

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
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OA/ID Number:	CF00554/1
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Folder Title:
Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [3]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Scenesetter	Meeting with Prime Minister Andreotti (3 pp.)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C", P-5
2. Talking points	Points to be made at meeting with Prime Minister Andreotti (7 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
3. Profile	Political profile (1 p.)	10/29/91	P-1, F-1, "S", P-5
4. Scenesetter	Meeting with NATO Secretary General Woerner (1 p.)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C", P-5
5. Talking points	Points to be made at meeting with NATO Secretary General Woerner(2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
6. Profile	Political profile (1 p.)	10/29/91	P-1, F-1, "S", P-5
7. Scenesetter	Meeting with President Cossiga (1 p.)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "S", P-5
8. Talking points	Points to be made at meeting with President Cossiga (2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
9. Profile	Political profile (1 p.)	10/29/91	P-1, F-1, "C", P-5
10. Scene-setter	Meeting with President Mitterand (4 pp.)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "S", P-5

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FILE LOCATION Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [3 of 5]
[OA/ID CF00544]

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
11. Talking points	Points to be made at meeting with President Mitterand (9 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "S"
12. Profile	Political profile (1 p.)	9/23/91	P-1, F-1, "S"
13. Scene-setter	Meeting with Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C", P-5
14. Talking points	Points to be made at meeting with Chancellor Kohl (4 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
15. Profile	Political profile (1 p.)	10/29/91	P-1, F-1, "C", P-5

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FILE LOCATION Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [3 of 5]
[OA/ID CF00554]

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Agency Referral/Mandatory Review Disposition Sheet

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This document sheet records the disposition of all actions in response to agency referral and/or mandatory review requests. Full citations for each record are listed on the preceding withdrawal sheets and correspond to the document numbers listed below.

DOCUMENT NO.	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	RECLASSIFICATION	CASE NO.
02	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
05	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
08	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
11	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
14	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F

COLLECTION	Chief of Staff, White House Office of Card, Andrew, Files
FILE LOCATION	Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [3 of 5] OA/ID NO. CF00554

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MEETING WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER GIULIO ANDREOTTI

SCENESETTER

PURPOSE

Andreotti is personally committed to making the Rome summit a successful "celebration" of NATO's accomplishments and its continuing importance as guarantor of European peace. You will want to assure his active support for our efforts to demonstrate that NATO remains relevant and dynamic, particularly by extending a helping hand to the East. You will also want to encourage Andreotti to work energetically in the EC for a European security identity which is fully compatible with NATO.

BACKGROUND

You last saw Andreotti at the London G-7 summit. At that time, you asked him to receive a briefing on Libyan misdeeds, which he subsequently received. (Though impressed by the facts, he still leans toward trying to bring Qadhafi around.) Andreotti wrote you a long letter of congratulations on your nuclear initiative, expressing hopes that the cuts could eventually go even farther. He also wrote you a cautiously optimistic letter after his September trip to China.

Domestic Situation. Prime Minister Andreotti's seventh government likely will continue in power until early 1992, when both legislative and presidential elections are mandatory. Given the pressures of trying to hold his coalition together, Andreotti is steering away from painful budget-cutting measures urged by many. Italy faces a deficit of nearly 11% of GDP and an inflation rate nearly twice the EC's average. Meanwhile, the country's north-south split is deepening, calls for systematic reform of the political system and government services go unheeded, and organized crime is spreading to the North. Despite this, Andreotti is the leading candidate to replace Cossiga as president next year.

NATO and European Security. The Italians have been prominent in efforts to build a stronger, EC-based European security identity. They remain attached to their Atlantic credentials, however. Andreotti particularly prefers a gradual approach that will not prejudice NATO's core functions. He thinks the Franco-German proposal dangerously mixes up what might become an expanded European defense capability with a functioning Alliance which actually meets Europe's defense needs. Italy recently joined with the UK on a paper on European security which emphasizes links between NATO and WEU and which refers more positively to the Alliance than the Franco-German initiatives. While mistrustful of French and German motives, the Italians are now engaged in an effort to bridge the differences between the two proposals in time for the EC summit in Maastricht.

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If handled well, Rome thinks that this process can keep Germany tied firmly to the Alliance and Europe, draw the UK closer to the EC and help move France toward NATO. In all of this, it still sees a U.S. presence as essential to maintain European integration and stability. You should urge that the EC make clear its recognition of NATO's essential role and commit to a security identity fully complementary with the Alliance.

Liaison with the East. The Italians are worried the U.S. and German ideas move too quickly to institutionalizing NATO liaison with Eastern and Central Europe and the USSR. They say this could harm NATO's effectiveness, cut into the role of the CSCE and lead to a fight with the French. The Italians have argued for a more informal and step-by-step process. We have made clear that our ideas will not take away from the role of CSCE, the EC or others as there is plenty of room for each institution to help these new democracies. We have also explained that our proposals will not create new security ties with our former foes or harm NATO's effectiveness, but that these steps will show those countries that we are being responsive to their needs and concerns. You should urge Andreotti to put his reservations aside and join us in approving a robust set of liaison relations.

French Proposal for Four Power Talks on Soviet Nuclear Arms. The Italians are strongly opposed to what they fear is an attempt to create a "new forum" which would take the issue out of NATO. They say Italy and other allies have just as much right to participate as France. We have told them that we support full Alliance consultations on this proposal.

Crotone. Andreotti and other senior Italians have indicated their willingness to help find a way to continue construction of the NATO base in Crotone, given congressional opposition to any funding in FY92. (There is \$28 million left in previously obligated funds.) If the project is to be scrapped, they will want to work closely with us to limit political damage.

Yugoslavia and Albania. Italy is increasingly concerned about the Yugoslav situation, and fears this could lead to wider regional instability. Sentiment in Italy is strong for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, though the government is resisting pressures for unilateral action. Italy remains committed to working with the EC and will probably support EC sanctions on those responsible for breakdown of negotiations. Italy also remains concerned about Albania following a large influx of refugees earlier this year. It is providing \$200 million in humanitarian aid.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Italy committed early to \$6.4 billion in credits over five years, but domestic budget problems and events in the Soviet Union have muffled calls for massive aid. In Bangkok, Italy supported U.S. calls for Soviet debt rescheduling.

Middle East Peace, Iran. Italy has been very supportive of our peace efforts in recent months. Andreotti will seek your views.

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The Prime Minister may visit Iran in November to promote Italian sales and pursue his efforts to moderate regional radicals. Italy is under heavy pressure from Iran to supply US-licensed helicopter parts. We have made clear that we can not approve such sales while Iran supports terrorism. For example, Iranian agents recently assassinated former Prime Minister Bakhtiar in Paris, and Tehran is currently threatening terrorism to disrupt the Madrid conference.

Allegations of U.S. Involvement in Airliner Crash. In June 1980 an Italian commercial airline crashed off the island of Ustica, near Sicily. Press stories have suggested that the U.S. military may even have accidentally shot it down. The Italian government has formally requested additional information. We have promised full cooperation.

Extradition Case: Khalid Duhan Al Jawary. Al Jawary is presently in custody in Italy pending extradition to the U.S. to face charges for three terrorist bombings in 1973. Al Jawary is appealing his extradition to Italy's highest court after being found extraditable by a lower court.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING

WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER GIULIO ANDREOTTI

NATO SUMMIT/EUROPEAN SECURITY

- We view the NATO and EC summit meetings as landmark events, both in their own way adapting European and transatlantic institutions to the changes in the Soviet Union and the evolution of democracy in Eastern Europe.
- We want both summits to be successful. Your leadership will be important in both cases.
- Here in Rome, we mark the successful completion of several tasks mandated by the London summit, especially the strategy review and the new force structure.
- But more importantly, this summit must enable NATO to look ahead and show adaptability to a Europe in flux.
- First, NATO should express support for a European Security Identity. But this new identity must reinforce the Alliance, not detract from it. We do not need competing armies or security organizations.
- I intend to make the following points in my meetings here and in public:
 - We have all learned that European and American security are indivisible and that the U.S. must maintain its responsibilities in Europe in this new era.
 - Because it binds European and American security, the alliance cannot be replaced, even in the long run. The U.S. and its allies consider the Alliance to be the

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guarantor of their security and the keystone of European stability.

- The U.S. welcomes European efforts to take on more responsibility and would support the creation of a European Defense Identity.
- Strengthening the WEU would be a step in the right direction and could link the Alliance with the EC.
- Such a European Defense Identity could complement and strengthen NATO, rather than assume NATO responsibilities or diminish the need for NATO.
- I hope I can count on your efforts not only in this summit, but equally importantly in subsequent EC debates to ensure that NATO's essential role is fully acknowledged and that whatever European Security Identity emerges is fully compatible with Alliance structures and commitments.
- Here in Rome, I also think it very important that NATO should promote liaison with Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as proposed in us, the Germans and others. We seek agreement on as many of the proposals for reaching out to the new democracies as possible. Slamming our door in the face of Walesa, Havel and the others is not an option.
- This does not mean full or even associate membership for the new democracies. Rather, it is an effort to respond to their legitimate and deep-seated concerns in the way NATO can best help.
- These countries are some of NATO's biggest supporters. We should not let them down.

YUGOSLAVIA

- We strongly endorse the principles put forward by the EC:
 - o borders must not be changed by force.
 - o future arrangements must come through agreement.
 - o any solution must assure the rights of all minorities.
- If the talks break down, we should step up the pressure on all parties to negotiate peacefully and in good faith.
- We are convinced that recognition of Slovenia or Croatia without an agreement would escalate the violence and take us even farther from a negotiated outcome.
- We should continue close consultations so that we can stay in step on possible sanctions, peacekeeping, and the question of recognition.
- Is there anything more the U.S. could be doing now to support the EC's efforts?

URUGUAY ROUND

- We support the efforts of Director General Dunkel to bring the round to a successful conclusion.
- We were encouraged by the EC Trade Minister's endorsement of a more flexible EC position on agriculture.
- We believe we have a window of opportunity right now to reach agreement in the core areas of the negotiations -- market access, agriculture, services and intellectual property.
- We all have much to lose from a failed round. We will all have to be flexible.

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FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR-POWER MEETING (if raised)

- We have told the French that we are willing to proceed on a one-time basis, if the allies agree. But we will not proceed if our allies are not in full accord.

G-7 AID TO THE USSR

- The United States has provided over \$18 million worth of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to targeted areas in the Soviet Union since February 1991.
 - This program will be extended and expanded.
- We have made available \$2.5 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees to the USSR for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products in 1991.
 - I have sent two high-level delegations to the Soviet Union recently to examine the food distribution system and to assess food needs.
- Our ability to extend food credit guarantees to the USSR will be curtailed if the Soviets default on their debt.
 - The G-7 Deputy Finance Ministers meeting in Moscow convinced us that the debt problem is critical.
 - While the agreement reached will help, the credit-worthiness problem of both the union and the republics will not go away.
- I hope Italy will continue to support a debt deferral agreement and help win French and German agreement.
- This winter we will each need to work with the Soviet central and republic governments to avert massive food shortages.

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EASTERN EUROPE

- Our help for Soviet reforms should not come at the expense of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.
- President Havel was just in Washington on a State Visit. He stressed again the need for help with defense conversion.
- We should do all we can to encourage foreign investment there, including by assuring the greatest possible access to the U.S. and European markets.
- The U.S. will provide further support. Our grant assistance to Central and Eastern Europe is second only to Germany's.
- (If pressed) Much of G-24 assistance is in the form of high-interest loans or tied credits. This makes little sense for countries already mired in debt.

MIDDLE EAST

- We were pleased to have Foreign Minister van den Broek representing the EC at Madrid which was a historic beginning of a long, arduous process.
- We are encouraged by the beginning of bilateral talks. The primary responsibility now falls on the parties: to work out the venue and to negotiate substance.
- You can be helpful by encouraging the parties to work out understandings directly, We should give them some time to do so.
- In the absence of an agreement, we are prepared to work with the parties and make proposals if necessary, but we do not want to pre-empt the efforts of the parties themselves.
- The bilateral talks are not designed to promote third-party participation -- European or otherwise. It is up to the

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parties to determine if they want even the co-sponsors to attend.

- On the other hand, we foresee broad international participation -- including a significant EC role -- in the multilateral negotiations to include both an arms control tract and a human/resources track. The latter could deal with refugee issues, water and economic development.
- We want to work with the EC on the initial meeting to structure these negotiations and on subsequent expert-level activity.

CROTONE (if raised)

- We want to work with you closely to explore options. Secretary Cheney is considering next steps at present.

IRAN (if raised)

- We continue to have serious concerns about Iran. We are grateful for its efforts to secure the release of Western hostages, but cannot approve sales of restricted material while Tehran supports terrorism. Tehran's threats against the Madrid Peace Conference and its assassination of a former Prime Minister in Paris show it is still in the terrorist game.

LIBYA (if raised)

- I am glad that you received our briefing on Qadhafi's activities. We will provide you with the briefing on Pan Am 103 as soon as our legal system permits. You also may have already have seen that the French indicted several top Libyan officials for the 1989 bombing of flight UTA 772.

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USTICA AIR CRASH (if raised)

-- I am vaguely aware of the press allegations about U.S.
involvement in this tragedy. We will cooperate with you
fully.

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MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

SCENESETTER

PURPOSE

To review summit goals and to preview the themes of your NATO intervention in order to solicit Woerner's support for our approach.

THE SETTING

This will be your second meeting with Woerner in less than a month. (You last saw him in the Oval Office October 11). Since then Woerner wrote to you (and to the other NATO government heads) reiterating the views he expressed in his meeting with you. Woerner shares our view that the summit is not a placeholder; on the contrary he believes it must demonstrate its leadership in a changing Europe.

The summit will take place against a backdrop of intense European debate on the structure of a European Security Identity as well as anxiety over the fluid and volatile state of the Soviet Union. We recommend you preview with him the key points you intend to make on both issues -- in particular on the European Security Identity -- during your intervention, in your meetings with Major, Kohl and Mitterrand, and in your public statements. (Points are attached.) You should also tell him that you will be asking your principal colleagues to make the same points.

Woerner's role at the summit will be important, especially if we cannot reach consensus on our liaison initiatives or if the discussions on the European security pillar reveal significant rifts within the Alliance. As such we suggest that you ask Woerner to reiterate the points you will be making at the summit.

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POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

- I'm glad we had the chance to preview the summit in our meeting last month, and I thank you for your recent letter outlining your views on the summit.
- This summit is not a placeholder. It is the time to begin NATO's second chapter for the post cold-war, post Soviet Union world.

NATO LIAISON

- I agree with you on the importance of expanding the NATO liaison. We need to ensure that this summit agrees on a robust, practical and effective set of initiatives that respond to the needs of the new democracies.

EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY

- It is important as well that we get the right language on a European Security Identity and its relationship to NATO.
- I met with John Major this morning. I'll be meeting with Andreotti and Kohl today and with Mitterrand tomorrow. Let me share with you the specific points I am making with them:
 - The U.S. welcomes allied efforts to take on more responsibility.
 - Strengthening the WEU would be a step in this direction, and it could link the alliance to the EC.
 - We have all learned that European and American security are indivisible and that the U.S. must maintain its responsibilities in Europe in this new era.

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- Thus, there can be no substitute for the alliance. A European defense identity will not assume NATO responsibilities, diminish the need for NATO, or one day replace it. Rather, it will complement and strengthen NATO.
- The U.S. and its allies consider the alliance to be the guarantor of their security and the cornerstone of European stability.
- I asked John Major to make these points. I'm going to ask Helmut and Francois as well. These points will also be one of the key messages in my public statements after the summit.
- I hope you can reinforce my message in your statements as well.

SOVIET UNION

- It's important that NATO demonstrate its leadership role in assessing the changes in the Soviet Union, and harmonizing our policies in response to the developments.
- I want the alliance to meet, consult and plan our approaches. Your leadership will be vital.
- Are there any particular messages or approaches that you would recommend I take at the meetings?

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING AND DINNER
WITH PRESIDENT COSSIGA

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

- The NATO and the EC summit in Maastricht next month are landmark events in adapting to the new realities in Europe.
- We view this summit and the Maastricht EC summit as companion meetings. Both need to be successful.
- Here, NATO needs to show that it is adapting. We will do so with the strategy review and new force structures, but equally important NATO must extend a hand to our former foes and support development of a European security identity that reinforces NATO.

YUGOSLAVIA

- We strongly endorse the principles put forward by the EC:
 - o borders must not be changed by force.
 - o future arrangements must come through agreement.
 - o any solution must assure the rights of all minorities.
- If the talks break down, we should step up the pressure on all parties to negotiate peacefully and in good faith.
- We are convinced that recognition of Slovenia or Croatia without an agreement would escalate the violence and take us even farther from a negotiated outcome.
- We should continue close consultations so that we can stay in step on possible sanctions, peacekeeping, and the question of recognition.
- Is there anything more the U.S. could be doing now to support the EC's efforts?

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- I appreciate Italy's support for our efforts towards peace in the Middle East.
- The peace conference and direct negotiations represent an historic breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Our objective is a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement on all fronts designed to achieve real peace and reconciliation in the region.
- Only through direct negotiations can this be achieved.
- The United States has encouraged all parties to approach the conference and negotiations with the creativity, determination, and mutual respect and tolerance that will be necessary to make the process succeed.

URUGUAY ROUND

- We believe we have a window of opportunity between now and the end of November to reach agreement in the core areas of the negotiations -- market access, agriculture, services and intellectual property.
- We all have much to lose from a failed round. We need to craft a package acceptable to all by year's end. We are willing to work hard and be flexible to do so. I hope the EC is ready to do likewise.

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POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

- Much has happened since our meeting in Rambouillet. The situation in the Soviet Union is dramatic. We both talked with Gorbachev recently. Supporting the transformations in the East will be as difficult a task as many of those we faced together during the Cold War.
- There is reason for hope in the Middle East. It will be difficult, but at least the sides have the prospect of beginning direct negotiations. I appreciate your support.
- But I think we must focus on the Alliance and European integration.

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

- I view the Rome NATO summit and the Maastricht EC summit as companion meetings. Both need to be successful.
- This reflects two firm beliefs on my part: that European integration is good for the transatlantic link as it produces a more effective partner, and that NATO is not a transitory alliance based solely on the Soviet threat.
- We might have some differences here. Two world wars and a Cold War have made clear to me is that the transatlantic partnership must remain active and relevant. I believe my successors will agree, provided that our European partners see the lasting value of this Alliance.
- Equally important, our Alliance must adapt. We will bless part of that process here in Rome. At the same time, I

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think it natural that as Europe becomes more integrated, it will assume more responsibility.

- I fully support development of a European Security Identity which complements and reinforces NATO. Our experiences in Iraq show the need for a European capability to act beyond NATO's area of responsibility.
- That is why we have sought to convey a positive public response to your recent initiative with Chancellor Kohl in spite of serious concerns about some points.
- We cannot support development of a European force delinked from the Alliance, in competition with it or based on the premise that NATO is fading away.
- If the WEU is to be the vehicle of an evolving European Security Identity, we must resolve how the WEU would carry out its missions and how command and control arrangements would relate to NATO, and confirm NATO's role in the decision-making and consultation process.
- If the WEU is to serve as the defense identity for the EC, it must also be the European pillar of NATO. To fulfill this dual role, it will need strong ties to both institutions.
- I think we can find a way to work together. If you are willing to make clear that your initiative is not aimed at setting up a "European army" to take over NATO responsibilities -- even in the long run -- then we are willing to work closely and cooperatively with you on the details of the WEU-NATO relationship.

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-- If you cannot agree, I hope we can avoid a public debate.

Here is what I intend to say in public on this subject:

-- We have all learned that European and American security are indivisible and that the U.S. must maintain its responsibilities in Europe in this new era.

-- Because it binds European and American security, the alliance cannot be replaced, even in the long run. The U.S. and its allies consider the Alliance to be the guarantor of their security and the keystone of European stability.

-- The U.S. welcomes European efforts to take on more responsibility and would support the creation of a European Defense Identity.

-- Strengthening the WEU would be a step in the right direction and could link the Alliance with the EC.

-- Such a European Defense Identity could complement and strengthen NATO, rather than assume NATO responsibilities or diminish the need for NATO.

LIAISON WITH THE EAST

-- Rome should mark the successful completion of several tasks mandated by the London summit, especially the strategy review and the new force structure.

-- NATO must also look ahead and adapt to a Europe in flux. The Alliance must extend a helping hand to the East addressing their needs by reinforcing the liaison program.

-- I know that you have concerns about the liaison program. In my mind, the program responds to these states' legitimate

concerns in a practical way and helps bring them into the mainstream of European security deliberations.

- We are not thinking of full or even associate membership for the new democracies.
- Nor do we want to imply any diminished status for CSCE or the other European institutions. There is plenty for each institution to do without impinging on others.
- Frankly, Francois I just do not understand it when I hear reports that your officials say that these proposals for liaison programs are aimed at assuring NATO and U.S. dominance in Europe. That is just not the case. Our bottom line is that we cannot slam the door on these new democracies.

NUCLEAR INITIATIVE

- Let me express my appreciation for your solid support of our nuclear initiative.
- In preparing our proposals, I started from the assumption that the United States must retain nuclear weapons in Europe as a part of our transatlantic commitment.
- I am very sensitive to your concerns about advanced defensive systems.
 - o The limited deployment we envisage is designed to respond to a very real threat, which has become more serious in recent months.
 - o These steps will not undercut the credibility of existing deterrent forces, including yours.

FRENCH FOUR-POWER PROPOSAL (If Asked)

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- You have raised a valid concern on command and control of Soviet nuclear weapons.
- We are willing to proceed with a one-time meeting if the Soviets are willing to limit the agenda strictly to command and control of their weapons and if the Allies agree.
- I do not want to proceed if our allies are opposed.
- As you may be aware, like you, we have already begun to pursue the issue bilaterally with the Soviets.

URUGUAY ROUND

- We support the efforts of Director General Dunkel to bring the round to a successful conclusion this year. I think this could be the vehicle that lets us produce an overall package which benefits all.
- I recognize France's special concerns in the agricultural sector and that you have been dealing with farm demonstrations again of late. But, there is much to lose from a failed round and gains for us all if we can agree.
- I have instructed my negotiators to show flexibility if the EC and others are ready to do the same. I hope you will support this effort.

G-7 AID TO THE USSR

- The United States has provided over \$18 million worth of pharmaceutical and medical supplies to targeted areas in the Soviet Union since February 1991.
 - This program will be extended and expanded.
- We have made available \$2.5 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees to the USSR for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products in 1991.

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- I have sent two high-level delegations to the Soviet Union recently to examine the food distribution system and to assess food needs.
- Our ability to extend food credit guarantees to the USSR will be curtailed if the Soviets default on their debt.
- The G-7 Deputy Finance Ministers meeting in Moscow convinced us that the debt problem is critical.
- While the agreement reached will help, the credit-worthiness problem of both the union and the republics will not go away.
- I know France has substantial outstanding Soviet debts. But, I hope that you will support a debt deferral arrangement.
- This winter we will each need to work with the Soviet central and republic governments to avert massive food shortages.
- G-7 coordination on humanitarian relief efforts will help to avoid wasteful duplication.
- It is important to continue to impress upon the Soviets the need to move quickly on macroeconomic and microeconomic reforms.

EASTERN EUROPE

- We can not forget Eastern Europe in this process. Poland especially needs a boost now to stay the course on economic reform. We are committed.
- For our own legal reasons, we do not plan to become involved in a triangular trade scheme. We have, however, approached the Saudis and the Japanese with a suggestion that they use

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their funds to purchase food aid for the USSR from the Central and East Europeans.

- (If pressed on burdensharing) We are the second largest donor of grant aid after Germany, while much of the aid from others is in high-cost loans or credits.

YUGOSLAVIA

- We support EC leadership. But we want a pattern of close coordination. What can we do to help?

MIDDLE EAST

- We are encouraged by the beginning of bilateral talks. The primary responsibility now falls on the parties: to work out the venue and to negotiate substance.
- You can be helpful by encouraging the parties to work out understandings directly, We should give them some time to do so.
- In the absence of an agreement, we are prepared to work with the parties and make proposals if necessary, but we do not want to pre-empt the efforts of the parties themselves.
- The bilateral talks are not designed to promote third-party participation -- European or otherwise. It is up to the parties to determine if they want even the co-sponsors to attend.
- On the other hand, we foresee broad international participation -- including a major EC role -- in the multilateral negotiations to include both an arms control tract and a human/resources track. The latter could deal with refugee issues, water and economic development.

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- We will work with the EC on the initial meeting to structure these negotiations and on subsequent expert-level activity. We look forward to French ideas and support.

LIBYA, IRAN AND TERRORISM (IF ASKED)

- Our investigation into the bombing of Pan Am 103 will be producing results shortly. While I cannot get into specifics at this time, there is clear Libyan involvement, as seems to be the case with the bombing of the UTA flight. We will need to discuss this further.
- As the briefing we gave recently to Foreign Minister Dumas showed, we believe Qadhafi remains involved in terrorism as well as in pursuit of chemical weapons and long range delivery systems.
- Despite Iran's efforts to help free the Western hostages in Lebanon, there is no question that it still supports terrorism as you recently experienced with the assassination of the former Prime Minister here in Paris. Tehran is also actively supporting those who would like to disrupt the Middle East Peace Conference with terrorism.

ZAIRE (if asked)

- We appreciate the assistance which French troops provided in evacuating our citizens and look forward to continued close cooperation on this problem.
- The violence and unrest in Zaire strongly suggest that Mobutu has lost much of his authority in Zaire.
- The best chance for ending Zaire's political and economic crisis is through real, meaningful power-sharing between

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Mobutu and the opposition. The two sides need to form a transitional government.

- A transitional government must immediately construct an electoral process that results in a free and fair election. Such elections should be held as soon as possible.
- A transitional government must also have complete control over all aspects of state finance and credible international financial controls must be established.

HAITI (if asked)

- We are working hard for Aristide's return and the restoration of a constitutional government in Haiti. You and the EC can help by reinforcing the OAS embargo.

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MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

SCENESETTER

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 4/24/24

PURPOSE

Your main aim will be to urge the Chancellor to reaffirm -- both during the summit talks and in his public remarks thereafter -- that the emerging European Security Identity will not take on Alliance responsibilities, even in the long-run. You will also need to cement the understanding you and Kohl reached in September on the Uruguay Round, so that your trip to the Hague can yield a statement of significant US-EC progress.

BACKGROUND

European Security Identity. Partly through clumsy public presentation, the October 14 Kohl-Mitterrand initiative created the very impression we had worked hard to avoid: that NATO and the EC are at cross-purposes in charting the future of the Western security system. The Chancellor will probably say that we misunderstood and overreacted, stressing that his effort aimed at our shared goal of bringing France closer to NATO. Toward that end, he may argue, it was necessary to pay lip service to French aspirations for an EC-based European security identity.

This explanation, which we have heard from German officials already, is not entirely true. Kohl believes that he must steer Germany between French efforts to weaken NATO and what he sees as U.S. opposition to common European foreign and security policies. In trying to square the circle, he is prone to agreeing first to the indivisibility of transatlantic security and then to French formulations for a separate European security system.

In your recent letter, you asked Kohl to clarify publicly that the Franco-German initiative would not take over Alliance responsibilities and that German troops assigned to the Franco-German corps would be NATO-committed. You will need to press the point, because Kohl's instinct will be to paper over the issue by simply professing his strong commitment to NATO. (As you have found with regard to the Uruguay Round, steady pressure is required to get Kohl to take the decisive position that is needed.)

NATO Liaison. U.S. and German views are very close on expanding NATO's links to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as proposed in the October 3 Baker-Genscher statement. You should encourage him to help bring the French on board, perhaps by stressing that this will deflect calls from the new democracies for associate or eventual full NATO membership.

Uruguay Round. Following your discussions with Kohl in late September, the German Cabinet approved a decision to give the EC Commission increased flexibility to successfully complete the

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Uruguay Round by the end of the year. At the EC Trade Ministers meeting October 11-12, Economics Minister Moellemann urged this flexible position on the EC and announced that Germany would take a leading role in trying to resolve the impasse in GATT negotiations. Your subsequent letter to Kohl welcomed his efforts and stressed our readiness to show flexibility on the remaining issues. You should encourage Kohl to keep up the pressure within the EC in order to assure US-EC agreement on the substance of a compromise package. If EC negotiations are hamstrung by the French on agriculture, Kohl may need to provide one last big push.

Soviet Debt Relief/Aid to Eastern Europe. Kohl will be interested in a readout of your meeting with Gorbachev in Madrid. Meanwhile, members of Kohl's Chancellery staff, increasingly pessimistic about Soviet economic prospects, have expressed concern about the ability of the USSR or its constituent republics to repay their considerable debts to Germany. The FRG is taking a tough line on debt repayment and was irritated by a U.S. proposal for debt deferral made at the recent G-7 meeting in Bangkok, which they claim would affect German banks disproportionately hard and U.S. banks very little.

More generally, the Germans are also complaining that they are carrying an undue share of the Soviet and East-Central European assistance burden. These complaints, though not without foundation, have begun to degenerate into a finger-pointing exercise. While acknowledging the important contributions Germany is making, you should also point out that the U.S. is stepping up to a major program of food and humanitarian assistance for the USSR and that we are second behind Germany in providing grant aid to Central and Eastern Europe. (Much of the rest of German assistance, like that of other G-24 countries, comes in the form of high-interest loans and tied credits that do less good than they like to admit.)

Yugoslavia. The Germans have retreated under EC pressure from earlier intimations that they might recognize Croatian and Slovenian independence unilaterally, but they may swing the EC toward a recognition policy if Carrington's peace efforts fail. You should turn Kohl away from that course, arguing instead that we should consider sanctions as a means of exerting pressure (mainly on the Serbian leadership and the military) to cease military activities and negotiate in good faith. Our Allies are beginning to perceive us as trying to keep this crisis at arms' length, leaving them saddled with Europe's first post-Cold-War crisis. You might ask Kohl whether there are any further steps the U.S. could usefully take now in support of EC-led efforts.

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POINTS TO BE MADE
MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL OF GERMANY

NATO SUMMIT/EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY

- This summit is crucial to defining NATO's new role and preparing the way for a successful EC summit next month. These two summits should demonstrate a new US-European partnership.
- I see three areas as key here in Rome:
 - o reaffirming the importance of an Atlantic common defense even in the new Europe.
 - o supporting a European security identity that strengthens the Alliance rather than competes with it.
 - o reaching out to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union.

KOHL/MITTERRAND INITIATIVE

- We are agreed on NATO's central role in ensuring the security of all its members and the stability of Europe.
- The initiative you and Francois announced has left the impression that Germany supports independent European defense structures.
- As I wrote to you, this perception is divisive at a time when we need to demonstrate that NATO and the EC are working in harmony toward the future Western security system.
- We appreciate private reassurances from your government. However, it is important to clarify publicly that the proposed Franco-German corps would not take over NATO

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responsibilities, and that the German forces contributed to it would be part of NATO's integrated military command.

- No one can do this as effectively as you yourself.
- If we get these fundamental questions straight, you can count on my strong support for the development of a European security identity.
- If you and I do not treat this issue in virtually the same words here at Rome, the perception of divergence will only grow.
- I plan to say that there can be no substitute for the Atlantic Alliance, which is the guarantor of Allied security and European stability.

LIAISON WITH THE EAST

- The Baker-Genscher joint statement outlined several steps to expand NATO's cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe and with the Soviet Union.
- President Havel during his State Visit raised the question of associate status.
- One way of deflecting such pressures is to give these new democracies a sense of belonging to the wider structures of European security. You might make that point with Francois.
- We do not see these efforts as weakening the CSCE process, and I am glad that NATO will be advancing some specific ideas for developing CSCE.

URUGUAY ROUND

- I appreciate Germany's renewed efforts within the EC Council to break the deadlock and give EC negotiators a new mandate.

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- As I said in my letter, we are ready to bargain on all of the four core areas identified in London -- agriculture, market access, intellectual property, and services.
- As you know, we are negotiating with the EC Commission on a compromise that we hope all can accept. Will France agree?
- You know how crucial this is -- for the world trade system, the LDC's, the emerging democracies, and US-European relations.
- I hope you will continue doing all you can. We have to give a strong political push for these negotiations to succeed.

SOVIET DEBT RELIEF/AID TO EASTERN EUROPE

- We understand Germany's problem with debt deferral because of your extensive exposure.
- However, failure to agree on debt deferral quickly could lead to default. One consequence of this would be a cutoff of U.S. credits, which will hurt the Soviets and make it even less likely your loans will be repaid.
- Germany's assistance for the Soviet Union and for Central and Eastern Europe is substantial, but you will not carry the burden alone.
- We are putting together a substantial package of food and humanitarian assistance for the USSR.
- Our grant assistance to Central and Eastern Europe is second only to Germany's, and we have opened up our markets to their steel, textile and farm goods.

YUGOSLAVIA

- We strongly endorse the principles put forward by the EC:
 - o borders must not be changed by force.

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- o future arrangements must come through agreement.
- o any solution must assure the rights of all minorities.
- If the talks break down, we should step up the pressure on all parties to negotiate peacefully and in good faith.
- We are convinced that recognition of Slovenia or Croatia without an agreement would escalate the violence and take us even farther from a negotiated outcome.
- We should continue close consultations so that we can stay in step on possible sanctions, peacekeeping, and the question of recognition.
- Is there anything more the U.S. could be doing now to support the EC's efforts?