lakehurst, NJ
Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ
Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, IN
Naval Coastal Systems Center,
Panama City, FL
Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD
Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY
Naval Surface Weapons Center
Detachment, White Oak, MD

Naval Underwater Systems Center
Detachment, New London, CT
Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering
Station, Keyport, WA
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA
Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN
Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Magu,
California
Trident Command and Control Systems
Maintenance Activity, Newport, RI
Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering
Station, Norfolk, VA

Additionally, the Commission recommends to the President that the Secretary defer implementation of this consolidation plan until January 1, 1992 in order to give the Secretary time to consider the findings and recommendations of the DoD Advisory Commission on Consolidation and Conversion of Defense Research and Development Laboratories and to consult with the appropriate committees of the Congress.

The Commission also believes there is a clear role for the Advisory Commission to advise the Secretary of how best to implement this consolidation plan so as to minimize the impact of the turbulence it could create, including the loss of key personnel. Clearly, the challenge of undertaking such a comprehensive

reorganization will require the careful development and execution of personnel management plans to minimize the disruption of critical research and development activities in the Navy laboratory system.

Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado

Category: Training

Mission: Technical Training Center

Cost to Close: \$222.5 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-44.5 million; Annual: \$42.2 million

Payback: 5 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Lowry Air Force Base and redistribute all technical training to the remaining technical training centers. The 1001st Space Systems Squadron Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Air Force Reserve Personnel Center remain at Lowry. The Lowry Technical Training Center will inactivate.

Lowry's long-term military value was low compared with other bases in its category. Its ranking suffered because base facilities ranked below the category average and the lack of a runway limits its ability to accept additional missions.

Additionally, it is the second-least expensive base to close in this category.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that Lowry was penalized too severely for the lack of a runway and that the DoD criteria placed too much emphasis on runway operations. The community also noted that the base has a favorable cost-per-student-trained ratio when compared with the other technical training centers. It also argued that the closure of Lowry would reduce too much infrastructure in light of the fiscal year 1988 decision to close Chanute Air Force Base. The elimination of two large training centers does not allow enough infrastructure to handle a quick surge in training that might be required.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that all training bases were treated fairly and Lowry did rank low in its category. The lack of a runway was considered correctly since it does limit future mission capabilities. However, the lack of a runway did not penalize Lowry when evaluated for supporting the current mission. Three training bases lacking active runway operations were all

downgraded equally with regard to future mission capabilities. Lowry's base facilities rated lower than the category average. The Commission found that the cost of training per student is a function of the type of training conducted at Lowry and not a function of the physical properties of Lowry Air Force Base. Concerning the remaining technical training capacity, the closure of Chanute and Lowry removes 33 percent of the training infrastructure. The Air Force's projected accessions are 50 percent of what they were in the 1980s, when there were six training centers. Therefore, the one-third reduction in facilities allows for surge capability if and when it is required. The Department of Defense should look closely at using the excess facilities created by this closure when evaluating the Department's overall facility requirements such as the consolidation of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Lowry Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Lowry Air

Force Base and the redistribution of all technical training to the remaining tech training centers. The 1001st Space Systems Squadron Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and the Air Force Reserve Personnel Center remain open, in cantonment areas as proposed by the Secretary Defense.

Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Flying/Tactical

Mission: Tactical Reconnaissance, RF-4

Cost to Close: \$39.8 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$128 million; Annual: \$36.3 million

Payback: 2 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Bergstrom and retire the assigned RF-4 aircraft. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing will inactivate. Maintain the existing Air Force Reserve units in an enclosed area if the base is converted to a civil airport. Relocate the 12th Air Force Headquarters, 12th Tactical Intelligence Squadron, and 602nd Tactical Air Control Center Squadron to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. The 41st Electronic Combat Squadron will remain in place at Davis-Monthan Air

Force Base rather than move to Bergstrom Air Force Base as recommended by the 1988 Commission. Finally, move the 712th Air Support Operations Center Squadron to Fort Hood, Texas.

Bergstrom ranked relatively low in the flying/tactical category based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base suffers from ground and regional airspace encroachment. The regional airspace is increasingly stressed by growth in air traffic. There are insufficient suitable air-to-ground or electronic combat ranges nearby for flight training. Finally, the capacity of on-base family housing is below average compared with other bases in the category.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that Bergstrom simply needs a new mission. It declared that the base is strategically located to support Fort Hood, Texas, with Close Air Support operations and airlift for operational or exercise deployments. The community also was concerned that the closure recommendation was based upon the impression that the base would definitely be converted to a commercial airport. The community minimized the

severity of ground and airspace encroachment.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that DoD's closure recommendation was not tied to the conversion of the airfield to a civil airport. However, there is an option to maintain the Air Force Reserve unit if the airfield is converted to commercial use. The lack of adequate ranges and increasing encroachment limit the base's overall military value. Other tactical units such as the 149th Tactical Fighter Group at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, can adequately support Fort Hood. Finally, Fort Hood uses its own Grey Army Airfield for airlift operations.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Bergstrom Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends that Bergstrom Air Force Base close and that the assigned RF-4 aircraft retire. The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing will inactivate. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility will remain if it continues to be economical for

the Air Force to operate it there. The Air Force Reserve units shall remain in a cantonment area if the base is converted to a civil airport. If no decision on a civil airport is reached by June 1993, the reserve units will be redistributed. If the reserve units stay but the airport is not an economically viable entity by the end of 1996, these units would also be redistributed. The 12th Air Force Headquarters 12th TAC Intelligence Squadron and the 602nd Tactical Air Control Center Squadron will relocate to Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona. The 712th Air Support Operations Center Squadron will relocate to Fort Hood, Texas. The 41st Electronic Combat Squadron will remain in place at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.

England Air Force Base, Louisiana

Category: Flying/Tactical

Mission: Tactical Fighters, A-10

Cost to Close: \$40.3 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$176 million; Annual: \$47.2 million

Payback: 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close England and retire or redistribute all aircraft among remaining Active and Reserve Component units. Inactivate the 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing. Realign one A/OA-10 squadron to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and one to McChord Air Force Base, Washington.

England ranked relatively low in the flying/tactical category. The long-term military value of England is limited by available airspace for training and by weather, for which England ranked lowest in its category. The Air Force acknowledged the advantage of England's proximity to Fort Polk, but stated that other bases could support the Army. Also, the cost to close is low while the savings are high.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that England's mix of weather was good for training. It stated that the local airspace, low-altitude military operating areas, and availability of higher-altitude airspace were not adequately considered. It questioned whether the Air Force could meet the Army's needs at Fort Polk if England closed. The community also stated that

DoD understated the combined economic impact of England's closure and Fort Polk's realignment.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the airspace and weather can impact the military value of the base. With its surrounding airspace England can meet current mission requirements, but will not be able to support future missions. Concerns that the current mission degraded the base rankings were unfounded. Air Force proposals to provide support to the Army were reasonable and formally endorsed by the Army. Finally, the combined economic impact of the two adjustments was substantially higher than for a single base.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on England Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of England Air Force Base and the redistribution of one squadron to Eglin Air Force Base, one squadron to McChord Air Force Base, and the retirement of other remaining assigned

aircraft, including the 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing.

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Category: Flying/Tactical

*Mission: Tactical Fighter Training and Joint Headquarters,
F-16*

Cost to Realign: \$31.0 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$53 million; Annual: \$20.4 million

Payback: 2 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign and partially close MacDill Air Force Base. The aircraft realign to Luke Air Force Base, Arizona; the Joint Communications Support Element moves to Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina; the airfield closes; and the remainder of MacDill becomes an administrative base.

The long-term military value of MacDill is limited by pressure on airspace, training areas, and low-level routes. MacDill is not located near Army units that would offer joint-training opportunities. MacDill also has ground encroachment. Drawdown in the force structure results in the need for one less

F-16 training wing. DoD did not recommend full closure because of the high cost to relocate two large joint headquarters.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that the reduction in the base's hospital staff associated with the population drawdown will reduce support to a large retired population and increase CHAMPUS costs. While it acknowledged airspace congestion, the community argued that airspace problems and accident potential in the Phoenix area are significantly worse. Loss of the airfield was also presented as degrading the ability of the joint headquarters to fulfill their missions. In particular, the community argued that a classified mission at MacDill required a dedicated airfield. The community also expressed the concern that realignment was the first step toward closure.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that MacDill was located in an area with increasing pressure on airspace and therefore restricted training capabilities. The increased CHAMPUS costs associated with base closures were factored into the Air

Force analysis. The CHAMPUS program was developed to address medical needs of all non-active duty beneficiaries since DoD policy precludes manning a hospital solely to meet the needs of a retired population. In this case the increased cost was due to the large number of retirees.

The Commission examined the broad comparisons between Phoenix and Tampa raised by the community. Detailed review revealed that resulting force structure was below historic highs and that air traffic procedures were workable. The Commission also noted that Luke has exceptional training airspace to the south, which is connected to Luke by established routing.

Arguments that the missions DoD plans to retain (both unclassified and classified) at MacDill require a military airfield were found wanting. The Commission also noted the high cost of total closure and the low cost and reasonable savings of realignment.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on MacDill Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan or the final selection criteria. Therefore,

the Commission recommends the realignment and partial closure of MacDill Air Force Base; the realignment of the aircraft to Luke Air Force Base, Arizona; the movement of the Communications Support Element to Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina; and the closure of the airfield and the remainder of MacDill becomes an administrative base.

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina

Category: Flying/Tactical

Mission: Tactical Fighters, A-10

Cost to Close: \$54.4 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$76.0 million; Annual: \$30.2 million

Payback: 2 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Myrtle Beach and redistribute all aircraft to modernize other Active and Reserve Component units. Inactivate the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing. The DoD recommendation also states that there be one active squadron each at Shaw and Pope Air Force Bases.

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base's long-term military value was low compared with other bases in its category. Its ranking suffered because of weather, ground encroachment, and because of its

location in a region where special use airspace is being stressed increasingly by growth in air traffic. Additionally, the cost to close is low while the savings are high.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that Myrtle Beach was incorrectly downgraded for ground encroachment and that the weather does not downgrade the base's ability to meet its mission. The community also noted that the base was recently identified as one of the best in the Air Force and has the potential to house a composite wing, which was not considered by the Air Force. It also argued that the closure of Myrtle Beach was an example of the Air Force's failure to consider providing close-air support to the Army.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that all flying/tactical bases were treated fairly and Myrtle Beach did rank low in its category. It does have training limitations, and projections indicate increasing pressure on airspace. Weather and airspace do degrade Myrtle Beach's military value and justify its low ranking. The base has low closure cost and favorable savings.

Regarding support to the Army, the Commission found that Shaw Air Force Base, North Carolina, provides the needed support to Army units in the area.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Myrtle Beach Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Myrtle Beach Air Force Base and the redistribution of all assigned aircraft to other Active and Reserve Component units, and that one active A/OA-10 squadron be realigned to Shaw and Pope Air Force Bases.

Moody Air Force Base, Georgia

Category: Flying/Tactical

Mission: Tactical Fighters, F-16

Cost to Close: N/A

Savings: 1992-97: N/A

Payback: N/A

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Moody Air Force Base and redistribute all aircraft to modernize other

active and reserve component units. The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing will inactivate.

Moody's long-term military value compared unfavorably with other bases in its category. Its ranking suffered because of weather and its location in a region where special-use airspace is being stressed increasingly by growth in air traffic. Additionally, it is the least costly base in its category to close.

Community Concerns:

The community argued that Moody was incorrectly downgraded for airspace and that the weather does not downgrade the base's ability to meet its mission. The community also noted that the base was recently identified as the best in the Air Force and has growth potential for a composite wing, potential that was not considered by the Air Force. It also argued that the closure of Moody was an example of the Air Force's failure to consider support to the Army.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that Moody's minor training limitations are successfully managed and the wing can meet its training needs. While an increase in

commercial aviation is evident, the routing around Moody's airspace and repeated examples of the Federal Aviation Administration providing additional airspace to Moody argue against training capability decreasing in the future. Sorties have been lost to weather, but the Air Force has successfully overcome this problem in the past and should be able to do so in the future. The closure of Moody provides only small savings that justifies leaving what has been recognized as one of the best bases in the Air Force, for installation excellence, open.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that DoD substantially deviated from selection criteria 1, 2, and 3 in recommending the closure of Moody Air Force Base. Specifically, DoD did not adequately consider the military value of Moody Air Force Base in its assessment of the extent of the impact of weather and airspace problems. Therefore, the Commission recommends Moody remain open.

Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Flying/Strategic

*Mission: Strategic Bombardment and Air Refueling, B-52 and
KC-135*

Cost to Close: \$45.6 million

*Savings: 1992-97: \$156 million; Annual: \$45.5 million Payback:
1 year*

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Carswell Air Force Base and transfer the assigned B-52H aircraft to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. The assigned KC-135 aircraft will transfer to the Air Reserve Component, and the 7th Bombardment Wing will inactivate. The 436th Strategic Training Squadron relocates to Dyess Air Force Base, Texas. Maintain the existing Air Force Reserve units in a cantonment area.

Carswell ranked low based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in its category. The base is poorly located for wartime bomber or tanker employment. The base has the worst ground and regional airspace encroachment in its category. The regional airspace will continue to be stressed by aggressive aviation growth in the area. Finally, much of the on-base housing is unusable because it is under renovation

and the contractor has defaulted. The Air Force projects this housing to be unusable for the extended future.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that many subelement scores were incorrect and that the "corrected" scores would change the overall rating for the base. The community minimized the impact and severity of airspace encroachment, citing excellent procedures and equipment used to control aircraft in the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport area. Similarly, it declared that the existing ground encroachment in both the clear and accident zones will decrease. The community was also concerned about the disposition of the base hospital. The hospital serves the active-duty military members and their dependents, as well as many retirees. The community was also concerned about the economic impact on a region already hard hit by other cuts in the defense industry.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found very few errors in the subelement scores, and the full Air Force process was validated by the GAO. Carswell is in an area of continued aviation growth and strong pressure on

regional airspace. Additionally, there is commercial and residential encroachment in the protected zones off either end of the runway. The poor location for wartime employment and ground and airspace encroachment limit the base's future military value.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Carswell Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Carswell Air Force Base and the transfer of the assigned B-52 aircraft to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. The assigned KC-135 aircraft should transfer to the Air Reserve Component. The 436th Strategic Training Squadron will relocate to Dyess Air Force Base. The existing Air Force Reserve units will remain in a cantonment area.

Castle Air Force Base, California

Category: Flying/Strategic

Mission: Strategic Bombardment, Air Refueling, and Combat Crew Training School; B-52 and KC-135

Cost to Close: \$99.2 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$63.0 million; Annual: \$52.7 million

Payback: 2 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Castle Air Force Base and transfer the assigned B-52G conventional aircraft to K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan. Transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to other Active or Reserve Component units. Transfer the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training mission to Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington. The 93rd Bombardment Wing will inactivate.

Castle ranked relatively low based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base is in a relatively poor location for wartime bomber employment. Its ranking also suffered because of its relatively poor location for wartime and peacetime air-refueling operations. The base endures local ground and regional airspace encroachment. The regional airspace is being increasingly stressed by growth in air traffic. Finally, the condition of the facilities at Castle is below the average of other bases in the same category.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that Castle was incorrectly categorized as a strategic/flying base when, in its opinion, the primary mission of the base is initial training of B-52 and KC-135 aircrews. It declared Castle has unique attributes to perform this training mission, including its many aircrew-training devices, access to numerous airfields, and transient student quarters. Finally, it believes that moving the training mission would be short-sighted because the longevity of the B-52 is in question.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the base was properly categorized along with other flying/strategic bases. It is in a poor location for wartime bomber and tanker employment. Regional airspace and local ground encroachment also degrade its overall military value. The DoD force-structure plan includes the B-52 aircraft until past the turn of the century.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Castle Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final

selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends closing Castle Air Force Base and transferring the assigned B-52 aircraft to K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base. Transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to other Active or Reserve Component units. Transfer the B-52 and KC-135 Combat Crew Training missions to Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington.

Eaker Air Force Base, Arkansas

Category: Flying/Strategic

Mission: Strategic Bombardment and Air Refueling, B-52 and KC-135

Cost to Close: \$18.5 million

Savings 1992-97: \$221.0 million; Annual: \$52.9 million

Payback: Less than 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Eaker Air Force Base and transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to other Active or Reserve Component units. The assigned B-52G Air Launched Cruise Missile aircraft retire. The 97th Bombardment Wing will inactivate.

Eaker ranked relatively low in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base is in a relatively poor location to support wartime

bomber employment. Its ranking also suffered because of the limited opportunity for peacetime use of tanker assets and access to bombing ranges. The base experiences some current restrictions on access to bombing ranges and expects future restrictions as well. Finally, the capacity of the facilities are below the average of other bases in the same category.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that Eaker is close to many air-refueling tracks, and removing assigned KC-135s will exacerbate a regional peacetime air-refueling tanker shortfall. It also stated that Eaker has better weather than many northern strategic bases. The community was especially concerned with the economic impact of the closure.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that, although Eaker is close to many designated air refueling tracks, it is still relatively distant from an area of high air-refueling requirements. Eaker is in a relatively poor location for wartime bomber and tanker employment. The cost to close Eaker is low, and the pay back is achieved in less

than one year. The economic impact on the community from the closing of Eaker will be among the most significant in the Air Force.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Eaker Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Eaker Air Force Base. The assigned B-52 aircraft will retire, and the assigned KC-135 aircraft will transfer to other Active or Reserve Component units.

Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana

Category: Flying/Strategic

Mission: Strategic Air Refueling, KC-135

Cost to Close: \$24.9 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$157 million; Annual: \$48.3 million

Payback: 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Grissom Air Force Base and transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component. The EC-135 aircraft will retire and the 305th

Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. Grissom ranked below average in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term overall military value compared with other bases in the category. The base's location provides limited opportunity for peacetime use of tankers and access to bombing ranges. Finally, Grissom costs the fourth least to close in the category and the savings generated after closure are substantial.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that Grissom has no airspace restrictions and that expansion capability is unlimited around the base. The community also highlighted that, because of its distance to the coast, the base's survivability is enhanced due to its midwestern location. Also, the existing ramp can accommodate additional aircraft and the quality of life at Grissom is better than at several bases not recommended for closure.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the base was properly graded. The base has no flying restrictions and can expand. However, the distance to air-refueling receivers and primary ranges diminishes

the bases military value. Grissom is the fourth lowest cost to close in the category and offers a significant annual savings. Closing the base will have a negative economic impact on the local community. Finally, the condition of facilities at Grissom graded lower than the category average.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Grissom Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Grissom Air Force Base, the retirement of assigned EC-135 aircraft, the inactivation of the 305th Air Refueling Wing, and the transfer of KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component.

Loring Air Force Base, Maine

Category: Flying/Strategic

*Mission: Conventional Bombardment and Air Refueling, B-52
and KC-135*

Cost to Close: \$46.6 million

*Savings: 1992-97: \$182 million; Annual: \$61.8 million Payback:
1 year*

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Loring Air Force Base and transfer the assigned B-52 aircraft to K.I. Sawyer and disperse KC-135 aircraft to Active and Reserve Component units.

Loring ranked relatively low in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term military value compared with other bases in the category. The base's location provides limited opportunity for peacetime use of tankers and access to bombing ranges. The condition of base facilities is below the average of other bases in the category. The cost to close Loring is low and the savings are among the highest of the bases in this subcategory.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that Loring is the closest base to conventional and strategic targets east of the United States. It also pointed out that Loring has two fully operational runways. Further, it stated that the base is near air-refueling routes, base facilities are adequate to meet current mission requirements, not enough credit was given for improvements to facilities, distance to bombing ranges is not a significant factor, and the Air Force

did not adequately consider the economic impact.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that, although Loring is the closest base to potential targets east of the United States, the advantage is relative when the total mission is considered. Loring is rated lower in military value because of the limited opportunity for peacetime use of tankers and access to bombing ranges. The condition of the facilities are below the command's average and the cost of required upgrades to meet the current and future missions is high. Loring has only one fully operational runway and one pre-launch survivability runway. The annual savings will be the highest of all bases closed in the flying/strategic category. The economic impact on the Loring community will be severe.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Loring Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Loring Air Force Base, the transfer of the

assigned B-52 aircraft to K.I. Sawyer, and the dispersal of the KC-135 aircraft to active and Air Reserve Component units.

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan

Category: Flying/Strategic

Mission: Strategic Bombardment and Air Refueling, B-52 and KC-135

Cost to Close: \$29.1 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$256 million; Annual: \$63.3 million

Payback: 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Wurtsmith Air Force Base and transfer the assigned KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component. The B-52G Air Launched Cruise Missile aircraft will retire and the 379th Bombardment Wing inactivates.

Wurtsmith ranked below average in the flying/strategic category based on its long-term overall military value compared with other bases in the category. The low ranking results from the base's distance to primary low-altitude training routes and peacetime air-refueling training requirements. Finally, Wurtsmith costs the third least to close in the category and the savings generated after closure are high.

Community Concerns:

The community claimed that Wurtsmith has no airspace restrictions and that all operational requirements for the assigned aircraft can be met without interference. The community also stated that closing Wurtsmith would have significant negative economic impact on northern Michigan. It directly challenged individual ratings of the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group. In addition it argued for keeping Wurtsmith open and closing K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the base was properly graded. The base has no flying restrictions and can perform all operations required to sustain the mission. However, the distance to scored training routes is significant and lowers the efficiency of the missions at Wurtsmith. Also, tankers must travel a significant distance to air-refueling receivers. Wurtsmith costs the third least to close in the category and offers the highest annual savings of any Air Force base closure. Closing the base will have a severe economic impact on the local community.

Finally, K.I. Sawyer graded higher overall in military value than Wurtsmith.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on Wurtsmith Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Wurtsmith Air Force Base, the transfer of KC-135 aircraft to the Air Reserve Component, and the retirement of the assigned B-52G aircraft and the inactivation of the 379th Bombardment Wing.

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona

Category: Flying/Training

Mission: Flying/Training, T-37 and T-38

Cost to Close: \$26.7 million

Savings 1992-97: \$222 million; Annual: \$54.1 million

Payback: 1 year

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Williams and retire or redistribute all aircraft. Inactivate 82nd Flying/Training Wing. Move Aircrew Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida.

Williams ranked low in the flying/training category and lowest for airspace encroachment--a problem that is expected to worsen. The condition of its facilities also ranked lowest. Williams's closure will have the least severe impact on its local community of any of the bases in its category.

Community Concerns:

The community argued principally that the Air Force did not give Williams enough credit for its excellent weather and incorrectly rated its facilities. The community believed that DoD placed too much emphasis on airspace without recognizing adjustments made in the region to alleviate encroachment problems. In addition, the community claimed the closure and movement of the Aircrew Training Research Facility will be too costly.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that all flying/training bases were treated fairly and Williams ranked lowest in its category. It has the most severe airspace problems--a situation that is only projected to worsen. Projected air traffic growth of 65 percent by 2005, civilian traffic cutting

into instrument training, and the potential of a new regional airport are a few of the problems.

The Air Force did consider a recent agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration to improve the utility of one of Williams' Military Operating Areas. However, this adjustment fails to address the more pressing problem of minimum airspace. Williams has the minimum airspace per sortie considered safe and the least of any flying/training base.

Williams did rate highest in the category for weather. However, even with added emphasis this rating could not overcome deficiencies in other areas.

Finally, Orlando, in addition to being the least expensive alternative for the relocation of the lab, also provides synergism by collocating Air Force and Navy elements working in the same area.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Williams Air Force Base, the transfer of the Aircrew

Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida, and the deactivation of the 82nd Flying/Training Wing.

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Base, Missouri

Category: Air Reserve Component Bases

Mission: Tactical Fighters, A-10

Cost to Close: \$47.6 million

Savings: 1992-97: \$-4 million; Annual: \$12.9 million

Payback: 5 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base and transfer the 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. The 36th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron and the 77th and 78th Aerial Port Squadrons will transfer to Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.

Since the joint-use plan with the Kansas City Department of Aviation, which was envisioned 12 years ago, has not materialized, the Air Force Reserve has borne a substantial portion of the operating costs of this airfield. The economically viable airport that the Air Force anticipated and the expected reduction in costs have not materialized. Therefore, relocating the Reserve activities

to an active Air Force base would achieve significant cost savings. Consideration was given to the recruiting needs of these units to ensure that the realignment meets military requirements and is cost effective. The long-term effect on training is minimal since Whiteman has similar access to training ranges, low-level routes, and Army exercise areas.

Community Concerns:

The community stated that the units would not be able to use current training ranges and could not support Fort Riley and Fort Sill. It also stated that the move would adversely affect recruitment, retention, and training because of the reduced population available for recruitment. In addition, it stated that the cost to move was understated because the missile wing would not move as soon as anticipated.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the Air Force's and community's cost estimates for relocating to Whiteman were incorrect. There will be some additional rehabilitation costs for temporary facilities, but the relocation costs would not be as much as envisioned for new construction.

The Air Force's payback period would be seven years, not five years. The recruitment area and the travel distance required is within the Air Force guidance. The move will enable the unit to use additional training ranges and support Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Fort Riley, Kansas, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, will get their support from Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan or the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Base, the transfer of the 442nd Tactical Fighter Wing to Whiteman Air Force Base, and the transfer of the 36th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron and the 77th and 78th Aerial Port Squadrons to Peterson Air Force Base.

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, Ohio

Category: Air Reserve Component Bases

Mission: Tactical Fighters and Air Refueling, A-7, and KC-135

Cost to Close: \$106.1 million

Savings 1992-97: \$-16 million; Annual: \$22.7 million

Payback: 5 years

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Close Rickenbacker Air Guard Base and transfer the 160th Air Refueling Group and the 907th Tactical Airlift Group to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The 4950th Test Wing will consolidate with the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base, California.

Since the Air Reserve Component units located at Rickenbacker are the predominate users of the airfield, the support costs for these activities are high and the relocation of the units could bring about significant savings. Transferring the units to Wright-Patterson keeps the Air National Guard units in Ohio and reduces the costs to move, since the 4950th would vacate useable facilities. Also, moving the Guard and Reserve units to Dayton would increase the overall recruiting area population. In addition, collocation with active forces will improve operations.

Community Concerns:

The community questioned the costing methodology and claimed that the costs to move the Air Reserve Component units were understated. It also said that the eight criteria were not consistently applied. In addition, it claimed that moving three more flying units to Dayton would cause airspace congestion. It also claimed that because Dayton's population is one-half the size of the population of Columbus, recruiting will be hurt.

Commission Findings:

The Commission found that the community's cost estimate was for building all new facilities at Wright-Patterson. The community did not recognize that the Air Force was using vacated facilities. Small additional increases in air traffic will be manageable. Using the Air Force's recruiting guidelines, locating the units in Dayton does not degrade the recruiting base. The Air Force modified its selection criteria for Air Reserve Component bases first by determining if there was a significant cost savings, and then by applying the eight criteria. An underlying concern was the moving of Air National Guard units across

state lines. This did not adversely affect the selection process.

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the Secretary's recommendation on Rickenbacker Air Reserve Base did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the closure of Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, the transfer of the 160th Air Refueling Group and the 907th Tactical Airlift Group to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and the consolidation of the 4950th Test Wing from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base with the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base.

Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas

Category: Training

Mission: Technical Training

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

As part of the closure of Chanute Air Force Base, Illinois, realign the fuels training to Sheppard Air Force Base,

Texas, and realign the technical training fire course to Goodfellow unless a satisfactory and cost-effective contract can be arranged. The 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure recommended that both of these courses be realigned to Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.

Commission Findings and

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on realignment of Goodfellow Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force structure and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment of the fuels training from Goodfellow Air Force Base to Sheppard Air Force Base.

Beale Air Force Base, California

Category: Flying/Strategic

*Mission: Strategic Reconnaissance and Air Refueling, U-2,
TR-1 and KC-135*

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign Undergraduate Navigator Training and the 323rd Flying Training Wing from Mather Air Force Base,

California, to Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, instead of realigning to Beale Air Force Base as recommended by the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.

Community Concerns:

The economic impact will harm an already depressed area.

Commission Findings and Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on realignment of Beale Air Force Base did not deviate substantially from the force structure on the final selection criteria. The economic impact will not be severe. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment of Undergraduate Navigator Training and the 323rd Flying Training Wing from Mather Air Force Base to Randolph Air Force Base, California.

March Air Force Base, California

Category: Flying/Strategic

Mission: Air Refueling, KC-10

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign 45 Air Force Audit Agency manpower authorizations from Norton Air Force Base, California, to the National Capital Region instead of to March Air Force Base as recommended by the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The remaining 139 manpower authorizations will transfer to March Air Force Base as directed by the 1988 Commission.

Commission Findings and Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation on realignment of these limited manpower authorizations did not deviate substantially from the force structure and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment of the 45 Air Force Audit Agency manpower authorizations from Norton Air Force Base to the National Capital Region and the transfer of 139 manpower authorizations from Norton Air Force Base to March Air Force Base.

Mather Air Force Base, California

Category: Flying/Training

Mission: Navigator Training, T-43 and T-37

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign the 940th Air Refueling Group from Mather Air Force Base to McClellan Air Force Base. Leave the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital open as an annex to McClellan Air Force Base instead of leaving the 940th Air Refueling Group at Mather Air Force Base and closing the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital, as recommended by the 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.

Commission Findings and

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure and final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the realignment of the 940th Air Refueling Group from Mather Air Force Base to McClellan Air Force Base and the retention of the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital as an annex to McClellan Air Force Base.

Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho

Category: Flying/Tactical

Mission: Tactical Fighter and Electronic Warfare, F-111 and EF-111

Department of Defense

Recommendation:

Realign the remaining F-4G aircraft to the Idaho and Nevada Air National Guard; inactivate the 35th Tactical Training Wing; maintain the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; realign the EF-111 aircraft assigned from Mountain Home Air Force Base to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. Establish a composite wing at Mountain Home.

Commission Findings and

Recommendation:

The Commission finds that the DoD recommendation did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and the final selection criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Realign the remaining F-4G aircraft to the Idaho and Nevada Air National Guard; inactivate the 35th

Tactical Training Wing; maintain the 41st Electronic Combat Squadron at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona; realign the EF-111 aircraft assigned from Mountain Home Air Force Base to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. Establish a composite wing at Mountain Home.

Chapter 6:

Communities and Base Reuse

Communities will have a wide range of experiences in developing reuse proposals. Even as the Commission conducted its review, a few communities were already developing plans for reusing base facilities. While short-term economic impacts from base closures are unavoidable, communities can take steps to mitigate these impacts and use the former base to stimulate new economic growth.

Full economic recovery from base closure is dependent upon timely disposition of the facilities and land vacated by the services. The Secretary of Defense should do everything in his power to ensure a timely transfer of these valuable assets to the local communities.

Mobilizing for Reuse

Reusing former military base property offers communities the best opportunity to rebuild their economies. The buildings and facilities can fill residential, commercial, and industrial needs and thus can replace jobs and income lost. Airfields are especially marketable because of the national shortage of available hangar space. Several communities that lost bases as a result of the 1988 base-closing commission

have taken advantage of this opportunity for a quick economic turnaround.

Attracting permanent tenants for the property, once disposal occurs, is an integral part of a community's strategy for economic recovery.

Successes can result from two things: early creation of an organization to plan and implement a suitable base reuse strategy, and aggressive marketing of base assets and available facilities.

DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) surveyed reuse of closed military installations between 1961 and 1990 and concluded that 158,000 new jobs had been created to replace 93,000 jobs lost as a result of base closures.

There are six steps that communities can take in preparing a strategy for reusing a closed installation:

- Form a reuse committee
- Work with federal and state representatives
- Maintain close relations with DoD
- Be active in the planning process
- Use federal and state programs
- Hire experts to fill any gaps in your professional staff.

Each community will have unique opportunities and constraints. The successful implementation of any base-reuse strategy hinges upon harnessing the energy and

creativity present in a community.

Economic Adjustment Assistance

DoD created the Economic Adjustment Program for this purpose in May 1961. Since 1970, DoD has rendered adjustment assistance through the President's Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC), which is composed of 18 federal departments and agencies and chaired by the Secretary of Defense.

EAC works with representatives of local, state and federal agencies to develop strategies and coordinate action plans that will generate new job opportunities and to alleviate the social and economic impacts resulting from DoD program changes. To assist communities, the Secretary of Defense can make grants to qualified local government entities for development of community-adjustment plans.

The transition period (often three to five years) in securing new civilian uses can be difficult for many communities. But the

Communities and Base Reuse

difficult for many communities. But the experience of communities affected by earlier base closures clearly indicates communities can adjust successfully.

More recently, OEA has been working with 21 communities that are near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. OEA has provided \$1.6 million in grants to the affected communities to help develop reuse plans and is working through the EAC to help these communities implement their reuse plans.

Environmental Restoration at Closing Bases

DoD is obligated under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act to restore contaminated sites on military bases.

Within the capabilities of technology and the availability of funds, DoD is committed to restoring closing bases to safe condition. The Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 can be used to fund this environmental restoration.

DoD also has several initiatives under way to expedite the environmental

restoration process and thereby speed local economic recovery.

- DoD is forming a task force to report on ways to improve interagency coordination of environmental-response actions; streamline and consolidate regulations, practices, and policies; and improve environmental restoration at closing bases.
- DoD has established a model program that will test ways of expediting cleanup and accelerating the contracting process. The program will also probe alternatives that will help avoid disputes, concurrent regulatory review, and options for local reuse while cleanup is in progress.
- DoD is reemphasizing ongoing efforts, including expanded use of interagency agreements that detail restorations at National Priority List sites and memoranda of agreement between DoD and states for resolving technical disputes at National Priority List sites.

Homeowners Assistance Program

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

The Homeowners Assistance Program, in operation since 1966, assists DoD military and civilian employees who are forced to move as a result of a base closure.

The government helps eligible employees who cannot sell their homes within a reasonable amount of time by either buying their homes for 75 percent of the pre-closure-announcement value or reimbursing them for most of the lost equity should the homeowners sell the house for less than the value before the closure was announced. The program also provides relief for displaced employees facing foreclosure.

The program is initially funded with appropriated funds; however, proceeds from the sale or rental of government-purchased houses replenish the fund.

The Displaced Employee Program provides for priority placement referral of separated employees to other federal agencies. In addition, DoD and the Office of Personnel Management have initiated a project to link data systems. Upon completion, the linked systems will support a significantly expanded Defense Referral System.

The communities that will lose bases as a result of the 1991 closure and realignment process face an uncertain future. Local leaders, with the assistance of federal and state agencies, can steer a path from economic dislocation to economic growth.

Civilian Employee Assistance

The DoD Priority Placement Program is another program that was originally established to help DoD civilian employees adjust to the base closures of the 1960s.

A state-of-the-art automated referral is currently in operation. In the years since its inception, the referral system has helped more than 98,000 employees find new assignments. This cost-effective system supports the Priority Placement Program.

104 STAT. 1808

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

TITLE XXIX—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURES AND
REALIGNMENTS

Defense Base
Closure and
Realignment Act
of 1990.
10 USC 2687
note.

PART A—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This part may be cited as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990”.

(b) **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established an independent commission to be known as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission”.

(b) **DUTIES.**—The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this part.

(c) **APPOINTMENT.**—(1)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

President.

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to the Commission—

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress;

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress.

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, the President should consult with—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members;

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members;

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one member; and

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member.

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall designate one such individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission.

(d) **TERMS.**—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was appointed to the Commission.

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.

(e) **MEETINGS.**—(1) The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public.

Public
information.

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1809

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon request, to the following:

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members.

(f) VACANCIES.—A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual's predecessor was appointed.

(g) PAY AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.—(1)(A) Each member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

(h) DIRECTOR OF STAFF.—(1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment.

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

(i) STAFF.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel.

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule.

(3) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense.

104 STAT. 1810

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Commission.

(j) OTHER AUTHORITY.—(1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent funds are available.

(k) FUNDING.—(1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second session of the 101st Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year 1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(l) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

(a) FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN.—(1) As part of the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period.

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such plan—

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph

(1);

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of each such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and type of units in the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) during and at the end of each such period; and

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure plan.

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the Commission.

(b) SELECTION CRITERIA.—(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. The Secretary shall provide an

Federal
Register,
publication.

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1811

opportunity for public comment on the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence.

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991.

Federal
Register,
publication.

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense committees in final form by no later than February 15 of the year concerned. Such amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15 of the year concerned.

(C) DOD RECOMMENDATIONS.—(1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, April 15, 1993, and April 15, 1995, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned.

Federal
Register,
publication.

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1), a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each recommendation.

(3) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department.

(4) The Secretary shall make available to the Commission and the Comptroller General of the United States all information used by the Department in making its recommendations to the Commission for closures and realignments.

(D) REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION.—(1) After receiving the recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations.

Public
information.

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the President a report containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on a review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations inside the United States.

Reports.

(B) In making its recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially

104 STAT. 1812

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

from the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations.

(3) The Commission shall explain and justify in its report submitted to the President pursuant to paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the Commission that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c). The Commission shall transmit a copy of such report to the congressional defense committees on the same date on which it transmits its recommendations to the President under paragraph (2).

(4) After July 1 of each year in which the Commission transmits recommendations to the President under this subsection, the Commission shall promptly provide, upon request, to any Member of Congress information used by the Commission in making its recommendations.

Reports.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(A) assist the Commission, to the extent requested, in the Commission's review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c); and

(B) by no later than May 15 of each year in which the Secretary makes such recommendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process.

Reports.

(e) REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT.—(1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President's approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.

(2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and the Congress the reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations.

(4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall—

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e);

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in each such report;

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1813

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than two years after the date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL.—(1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of—

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits such report; or

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such report is transmitted.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of a period.

SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION

(a) IN GENERAL.—(1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this part, the Secretary may—

(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance;

(B) provide—

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation,

if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance;

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at any such installation, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for environmental restoration and mitigation;

10 USC 2687
note.

Community
action programs.

Environmental
protection.

104 STAT. 1814

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

Environmental
protection.

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense and available for such purpose.

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the Department of Defense as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purpose.

(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.—(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at a military installation closed or realigned under this part—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484);

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)); and

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 U.S.C. 667b).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the utilization of excess property and the disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard.

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installa-

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1815

tion to be closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

(c) **APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969.**—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated.

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider—

- (i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission;
- (ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or
- (iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.

(d) **WAIVER.**—The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations under this part without regard to—

- (1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and
- (2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the "Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990" which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

- (A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account;
- (B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

10 USC 2687
note.

104 STAT. 1816

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

(C) proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this part.

(b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—(1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 2905(a).

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) **REPORTS.**—(1) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during such fiscal year.

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the Commission shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congressional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3).

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the Commission, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of—

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this part; and

(B) any amount remaining in the Account.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2907. REPORTS

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of Congress—

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT

(a) **TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of section 2904(b), the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), and—

(1) which does not have a preamble;

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1817

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: "That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on ———", the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: "Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission."

(b) REFERRAL.—A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(c) DISCHARGE.—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

(d) CONSIDERATION.—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution (but only on the day after the calendar day on which such Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to do so). All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as

104 STAT. 1818

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

(e) **CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

(f) **RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.**—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States.

(b) **RESTRICTION.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the period specified in subsection (a)—

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under consideration for closure or realignment; or

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the United States.

(c) **EXCEPTION.**—Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry out—

(1) closures and realignments under title II of Public Law 100-526; and

(2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable, including closures and

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1819

realignments carried out for reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) of such section.

SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS

10 USC 2687
note.

As used in this part:

(1) The term "Account" means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1).

(2) The term "congressional defense committees" means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term "Commission" means the Commission established by section 2902.

(4) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility.

(5) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

(6) The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Defense.

(7) The term "United States" means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting "homeport facility for any ship," after "center,"; and

(2) by striking out "under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department" and inserting in lieu thereof "under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility,".

Part B—Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments

SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

10 USC 2687
note.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity;

(2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries;

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released to host countries in whole or in part by

104 STAT. 1820

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

the United States should be handled on a facility-by-facility basis.

(b) **RESIDUAL VALUE.**—(1) For each installation outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, of the improvements made by the United States at facilities at each such installation.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(A) The term “fair market value of the improvements” means the value of improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use.

(B) The term “improvements” includes new construction of facilities and all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing facilities or to real property, without regard to whether they were carried out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(c) **ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is established on the books of the Treasury a special account to be known as the “Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account”. Any amounts paid to the United States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account.

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in the United States. Funds in the Account shall remain available until expended.

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES

(a) **USES OF FACILITIES.**—Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out “minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock incarceration facilities”;

(2) by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (3);

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4):

“(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for confinement or correctional facilities; and”.

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990.

10 USC 2391
note.

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1821

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that fiscal year, the sum of \$100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title II of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title.

(b) EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING.—(1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding at the end the following:

10 USC 2687
note.

“(b) BASE CLOSURE ACCOUNT TO BE EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS.—No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used for purposes described in section 204(a)(3) except funds that have been authorized for and appropriated to the Account. The prohibition in the preceding sentence expires upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title.”.

(2) The amendment made by paragraph (1) does not apply with respect to the availability of funds appropriated before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(c) TASK FORCE REPORT.—(1) Not later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning—

10 USC 2687
note.

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously.

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1). The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees):

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force.

(B) The Attorney General.

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration.

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.

(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by the head of the National Governors Association.

104 STAT. 1822

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

(G) A representative of a State attorney general's office, appointed by the head of the National Association of Attorney Generals.

(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

(a) **NORTON AIR FORCE BASE.**—(1) Consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(1) of Public Law 100-526.

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees.

(b) **GENERAL DIRECTIVE.**—Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations.

10 USC 2687
note.

SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEL PROGRAM.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration program.

(b) **ADMINISTRATOR OF PROGRAM.**—The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment as the Administrator of the model program referred to in subsection (a). The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(1).

(d) **PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.**—In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of Defense shall:

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for which

Reports.

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

104 STAT. 1823

preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 U.S.C. 541 et seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the contractor's breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract.

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following:

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies.

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest.

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria.

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, whichever is later.

(e) APPLICATION OF SECTION 120 OF CERCLA.—Activities of the model program shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620).

(f) EXPEDITED AGREEMENTS.—The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and concurrences.

(g) REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals of this section within the annual

104 STAT. 1824

PUBLIC LAW 101-510—NOV. 5, 1990

report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 10, United States Code.

(h) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW.**—Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).

DIVISION C—OTHER NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

TITLE XXXI—DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS

PART A—NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 3101. OPERATING EXPENSES

Funds are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1991 for operating expenses incurred in carrying out national security programs (including scientific research and development in support of the Armed Forces, strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense, and military applications of nuclear energy and related management and support activities) as follows:

(1) For weapons activities, \$3,795,381,000, to be allocated as follows:

(A) For research and development, \$1,092,218,000.

(B) For weapons testing, \$437,268,000.

(C) For weapons safety, \$160,000,000, to be derived from funds available under subparagraph (A) or (B) or both.

(D) For production and surveillance, \$2,161,180,000.

(E) For program direction, \$104,715,000.

(2) For defense nuclear materials production, \$1,892,770,000, to be allocated as follows:

(A) For production reactor operations, \$811,457,000.

(B) For processing of defense nuclear materials, including naval reactors fuel, \$628,969,000.

(C) For supporting services, \$292,043,000.

(D) For uranium enrichment for naval reactors, \$117,801,000.

(E) For program direction, \$42,500,000.

(3) For verification and control technology, \$181,484,000.

(4) For nuclear materials safeguards and security technology development program, \$83,934,000.

(5) For security investigations, \$65,000,000.

(6) For new production reactors, \$134,900,000.

(7) For naval reactors development, \$569,200,000.

SEC. 3102. PLANT AND CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

Funds are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Energy for fiscal year 1991 for plant and capital equipment (including maintenance, restoration, planning, construction, acquisition, modification of facilities, and the continuation of projects authorized

Appendix B:

Force-

Structure

Summary

Background

Public Law 101-510 required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and to the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1997. The Secretary submitted the plan to Congress on March 19, 1991, and to the Commission on March 23, 1991.

The force-structure plan incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the FY92-97 period and takes account of the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:

- The military threat assessment,
- The need for overseas basing, and
- The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force-structure plan is classified SECRET. What follows is an unclassified summary of the plan.

Military Threat Assessment

(Note: Taken verbatim from *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report*, April 1991)

For 40 years, the Soviet Union and its

surrogates posed the principal threat to U.S. interests and objectives. However, America's security agenda is being rewritten because of the collapse of East European communism, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, ongoing changes within the Soviet Union, the reshaping of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and a reduction in Soviet conventional military power. This redefinition of our threat perception has been accelerated by the emergence and intensification of both new and historical regional quarrels, one of which has already brought the United States into armed conflict in the Persian Gulf. Threats to U.S. interests range from the enmity of nations like North Korea and Cuba, to pressures from friend and foe alike to reduce U.S. presence around the world. In addition, our efforts to promote regional stability and to enhance the spread of democracy will continue to be challenged by insurgencies and terrorism.

Threats

Even with the promise of a greatly reduced Soviet force posture in Eastern Europe, certain crucial constants endure in our long-term assessment of Soviet military capability and global threats.

- The Nuclear Threat. The most enduring concern for U.S. leadership is that the Soviet Union remains the one country in the world capable of destroying the United States with a single, devastating attack. However, the rationale for such an attack is difficult to construe. Nevertheless, until and unless the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal is vastly modified, the cornerstone of U.S. military strategy must continue to be a modern, credible, flexible, and survivable nuclear deterrent force.
- The Conventional Threat. Even though Soviet military power is reducing and changing in form and purpose, the Soviet state still will have millions of well armed men in uniform and will remain the strongest military force on the Eurasian landmass. As leader of the Free World, the United States must maintain, in conjunction with our allies, the conventional capability to counterbalance the might of the Soviet Union's huge conventional forces.

Across the Atlantic

Looking eastward from our Atlantic shore, the focus of U.S. security concern has shifted from Western Europe to the defense of both Europe and the Persian Gulf. With respect to Europe, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet retrenchment within its borders, German unification, and the prospect of economic integration embody the success of collective defense, as well as the imperatives for new approaches to collective security. Although the prospect of a concerted military threat to Western Europe from the east has faded dramatically, continuing political and economic instability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union presents new concerns. Consequently, we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners are conducting a thorough review of alliance strategy. The broad outlines of a new force posture are already emerging and include highly mobile units, some of which will be restructured into multinational formations. The number of active units will be scaled back, and increasing reliance will be placed on mobilization and reconstitution.

Looking across the Mediterranean to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, regional threats to U.S. vital interests and enduring

obligations will place continuing demands on our Armed Forces. Escort operations in the Persian Gulf, conducted for over two years, established the precedent of U.S. military intervention to protect the free flow of oil. Then, just as the Soviets and the Iran-Iraq war receded as threats to regional stability, Iraq emerged from eight years of war with a fanatic zeal, a large arsenal, a shattered economy, overwhelming foreign debts, and a trumped-up quarrel with Kuwait. Even though Iraq has been ejected from Kuwait by the United Nations-sponsored and U.S.-led international coalition, the region still faces an uncertain future. We will maintain our commitment and expect to significantly reduce, but not entirely eliminate, our forces in this region.

- Immediate security concerns for many nations in Southwest Asia will be lessened because of the resounding defeat of the Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm. Over the longer term, however, a number of problems including the prospect of Iraqi rearmament, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and subsequent reconfiguration of regional security arrangement, and relationships will complicate defense planning and shape strategic choices for all parties

in the region.

- While Iraq will require perhaps a decade to rebuild its military capabilities to prehostilities levels, Baghdad will likely remain a disruptive political force in the region. The calculus of regional security will shift as Western coalition forces draw down and political leaders are challenged to construct a more stable and predictable regional environment. The prospect of regional instability will likely remain the chief cause of concern among most political and military decision makers for at least the next two or three years.

Across the Pacific

The divided Korean peninsula stands in stark contrast to the dissipating Cold War in Europe. However, the U.S. security burden is being eased by the continuing surge of democracy, economic growth, and military capacity in South Korea. Our reassessment of regional security concerns concluded that the United States could undertake a prudent phased series of steps to reduce its force presence in Korea modestly--as well as Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific--and

could initiate a gradual transition toward a partnership in which Republic of Korea armed forces assume the leading role. Should deterrence fail, however, in-place and reinforcing U.S. forces would still be required. For the region as a whole, a modest level of U.S. military presence--principally maritime--will be essential to preserve stability, encourage democracy, and deter aggression.

The Rest of the World

This broad characterization is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in regions beyond Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Rather, the nature and urgency of threats beyond those especially compelling locales are such that the threats can be dealt with by a judicious mix of active forces adequate to protect the most vital U.S. interests and by units with specialized capabilities and mobility for crises at the lower end of the spectrum. The more important point is that many regional disputes are becoming increasingly lethal with the proliferation of advancing technological weapons.

The Need for Overseas Basing

In August 1990, the President, while speaking of our changing defense strategy, said: "Our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more forces than we need to guard our enduring interests--the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed . . . and to . . . maintain an effective deterrent." This strategy necessitates maintaining a balance between Continental United States (CONUS) basing and overseas basing. To provide the foundation for any national military strategy, the military must maintain facilities in CONUS for active and reserve forces for such purposes as strategic offense, tactical warning and assessment of an attack on the United States, training, research and development, mobilization, maintenance and supply, homeporting, counterdrug operations, contingency planning, and day-to-day management of the various components of the military.

Balancing the need for CONUS facilities

is the continuing need for robust, though reduced, forward presence. Overseas basing remains important to the execution of peacetime forward presence and to regional contingency operations during crises. Foreign bases enhance deterrence, contribute to regional stability, and facilitate rapid response by U.S. forces in meeting threats.

In both Europe and Asia, a continuing forward-deployed presence will be maintained in sufficient strength to deter aggression and fulfill mutual security treaty obligations. However, the rapidly changing security environment has dictated changes to the overseas deployments of American forces.

Europe

These changes will be most noticeable in Europe where a dramatic reduction in U.S. forward-based forces will occur. The United States will continue to maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces, modernized where necessary, to serve as the keystone to deterrence. The continuing U.S. presence there signifies our commitment to deter aggression and is vital to regional stability in an uncertain era of shifting military balances and political

relationships. Similarly, our ability to reinforce Europe in a crisis and maintain the necessary and scaled-back but ready reception and basing facilities there becomes increasingly important as our forward presence is reduced.

Middle East and Persian Gulf

In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the United States and its allies will be best served by a continued, modest military presence within the region. We have an enduring commitment to this region requiring us to restore and preserve regional stability. It has become increasingly clear that the traditional terms of American presence in the Gulf region have been forever transformed, and future events in this region will shape the nature of U.S. presence.

Asia

In Asia, where potential regional aggressors have long presented a more likely threat to stability than has superpower

competition, some reductions will occur. A 10 to 12 percent reduction by the end of 1992 in the 135,000 personnel currently forward-deployed in Asia is already underway. The U.S. presence at bases in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines has historically been accepted and generally welcomed as a significant contribution to regional stability. Even if the U.S. basing structure in the region experiences changes in the years to come, continuing U.S. presence and access to the region will remain important to preserve strategic interests and regional stability.

The Force Structure

Reflecting the reduced chance of global conflicts, the President's FY 1992-1993 budget [and its accompanying Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)] includes reductions in the U.S. force structure that continues a prudently phased plan for reaching the force targets established for the new strategy and threat projections. By the end of 1995, U.S. forces will approximate those targets and be well below FY 1990 levels. The FY 1995 force will also be substantially restructured so as to support the new strategy most effectively and

Force-Structure Summary

efficiently.

Strategic forces are programmed to be scaled back in accordance with expectations regarding arms reductions agreements and to enable the Department of Defense to maintain credible strategic deterrence at the least cost. Retirement of the MINUTEMEN II force will begin in 1992. Retirements of submarines with the POSEIDON missile will be accelerated. During the 1990s, the current mix of 34 POSEIDON and TRIDENT submarines will be reduced to a force of 18 TRIDENT submarines. Air Force strategic bombers will decrease from 268 in 1990 to 181 in 1995.

Conventional forces will be restructured to include significant airlift and sealift capabilities, substantial and highly effective maritime and amphibious forces, a sophisticated array of combat aircraft, special operations forces, Marine Corps divisions, and heavy and light Army divisions.

Compared to 1990 force levels, by the end of FY 1995 the Army will have 6 fewer active divisions; the Navy will have 94 fewer battle force ships, 1 less aircraft carrier and 2 fewer carrier air wings; and the Air Force will have 10 fewer tactical fighter wings.

Appendix C:

Selection Criteria

Military Value (given priority consideration)

1. Current and future mission requirements and the impact of operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total-force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

Return on Investment

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

Impacts

6. The economic impact on local communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructures to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Appendix D

Department of Defense's Closure and Realignment Recommendations

Recommended Closures:

Department of the Army

Fort Chaffee, AR
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN
Fort Dix, NJ
Fort Devens, MA
Fort McClellan, AL
Fort Ord, CA
Sacramento Army Depot, CA
Harry Diamond Lab Woodbridge
Research Facility, VA

Department of the Navy

Chase Field Naval Air Station, TX
Hunters Point Annex, CA
Long Beach Naval Station, CA
Moffett Field Naval Air Station, CA
Orlando Naval Training Center, FL
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA
Philadelphia Naval Station, PA
Sand Point (Puget Sound) Naval
Station, WA
Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, CA
Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA
10 RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet
Support Activities
Davisville Construction Battalion
Center, RI

Department of the Air Force

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX
Carswell Air Force Base, TX
Castle Air Force Base, CA
Eaker Air Force Base, AR
England Air Force Base, LA
Grissom Air Force Base, IN
Loring Air Force Base, ME
Lowry Air Force Base, CO

Moody Air Force Base, GA
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO
Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH
Williams Air Force Base, AZ
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI

Recommended Realignments:

Department of the Army

Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA
Aviation Systems Command/Troop
Support Command, St. Louis, MO
Fort Belvoir, VA
Fort Detrick, MD
Fort Monmouth, NJ
Fort Polk, LA
Harry Diamond Laboratories, MD
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA
Rock Island Arsenal, IL
White Sands Missile Range, NM

Department of the Navy

Midway Island Naval Air Facility,
Midway
16 RDT&E Engineering and Fleet
Support Activities

Department of the Air Force

MacDill Air Force Base, FL

Appendix E:

Commissioner

Biographies

Jim Courter, chairman, represented the 12th district of New Jersey in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1978 until 1990. While in Congress, he chaired the House Military Reform Caucus and served on the following subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee: Military Installations and Facilities, Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, and Research and Development. In 1983 he wrote and shepherded through Congress a law that created the Office of Defense Test and Evaluation, an ombudsman and advisory office that ensures weapons are properly field-tested before they are mass-produced. Mr. Courter is today senior partner of the law firm he founded, Courter, Kobert, Laufer, Purcell and Cohen, in Hackettstown, New Jersey.

William L. Ball III has been Secretary of the Navy, assistant to the President for legislative affairs, and administrative assistant to Senator John Tower. He has served on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff and in the U.S. Navy. Today, Mr. Ball is president of the National Soft Drink Association in Washington, D.C.

Howard H. (Bo) Callaway

was a Member of Congress from Georgia prior to serving as Secretary of the Army. He was the manager of President Gerald Ford's 1976 campaign, and he is now chairman of GOPAC in Washington, D.C. He is also the chief executive officer and principal owner of the Crested Butte Mountain Resort. He served in the U.S. Army in Korea.

*General Duane H. Cassidy,
U.S. Air Force (Retired)*

was commander-in-chief of the U.S. Transportation Command and of the Military Airlift Command. He served in the Air Force for more than 30 years. During this time, he served in Vietnam, commanded the Military Airlift Command's 21st Air Force, and was deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel. General Cassidy is now vice president for logistics technology at CSX Corporation in Richmond, Virginia.

Arthur Levitt, Jr., is chairman of the board at Levitt Media Company. He founded the American Business Conference, was a director of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, chairman of the 1980 White House Small Business Conference, and chairman and chief executive officer of the American Stock

Exchange. Mr. Levitt served in the U.S. Air Force and is on the board of the Rockefeller Foundation.

James C. Smith II, P.E., was a member of the Secretary of Defense's 1988 Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. For many years he was a staff member of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. Dr. Smith is an engineer by training and served in the U.S. Army, time that included two tours in Vietnam. Today, he is a vice president of Brown & Root U.S.A., Inc., an engineering and construction company located in Houston, Texas.

Robert D. Stuart, Jr., was U.S. ambassador to Norway from 1984 to 1989, after serving as president, chief executive officer, and then chairman of the board of The Quaker Oats Company. Ambassador Stuart is president of the Council of American Ambassadors, vice chairman of the Illinois Commission on the Future of Public Service, and president of North Star Investments. He served in the U.S. Army in Europe during World War II.

Appendix F:

Commission Staff

Matthew P. Behrmann, *Director of Staff*

Paul J. Hirsch, *Director of Review and
Analysis*

Benton L. Borden, *Deputy Director of
Review and Analysis*

Cary Walker, *Director of Communications
and Public Affairs*

Caroline Cimon, *Director of
Administration*

Robert J. Moore, *General Counsel*

Col. Wayne Purser, USAF, *Senior
Military Executive**

Professional and Administrative Staff

David Anderson

Rodell Anderson**

Follin Armfield

Jill Bates

Jacqueline Nguyen Bossart

Steven A. Bowers

Roderick M. Bricksin*

LtCol. Randle K. Bunner, USAF*

LtCol. Michael Burchett, USA*

Marvin Casterline**

Elizabeth Combs

Robert L. Crosslin***

Michael T. Damgard

Capt. Tim Fletcher, USAF*
Glenn E. Flood*
Kenlyn Foster
Kim Fuller
James P. Gallagher
James S. Grichar#
David Hadwiger
Cdr. John Hart, USN*
LtCol. John Hertel, USMC*
William James***
Patricia Keller
Kevin Kenneth Kirk
Steven N. Kleiman*
Col. Warren Lamont, USAF*
Jill Fredricks Lehtonen
Stacey Lukens
Margaret McCarthy
Erin McElroy
Grant W. McGuire
Tobias G. Messitt
Stephen R. Moffitt
William B. Moore***
Clay Nettles
Trevor L. Neve***
John J. Patrick
Suzanne J. Petrie
Wendi Lou Petsinger
James K. Phillips
Kristina E. Potts
J. Robert Reale
Barry D. Rhoads
Alonzo Robertson
Timothy R. Rupli
Robert Salthouse***

Lynn M. Schmidt
Paul Sheridan
Maj. Thomas L. Snyder, USA*
Beverly A. Spagg##
Maj. Glenn F. Spears, USAF*
Jacob Sprouse**
Priscilla W. Stegenga
Alexandra B. Stephenson
Richard A. Tandler
Capt. Jerry Vernon, USN*
S. Alexander Yellin
David Yentzer*
Vic Zangla**

* Detailee from Department of Defense

** Detailee from General Accounting
Office

*** Consultant from Logistics
Management Institute

Detailee from Federal Emergency
Management Agency

Detailee from Environmental Protection
Agency

Appendix G

Hearings and Site Visits

Washington D.C. Hearings

*Presentation of Department of Defense
Recommendations*

15 April 1991

1100 Longworth House Office Building

26 April 1991

*Presentation of Force Structure Plan and
Department of Defense Methodology*

1100 Longworth House Office Building

10 May 1991

*Presentation on Land Value, Environment,
and Economic Impact*

1100 Longworth House Office Building

14 May 1991

*Presentation of GAO Report on the
Department of Defense Analyses Supporting
Proposed Closures and Realignment*

1100 Longworth House Office Building

21 - 22 May, 1991

*Congressional Testimony on Military Facility
Closures and Realignment*

215 Dirksen Senate House Office Building

5 June 1991

Testimony on the Army Corps of Engineers

2167 Rayburn House Office Building

6 - 7 June 1991

Commission Deliberations

Office of Thrift Supervision

Washington, D.C.

13 - 14 June 1991

Commission Deliberations

General Services Administration Building

Washington, D.C.

28, 29, 30 June 1991

Commission Deliberations

2167 Rayburn House Office Building

1100 Longworth House Office Building

REGIONAL

HEARINGS

San Francisco Regional Hearing

6 - 7 May 1991

California Palace of the Legion of Honor

Los Angeles Regional Hearing

8 May 1991

California Museum of Science and History,

Kinsey Auditorium

Denver Regional Hearing

13 May 1991

Denver Auditorium

Fort Worth, Texas Regional Hearing

14 May 1991

Will Rogers Memorial Center

Jacksonville, Florida Regional Hearing

23 May 1991

Prime F. Osborn Convention Center

*Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Regional
Hearing*

24 May 1991

Philadelphia Civic Center

Boston, Massachusetts Regional Hearing

28 May 1991

State House, Gardner Auditorium

Indianapolis Regional Hearing
30 May 1991
Indianapolis Convention Center

Regional Hearing - Kingsville NAS
21 June 1991
Kingsville Naval Air Station, TX

*Regional Hearing, Marine Corps Recruit
Depot*
17 June 1991
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego

17 June 1991
Regional Hearing, Washington, D.C.
334 Cannon House Office Building

*Regional Hearing - Goodfellow Air Force
Base*
18 June 1991
San Angelo Civic Auditorium

*Regional Hearing - Plattsburgh Air Force
Base*
20 June 1991
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York

*Regional Hearing - Meridian Naval Air
Station*
21 June 1991
Temple Theatre, Meridian, Mississippi

Appendix H

Military

Installations

Visited by

Commissioners

Army

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN

Fort Chaffee, AR

Fort Devens, MA

Fort Dix, NJ

Fort McClellan, AL

Fort Ord, CA

Rock Island Arsenal, IL

Sacramento Army Depot, CA

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA

Navy

Hunters Point Annex, CA

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA

Marine Recruit Training Center San Diego,
CA

Naval Air Development Center,
Warminster, PA

Naval Air Station Chase Field, TX

Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX
Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS
Naval Air Station Moffett Field, CA
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA
Naval Electronic Systems
 Engineering Center, Charleston, SC
Naval Station Long Beach, CA
Naval Station Philadelphia, PA
Naval Station Sand Point, WA
Naval Station Staten Island, NY
Naval Underwater Systems Center,
 New London, CT
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA

MacDill Air Force Base, FL
Moody Air Force Base, GA
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY
Richards-Gebaur Reserve Station, MO
Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH
Sacramento Air Logistics Center, CA
Williams Air Force Base, AZ
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI

Air Force

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX
Carswell Air Force Base, TX
Castle Air Force Base, CA
Eaker Air Force Base, AR
England Air Force Base, LA
Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX
Grissom Air Force Base, IN
Loring Air Force Base, ME
Lowry Air Force Base, CO

Appendix I: Menu of Options

Base	Category	Study For
Army Army Corps of Engineers* Fort Richardson, AK Fort Drum, NY Fort McCoy, WI* Fort Pickett, VA* Fort A.P. Hill, VA* Fort Indiantown Gap, PA* Fort Buchanan, PR* Fort Hamilton, NY* Fort Totten, NY*	Fighting/Maneuver Fighting/Maneuver Major Training Major Training Major Training Major Training Major Training Command and Control Command and Control	Close/Realign Close Close To Reserves To Reserves To Reserves To Reserves To Reserves Close/Realign Close/Realign
Navy Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA* Treasure Island, CA* Staten Island, NY* Pascagoula, MS Mobile, AL Everett, WA Ingleside, TX Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL U.S. Marine Corps Depot, Albany, GA Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk, VA Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL NAS Meridian, MS* NAS Kingsville, TX* NAS Agana, Guam Great Lakes, IL San Diego Naval Recruit Training Depot, CA* San Diego Marine Recruit Training Depot, CA*	Shipyard Naval Station Homeport Homeport Homeport Homeport Homeport Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Industrial/Depot Naval Air Station Naval Air Station Naval Air Station Training Center Training Center Training Center	Close Close/Realign Close Close Close Close Close Realign Realign Realign Realign Realign Realign Close Close Close Close/Realign Close/Realign Close/Realign

Air Force		
Goodfellow, TX*	Training	Close
Plattsburgh, NY*	Flying/Strategic	Close
Griffiss, NY	Flying/Strategic	Close
Homestead, FL	Flying/Tactical	Close
Mountain Home, ID	Flying/Tactical	Close
MacDill, FL*	Flying/Tactical	Close

* Indicates Commission continued to consider base for closure or realignment after June 7.



Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

1625 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006-1604

printed on recycled paper