

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
1998-0142-F; 2025-0373-S

FOIA Number:
S

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential Library Staff.

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Chief of Staff, White House Office of
Series: Card, Andrew, Files
Subseries: Subject Files

OA/ID Number: CF00554/1
Folder ID Number: CF00554-001

Folder Title:
Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	15	22	2	5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1992

337735
F6006-01

C. F.

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

RE: ANDY CARD FILES

Today Lee Johnson received a phone call from Lisa Kiser, a member of Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card's staff. Ms. Kiser said that they had identified two boxes of Presidential records among Mr. Card's boxes now located at the Department of Transportation. She asked if she could return these boxes to WHORM, and we agreed to take custody of these records. About thirty minutes after her call, she arrived in the EOB's South Court in a DOT vehicle with the two large banana boxes of records.

We transferred the contents of the banana boxes to three FRC's and prepared rudimentary container lists for the boxes (see attached lists). While reboxing the records, we determined that some of the briefing books were security-classified. Therefore, we made arrangements with Tom Taggart to store these three boxes with other sensitive records on the 5th floor.

These records generally deal with personnel matters, transition matters, and foreign trips. They are definitely Presidential records and should fit logically with other Andy Card files transferred to WHORM as Oversized Attachments during the past several years. Ms. Kiser agreed to transfer other Presidential records that may surface at DOT. Her telephone number at DOT is 366-1111.

David E. Alsobrook
David E. Alsobrook
Archivist

CF 554
CF 555
CF 556

C. F.

ENCLOSURES FILED OVERSIZE ATTACHMENTS

3 boxes filed 7/13/92

ANDY CARD FILES

BOX 1 of 3

C. F.

Briefing Books:

NATO Summit, Rome, 11/6/91-11/8/91

President's Visit to the Hague and the Netherlands,
11/8/91-11/9/91

Report on Transition, President Ronald Reagan, 1988

Presidential Commission on Executive Exchange, 1989

[Transition, 11/88 (No Title)]

"Managing the Transition: The Next Fifty Days," 11/30/88

First 100 Days: Initial Planning Volume, 12/8/88 (In Folder)

Files:

AC [Andy Card]--FYI Memos [and Resumes], 1988-89

WH Resumes to be Held, 1988

C. F.

CF 554

ENCLOSURES FILED OVERSIZE ATTACHMENTS

ANDY CARD FILES

Box 1 of 3

Briefing Books:

NATO Summit Rome, 11/6/91-11/8/91

President's Visit to the Hague and the Netherlands,
11/8/91-11/9/91

Report on Transition, Ronald Reagan, 1988

Presidential Commission on Executive Exchange, 1989

Transition Briefing Book, No Title, 11/88

"Managing the Transition: The Next 50 Days," 11/30/88

First 100 Days: Initial Planning Volume 12/8/88
(In Folder)

AC--FYI Memos (and Resumes), 1988-89

WH Resumes to be Held, 1988

ANDY CARD FILES

BOX 2 of 3

Briefing Books:

C. F.

Transition Book--1980 & 1988

STA/LTA Planning Book, 1/9/89 (2 Copies)

Houston Economic Summit, 7/9/90-7/11/90

Oakwood Child Development Center, Los Angeles, CA, 6/89-9/89

Michael J. O'Neil (U.S. Army Records), 1990-91

Foreign Presidential Travel--London, Greece, & Turkey, 1991

Transition Personnel Book, 11/19/88

President's Education Summit with Governors, 9/27/89-9/28/89

Travel--Official & Political, 1991

C. F.

CFSSS
ENCLOSURES FILED OVERSIZE ATTACHMENTS

ANDY CARD FILES

BOX 3 of 3

Briefing Books:

Federal Judgeships, 1989

WH Office of Policy Development--Transition Briefing
Materials, 1988

President's Trip to Japan, PRC, & Korea, 2/22/89-2/27/89

C. F.

C. F.

CF556
ENCLOSURES FILED OVERSIZE ATTACHMENTS

The NATO Summit, Rome, Italy
November 6 - 8, 1991

~~SECRET~~



The NATO Summit
Rome, Italy
November 6 - 8, 1991

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

11/9/2015 MM

Andy Card

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE NATO SUMMIT
ROME, ITALY

November 6 - 8, 1991

SCOPE PAPERS

1. General Scowcroft's Scope Paper
2. Secretary Baker's Scope Paper

INTERVENTION

SUMMIT DECLARATION

DECLARATION ON THE USSR

DECLARATION ON YUGOSLAVIA

NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR WORKING SESSIONS

1. Nuclear Force Reduction Initiative and Soviet Response
2. Nato Liaison with the Soviets and East Europeans
3. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
4. Post-Helsinki Security Talks (SF-38)
5. NATO Strategy Review
6. Yugoslavia
7. Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF)
8. START
9. Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
10. Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)
11. Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)/ABM Treaty
12. Nuclear Testing
13. NATO Command Structure
14. Open Skies
15. Assistance to the Soviet Union
16. Soviet Political Developments

BILATERAL MEETINGS

1. Meeting with Prime Minister Major
 - Scen setter
 - Talking Points
 - Participants/Bios
2. Meeting with Prime Minister Andreotti
 - Scen setter
 - Talking Points
 - Participants/Bios

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/25/99

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

3. Meeting with Prime Minister Woerner
 - Scen setter
 - Talking Points
 - Participants/Bios
4. Meeting with President Cossiga
 - Scen setter
 - Talking Points
 - Participants/Bios
5. Meeting with President Mitterrand
 - Scen setter
 - Talking Points
 - Participants/Bios
6. Meeting with Chancellor Kohl
 - Scen setter
 - Talking Points
 - Participants/Bios
7. Meeting with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva
 - Scen setter
 - Talking Points
 - Participants/Bios

OTHER POSSIBLE BILATERALS

1. Meeting with Belgian Prime Minister Martens
2. Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney
3. Meeting with Danish Prime Minister Schlueter
4. Meeting with Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis
5. Meeting with Icelandic Prime Minister Oddsson
6. Meeting with Luxembourg Prime Minister Santer
7. Meeting with Netherlands Prime Minister Lubbers
8. Meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland
9. Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez
10. Meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Yilmaz

MEETING WITH POPE JOHN PAUL II

- Scen setter
- Talking Points
- Participants/Bios

MEETING WITH AMERICAN COMMUNITY

- Scen setter

FACT SHEETS

1. NATO Strategy Review
2. NATO Command Structure
3. NATO Force Structure
4. NATO Liaison with the Soviets and East Europeans
5. Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
6. Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)
7. Open Skies
8. Post-Helsinki Security Forum at 38 (SF-38)
9. Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS)/ABM Treaty
10. START
11. Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SNF) Issues
12. U.S.-Soviet Relations
13. Soviet Union: Political Developments
14. The Baltic States - Political Situation
15. Yugoslavia - Political Situation
16. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

OTHER BIOGRAPHIES

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE SCHEDULE

Tuesday, November 5, 1991

OFFICIAL PARTY AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

6:30 pm **Baggage Call.** Please leave unlocked baggage outside Room 89 1/2, OEOB, at this time.

Wednesday, November 6, 1991

OFFICIAL PARTY AND STAFF INSTRUCTIONS:

4:00 am **Baggage Call.** Please leave unlocked baggage outside Room 89 1/2, OEOB, at this time.

5:55 am Vans depart West Basement en route Andrews Air Force Base.

5:55 am Guests and Staff with own transportation and baggage should arrive Distinguished Visitor's Lounge, Andrews Air Force Base at this time for check-in.

6:15 am Guests and Staff with own transportation but without baggage should arrive Distinguished Visitor's Lounge, Andrews Air Force Base at this time for check-in.

6:40 am MARINE ONE departs White House en route Andrews Air Force Base.

6:50 am MARINE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.

7:00 am AIR FORCE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en

(E.D.T.) route Rome, Italy.

(Flying Time: 8 Hours)
(Time Change: Ahead 6 Hours)
(Interchange: No)

9:00 pm AIR FORCE ONE arrives Ciampino Airport, Rome,
(3:00 pm Italy.
E.D.T.)

* ARRIVAL CEREMONY
-Open Press
(9:05 pm - 9:15 pm)

9:20 pm MARINE ONE departs Ciampino Airport en route Urbe
Airport Landing Zone.

(Flying Time: 25 Minutes)

9:45 pm MARINE ONE arrives Urbe Airport Landing Zone.

9:55 pm MOTORCADE departs Urbe Airport Landing Zone en
route Villa Taverna.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

10:05 pm MOTORCADE arrives Villa Taverna for RON.

RON Rome, Italy

Thursday, November 7, 1991

* WORKING BREAKFAST WITH PRIME MINISTER MAJOR
-Photo Opportunity
(7:05 am - 7:50 am)

7:55 am MOTORCADE departs Villa Taverna en route Sheraton
Hotel.

(Drive Time: 30 Minutes)

8:25 am MOTORCADE arrives Sheraton Hotel.

* SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER BILATERAL
-Photo Opportunity
(8:05 am - 8:55 am)

- * PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI BILATERAL
-Photo Opportunity
(9:00 am - 9:30 am)
- * NATO LEADERS COFFEE
-Closed Press
(9:35 am - 9:55 am)
- * FIRST NATO WORKING SESSION
-Travel Pool Coverage (At Beginning Only)
-Opening Statement
(10:00 am - 12:45 pm)
- * FAMILY PHOTO
-Pool Coverage
(12:50 pm - 12:55 pm)
- * WORKING LUNCHEON
-Closed Press
(1:00 pm - 2:25 pm)
- * SECOND NATO WORKING SESSION
-Closed Press
(2:30 pm - 5:30 pm)
- * BILATERAL WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL
-Closed Press
(5:35 pm - 6:05 pm)

6:10 pm MOTORCADE departs Sheraton Hotel en route
Quirinale Palace.

(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)

6:30 pm MOTORCADE arrives Quirinale Palace.

- * COURTESY CALL ON PRESIDENT COSSIGA
-Photo Opportunity
(6:35 pm - 6:55 pm)

7:00 pm MOTORCADE departs Quirinale Palace en route Villa
Taverna.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

7:10 pm MOTORCADE arrives Villa Taverna.

- * PRIVATE TIME: 1 HOUR 15 MINUTES
(7:15 pm - 8:30 pm)

8:35 pm MOTORCADE departs Villa Taverna en route Quirinale Palace.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

8:45 pm MOTORCADE arrives Quirinale Palace.

- * ARRIVAL CEREMONY
-Pool Coverage
(8:50 pm - 8:55 pm)
- * DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT COSSIGA
-Closed Press
-Toast (TBD)
(9:00 pm - 10:45 pm)

10:50 pm MOTORCADE departs Quirinale Palace en route Villa Taverna.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

11:00 pm MOTORCADE arrives Villa Taverna for RON.

RON Rome, Italy

Friday, November 8, 1991

- * WORKING BREAKFAST WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND
-Closed Press
(7:45 am - 8:30 am)
- * AMERICAN COMMUNITY GREETING
-Closed Press
(8:35 am - 8:50 am)

8:55 am MOTORCADE departs Villa Taverna en route Sheraton Hotel.

(Drive Time: 30 Minutes)

9:25 am MOTORCADE arrives Sheraton Hotel.

- * FINAL NATO WORKING SESSION
-Closed Press
(9:30 am - 12:00 pm)

12:05 pm MOTORCADE departs Sheraton Hotel en route Vatican.
(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)

12:30 pm MOTORCADE arrives Vatican.

- * WELCOMING CEREMONY
-Travel Pool Coverage
(12:35 pm - 12:40 pm)
- * AUDIENCE WITH THE POPE
-Closed Press
(12:45 pm - 1:25 pm)
- * EXPANDED AUDIENCE WITH THE POPE
-Travel Pool Coverage
-Joint Statements
(1:30 pm - 1:45 pm)
- * AMERICAN SEMINARY COMMUNITY GREETING
-Closed Press
-Brief Remarks
(1:50 pm - 1:55 pm)

2:00 pm MOTORCADE departs Vatican en route Villa Taverna.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

2:15 pm MOTORCADE arrives Villa Taverna.

- * PRESS CONFERENCE
-Open Press
-Remarks
(2:30 pm - 3:00 pm)

3:15 pm MOTORCADE departs Villa Taverna en route Urbe
Airport Landing Zone.
(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

3:25 pm MOTORCADE arrives Urbe Airport Landing Zone.

3:30 pm MARINE ONE departs Urbe Airport Landing Zone en
route Ciampino Airport.
(Flying Time: 25 Minutes)

3:55 pm MARINE ONE arrives Ciampino Airport.

4:05 pm AIR FORCE ONE departs Rome, Italy en route The
(10:05 am Hague, The Netherlands.
E.D.T.)
(Flying Time: 2 Hours 10 Minutes)
(Time Change: None)
(Interchange: No)

6:15 pm AIR FORCE ONE arrives Schipol Airport, The Hague,
(12:15 pm The Netherlands.
E.D.T.)

6:25 pm MOTORCADE departs Schipol Airport en route
Noordeinde Palace.
(Drive Time: 30 Minutes)

6:55 pm MOTORCADE arrives Noordeinde Palace.
* PRIVATE TIME: 1 HOUR 25 MINUTES
(7:00 pm - 8:25 pm)
* DINNER HOSTED BY QUEEN BEATRIX
-Closed Press
(8:30 pm - 10:30 pm)

RON The Hague, The Netherlands

Saturday, November 9, 1991

8:35 am MOTORCADE departs Noordeinde Palace en route
Trevisaal.
(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

8:50 am MOTORCADE arrives Trevisaal.
* EC MEETING
-Pool Coverage
(8:55 pm - 11:50 pm)
* PRESS AVAILABILITY
-Expanded Pool
(12:00 pm - 12:20 pm)

12:25 am PROCEED to Ridderzaal.

* LUNCHEON HOSTED BY PRIME MINISTER LUBBERS
-Open Press
-Remarks
(12:30 pm - 1:45 pm)

1:50 pm MOTORCADE departs Ridderzaal en route American School.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

2:05 pm MOTORCADE arrives American School.

* AMERICAN EMBASSY GREETING
-Closed Press
-Brief Remarks
(2:10 pm - 2:25 pm)

* AMERICAN COMMUNITY GREETING
-Expanded Pool
-Brief Remarks
(2:30 pm - 2:45 pm)

2:50 pm MOTORCADE departs American School en route Schipol Airport.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

3:05 pm MOTORCADE arrives Schipol Airport.

* DEPARTURE CEREMONY
-Open Press
(3:10 pm - 3:15 pm)

3:20 pm AIR FORCE ONE departs The Hague, The Netherlands
(9:20 am en route Andrews Air Force Base.
E.D.T.)

(Flying Time: 8 Hours 5 Minutes)
(Time Change: Back 6 Hours)
(Interchange: No)

5:25 pm AIR FORCE ONE arrives Andrews Air Force Base.
(E.D.T.)

5:30 pm MARINE ONE departs Andrews Air Force Base en route Camp David.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo	From Brent Scowcroft to POTUS, Re: Your Participation in the NATO Summit (3 pp.)	11/2/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, Office of the
Series: Card, Andrew A., Files
Subseries: Subject Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [1]

Date Closed: 11/5/2015	OA/ID Number: CF00554-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0142-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Your Visit to the NATO Summit in Rome, November 7-8, 1991 (6 pp.)	11/5/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, Office of the
Series: Card, Andrew A., Files
Subseries: Subject Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [1]

Date Closed: 11/5/2015	OA/ID Number: CF00554-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0142-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMIT INTERVENTION STATEMENT

- We meet at a turning point in history for the second time. The first was the day this Alliance was born.
- Then the world was divided, one half suppressed, the other fearful. Dean Acheson said then our task was to create a world half free.
- My friends, we did more than keep half the world free. We helped create a new world. We must now confront the forces of change that have been liberated by our success -- forces that are powerful, exciting, unfamiliar, and ripe with both danger and opportunity.
- The challenges of this world are as daunting as Stalin's army was menacing forty years ago.
- Like then, this is a time for decision for the Alliance. We should decide wisely, for we have awesome and inescapable responsibilities, not only for our peoples but for the future.
- To decide wisely, we must speak directly. I will not talk of bridges, pillars, or cornerstones. We are not here as engineers but as political leaders and trustees of democracy.
- In North America, in Western Europe, and even in the East, the Alliance is rightly viewed as the core of European -- indeed, world -- stability.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958
Case No. 98-0142-F
JGP, 5/24/99

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

- As its stewards, it is up to us to give the Alliance direction and to employ its towering strengths toward noble ends.
- To do this, we must provide answers to four defining questions:
 - First, in this uncertain world, how can we be sure that every ally can be safe from any threat of any sort?
 - Second, how should we answer the calls of Europe's new democracies to join us?
 - Third, how should we respond to the disintegration of Soviet power?
 - And lastly, how should we relate to each other as Europe travels toward union?
- We must answer these questions now, but we must answer them right.
- Talk of military strategy is sometimes awkward for politicians who pride themselves as men of peace. But our first responsibility is to remove any doubt that our peoples, their homes and their vital interests are secure. And our history teaches us that adequate military strength is a prerequisite for political confidence and the pursuit of cooperation.
- Today we should approve a fundamentally new strategic doctrine. Our forces will be lean, agile, and unmatched in human and technological quality. No corner of the Alliance will be unprotected.
- And we will, let us be clear, maintain a credible, though radically reduced nuclear deterrent.

- Thus, whoever might contemplate aggression against any ally will face the power of a united Alliance with a full range of options.
- Without doubt, the withdrawal of Soviet power from the heart of Europe has improved our general security. But this is still a dangerous world, and the first principle of this Alliance still stands: as long as any single ally is less than secure, we are none of us secure.
- As we look to the East, the unwilling allies of our former enemy now want to be our allies. No amount of diplomatic elusiveness can alter this fact. Their aspiration should neither surprise nor alarm us. We cannot evade the responsibility to answer their query.
- I submit that the liaison program that has been suggested is not the most we should do but the least we can do. How can we decline to clasp the outreached hand of the peoples whose freedom has at last been won by a combination of their courage and our resolve?
- It is my conviction that to offer less than the program of practical cooperation and communication we have suggested is not a serious option -- historically, strategically, or morally.
- If we at this table are concerned about instability in the Soviet Union, consider how the world must look to our fellow Europeans who live on the edge.
- Look back to a time when we lived on that edge. Forty years ago the names were Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Paul Henri

Spaak. Today the names are Lech Walesa, Vaslav Havel, Jozsef Antall.

- Security for these nations lies not in new legal undertakings, but in helping them transform their countries. It is our duty -- and in our interest -- to help them change their military apparatus from a weapon of the state into a guardian of a free people.
- The liaison program will play an indispensable part in a much larger strategy, involving all of our institutions.
- We cannot welcome these nations to our world of values and yet hold them at arms length from our affairs. For forty years we said, even though your voices are silenced by tyranny, we hear you. Now that these voices are free, can we turn a deaf ear?
- We and the Europeans to our east are rivetted on developments to their east, in that space once home to a power that threatened our interests and our values -- a power whose armies have more than once marched through Europe.
- While we cannot exclude that one day, despite our every wish and effort, a threat will rise again in that space, for the foreseeable future we see other powerful revolutionary forces at work:
 - a brave struggle to create a legitimate government; and
 - a rapid devolution of authority from what had been an immensely powerful central state.

- Men of principle -- Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and others -- are attempting to navigate through this perilous transition, and they deserve our understanding and support.
- But we cannot ignore the dangers. This is one reason I wanted to move swiftly to reduce drastically the danger of nuclear instability.
- What will be the outcome? Is there the potential for a new equilibrium? The U.S. does not know what leaders within the Soviet Union themselves do not know.
- But we do know that Europe and America cannot respond to this situation separately. We must share our assessments, harmonize on strategies, and act in concert. The Alliance has, since its birth, been indispensable in forging common policies toward the USSR -- and so it is now.
- This is why we have proposed to intensify consultations in the North Atlantic Council. We should be clear at this moment about our principles, and we should use the Alliance to promote them in practice.
- I come now to the fourth question: how do we deal with each other? In offering the American perspective, I want to be clear and direct -- there is no place for vagueness between us on this matter.
- First, the United States will not -- because it cannot -- abandon its responsibilities, its interests, and its place in Europe. We have learned one of this bloody century's most painful lessons.
- Second, the United States does not want followers in the Alliance, it wants partners. The Alliance is not an

American enterprise or a vehicle of American power. We never sought preponderance, and we certainly do not seek to keep it. Indeed, to ascribe to us ambitions of power in Europe is to misunderstand my country and to ignore the role it has played in Europe. Nor do we claim a monopoly on ideas for the Alliance. If we did, none of us would be sitting here today, for the idea of the Washington treaty was Europe's.

-- Third, the United States has been, is, and will remain an unhesitating proponent of the aim and process of European integration. This strong American support extends to the prospect of a political union -- as well as the goal of a defense identity.

-- Fourth, even the attainment of European Union, however, will not diminish the need for NATO -- as far as we are concerned, and as far as we can see. We do not see how there can be a substitute for the Alliance, as the provider of our defense and Europe's security.

-- We support the development of the WEU because it can complement the Alliance and strengthen the European role in it. It can help Europe and North America face together threats to shared vital interests outside of Europe. But we do not see the WEU as a European alternative to the Alliance.

-- It would be a mistake to leave this hall with blissful ambiguity on this point. Our premise is that the American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European Union. If our premise is wrong

- if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today.
- And lastly, the idea of a duplicative standing military structure is an illusion. At a time when our societies clamor for a peace dividend, redundant capabilities can be built only at the expense of those that exist. If we can depend on each other -- and I have no doubt that we can -- then our interdependence should be satisfactory to one and all, and redundant capabilities are unnecessary.
- I will close with this thought. This Alliance has been more successful than any of us dared to dream. It was designed to defend our freedom, but in fact it triumphed over totalitarianism.
- What we have built is not some military pact but a community of values and trust -- unique in history, perpetual, and vital for the new order.
- There is no road-map for the new world, no way to know what the next year, let alone the next century will bring. But our ability to cope with the future -- indeed, to shape it - - will be immeasurably greater if we walk out of here tomorrow with an Alliance renewed.

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING,
PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.3 (C)

DRAFT U.S. TEXT FOR THE
NATO SUMMIT STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET UNION

JGP 7/21/98

THE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WARMLY WELCOME THE HISTORIC EVENTS THAT ARE FUNDAMENTALLY TRANSFORMING THE SOVIET UNION AS WE HAVE KNOWN IT AND THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE REPUBLICS. BY THEIR DETERMINED STAND AGAINST THE ILLEGAL COUP OF AUGUST 19 THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE GAINED AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD A NEW FUTURE BASED UPON DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY. THE NATIONS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO ASSIST IN THIS GREAT ENDEAVOR. WE ARE PREPARED TO BUILD OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REPUBLICS ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES THAT HAVE GUIDED OUR OWN POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR DECADES.

IT IS FOR THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION TO DECIDE THEIR FUTURE, THROUGH PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES. IN THIS PROCESS, THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE PLACE FOR THREATS, INTIMIDATION, COERCION OR VIOLENCE. ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE BASED ON DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. ALL PARTIES SHOULD SAFEGUARD HUMAN RIGHTS, BASED ON FULL RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND INCLUDING EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PERSONS BELONGING TO MINORITIES. EXISTING BORDERS, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, SHOULD BE RESPECTED; THEY MAY BE LEGITIMATELY CHANGED ONLY PEACEFULLY BY AGREEMENT AND CONSISTENT WITH CSCE PRINCIPLES. AUTHORITIES AT ALL LEVELS SHOULD RESPECT INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE EMBODIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE CHARTER OF PARIS, AND OTHER CSCE DOCUMENTS. WE ALSO WANT TO STRESS THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON THE NEED FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REPUBLICS TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS TO ENSURE THAT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE USSR, ESPECIALLY THE START TREATY, THE CFE TREATY, THE NPT, AND THE BWC ARE RESPECTED, RATIFIED, AND IMPLEMENTED.

IN A PERIOD OF DRAMATIC POLITICAL CHANGE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REPUBLICS IMPLEMENT POLICIES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. WE CALL UPON ALL AUTHORITIES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY STEPS THAT COULD LEAD TO PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR PROLIFERATION OF OTHER MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WELCOME THE STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ABOUT THEIR PLANS TO INSURE THE SAFE, RESPONSIBLE AND RELIABLE CONTROL OF THESE WEAPONS. SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST NOT BECOME THE OBJECT OF POLITICAL BARGAINING OF ANY KIND. WE URGE THAT THE SOVIET AND REPUBLIC GOVERNMENTS ADOPT FIRM MEASURES TO PREVENT THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES. WE ASK FOR RESTRAINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES THAT BY THEIR SIZE AND CHARACTER MIGHT EXACERBATE POLITICAL TENSIONS, RETARD MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM, AND CONTRADICT EFFORTS TOWARD LOWER AND MORE STABLE LEVELS OF FORCES EMBODIED IN THE CFE TREATY. THE CFE TREATY IS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST -- INCLUDING THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REPUBLICS -- BECAUSE IT REDUCES THE DANGERS OF INSTABILITY AND ENHANCES OPENNESS.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

THE ALLIES ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT POLITICAL CHANGE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND THE BUILDING OF FREE MARKETS. WE ENCOURAGE ECONOMIC POLICIES THAT PROMOTE TRADE AND COOPERATION AMONG REPUBLICS. WE WELCOME THE INTEGRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REPUBLICS INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY. NEWLY ESTABLISHED LINKS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SHOULD FACILITATE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE MARKET ECONOMIC REFORMS THAT COULD LAY THE BASIS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND PROSPERITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REPUBLICS. THE ALLIES STAND READY TO ASSIST IN THIS HISTORIC UNDERTAKING, INCLUDING THROUGH SUPPORT OF DEFENSE CONVERSION EFFORTS AND TO EXTEND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT TO THE SOVIET PEOPLES AS THEY COPE WITH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISES THAT CONFRONT THEM. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WITH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES REINFORCED ON A REGULAR BASIS AS NEEDED BY SENIOR OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS WILL BE EXPECTED TO CONSULT ACTIVELY, TO REPORT PERIODICALLY ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND TO HARMONIZE A COMMON APPROACH TOWARDS UNFOLDING EVENTS.

WE CALL UPON LEADERS AND AUTHORITIES AT ALL LEVELS THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR COMMITMENT TO THESE VALUES AND PRINCIPLES.

TO BE PROVIDED

TO BE PROVIDED

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Paper	The Alliance's New Strategic Concept [SENT FOR AGENCY REFERRAL] (18 pp.)	11/4/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff, Office of the
Series: Card, Andrew A., Files
Subseries: Subject Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Briefing Book: NATO Summit, Rome - 11/6-8/91 [1]

Date Closed: 11/5/2015	OA/ID Number: CF00554-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0142-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #: 1998-0142-F(21)	MR Case #:
AR Disposition: Denied in Full	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 10/14/2003	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information