

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):

1998-0142-F; 2025-0373-S

FOIA Number:

S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Card, Andrew, Files
Subseries: Subject Files

OA/ID Number: CF00554/1
Folder ID Number: CF00554-002

Folder Title:
Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	22	2	5

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY)**

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (3 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
2. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
3. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
4. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
5. Paper	Issues for NATO Summit (3 pp.)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C", P-5
6. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (3 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
7. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "S"
8. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (3 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
9. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
10. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
11. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"

Page 1 of 2

COLLECTION Bush Presidential Records
Chief of Staff
Andrew Card Files

FILE LOCATION Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [2 of 5]
[OA/ID CF00554]

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY)**

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
12. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "S"
13. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
14. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
15. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (1 p.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
16. Talking points	Points to be made RE: NATO issue (2 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
17. Scene-setter	Meeting with Prime Minister Major (3 pp.)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C", P-5
18. Talking points	Points to be made RE: meeting with Prime Minister Major (7 pp.) (SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL)	11/91	P-1, F-1, "C"
19. Profile	Political profile (1 p.)	10/29/91	P-1, F-1, "S", P-5

Page 2 of 2

COLLECTION Bush Presidential Records
Chief of Staff
Andrew Card Files

FILE LOCATION Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [2 of 5]
[OA/ID CF00554]

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advise between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Agency Referral/Mandatory Review Disposition Sheet

(GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY)

This document sheet records the disposition of all actions in response to agency referral and/or mandatory review requests. Full citations for each record are listed on the preceding withdrawal sheets and correspond to the document numbers listed below.

DOCUMENT NO.	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	RECLASSIFICATION	CASE NO.
01	Document Released in Part	12/23/98		98-0142-F
02	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
03	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
04	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
06	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
07	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
08	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
09	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
10	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
11	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
12	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
13	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
14	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
15	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
16	Document Released in Full	12/23/98		98-0142-F
18	Document Released in Part	12/23/98		98-0142-F

COLLECTION	Chief of Staff, White House Office of Card, Andrew, Files
FILE LOCATION	Briefing Book: NATO Summit Rome, Italy 11/6-8/91 [2 of 5] OA/ID NO. CF00554

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTION INITIATIVE AND SOVIET RESPONSE

- Our initiative, and the Soviet's positive reply, are proof that a new era has dawned in the U.S.-Soviet military relationship.
- The most dangerous weapons of the Cold War, nuclear forces, will now be subject to dramatic, rapid, and truly cooperative reductions.
- The Soviet peoples' historic choice of democracy in August has opened new options for securing a lasting peace between East and West.
- We can now conceive a new, truly cooperative approach to security -- one based on mutual confidence.
- Many of the proposed reductions in our nuclear forces, and the decision to make them unilaterally, were unthinkable only months ago.
- Perhaps the most striking new development is the U.S. and Soviet decisions to destroy, on a global basis, all their nuclear weapons for ground-launched short-range missiles and artillery.
- The U.S. initiative reflects not only vastly improved political relations, but a recognition of a fundamental change in the Soviet military posture as well.
- We are gratified that the Soviet Union has elected to take comparable steps.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 4/24/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

- While we implement these measures, we must move on to reach agreement on the other elements of our proposal, including the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.
- We believe future reductions should focus on those systems that are most destabilizing.
- The Soviets have proposed a different approach -- focussed on numerical reductions of strategic systems to 50% below START levels.
- Despite these conceptual differences, both sides have fundamentally compatible objectives and agree that effective, secure deterrence can be maintained at still lower levels of strategic forces.
- Our recent discussions in Moscow showed a new openness in discussing the two sides' future force structures that was not present even during the START negotiations.
- We are pleased that the Soviets have agreed to address our proposal for limited defenses against limited ballistic missile threats. We believe that ballistic missile defenses can play an important role in securing the peace.
- We will continue to pursue this and other important subjects such as nuclear weapons safety with the Soviets.

(If Air-Delivered Nuclear Weapons (ADNW) are raised:

- As I said in my address September 27, an effective air-delivered nuclear deterrent is essential to NATO's security.
- The precise configuration of that force is a matter for discussion and agreement among the allies concerned.

- I can say that it is important that nuclear responsibilities continue to be shared among basing countries and that not all be required to bear unique burdens in relation to NATO'S nuclear deterrent.
- The Soviet proposal for central storage sites for ADNW is interesting, and we are studying it.
 - It is noteworthy that the Soviets did not call for the removal of U.S. ADNW from Europe.)

(If Verification or Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are raised:

- The measures which we have announced as unilateral are just that -- we do not envisage verification mechanisms or CBMs that in the past have been part of negotiated arms control agreements in the past.
- We are open to steps to increase the transparency of our implementation of these measures -- for example, we will release to the public information about withdrawals and eliminations.
- We also believe previously agreed confidence-building and transparency measures may help provide further insight into developments.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTION INITIATIVE AND SOVIET RESPONSE

Release
B/1.5 (8)
in part

- Our initiative, and the Soviet's positive reply, are proof that a new era has dawned in the U.S.-Soviet military relationship.
- The most dangerous weapons of the Cold War, nuclear forces, will now be subject to dramatic, rapid, and truly cooperative reductions.
- The Soviet peoples' historic choice of democracy in August has opened new options for securing a lasting peace between East and West.
- We can now conceive a new, truly cooperative approach to security -- one based on mutual confidence.
- Many of the proposed reductions in our nuclear forces, and the decision to make them unilaterally, were unthinkable only months ago.
- Perhaps the most striking new development is the U.S. and Soviet decisions to destroy, on a global basis, all their nuclear weapons for ground-launched short-range missiles and artillery.
- The U.S. initiative reflects not only vastly improved political relations, but a recognition of a fundamental change in the Soviet military posture as well.
- We are gratified that the Soviet Union has elected to take comparable steps.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958

Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/20/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DP


- While we implement these measures, we must move on to reach agreement on the other elements of our proposal, including the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.
- We believe future reductions should focus on those systems that are most destabilizing.
- The Soviets have proposed a different approach -- focussed on numerical reductions of strategic systems to 50% below START levels.
- Despite these conceptual differences, both sides have fundamentally compatible objectives and agree that effective, secure deterrence can be maintained at still lower levels of strategic forces.
- Our recent discussions in Moscow showed a new openness in discussing the two sides' future force structures that was not present even during the START negotiations.
- We are pleased that the Soviets have agreed to address our proposal for limited defenses against limited ballistic missile threats. We believe that ballistic missile defenses can play an important role in securing the peace.
- We will continue to pursue this and other important subjects such as nuclear weapons safety with the Soviets.

(If Air-Delivered Nuclear Weapons (ADNW) are raised:

- As I said in my address September 27, an effective air-delivered nuclear deterrent is essential to NATO's security.
- The precise configuration of that force is a matter for discussion and agreement among the allies concerned.

-- I can say that it is important that nuclear responsibilities continue to be shared among basing countries and that no ally be required to bear unique burdens in relation to NATO'S nuclear deterrent.

--



B1
1.5(d)

(If Verification or Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) are raised:

- The measures which we have announced as unilateral are just that -- we do not envisage verification mechanisms or CBMs that in the past have been part of negotiated arms control agreements in the past.
- We are open to steps to increase the transparency of our implementation of these measures -- for example, we will release to the public information about withdrawals and eliminations.
- We also believe previously agreed confidence-building and transparency measures may help provide further insight into developments.)

CONFIDENTIAL

POINTS TO BE MADE

NATO LIAISON WITH THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS

- NATO's liaison program has helped promote the fundamental political and security goals of the Alliance.
- Expanding the program through concrete initiatives will help respond to Eastern security concerns and promote positive change in the East.
- We've been very pleased with the success of NATO's liaison program.
- Through dialogue, the Alliance has influenced Soviet and East European thinking on a range of security issues.
- By sharing our technical expertise, we've helped those countries begin resolving problems that can affect European stability as a whole.
- But there is room to expand the program, and the Soviets and East Europeans have made it clear that they would welcome such an expansion.
- Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Jim Baker recently put forth a set of solid initiatives to do so.
- These initiatives are practical, are timely, and demonstrate that NATO can play a vital role in helping liaison states to determine military capabilities proportionate to legitimate defense needs, develop democratic systems, and balance market economies.
- They would also help regularize the liaison process without giving the liaison states a voice in NATO decision making.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 12958

Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- And they are crafted to complement efforts in the CSCE and other fora to develop arrangements for cooperative security to meet the needs of the newly emerging democracies.
- The Soviets and East Europeans have indicated their support for those initiatives.
- I hope this summit will agree to adopt them.

(If liaison with Soviet republics is raised:

- The evolving relationship between the center and the republics is highly sensitive, and this is not the time to begin a liaison relationship with the republics.
- But it is important that we keep the liaison program flexible and be prepared to respond to new circumstances.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE)

- I'm very pleased to see how successfully CSCE has developed since our summit last November in Paris. The results of the Moscow human rights meeting show that CSCE remains vital to the realization of a truly democratic Euro-Atlantic community.
- I look at CSCE as one of the cornerstones of the new Europe. Its values and principles form the basis of our vision for a democratic, economically prosperous, and secure Europe in the coming months and years.
- As we move toward the Helsinki meeting, NATO's role will be critical. Concerted NATO action to focus CSCE's institution-building can have dramatic effects, as we saw last year.
- We want to strengthen the CSCE's role in conflict prevention and dispute settlement. We should also preserve CSCE's traditional role in advancing principles and values among all its members.
- We've suggested a series of proposals for specific CSCE steps which we urge NATO to endorse. They would help to focus the work of the CSCE Council of Ministers and the COSO as they consider ways to strengthen CSCE.
- We think NATO should propose amending the consensus rule, but only in cases of gross and uncorrected violations of CSCE rules.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- As we work to finalize the structure of post-Helsinki security talks, we must make every effort to maintain Alliance solidarity.
- We should also not hesitate to strengthen NATO's ties to CSCE, including by establishing a formal liaison.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

POST-HELSINKI SECURITY TALKS (SF-38)

- We continue to regard NATO as the forum for Allied consultation on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members.
- We are pleased with the depth of NATO preparations conducted to date to establish a common position on the post-Helsinki Security Forum.
- We would like to see this process intensify so that a common Alliance position will be ready for Helsinki.

If Allies raise the need for more arms reductions and limits:

- The need to implement the CFE Treaty and NATO's strategy review, as well as the need to analyze the emerging situation in the former Soviet Union, all argue for a pause for reflection before seeking further reductions.
- But, there is much for the Alliance to do in the SF-38 forum. We need to deepen and expand our security dialogue, expand conflict prevention mechanisms and measures, and tackle global security issues such as restraints on arms transfers.)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE No. 98-0142-F
JGB, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5
LISTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 12958

Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

POINTS TO BE MADE

NATO STRATEGY REVIEW

- NATO is a strong and vital alliance that is adapting to the changing security situation in Europe and the world.
- The Alliance is bound together by shared values and interests, as well as by common security challenges.
- The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" outlines a vision for NATO that is flexible and robust and that confirms the Alliance's central role in European security and stability.
- The dramatic events of the last two years have moved Europe beyond confrontation into a much more promising era, opening up a second chapter in the alliance.
- But the end of the Cold War has not meant an end to uncertainty and risk. It will be difficult to solidify democracy and stability in Central and Eastern Europe and to nurture its development in the Soviet Union.
- In the complex situation now developing, NATO provides the certainty and confidence of a democratically based, integrated military power and structure.
- The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" focuses on this reality, and adds "cooperation" with all states in Europe -- including our former adversaries -- to NATO's traditional dual approach of "dialogue" and "collective defense capability."
- The new strategy recognizes NATO's increasing role in contributing to stability and crisis management, even as it emphasizes NATO's core security functions with an integrated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

military structure and appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons.

- The positive changes in Europe allow all of us the opportunity to reduce the size and readiness of some of our forces. Those remaining will be more flexible and capable than ever before; they will be deployed closer to home when possible; and many will be assigned to multi-national formations, including rapid reaction units.
- The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" re-affirms the defensive nature of the Alliance, the resolve of NATO members to defend themselves, and NATO's importance as the fundamental link between the security of Europe and North America.

(If the issue of out-of-area use of NATO forces is raised:

- NATO has always had an important role during crises outside its territory that could affect the security of its members. We did not need a NATO flag hoisted prominently during the Gulf crisis to appreciate how crucial NATO patterns of cooperation were to ensure our success. NATO logistics and planning, developed and maintained during peacetime, were vital to success in ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.)

(If NATO's continued central role in Europe is questioned, in view of the recent Franco-German security proposal:

- The recent Italian-British and French-German proposals and the Baker-Genscher statement of October 2 have contributed to discussions of European security.
- In our view, these ideas go to the issue of partnership with our allies, and cooperation with our former adversaries.)

(If the continued role of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO is questioned:

- The new "Alliance Strategic Concept" notes the continued deterrent role of NATO nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. I specifically noted the importance of these systems in my September 27 nuclear reduction initiative.
- On the issue of partnership, we do not see NATO and a European Security Identity competing with one another. In defense of its members there is no substitute for the Atlantic Alliance.
- At the same time, NATO does not and need not have to get out in front on every potential security problem. This would be impractical and unnecessary. It is important, however, that NATO remain the venue where consultations are held and decisions are made on policies affecting the security of its members.)

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

YUGOSLAVIA

NATO'S ROLE

- We all agreed that NATO should not involve itself publicly on the Yugoslav crisis. We consulted but took no steps that might undermine EC-led efforts under CSCE mandate.
- A statement now will be useful -- in support of the EC's efforts, adding NATO's voice to those of the CSCE and UN.
- If it comes to serious consideration of a peacekeeping force, NATO should consult.
- Even under optimum conditions in Yugoslavia, such an operation would be complex and dangerous.
- Neighboring states, including NATO members, could be affected directly. All of us would be affected indirectly.

EC-LED EFFORTS

- We strongly support the EC's efforts and the principles they have laid down for the negotiations: consensus, guarantees for minority rights, and no border changes by force.
- If the talks break down, we should step up the pressure on all parties to get back to the bargaining table.
- Recognition of Slovenia or Croatia without an agreement would escalate the violence and undermine negotiations.
- We should continue close consultations so that we can stay in step on possible sanctions, peacekeeping, and the question of recognition.
- Is there anything more the U.S. or the Alliance could be doing now to support the EC's efforts?

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP 5/25/99

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (SNE)

- NATO's strategy for deterring aggression has worked, and pared to the appropriate level, our nuclear deterrent will continue to serve vital transatlantic interests.
- The U.S. nuclear reductions initiative has met in full the Alliance's core arms control objectives as set forth in the London Declaration of July 1990.
- The security of the United States remains linked with that of Europe. To provide the necessary insurance against future uncertainties, U.S. air-delivered nuclear weapons will remain in Europe as part of NATO's posture of minimum deterrence.
- NATO's strategy of deterrence has worked.
- For 40 years NATO has deterred possible Soviet aggression with balanced deployments of nuclear and conventional forces.
- The London Declaration of July 1990 reflected NATO's conclusion that changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union meant far fewer NATO nuclear weapons were needed.
- That same month, the North Atlantic Council directed the Special Consultative Group to discuss ways to achieve these reductions. The SCG met seven times through October 1991.
- It has become clear over the past two years or so that a Soviet invasion of Europe, with little or no warning, is impossible.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 12958

CASE No. 98-0142-F
JG P, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

- The events of the failed coup in August confirmed this judgment.
- These events reinforced the approach which the SCG was already considering. The new circumstances called for bold action.
- The SCG's deliberations played a significant role in formulating our initiative.
 - The initiative I announced on September 27 has achieved what it would have taken years to negotiate: commitments to destroy every short-range ground-launched nuclear warhead owned by the United States and the Soviet Union.
- This initiative is a revolutionary alternative to traditional arms control: complex, protracted negotiations in an atmosphere of distrust are superseded by mutual commitments to rapid, cooperative and stabilizing reductions.
- President Gorbachev has since answered my challenge for comparable Soviet moves by agreeing to destroy all Soviet ground-launched SNF warheads.
- As a result, by the mid-90s NATO will move to a posture of deterrence, which relies on a dramatically reduced level of air-delivered nuclear weapons.
- Retaining these weapons will insure against the uncertainties of the future, and signal the continuation of the historic linkage between the security of the United States and its NATO allies.

- I am pleased to see that the SCG "Report to the Heads of State and Government" states that the initiative meets the Alliance's SNF arms control commitment established in the London Declaration of July 1990.
- It is with great pleasure that I present this report to you as a symbol of the enormous success and continued importance of this Alliance, both in its effective and productive consultations, and, most importantly, in protecting peace and freedom in Europe.

(If air-delivered nuclear weapons (ADNW) are raised:

- We are continuing to study Mr. Gorbachev's proposal to remove air-delivered nuclear weapons from operational status and place them in central storage.
- The configuration of NATO's nuclear structure is a subject for concerned Allies to discuss and agree upon.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

START

- Prompt START ratification remains essential to lock in Soviet reductions and verification provisions.
 - Your recent nuclear initiative builds on START and assumes it will be ratified and implemented by both sides.
- Despite recent political changes in the Soviet Union, START implementation is moving forward.
- Prompt ratification of START by both parties is essential.
 - Our nuclear initiative goes beyond START, but is premised on START ratification by both sides.
- We have no reason to doubt Soviet assurances that central authorities have always kept, and continue to keep, control over strategic nuclear weapons.
- The role of the republics in Soviet security policy is an internal matter. However, we believe it is critical that the command and control of Soviet strategic nuclear forces remain under a single unified command.
 - We do not want changes in the Soviet Union to result in the emergence of new nuclear powers in the area.
 - We have taken every opportunity to make this clear to Soviet leaders, both those from the center and the republics.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F
JGR, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

(If asked why the Administration has not yet submitted the START treaty to the Senate:

- We are preparing the documentation and analysis that will be submitted to the Senate along with the Treaty. Our goal is to submit START before the Senate adjourns this year.
- We encourage the Soviets to move forward quickly to ratify START.)

(If asked about Soviet ratification of START:

- The specifics of their ratification process are for the Soviets to work out.
- However, the ongoing transformation in the Soviet Union is not a reason to delay Senate ratification.
- It is in our interest to put in place as soon as possible START's reductions, limitations and openness measures no matter what the outcome of the political changes in the USSR.
- The START implementation process is underway. The sides are carrying out early exhibitions and other preliminary tasks required prior to ratification.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

- The CFE Treaty continues to be a cornerstone of future security and stability in Europe. All CFE signatories should ratify as quickly as possible.
- A key issue in CFE ratification is the status of the Baltic States and other potentially independent republics.
 - The independent Baltic States are not CFE participants.
 - The Soviets have agreed that their equipment in the Baltics continues to count under the Treaty.
- The CFE 1A follow-on negotiation limiting manpower of the 22 participants is scheduled to conclude by March 1992.
- A ratified CFE Treaty will introduce an element of stability into a rapidly shifting European security scene.
 - We urge CFE signatories to ratify the treaty before November 19 and certainly no later than year-end. We are working with our Senate on speedy ratification.
- We sent a high-level briefing delegation to the Baltics, which was well received. We will now need to work with the Baltic States to permit inspection of Soviet forces on Baltic territory.
- The U.S. is fully prepared to conclude manpower limitation talks in Vienna by March 1992.

(If asked about the pace of U.S. ratification:

- The legally binding commitment by the Soviet Union regarding TLE located in the Baltic States is helpful in addressing concerns in the U.S. Senate.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE No. 98-0142-F
JGR, 5/25/99

-- The Senate has a heavy fall agenda and remains concerned about the impact of events in the Soviet Union. We continue to work intensively with our legislators to secure rapid ratification.)

(If asked about Ukrainian independence:

-- It is our view that it will be necessary for Ukraine to participate in CFE if it opts out of the new union and retains significant amounts of treaty-limited equipment (TLE).)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CSBMs)

- We have made good progress in implementing the CSBMs endorsed at the Paris summit. These secured most of NATO's goals in the area of CSBMs.
- We hope to have an additional package of measures ready by the time of the Helsinki Conference.
- We look forward to the opening of the post-Helsinki Security Forum where a Europe no longer divided by blocs can begin to define its new security tasks.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
CASE No. 98-0142-F
JG P, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

GLOBAL PROTECTION AGAINST LIMITED STRIKES (GPALS)/ABM TREATY

- The U.S. is committed to GPALS to defend the United States, our forward deployed forces, and our friends and Allies against limited ballistic missile attacks.
- The U.S. seeks to cooperate with the Soviet Union in adapting to the changed security environment by facilitating the deployment of ballistic missile defenses.
- The U.S. has tabled a new proposal at the Defense and Space Talks that could accept limits on strategic defenses, and the Soviets have responded constructively. Prospects for agreement are better than ever before.
- The U.S. intends to implement GPALS in a manner that preserves strategic stability and takes account of the importance of maintaining the credibility of Allied nuclear deterrent forces.
- My decision to revise SDI's mission reflects the U.S. perception that missile proliferation poses a growing threat to international security and stability, and that the Soviet threat has receded.
- The recent experience in the Gulf War and the widespread proliferation of ballistic missiles underscore the importance of defenses to protect against limited missile attacks.
- The U.S. is committed to deploying GPALS in a manner that preserves strategic stability. We are convinced that this

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958

CASE No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

will not threaten the credibility of Allied nuclear deterrents.

- We welcome President Gorbachev's willingness to discuss my proposal to join the U.S. in taking immediate, concrete steps to permit the deployment of limited defenses.
- For our part, we have proposed at the Defense and Space Talks to accept limits on strategic defenses consistent with GPALS limited objectives.
- We seek to cooperate with the Soviet Union in relaxing ABM Treaty constraints that would permit the type of limited defenses envisioned in GPALS.
- GPALS is an integral element of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to address the threat posed by ballistic missiles encompassing diplomatic efforts, multilateral arms control, export controls and regional restraint.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

NUCLEAR TESTING

- We do not intend to undertake a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests such as that unilaterally declared by the USSR.
- The cuts included in my initiative will make our nuclear deterrent smaller, safer, and more stabilizing.
- The number of tests we conduct has been declining. But, as long as nuclear deterrence continues to play a critical role in our national security policy, we must test to ensure that it remains safe and effective.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

- Following on NATO's force modifications, the Alliance is reorganizing its command structure as a further reflection of NATO's adaptation to the new Europe.
- The twin goals are to conserve resources and to give a more European cast to NATO's structure.
- NATO's command structure is being streamlined to reflect a revised force structure and the changed security situation in Europe.
- Alliance Chiefs of Defense and Defense Ministers have been working this issue and expect agreement by the December NATO Defense Ministers meeting.

(If asked about the dispute among the UK/Norway/Denmark and Germany over the boundary between AFNORTHWEST and AFCENT:

- I understand that some of the remaining issues in the command structure review are being worked out in military channels. We look forward to seeing their recommendations.)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE ON OPEN SKIES

- Events in the Soviet Union underscore the importance of Open Skies as a multilateral confidence building and openness measure covering all the European states and North America, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
- Unfortunately, the Open Skies negotiations have been stalled for over a year now due to Soviet intransigence on such key issues as territorial coverage, flight quotas, and sensor capabilities.
- Indications that the Soviets are now prepared to be more forthcoming on these issues are encouraging, however, and we are optimistic that an Open Skies treaty can be completed before the Helsinki conference next March.
- Our delegation to the talks which just resumed in Vienna will be in the forefront of the Alliance's efforts to meet this objective.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION

- The situation in the Soviet Union represents an opportunity unparalleled in history to help secure freedom and democracy.
- We will provide food and other humanitarian assistance to ease hardship and provide support to the democrats.
- The union and republics need to develop a credible market reform plan with the IMF and World Bank.
- We have encouraged mechanisms that will preserve cooperation and cohesion among republics, such as the Treaty on Economic Community.
- The Europeans' reluctance to agree to debt deferral hurts the Soviets and could prevent us from providing the food credits the Europeans want us to provide.
- We will help the Soviet people make it through the winter.

FOOD ASSISTANCE

- We made available a total \$2.5 billion in credit guarantees to the USSR for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products in 1991.

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

- We have provided over \$18 million worth of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to targeted areas in the Soviet Union and the Baltics since February 1991.
- We are expanding our technical assistance program and will concentrate on food distribution, energy, defense conversion, and democratic institution building.

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 12958

Case No. 98-0142-F
JG P, 5/25/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

- We need to move quickly on Soviet debt deferral if we are to prevent default. Hesitation by some Europeans to agree to deferral may trigger default, which would result in a cut off of our credit guarantee program.
- While our immediate focus is necessarily on this winter, we cannot forget our longer-term goals of building a democratic society with a market economy.
- We strongly support IMF efforts to help the union and republics come up with credible market reform plans.

TO BE PROVIDED

GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 17
LISTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 18
LISTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE FOLLOWING PAGE HAS HAD MATERIAL REDACTED. CONSULT THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH UK PRIME MINISTER MAJOR

()
FBI, 1.5(d)
declassified 11/20/16

EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY

- We have particular concerns about the Franco-German initiative, but we have kept these disagreements out of the public eye to avoid the appearance of divisive debate on the eve of the NATO summit.
- I have written both Francois and Helmut about our concerns.
- In your November 1 meeting were you able to solidify Helmut's support for a European Security Identity that strengthens NATO?
- In my intervention, in my meetings with Helmut and Francois, and in public, I intend to say the following:
 - The U.S. welcomes allied efforts to take on more responsibility.
 - Strengthening the WEU would be a step in this direction, and it could link the alliance to the EC.
 - We have all learned that European and American security are indivisible and that the U.S. must maintain its responsibilities in Europe in this new era.
 - Thus, there can be no substitute for the alliance. A European defense identity will not assume NATO responsibilities, diminish the need for NATO, or one day replace it. Rather, it will complement and strengthen NATO.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958

Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/20/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DP

- The U.S. and its allies consider the alliance to be the guarantor of their security and the cornerstone of European stability.
- I would appreciate your support for these messages. I intend to ask Helmut and Francois to do the same.

NATO LIAISON

- We have worked out an effective and practical package of proposals that responds to the changes in the East.
- We have made it clear that this program will neither dilute the Alliance's structures, nor compete with CSCE.
- With the possible exception of the French, the Allies all support the idea of expanding the liaison program. I will take up this issue in my meeting with Francois tomorrow.

G-7 AID TO THE USSR

- The United States has provided over \$18 million worth of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to targeted areas in the Soviet Union since February 1991.
 - This program will be extended and expanded.
- We have made available \$2.5 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees to the USSR for the purchase of U.S. agricultural products in 1991.
 - I have sent two high-level delegations to the Soviet Union recently to examine the food distribution system and to assess food needs.
- Our ability to extend food credit guarantees to the USSR will be curtailed if the Soviets default on their debt.
 - The G-7 Deputy Finance Ministers meeting in Moscow convinced us that the debt problem is critical.

- While the agreement reached will help, the credit-worthiness problem of both the union and the republics will not go away.
- I ask that you weigh in with Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in an effort to secure their support for our debt deferral arrangement.
- This winter we will each need to work with the Soviet central and republic governments to avert massive food shortages. I know that you have provided food aid through the EC and direct technical assistance through your "Know-How Fund". I hope that you can focus your technical assistance efforts on Soviet food distribution problems.
- Your initiative to promote G-7 coordination on humanitarian relief efforts will help to avoid wasteful duplication.

PRESIDENT'S NUCLEAR INITIATIVE

- I appreciate your support for this initiative.
- I am firmly committed to maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as part of our transatlantic NATO commitment, and as a reflection of the continuing link between U.S. and European security.
- I am committed to supporting you in the maintenance of an independent British nuclear deterrent. We will ensure that GPALS does not jeopardize your deterrent.

(If TASM is raised:

- With the withdrawal of ground-launched nuclear systems from Europe, we will all need to be unequivocal that we will preserve an effective and up-to-date NATO air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe.

- However, I believe an attempt now to add further specificity within the alliance to that commitment would not be wise.
- It would generate political tensions among the NATO allies which would benefit no one, and would be more likely to foreclose future options than to protect them.
- We are prepared to cooperate with you on future air-delivery options, and I can arrange to have U.S. experts meet with your officials to discuss this at an early date.
- We will avoid any action that would erode political support for efforts by Britain, either alone or in collaboration with France, to pursue whatever options seem opportune in this area.)

(If GPALS is pressed:

- We have discussed your concern about the potential impact of advanced defensive systems. My proposal for steps to permit the limited deployment of ballistic missile defenses against limited attacks is intended to respond to a very real threat which has become even more serious in recent months.
- Any such steps will not undercut the credibility of existing nuclear deterrent forces -- including yours.
- To underscore the limited objectives of such defenses, on October 3 the United States put forward a new position at the Defense and Space Talks in Geneva, indicating our willingness to negotiate a new regime that includes limits on U.S. and Soviet defensive deployments consistent with these limited objectives.)

(If nuclear testing is raised:

- We do not intend to undertake a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests such as that unilaterally declared by the USSR.
- The cuts included in my initiative will make our nuclear deterrent smaller, safer, and more stabilizing.
- The number of tests we conduct has been declining. But, as long as nuclear deterrence continues to play a critical role in our national security policy, we must test to ensure that it remains safe and effective.

(If Uruguay Round is raised:

- I was grateful that Germany renewed its efforts within the EC Council to break the deadlock and give EC negotiators a new mandate.
- As I said in my letter, we are ready to bargain on all of the four core areas we identified at our London summit -- agriculture, market access, intellectual property, and services.
- As you know, we are negotiating with the EC Commission on a compromise that we hope all can accept. Do you think the French will agree?
- You know how crucial this is -- for the world trade system, the LDC's the emerging democracies, and U.S.-European relations.
- I hope you will continue doing all you can. We have to give a strong political push for these negotiations to succeed.

(If Vietnamese Boat People are raised:

- We are heartened that arrival rates are down in Hong Kong and numbers of volunteers set to return to Vietnam are up.


- As I said in my message to you, we understand your case for repatriating the double-backers. We hope that their return will send a strong enough message to deter others and encourage voluntary returns.
- While we support your plans to screen newcomers first and encourage those screened out to return home, we retain our opposition to mandatory return and use of force for the other screened-out asylum seekers.
- We worry that use of forcible return could spread to the other first asylum countries, causing collapse of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA).
- I hope the Cambodia settlement is a harbinger of change in Vietnam. As we near the time when the boat people problem could end, it is in everyone's interest to close out the Vietnamese boat people saga with dignity.

(If arm sales to Argentina are raised:

- After a careful review, we have decided to revise our policy on arms sales to Argentina.
- At home, Menem has consolidated the return to democratic rule and reasserted civilian control over the armed forces. In the international arena, Menem's dispatch of naval forces to the Gulf during the war and Argentina's recent withdrawal from the non-aligned movement are but two examples of his efforts to more closely align Argentina with the West.
- At the same time, we have been greatly encouraged by the improvement in your relations with Argentina.

-- We believe it is important to reinforce Menem's efforts to reintegrate the armed forces into the national and international mainstream.

--



(If Trinidad terms are raised:

-- I understand that you are anxious to move ahead with your Trinidad Terms proposal for the poorest nations.

-- We agreed in London to improve the terms for these countries, and we are working on the budgetary and legal questions which prevent our going ahead now.

-- The principle of consensus in the Paris Club has served all creditors well.

- We hope the UK will cooperate with us to preserve consensus in the Paris Club on this and all issues.

-- We have no objection to your going ahead with these terms bilaterally outside the Paris Club.

GEORGE BUSH LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 19
LISTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.