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Record Group/Collection:	George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin:	Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series:	Sununu, John, Files
Subseries:	Cabinet Agencies Files

OA/ID Number:	29185
Folder ID Number:	29185-006

Folder Title:
Vice President (Kristol) (1990)

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	25	6	2

Richard Harris

MEMORANDUM TO ED ROGERS

FM: DAVE BECKWITH

SUBJ: TALKING POINTS FOR NIGHTLINE

11³⁰ set up
11⁴⁵ tape

10/2/90

Here are the points we have been stressing regarding the Veep's role in the Gulf crisis:

1. Vice President has been an active participant in every important meeting on the crisis. He was there when the President was first briefed, at Camp David that weekend when the basic strategic response was developed, at all NSC meetings.

2. He, like Bush, returned to Washington twice from his vacation to attend key meetings and contribute.

3. He undertook an important diplomatic mission, encouraged by Bush, to South America early in the crisis. He reached early understandings, with Venezuelans on increased oil production, and with Brazilians and Argentinians on stopping arms and technology flows to Iraq.

4. He has helped the President and advised him on a variety of subjects during the crisis, from Congressional relations to Israeli response to military matters. He has also taken on a greater share of the political and party-building load around the country.

For your possible use. I am adding a few specific examples of contributions to the process that the Vice President made:

1. The Vice President, from his eight years on the Senate Armed Services Committee, is an expert on several military matters, including ballistic missile proliferation. His was a consistent and strong voice, even before the invasion, warning that Saddam Hussein was a hard case with a long-range military plan.

2. The Vice President, also dating from his Senate days, is an expert on Israel. He's traveled there several times and maintains close contacts. He was able to offer a candid assessment of their reaction that proved to be accurate and helpful to the President.

3. He was also exceptionally helpful, as he always is, in gauging Congressional reaction, measuring responses on the War Powers resolution, in assessing and solidifying Congressional support.

4. When he went to Colombia for the President early on, he achieved a breakthrough at his lunch in Bogota with Carlos Andres Peres of Venezuela. It was the first indication we'd received that Venezuela and other OPEC countries would increase oil production to make up for the Iraq-Kuwait shortfall, and the Vice President's personal relationship with Peres helped solicit his leadership in that. He also helped cement the arms and technology embargo against Iraq by talking with leaders from Brazil and Argentina on that trip.

5. Overall, the Vice President has sound judgment. The President wants him included in every important meeting because he wants his advice.

(Ed: Bill Kristol, Spence, myself and the Veep will be on AF II from about 7 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. EDT and reachable Monday. I've asked Craig Whitney to coordinate with you to get a tape recording of the Governor's remarks, which we will transcribe. Many thanks to both of you.)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Note	From Bill Kristol to John Sununu Re: Article in "New Republic" (1 pp.)	4/18/90	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Vice President
 (Kristol) (1990)

Open on Expiration of PRA
 (Document Follows)
 By *JH* (NLGB) on 10/28/05

Date Closed:	12/16/2004	OA/ID Number:	29185-006
FOIA/SYS Case #:	1998-0004-F[1]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:	2005-0426-S	Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

April 18, 1990

NOTE TO: JOHN SUNUNU

FROM: BILL KRISTOL *WK*

JS kept Article

Here's the somewhat reasonable piece on the environment (by a "liberal skeptic") from the New Republic that I mentioned yesterday. I'd be glad to help work on putting together a group of people on the outside and a strategy that could get a more rational debate going in this area.

cc: The Vice President
Michael Boskin
Andy Card
Dick Darman
Boyden Gray
Roger Porter

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From Lawrence Lindsey to the President's Council on Competitiveness Re: Orphan Drug Legislation (1 pp.)	5/10/90	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Vice President
(Kristol) (1990)

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By JP (NLGB) on 10/28/05

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

THE CHIEF of STAFF
has seen

May 10, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS

FROM: LAWRENCE LINDSEY 4
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Orphan Drug Legislation

The Council's Working Group on Biotechnology met on Tuesday to consider Congressman Waxman's proposed Amendments to the Orphan Drug Act. The Working Group unanimously agreed on four principles:

1. The Orphan Drug Act has been an effective mechanism in furthering research and development on drugs for rare diseases and conditions and should not be altered in any fundamental manner.
2. The Working Group does not believe that current legislative proposals will prove successful at improving the Act's administration or effectiveness.
3. The Working Group is strongly opposed to any measure that would retroactively remove rights assigned under the Act.
4. The Working Group urges the Food and Drug Administration to continue to refine its efforts to implement the Act in a manner that limits its special provisions to development of treatments for patient populations of fewer than 200,000 persons.

I ask you to review these four principles and hope they meet your approval. If you do have any comments, please let me (456-6402) know by close of business Friday, May 11, 1990. The Vice President would like to be able to forward to the President as soon as possible these recommendations for Administration policy on proposed revisions to the Orphan Drug Act.

cc: Secretary Sullivan
Secretary Yeutter
Administrator Reilly

"approve"
JHS
Passed to
Lindsey
5/11



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1989

NOTE TO GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: BILL KRISTOL *UK*

I think you'll find this a useful update on where we stand on follow through on the President's July 20th proposal for sustained manned exploration of space. This memo was worked out in coordination with Bob Grady (for Dick Darman) and Allan Bromley; so it represents a consensus Space Council-OMB-OSTP view.

If you think it appropriate, feel free to share this with others and/or pass it on to the President.

Space
file
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	From Mark Albrecht to the Vice President Re: Policy Planning for Human Space Exploration (4 pp.)	10/13/89	P5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Sununu, John, Files
Subseries: White House Offices File
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Vice President
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NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

October 13, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MARK J. ALBRECHT 

SUBJECT:

Policy Planning for Human Space Exploration

In his July 20, 1989 speech commemorating Apollo 11, the President outlined a long-term plan for a sustained expansion of manned presence beyond Earth Orbit into the Solar System. He also tasked you to lead the Space Council in determining specifically what is needed for this next round of exploration -- money, manpower, material, the feasibility of international cooperation, timetables and milestones along the way. The purpose of this memorandum is to report on proposed actions to implement that direction, agreed upon between my office, OMB and OSTP.

There are many alternative paths to the future the President described, and there are many important considerations that must be included in making a commitment of this magnitude. Therefore, it is vital that we provide the President now with the information he will need to choose the best path for man's journey to the stars. A path that meets his goals not only for the Moon and Mars, but for enhancing America's technological future, our children's education, and his vision of global partnership.

This will take time and it will require many decisions, some of which the President alone can make. We will be making critical choices on the basic scope and nature of this program for several years to come, but what we must do now is start setting the overall direction of the effort, asking the right questions, pursuing the right answers, establishing the right institutions, and building the enduring consensus required to meet the President's goals.

Over the coming months, we will define overall exploration program options, identifying enabling technologies and setting realistic and achievable resource strategies. As we do so, we will seek the President's guidance on several critical program shaping issues.

It would be a mistake in my opinion for us to rush to embrace a specific program plan now, a program that might prematurely foreclose options, constrain technology, and lock us into a single path for 20 or 30 years. Historically, our experience with major scientific and technological initiatives, especially those with long-term resource requirements, has taught us that premature commitments inevitably lead to schedule delays, cost growth, loss of capability, and erosion of public support. We must resist the temptation to answer all questions at once and too soon. This approach is responsible and prudent, and the one I believe that will lead ultimately to success. However, we can and should provide more detail on our strategy, our goals and our intentions for global participation. We have planned these activities so that they can be integrated into the President's proposed FY91 budget.

Accordingly, I suggest that we seek the President's decisions in the next few months on overall guidance and direction for future detailed mission planning. Working closely with OMB, OSTP and NASA, and other agencies where appropriate, we have set in motion a process which will frame the major policy issues for the President's consideration.

Major Policy Issues

We have identified three major policy issues that will require Presidential decision: mission planning, international participation, and management.

1. Mission Planning. We believe that it is important that the Space Council develop and present to the President a set of specific goals and objectives for the Moon/Mars initiative and a range of approaches to achieve them. There are a number of complex trade-offs among mission objectives, technology, schedule, cost and budget. Possible approaches include a program with fixed target dates as President Kennedy set for Apollo, a program with a fixed budget target (and no fixed schedule), or a program focused on achieving new technology "breakthroughs" prior to committing to specific program milestones.

Based on our preliminary analysis, we believe it would be premature to define a baseline program with specific costs and schedules. However, in cooperation with NASA, we are examining the elements of a potential baseline mission plan, including detailed information on technology, schedule, cost and budget. Our goal is to ensure that all the feasible technical options are fully considered and that real, robust alternatives are developed for the President's consideration.

One particular issue that will require special attention is the relationship of Space Station Freedom to the longer term plans for exploring the Moon and Mars. NASA believes that the Space Station should be the principal depot for launching exploration missions. Our European and Japanese partners, as well as many in our own scientific community, are concerned that refocusing of the Space Station to support exploration will diminish its ability to serve as a suitable platform for "microgravity" research experiments in their planned laboratory modules. **Developing a rational defensible strategy for Space Station Freedom within the context of the President's exploration initiative will be a key task for the Council.**

2. International Participation. We believe that international participation could have significant benefits in terms of pooling financial, technical, and human resources, and in terms of advancing foreign policy objectives. We plan to consider various types and levels of cooperation. **We are examining the broad outlines of possible cooperative programs, both with our friends and allies and with the Soviet Union.** This will lead to a realistic understanding of the potential technical, financial, and political benefits and attendant risks.

3. Management. The third area we are examining involves management. **Our current space program infrastructure must be examined in-depth to determine how it may need to be adapted to meet the challenge of the Moon/Mars exploration initiative.** We are examining such factors as: attracting and retaining our Nation's best scientists and engineers; managing complex technical acquisitions in a streamlined fashion; creating management structures that can adapt to change while minimizing the need for large permanent infrastructure; and mobilizing the country's technical and industrial strengths in support of this initiative, and in particular, making maximum use of the resources of the private sector.

Next Steps and Schedule

Our current plans involve the following next steps:

- o We convene a meeting of the National Space Council within the next several weeks to initiate formally the process of options development.
- o Space Council staff, working with OMB, OSTP, NASA and other appropriate agencies, already are developing detailed options papers. These will be presented to the full Council beginning in November.
- o Admiral Truly will provide the Council in mid-November with NASA's view on how the exploration should be structured, including their detailed technology, schedule, cost and budget data. This study will assist the Council's evaluation of exploration program options.
- o We will work closely with OMB to ensure that the Space Council's deliberations are fully integrated with the President's FY 1991 budget.

The Space Council deliberations will be modeled after the process used to develop the President's Clean Air Act legislative proposals. The President may wish to participate himself in some of these discussions prior to receiving your final recommendations.

The Council deliberations may extend into next year. However, we expect to have preliminary information by the end of this year. This would provide the opportunity, should the President choose, of addressing the human space exploration initiative in his State of the Union Address.

Conclusion

The President's call for a sustained, long-term program of manned space exploration poses a formidable challenge to the Nation. I believe the National Space Council has underway a policy planning process that will meet the challenge. Our goal is to develop realistic alternatives that will enable the President to chart the long-term course, while providing sufficient flexibility to live within tight budget constraints and to fully exploit the opportunities afforded by new technology developments.

June 30, 1989

TALKING POINTS ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

- * The President is committed to the development and deployment of Strategic Defenses when they are ready.
- * By developing the means to defend against ballistic missiles that threaten us, we also lessen the incentives for aggression thus enhancing stability and deterrence.
- * The primary obstacles to SDI can generally be categorized as technological, strategic, political and economic.

Technology and SDI

- * Though many complex scientific and engineering problems remain, there appear to be no technological show-stoppers for SDI.
- * In some areas such as kinetic kill, technological breakthroughs have been achieved. A system popularly known as Brilliant Pebbles is one example.

Strategy and SDI

- * On June 29, 1989, Vice President Quayle outlined how SDI will one day alter the strategic equation between offense and defense.
- * SDI's ultimate goal is the devaluation in the strategic utility of ballistic missiles.
- * We are seeking a more stable balance that relies increasingly on defense. It would be preferable, but not necessary, if the Soviets would work with us to develop a cooperative arrangement for making this transition.
- * Progress on strategic offensive arms reductions and strategic defense are not mutually exclusive -- on the contrary, START and SDI are complementary.
- ** In general, the more progress we make toward offensive reductions, the more we will need to rely on SDI to help us deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. SDI is an insurance policy for START.
- *** First, the Soviets' largely modern land-based ICBM force is projected to ensure them a hefty first-strike capability well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable system of strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this ICBM threat.

- *** Second, the U.S. would be better able to cope with the problem of Soviet mobile ICBMs. SDI would complement a mobile verification regime in START that most experts feel would be far from perfect.
- *** Third, the sheer complexity of the proposed START treaty will probably result in unavoidable loopholes that arms control on its own cannot plug. In turn, this situation would jeopardize treaty ratification. Strategic defenses could help plug the loopholes.
- * Finally, Strategic Defense will be the only thoroughly reliable way to address the problem of accidental, unauthorized, or third-world "madman" launches of ballistic missiles.
- ** Concerns are no longer hypothetical. The Director of Central Intelligence testified recently that up to 15 developing nations could have a ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century.
- ** The instability of many regimes raises another frightening scenario -- who has authority to release missiles during periods of intense civil strife? As the nuclear and chemical club grows, this question will be asked more often.
- ** Controlling missile technology from the supply side is not enough -- ultimately we must have the capability to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles.
- ** One interesting possibility is that with a space-based defense, the U.S. could also defend other countries against rogue launches.

Politics and Economics of SDI

- * The recent recommendation by the majority of the members of the House Armed Services Committee to cut the SDI budget by over a billion dollars is a shortsighted move.
- * Just at the time American ingenuity is starting to produce technological breakthroughs, SDI opponents are trying to reduce the funding to a level which could not sustain a viable program.
- * The strategic rationale for SDI must be made clearer to the American public and to their representatives in Congress.
- * Strategic modernization and strategic defense should not be allowed to become an either/or proposition -- as pointed out above, offenses and defenses are synergistic.

What Next?

- * In order to support a deployment decision in three or four years, the President must be able to depend on the results of his carefully designed research and development program. It must be adequately funded.
- * The program schedule for the next two years includes a number of very important tests and experiments. These include:
 - ** The first-ever test of a Neutral Particle Beam in Space.
 - ** Space tests of tracking, pointing, sensor, and communications technologies.
 - ** Numerous interceptor tests for kinetic kill systems such as Brilliant Pebbles.
- * All these early tests comply with the ABM Treaty. Later on, however, tests that fall outside the Treaty will be required before the President can confidently make a deployment decision.

Bottom Line

- * The Congress and the public it serves must come to recognize that SDI is one of several answers to the many strategic problems the U.S. faces going into the next century.
 - ** SDI would dramatically reduce the risk of nuclear war by denying an aggressor the ability to execute a first strike.
 - ** SDI would provide the American people with much-needed insurance against an accidental or inadvertent attack or against a deliberate launch by an irrational government.
- * The Bush Administration continues to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20270

January 11, 1989

MEMORANDUM

TO: George Bush

FROM: Dan Quayle

SUBJECT: Presidential Council on Competitiveness

I recommend that you establish a Presidential Council on Competitiveness, chaired by the Vice President, which could perform some of the functions of the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, but give a different focus to our efforts to move the economy forward.

The rationale for this change is that much of the regulatory relief effort can now be handled by OMB. A new emphasis on competitiveness could give substantial backup to OMB in continuing deregulation efforts while at the same time focusing efforts on human resource development and other issues critical to a Bush presidency.

The Council would be established by a Presidential memorandum making the following basic points:

The continued economic progress of the United States demands that we maintain and improve our international competitiveness position.

The competitive position depends on: the full development of our human resource potential; the promotion of scientific and technological progress; removal of barriers to innovation; careful assessment of any governmentally-imposed burdens on the free enterprise system; and removal of artificial barriers to the flow of trade.

In order to ensure that our policies are consistent with these basic objectives, there is established the Presidential Council on Competitiveness. The Council will be chaired by the Vice President and shall include: the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Domestic Policy Council, the Chairman of the Council on Economic Advisers, the Director of OMB and the Special Trade Representative.

It shall be the function of the Council to review proposed budget, regulatory or legislative initiatives to ensure their consistency with the purposes of this order. Matters may be brought to the Council at the direction of the President, on its own initiative or at the request of any member.