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Moon/Mars Initiative

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 19, 1990

MOON/MARS INITIATIVE

1. Presidential Statement/Press Conference - Wednesday

2. Vice Presidential Activities:
   - satellite interviews in targetted states (CA, FL, TX, VA) - Thursday, 5-6pm at the RNC
   - letter to Hill - Whitten and Conte
     o cc all Members

3. Congressional Activities:
   - Bob Walker and Newt Gingrich to host Press Conference on Thursday followed by series of 1-minute speeches praising POTUS on initiative
   - Sen. Garn to introduce on the floor - Dole, Gramm and Wallop to speak on initiative's behalf

4. Communications Activities:
   - Op/Eds by Tom Lewis (FL - Orlando Sentinel), Buzz Aldrin (CA - L.A. Times), Robert Jastrow (MD - Baltimore Sun) Professor at Dartmouth (one of the Goddard founders) and Gene Cernan (TX - Houston Chronicle)
   - Roll Call Newspaper devoting entire Monday issue to space issues/ Sen. Garn - pro and Sen. Gore - con
   - Talking Points to Industry Leaders

5. Public Liaison Activities:
   - Trade Groups Meeting - Thursday 1-2pm/60 attendees
   - Distribute Presidential Remarks and Vice Presidential Letter
   - Announce action (letter, meeting, etc.)

6. RNC Activities:
   - Actualities in Key Districts

7. Press Office Activities:
   - Actuality - Wednesday
   - Weekend Talk Shows - all Administration spokesmen mention Moon/Mars
   - Morning Shows

8. Space Council Activities:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- Albrecht backgrounder w/ trade journalists - Tuesday
- Albrecht follow-up w/op ed writers
- Albrecht review talking points, fact sheet etc. for distribution

ED/DEB -
All - Our Research Group Came Up with
the Following - Sorry It's Late - Computer
Problems -

20 June 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR B. JAY COOPER

FROM: JACK PITNEY
JAY MUMFORD

SUBJECT: CONSTITUENCIES WITH AN INTEREST IN SPACE

The congressional districts with the greatest interest in space are the following:

Florida 11 - Bill Nelson (D) - Kennedy Space Center
Texas 9 - Jack Brooks (D) - Johnson Space Center
Texas 25 - Mike Andrews (D) - Many employees of Johnson Center
Alabama 5 - Ronnie Flippo (D) - Marshall Space Flight Center
California 22 - Carlos Moorhead (R) - Caltech, Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Maryland 5 - Steny Hoyer (D) - Goddard Space Flight Center
Mississippi 5 - Gene Taylor (D) - John C. Stennis Space Center

The ten states that receive the greatest total NASA research grants are (in descending order):

California
Texas
Massachusetts
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Maryland
Colorado
Arizona
Illinois

Within these states, space-related industries or government facilities are located in the following districts. (Those listed at the top of this memo are excluded):

Arizona 1 - Jay Rhodes (R) - high tech plants, Arizona State
Arizona 5 - Jim Kolbe (R) - high tech, University of Arizona
California 4 - Vic Fazio (D) - aerospace, UC Davis
California 9 - Pete Stark (D) - Livermore Labs, Hayward State U.
California 10 - Don Edwards (D) - part of Silicon Valley
California 12 - Tom Campbell (R) - Silicon Valley, Stanford, Ford Aerospace
California 13 - Norman Mineta (D) - Silicon Valley
California 19 - Bob Lagomarsino (R) - Vandenberg AFB
California 20 - William Thomas (R) - Edwards AFB
California 21 - Elton Gallegly (R) - Raytheon, Northrup, Rockwell
California 26 - Howard Berman (D) - Lockheed
California 30 - Matthew Martinez (D) - Light industry, high tech
California 31 - Mervyn Dymally (D) - Aerospace
California 32 - Glenn Anderson (D) - Rockwell
California 33 - David Dreier (R) - Harvey Mudd College (engineering school)
California 35 - Jerry Lewis (R) - Aerospace **member, Apps subcommittee**
California 36 - George Brown (D) - UC Riverside
California 39 - William Dannemeyer (R) - Hughes, Rockwell, Northrup
California 40 - Chris Cox (R) - high tech, UC Irvine
California 41 - Bill Lowery (R) - UCSD, Miramar NAS, aerospace
California 44 - Jim Bates (D) - North Island NAS, San Diego NAS
Colorado 2 - Dave Skaggs (D) - ATT, HP, IBM, Bell Aerospace
Colorado 4 - Hank Brown (R) - high tech
Colorado 5 - Joel Hefley (R) - USAF Academy, NORAD
Maryland 1 - Roy Dyson (D) - Naval Air Center at Patuxent
Maryland 4 - Tom McMillen (D) - US Naval Academy
Maryland 7 - Kweisei Mfume (D) - Johns Hopkins
Maryland 8 - Connie Morella (R) - Many NASA employees
Mass 1 - Silvio Conte (R) - GE
Mass 3 - Joe Early (D) - High tech
Mass 4 - Barney Frank (D) - High tech
Mass 5 - Chester Atkins (D) - High tech **member, Apps subcommittee**
Mass 8 - Joe Kennedy (D) - MIT, Harvard
Mass 9 - Joe Moakley (D) - High tech
Mass 11- Brian Donnelly (D) - high tech, hurt by departure of General Dynamics
NY 1 - George Hochbrueckner (D) - Grumman
NY 2 - Tom Downey (D) - Grumman
NY 3 - Bob Mrazek (D) - Unisys
NY 4 - Norman Lent (R) - Grumman
NY 23 - Mike McNulty (D) - RPI, SUNY/Albany
NY 29 - Frank Horton (R) - Kodak, RIT

NY 30 - Louise Slaughter (D) - Kodak, Xerox
Ohio 1 - Tom Luken (D) - GE
Ohio 3 - Tony Hall (D) - Wright-Patterson AFB
Ohio 4 - Mike Oxley (R) - General Dynamics
Ohio 12 - John Kasich (R) - OSU, McDonnell Douglas and ATT
Penn 14 - William Coyne (D) - Westinghouse, Rockwell
Texas 1 - Jim Chapman (D) - Rocket fuel **member, Apps subcommittee**
Texas 10 - Jake Pickle (D) - UT Austin, electronics
Texas 16 - Ron Coleman (D) - White Sands Missile Range
Texas 24 - Martin Frost (D) - LTV
Virginia 7 - French Slaughter (R) - UVA
Virginia 10 - Frank Wolf (R) - Pentagon, government workers

Also note:

Connecticut 3 - Bruce Morrison (D) - Yale, New Haven Science Park
Connecticut 4 - Chris Shays (R) - GTE, many corporate hqs

Census Federal Expenditures by State 1989

Table 6. Federal Government Expenditure for Other Programs, by State and Territory: Fiscal Year 1989

(Thousand dollars. Detail may not add to total because of rounding. For meaning of abbreviations and symbols see introductory text)

State and territory	Total	Grants					
		Total	Department of Health and Human Services—research programs[1]	National Science Foundation[1]	National Aeronautics and Space Administration—space program research grants	National Endowment for the Arts[1]	National Endowment for the Humanities[1]
United States, total	37,147,547	9,390,822	5,993,113	1,557,180	324,984	143,807	131,883
Alabama	379,299	122,820	94,427	6,563	8,930	468	844
Alaska	22,200	11,536	644	6,643	630	400	912
Arizona	274,626	97,070	44,195	20,838	12,081	870	1,281
Arkansas	525,935	28,083	9,257	1,304	145	-	734
California	2,915,858	1,335,965	893,177	241,479	97,881	17,291	11,919
Colorado	583,518	232,916	82,946	98,125	12,298	500	1,344
Connecticut	576,858	180,908	148,312	18,472	1,123	3,977	3,701
Delaware	41,990	15,426	2,507	6,190	1,009	72	1,773
District of Columbia	1,045,065	325,628	88,539	19,085	3,600	5,949	3,867
Florida	585,305	166,698	87,636	28,364	5,414	1,314	1,589
Georgia	506,199	122,347	79,205	18,408	4,536	2,327	1,081
Hawaii	99,765	29,668	10,309	11,943	2,944	792	557
Idaho	152,841	7,835	1,095	1,731	1,532	38	519
Illinois	2,078,378	355,279	198,219	89,875	10,336	4,117	6,628
Indiana	901,412	114,008	57,829	38,675	4,053	1,159	2,457
Iowa	2,086,278	68,830	60,139	9,833	3,504	421	835
Kansas	783,556	35,759	19,527	5,209	1,391	933	1,153
Kentucky	320,581	38,042	18,349	4,301	443	3,078	1,171
Louisiana	547,056	82,225	46,292	8,047	1,702	757	1,270
Maine	61,669	24,857	12,658	3,728	521	431	1,058
Maryland	1,685,385	472,768	406,561	33,406	12,474	3,832	3,281
Massachusetts	1,089,491	858,861	634,991	143,079	23,557	5,352	10,790
Michigan	766,080	243,057	161,862	49,289	8,524	2,065	1,893
Minnesota	2,192,945	178,739	127,836	21,831	1,979	10,882	3,240
Mississippi	400,506	28,766	6,867	3,099	2,070	179	1,531
Missouri	1,506,156	170,701	134,724	14,536	3,455	1,800	1,935
Montana	563,594	10,317	3,208	3,877	272	416	574
Nebraska	919,499	25,334	18,057	3,210	854	534	581
Nevada	40,251	12,050	3,937	2,812	359	172	439
New Hampshire	72,766	40,764	20,785	5,521	3,585	438	1,930
New Jersey	345,152	128,808	64,081	47,236	3,316	1,068	3,209
New Mexico	161,486	48,798	21,940	7,705	3,390	1,897	1,308
New York	1,866,572	1,045,983	710,024	178,326	16,649	44,490	21,065
North Carolina	523,534	297,389	236,517	29,416	7,029	914	2,416
North Dakota	763,892	14,712	2,694	1,178	61	-	808
Ohio	841,733	246,917	160,860	28,442	21,401	2,980	2,548
Oklahoma	483,393	43,917	14,897	6,929	655	178	2,090
Oregon	312,263	117,555	59,387	19,382	3,106	1,105	2,274
Pennsylvania	1,062,203	561,819	386,217	93,798	15,198	6,411	6,374
Rhode Island	83,939	49,272	27,108	16,099	1,450	332	949
South Carolina	212,536	46,580	18,839	6,990	521	1,258	2,210
South Dakota	539,312	7,129	1,170	2,349	425	-	441
Tennessee	357,782	62,279	40,736	6,384	1,929	508	506
Texas	2,360,159	412,748	282,129	52,020	25,123	4,410	3,905
Utah	218,163	129,770	55,531	13,012	1,358	2,508	1,245
Vermont	50,224	32,675	22,524	2,508	-	225	1,093
Virginia	1,056,047	175,171	96,105	33,680	13,721	877	2,663
Washington	631,668	256,311	196,808	35,592	3,873	1,681	1,815
West Virginia	104,126	56,509	6,260	32,450	264	174	578
Wisconsin	1,058,265	168,654	111,195	29,099	3,791	1,389	2,268
Wyoming	80,983	15,260	1,074	4,327	132	824	1,079
American Samoa	24	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guam	2,810	526	290	45	-	-	-
Northern Marianas	49	29	-	-	-	33	-
Puerto Rico	88,733	25,101	11,424	2,042	322	244	459
Virgin Islands	3,264	1,177	474	-	-	3	251
Undistributed	22,768	(368)	-	-	-	(368)	-

See footnotes at end of table.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

JUNE 19, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR ED ROGERS

FROM: DEB AMEND
CHRISTINA MARTIN

SUBJECT: TARGET TELEVISION MARKETS FOR SEI MESSAGE

Coordinating with OVP and Media Relations, in order to offer Vice President Quayle -- who has cleared his schedule Thursday afternoon for this purpose -- and Admiral Truly via satellite to the following markets:

California -- Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego

Texas -- Houston, Dallas

Florida -- Tampa, West Palm Beach, Orlando

Washington, D.C. -- To include Virginia and Maryland

Colorado -- Colorado Springs, Boulder, Denver

Ohio -- Columbus, Cleveland

New York -- Buffalo, Rochester

Utah -- Salt Lake City, Provo

Connecticut -- New Haven, Hartford

Minnesota -- Minneapolis/St. Paul

Washington -- Seattle

New Jersey -- Princeton

Pennsylvania -- Philadelphia

Illinois -- Chicago

STATUS AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENT'S SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE

- On December 14, 1972 Gene Cernan left man's last footprint on the moon. The Apollo program cost $100B (1990 dollars) and took eight years. During that time other, non-Apollo space efforts grew at unprecedented rates, the government hired the largest scientific force in history (and the best), and colleges and universities swelled with applicants and graduates in science and engineering. It is widely regarded as the golden age of American technology advancement.

- President Nixon later in 1972 decided against a follow-on exploration initiative to include a space station, a return to the moon and a manned journey to Mars.

- President Nixon, instead started the space shuttle program as a "stepping stone", but made no commitments beyond that development.

- President Reagan in 1984 initiated the space station program as a means of "assuring for the United States preeminence in the utilization and exploration of space".

- Early congressional criticism of the space station focused on the lack of an overall plan and strategy. In 1985 President Reagan established a national commission to provide a long range strategy.

- In January of 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded during launch, killing seven people.

- The national commission reported later in 1986 and was followed by the Ride report to NASA on America's future in space, both cited a lack of long term focus as a critical defect in our space program.

- The National Academy of Sciences wrote President-elect Bush in December, 1988 urging him to provide a long term focus for our space efforts, a durable framework to establish priorities.

- On July 20, 1989 President Bush announced a long term goal for space exploration, completion of Space Station Freedom before the end of the nineties, a return to the moon to stay, and a human exploration of Mars.

- The exploration initiative was enthusiastically received by the space community, and immediately attacked by Congressional Democrats as an unaffordable pipe dream on the one hand and too vague, without firm timetables and cost estimates on the other. The general public reception was mixed and low key.

• In the late Winter of 1990, President Bush further defined the initiative as a focused technology development program for the next few years with an objective of developing alternate approaches which promised lower costs and better performance, and he invited international cooperation. He also set a target of a manned mission to Mars no later than 2019.

• The FY 91 NASA budget request included $952M for the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). Roughly $764M of ongoing programs and $188M of new money.

• In March, 1990 the President met with Congressional leaders to discuss space and his exploration initiative.

• On Tuesday, the House subcommittee on NASA appropriations funded the bulk of the President's overall space request, but specifically and purposefully zeroed the SEI.

ISSUE:

How hard should the Administration fight for the exploration initiative within the Congress?

PRO's:

• This initiative has been the galvanizing focus of the President's thrust in space. Failure to rally about it now will show weakness and lack of commitment to the entire program.

• Having thrust the exploration gauntlet down, the entire manned effort hangs in the balance. For example, the space station is designed to provide the life science data required for manned flight beyond low earth orbit. The station is to be permanently manned. Both of these capabilities would be threatened by a rejection of long term space exploration goals. The Space Shuttle itself would come under attack as expensive and dangerous with no central purpose.

• With Japan and Europe moving out on their own manned programs, this would undermine our leadership role.

• Ultimately, the question is, if not us, who? If not now, when? Having started this, the President has to finish it.

CON's:

• The initiative has not generated a groundswell of support on the Hill. A lot of work would be required to make a floor issue of this.

- We could always do our spadework over the coming year and take it up next year, perhaps winning more popular support.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The President's speech in Huntsville, AL on Jun 21 should reinforce the President's commitment to space exploration and take strong issue with the House Committee action.

2. OMB should issue a forceful reclama to the House Appropriations Committee concerning the exploration program.

3. The Administration should work, at the summit level, to obtain the largest possible allocation for NASA.

4. The Administration position should be that money for the SEI is a requirement at any level of NASA funding.

5. The Vice President should personally contact House and Senate appropriations committee senior members to express the Administrations commitment to a strong exploration program.

6. Senior White House and OMB leadership should undertake vigorous efforts to ensure the Senate Appropriations allocation and subcommittee mark contain SEI funds.

THE ISSUE

At the Space Council meeting there was a lack of unanimity as to whether the President should announce a target date for the return to the Moon and, if so, what that date should be. The Departments of Commerce and Transportation expressed concern that setting a date too early might prematurely foreclose on our ability to develop and take advantage of new technologies and innovative approaches which could offer substantially cheaper accomplishment of goals, faster achievement of milestones, safer human involvement, and better overall performance. NASA believes that setting a date more than twenty years in the future for returning to the Moon, or not setting a date at all, could undermine public and Congressional commitment to your objectives. The Department of State expressed concern that an early date might interfere with orderly completion of the first phase of Space Station Freedom and might lead to concern on the part of our foreign Space Station partners.

The most conservative program plans we examined showed that the United States could easily return to the Moon in the first decade of the next century. Some concepts would enable us to achieve this milestone in this decade. One approach might be to set a goal of returning to the Moon as early as possible, but no later than the first decade of the next century. This will provide a motivation for those working on the program. It will also allow us several years to develop new and innovative technologies which will not only enable us to accomplish our objectives faster, cheaper, safer and better, but will also provide a boost to U.S. economic competitiveness. This approach will allow us to complete the first phase of Space Station Freedom as planned and to fully consult with our Space Station partners on how to proceed beyond this phase.

It could be particularly important to set a target date for returning to the Moon in light of apparent Japanese interest in a manned lunar exploration program. The launch of a Japanese probe to the Moon last week makes them the third nation after the United States and the Soviet Union to begin exploration of the Moon. Considerable interest and effort is underway in Japan to proceed toward a manned lunar base. If we are to deal with the Japanese cooperatively in future space exploration, setting a date now will provide our programs necessary focus and reality.

cc: Governor Sununu
Richard Darman

NATIONAL SPACE COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

January 29, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: MARK ALBRIGHT

SUBJECT: SPACE COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE PROGRAM

PURPOSE

The National Space Council has met and unanimously agreed to seven policy features of the President's Space Exploration Initiative. They were unable to agree on the question of whether the United States should set a date goal at this time for a return to the Moon. This memorandum summarizes the agreed points and reviews the various considerations for the remaining issue.

BACKGROUND

Last July 20 the President asked you to lead the National Space Council in determining what would be required for our next round of space exploration and what the feasibility of international cooperation might be. In separate analyses, the Space Council has investigated international cooperation and management issues. This memorandum deals with the program approach to be taken in the Initiative.

The President's budget submission to Congress for FY 1991 contains $1.267 billion for the Space Exploration Initiative to be directed at the manned exploration of the Moon and Mars. These resources will be divided between investments in technology, new and better means to launch payloads into space, and unmanned scientific exploration of the Moon and Mars. The overarching goals of this program are to advance U.S. leadership in the exploration and use of space for scientific, technological, and economic purposes. In addition, the budget request includes $2.627 billion to begin construction of Space Station Freedom.

At the sixth meeting of the National Space Council held on January 18, 1990, we discussed policy recommendations for the Space Exploration Initiative. You forwarded the Space Council's unanimous recommendations to the President on January 26. These recommendations are as follows:

o THE INITIATIVE WILL INCLUDE BOTH LUNAR AND MARS PROGRAM ELEMENTS.

o THE EARLY PROGRAM WILL FOCUS ON TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT WITH A SEARCH FOR NEW/INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AND TECHNOLOGIES.

Spurred by the focus on technology development, the early program would provide ancillary benefits such as strengthening U.S. capabilities in key industries, stimulating science, engineering, and mathematics education, and promoting excellence in science and engineering disciplines.

o THE PROGRAM WILL INCLUDE INVESTMENT IN HIGH LEVERAGE, INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES WITH POTENTIAL TO MAKE A MAJOR IMPACT ON COST, SCHEDULE, AND/OR PERFORMANCE.

o THE PROGRAM WILL TAKE AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS -- DEFINING TWO OR MORE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION REFERENCE ARCHITECTURES WHILE DEVELOPING AND DEMONSTRATING TECHNOLOGY BROAD ENOUGH TO SUPPORT ALL. SELECTION OF A BASELINE PROGRAM ARCHITECTURE WILL OCCUR AFTER THAT TIME.

o THE PROGRAM WILL PERFORM MISSION, CONCEPT, AND SYSTEM ANALYSIS STUDIES IN PARALLEL WITH TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.

The early stages of the program, lasting at least several years, would be devoted to laying a solid foundation for the Space Exploration Initiative. During this early phase, we would develop mission objectives, explore technology options, and analyze alternative mission scenarios and architectures. These studies would not involve formal system definition work.

The baseline architecture for human space exploration would not be selected for at least several years. In the ensuing period, a range of potential program architectures would be studied. These architectures would incorporate different technical approaches and performance capabilities (e.g., nuclear propulsion, heavy lift launch vehicles, lightweight inflatable structures, etc.).

An integral part of the early stage of this program approach would be aggressive research to develop technology. Technology development, looking at both evolutionary technologies and new/innovative approaches that could have significant effects on human exploration schedule, cost, risk and/or performance, would be undertaken, subject to the availability of funds for such efforts. Industry, universities, federal laboratories, and other sources

outside NASA would also be approached by NASA for ideas. An organization such as the National Academy of Sciences would be tasked to establish a review panel composed of some of the nation's top scientists, engineers and industry leaders; they would evaluate promising alternatives. This approach, in addition to stimulating technology development, would allow the eventual architectural baseline to incorporate the benefits of all available aspects of technology innovation.

o THE PROGRAM WILL INCLUDE ROBOTIC SCIENCE MISSIONS.

The program would include robotic science missions as a critical element. The robotic science missions, in addition to significantly advancing scientific knowledge of the Moon and Mars, would obtain data needed to assist in the design and development of subsequent human exploration missions and systems and would demonstrate technology and long-communications-time operations concepts.

Three specific robotic science missions have already been approved as part of the President's FY 1991 budget. These three missions, undertaken for their intrinsic scientific value, also make essential contributions to the data base required prior to undertaking manned missions to the Moon and Mars. The missions are: a significant enhancement of the previously approved Mars Observer, which is scheduled for a 1992 launch; and two new missions -- Lunar Observer now planned for a 1996 launch and Lifesats (a series of satellites for biological research), planned for launch beginning in 1994. These three missions will be necessary regardless of the architecture chosen for any manned mission. Other missions will be studied before making new start decisions.

o AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE IS TO ENHANCE U.S. ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS.

The Space Council will review alternative approaches to implementing the Space Exploration Initiative in order to enhance U.S. economic competitiveness. In addition, early Moon-Mars Initiative planning will emphasize the identification of a range of technologies and services that could be offered by, or in conjunction with, the private sector. Within six months, the Space Council will make recommendations concerning private sector participation in the program.