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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:	Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:	Cabinet Agencies Files

OA/ID Number:	29186
Folder ID Number:	29186-002

Folder Title:
Baker (State Department) (1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	25	6	3

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo	From E. Rowny to John Sununu Re: Washington Times June 8 Article (1 pp.)	6/8/90	P 3	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker (State Department) (1990)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/13/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 8, 1990

TO: The Honorable John H. Sununu

FROM: E. Rowny (e)

SUBJECT: Washington Times June 8 Article

Bill Gertz has sensationally distorted a response I gave to a question in what I believed was an off the record seminar and closed to the press, at an American Bar Association meeting.

The thrust of my remarks, which Gertz did quote correctly, reads: "We still have a very good opportunity and every expectation that we can reach a START Treaty that will be in our interest".

I am as angry and embarrassed by this reckless newspaper writing as I know you must be.

United States Department of State

*The Chief of Protocol
Washington, D.C. 20520*

June 29, 1990

MEMORANDUM

TO : The Chief of Staff
FROM : The Chief of Protocol
SUBJECT : Portal-to-Portal vehicle usage for
The Chief of Protocol

For your information, I attach a copy of the memorandum sent to me by J. Bonnie Newman and my memorandum of transmittal to the chief administrative officer of the Office of The Chief of Protocol for proper execution.

I want to thank you profoundly for your help and support. It is a matter that impinges directly on the best possible performance of this Office and I delight that the continuation of this special privilege will help me to better serve our Chief Executive and our nation.

With appreciation to you and your staff and warmest personal regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1990

JUN 26 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR JOSEPH VERNER REED
CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

FROM:

J. BONNIE NEWMAN *Bonnie Newman*
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT:

Portal-to-Portal Transportation

This is to formally advise you that, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1344, the President has authorized the use of a government vehicle to provide you with home to work transportation through calendar year 1990. You will need to resubmit your request by December 1, 1990, in order to obtain such transportation for the next calendar year.

The use of this privilege is limited to those situations in which use of such transportation would be appreciably more efficient than alternative arrangements.

Internal Revenue Service regulations require that the personal use of an employer-provided vehicle be reported as a taxable, non-cash fringe benefit. An employer may elect either to withhold income tax, or not, for the value of this fringe benefit; pursuant to Public Law 99-44 § 3. You may wish to discuss this issue with the payroll office at the Department of State.

United States Department of State

The Chief of Protocol
Washington, D.C. 20520

June 29, 1990

MEMORANDUM

TO : Kathleen J. Mullen
Assistant Chief of Protocol
for Administration

FROM : The ~~Chief~~ of Protocol

SUBJECT : Portal-to-Portal vehicle usage for
The Chief of Protocol

With respect to our pending application for the renewal of the Presidential authorization for portal-to-portal usage of the vehicle assigned to The Chief of Protocol (your memorandum of March 22, 1989 to the White House), I attach the requisite authorization from the White House for the period ending December 31, 1990.

Please note that we are requested to submit our application for the renewal of this privilege for the period commencing January 1, 1991, no later than December 1, 1990.

Please note also that such usage must be limited to occasions when, "the use of such transportation would be appreciably more efficient than alternative arrangements" -- i.e., to those situations in which it is most related to the necessity and convenience of government for the proper execution of the official duties of this office.

As you know, such guidelines have governed the use of this vehicle since my accession to the post. In order to insure that the proper tax and accounting considerations, as noted in the White House memorandum, are taken into consideration with regard to all such vehicle usage, I should appreciate your reviewing the relevant logs so that any exception can be identified and proper steps taken.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to Secretary Brady Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)	6/29/90	P 5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker (State Department) (1990)

Open on Expiration of PRA
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 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 29, 1990

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY BRADY
GOVERNOR SUNUNU
BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JAMES A. BAKER, III



The attached is self-explanatory, but sounds to me like it might not be a bad idea to emphasize the importance we attach to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round.

This would be an exceptional event that would be designed simply to send a strong message -- not to create a precedent or to result in trade ministers attending regularly scheduled summit sessions.

It could afford a way to enhance public support and attention for one of our primary goals.

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Memo	From Clayton Yeutter to James Baker Re: Uruguay Round (1 pp.)	6/19/90	P 5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
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THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
WASHINGTON
20250-0100

June 19, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER III
SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM: CLAYTON YEUTTER 

Jim, I mentioned this to Dick McCormack on the airplane a couple of weeks ago, but wanted to follow up with a note to you. Senator Bentsen's recent letter strongly recommending that Ambassador Hills be invited to participate at the Summit reminded me to do this.

I'm told that near the end of the Tokyo Round (1978 I believe) the applicable trade ministers were called to the summit on very short notice, and instructed by the chiefs of state to promptly bring the Round to a successful conclusion. You may wish to consider repeating this at Houston, particularly in view of the wide disagreements on agriculture which surfaced at the OECD Ministerial.

Frans Andriessen will already be there as your counterpart, and he can represent the entire European Community since the Uruguay Round negotiations are in his portfolio. I'm told that the Japanese will be bringing Muto, the MITI Minister, so he'll already be on the scene. That means you are missing only Carla and John Crosbie of Canada. Since both of them are nearby it would be very easy to call them to Houston to join Andriessen and Muto in receiving such a message.

Following this format, or something like it, will also avoid the problem of adding the trade ministers (or anybody else) as official members of the delegation.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1990

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Transmittal of the Verification Protocols to the Senate for Advice and Consent

Purpose

To submit the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

Background

Secretary of State Baker has forwarded the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties for your transmittal to the Senate requesting its advice and consent to ratification of the two treaties (Tab C). The treaties themselves were submitted to the Senate by the previous Administration, but were held awaiting completion of these protocols.

Attached for your signature is your transmittal message to the Senate (Tab A), which also forwards the State Department report on the protocols (Tab B) and the text of the protocols (Tab C).

You and President Gorbachev signed the protocols at the Washington summit, clearing the way for ratification of the two treaties which were signed in 1974 and 1976. We anticipate Senate hearings beginning later in July and floor action when Congress returns after the August recess.

We do not expect there to be any important problems with ratification -- the protocols give both sides the right to use very accurate methods to measure the yield of tests, correcting the verification shortcomings in the original treaties. That said, the ratification debate will provide a forum for those Members of Congress who oppose nuclear testing and oppose your policy of gaining some experience with these treaties before negotiating further limitations on nuclear testing.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Transmittal Message to the Senate (Tab A).

Attachments

Tab A	Transmittal Message to the Senate
Tab B	Secretary Baker's Memo to the President
Tab C	Protocols to the TTBT and PNET

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (the Protocols). The Protocols were signed at Washington on June 1, 1990. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the Report of the Department of State on the Protocols.

The Protocols provide for effective verification of compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, signed on July 3, 1974, and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, signed on May 28, 1976. These Treaties, which limit the yield of nuclear weapon tests and individual nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to no more than 150 kilotons, were transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on July 29, 1976. The Protocols replace, and should be substituted for, the Protocols that were submitted with the Treaties at that time. In addition, the Administration remains committed to the nuclear testing

treaty safeguards that were submitted to the Senate in 1987, which are essential to the national security and to the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent.

The Protocols represent the successful culmination of several years of effort to provide for effective verification of compliance with the Treaties. Negotiations to develop new Protocols to verify compliance with the limits established by the Treaties began in November 1987 and continued until May 1990, when the Protocols were completed. The Protocols provide for a variety of activities related to verification, including the use of the hydrodynamic yield measurement method. Operational changes in the U.S. nuclear test program, including changes at the Nevada Test Site, which implementation of the verification measures will entail were considered carefully and have been judged manageable and therefore acceptable in the interests of effective verification.

I believe these Treaties are in the national interest. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Treaties including their Protocols and to give its advice and consent to their ratification.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

S/S 9014298
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1990

The President:

I have the honor to submit to you the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, and the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (the Protocols). Accompanying this Report are section by section analyses of the Protocols. I recommend that you transmit the Protocols to the Senate for their advice and consent to ratification.

The Protocols implement, and provide for effective verification of compliance with, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (TTBT) signed on July 3, 1974, and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET) signed on May 28, 1976. Those two Treaties, which limit the yield of nuclear weapon tests and individual explosions for peaceful purposes to no more than 150 kilotons, were

The President,

The White House

transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on July 29, 1976. (Executive N, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1976.) Committee hearings were held in the summer of 1977, but at the request of the Administration in 1978, the Treaties were not reported for consideration by the full Senate.

On January 13, 1987, President Reagan requested that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the two Treaties, subject to the condition that ratification be deferred until additional agreements ensuring effective verification of the Treaties could be negotiated and submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Together with its request for advice and consent to ratification in 1987, the Administration provided the Senate with a list of nuclear testing treaty safeguards. (Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 305.) The Administration considers safeguards essential to ensuring the nation's ability to retain the technical means and knowledge necessary to support the nuclear deterrent and existing and future national security policies and therefore remains committed to these safeguards.

Negotiations to establish effective verification measures for the TTBT and the PNET began in November 1987. The two new Protocols were negotiated in the six rounds of Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) which continued until May 1990. As part of the NTT, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement in 1988 providing for a Joint Verification Experiment under

which each side used the hydrodynamic yield measurement method to measure the yield of a nuclear test at the other side's nuclear weapon test site. At the 1989 ministerial meeting at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle on the routine use of on-site hydrodynamic yield measurements and in-country seismic monitoring with respect to verification of the TTBT. The two Protocols were signed on June 1, 1990, at the Washington Summit. The Protocols, submitted herewith, provide for the effective verification sought by this Administration and the previous Administration.

The Protocol to the TTBT is an integral part of the TTBT; it would enter into force at the same time as the TTBT and remain in force as long as the TTBT remains in force. The Protocol to the PNET is similarly an integral part of the PNET. Although the two Treaties and their respective Protocols complement each other, the Protocols were negotiated separately and they deal with fundamentally different nuclear programs. Each Protocol stands on its own.

The TTBT and its Protocol deal with nuclear weapon tests, while the PNET and its Protocol deal with nuclear explosions having non-military applications, such as oil and gas extraction. The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes since 1973 and has no plans to conduct such explosions in the future. The Soviet Union has not announced a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes since 1988.

The new Protocols replace, and should be substituted for, the Protocols that were transmitted to

the Senate with the Treaties on July 29, 1976. However, the Agreed Statement relating to paragraph 2(c) of Article III of the PNET, signed on May 13, 1976, and transmitted to the Senate on July 29, 1976, will apply to the PNET as originally contemplated. The understanding regarding slight, unintended breaches of the 150-kiloton limit established by the TTBT remains part of the transmittal documents accompanying the original transmittal of the TTBT for Senate advice and consent to ratification and the associated public record.

The new Protocols provide for unprecedented on-site and in-country verification measures designed to ensure verification of compliance with the TTBT and the PNET. Each Protocol provides the right to use the hydrodynamic yield measurement method with respect to all tests or explosions having a planned yield exceeding 50 kilotons, so that the 150-kiloton yield limitation established by the TTBT and the PNET can be effectively verified. The TTBT Protocol also provides the right for in-country seismic monitoring of all tests having planned yields exceeding 50 kilotons. Each Protocol also provides the right to on-site inspection with respect to all tests or explosions having planned yields exceeding 35 kilotons. The PNET Protocol permits the temporary deployment of a local seismic network for specified group explosions, to confirm the declared number of explosions in the group. In addition, the Protocols place constraints on tests and explosions in cavities, tests that include two or more explosions, group explosions, and weapon tests in configurations that raise special verification concerns. Furthermore, each

Protocol requires an extensive information exchange with respect to each test or explosion subject to verification measures, and establishes means of validating the information provided. Each Protocol specifies in precise detail the procedures to be followed in the exercise of the verification rights provided. Finally, the Protocols provide for a bilateral Coordinating Group to be established for each test or explosion for peaceful purposes, to coordinate the activities of personnel of both Parties and to deal with any questions that may arise. Also enclosed, for the information of the Senate, are letters exchanged by the Heads of Delegation to the Nuclear Testing Talks, which will implement certain aspects of the TTBT Protocol.

Agencies concerned with U.S. weapon development programs participated throughout the negotiation of the Protocols. In addition, experts from our national weapon laboratories served as technical advisers throughout this negotiation. Operational changes in the U.S. nuclear test program, including changes at the Nevada Test Site, which implementation of the verification measures will entail were considered carefully and have been judged manageable and therefore acceptable in the interests of effective verification.

The Protocols submitted herewith will provide effective verification of compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, and are in the

national interest. Accordingly, I recommend that you transmit the Protocols to the Senate at the earliest possible date for their advice and consent to ratification.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James A. Baker III". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "James A. Baker III".

Enclosures: As stated.

June 22, 1990

SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION
OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

The Protocol consists of a preamble and thirteen sections,
organized as follows:

Section I.	Definitions
Section II.	Test Sites
Section III.	Verification Measures
Section IV.	Notifications and Information Relating to Tests
Section V.	Hydrodynamic Yield Measurement Method
Section VI.	Seismic Yield Measurement Method
Section VII.	On-Site Inspection
Section VIII.	Equipment
Section IX.	Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel
Section X.	Entry, Transport, Food, Lodging, and Provision of Services for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel
Section XI.	Procedures for Consultation and Coordination
Section XII.	Release of Information
Section XIII.	Entry Into Force

June 22, 1990

SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE
PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON UNDERGROUND
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

The Protocol consists of a preamble and thirteen sections,
organized as follows:

Section I.	Definitions
Section II.	Explosion Depth and Composition
Section III.	Verification Measures
Section IV.	Notifications and Information Relating to Explosions
Section V.	Hydrodynamic Yield Measurement Method
Section VI.	Local Seismic Network
Section VII.	On-Site Inspection
Section VIII.	Equipment
Section IX.	Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel
Section X.	Entry, Transport, Food, Lodging and Provision of Services for Designated Personnel and Transport Personnel
Section XI.	Procedures for Consultation and Coordination
Section XII.	Release of Information
Section XIII.	Entry Into Force



UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS

Geneva, Switzerland

May 24, 1990

Mr. Igor Palenykh
Head of USSR Delegation to the
Nuclear Testing Talks

Dear Mr. Palenykh,

In preparing for the use of the seismic yield measurement method in accordance with the Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, the U.S. side has identified the conditions and technical requirements for the installation and operation of its seismic equipment at the three Designated Seismic Stations identified by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the letters exchanged by the Sides in Moscow on February 8, 1990. These conditions and requirements are set forth in the document dated May 9, 1990, entitled "Technical Requirements for the Installation and Operation of Seismic Equipment of the U.S. Side at Designated Seismic Stations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This document is attached to this letter.

The U.S. side has received the document of May 9, 1990, prepared by the Soviet side, entitled "Technical Requirements for the Installation and operation of Seismic Equipment of the Soviet Side at Designated Seismic Stations of the United States of America." For purposes of planning and preparation of the implementation for the provisions contained in the protocol, this document is acceptable to the U.S. side.

With respect to the need to prepare the facilities at the Designated Seismic Stations of the United States of America for use by the Soviet side in exercising its rights under the Protocol, the U.S. side confirms the understanding that this planning and preparation will proceed in three stages.

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Confirming the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of July 3, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Convinced of the necessity to ensure effective verification of compliance with the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

92

Dr. [unclear]

PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Confirming the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of May 28, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Taking into account the fact that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are conducted outside national nuclear test sites under various geological conditions,

Convinced of the necessity to ensure effective verification of compliance with the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

92

Stavitsky

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 1, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN H. SUNUNU 

SUBJECT: Home-to-Work Transportation for Chief of Protocol

Issue: Whether to grant the request from the Chief of Protocol, U.S. Department of State, that he be designated as eligible to receive home-to-work transportation.

Background: By statute, you may designate ten officers and employees of federal agencies as eligible for such transportation. (These ten designations are in addition to the Executive Office of the President designations that you have already made.) Thus far, you have not used this authority.


Ambassador Joseph Verner Reed has again requested that you designate him as eligible for such transportation. He has made the case that this transportation is necessary for him to be effective in carrying out his diplomatic functions. His most recent memorandum on this subject is attached.

Proposed Decision: I recommend that the Chief of Protocol be granted portal-to-portal transportation, effective immediately, but limited to those situations in which it is most related to the necessity and convenience of the government -- i.e. when the use of such transportation would be appreciably more efficient than alternative arrangements. This would be the case, for example, when he is proceeding from his home directly to an official government arrival ceremony at which he is required to use a government car. The need in these circumstances is demonstrably legitimate.

Concur 

Do not concur _____

Let's discuss _____

Attachment 

United States Department of State

*The Chief of Protocol
Washington, D.C. 20520*

March 30, 1990

MEMORANDUM

TO : The Chief of Staff
FROM : The Chief of Protocol
RE : Authorized Transportation

The Chief of Protocol of the White House holds a position that is unique in government. It is a position that must conform to the obligations which are incumbent on host nations under international law, practice, custom, conventions and protocols. As the officer of the United States Government charged with the responsibility of overseeing the diplomatic corps, the Chief must be immediately available to all members of this corps on a twenty-four hour basis, seven days a week for both ordinary and extraordinary circumstances.

In requesting authorization for a motor vehicle for the Chief of Protocol, then Secretary of State Shultz made the point that the Chief "holds a position which is unique in the federal government."

Under universal diplomatic usage and custom, the Chief must also be/at the disposition and convenience of the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State in connection with their duties to receive chiefs of state and dignitaries of other nations, to themselves travel to other nations, and to receive and treat with the representatives of foreign nations accredited to the White House.

The unrestricted availability of a motor vehicle to the Chief has been the uninterrupted practice of every Administration stretching back to the time when such vehicles were first authorized for government business.

In the same document quoted above (letter to the Chief of Staff of the White House, dated June 13, 1986 from Secretary Shultz) (copy attached), in requesting the requisite Presidential authorization for such a vehicle under 31 USC 1344 (b) (1), (B) and (C), wrote, "It is imperative that the Chief of Protocol be one of the ten Executive Department officials that may be authorized transportation by the President." He concluded: "The Chief would be unable to perform the job effectively without authorized transportation."

It is respectfully requested that the requisite Presidential approval be renewed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

January 25, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR JOSEPH V. REED

FROM: J. BONNIE NEWMAN *J. Bonnie Newman*
Assistant to the President for Management
and Administration

SUBJECT: White House Privileges

This responds to your memorandum of January 17 requesting certain White House privileges for you and your deputy, Jennifer Fitzgerald.

I am pleased to advise that White House passes will be issued, and your White House drop lines have been approved.

Although you will not be a member of the Mess, you will be accommodated on a case-by-case basis.

With regard to portal-to-portal transportation, the Chief of Protocol is not eligible for such transportation at this time.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Letter	From James Baker to Richard Darman Re: Funding levels for State Department Programs (1 pp.)	4/18/90	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker (State Department) (1990)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By JP (NLGB) on 5/12/05

Date Closed:	12/13/2004	OA/ID Number:	29186-002
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 18, 1990


Dear Dick:

Pursuant to our discussion late last week with Brent and John about repeal of Section 614 of the Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990 (Public Law 101-162), I have arrived at a "bottom line" position -- the lowest numbers I believe we can live with. I am encouraged that you believe Senator Byrd will support a repeal of Section 614 without offsets if we are willing to reduce the amount we are requesting. In that regard, assuming you are comfortable, we can accomplish this by reducing the amount needed, according to CBO's initial estimate, by \$161 million in budget authority (from a total of \$363 million) and \$73 million (from a total of \$258 million) in outlays.

As a result of CBO scorekeeping and the complicated legal issues involved, reaching a compromise is not as simple as just coming up with a set of numbers. I understand OMB has suggested legislative language that would repeal 614 except for Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) and Acquisition and Maintenance of Foreign Buildings Abroad (FBO). For these accounts, the language would allow us to remain at current operating levels, i.e., continue at the level of funding already made available by Treasury and OMB. Dick, in order to support this legislative proposal, I need your assurance that OMB will work closely with Treasury to guarantee that currently available levels for CIPA and FBO are maintained; and with the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), so that these levels will be used to establish baselines for the two accounts for FY 1991. Finally, our goal must be to seek agreement from OMB, CBO, and Congressional staff that the basis for Continuing Resolution treatment of FBO and CIPA will be the currently available numbers.

If this package is agreeable with you, let me know how I can help you move it forward.

Sincerely,



James A. Baker, III

The Honorable
Richard G. Darman,
Director,
Office of Management and Budget.

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

ECONOMIC INFORMATION FOR PRESIDENT CRISTIANI
AND PRESIDENT BUSH MEETING

TOPIC: ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1. The level of military assistance (grants) was projected at around US\$ 97 million in 1990. The Economic Support Fund (ESF), which is the balance of payments assistance program, was cut by US\$ 51 million in 1990 from its 1989 level.

If the military assistance is cut in half, El Salvador's aid would be reduced from its projected level by about US\$ 100 million in a one year period.

2. The Government Economic and Social Plan for 1989-1994, includes structural reforms to increase the country's export base and reduce its large dependency on foreign assistance. However, the result of this effort will take some years to materialize. Presently, the external sector of El Salvador shows a large disequilibrium. Despite a recovery in coffee production, the significant drop in coffee prices in the international market will entail a loss in exports earnings of about US\$ 130 million in 1990. International reserves are at a critical level and inherited external arrears surpass US\$ 110 million.

The reduction in ESF assistance further enlarged the projected external sector deficit. This gap is expected to be financed mainly with resources provided through programs with the IMF and the World Bank. However, a cut in military assistance would be a serious blow to the recently negotiated stand-by program with the IMF and puts in jeopardy the Structural Adjustment Loan that is being negotiated with the World Bank. These programs assume a certain level of external resources to support the Government's effort to reorient the economy, finance the government budget, and to reduce the initial social and economic costs of the adjustment.

3. Considering the difficult economic situation, the strong commitment of the GOES to reduce the social and macroeconomic disequilibria, and the fragile social balance, it is necessary for El Salvador to receive the volume of U.S. assistance as originally programmed. In the event that the military assistance cut is approved by the U.S. Congress, there would

be the need to increase the ESF program assistance by the same proportion. This increase in ESF is critical to avoid the collapse of the GOES economic program including a reduction in social expenditure to finance defense outlays.

The GOES is committed to improve the economic, social and legal conditions in El Salvador because it is fully aware that this is the only way to strengthen the democratic process and to build a solid base towards a long lasting peace. A further cut in U.S. aid at this critical moment may create social unrest and make the peace process even more difficult.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Note	From James Baker to John Sununu Re: Letter from George Mitchell (1 pp.)	4/2/90	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: Cabinet Agencies Files
WHORM Cat.:
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1990

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

NOTE FOR JOHN H. SUNUNU ✓
BRENT SCOWCROFT
RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

This just arrived today. While there are obvious potential problems here, this may also present us with an opportunity.

We need to decide on our response. In the meantime, I've sent the attached acknowledgement.

Attachments

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 2, 1990

Dear George:

Thank you for your note. I think you suggest an idea that we need seriously to consider. It's important to develop a consensus between us on foreign assistance over the next several years. We obviously now have new challenges and new demands that require a different approach to foreign assistance.

At the same time, while I welcome our getting together and devising a common approach for the next several years, we cannot condition the assistance package for Panama and Nicaragua on our achievement of a longer term approach. Their needs are immediate and we simply cannot put off providing assistance without jeopardizing democracy in each country.

So I look forward to working with you to see if we can bring the Executive and Legislative branches together on foreign assistance and I'll be in touch with you soon on that.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jim".

James A. Baker, III

The Honorable George Mitchell
Majority Leader
United States Senate

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, DC 20510-7010

April 2, 1990

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Jim:

In response to your recent request that the Senate move expeditiously to consider the President's call for emergency aid to Panama and Nicaragua, I discussed the matter with the Chairmen of the appropriate committees and subcommittees; and the Foreign Relations Committee has reported out a bill which authorizes substantially what the Administration requested for the two countries. I hope to bring this bill to the floor early this week.

However, questions remain about the overall long-term goals of our foreign aid, and how the money for Panama and Nicaragua will be specifically utilized. In this regard, it would be extremely helpful to me, to the Chairmen of the Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations Committees, and I believe to all Senators, if the Administration could provide us with a long-term foreign aid plan. It should be over a three or five year period and relate to all parts of the budget, including other foreign aid spending, defense spending, domestic spending, and the deficit. It should explain how this request is justified in terms of overall foreign policy goals and requirements throughout the world.

By continuing to approach foreign aid on a country by country basis and in one-shot emergency increments, the Administration has provided no overall or long-term view of how the foreign aid requests are affordable in relation to other spending plans; nor is there a clear explanation of the relationship between this request and our overall national security objectives. I believe it is essential that the Senate have such a plan before it appropriates the emergency aid requested by the Administration for Panama and Nicaragua.

Sincerely,


George J. Mitchell