

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
1998-0004-F[1]

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:	Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:	Cabinet Agencies Files

OA/ID Number:	29186
Folder ID Number:	29186-004

Folder Title:
Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	25	6	3

EDITORIAL ROUNDUP FROM REGIONAL NEWSPAPERS
October 1, 1989

NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

Commentary Before the National Address on Drugs

"This nation [U.S.A.] has a strong, moral obligation to help the government of Colombia in its current fight against powerful drug cartels." -- Argus Leader, 8/28/89

"If drugs are destroying our communities, it may be in our communities - and the need to restore them to health - where we should be applying more of our efforts." -- Brian Dickinson, The Dallas Morning News, 9/4/89

"If this is war, let it be fought bravely and with all the necessary resources - and with the support of the United States." -- Omaha World-Herald, 8/26/89

"The abyss that drugs gave dug for this nation will be filled only by serious reforms in the criminal law - by creating court and penal systems that effectively punish drug violators and developing a social policy that strengthens and rebuilds social institutions and disciplines." -- The Washington Times, 8/14/89

"More state and federal aid is needed to win the regional battle centered in San Diego [California]. But stronger local efforts are also essential." -- San Diego Union, 8/27/89

"Track down the pilots, couriers, and money-handlers for a change. America seems to be losing the kingpin war." -- Lansing State Journal, 9/2/89

"President Bush . . . will announce his intention to hit the drug smugglers abroad and wait until spring, if then, to go after those closer to home, sources say. Incredibly, the trafficking problem that has made Los Angeles the cocaine capital will thus be glossed over." -- Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 8/29/89

"Bush unreasonably expects cities to divert funds from other programs into his proposed \$350 million war on drugs. Cities are correctly urging that military funds be redeployed in the defense of the nation - saving its cities' families and children." -- Boston Globe, 8/31/89

[The President Should Say:] "I ask each one of you to search your heart and ask: What would I be willing to pay to rid this country of drugs? I propose a modest tax increase in income tax rates, earmarked for the war on drugs and for efforts that brighten the hopes and strengthen that characters of young Americans so that they will spurn the false allure of drugs." -- The Des Moines Register, 9/4/89

"The dreadful menace of drug abuse will not be defeated until the demand on the streets of San Diego and every other U.S. City is eradicated." -- The San Diego Union, 9/2/89

"Whatever approach the Bush administration lays out for its interagency, complex, long term war on drug supply and demand still may miss the deepest and most intractable, or targets . . . economic poverty." -- Lincoln Journal, 9/5/89

Commentary After the National Drug Address

"President Bush outlined a national strategy for the war on drugs. But the real battle lines must be drawn right here in Dallas." -- The Dallas Morning News, 9/7/89

"Wisconsin's federal and state leaders support President Bush's anti-drug strategy but express skepticism over how to pay for it and whether Congress would be able to put the pieces together." -- Milwaukee Journal, 9/7/89

"He [POTUS] promised no taxes, and he is trying to stuff a national commitment to an all-out war into the limited space that his no-tax promise leaves. It cannot be done." -- Fort Worth Star-Telegram, (date not known)

"What he [POTUS] proposed is a promising national strategy. But its success is dependent on the cooperation of Congress and the will of the people. Delay and partisan dispute will only insure defeat." -- The Indianapolis Star, 9/7/89

"Certainly, he [POTUS] tried. Instead of laborious facts and figures, he spoke of a 6-year-old boy destined to a life of crime.

"Instead of the boring budget matters, he talked of a private businessman who invested his own money in the fight.

"Those are Reaganisms. Those are proven techniques.

"Bush may not yet wear the crown, but he has laid the TV cables for its conquest. If only his drug plan could be so successful." -- Art Chapman, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 9/6/89

"The most widely abused drug in America - alcohol - was not mentioned once by Bush, even though it often is used together with illegal drugs." -- Christian Science Monitor, 9/8/89

"Whether this one succeeds will depend in part on Mr. Bush's ability to bring unity to an effort that often has been disorganized and on Congress' ability to finance the President's ideas.

"Though highly publicized, Tuesday night's speech was merely a call to arms. A long, grueling fight lies ahead." -- The Dallas Morning News, 9/6/89

"The drug war is not going to be won in the Chicago City Council or in Washington. If it is won at all, it will be won at home." -- Chicago Tribune, 9/11/89

"Drug abuse is fueled in part by poverty; if poverty isn't eased, drug abuse will continue. In overlooking that fateful link, the President has blunted the promise of his plan." -- Minneapolis Star Tribune. 9/7/89

"Mr. Bush has yet to state explicitly where he will find the money to wage his war on drugs. If those funds are merely diverted from other social programs, the result will be a cruel shell game. In a broader sense, the President's plan addresses the more obvious manifestations of drug abuse without examining its deeper bases: poverty, unemployment, poor public education, despair." -- Detroit Free Press, 9/6/89

"However, the speech's chief drawback is that, while promising much, it pledged too little in terms of government resources." -- The Milwaukee Journal, 9/7/89

". . . the President's new drug control strategy deserves a hard try, not only because it contains some good proposals but also because it at least sets out a national policy.

"But there is one major problem with Bush's war on drugs. That problem is money.

"Because if the President and Congress once again bog down in partisan squabbling, no progress will be made." -- Chicago Tribune, 9/7/89

"But his [POTUS] self-imposed (no-new-taxes) budget restraints create a huge gap between the drug crisis and the resources the U.S. can bring to bear. Trade is one area where there is some wiggle room if only Mr. Bush can get things coordinated." -- Baltimore Sun, 9/11/89

"President Bush's move to step up the war on illegal drugs won praise from Vermont elected officials Tuesday, while a civil libertarian labeled it 'hysteria, foolishness and cynicism.'" -- David Gram, Burlington Free Press, 9/6/89

"The President's plan looks like a good start and can succeed, in spite of the pessimists, because the majority of the nation's people has finally awakened to the threat of drugs." -- Nackey Loeb, Manchester Union Leader, 9/8/89

"He failed to turn the nation's attention to the poverty that breeds drug use, the debilitating national debt that crimps federal spending on social programs and the dichotomies in our society that hammer wedges between classes." -- The Burlington Free Press, 9/6/89

"Bush has moved toward making good on his inaugural pledge that the drug scourge will stop." -- The Oregonian, 9/7/89

"Yesterday, on television, you had George Bush fighting the drug war by pouring money into ideas that haven't worked - more arrests, more sentencing, more prisons." -- Seattle Times, 9/6/89

"President Bush's speech is only the starting point for what must become a long-term national priority." -- The State Journal-Register, 9/7/89

"His [POTUS] comprehensive national strategy for combatting drugs is an incremental approach that makes sense." -- Rocky Mountain News, 9/7/89

"It would be absurd to claim any great victory in President Bush's newly proclaimed war on Latin American drug kingpins. But the President and the other good guys have clearly won the first little engagement." -- Tulsa World, 9/9/89

"But even more crucial than the \$7.8 billion in expanded federal programs is the presidential leadership being exerted now to mobilize the country in a sustained national crusade." -- The San Diego Union, 9/8/89

". . . but Bush's administration shows no willingness to deal with poverty, illiteracy and despair in inner cities, where selling crack beats no job at all." -- Arkansas Gazette, 9/7/89

"Personally, I would like the President to be even tougher on punishments for drug dealers; I would like the assurance of a greater commitment to really doing it this time, to be sure we do not end up scattering ourselves to the winds as we did in Vietnam." -- Georgie Anne Geyer, Salt Lake Tribune, 9/12/89

"It was a gutsy move because Bush knows he cannot win the war on drugs in one year, nor can he win it with his initial proposals. He must return next year and the years following with refinements, adjustments and further spending increases as the struggle evolves." -- Spokane Spokesman Review, 9/7/89

"Instead of pulling the nation out of the drug-abuse quagmire, the president's proposal will do little more than keep us from sinking deeper into it. This crisis demands a more aggressive approach." -- Los Angeles Herald Examiner, 9/6/89

"Mr. Bush's plan may be revised by the Congress but the important thing is that the President has taken this on as a top priority and after all, leadership for a national struggle must come from the top." -- The Tennessean, 9/7/89

#

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

*file
Drugs*

COMMENTS ON BIDEN SPEECH

1. The President refused to use the tools already available.
(page 1)

Comments:

- The \$5.3 billion authorization level in the 1988 drug bill as well as the \$1 billion appropriated to implement the bill exceeded the prior bipartisan agreement.
- Much of the \$1 billion appropriation has yet to be obligated because of the slow spending nature of some of the accounts.
- Further, in the past the Congress has underfunded the President's request for several of the programs included in the 1988 Drug Bill, e.g., the 1989 initial appropriation: \$18M less for prisons than requested; \$79M less for FBI; \$34M less for DEA.

2. The President called for new anti-crime legislation when he'd just cut funding for Glynco. (page 1)

Comments:

- The President's 1990 violent crime initiative has not been funded to date as recent action in the House Commerce/Justice/State and Treasury/Postal Committees action indicates.
- The 1990 President's budget, adjusted for non-recurring costs such as the purchase of Artesia, would provide higher training levels than 1989, markedly higher in advanced training.

3. Congress has provided all the necessary laws or penalties.
(page 1)

Comment:

- Laws are not enough. The President has limited the access criminals have to guns by restricting the importation of automatic weapons. He has called for a more enforceable death penalty; habeas corpus exclusionary reform; as well as for additional prison space and prosecutors so the new laws can be implemented. He has provided guidance to the nation's prosecutors to assist in the

implementation of the many new Federal Criminal Statutes. He has told prosecutors to not plea-bargain gun cases -- so that the mandated minimums can have a real effect.

4. The President failed to request funds to implement the 1988 Anti-drug law (page 2)

Comments:

- Congress passes many funding authorization laws which neither it nor the Administration fully fund. The President sets his own priorities for funding increases and is not constrained to request certain levels simply because the Congress has authorized it. It should also be noted that Congress, in its 1989 appropriations actions, did not fully fund the drug bill either.

5. The drug bill would add a significant number of new positions. (page 2)

Comment:

- The 1988 Drug Amendments did not authorize only staffing; other activities were authorized. For example, the authorization would support 560 DEA agents, not the 700 claimed; and for Coast Guard officers, 1,600, not the 1,700 claimed. The FBI authorization, conversely, would support 280 agents, not 200.

6. The drug bill would add significant new treatment slots. (page 2)

Comments:

- The Administration has significantly increased treatment funding already. Some \$621 million was provided in 1989, a \$221 million increase from the 1988 level of \$400.3 million. The President requested \$735.3 million for 1990 -- almost doubling expenditures from two years ago and an increase of \$114 million from 1989.

7. The President said no to various initiatives, e.g., the 2,000 new prison beds. (page 2)

Comment:

- In 1990, President Bush requested funding for 24,000 prison beds (16,000 in the Crime initiative). The House acted on the 1990 Justice appropriation and only set aside current services

funding, therefore providing no ability to fund the President's prison initiative.

8. The President threatened to veto funding of Drug bill provisions. (page 2)

Comments:

- The Administration said that if the appropriation for the drug bill got so large that it would trigger a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequester it would be vetoed because it was well within Congress' ability to adequately fund the Drug bill and still remain within the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit ceilings. Final appropriations proved this to be true.

9. Severe criminal justice and treatment system overloads are not being addressed. (page 2)

Comment:

- Our new Strategy is much more than "cardboard cops" and "tenuous treatment." The Administration has already proposed in the Anti-Crime package a number of initiatives to address needs in the criminal justice system, just as treatment funding has already been greatly increased. The Strategy, which deals with the overall drug crisis, will not neglect any of the areas in which national needs must be addressed.

10. Congress created a Drug Czar to learn what works and what we know about drug problem, and what we have yet to learn. (page 3)

Comment:

- Director Bennett has conducted an extensive program of consultation with Federal agencies, Congress, State and local governments, private citizens and corporate groups. These groups have provided recommendations on issues pertaining to "what works" in prevention, education, treatment, law enforcement and international cooperation. In addition, experts in the public and private sector provided from their perspective input on the causes of the drug problem, and suggestions for actions needed to assail illegal drug use. These suggestions were useful background material in the development of the National Drug Control Strategy.

11. Concerned about lack of Czar consultation with Congress, specifically Brooks, Moynihan and Kennedy. (page 3)

Comment:

- The Director has met personally with 57 Members of Congress, including Jack Brooks, Pat Moynihan, and Ted Kennedy. Dr. Bennett has also placed more than 140 phone calls to Members of Congress to discuss aspects of the Strategy. In April, the Director wrote to each Member of Congress inviting their suggestions and input on the National Drug Control Strategy.

12. There are a number of statutory requirements which Dr. Bennett must meet. (page 4)

Comment:

- The Strategy includes comprehensive, research-based goals as well as measurable short-term objectives that the Director has determined may be realistically achieved in the next two years; it discusses the balance between funding for supply and demand reduction. The Director has reviewed State and local drug control activities -- not only did ONDCP solicit input from States and localities on their activities, but we also asked DOJ for information and recommendations from State and local programs that receive Federal funds. As to the requirement that the Director provide "a complete assessment of how (his) budget proposal implements the Strategy," the law requires that this be included in the second Strategy submission, and it will be provided in the February Strategy.

13. The Senator states nine principles:

- o Pay for what we promise - fund the full \$1.8 billion from 1988 law.
- o Provide drug treatment to any addict who wants help.
- o Enforce our drug laws and take back our communities.
- o Hold drug users and traffickers accountable for their crimes.
- o Get better mileage out of our criminal justice system.
- o Improve coordination of education, prevention, law enforcement, and treatment programs.

- o Engage best and brightest scientific minds on drug cures.
- o Place irresistible pressure on international drug cartels.
- o Achieve a fundamental change in national attitudes.

He will find, when he sees the Strategy, that in fact there is substantial bipartisan agreement on these principles, and that there is plenty of room for bipartisan work to assure the success of the National Drug Control Strategy.

U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

National Press Club
Washington, D.C.
Monday, July 31, 1989

"War on drugs," "End the scourge," "Take back our streets," "Just say no" -- you've heard them all before, the slogans, the war of words against drugs. What have these words wrought? Cynicism, opportunism, and despair. Cynicism among many, but particularly the press; opportunism on the part of countless politicians, including the President; and despair in our schools, our churches and our homes.

Let me start with the cynicism. It is the prevailing attitude among observers of the drug debate, for how else can it be explained that President Bush is taken vigorously to task for pledging a mission to Mars, or for proposing to rebuild the economies of eastern Europe, without providing the funding to back up his promises -- and yet he is able to stand up at his inauguration and say "this scourge will end," and then have no one "call" him when he refuses to use the tools already available to him to fight the "war on drugs." And how else can it be explained that the President is able to go to the Law Enforcement Training Institute at Glynnco, Georgia, and call for a new package of anti-crime legislation -- when, just a few months earlier, he had proposed cutting the funding for the very institute at which he spoke? How else can such hypocrisy go unnoticed, especially when it is not an isolated incident, but part of a continuing pattern?

Such has been the track record of the Bush administration from the beginning when it comes to waging its "war on crime and drugs." For example, President Bush came to my state and called for longer sentences for drug dealers. But, Mr. President, Congress passed a law in 1984 that took away judges' discretion to shorten prison terms for drug dealers. Mr. President, we don't need a new law -- we have it already.

Mr. President, you've spoken at length about the need for a death penalty for drug dealers, minimum prison terms for weapons offenders, preventive detention for persons arrested with drugs. But Mr. President, we already passed such laws -- in 1984, 1986, and again in 1988. You don't need new laws to do these things; you already have them already.

2

Mr. President, we've passed 208 new, tough anti-crime laws in the past five years. If you want more, I am sure the Congress will oblige. But before we do, it's time to take a look at what you could have to fight you "war on drugs," but haven't bothered to ask for. In 1988, Congress passed a sweeping anti-drug bill. But in 1989, Mr. President, you showed no interest in using that law to fight crime and drugs in this country. You failed to put in your budget the money needed to make these tough laws work.

Let me be specific. Here's what we included in that drug bill that the President never put in his budget: more than 700 new DEA agents, who could have busted almost 2,500 drug king-pins in a year's time; 1,700 new Coast Guard officers, our first line of defense against imported drug supplies; almost 600 other federal law-enforcement officers, including 200 FBI agents, 60 marshals, 100 new ATF agents, and more; enough money to start 1,000 new state and local police task forces, which could have shut down open-air drug markets all over the country; treatment beds for almost a quarter million addicts who now are waiting for treatment, people who want to kick the habit, but are told they have to wait months for openings in programs to help them, months during which they rob and mug to pay for the craving they can not or will not curtail. We could have helped 230,000 such people this year, but President Bush would not pay for it.

The list of items President Bush "just said no" to goes on and on: 125 drug education projects, 60 anti-gang task forces, 2,000 new prison beds, and much more. With all these items, the President not only refused to pay for them, but actually threatened a veto if Congress tried to force them on him.

Mr. President, you say you want a "war on drugs," but if that's what you want, we need another D-Day. Instead, you're giving us another Vietnam: a limited war, fought on the cheap, financed on the sly, with no clear objectives, and ultimately destined for stalemate and human tragedy. That's not fair to the victims of crime, or to the victims of drugs, or those we ask to protect all of us from becoming victims -- because what we have now is a half-million police officers trying to stop 36 million crimes; each prosecutor handling 60 cases at one time; court calendars backed up, with a year's delay in sending some criminals to jail; and treatment centers telling some addicts that they must wait up to two years for help. And what has President Bush offered in response to this crisis? Only cardboard cops, cut-out courts, paper prosecutors, pretend prisons, and tenuous treatment.

The results of the President's failure to match his opportunistic rhetoric with anything more than hollow promises, has been despair -- the anguish and despair of families whose children have been caught in the cross-fire of the drug gangs, the despair of the school teacher unable to penetrate young minds

3

sealed off by drugs rather than blossoming with ideas, the despair of the hospital worker caring for drug-addicted newborns, the despair of the police officer whose partner who lost his life to a crack trafficker back on the street only hours after they had locked him up.

This despair is real, but it doesn't have to be. Yes, we know that almost half the high-school students in America still aren't aware that cocaine is harmful, but we also know that among those who do believe it is harmful -- and that number has risen from only a third to more than half just since 1986 -- only seven percent ever try it. When the word gets out, the kids wise up. Yes, we know that 70 percent of the crimes committed in America are drug-related, and that the average heroin addict, for example, commits almost 200 crimes a year to support his habit; but we also know that crimes committed by drug users fall by 84 percent after they receive the treatment they need. Yes, we know that the murder of innocent bystanders caught in the cross-fire near drug markets has gone up 255 percent in the past two years alone -- but we also know that when intensive law-enforcement efforts succeed in closing down a drug market, violent crime in the surrounding area drops by as much as 67 percent. So there is despair in America -- and why not, there's plenty of cause for it -- but there's cause for hope, too.

It is because there is hope -- reason to believe that we can reduce the drug epidemic in America -- that we created the drug-czar post in 1988. We created the drug czar to learn what's being tried in the country that works, and what doesn't; to find out what we know about the drug problem, and what we have yet to learn; and to attempt to put an end to the bureaucratic turf battles among federal agencies that have plagued our anti-drug efforts. We also counted on the drug czar to move the drug issue beyond the realm of political profit-taking and into the sphere of genuine progress -- but in the light of what has happened in recent weeks, it appears that the Bush Administration may be more interested in partisan politics than in effective policy.

Frankly, I am concerned. According to some press accounts, it appears that our new drug czar, Dr. William Bennett, has spent more time consulting with Lee Atwater on his September drug strategy than he has spent consulting such experienced Congressional drug-policy experts as Pat Moynihan, Ted Kennedy or Jack Brooks. He's taken the time while traveling the country to take pot shots at Congress and to make fun of Congressman Rangel, while we wait and wonder what his plan will contain. I know that, to quote my friend Pat Moynihan, "It could be said that nothing is lost here save dignity," but I am concerned, so there are two things I want to do now: first, make it clear what is required of Dr. Bennett, by law; and second, make it clear what the Congress expects of any plan that is submitted -- to lay down a few markers.

4

Let me start with what the drug-czar law requires Dr. Bennett to do. First, he must offer "comprehensive, research-based, long-range goals for reducing drug abuse in the United States." These goals must be visionary and ambitious -- but they must also be rooted in reality. Second, he must "include short-term, measurable objectives which the Director determines may be realistically achieved in the two-year period" following the submission of his plan. That is, he must set out some immediate targets -- some guideposts we can use to judge in the short-term if we are headed in the right direction. Third, he must "describe the balance between resources devoted to supply-reduction and demand-reduction." And let me just note, as evidence of how committed Congress is to the notion that our drug strategy should be evenly divided between demand-reduction and supply-reduction, we created two deputies for the drug czar: a deputy for supply control and one for demand control. Fourth, the drug director must "review state and local drug-control activities, to insure that the United States pursues well-coordinated and effective drug control at all levels of government." And fifth, he must offer "a complete assessment of how (his) budget proposal is intended to implement the strategy, and whether the funding levels contained in such proposal are sufficient to implement such strategy" -- in other words, if he plans to spend enough and if he plans to spend it right. This, nothing more and nothing less, is what we will be expecting from the drug director in September.

Now let us consider what Dr. Bennett should aim at in his plan -- and rather than lay out an entire strategy that I have, in fact, prepared; rather than offer a Democratic strategy to get the political jump on the Administration; rather than respond to the political challenge that has already been laid down by the Administration -- in the hope that Congress and the Administration can work together to assure the success of the new drug director, I offer nine points of what I hope will be our mutual understanding of how Dr. Bennett's plan should fulfill the purposes of the law. These points should not be taken as an attempt to hold the Director to the requirements of my own anti-drug program, but as statements of principle, all derived from a national consensus, that I believe his plan must in some way reflect. If we can maintain that kind of principled agreement, if we can avoid proposals that seek only partisan advantage, and if Dr. Bennett's plan offers a realistic prospect of putting those principles into practice, I believe he can count on the support of the Congress, and that we can, at long last, offer the American people hope that illegal drugs can, indeed, be brought under control.

5

I will offer some specific ideas as examples to illustrate how each of these broad goals might be effectively approached, but it is achieving the general thrust of those principles that most concerns me today. These ideas, as well as 50 more such ideas I have passed out to you today, are only possibilities, are only some of the options that show that the principles I am setting out are attainable, pragmatic, and realistic. Dr. Bennett should consider these ideas, and many more like them, because it is critical that he not shy away from setting specific, concrete and significant goals in his proposal.

So let me begin my challenge to Dr. Bennett with this fundamental premise: first, we must pay for what we promise. I have already spoken in some detail on this point, and I won't belabor it, other than to say that it's time to pay off on our promises to fight drugs, and to keep paying until the job is done. That means, immediately, finding the full \$1.8 billion we need to pay for last year's drug bill. And that means, so there is no doubt about what I am saying, even raising taxes, if need be, to pay for these anti-drug programs. Now, I understand that what I just said runs directly opposite to the politics of "read my lips" which have taken hold in Washington, but I believe that the people are ahead of the politicians on this score. That's why I went to the Senate floor a few months ago and proposed an amendment to raise excise taxes a penny a beer, five cents on a bottle of wine, and two cents per pack of cigarettes -- to raise the money needed to pay for the 1988 drug bill. Mr. President, we also read your lips when you said, "this scourge will end." Now it is time for you and the Congress to read the lips of the American people when they say, "Give us back our neighborhoods;" "Allow us to walk our streets;" "Give our children safe schools to learn in" -- "Help us, Mr. President!"

And we shouldn't kid ourselves. The \$1.8 billion needed to pay for last year's drug bill is just a down-payment. It took more than a year for things to get this bad, and it will take more than a year for them to get better. We're going to have to make up our minds to continue funding the drug fight, fully, for as long as it takes to lift the siege of America and set our people free.

Second, we must provide drug treatment for any addict in the country who wants help. Ultimately, treatment on demand -- immediate treatment, with no waiting -- must be available for every addict who wants to kick the habit. We should make this a national commitment, with a specific plan and an iron-clad deadline for reaching this goal. I propose September 5, 1993, the fourth anniversary of Dr. Bennett's strategy, as a deadline for meeting this goal that is ambitious and yet attainable.

6

In the meantime, within the next 12 months, I propose a national policy of "targeted treatment on demand": treatment for any child-addict 16 or younger, or any juvenile in the justice system; and for pregnant women and the mothers of small children, who most urgently need help with their drug habits. This is not sentimentality; it is based on hard-headed facts -- almost 20 percent of the babies born at D.C. General, here in Washington, come in to this world addicted to cocaine, and anyone here who read in the Sunday Washington Post the story about six-year old "Drooney" and his addicted mother knows why getting immediate help for these women is a national imperative.

Yes, treating all pregnant women with drug problems could cost as much as \$1.5 billion a year, but it will save us \$15 billion in health-care costs for addicted babies over the first five years of their lives. We can meet this goal more quickly with one simple, though not inexpensive, proposal -- extending medicaid to cover drug treatment -- because believe it or not, in most parts of this country, most types of drug treatment are not covered by this medical "safety net." And let me say this: we don't have to wait for volunteers for drug treatment; treatment should be part of every sentence for drug abuse and drug-related crime.

Third, we must enforce our drug laws and take back our communities. It's time to take our communities back from the drug traffickers and the drug abusers, and we can do it. For example, we can declare our schools and their neighborhoods to be drug-free zones where our children can learn and play at peace, with mandatory minimum one-year prison sentences for drug offenses committed anywhere close to a school. This will not guarantee there will be no drugs at all in the schools, but it will make getting to and from school a lot safer for our kids. Congress should adopt such laws immediately, and then provide special federal funds to make them work.

We can pass special laws that empower cities and towns to brick up or tear down buildings used as "crack houses;" just get rid of them, and get rid of the destruction and death they deal out to their neighborhoods. And of course, most importantly, we must hire thousands of new cops, judges, and prosecutors to make the tough laws we pass in Washington something more than hollow threats.

Fourth, we must hold drug users and traffickers accountable for their crimes. We can send young federal and state drug offenders serving short sentences for relatively minor drug violations to "boot camps," regional programs at former military bases where young adults would serve their time under military-style discipline, work and exercise -- and receive treatment. A dozen such camps could serve the whole country, easing the burden on both state and federal prisons, and they

7

could be the salvation of thousands of young people who might, for the first time in their lives, develop the personal discipline that could return them to a life free of crime and drugs. Another way to relieve the burden of drugs on state prison systems would be to establish 10 regional drug prisons, federal prisons where drug offenders would be placed in a rigorously drug-free environment and provided with thoroughgoing treatment programs.

We can earmark funds to assist states and communities in setting up "Do Drugs/Do Time" programs like the one in Phoenix, where anyone arrested with a small amount of drugs has the option of being charged with a felony or of enrolling in a treatment program, and paying for it out of their own pocket.

To help discourage even casual users, we can extend the federal forfeiture provisions, so that the automobiles of drug users are confiscated on the spot the moment they make a buy. These measures, and others like them, can make it clear that we are holding all drug users accountable for their contribution to the epidemic we have on our hands.

Fifth, we need to get better anti-drug mileage out of our criminal-justice system. We can insist that every person arrested in this country be tested for drug use; we can require drug treatment for those who test positive and impose pre-trial detention on those who fail to complete treatment. This can be done immediately in the federal courts, and should be accelerated in state and local courts with the federal assistance we should provide. The simple notion is this: we should use the leverage the criminal-justice system gives us over drug users to force everyone we arrest, convict, and jail to emerge from the system "drug-free."

Sixth, we need to continue and improve upon the close coordination between federal, state and local drug education, prevention, law-enforcement and treatment programs, backed by federal funding, training and information-sharing. It was to maintain and strengthen this all-important function that we created an associate director under the drug czar with specific responsibility for coordinating anti-drug activities at all levels of government.

Seventh, we need to engage the best and the brightest scientific minds in the country to respond to this national public-health emergency. Drug abuse is the public-health crisis in America, but our health authorities have been slow to respond to it as such. A 1983 medical journal article warned us that a crack epidemic had broken out in the Bahamas and was certain to come our way. And what did our Center for Disease Control do in response to that warning? Nothing! We need to do better; we

8
need to mobilize our medical community to cope with this public-health emergency.

We should call upon the National Academy of Sciences and the National Institute of Medicine to promptly convene a national commission on medical responses to drug addiction. This blue-ribbon panel should be told to identify the most promising medical prevention, treatment and research strategies, including an intensive program to find a pharmacological "blocking agent" for crack cocaine; and we can set a deadline for their report. And while we're at it, we can require the FDA to speed approval of any medical remedy that promises more effective drug treatment. Promising research is already under way on such drugs, and if they prove to be effective and safe, they should be made available to drug users as quickly as possible.

Eighth, we must impose irresistible pressure on the international drug cartels and the nations which tolerate them. We can insist on something that Congress has urged repeatedly and fruitlessly, that both the State and Defense departments, as well as the intelligence community, recognize the drug crisis as a top priority among their responsibilities, and act upon that belated recognition. Specifically, we can direct the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations toward the formation of a multinational anti-drug strike-force, under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, to combat the drug traffickers wherever we find them. And we can create a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for drug operations and establish a unified drug command for the military services, including our military contribution to any multinational drug strike-force. It's time to exert our diplomatic resources and our military strength in our own defense, and we can do it.

Ninth, and finally, though again by no means exclusively, we need education and prevention programs that go beyond simple warnings and brochures. We need a fundamental change in attitudes, starting with the media and the entertainment industry. We can insist, and we should insist, that our singers and songwriters, our actors and actresses, our athletes and our coaches, become the role models in fact that they believe themselves to be and we want them to be. In our tens of millions, we invite them into our homes and our hearts, and we should be able to call on them in a time of such need. And I can tell you there is genuine interest in doing more among the major networks and entertainment leaders.

I have already spoken with the chairman of the board of CBS and the president of Paramount, and I intend to follow up soon with other leaders in the business. They are ready and willing to play a part in helping change the attitudes of our young people toward drugs, and they are talking about more than a few more public-service spots about drugs. I believe we should take

9
every possible advantage of their interest, their creativity and their power to persuade. It will certainly take some bold, innovative leadership to mount an industry-wide campaign, but we can settle for nothing less.

We must continue and improve everything we are already doing in drug education, from pre-kindergarten and through high school, and we must extend anti-drug education into the community. Specifically, we can do things like fund Boys and Girls Clubs for every public-housing project in America. These clubs provide just the kind of results we want for our least-privileged children, a reduction in the frequency and severity of substance abuse, and an improvement in attendance and performance in school.

These are all things we can do, but these few examples are merely representative of the many and multifaceted initiatives we should take in our struggle with illegal drugs.

In the end, we must return to a basic truth: America does not have a drug problem, but many drug problems. What motivates a 45-year old lawyer to cruise in his BMW for a snort of cocaine is profoundly different from what lures a 13-year-old ghetto youth to crack, or from what leads an 18-year-old pregnant girl to do drugs, even though she knows she's killing the life inside her. The solutions we pursue now must be as many and as varied as the problems that we face, but we must pursue them, seriously, creatively and relentlessly, so that we can no longer say about our "war on drugs" what G.K. Chesterton said about the Christian ideal: not that it has been tried and found wanting, but that it has been found difficult and left untried.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1989

file
THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: DAVID Q. BATES

SUBJECT: Summary of the Draft National Drug Strategy

At your request, Bill Bennett sent the attached summary of the draft National Drug Control Strategy. I plan to have this summary updated following DPC deliberations this week and will send it to the President on Friday with the material for next Tuesday's DPC meeting on the National Drug Control Strategy.

Also attached is an analysis prepared by Bill Bennett of Senator Biden's July 31 speech to the National Press Club. This analysis was requested by the President. Director Bennett's memo responds to the main charges leveled against the Administration's drug policies. I have forwarded the comments on Biden's speech to the President today.

Attachment

cc: Dick Darman
Roger Porter

INTRODUCTION

Americans believe that illegal drugs represent the gravest threat to our national well-being. **Crime:** Fear of drugs and attendant crime are at an all-time high. Rates of drug-related homicide continue to rise -- sometimes alarmingly -- in cities across the country. **Health:** The number of drug-related emergency hospital admissions increased by 121 percent between 1985 and 1988, as many as 200,000 babies are born each year to mothers who use drugs, and intravenous drug use is now the single largest source of new AIDS virus infections. **The Economy:** A U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimate puts annual gross drug sales at \$110 billion -- more than our total gross agricultural income, and more than double the profits enjoyed by the Fortune 500 companies combined. **Overseas:** The drug trade and drug-inspired violence and corruptions are causing serious social, economic, and political disruption. In many foreign nations trafficking threatens stability and democratic institutions.

This month, the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) released the results of its National Household Survey on Drug Abuse -- the first such national study of drug use since 1985. The survey found **the number of Americans using any illegal drug on a "current" basis** (i.e., at least once in the 30-day period preceding the survey) has **dropped 37 percent:** from 23 million in 1985 to 14.5 million last year. Thus, despite the persistent widespread availability of illegal drugs, millions of Americans who once used them regularly appear to have recently given them up altogether. And we know from this and other surveys that many others -- young people for the most part -- have been successfully induced not to try drugs in the first place.

But the NIDA survey also found that **the "frequent" use of cocaine** in any form (i.e., the number of respondents who report ingesting the drug one or more times each week) **is up a shocking 33 percent since 1985.** One word probably explains much of the intensifying drug-related chaos that we see every day: crack. We are now fighting two drug wars. The first and easiest is against "casual" use of drugs, and we are winning it. The other, much more difficult war is against addiction to cocaine, by far the most common dangerous drug of abuse. And on this second front, increasingly located in our cities, we are losing -- badly.

We must have what we have never had before: **a comprehensive, fully integrated national drug control strategy -- a strategy with particular emphasis on attacking the use of crack cocaine.** The proposed strategy sets forth a coordinated and balanced plan of attack involving: our criminal justice system; our drug treatment system; our collection of education, public awareness, and community prevention campaigns; our international policies and activities; and our efforts to interdict smuggled drugs before they cross our borders.

The following sections summarize the National Strategy.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

National Needs

The absence of significant risk of punishment for illegal drug activity is perhaps the most corrosive force hindering drug reduction efforts. The criminal justice system must serve as one of the most powerful forms of drug prevention and as such must make it increasingly difficult to engage in any drug activity with impunity. In order to be an effective deterrent, the criminal justice system must expand to accommodate more people at every point, from arrest through prosecution, release, and final supervision.

Proposed Policies

- o Expand the criminal justice system to include a larger police force, sufficient numbers of jails, prosecutors, judges, courtrooms and prisons.
- o Propose new funding for the criminal justice system and provide financial assistance to State and local governments for street-level law enforcement, including courts and corrections.
- o Provide Federal funding to States for planning, developing and implementing alternative sentencing programs for non-violent drug offenders.
- o Increase Federal funding for Federal law enforcement activities, including courts, prisons, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers.
- o Develop creative alternatives for incarceration to free up jail/prison space, such as boot camps, house arrest, and public service.

Specific Provisions

- o Aggressively expand programs to eradicate the domestic marijuana crop.
- o Provide funding through the Department of Housing and Urban Development to establish security systems for public housing projects, including tenant identification cards, guards, and security fences.
- o Require drug testing of prisoners, parolees and arrestees.
- o Tighten bail, probation, parole and sentencing practices.
- o Expand strictly supervised addiction recovery programs for offenders.

TREATMENT

National Needs

Regardless of how successful we are in preventing the next generation from using drugs and how successful we are in our international and domestic battles to interdict and disrupt drug markets, millions will remain who need help to stop using drugs. Responsible and compassionate public policy requires that effective treatment be made available to all who seek or need it, and effective treatment is an important part of our overall strategy to reduce drug use.

Proposed Policies

- o Expand availability of drug treatment by expanding the number of treatment slots and the range of treatment methods available.
- o Undertake expanded research and evaluation to increase our knowledge of what works.
- o Hold Federally-funded treatment programs accountable for their effectiveness.
- o Improve drug treatment by joining treatment to a range of social, counseling, medical, and job training services.
- o Explore expanded use of "civil commitment" whereby addicts are sent by the courts to residential treatment facilities.
- o Expand treatment efforts for a special population of drug users: pregnant women and newborn babies.
- o Encourage Medicaid drug treatment to support less expensive forms of treatment than inpatient-care.

Specific Policies

- o Seek additional funds under the ADAMHA block grant for drug abuse treatment.
- o Require that States outline how block grant funds will be used to improve treatment and increase the accountability of the treatment system by mechanisms to match drug users with the appropriate treatment modality.
- o Improve coordination among drug treatment and social, health, employment, and criminal justice agencies.
- o Require periodic drug testing of patients and sanctions on patients who continue to use drugs during treatment.

- o Encourage States and private insurance companies to cover outpatient and other less intensive forms of treatment for drug use. Conduct a thorough review of Federal policy to determine whether changes in Federal coverage are necessary.
- o Provide for employee training at Federally-funded treatment facilities to enable employees to stay abreast of the most effective treatment techniques.
- o Increase efforts to locate and treat expectant mothers who use drugs.
- o Support demonstration projects to improve the screening and referring of drug users for treatment.

PREVENTION

National Needs

The principal goal of prevention is to see that Americans, especially, children, never start taking drugs. The Federal Government should set an example for the entire society that drugs are wrong --- and support community drug prevention efforts. Individuals, parents, and employers must become involved in programs concerning drug prevention and education to prevent the use of illegal drugs.

Proposed Policies

- o Provide Federal support to community-wide drug prevention efforts. Target activities aimed at inner-city youth, dropouts, and youths in small town and rural areas.
- o Encourage schools and universities to develop and implement drug prevention programs.
- o Make the Nation's public housing projects safer and more free from drug activity.
- o Promote drug-free workplace policies in the private sector and in State and local governments, including drug testing as appropriate.

Specific Provisions

- o Create a National Drug Prevention Corps to galvanize volunteer efforts to prevent the use of illegal drugs.
- o Require schools, colleges and universities to implement firm drug prevention programs and policies as a condition of eligibility for Federal education funds.
- o Expedite eviction procedures and provide funds to keep drug dealers out of public housing projects.
- o Ensure a drug-free Federal workforce by aggressively implementing Executive Order 12564 workplace plans, including drug testing, to the extent allowable by law.
- o Continue to support drug-free employee assistance workplace plans in the private sector which communicate a clear anti-drug policy, including sanctions for illegal drug use.
- o Encourage grass roots prevention programs to extend and apply this knowledge and expertise to particularly troubled inner-city communities.

INTERNATIONAL

National Needs

The principal foreign drug threats are cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and other dangerous drugs. We need effectively to attack international production and trafficking organizations responsible for bringing these drugs into the U.S. We must enlist the aid of other nations, and work with and motivate them to engage their resources and efforts to defeat international narcotics trafficking.

Proposed Policies

- o Develop a comprehensive, sustained multi-year effort involving economic, military, and law enforcement support to the governments of coca-producing nations.
- o Use diplomatic initiatives to bring international influence to bear in opium-growing nations, where the U.S. has little direct influence.
- o Support carefully targeted eradication programs for coca, opium, and marijuana.
- o Attack international trafficking by focusing on the financial aspects of the trade. Support international agreements to criminalize and punish money laundering.
- o Impose stringent controls on the export of chemicals used in the production of illegal drugs, and press for international agreements on monitoring the commerce in chemicals which might be diverted to the illegal drug trade.

Specific Provisions

- o Convene an Andean Drug Summit.
- o Strengthen the effectiveness of the certification process.
- o Ratify the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
- o Strengthen international law enforcement by providing training, equipment, and logistical support to foreign governments, and by facilitating bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information.
- o Ratify current Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and press for more such treaties.

INTERDICTION

National Needs

Interdicting illegal drug shipments and intercepting other resources is one important means of attacking the drug trade at home and abroad. Its contribution to our overall anti-drug strategy depends on how effectively we can use it to disrupt trafficking organizations, reduce the flow of drugs, and thus reduce consumption. Effective border and offshore interdiction is critical to the effort.

Proposed Policies

- o Target interdiction not simply at seizure of drugs, but also at creating serious personal and financial risk for trafficking organizations and the high level individuals involved in the drug trade.
- o Focus on developing effective policies and enforcement programs to deter and incapacitate general aviation pilots transporting drugs near or into the U.S.
- o Continue our policy of interdicting maritime vessels transporting illicit drugs towards the United States by both unilateral U.S. maritime operations and joint operations with source and transit countries.

Specific Provisions

- o Develop comprehensive agency-wide information-based approaches to interdiction and better manage our interdiction planning and coordination.
- o Enhance border systems, operations, and activities.
- o Improve detection and monitoring systems, especially for containerized cargo shipments.
- o Refine our air interdiction strategy to raise the risk to general aircraft pilots who transport illicit drugs.
- o Maintain and improve operations aimed at apprehending money couriers and shipments.
- o Expand Border Patrol operations between Ports of Entry on the U.S./Mexican land border.

RESEARCH

National Needs

We must improve the quality of the information, research, and technological capabilities available for drug control policies and programs.

Proposed Policies

- o Develop a more current and flexible information base in such areas as drug abuse prevalence, characteristics of drug users, treatment capacity and effectiveness, and the effects of drug control policies on the criminal justice system.
- o Increase funding for clinical and medical research on causes of and treatments for drug addiction, especially cocaine addiction.
- o Support the development and adaptation of technologies for use in controlling drug production, trafficking, and abuse.
- o Recommend that all programs be evaluated to determine what works and where resources should be directed.

Specific Provisions

- o Establish a permanent Drug Control Research and Development Committee under the auspices of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, whose goals will be to: set research policies and priorities, coordinate data collection, and assist agencies in acquiring technologies to suppress the flow of illegal drugs.
- o Disseminate information through a central clearinghouse funded by a consortium of drug program agencies.

INTELLIGENCE

National Needs

The war against drugs cannot be fought without comprehensive collection, incisive analysis, and proper dissemination of critical information on drug production and trafficking. If we are to target our efforts effectively at the traffickers' most vulnerable points, we must know the enemy better than we now do.

Proposed Policies

- o Create a National Drug Intelligence Center under the joint leadership of the DEA and the FBI to unite U.S. drug-related analytical capabilities, and to improve existing intelligence capabilities.

Specific Provisions

- o Increase intelligence efforts to target the infrastructure of trafficking organizations and their allied enterprises.
- o Improve automation and information systems to allow swifter, better, and more cost-effective criminal justice actions.
- o Disseminate finished intelligence products among all agencies with a need to know, including Federal, State, and local agencies.

GOALS

National Needs

Indicators are needed which reflect the rate of use of illegal drugs, attitudes towards the use of illegal drugs, drug-related crime, and the like. The following indicators tell the most about the condition of America as it relates to drugs:

- o Level of annual use of illegal drugs. 2-year goal: 10% reduction in the number of users reporting any use of illegal drugs during the past month; 10-year goal: 50% reduction.
- o Level of adolescent use of illegal drugs during the past month. 2-year goal: 10% reduction; 10-year goal: 50% reduction.
- o Level of use of illegal drugs less than once a month during the past year. 2-year goal: 10% reduction; 10-year goal: 50% reduction.
- o Level of use of cocaine weekly or more often. 2-year goal: 50% reduction in the rate of increase in the number of people reporting use of cocaine weekly or more often; 10-year goal: 50% reduction in the number reporting use of cocaine weekly or more often.
- o Level of adolescent use of cocaine during the past month. 2-year goal: 20% reduction; 10-year goal: 50% reduction.
- o Number of emergency room mentions for cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and dangerous drugs. 2-year goal: 10% reduction; 10-year goal: 50% reduction.
- o (1) Estimates of the amount (tons) of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and dangerous drugs entering the United States. (2) Number of people reporting these drugs are easy to obtain. 2-year goals: 10% reduction in estimates of the amount entering the United States and 10% reduction in the number reporting these drugs are easy to obtain; 10-year goals: 50% reduction in estimates of the amount entering the United States and 50% reduction in the number reporting these drugs are easy to obtain.
- o Level of domestic marijuana production. 2-year goal: 10% decrease; 10-year goal: 50% decrease.
- o Number of high school students reporting that they did not disapprove of the use of illegal drugs. 2-year goal: 10% decrease; 10-year goal: 50% decrease.

BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS

National Need

A consolidated drug control budget that is assembled as an integrated package, bringing balance to entire system.

Proposed Policies

The funding priorities for fiscal year 1990 are to:

- o Increase assistance to State and local law enforcement;
- o Expand resources for treatment and prevention programs;
- o Initiate a major anti-drug campaign in the source countries;
- o Establish order in the Nation's public housing projects;
- o Build more Federal prisons, expand Federal and State courts and correctional systems, and add more prosecutors;
- o Step up efforts against money laundering operations;
- o Provide sufficient resources to operate and maintain our border interdiction system at its present level.

The following priorities will be added in 1991 and 1992:

- o Expand inter-agency drug task force operations;
- o Augment drug intelligence capabilities;
- o Strengthen our land interdiction resources along the Southwest border;
- o Reduce the amount of marijuana cultivated on American soil.

Specific Provisions

Recommend \$2 billion increase in drug funding, from \$5.6 billion in 1989 to \$7.6 billion in 1990. Major changes over 1988 are:

- o State and Local law enforcement assistance +\$ 200 million
- o Treatment and Prevention programs +\$ 565 million
- o International initiatives +\$ 290 million
 (Still under review by the NSC)
- o Federal Prisons, Prosecutors and Courts +\$ 790 million
- o Resources for interdiction would be reduced
 slightly to help offset the above increases -\$ 80 million

*file
drug*



CAMP DAVID

To: John Sununu

From: GB

Re: Jim burke.


THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

At residence the other
nigth Jim gave me the
attached papers-I assume
Bennett has them.

Perhaps they should go
to W.H. staffer who
works iwth Bill on Drug
problem.



gb . 8-12-89



Drugs in the Work Place

- o Estimated over 10% of American workforce use illegal drugs regularly
- o U.S. competitiveness at stake due to lower productivity and lower quality of product and services
- o Loss of life and human misery indefensible

Recommendation:

Name a leader with a national reputation to organize and administer a private sector effort to secure a drug free work place.

Suggestions:

Don Peterson - Ford Motor
Jim Robinson - American Express (Former Chairman United Way)
Ed Brennan - Sears (Recent Chairman United Way)
Paul O'Neil - Alcoa
Jack Welch - GE
Bill Howell - J. C. Penney
Bill Brock

May wish to ask National Union Leader as Vice Chairman

This effort would be carried out with funding (available in budget) and guidance of the Department of Labor.

After discussions with Director Bennett and Secretary Dole, this individual would be offered the option of forming his own organization (all volunteer - similar to the 1968 National Alliance for Business) or working through an already existing organization (NAB or Chamber of Commerce).

Presidential Address

- o The President should define the problem in understandable terms -- occasional user and the heavy user -- and the differences.
- o He should offer the Bennett plan -- highlighting the various elements -- giving it his full support.
- o Using the "war on drugs" simile he should emphasize that while the federal government was committed to do what was required -- and that much of this can be effective -- the war can't be won in Washington.
- o Referring to Director Bennett's statement..."The problem is too many Americans are using too many drugs"...he should emphasize much more has to be done...and it will take time and patience. But we do not serve by "standing and waiting". We must all get involved.
- o Every parent who is not involved with their child and their school system is part of the problem.
- o Every employer who has not taken responsibility for this problem in his or her work place...is part of the problem.
- o Every religious institution that does not have an active program of education and spiritual assistance is part of the problem.
- o Every public personality in movies, television, sports, music, politics, etc., who are involved with drugs is a very visible part of the problem.
- o Everyone has got to help -- everyone must do something...and if we all do...this scourge will end...as I promised you it would.
- o Take public action on drug testing -- President -- the staff, and all White House personnel.
- o Close with promise for a number of private sector initiatives...Partnership goal of \$1 million/day...work place initiative...Robert Wood Johnson "Fighting Back" program in the communities...and establishment of private sector advisory committee.
- o Finally advise that we will be measuring progress against current NIDA report on an annual basis...and that there will be special reporting on those cities where problem is greatest...and a national clearinghouse to make available information on what is working in terms of prevention, interdiction and treatment.

Media and Entertainment Industries

Media

The cultural change in the United States regarding illicit drug use is truly remarkable. Research clearly shows that The Partnership For A Drug Free America advertising is central to this shift in attitudes and usage.

Furthermore, there is hard evidence that higher levels of advertising -- above \$350 million/yr. will cause changes of attitude that won't otherwise occur.

Recommendation:

Schedule a White House event where J.E.B. presents the results of the research in cooperation with NIDA to the advertising and media industry leadership.

✓ The President shows up for five or ten minutes to thank the media for their extraordinary contributions encouraging everyone to the goal of \$1 million/day for the next three years.

The President would at the same time compliment the media for the news coverage and editorial support that is so important in helping the nation deal with this problem.

Entertainment:

The entertainment industry must be a greater part of the solution to the drug problem than they have been in the past, and their leadership is beginning to understand that.

Recommendation:

Plan for a White House meeting during the first quarter of 1990 with the industry leadership. This meeting would be educational...covering all aspects of the problem in a way that would be designed to inspire them to dramatize the problem and those solutions that their audiences can identify with, e.g., community action.

Random Thoughts and Quotes

A new "Declaration of Independence" fits both the supply-side and the demand-side activities and symbolize how both the nation and the individual should feel about drugs. (If chosen President could have symbolic signing by leaders from all walks of life.)

Have President meet with a group of children -- talk about the drug problem -- get them to talk about their parents, e.g.,

"A message for all adults -- Just Say No!"

"My worst nightmare for America is happening right now...where a teenage girl who should be in school is giving birth to a baby who is addicted to cocaine."

Politically drugs is the only issue strong enough to occupy the attention of the nation and overwhelm the difficulties inherent in the abortion issue -- upscale, educated women are pro-choice and see Supreme Court decision as unfair to the poor.

"The general decline in drug use indicates that our national media campaigns, school and community based prevention programs, and interest in efforts in the work place are having an impact." (From Sullivan Press Statement - 7/31)

The United Way of America speech can help mobilize the nation on drugs and education.

Battle should be waged family by family, school by school, town by town, county by county, state by state. The federal government does not operate effectively at the local/family level.

Mandatory drug testing -- as far as the law will allow.

Voluntary testing -- to set examples.

Random Thoughts and Quotes (Continued)

Measuring results -- Macro - OK - but Micro (community/neighborhood/company examples that individuals can relate to).

Drugs enslave, and enslaved people are not free to pursue the opportunities this great nation presents to all who deserve them. Nor is an enslaved nation able to provide, to the fullest extent possible, for the common welfare of all its people.

The U.S. Department of Transportation estimates that 10 to 15 percent of all highway fatalities involve drug use. Other studies find that drug users are three times as likely to be involved in on-the-job accidents, are absent from work twice as often, and on average incur three times the level of medical costs as non-users. And virtually all experts see a strong link between teenage suicide and the use of illegal drugs.

In some cities, as many as three-quarters of the individuals arrested for crimes test positive for drugs. Each heroin user on average costs other Americans \$14,000 in burglaries and other crimes.

Drugs have become an achilles heel that threatens American leadership amongst the world's family of nations. We have taught the world the sweet taste of democracy only to poison the cup we drink from ourselves.

There is a common thread. And it is a simple one. The community -- the parents, teachers, local officials, the police and others -- took personal responsibility for the problem. They saw the damage drugs had caused and took it upon themselves to do something about it. They marshalled their resources to communicate, to educate, to provide counsel and help, to create and enforce stiffer penalties, to do what had to be done to wage their personal war on drugs.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo	From Robert S. Ross to John Sununu Re: Concerns over the Pending National Drug Strategy (2 pp.)	7/27/89	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

58184



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

THE CHIEF OF STAFF
has THE CHIEF OF STAFF
has SEEN

MEMORANDUM TO: Governor John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House

FROM: Robert S. Ross, Jr. *[Signature]*
Executive Assistant to
the Attorney General

SUBJECT: Concerns Over the Pending National
Drug Strategy

The principal overall concern is that the Attorney General continue to be clearly recognized as the nation's chief law enforcement officer with sole operational responsibility and authority in the enforcement of the drug laws.

Particular concerns derived thus far from discussions that have been undertaken, both in official settings and in the press, include the following:

1. Suggestions have been made that more federal personnel, especially FBI and DEA agents, should be diverted into "street" enforcement activities. This represents, in our view, an inefficient use of limited federal enforcement resources which should continue to be focused, in our view, upon the arrest and prosecution of major drug traffickers, both domestic and international, and the seizure and forfeiture of their profits and assets.

2. Suggestions have also been forthcoming with regard to increasing the role of the military in some unspecified way and, in particular, to use military forces against drug trafficking operations in foreign countries, especially in Latin America. Such activities, quite apart from questions of national sovereignty, could well jeopardize the physical security of law enforcement agents (who are not militarily trained or endowed with a military mission) in their own operations within such countries and blur the traditional lines of distinction between national sovereignty and law enforcement roles.

3. Public mention has also been made of the suggestion of "hit squads" which would be commissioned as part of an overall covert operation initiative to seek out and assassinate drug lords in other countries, especially in Latin America. Needless to say, our view of such activities is very negative, both from a public policy standpoint and from the standpoint of increased potential exposure to retaliatory efforts against law enforcement or other officials of the United States.

4. Considerable concern exists about the interrelationship between intelligence gathering activities not related to law enforcement and the preparation of prosecutions of major drug traffickers. In particular, note must be taken of the effect which the non-availability (for valid "sources and methods" reasons) of such intelligence in a criminal prosecution might have upon ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions. Such questions as the non-availability of material generated in widespread intelligence gathering activities under discovery rules, as Jencks Act material, etc. are deserving of serious analysis and discussion in the context of any such enhanced or ongoing activity.

5. Any discussion about the budget for drug-combating activities necessarily will impact upon the Department of Justice and our general overall law enforcement responsibilities. That is to say, increases in the drug law enforcement effort, may cause us to lessen our efforts against organized crime, white collar crime, or in the environmental, civil rights or antitrust fields, and may substantially diminish our overall operational capabilities as well. Moreover, similar concerns, we expect, will be expressed by other departments and agencies whose budget might be "tapped into" for either supply side or demand side enhancements in the drug effort.

6. Finally, any national drug strategy for this nation shall take into account the United Nations Drug Convention adopted in Vienna last year and currently before the Senate for ratification. Failure to swiftly ratify this Convention and to frame a drug policy for the United States that is incompatible with the Convention will forfeit a unique opportunity to insure our world leadership in the effort to contain the problems of drug trafficking and drug abuse.



**OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500**

July 26, 1989

NOTE TO JOHN H. SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN P. WALTERS
CHIEF OF STAFF

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "JPW", written over the printed name "JOHN P. WALTERS".

Attached for your information is a draft introduction to the National Drug Control Strategy. It will soon contain an additional section summarizing our strategy and recommendations -- once we have finished receiving DPC Working Group comments on the draft chapters you have already seen.

INTRODUCTION

Last month, the federal government's National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) released the results of its ninth periodic Household Survey -- the first such comprehensive, national study of drug use patterns since 1985. Much of the news in NIDA's report was dramatic and startling. The number of Americans using any illegal drug on a "current" basis (in other words, at least once in the 30-day period preceding the survey) has dropped 37 percent: from 23 million in 1985 to 14.5 million last year. This fall-off in use does not quite hold for every drug in every age group; current use of inhalants, for example, is up markedly among 18- to 25-year-olds. But even for inhalants, current use overall -- throughout the population -- is down substantially. And best of all, current use of the two most common illegal substances -- marijuana and cocaine -- is down as well: 36 and 48 percent respectively.

This is all good news -- very good news. But it is also, at first glance, difficult to square with simple, common sense. Most Americans remain firmly convinced that drugs represent the gravest present threat to our national well-being -- and with good reason. Because a wealth of other, up-to-date evidence suggests that our drug problem is getting worse, not better.

- * Fear of drugs and attendant crime are at an all-time high. Rates of drug-related homicide continue to rise -- sometimes alarmingly -- in cities across the country. Felony drug convictions now account for the single largest and fastest growing sector of the federal prison population. Three-fourths of all robberies and half of all felony assaults committed by young people (statistically, the most crime-prone age group) now involve drug users.

- * The threat drugs pose to American public health has never been greater. Intravenous drug use is now the single largest source of new AIDS virus infections, and perhaps one-half of all AIDS deaths are drug-related. The number of drug-related emergency hospital admissions increased by 121 percent between 1985 and 1988. As many as 200,000 babies are born each year to mothers who use drugs. Many of these infants suffer low birth weight, severe and often permanent mental and physical dysfunction or impairment, or signs of actual drug dependence. Many other such babies -- born many weeks or months premature -- do not survive past infancy.
- * Drug trafficking, distribution, and sales in America have become a vast, economically debilitating black market. One U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimate puts annual gross drug sales at \$110 billion -- more than our total gross agricultural income, and more than double the profits enjoyed by all the Fortune 500 companies combined. Such figures cannot truly be calculated with any real precision, but it is all too clear that drug use acts as a direct and painful brake on American competitiveness. The Chamber of Commerce reports that on-the-job drug use alone costs American industry and business \$60 billion a year in lost productivity and drug-related accidents.
- * In Southeast and West Asia, South and Central America, and the Caribbean, drug exporting networks and domestic drug use are causing serious social, economic, and political disruptions. Intense drug-inspired violence or official corruption have plagued a number of Latin American countries for years; in more than one of them, drug cartel operations and associated local insurgencies are a real and present danger to democratic institutions, national economies, and basic civil order. In Pakistan, the number of heroin addicts has more than tripled in the past four years alone. And so, because our national security directly depends on regional stability throughout the Americas and across the globe, drugs have become a major concern of U.S. foreign policy.
- * And finally, undeniably, the fact remains that here in the United States, in every state -- in our cities, in our suburbs, in our rural communities -- drugs are potent, drugs are cheap, and drugs are available to almost anyone who wants them.

Insofar as this crisis is the product of individual choices to take or refuse drugs, it has been -- and continues to be -- a crisis of national character, affecting and affected by the

myriad social structures and agencies that help shape individual American lives: our families, our schools, our churches and community organizations, even our broadest messages to one another through popular culture and the media. At least in part, NIDA's most recent Household Survey is proof that grassroots America can meet the challenge of drugs, and meet it well.

Not so long ago, drug use was an activity widely thought of as harmless fun or isolated self-indulgence. Today it is seen -- just as widely, and far more accurately -- to be a personal, social, medical, and economic catastrophe. In less than a decade, parents, educators, students, clergy, and local leaders across the country have changed and hardened American opinion about drugs. The effectiveness of their activism is now largely vindicated. Despite the persistent widespread availability of illegal drugs, many millions of Americans who once used them regularly appear to have recently given them up altogether.

What, then, accounts for the intensifying drug-related chaos that we see every day in our newspapers and on television? One word probably explains much, if not all of it. That word is crack.

Cocaine in Our Cities

For all its welcome good news, the NIDA Household Survey also brings us terrible proof that our current drug epidemic has far from run its course. "Frequent" use of cocaine in any form (measured by the number of survey respondents who report

injecting that drug one or more times each week) is up a shocking and unprecedented 33 percent since 1985. Not coincidentally, 1985 was the first year in which crack became an almost ubiquitous feature of American inner-city life. It is an inexpensive, extremely potent, fast-acting derivative of cocaine with a limited-duration "high" that encourages compulsive use. It is, in fact, the most dangerous and quickly addictive drug known to man.

Crack is responsible for the fact that vast patches of the American urban landscape are rapidly deteriorating beyond effective control by civil authorities. Crack is responsible for the explosion in recent drug-related medical emergencies -- a five-fold increase in cocaine-driven hospital admissions since 1984. Crack use is increasingly responsible for the continued marketing success enjoyed by a huge international cocaine trafficking industry, with all its consequential evils. And crack use, like all drug use, is highly contagious. It is spreading -- like a plague.

We seem to be witnessing a common and tragic phenomenon of drug-use epidemiology. Interest in a given illegal substance often begins first among a particular -- usually elite -- segment of the population. It is next picked up and spread more broadly through so-called "casual use" in the mainstream middle class. After a time, the drug's dangers are made widely known through public health advisories or painful personal experience, and mainstream use then drops sharply. But the drug continues to

slide further down the socio-economic scale, and its chronic or addictive use eventually becomes concentrated among the most vulnerable of our citizens: young, disadvantaged, inner-city residents.

So it is now with cocaine. We must be extremely careful with our new statistics, of course, lest they limit and distort either public thinking about the drug problem or public policy that such thinking will do much to shape. Demographics are not destiny. In 1985, a current cocaine user was likely to be white, male, a high-school graduate, employed full-time, and living in a small metropolitan area or suburb in the western United States. Except that he has now moved to the Northeast, the profile of this "median" current cocaine user remains essentially unchanged today.

No inevitable link exists between urban life -- however disadvantaged -- and drug abuse. The majority of American city residents -- rich or poor; male or female; black, white, or Hispanic; well- or poorly-educated -- do not take drugs. And far too many Americans outside our cities do. Our drug problem remains acute, it remains national in scope and size, and it continues to involve drugs of every sort. No effective anti-drug campaign can ignore our current epidemic's full complexity.

Nevertheless, the epidemiological trend is unmistakable. We are now fighting two drug wars, not just one. The first and easiest is against "casual" use of drugs by most Americans, and we are winning it. The other, much more difficult war is against

inner-city addiction to cocaine, by far the most common dangerous drug of abuse. And on this second front, we are losing -- badly.

Few American communities can afford to assume they are immune to cocaine. The drug black market has proved itself remarkably flexible and creative. Crack is an innovation in cocaine retailing that takes uncanny advantage of the nation's changing drug use patterns. And because it is so horribly seductive and "new," it threatens to reverse the current 15-year trend and send a fresh wave of cocaine use back out of our cities and into the country at large. Indeed, to some extent at least, it is happening already: almost every week, our newspapers report a new first sighting of crack -- in the rural South or in some midwestern suburb, for example.

What's more, as we guard against crack's spread, we must begin to prepare ourselves for what may well come after it. Almost every stimulant epidemic in history has ignited a sedative epidemic in its wake, as users begin employing chemical "downs" to modulate the peaks and valleys of addiction. With cocaine, the sedative of choice has traditionally been heroin. And here, too, the drug market has shown a genius for innovation. In the past year or so, a cheap, powerful, and instantly intoxicating form of smokable heroin -- which obviates the need for intravenous needles -- has begun to appear on our streets.

For now, however, our biggest and most immediate problem is inner-city crack use. It is an acid that is fast corroding the hopes and possibilities of an entire generation of disadvantaged

young people. They need help. Their neighborhoods need help. A decent and responsible America must fully mobilize to provide it.

Thinking About Drugs and Public Policy

What, exactly, should we do? What's the best way to fight drugs and drug abuse? It is a broad and complicated question. It is also a question the United States has struggled with inconclusively for many decades.

Facing understandable public outrage and alarm over the terrible consequences of widespread drug use, federal, state, and local governments have repeatedly sought to concentrate dramatic responsive action against one or another point on the drug-problem continuum: first through law enforcement; later through a combination of prevention, education, and treatment efforts; and most recently through heavy emphasis on interdiction of imported drugs at our borders.

Conceived largely as an end in itself, each of these national initiatives has succeeded -- in a limited but worthy sphere. We have had, in slow succession, more law enforcement, more prevention, education, and treatment, and more interdiction. But through it all, undeniably, our national drug problem has persisted. Until last month, convincing evidence of significant forward progress was painfully scarce. Indeed, until last month, most evidence continued to suggest that the United States was suffering the worst epidemic of illegal drug use in its history -- more severe than the heroin scare of the late 1960s and early

1970s; far more severe, in fact, than any ever experienced by an industrialized nation.

The new Household Survey changes our picture of the drug problem a bit, making it more precise and comprehensible. But it does not change the lesson that must be learned from all our many years of experience in the fight. That lesson is clear and simple: no single strategy -- pursued alone or to the detriment of other possible and valuable initiatives -- can work to contain or reduce drug use. No single strategy can justly claim credit for recent reductions in most use of most drugs by most Americans. And no single strategy will now get us out of our appalling, deepening crisis of cocaine addiction.

Unfortunately, however, the search for such a strategy still consumes the bulk of American public energy and debate about drugs. Two radically opposed strains of thought are principally at issue in this unavailing search. Each, interestingly enough, casts unfair aspersions on the skill and utility of our law enforcement agencies and their officers -- the first by complaining that law enforcement doesn't work at all and should be junked; the second by complaining that law enforcement doesn't work enough and should be the focus of all our future effort. Each of these positions, in turn, is incomplete and therefore misguided.

Most Americans correctly view drugs as a personal tragedy for those who use them. Most Americans are eager to provide drug users with the medical attention that can help them stop, and

young people with the social and educational training that can help prevent them from starting in the first place. Neither goal is a primary concern of law enforcement. So does it then follow that we should undertake a massive shift of emphasis away from drug enforcement and toward, instead, treatment for addicts and counseling for students?

Many people think so. Consider the argument in its starkest and most extreme form. Hardly a week goes by these days in which some serious forum or other -- a national news magazine, for example, or the opinion page of a major newspaper, or a scholarly conference or television panel discussion -- fails to give solemn consideration to the advocacy of wholesale drug legalization. Legalization's proponents generally say something like this: Enforcing our many laws against drugs is a terribly expensive and difficult business. Were we to repeal those laws, drug-related crime would vanish, and the time and money saved in reduced law enforcement could be more effectively spent on health care for addicts, and on preventive instruction for the rest of us.

Exactly how under this scenario we could convincingly warn potential new users about the evils of drugs -- having just made them legally acceptable -- is not entirely clear. Nor is it clear how an already overburdened treatment system could possibly respond to what even legalization proponents themselves admit would probably be a sharply increased rate of overall drug use. The cost of drugs -- measured in purchase price, the time it takes to search them out, and the risks involved due to

unreliable "quality" and legal sanction -- is a key predictor of drug use. Cheaper, easier-to-get, and "better" legalized drugs would likely mean more drug users and more frequent drug use.

And would legalization actually reduce crime? Crimes committed by addicts to pay for their habits might theoretically decline a bit. But since addicts use drugs -- especially cocaine -- as often as they can, less expensive drugs might just as well mean more frequent purchases and a still-constant need for cash-producing burglaries and robberies. What's more, since cocaine use is known to produce dangerous behavioral side-effects -- paranoia, irritability, and quick resort to violence on minimal provocation -- legalization might also entail an increase in more serious crime by addicts.

Drug traffickers, by contrast, are involved in crime for profit alone. An average gram of cocaine now sells for \$60 to \$80. The free-market price would be roughly 5 percent of that -- \$3 or \$4. If legalized drug sales were heavily regulated and taxed to restrict availability and maximize government revenue, then a gram of cocaine might sell for \$30 or \$40. In that case, criminal organizations could still undercut legal prices and turn a substantial profit. In truth, to destroy the cocaine black market entirely, we would probably have to make the drug legally available at not much more than \$10 a gram. And then an average dose of cocaine would cost about 50 cents -- well within the lunch-money budget of the average American elementary school student.

In short, legalizing drugs would be an unqualified national disaster. In fact, any significant relaxation of drug enforcement -- for whatever reason, however well-intentioned -- would promise more use, more crime, and more trouble for treatment and prevention efforts.

None of this is to suggest that stronger and better coordinated law enforcement alone is an answer to the drug problem, though this view, too, has its many adherents. In the teeth of a crisis -- especially one which has for so long appeared to spiral wildly out of control -- we naturally look for villains. We need not look far; there are plenty of them. Anyone who sells drugs -- and (to a great if poorly understood extent) anyone who uses them -- is involved in an international criminal enterprise that is killing thousands of Americans each year. For the worst and most brutal drug gangsters, the death penalty is an appropriate sentence of honest justice. And for the multitude of crimes associated with trafficking and use, many of the other tough and coherently punitive anti-drug measures proposed in recent years have their place and should be employed.

We should be tough on drugs -- much tougher than we are now. Our badly imbalanced criminal justice system, already groaning under the weight of current drug cases, should be rationalized and significantly expanded. But we cannot afford to delude ourselves that drug use is an exclusively criminal issue. Whatever else it does, drug use degrades human character, and a purposeful, self-governing society ignores its people's character

at great peril. Drug users make inattentive parents, bad neighbors, poor students, and unreliable employees -- quite apart from their common involvement in criminal activity. Legal sanctions may help to deter drug use, and they can be used to direct some drug users to needed treatment. But locking up millions of drug users will not by itself make them healthy and responsible citizens.

Few people better understand this fact, and the limitations of drug enforcement that it implies, than our drug enforcement officers themselves. They are regularly showered with criticism. They are said to waste time and energy in petty bureaucratic disputes and "turf battles." When they are actually in the field risking their lives in a fight whose odds are heavily stacked against them, their every misstep and failure -- however small -- is nevertheless routinely held up to political and journalistic ridicule.

We do them a grave injustice. Jealousy and bickering among federal, state, and local drug agencies makes for interesting gossip, to be sure. But the plain truth is that it is not the norm. And when interagency cooperation does occasionally break down, it can usually be traced either to the overriding spirit and energy of our front-line drug enforcement officers -- which we should be extremely reluctant to restrict within formal and arbitrary lines -- or, more basically, to a failure of coherent policymaking in Washington.

In the too-long absence of any real national consensus about the proper overarching goal of American drug policy, the only available measure of drug-enforcement success has been statistical: so many thousands of arrests, so many tons of marijuana seized, so many acres of opium poppy plants and coca leaves destroyed. In this kind of policy vacuum, some degree of competition over "body counts" among involved enforcement agencies is almost inevitable. The real miracle is that intramural rivalries have been so relatively restrained and insignificant.

No doubt federal, state, and local drug enforcement activities can and should be made tougher, more extensive, more efficient. This report offers a number of major proposals to accomplish just that. But, again, stronger and better coordinated drug enforcement alone is not the answer. It is a means to an end. It should not become the end itself.

We must be tough. We must be humane. And we must pursue change -- in some cases, sweeping change. But before it can begin, we must get smart about the drug problem -- smarter than we have been in the past.

First, we must come to terms with the drug problem in its essence. Worthy efforts to alleviate the symptoms of epidemic drug abuse -- crime and disease, for example -- must continue unabated. But a largely ad-hoc attack on the holes in our dike can have only an indirect and minimal effect on the flood itself. By the same token, we must avoid the easy temptation to blame our

troubles first on those chronic problems of social environment -- like poverty and racism -- which help to breed and spread the contagion of drug abuse. We have been fighting such social ills for decades; that fight, too, must continue unabated. But we need not -- and cannot -- sit back and wait for that fight to be won for good. Too many lives will be lost in the interim. The simple problem with drugs is painfully obvious: too many Americans still use them. And so the highest priority of our drug policy must be a stubborn determination further to reduce the overall level of drug use nationwide -- experimental first use, "casual" use, regular use, and addiction alike.

That said, we must be scrupulously honest about the difficulties we face -- about what we can reasonably hope to accomplish, and when. People take drugs for many complicated reasons that we do not yet fully understand. But most drug users share an attitude toward their drugs that we would do well to acknowledge openly: they find drugs intensely pleasurable. It is a hollow, degrading, and deceptive pleasure, of course, and pursuing it is an appallingly self-destructive impulse. But self-destructive behavior is a human flaw that has always been with us -- and always will. And drug addiction is a particularly tenacious form of self-destruction, one which its victims very often cannot simply choose to correct on their own.

Last fall, an important and valuable piece of omnibus federal drug legislation was enacted, "The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988." Among its several hundred provisions was a declaration

that it would be the policy of the United States Government to "create a Drug-Free America by 1995." That is an admirable goal. It is already a reality for the vast majority of Americans who have never taken an illegal drug. And government has a solemn obligation to keep those Americans -- and their children after them -- safe and secure from the poison of drug trafficking and drug abuse.

But government also has an obligation to tell the truth and act accordingly. There is no quick fix or magic bullet for individual dissipation, and policymakers should not pretend that we are on the verge of discovering one for drugs. The continued search for a single "answer" to our troubles with drugs -- in law enforcement, in prevention and treatment, in border interdiction, or somewhere else -- is a bad idea. We have bounced back and forth in emphasis this way for too long. It has not worked well. And it will hold us back in the near- and long-term future, by diverting our attention from new and serious work that can and must be done right now.

The United States has a broad array of tools at its disposal, in government and out, each of which -- in proper combination with the others -- can and does have a significant effect on the shape and size of our drug problem. We must use them all. We must have what we have never had before: a fully integrated national drug control strategy. It must proceed from a proper understanding of all that we do and do not know about drugs. It must take calm and intelligent measure of the

strengths and limitations of specific available drug control initiatives. And it must then begin to intensify and calibrate them so that the number of Americans who still use cocaine and other illegal drugs, to the entire nation's horrible disadvantage, is -- more and more as time goes by -- dramatically reduced.

10. MICHAEL JACKSON
WH Cabinet Affairs
456-2397

CHARLES B. RANGEL, NEW YORK
CHAIRMAN

JACK BROOKS, TEXAS
FORTNEY H. (PETE) STARK, CALIFORNIA
JAMES H. SCHEUER, NEW YORK
CAROLIS COLLINS, ILLINOIS
DANIEL K. AKAKA, HAWAII
FRANK J. GUARINI, NEW JERSEY
DANTE B. FASCELL, FLORIDA
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, NEW JERSEY
MEL LEVINE, CALIFORNIA
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, TEXAS
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, FLORIDA
EDOLPHUS "ED" TOWNS, NEW YORK
JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR., OHIO
KWEISI MFUME, MARYLAND
JOSEPH E. BRENNAN, MAINE
NITA M. LOWEY, NEW YORK

U.S. House of Representatives

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
ROOM H2-234, HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6425

COMMITTEE PHONE 202-226-3040

July 21, 1989

LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, PENNSYLVANIA
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, OHIO
STAN FARRIS, VIRGINIA
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., WISCONSIN
ROBERT K. DORNAN, CALIFORNIA
TOM LEWIS, FLORIDA
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
WALLY HERGER, CALIFORNIA
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, CONNECTICUT
BILL PAXON, NEW YORK
BILL GRANT, FLORIDA

EDWARD H. JURITH
STAFF DIRECTOR
ELLIOTT A. BROWN
MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

The Honorable James A. Baker III
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Personal and Confidential

Dear Secretary Baker:

Let me begin my again thanking you for meeting with the Select Committee on June 14.

As you know, I am deeply concerned about the direction of our national drug control strategy.

I'm told we should be patient that we should wait for The Drug Policy Coordinator, Dr. William Bennett, to develop and come up with the strategy mandated by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Unfortunately, there is far too much at risk to be patient. Therefore, I am personally inquiring of every cabinet official to gain an understanding as to how they see their role in this "war on drugs."

I know how important it is to build Federal prisons and to "light a thousand lights", but its so sad to see tens of thousands of lives wasted, hopes lost, and problems yet unknown occur with out any agency, department or bureau of our Federal government even suggesting what our policy or strategy is or should be.

Well, let me tell you, that it was never the intention of the Congress to hold up the war, and simply wait for the drug "coordinator" to come up with a strategy. That is to be our long-term program.

If your office has any thoughts, ideas, suggestions, or written any papers, or if you have given any speeches, talks or suggestions on how you see your role in this so called "war against drugs", I hope that you would have your staff share the

The Honorable James A. Baker III
Secretary
Department of State
Page Two


above with me. I cannot fully express the depth of my disappointment in waiting for the Administration's leadership in the struggle for our nation's survival against the international drug barons.

I sincerely trust that the problem is one of communications. Maybe the plans and strategies of the members of the Cabinet just have not been reported.

Or maybe, its just that I have not been informed properly.

In any event, I hope my inquiry will enable me to have a better understanding of where our country stands (and how we are doing) in the so called "war against drugs".

Sincerely,



CHARLES B. RANGEL
Chairman

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From William Bennett to John Sununu Re: Biden Anti-drug Proposals [2 copies] (4 pp.)	7/26/89	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



**OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500**

July 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM J. BENNETT *WJB*
DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Biden Anti-Drug Proposals

In 1986 and 1988, the drug issue united Republicans and divided Democrats; their failure to back tough criminal penalties and increased user accountability made some Democrats vulnerable to charges of softness on crime.

With the President's drug strategy due September 5, the week Congress returns from August break, Democratic Members of Congress are waiting to receive and react to the Administration's initiative. They are eager to regain political control over drugs.

Senate Democrats headed by Senator Biden are already putting together a drug package. We believe they will meet tomorrow to discuss ideas under consideration. It appears that they are looking at the problem in two parts: providing adequate funding for the 1988 drug bill, and offering a legislative package to counter the President's strategy.

Already this year Republican Members of Congress have had to take heat for voting against amendments that would increase existing drug funds or transfer defense program funds to drug accounts. Their principal cover for these votes has been the fact that the President's strategy is due in September and only then will priorities for the drug war be clear. Responding to criticisms that the President did not "fully fund" the 1988 drug bill, our members have criticized the Democrats' cynical authorization of huge amounts for drugs that they knew would, in fact, never be fully appropriated.

The Biden Group seeks to counter this criticism by identifying new sources for full funding of the 1988 bill. Currently under consideration are "sin taxes," drug bonds, a tax return checkoff, defense and domestic spending cuts, elimination of corporate tax deductions for alcohol and tobacco advertising, and lifting the cap on asset forfeiture funds.

- 2 -

The second part of the Biden Package brings together a number of previously identified anti-drug proposals, most of them supply-reduction initiatives. They include habeas corpus and exclusionary rule reform, Moynihan's Treatment in Prisons Bill, the Biden Anti-Drug/Anti-Corruption Bill, various asset forfeiture provisions, boot camps, and penalties for sale of steroids. There does not seem to be any international narcotics focus, though other provisions are not yet known.

If Biden were to introduce his bill in the near future (and he has scheduled an address at the National Press Club next Tuesday), it would place the Administration in a defensive and reactive posture. The Biden proposal would become the legislative vehicle around which most future drug discussions would turn.

Including mostly supply-side provisions in their bill would at last give the Democrats the opportunity to gain the support of law enforcement groups -- groups that the President won during the last election.

Biden's strategy appears intended to unite Democrats and give them a platform from which to attack the Administration's strategy.



OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500

July 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM J. BENNETT *WJB*
DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Biden Anti-Drug Proposals

In 1986 and 1988, the drug issue united Republicans and divided Democrats; their failure to back tough criminal penalties and increased user accountability made some Democrats vulnerable to charges of softness on crime.

With the President's drug strategy due September 5, the week Congress returns from August break, Democratic Members of Congress are waiting to receive and react to the Administration's initiative. They are eager to regain political control over drugs.

Senate Democrats headed by Senator Biden are already putting together a drug package. We believe they will meet tomorrow to discuss ideas under consideration. It appears that they are looking at the problem in two parts: providing adequate funding for the 1988 drug bill, and offering a legislative package to counter the President's strategy.

Already this year Republican Members of Congress have had to take heat for voting against amendments that would increase existing drug funds or transfer defense program funds to drug accounts. Their principal cover for these votes has been the fact that the President's strategy is due in September and only then will priorities for the drug war be clear. Responding to criticisms that the President did not "fully fund" the 1988 drug bill, our members have criticized the Democrats' cynical authorization of huge amounts for drugs that they knew would, in fact, never be fully appropriated.

The Biden Group seeks to counter this criticism by identifying new sources for full funding of the 1988 bill. Currently under consideration are "sin taxes," drug bonds, a tax return checkoff, defense and domestic spending cuts, elimination of corporate tax deductions for alcohol and tobacco advertising, and lifting the cap on asset forfeiture funds.

- 2 -

The second part of the Biden Package brings together a number of previously identified anti-drug proposals, most of them supply-reduction initiatives. They include habeas corpus and exclusionary rule reform, Moynihan's Treatment in Prisons Bill, the Biden Anti-Drug/Anti-Corruption Bill, various asset forfeiture provisions, boot camps, and penalties for sale of steroids. There does not seem to be any international narcotics focus, though other provisions are not yet known.

If Biden were to introduce his bill in the near future (and he has scheduled an address at the National Press Club next Tuesday), it would place the Administration in a defensive and reactive posture. The Biden proposal would become the legislative vehicle around which most future drug discussions would turn.

Including mostly supply-side provisions in their bill would at last give the Democrats the opportunity to gain the support of law enforcement groups -- groups that the President won during the last election.

Biden's strategy appears intended to unite Democrats and give them a platform from which to attack the Administration's strategy.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	From John Schall to David Bates Re: Working Group on Anti-drug Policy Meeting (2 pp.)	7/26/89	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1989

*To Governor
Sumner*

*FBI
WBR*

7/26

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID BATES

FROM: JOHN SCHALL *JAS*

SUBJECT: Working Group on Anti-Drug Policy Meeting

The Working Group on Anti-Drug Policy met this afternoon to discuss the research and intelligence chapters as well as appendices on high intensity drug trafficking areas and information management. We will meet tomorrow to discuss the appendices on goals and suggested state legislation.

To help you make sense of all the pieces of this puzzle, attached is a complete binder with all of the chapters we have received to date. We will forward the remaining chapters and future drafts to you as we receive them.

We have asked ONDCP to give us a list of issues on Sunday that may need DPC consideration to resolve. Incidentally, John Walters is confident that virtually all issues will be resolved in the next week. We will also ask OMB, Justice, HHS, and Treasury to give us a list of the important issues they believe may need to be addressed.

It is worth noting that this Strategy will not designate any high intensity drug trafficking areas. No objection from agencies is expected.

Potential Issues Requiring Resolution:

From our discussions of portions of the Strategy, several issues may require further resolution and might need to be addressed by the DPC. This list is merely speculative at this point and by no means comprehensive.

- o The creation of various coordinating committees to be chaired by ONDCP. There are already at least three such committees proposed -- a Drug Control Research and Development Committee, a Supply Coordinating Committee, and a Demand Coordinating Committee. Justice may object to ONDCP chairing the Supply Coordinating Committee. We in OCA/DPC need to ensure that any new groups come under the purview of the Policy Councils.

- o Increased funding for state and local law enforcement. If these funds offset other DOJ resources, there may be an objection.
- o Goals. Goals for percentage reductions in drug use are set for both two years from now and ten years from now. To escape the problem of two year goals (and potential political fallout from missing them), the Strategy could merely assert non-numerical "objectives" to meet in two years. Justice made such a suggestion, and we will ask them to draft a possible alternative.
- o Intelligence center. This is expected to be a big problem with DEA. Even Walters thinks this may be one issue he won't be able to resolve.
- o International intelligence problem. I guess Justice has raised this in the NSC portion of the debate. Basically, if international intelligence is used, there may be some constitutional problem with the accused person's right to confront his accusers.
- o Transportation funds. The Department has not yet spoken, but they may object to tying certain transportation funds to whether states enact certain laws regarding driver's licenses, etc. Funds have previously only been tied to the drinking age laws.
- o Budget. Your meeting tomorrow will determine whether this is settled. Still, if FY1990 offsets are needed, we will hear some complaints from the other departments.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	From Robert S. Ross to John Sununu Re: Concerns over the Pending National Drug Strategy [same as doc 01] (2 pp.)	7/27/89	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

July 27, 1989

MEMORANDUM TO: Governor John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff
The White House

FROM: Robert S. Ross, Jr. *RSR*
Executive Assistant to
the Attorney General

SUBJECT: Concerns Over the Pending National
Drug Strategy

The principal overall concern is that the Attorney General continue to be clearly recognized as the nation's chief law enforcement officer with sole operational responsibility and authority in the enforcement of the drug laws.

Particular concerns derived thus far from discussions that have been undertaken, both in official settings and in the press, include the following:

1. Suggestions have been made that more federal personnel, especially FBI and DEA agents, should be diverted into "street" enforcement activities. This represents, in our view, an inefficient use of limited federal enforcement resources which should continue to be focused, in our view, upon the arrest and prosecution of major drug traffickers, both domestic and international, and the seizure and forfeiture of their profits and assets.
2. Suggestions have also been forthcoming with regard to increasing the role of the military in some unspecified way and, in particular, to using military forces against drug trafficking operations in foreign countries, especially in Latin America. Such activities, quite apart from questions of national sovereignty, could well jeopardize the physical security of law enforcement agents (who are not militarily trained or endowed with a military mission) in their own operations within such countries and blur the traditional lines of distinction between national sovereignty and law enforcement roles.
3. Public mention has also been made of the suggestion of "hit squads" which would be commissioned as part of an overall covert operation initiative to seek out and assassinate drug

lords in other countries, especially in Latin America. Needless to say, our view of such activities is very negative, both from a public policy standpoint and from the standpoint of increased potential exposure to retaliatory efforts against law enforcement or other officials of the United States.

4. Considerable concern exists about the interrelationship between intelligence gathering activities not related to law enforcement and the preparation of prosecutions of major drug traffickers. In particular, note must be taken of the effect which the non-availability (for valid "sources and methods" reasons) of such intelligence in a criminal prosecution might have upon ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions. Such questions as the non-availability of material generated in widespread intelligence gathering activities under discovery rules, such as Jencks Act material, etc., are deserving of serious analysis and discussion in the context of any such enhanced or ongoing activity.

5. Any discussion about the budget for drug-combating activities necessarily will impact upon the Department of Justice and our general overall law enforcement responsibilities. That is to say, increases in the drug law enforcement effort, may cause us to lessen our efforts against organized crime, white collar crime, or in the environmental, civil rights or antitrust fields, and may substantially diminish our overall operational capabilities as well. Moreover, similar concerns, we expect, will be expressed by other departments and agencies whose budget might be "tapped into" for either supply side or demand side enhancements in the drug effort.

6. Finally, any national drug strategy for this nation should take into account the United Nations Drug Convention adopted in Vienna last year and currently before the Senate for ratification. Failure to swiftly ratify this Convention and to frame a drug policy for the United States that is incompatible with the Convention will forfeit a unique opportunity to insure our world leadership in the effort to contain the problems of drug trafficking and drug abuse.

J

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

7/20/89

TO: DAVID BATES

FROM: STEPHEN DANZANSKY

Per our conversation, I am enclosing some suggested talking points to be made at your Drug Strategy Summit Group meeting tomorrow with Governor Sununu, Bill Bennett, and Dick Darman.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Paper	Points to be Made: Drug Strategy Summit Group (3 pp.)	n.d.	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

POINTS TO BE MADE: Drug Strategy Summit Group

I. Process

--The deliberative process for the drug strategy was extremely tight from the beginning given the necessity for DPC deliberations with the President especially prior to his summer respite in Kennebunkport commencing August 18. Our plan (see attached Tab A) was to start the DPC working group on June 30, with the preface delivered on July 10 or 11 and the full text on Strategy considered beginning July 17.

--We have kept to the DPC working group schedule but the product has been delayed. At last Monday's meeting (July 17), only two chapters had been completed for review: Treatment and Prevention. These are the two least controversial elements. Also, much of the controversial material - budgetary implications and jurisdictional questions between responsible federal or state agencies - were to be included as appendices and were not delivered along with the chapters.

--The remainder - chapters on Criminal Justice, Intelligence, and Research - were delivered today and are being analyzed. They promise to engender a much more lively debate, particularly on turf issues.

--In summary, the process has been beset by several unusual elements:

- The accelerated time-table.
- Failure to deliver product to the working group on time, and piecemeal presentation.
- Unusually high and longstanding suspicions and interagency disagreements (appendices & budget)
- Separation of supply and demand questions between DPC and NSC. Interdiction, for example, has largely been left to NSC, but there are many legitimate DPC issues related to interdiction in parts of the report which the DPC working group has not seen.

--To handle this, we have set up a mechanism: Bi-level consideration. A private group of OPD, Justice, Bennett's staff, and OMB meet ahead of the working group sessions to highlight problems and to iron out our major issues or disagreements. This has proven effective in later working group meetings to minimize dissent and keep them from becoming semi-public debating societies. The major players feel they are getting their day in court and two bites at the apple.

--However, Bennett's recent national tour with its attendant press coverage has damaged the process. The networks and press have highlighted sections of the draft report and are looking for disagreements. This adds an undercurrent of distrust to the working group deliberations.

--Bennett has a number of bridges to cross: budgetary (OMB), turf (Justice and HHS), and substantive. Bill Bennett needs to stay home and make his points within the community instead of on the road.

--The relative peace we have experienced so far results from a couple of factors:

- DPC process: working group, mini-group, hand-holding
- The more controversial chapters have not been considered as well as the more controversial appendices to early chapters have not been considered because they have not yet been delivered.
- We have not felt the full effect of the recent Bennett road trip and leaks of report drafts.

--We ought not be deafened by the present calm!

II. Substance

--In the text delivered so far, we have seen little that is likely to create interagency controversy. Neither is it likely to create a huge public impact. Cost appears to be within bounds.

--Some of the more lively and controversial textual references (e.g., "present policy is a failure") have been eliminated by both the interagency process and by the drug use decrease figures (37%) about to be released (early August) by NIDA (National Institute on Drug Abuse).

--Some major disputes appear to be on the horizon, not the least of which is a major turf battle that may erupt over a recommendation contained in the just-released Criminal Justice chapter. That recommendation suggests the need for a central coordinating drug policy body to guide operations in the field, set enforcement priorities, and coordinate enforcement. The proposed candidate: Director of National Drug Control Policy. The AG currently has coordinative and enforcement authority and his staff views this as a fundamental usurpation of the AG's law enforcement authority. We have alerted Bennett's staff to this issue and have scheduled a meeting to mediate this and other issues at 9:15 on Monday, i.e., before the working group meets.

III. Budget

--Attached (Tab B) is a summary of what OMB and Bennett will be discussing re funding of the Strategy. OMB will probably attempt to secure from Bennett a commitment NOT to specify the year (FY 90 vs 91) in which the additional funding will be demanded. This would allow Bennett to lay out his plan regarding what must be done without providing an exact timetable for implementing all of its elements. I would expect the budget strategy to be the focal point for your Friday meeting with Bennett, Darman and the Governor.



OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500

DPC STRATEGY REVIEW TIMETABLE

*REVISED

- | | | |
|-----|--|---------|
| 1. | DPC Working Group organizational meeting | June 30 |
| 2. | DPC Working Group meeting on "context" chapter | July 12 |
| 3. | Draft of Strategy to DPC Working Group | July 17 |
| 4. | DPC Working Group meeting on Strategy | July 20 |
| 5. | DPC Working Group meeting on Strategy | July 26 |
| *6. | Full DPC meeting on full Strategy
(without President) | Aug 3 |
| *7. | Full DPC meeting on full Strategy
(without President) | Aug 4 |
| 8. | Full DPC meeting on full Strategy
(with President) | Aug 11 |
| *9. | Full DPC meeting on full Strategy
(with President) | Aug 15 |

7/12/89

1990 Budgetary Needs in Addition to the President's Budget
(Dollars in Millions)

AMOUNT	DESCRIPTION
1. \$200	Treatment Activities and Treatment Research. The additional funds would be targeted on treatment for pregnant women and cocaine babies. Would include \$35 million for treatment research and improved surveys to help identify and improve effective treatment approaches. Possibly propose changes to mechanics of grant program to allow greater accountability and improve ability to target funds.
2. \$100	International Initiative. Initiate major international effort involving military and economic assistance to selected growing, processing and transit regions.
3. \$300	State and Local Assistance. Emphasize user accountability by providing more funds to States and localities to enable them to expand their drug law enforcement capabilities. Possibly propose changes to mechanics of grant program to allow greater accountability and improve ability to target funds.
4. \$100	Intelligence. Improve the ability of the Federal Government to analyze and disseminate intelligence information on drug trafficking organizations.
5. \$100	Prevention. Increase funding for educational and prevention activities. Could include additional aid to schools to institute <u>effective</u> accountability-based policies and programs.
6. \$200	Public Housing. These funds would be used to provide assistance to public housing projects with serious drug problems to rid the premises of drug dealers, increase security, effect repairs, and restore projects to law-abiding, responsible tenants.
\$1,000	Total

7/16/89

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID BATES

FROM: JOHN SCHALL *JAS*

SUBJECT: Working Group on Anti-Drug Policy

Michael Jackson and I met this afternoon with John Walters to nail down the schedule for DPC consideration of the National Drug Control Strategy.

The first meeting of the Working Group will be held on Friday, June 30. As you can see from the attached timetable, ONDCP anticipates holding 4 Working Group sessions, 2 full DPC meetings without the President, and 2 full DPC meetings with the President (as needed). The schedule is extremely tight.

Walters does not envision any formal subgroups within the larger Working Group. Instead, he expects to hold several ad hoc discussions as necessary with key agency personnel on specific aspects of the Strategy that may be in disagreement.

The NSC portion of the Strategy, of course, will proceed on a different track. The longer attached schedule includes the dates for NSC consideration.

We will go ahead and put in scheduling proposals for the DPC meetings with the President now, so that if the dates need to be changed, ONDCP can build that into their schedule. Michael Jackson will notify some of the key Cabinet members and determine their availability in early August.

A point Walters made that is worth emphasizing to all participants is that there will be another Strategy produced for submission in February. Therefore, issues that will take more time to consider can be included in the next Strategy, rather than delaying the consideration process for the first Strategy to be submitted September 5.

cc: Steve Danzansky
Michael Jackson

STRATEGY TIMETABLE

- | | |
|--|------------|
| 1. DPC Working Group organizational meeting | June 30 |
| 2. Draft statement of "problem" chapter to DPC Working Group | July 10 |
| 3. DPC Working Group meeting | July 12 |
| 4. Full draft of Strategy to DPC Working Group | July 17 |
| 5. DPC Working Group meeting on Strategy | July 20 |
| Revision of Strategy | July 20-23 |
| 6. Revised Strategy sent to DPC Working Group | July 24 |
| 7. DPC Working Group meeting | July 26 |
| Revision of Strategy | July 26-30 |
| 8. Revised Strategy sent to full DPC | July 31 |
| 9. Full DPC meeting (w/o President) | Aug. 2 |
| Revision of Strategy | Aug. 2-6 |
| 10. Full DPC meeting (w/o President) | Aug. 7 |
| Revision of Strategy | Aug. 7-9 |
| 11. Full DPC meeting (w. President) | Aug. 11 |
| Revision of Strategy | Aug. 11-14 |
| 12. Full DPC meeting (w. President) | Aug. 16 |

(6/26/89)

STRATEGY TIMETABLE

- | | |
|---|-----------------|
| 1. Draft text of NSR for internal ONDCP review | June 28 |
| 2. DPC Working Group organizational meeting | June 28 |
| 3. NSR circulation to agencies | June 30 |
| Draft of "prob." chapter circulated for internal ONDCP review | July 5 |
| ONDCP comments on "prob." chapter | July 7 |
| 4. Draft statement of "problem" chapter to DPC Working Group | July 10 |
| <u>Draft of Strategy circulated for internal ONDCP review</u> | <u>July 11</u> |
| 5. DPC Working Group meeting | July 12 |
| <u>ONDCP comments on Strategy</u> | <u>July 14</u> |
| 6. Full draft of Strategy to DPC Working Group | July 17 |
| 7. Andean Strategy | week of July 17 |
| 8. DPC Working Group meeting on Strategy | July 20 |
| Revision and clearance of Strategy | July 20-23 |
| 9. N.S. Int'l. Strategy complete | July 21 |
| 10. Revised Strategy sent to DPC Working Group | July 24 |
| 11. PCC on Int'l. Strategy | week of July 24 |
| 12. DPC Working Group meeting | July 26 |
| Revision and clearance of Strategy | July 26-30 |
| 13. Revised Strategy sent to full DPC | July 31 |
| 14. Deputies meeting on Int'l. Strat. | week of July 31 |

15. Full DPC meeting (w/o President)	Aug. 2
Revision and clearance of Strategy	Aug. 2-6
16. Full DPC meeting (w/o President)	Aug. 7
17. NSC meeting on N.S. Policy and Strat.	week of Aug. 7
Revision and clearance of Strategy	Aug. 7-9
18. Full DPC meeting (w. President)	Aug. 11
Revision and clearance of Strategy	Aug. 11-14
19. Full DPC meeting (w. President)	Aug. 16

(6/24/89)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	From Michael P. Jackson to David Q. Bates Re: Congressional Monitoring of William Bennett's Drug Control Strategy (2 pp.)	6/23/89	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)
By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

8

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 23, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES

FROM: MICHAEL P. JACKSON *MPJ*

SUBJECT: Congressional Monitoring of William Bennett's Drug Control Strategy

This memo summarizes a conversation I had yesterday with John Walters about Congressional oversight of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Two items are worth note.

1. As you know, there are an unusually large number of Congressional committees that have a claim to oversee formulation of the Administration's drug control strategy. Bennett is trying to postpone numerous requests for testimony on the strategy or parts of it until after the strategy is finalized in September. In the interim, Bennett is dealing most directly with the two appropriations committees. Senator Glenn, however, has been particularly eager to have Bennett testify before the Governmental Affairs Committee prior to September. Walters has promised to keep our legislative affairs staff fully briefed on testimony requests that they have not honored.

2. In a related matter, Walters wanted us to know that Congressional scrutiny of their operation -- which has always been substantial -- has intensified somewhat in recent weeks. Two matters are worth knowing about:

(a) Bennett has been operating with the knowledge that, after the strategy is complete, they have a legal obligation to report on the process they used to arrive at their recommendations to the President. Now, however, John Conyers (D-MI) and Frank Horton (R-NY) have requested a GAO review of the strategy as it is being formulated. Already working at maximum capacity on the strategy itself, Bennett's staff is now having to explain to the GAO what they are doing as they do it.

(b) In addition, apparently a number of Congressional staffers have tried to monitor more informally the administrative details of how the Office of National Drug Control Policy has been organized, staffed, and provided resources. Walters tells me that recently Bennett and he

have worked to dismiss some Congressional staff suggestions that the White House has been insufficiently attentive to their administrative needs. I suppose this is, in part, a latent manifestation of Congressional interest the President's decision not to include Bennett in the Cabinet. In particular, Walters has recently personally assured several Republican Members that the office is working well and closely with the White House administrative staff. Announcement of the formation of the DPC working group will hopefully reassure those Members that Bennett's shop is also working closely with the White House and Administration policymakers.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Memo	From David Q. Bates to John Sununu Re: Bill Bennett Press Conference on Thursday, October 19th (1 pp.)	10/17/89	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
 financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
 and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
 agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
 information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
 personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
 purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
 financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Drugs

file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: DAVID Q. BATES

SUBJECT: Bill Bennett Press Conference on Thursday, October 19th

As mentioned in last week's Cabinet Report, Bill Bennett will hold a press conference this Thursday, October 19th to discuss progress in his emergency initiative to aid the District of Columbia in its drug fight. Draft background material from Bennett's office is attached. Bennett's staff thinks they have made good progress on the support promised and that D.C. has not used the federal help very effectively.

The press conference -- which should attract substantial press note -- fulfills a promise Bennett made last April to provide a six-month assessment. Today's Washington Post carries a front page article (attached) that previews the coverage Bennett is likely to receive.

cc: Marlin Fitzwater

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 14, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID Q. BATES, JR.
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY TO THE
CABINET

FROM: C. BOYDEN GRAY *cmg*
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comparison of Director Bennett's Draft Anti-Drug
Strategy with the President's Campaign Statements

The fundamental principle of Director Bennett's proposed approach is stated on pp. 187-188 of the draft plan submitted to the DPC. The Director argues that previous efforts have been concentrated on drug interdiction and on investigating high-level traffickers who control the drug distribution networks. He contends that greater attention must now be focused on other parts of the anti-drug effort. Specifically, he calls for directing additional resources at drug sources; at drug users and street dealers; and at expanding prison capacity. Essentially, he maintains that we have focused our attention too heavily on the middle portion of the drug chain and that we must now give more emphasis to the beginning and end of the chain.

This is exactly the same position that the President took during the campaign. As head of the South Florida Task Force, he had led one of the most successful interdiction efforts in history; he was justifiably proud of this accomplishment and also quite aware of the inadequacy of such programs. In a speech on May 26, 1988, for example, he said: "[I]f we're going to move from holding our own in this war to winning it, we must turn our attention from the middle of the drug flow -- the dealers -- to the beginning and the end -- the producers and users -- because this is not a pipeline we're talking about, controlled by a single shutoff valve -- it is a flood . . ."

The President articulated his anti-drug program in a number of different addresses and releases, but the themes were consistent:

- o Reducing demand through the hardheaded use of incentives aimed at those in the retail and consumer segments of the drug market.
- o Reducing supply by reducing the incentives for producer countries to tolerate or encourage the drug business.
- o Improved coordination of the various entities involved in fighting drugs, especially increased international and federal-state cooperation.

Director Bennett's proposal is conceptually identical. It is also identical in many of its particulars. I understand that Richard Breeden is developing a detailed comparison of the two plans. Accordingly, I will simply point out a few of the more striking similarities:

- o The President proposed that federal assistance to drug treatment programs be linked to their success rate. The Bennett plan would require States, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to develop performance criteria for treatment facilities; funding allocations would be based in part on these criteria.
- o The President proposed that drug users have their driver's licenses suspended. The Bennett plan makes the same proposal.
- o The President proposed that schools develop special education/treatment programs for students with drug or alcohol problems. The Bennett plan proposes the development of alternative schools for students with drug problems.
- o The President proposed that federal parole be conditioned on drug testing. The Bennett plan recommends that federal criminal justice funds be conditioned on the States adopting drug testing programs for arrestees, prisoners, parolees, and those out on bail.
- o The President proposed mandatory drug testing for jobs involving public health and safety and national security. The Bennett plan proposes aggressive implementation of E.O. 12564.
- o The President proposed a "Zero Tolerance policy, not just as a law enforcement policy, but a way of life." He focused especially on tying federal aid to schools with anti-drug programs and on making drug-free programs a condition for obtaining federal contracts. The Bennett plan proposes mandatory drug prevention programs for federally funded schools and colleges; drug free workplace plans for federal contractors and grantees; and federal funding for community-wide drug prevention programs.
- o The President proposed that a summit of Western hemisphere nations be convened to develop a strategy for international cooperation against drugs. The Bennett plan calls for a Drug Summit of source, transit and consuming countries.
- o The President proposed increased U.S. support for eradication and disruption of drug processing in source countries, including training and logistical support for the efforts of source country governments and programs to replace with legitimate income the foreign exchange that

will be lost as a result of serious anti-drug efforts. The Bennett plan echoes this proposal.

- o The President proposed that efforts aimed at preventing "money laundering" be strengthened. The Bennett plan makes the same proposal.

In several respects, especially those dealing with interagency coordination, the Bennett plan is of course more detailed than the President's campaign speeches. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to identify a single major proposal in the Bennett plan that is not clearly tied to the program put forth by the President during the campaign.

In my view, it is extremely important that the Bennett report be presented to the public as what it is: a more detailed version of the President's campaign pledges. Recent press reports have focused on Director Bennett's potentially controversial "tough cop" approach. Everyone, especially the press, needs to be forcefully reminded that this is the platform on which the President of the United States was elected. I believe it would be helpful if this point were made, and made prominently, in the Bennett report itself.

cc: Governor Sununu
James W. Cicconi

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memo	From J. Bonnie Newman to Janet Hale Re: Office of the National Drug Control Policy FY90 Budget (2 pp.)	3/30/89	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

cc: Schwartz

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR JANET HALE

ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

FROM:

J. BONNIE NEWMAN *J. Bonnie Newman*
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Office of National Drug Control Policy FY90 Budget

We have reviewed the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) fiscal year 1990 Congressional budget request. With the intention of assisting this important new agency in beginning successful operations, we would like to offer the following comments:

o At this early stage in ONDCP's existence it is understandable that precise descriptions of the manner in which funds will be expended, will be difficult. However, it is recommended that a more thorough description of the utilization of funds, by object class category, be provided in order to more completely support the request level of \$12,000,000 which is an increase of \$8,500,000 over the 1989 level.

o The Bush Administration submitted a budget amendment which designated \$7 million for staffing requirements and \$5 million for research activities. It is recommended that OMB review the structure of ONDCP's proposed budget to ensure that it is consistent with policy guidance contained in the budget amendment.

o The schedule on page 15 reflects that an estimated \$50,000,000 of the Special Forfeiture Fund will be obligated in FY90. It is our understanding that Congress desires specific justification for ONDCP's intended use of amounts requested to be appropriated from this fund. The submission contains little justification concerning how the proceeds from this fund will be utilized, with the exception of a reference to \$5,000,000 for "research activities" in FY90. In addition the definition of "research activities", itself, should be further explained.

o The submission reflects an apparent misunderstanding with respect to how detailees are accounted. First, an object class (11.8) entitled "Special Personal Services Payments" should be included in the schedules on pages 16 and 20. This category should reflect an estimate of the total budgeted for detailee obligations. Second, detailees do not count against Full Time Equivalent (FTE) ceilings. The second paragraph on page 4 seems to indicate that ONDCP is scoring detailee usage against the requested FTE ceiling.

o FY89 Full Time Permanent (FTP) and Full Time Equivalent levels (page 5) of 80 and 40 positions, respectively, do not agree with the President's budget submission (which reflected 40 FTP's and 10 FTE's).

o Average salary per FTE of \$50,000 and the grade structure reflected on page 18 are relatively high in comparison to other EOP agencies.

o On page 3, ONDCP cites that they are required to perform administrative functions normally provided to other EOP agencies. ONDCP receives the same level of support as that of other EOP agencies physically located outside the White House Complex. This statement could be misinterpreted by Congress as a lack of EOP support for ONDCP, and we recommend that their administrative responsibilities be conveyed in a more positive fashion.

o Pages 9 and 10 mention that ONDCP will serve as the chair for two special commissions. It is recommended that associated funding responsibilities be defined.

o ONDCP's responsibilities with respect to formulating a consolidated national drug control budget proposal are considerable. As the submission states, this charter will require advanced analysis and an elaborate filing and retrieval system. Clearly, automated tools will be crucial to support the tracking and analysis of agency budget proposals. In this regard, ONDCP should work closely with OA's Information Resources Management Division to define automated systems requirements and assess the impact on OA and the EOP Data Center.

o Finally, I feel it is important to address responsibility for the administration of the Special Forfeiture Fund. Currently, OA provides the full range of administrative services to EOP agencies. Considering the magnitude of the fund (\$136,000,000 in FY90), significant additional administrative support may be needed. It is important that our staffs define the work load involved and which agencies will be primarily responsible for administering the fund, at an early stage.

We are fully supportive of ensuring the success of ONDCP. The above comments are provided in the interest of assisting ONDCP with formulating a request that soundly justifies a level of resources that is adequate to support their program. We would be pleased to provide OMB and ONDCP with any further assistance.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

March 30, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: Janet Hale *off*
SUBJECT: Drug Czar Budget for FY 1990

The Drug Czar's office has sent us their Congressional budget justification showing total spending in FY 1990 of \$17 million. President Bush's Budget allows for only \$12 million. Below is a summary of how this 1990 request developed.

Reagan Budget

- o Funding of \$3.5 million
- o 40 positions
- o Important to note that total paid FTE for drug policy personnel in the Reagan years was no more than approximately 50. (White House Drug Abuse Office, National Drug Policy Board, and National Narcotics Border Interdiction System)

Bush Budget

- o \$7 million salary and expenses
- o \$5 million for research -- direct appropriation
- o Funding could support up to 70 FTE.

Issues

- Precise amounts for rent, security and utilities dependent on office location.
- Security requirements may force office to move.
- Specific staffing within 70 FTE yet to be determined.

Bennett Budget

- o \$12 million for salaries and expenses
- o \$5 million for research -- funded through special forfeiture fund

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	From William Bennett to John Sununu Re: Presidential Leadership on Law Enforcement Issues (1 pp.)	4/4/89	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



**OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500**

April 4, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN SUNUNU
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM J. BENNETT *WJB*
DIRECTOR

It is time to cut through the analytic morass. My advice is the following:

1. In the next day or two the President should say he is directing the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and his staff to develop a legislative proposal that will ban the import, sale, and distribution of assault weapons in a way that will satisfy the interest and desires of responsible law enforcement officials and protect the rights of law abiding hunters and the gun owning public. The point is to get the President on record before it is too late (which could be within a matter of days as the law enforcement groups sign on to Metzenbaum).
2. The President should also direct his legislative affairs staff to work with Senators Dole and Gramm to include in the legislative proposals provisions for additional prison space and the more effective use of prisons.
3. The President should reiterate his commitment to enforcement of current laws carrying stiff penalties for use and possession of firearms during the commission of drug crimes.

Note: I attended the long meeting with Roger Porter last night. It was admirable for its analytic thoroughness but we are going to miss the boat if the President does not act, speak. Others may want to quibble or dispute my terms. But what matters is that the President act and not be acted upon. Leadership. Let's go.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memo	From Mike Uhlmann to Boyden Gray Re: The Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988 (9 pp.)	12/13/88	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Ad

MEMORANDUM

TO: Boyden Gray
FROM: Mike Uhlmann
DATE: December 13, 1988
RE: The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988

As you are aware, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (hereafter, the ADAA) into law on November 18, 1988. Given the comprehensive scope of the ADAA, the importance of drug-related matters during the campaign, the strong personal interest in the subject on the part of the President-Elect, and your own responsibility for briefing him on narcotics issues, you will necessarily be drawn into the center of the Administration's plans for implementing the Act.

I attach for your review a summary of major provisions of the ADAA. Even a brief perusal will demonstrate the size of the task mandated by the Act. Hardly a feature of government which might be thought to relate to narcotics is left untouched. Among other things, it creates a new and powerful office within the Executive Office of the President; (in effect, a specialized OMB) authorizes a series of new program expenditures (as well as imposing strictures on those expenditures); and imposes significant duties in both foreign and domestic policy on not fewer than ten Cabinet Departments. Measured by any standard, it is the most comprehensive piece of legislation ever enacted by Congress to deal with drug abuse.

- 2 -

The considerable budgetary, managerial, and policy problems created by its enactment will be in every respect exacerbated by heightened media and congressional expectancy -- not least because the ADAA enables Congress to sit in more or less continual judgment on the actions of the President.

Although the ADAA focuses on narcotics, it must be understood in the larger separation-of-powers context, which, as you know, is an issue of utmost concern to the President-Elect. The Act is in my view the most serious intrusion into presidential prerogative since the War Powers Act, and carries an enormous potential for political mischief dangerous to the Presidency. Everyone associated with the implementation of the Act -- beginning with the President, Governor Sununu, and you, and extending to senior officers of the major Departments -- should be sensitive to this larger context.

You will in the weeks and months ahead hear from the various departments and agencies whose interests are affected by the legislation. It is unnecessary at this point to detail the kinds of difficulties that the ADAA will necessarily entail, but Governor Sununu and you can count on having to spend a significant portion of your time dealing with the "Drug Czar" and refereeing numerous inter-agency disputes on everything from jurisdictional turf and policy coordination to budgetary and personnel levels. Many of these disputes will threaten to break into public at a moment's notice, as various Executive Branch entities seek to strengthen their positions

via leaks to Congress or the newsmedia. Over time, the resolution of these problems will become the responsibility of the Director of the newly created Office of National Drug Control Policy. But fundamental questions of political and legal strategy must be addressed before a Director is named.

The purpose of this memorandum is to suggest certain preliminary steps which ought to be taken to ensure that the President-Elect's interests are fully protected and to ensure that an orderly process is established for the implementation of the ADAA.

(1) Appointment of Officers Within the EOP.

As you will see from the first page of the attached summary, the ADAA establishes an Office of National Drug Control Policy within the EOP, headed by a Director, with two Deputy Directors (one for demand side, one for supply side) and an Associate Director (for state and local affairs). All four require Senate confirmation. None can hold any other federal office. Among other powers, the Director is authorized to

- Prepare a national drug-control strategy, which is to be submitted to Congress by the President within 180 days of the Director's confirmation, and thereafter, by February 1 of each year.

- Recommend changes in the organization, management, and budgets of federal departments and agencies engaged in drug enforcement.

- 4 -

- Develop a consolidated drug-control budget for the federal government and certify the adequacy of each agency's budget request.

- Advise the National Security Council and attend NSC meetings at the direction of the President.

These are very considerable powers and will make the Director in fact, if not in name, an officer of Cabinet rank. This status will combine with the notoriety of the drug issue to make the Director a prominent figure not only within the Executive Branch but in Congress and the national newsmedia. And, because the Director and his three principal subordinates will all be Senate-confirmed officers, Congress will not want for opportunities to examine and second-guess every aspect of the Administration's drug-related policies.

Viewed entirely from the perspective of drug policy, a good case can be made for appointing someone with extensive law enforcement experience. But familiarity with law enforcement is only one of the criteria useful to a job of this magnitude, and in some respects may not be the most important. For one thing, the law-enforcement side of the equation can be met by one of the Deputy Directors. More importantly, the attributes which make for a good prosecutor may in fact impede the effective execution of the Director's duties, which call for a high degree of diplomatic skill, familiarity with the federal bureaucratic process, appropriate deference to powerful Cabinet officers, wariness of congressional interference with

presidential discretion, and a temperament that is not susceptible to flattery or self-aggrandizement. Finally -- and this ought to be of decisive importance -- the Director must be disposed to be first and last the President's man. It is most emphatically not a job for anyone who could be tempted to think about his or her next job.

If these kinds of concerns are at all well-founded, they would seem to point to someone at the end, rather than at the mid-point, of a distinguished public career. He or she should have impeccable character and demonstrated bureaucratic skill; enough self-confidence to deal with Cabinet officers as a peer while at the same time respecting their separate statutory responsibilities, and sufficient self-confidence as well to deal with Congress without being intimidated by congressional pressure; the ability to advise the President honestly without the intrusion of his own ego; the willingness to catch the javelins while ensuring that the laurels go to the President. In short, the Director ought to have a certain largeness of soul, whose only vanity consists in the desire to perform a public service for the President and the nation. If that disposition can be combined with prior law-enforcement experience, so much the better. But it is the character of the Director which ought to be of decisive importance.

Ideally, the search should begin among the most senior ranks of present or former public officials, preferably those with high-level federal experience, e.g., Cabinet

- 6 -

officers or their equivalents, or federal judges who are retired or in senior status. Drawing the nominee from those ranks would address a number of serious problems at once: (1) he or she would bring to the office a reputation for public accomplishment which need not be proven at the outset; (2) it automatically eliminates the problem of personal ambition which, in a younger person, could prove tempting even for someone with the best of intentions; (3) it would demonstrate to the nearly dozen Cabinet officers whose cooperation is necessary to the implementation of the ADAA that they are dealing with a "peer"; (4) it would go a long way toward ensuring the President that the Director's advice will be at once professionally sound and personally disinterested; and (5) it would reassure Congress and the public that the President is serious about solving the narcotics problem.

This is not to say that these goals cannot be advanced to some degree by picking someone of relative youth or less visible background. It is to say that they are advanced more certainly, both at the outset (which in this instance can be critically important) and later on, by picking someone of mature years and great public distinction.

I have for your consideration a list of possible nominees whose experience and demeanor fit these criteria; their potential pros and cons can be discussed whenever you are ready. My purpose here is simply to warn you and others against discussing in any public way (whether overtly or by

means of intentional or unintentional leak) possible nominees for the post. The Directorship is no ordinary political appointment, and the criteria for selection must be thoroughly weighed before serious attention is focused on particular names.

That is Point One. Point Two is that the President should become personally acquainted as soon as possible with the implications for the separation-of-powers created by the ADAA.

(2) Preliminary Discussion with Senior Staff and Cabinet Officers.

At the earliest practicable date, a meeting should be held, either at the call of The President-Elect or Governor Sununu, to discuss the major features of the ADAA. The fact of the meeting should be closely held, as far removed from media attention as possible. Governor Sununu will no doubt have ideas of his own as to who should be present, but at the very least, I would suggest the following: the Attorney General; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of State-Designate; the OMB Director-Designate; and such senior Transition Officers as may be appropriate. The agenda for the meeting (which should be established by Governor Sununu) should be narrowly focused, at least preliminarily, on the following: (a) a briefing on the ADAA generally; (b) a discussion of the new office of National Drug Policy and the powers of its Director; (c) the legal and political implications for the

President; and (d) the criteria which ought to guide the selection of the Director and his subordinates. It would be useful, I think, to have the President-Elect present at this meeting, although he and the Governor may prefer that a preliminary meeting be held prior to one with the President-Elect. Either way, the purpose of the meeting is to sensitize those who will be principally affected by the ADAA to its larger implications. And the sooner that occurs the better. It will not be long after January 20 before Congress and the media start asking about the new Drug Office and when the Director will be named.

You are correct if you infer from my words a sense of the greatest urgency. I knew, like most of us who have trod in and around this issue over the past year, that there were problems associated with the ADAA. But until I sat down and read the bill (and especially those features affecting Executive powers), I had no idea how serious those problems could be. The National Drug Control Policy Office is nothing less than another OMB devoted exclusively to narcotics policy; it duplicates functions already performed by OMB, the domestic policy staff, and to a certain extent by the NSC; it creates another bureaucratic layer within the EOP that virtually every major Department and agency will have to deal with; it empowers the Director to muck about in the policies, programs, and budgets of much of the government (including the intelligence community); it will create major managerial and political

- 9 -

headaches for you and the Chief of Staff; it invites Congress to poke into the most minute details of Administration policy; and it will present the President with a continuing threat of adverse political exposure.

If you and the Governor agree that this matter should receive priority attention, I will prepare a memorandum which establishes an agenda for the meeting and provides a brief description of the Act's major features.

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Paper	Legislative Strategy RE Drug Package for Discussion 9/7/89 (3 pp.)	9/7/89	P 5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Bennett (Drug Policy - 1989)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/1/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

file
Drugs

LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY RE DRUG PACKAGE

FOR DISCUSSION 9/7/89

(1) Context:

(a) The President has seized the initiative, leadership, headlines, and credit. A comprehensive strategy has been delivered to the Congress (on time) -- and has been effectively presented to the American people.

(b) The burden for implementation has shifted (in some measure) to the Congress.

(c) Republicans want in on the spotlight and credit. Some (mistakenly) think that there is hay to be made with a "Bush bill" that they would sign on to. In fact, most of what is required legislatively is in the form of budget amendments (already submitted). These can be handled through appropriations. The actual changes in authorizing legislation are rather thin.

(d) Democrats want to get credit, and to diminish the President's advantage -- but have, so far, only managed to associate themselves with a desire for a tax increase. (There is a compelling rejoinder to this: "This is a war on drugs, not a war on the taxpayer!")

(e) There is a threat that the Democrats could get their act together sensibly -- although there are no signs of their doing so yet. Elements of a politically smart Democratic approach might include:

-- congratulation of the President for a "good start" (damning with faint praise, instead of criticism -- while the President has the high ground; letting more serious criticism come a bit later in a context Democrats can better control);

-- creation of a visible, Democratically-controlled and led, "special committee" for "special hearings" (televised) and "prompt action" -- followed by systematic, graphic, highly publicized exposure of inadequacies of the Administration's plan and demands for a more serious, more complete, more likely-to-succeed approach to the war;

-- promise of a comprehensive supplemental bill in less than 60 days -- "record time" -- thus seeming to act quickly, while actually postponing action until after the sequester threat has passed (October 15).

WED 4B ISSUES
CRIME PACKAGE

NOTE: This would allow the Congress to load up a bill any way they might like without having to come up with either taxes or offsets. They could cite the precedent of the \$20 billion S&L funding that went through the same G-R-H loophole for FY'89.

FURTHER NOTE: Republican desires for a single bill or a special committee could accidentally lead the Democrats to the winning strategy they have so far failed to adopt!

(2) How best to get the President's program enacted:

(a) Stick with the existing PR plan (doing positive things, on our terms, in environments we can control).

(b) Ask the Congress to fund the President's strategy (which we delivered on time) in the pending appropriations bills (which they should deliver on time) -- i.e., by October 1.

(c) As appropriations bills come up for action (in September), offer amendments that make them conform to the President's strategy -- with appropriate offffsets, and with united Republican support.

- (i) If amendments win, we win.
- (ii) If amendments lose, Democrats are responsible for failing to fund key elements of the strategy.

NOTE: The risks here are that Democrats will respond by:

- (i) dodging all such maneuvers by referring them to a special committee/special process (see "threat" above); or
 - (ii) substituting offsets from DOD for any offsets we would propose.
- (d) Do not accept procedural recommendations that would move things less quickly than through the current appropriations process -- or that would shift the burden for developing legislation and funding proposals back to the Executive branch. We've won that battle -- and now should keep the pressure on Congress to implement the strategy promptly, through the appropriations process.

(3) How to let Republicans in on the spotlight/credit/action:

(a) Urge them to adopt the September appropriations strategy as above -- to sponsor, advance, and fight for the appropriations amendments necessary to advance the President's drug strategy. (NOTE: This will likely apply primarily to the Senate.) Offer to highlight key amendments and sponsors with Presidential involvement as appropriate.

(b) Urge them to adopt the "war-on-drugs-not-war-on-the-taxpayer" theme as appropriate.

(c) Be willing to provide technical assistance if they want to put together a single "comprehensive" bill -- but pour cool water on this approach on grounds that it risks:

(i) diminishing what is now a well launched strategy (the red book);

(ii) helping the Democrats legitimize a big bill -- outside of the appropriations/G-R-H process.

(d) Be prepared to rethink our preferred approach if they raise compelling reasons to do so!

JULY 17th LETTER TO PRES.
FROM DOMENICI NEVER
ANSWERED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

September 5, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: DAVID Q. BATES 

SUBJECT: The Drivers License Revocation Recommendation in
the Drug Control Strategy

As you know, the President decided he would not make state legislation revoking the drivers licenses of convicted drug offenders a precondition for receipt of highway funds. He instructed us, however, that the Strategy should urge the states to take action on license revocation legislation. In conjunction with Dick Darman, Secretary Skinner and other staff, we devised a series of target dates for state action. A sentence containing these target dates was included in the final version of the Strategy approved by the President.

By accident at ONDCP, the sentence containing the target dates was omitted from the printed text. The printed report and the Executive Summary do clearly call for the states to pass the drivers license revocation legislation. The relevant pages are attached.

In order to elaborate on the President's position, Bill Bennett plans to write the Governors about the recommended legislation in the Strategy and to propose the deadlines we devised. He also will look for an appropriate speech to call attention to the drivers license revocation recommendation, including the target deadlines.

Attachments

cc: Dick Darman
Andy Card

sanctions is between prison or nothing at all. Dealers involved in large-scale drug traffic and violent predatory crime are obvious candidates for prison sentences that will both take them off the streets for significant periods of time and deter other potential offenders. Such sentences put a strain on the system, but the demands of justice and domestic security require them.

Other types of offenders, however, can be dealt with in more efficient and often less expensive ways. Military-style boot camps, with their rigorous regimes and austere conditions, bring a sense of order and discipline to the lives of youthful, non-violent first-time offenders, and perhaps serve as a deterrent against future crimes. Halfway houses and strictly supervised addiction recovery programs can meet the demands of offenders who require treatment. A number of States have successfully experimented with various house arrest programs that keep an offender incapacitated at his own expense. "Casual" users who maintain a job and a steady income should face stiff fines — much stiffer than they do now — and, where appropriate, property forfeiture. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act further broadens the array of penalties a judge has at his disposal by providing courts with the power to deny or withhold certain Federal benefits from convicted drug offenders. The Administration will encourage the regular application of that provision to ensure that it becomes a more widely used tool for penalizing drug use.

These are the sorts of alternative sanctions that the criminal justice system must explore if it is successfully going to deter and contain drug use. But such measures can be — and must be — complemented by a host of less formal sanctions aimed specifically at those first-time and occasional users who, because their activities are too often viewed as relatively inconsequential, now avoid any penalty whatsoever. These are the users who should have their names published in local papers. They should be subject to drivers' license suspension, employer notification, overnight or weekend detention, eviction from public housing, or forfeiture of the cars they drive while purchasing drugs. Whatever the extent of their offense, if they use drugs they should be held accountable.

Young offenders in particular must be confronted with penalties that both deter them from future drug use and embarrass them among their peers. Today, many young drug offenders boast about their lenient treatment in the hands of the authorities and wear it as a badge of pride; corrections officials must make sure that when juveniles are caught using or selling drugs, their punishment becomes a source of shame. We need a mix of sanctions for juvenile drug use that includes school suspension, parental notification, and postponement of driver's license eligibility, and extends to weekends of "community service" that involve arduous and unenviable public chores.

Appendix C

non-law-enforcement funding accounts are counterproductive. Asset forfeiture laws should also facilitate "tracing; they should include a legal presumption that assets are derived from a drug enterprise if authorities can show that there is no other likely source of income for their purchase. All asset forfeiture laws should be written to permit the substitution of non-drug related assets for drug-related assets in cases where drug-related assets are beyond the reach of our judicial process.

Schoolyard laws. Modeled after the Federal "schoolyard law," these laws afford special protection for children by creating "drug-free" zones around locations frequented by minors. They establish stiff minimum and mandatory sentences for anyone caught distributing drugs (or possessing drugs with an intent to distribute) within 1000 feet of a school, playground, pool, youth center, or video arcade. Schoolyard laws should also apply to minors selling drugs inside these zones so as to prevent dealers from utilizing underage drug "runners" to circumvent the law.

User accountability laws. States should enact a range of penalties for persons caught using or possessing even small amounts of drugs, among them:

- Suspension of drivers' licenses for 1-5 years.
- Suspension of State benefits (such as student loans, grants, and contracts) for 1-5 years. Exceptions could be made for certain welfare-related benefits, and provision could be made for restoration of all benefits upon completion of a drug rehabilitation program.
- Criminalization of offers, attempts, and solicitations to sell or buy drugs. (Such statutes permit law enforcement officers to make drug arrests without consummating a sale or purchase with actual drugs.)

Drug-Free Workplace statutes. All State and municipal employers, including agencies, contractors, and grantees, should be required to take personnel action against employees found to be using drugs, or to be under the influence of drugs at work. Such action could include suspension, termination, or enrollment in a drug treatment program.

Many of the drug control laws noted above are contained in the model Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA) as recently amended. States are encouraged to examine this draft legislation closely and to determine what changes to their existing laws might be appropriate.

Executive Summary

Priorities

- Increased Federal funding to States and localities for street-level drug law enforcement.
- Federal funding to States for planning, developing, and implementing alternative sentencing programs for nonviolent drug offenders, including house arrest and boot camps.
- Increased Federal funding for Federal law enforcement activities (including courts, prisons, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers); and additional resources targeted on Federal money laundering investigations.
- Vigorous prosecution of and increased fines for all misdemeanor State drug offenses.
- Expanded programs to eradicate the domestic marijuana crop.
- Adoption by the States of drug-testing programs throughout their criminal justice systems: for arrestees, prisoners, parolees, and those out on bail. Adoption of such programs will be a condition for receipt of Federal criminal justice funds.
- Funding through the Department of Housing and Urban Development to establish security systems for public housing projects, including tenant identification cards, guards, and security fences.
- Establishment of a Supply Reduction Working Group, chaired by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, to carry out the statutory requirement to "coordinate and oversee the implementation by National Drug Control Program agencies of the policies, objectives, and priorities" defined in the National Drug Control Strategy. This group will consider supply-related drug policy issues that are interdepartmental in nature. It will not deal with operational decisions or have line authority or responsibility.
- Revision of Federal drug agency personnel evaluation systems, where appropriate, to add a criterion for career advancement and reward that emphasizes cooperation among employees within and across various agencies.
- Strong encouragement for States to adopt policies revoking the drivers licenses of those convicted of a drug offense and recommendation of model drivers license revocation legislation to the States.

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

September 11, 1989

RETAIL VALUE OF THE DRUG ENTERPRISE IN THE U.S.

Estimated Value of Drug Sales in 1988

We have prepared an independent estimate of the total value of illegal drug sales in the United States in 1988. It is a very rough calculation as a result of limited data and estimating problems, but it is probably conservative:

Value of Retail Sales
of Illegal Drugs in 1988

Cocaine	\$30 Billion
Heroin	\$15 Billion
Marijuana	\$20 Billion
Dangerous Drugs	\$10 Billion
TOTAL	\$75 Billion

At a guess, the range is probably \$60 to \$120 billion. Attached is a more detailed description of the estimates.

Estimated Cartel Profits in 1988

Based on the above estimate of retail sales of cocaine, we would estimate the profits of the Colombian cocaine cartels to be \$1.5 - 2.0 billion per year.

ATTACHMENT

Basis of Estimates

There are two basic approaches to estimating retail sales or consumer expenditures on drugs: consumption and supply.

A consumption-based estimate starts with survey data on number of users and frequency of use. The number of person-days of use is multiplied by an estimate of the quantity used daily by different users, to obtain an estimate of amounts used or consumed. This is then multiplied by an estimate of the unit price of the drug to produce an estimate of retail sales. Survey data is relatively "hard" data. However, the survey may understate use, and it excludes some populations (e.g., the homeless, prisoners) who are more likely than average to be drug users. Estimates of quantities used by particular types of users are very judgmental. Price estimates (from DEA, the only source) are very soft. The result is a detailed calculation which produce range which is of uncertain quality.

Supply-based estimates are much simpler. They start with an estimate of amounts shipped to (or produced in) the U.S. and subtract amounts seized, to obtain a proxy estimate of amounts used or consumed. This is multiplied by (the same) estimate of the unit price of the drug to produce an estimate of retail sales. This method has the virtue of simplicity. However, the estimates of amounts shipped are very difficult and may or may not be reasonable.

Generally, a comparison is made between the consumption-based and supply-based estimates, and if they are similar, a mid-point or other judgmental estimate is made. Otherwise, a strictly judgmental process is necessary.

Retail Sales Value of Cocaine, 1988

Consumption-Based Estimates

<u>Users by Frequency</u>	<u>Expenditures per User (at \$100 per gram)</u>	<u>Value in Billions</u>
Daily Users	1 gm/day \$100/day	
99,000	\$36,500/yr	\$ 3.614
Almost Daily (3-6 days per week)	1 gm/day \$500/wk	
193,000	\$26,000/yr	5.018

1-2 days per week	1 gm/day		
	\$150/wk		
569,000	\$7,800/yr	4.438	
Several times per month	1/2 gm/day		
(25-51 days per year)	\$50/day		
868,000	\$1,250 - \$2,550/yr	1.085 -	2.213
1-2 times per month	1/2 gm/day		
(12-24 days per year)	\$50/day		
675,000	\$600 - \$1,200/yr	.405 -	.810
Every other month or so	1/2 gm/day		
(6-11 days per year)	\$50/day		
1,088,000	\$300 - \$550/yr	.326 -	.598
3 to 5 days in last year	1/2 gm/day		
	\$50/day		
1,832,000	\$150 - \$250/yr	.275 -	.458
1 or 2 days in last year	1/2 gm/day		
	\$50/day		
2,884,000	\$50 - \$100/yr	.144 -	.288
		\$15.305 - \$17.437	

Calculation assumes powder price of \$100/gram.
Crack price is \$100 - \$200 per gram.
If half of cocaine is crack, range is \$15.227 - \$26.003 billion.

Consumption figures exclude: homeless, persons in residential treatment, prisons and jails, dormitories.

Supply-based Estimates

Available domestic supply estimated at 140,000 - 290,000 kg.

At \$100/gm powder price: \$14 - 29B.
If half of cocaine is crack, range is 14 - 43.5B.

Judgmental Estimate

\$30 Billion

Retail Sales Value of Heroin, 1988

Based on information from Demand Reduction, an addict uses daily and spends \$500 to \$600 per week, or \$26,000 to \$31,200 per year.

There is some controversy over the number of heroin addicts. Estimates range upwards from 500,000.

If there are 1/2 million addicts,
then the retail sales value is \$13 to 15.6 billion.

If there are 750,000 addicts,
then the retail sales value is \$19.5 to 23.4 billion.

If there are 1 million addicts,
then the retail sales value is \$26 to 31.2 billion.

Judgmental Estimate

\$15 Billion

Retail Sales Value of Marijuana

Consumption-based Estimates

Assumes a price per ounce of \$20 - 225 for commercial grade and \$120 - 300 for sinsemillia. The market is 85% commercial grade and 15% sinsemillia.

<u>Users by Frequency</u>	<u>Expenditures Per User</u>	<u>Value in Billions</u>
Daily Users	2 joints/day	
	\$1.25 - \$8.04/day	
1,964,000	\$456 - \$2,935/yr	\$.896 - 5.764
Almost Daily (3-6 days per week)	1 joint/day	
	62 cents - \$4.02/day	
2,063,000	\$162 - \$1,045/yr	.334 - 2.156
1-2 days per week	1 joint/day	
	62 cents - \$4.02/day	
2,596,000	\$48.75 - \$313.50/yr	.127 - .814
Several times per month (25-51 days per year)	1 joint/day	
	62 cents - \$4.02/day	
2,014,000	\$15.63 - \$205.02/yr	.031 - .413

1-2 times per month (12-23 days per year) 2,405,000	1 joint/day 62 cents - \$4.02/day \$7.50 - \$92.46/yr	.018 - .222
Every other month or so (6-11 days per year) 2,190,000	1 joint/day 62 cents - \$4.02/day \$3.75 - \$44.22/yr	.008 - .097
3 to 5 days in last year 2,846,000	1 joint/day 62 cents - \$4.02/day \$1.86 - \$20.10/yr	.005 - .057
1 or 2 days in last year 5,021,000	1 joint/day 62 cents - \$4.02/day \$0.62 - \$8.04/yr	.003 - .040
		\$1.400 - \$9.574

Consumption figures exclude: homeless persons in residential treatment, prisons and jails, dormitories.

Supply-based Estimates

Available domestic supply estimated at 12,130 - 16,710 metric tons.

Retail price (weighted average) \$1,234,240 - \$7,552,000
per metric ton
Value: \$14.971 - \$126.193B

Judgmental Estimate

\$20 Billion

Dangerous Drugs

A number of individual drugs are included in this category, ranging from LSD to Valium. Estimates of sales value are especially difficult because the survey data on users does not determine the frequency of use, which must then be assumed. There are no estimates of available supply.

Users of dangerous drugs: 23,263,400
(The same person may be counted several times if he or she uses more than one drug.)

Retail prices per dose range from \$1 to \$20.

If the average user of any one drug uses it once a week and the average price is \$5, retail sales value is \$6.048 billion.

If the average user of any one drug uses it twice a week and the average price is \$7.50, retail sales value is \$18.145.

Judgmental Estimate

\$10 Billion

Estimate of Annual Profits of Colombian Cartels

In estimating annual profits, we assumed that all cocaine processing and shipment is controlled by the cartels until it lands in the United States, and computed gross sales by the cartel of \$2.4 billion. This calculation is based on the structure of the cocaine market and the relationship of "landed" price to "street" price as identified in the work of Peter Reuter (RAND Corporation) and Mark Kleiman (Harvard):

Import price per kilo ("landed")	\$ 20,000
Retail price--1 gram units	\$250,000

We then subtracted costs to the cartel--to pay farmers, bribe Colombian military officials, compensate pilots, etc.--from the gross sales of the cartel to compute profits. We assume that costs account for about 25% of the "landed" price, and that 75% of the "landed" price is profit.