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THE WHITE HOUSE

Nov. 17, 1991

Dear Mr. Edley -

It was a special pleasure to meet and talk with you during the luncheon at Camp David.

The Drug Advisory Council briefing for the President was impressive. I am confident that by working together significant progress can be made in ridding drugs from the workplace.

Keep in touch. Sincerely, Andy Card

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Christopher F. Edley
President Emeritus
United Negro College Fund
500 East 62nd Street
New York, NY 10021

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1991

Dear Captain Eng,

In response to your tour request, I have arranged a White House tour for 35 people on Saturday, November 23, 1991 at 8:00 a.m.

Your group should proceed to the East Executive Entrance of the White House located between the Residence and the Treasury building. Upon your arrival, simply give your name to the guard on duty (the "Air Force ROTC Cadets" group) and an agent will escort you through the building. The tour will last approximately 45 minutes and will take you through the public and social rooms of the White House.

You have my best wishes for a wonderful visit.

Sincerely,



Robert S. Nichols
Office of the Chief of Staff

Captain Keylor Eng, USAF
Department of the Air Force
Detachment 355, Air Force ROTC (ATC)
Boston University, 118 Bay State Road
Boston, Massachusetts 02215-1501

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1991

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROB NICHOLS

FROM: DEBRA ROMASH DUNN, DIRECTOR 
VISITORS OFFICE

SUBJECT: SPECIAL GROUP TOUR

This memorandum will confirm that you have a special group tour of the White House for 35 people from the AF ROTC Cadets on Saturday, November 23.

The members of the group should arrive at the Visitors Entrance on East Executive Avenue at 8:00 a.m. Please have the person in charge of your group check with the officer on duty upon arrival. He will be expecting them.

On behalf of President and Mrs. Bush, we express best wishes to your group for a most enjoyable visit to the White House.

Linda - tour still needs to be set up
No one answered tonight in the visitor's
office.
deb

**Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page**

Request
submitted on
11/5/91

October 30


AC HAS SEEN

Andy,

Assume it's okay to ask for the White House tour. There will be 35 cadets, so we'll have to ask Debbie Romash Dunn for a special tour. She won't mind, I'm sure, unless she's completely booked.

Keylor also asks for advice on the White House Fellows program.

OK FOR TOUR



NO TOUR

*Robert,
Please set
up.*

Andrew H. Card, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Captain Keylor Eng, USAF
Boston University
Department of Aerospace Studies
118 Bay State Road
Boston, Massachusetts
02215

THE WHITE HOUSE

11-1-91

Dear Keylor-

Thank you for your letter of October 27. I will ask that the Visitors Office give every consideration to your request that your Air Force ROTC Cadets have a tour of The White House.

I am thrilled that you will seek selection as a White House Fellow. It is an excellent program. It would not be appropriate for me to influence the selection process. I suggest you get your application in promptly. Good luck!

Andy Card



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 355, AIR FORCE ROTC (ATC)
BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 118 BAY STATE ROAD
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS 02215-1501

AC HAS SEEN

RECEIVED

OCT 30 1991

Sunday, 27 Oct 91

Dear Andy,

Please let me introduce myself. My name is Keylor Eng and you know of me through my brother Taylor or perhaps through your parents or sister Sara. If we've met before, it had to have been years ago when your mom and dad were teaching Sunday school and we met through a church function.

The reason I'm writing to you is for a two-fold favor. As the Commandant of Cadets at the Air Force ROTC Detachment at Boston University, I try to arrange activities for the cadets to learn how the Air Force operates and how much fun public service can be. In the attached letter from my commander, Lt Col Fry, we've asked you to arrange a tour of the White House for the cadets. I hope this is as insignificant as placing our name on a roster and that's it. I realize how busy you must be because even at our level of the Executive branch, the adage "doing less with less" seems irrelevant with the impact we have on these future Air Force officers. So these days in order to keep a quality program, we do more to keep students interested. Hence, the Washington D.C. base visit instead of a couple of trips to Henscom AFB or Otis ANGB. Whatever you arrange will be greatly appreciated.

Second, my brother spoke to you on that Sunday about my attempt at becoming one of the White House Fellows this coming year.

I'm nearing the end of my assignment here at Detachment 355 with AFROTC and hope to continue on. After eleven years in the Air Force, I've decided to try competing in this prestigious program. What I ask is your advice! Is there anything you could recommend to me to help achieve this? I have been working on the package, have asked friends and previous supervisors to write recommendations, and believe I have a fair chance. The package deadline is 15 Dec 91 and should be complete by the beginning of December.

Thanks in advance for your help. If all goes well, we'll bring approximately 35 cadets from not only BU but six other AFROTC detachments in the greater Massachusetts area. I hope you can find the time to say hello, although I know how precious weekends can be. Again, thanks Andy. Hope to hear from you soon.

Sincerely Yours,





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
DETACHMENT 355, AIR FORCE ROTC (ATC)
BOSTON UNIVERSITY, 118 BAY STATE ROAD
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS 02215-1501

AC HAS SEEN

The Honorable Andy Card
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

22 Oct 91

Dear Mr Card,

May we ask your assistance in scheduling a tour of the White House on the 23rd of November?

On 22 and 23 November 1991, approximately 35 Air Force ROTC cadets from Detachment 355 at Boston University and six other AFROTC detachments in the Massachusetts area will be visiting Bolling and Andrews AFB, the Pentagon, and the Washington D.C. area. The visit is part of the Air Force ROTC Base Visit Program with the purpose to introduce and motivate eligible members towards the Air Force ROTC and a future as Air Force officers.

We selected Washington D.C. as the site for this semester's visit to better acquaint our cadets with our federal government. If you could assist us in any way, I know our cadets will appreciate any help your office could provide. The project officer is Captain Keylor Eng. He can be reached at this address or by phone at (617) 353-4705/4707. Thank you for you help.


JAMES L. FREY, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

THE WHITE HOUSE

10.20.91

Dan-

Thank you for your note and
for what you have been doing for
Dick Thornburgh. Yes, I will
do all I can to help you.

Please call me.

Judy


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Daniel G. Eramian
c/o Thornburgh for Senate
681 Anderson Drive
Pittsburgh, PA 15220

THORNBURGH FOR SENATE

5th FLOOR, 6 FOSTER PLAZA
681 ANDERSEN DRIVE
PITTSBURGH, PA 15220
412/928-5960
412/921-1032 (FAX)

4th FLOOR, PACKARD BUILDING
15TH and CHESTNUT STREETS
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102
215/977-2327
215/977-2328 (FAX)

RECEIVED

OCT 18 1991

AC HAS SEEN

10/16/91

Dear Andy,

Greetings from Pittsburgh! In less than three weeks Dick will be (should be anyways) the new Republican Senator. I told Dick before I joined this little crusade that I would be happy to campaign for him, but I would be less happy to go to the Senate--a step back in my mind, and after six years at that great institutuion in Massachusetts from whence we both served time, I don't think I could learn much.

The bottom line is that I want to return to the Administration and or work in the campaign next year. I know my resume is at White House Personnel but not much has happened. Our mutual Andrew (save the poor starving savages) Natsios suggested I write to you. Frankly, I would love to spend a season in the White House. I have attached a resume/political history. Anything you can do or any suggestions would be greatly appreciated. Many thanks.

Dan

Daniel G. Eramian
903 North Wayne St., #304
Arlington, Va., 22201
(412) 928-5960, (703) 358-9081

Skills:

MANAGEMENT/COMMUNICATION OPERATIONS

Career History:

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1990-

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
--Chief spokesman for the Attorney General and Department with 88,000 employees and \$11 billion budget. Promote administration policy through the media, conduct press briefings, approve speeches and manage Department's public affairs staff.

Also oversee media relations activities of 94 U.S. Attorneys nationwide as well as the public affairs staffs of the Department's component agencies including Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Marshals, Bureau of Prisons and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1989-90

U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
--Spokesman for Department. Conducted press briefings, wrote press releases, coordinated interviews and press conferences, directed public affairs staff.

CHIEF OF STAFF/SPOKESMAN 1987-89

Republican Leader, Massachusetts State Senate
--Staff director, spokesman to media, developed legislation, liaison for intergovernmental affairs and lobbyists.

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT/SPOKESMAN 1986-87

U.S. General Services Administration, Region I, Boston
--Assisted Regional Administrator in agency management including budget, personnel and program operations.
Spokesman to media and Congressional delegation.

PRESS SECRETARY 1982-86

Assistant Republican Leader's Office, Mass. State Senate
--Spokesman to media. Wrote press releases and speeches.
Scheduled press conferences, public appearances.

EXECUTIVE EDITOR 1978-81

Suburban World Newspapers, Needham, Massachusetts.
--Editor and business manager of four newspaper group,
(cir. 30,000). Supervised newsroom and production
staffs.

EDITOR 1975-81

Needham Times, Needham, Massachusetts
--Editor, reporter, photographer. Wrote editorials and
designed layouts.

Education:

Suffolk University, Masters in Public Administration
Pi Alpha Alpha, National Scholastic Honor Society

University of Massachusetts at Amherst
B.A. English Literature

Daniel G. Eramian

(Political background)

1991 Press Secretary, Dick Thornburgh for U.S. Senate Campaign

1988 Senior Advisor to Regional Political Directors (Ron Kaufman, Andy Card), Massachusetts George Bush Campaign, primary and November campaigns.

1988 Member of Massachusetts Research and Media Committee for George Bush Campaign.

1988 Member of Massachusetts George Bush Executive Committee.

1988 Press Secretary, Republican National Convention, Massachusetts Delegation.

1986-87 Schedule "C" appointment, Executive Assistant to Regional Administrator, General Services Administration, Boston, Mass.

1984 Press Secretary, Massachusetts Reagan-Bush Campaign.

1984 Press Secretary, Republican National Convention, Massachusetts Delegation.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
JOAN SHORENSTEIN BARONE CENTER ON THE
PRESS, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

79 JOHN F. KENNEDY STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
(617) 495-8269


NOT RECORDED
F.B.

Sunday, *8 September 1991

Dear Andy:

Enclosed is a copy of the 9 Sundays proposal.
I apologize for the delay in getting this to you.
They're a little mixed up at the JSB Center.

All Best,




John Ellis

RECEIVED

SEP 12 1991

PRESS • POLITICS



• PUBLIC POLICY •

Nine Sundays:

A Proposal for Better Presidential Campaign Coverage

Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on
the Press, Politics and Public Policy

John F. Kennedy School of Government

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

NINE SUNDAYS:

A Proposal for Better Presidential Campaign Coverage

by
John Ellis

with an Introduction

by
Marvin Kalb

Joan Shorenstein Barone Center
on the Press, Politics and Public Policy

John F. Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

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Introduction

by Marvin Kalb

Marvin Kalb is Director of the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy and Edward R. Murrow Professor of Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Over a 30-year career as Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for CBS News and NBC News and as moderator of "Meet the Press," Kalb received numerous awards for reporting. A graduate of the City College of New York, he has an M.A. from Harvard in Russian history. He is the author or co-author of six non-fiction books, including Candidates '88, Kissinger and Roots of Involvement: The U.S. and Asia, as well as two best-selling novels.

The Nine Sundays Proposal

by John Ellis

John Ellis was an Appleman Fellow at the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy during the 1990-91 academic year. A former political producer for NBC News and analyst for their 1988 and 1984 election unit, Ellis now works as a private consultant. He is a regular contributor to the Los Angeles Times "Opinion" section on American politics and culture. Ellis holds a B.A. in American Studies from Yale University.

The Equal Time Provisions and the Nine Sundays Proposal

by Frederick Schauer

Frederick Schauer is the Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment at the Kennedy School's Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy. He received his A.B. and M.B.A. degrees from Dartmouth College and a J.D. from Harvard University. Teaching and writing primarily in the areas of constitutional law, freedom of speech, and philosophy of law, he is the author of The Law of Obscenity, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, and Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decisionmaking in Law and in Life.

INTRODUCTION

The 1988 presidential campaign could have depressed anyone, even Republicans who won. Photo-ops in flag factories or tanks, soundbites running all of 9.6 seconds, "debates" that Walter Cronkite, for one, described as "phony, an unconscionable fraud," newspaper and radio/tv polls that relied excessively on charts, graphs and statistics rather than on old-fashioned legwork, political ads that distorted records, and, on top of it all, Willie Horton, Boston Harbor, and flag-burning--day after day, there seemed to be no end to the trivialization of American democracy, ironically at a time when it served as a new beacon of hope for oppressed peoples around the world.

And when, finally, it ended, and another President was elected, campaign managers and aides representing a dozen or so Republican and Democratic candidates gathered at the Kennedy School of Government in early December, 1988 for some serious reflection about the emerging nature of American politics. They were all exhausted. The winners-- Lee Atwater, fresh from his final triumph, and the irrepressible Roger Ailes--tried to sound magnanimous, but the losers weren't having any of that. They were convinced that the American people had been shortchanged. Reporters and scholars eavesdropped on the occasionally heated

exchanges but soon realized that not enough time had elapsed to generate deep insights into 1988. Was there any reason to believe that 1992 would be better? Ailes provided the quote that still resonates in my mind. "If you didn't like '88," he said, "you're going to hate '92."

Hardly uplifting but nevertheless notable for its outrageous candor, the quote for me served a very special purpose: it focused the mind and sparked a major research effort by the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on Press, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, funded in large measure by the Markle Foundation, to explore press performance during the '88 campaign and then, on the basis of its findings, to suggest a set of recommendations for improving the process in '92. In different ways, everyone associated with the JSB Center over the past two and a half years contributed to the project--Professors Gary Orren and Frederick Schauer, Visiting Professors Michael Schudson, Timothy Cook, Lawrence K. Grossman, Jim Squires and Neil Postman, and a succession of Fellows and lecturers including Kiku Adatto, Sissela Bok, David Broder, Walter Cronkite, Dayton Duncan, Albert Hunt, Marion Just, James McEnteer, Cokie Roberts, Tim Russert, Bill Wheatley, Lewis W. Wolfson and David Yepsen.

Spearheading the effort and coordinating not only a series of seminars and conferences but also the supporting research was a team consisting of Ellen Hume, Executive Director of the JSB Center, John Ellis, a Fellow and former political producer at NBC News, and Carter Wilkie, a research fellow and writer.

The JSB Center's report falls into two parts: the analysis of the '88 campaign coverage and a set of recommendations designed to improve press coverage throughout the '92 campaign, which is being drafted primarily by Ellen Hume; and "Nine Sundays," a special proposal for improving not only tv coverage of the presidential election campaign but as a happy consequence the political process itself, which was drafted by John Ellis.

The "general election campaign" theoretically runs nine Sundays--from Labor Day, when the presidential campaign is presumed to begin in earnest, to Election Day, when it all comes to a blessed close. It is in this finite period of time, with increasing interest week after week, like a metronome beating time to the quickening pace of the political process, that the American people begin to devote more of their attention to a rather key question. Who will be their next President?

In "Nine Sundays," the Shorenstein Barone Center on Press, Politics and Public Policy proposes that the three major networks on a rotating basis, plus CNN, C-Span, Monitor and PBS, provide ninety minutes of evening or prime time every Sunday for nine weeks to a serious and substantive discussion by the two principal presidential candidates of the major issues that concern the American people. One issue at a time. For example, taxes may be the subject for one Sunday, Middle East policy or abortion for another, education, the environment, or US-Soviet relations on other Sundays. Such an approach would guarantee a detailed examination of the principal issues of the '92 campaign and undercut the current tendency to reduce all political dialogue to brief sound-bites--and report it that way, as if substance were secondary. This proposal, if adopted, would radically change the content of modern-day politics.

Of the nine Sundays between Labor Day and Election Day, two Sundays would be devoted to presidential debates. We would prefer four debates, but the experts claim that there is little incentive for an incumbent President to accept more than two. Two it is. A new format though is recommended: no audience, no artificial hoopla and applause, no panel of journalists, one subject, one moderator, all to be done in a

simple, unadorned TV studio. A debate is, after all, nothing more in these times than a tv program, crucially important though it might be. A third Sunday would be devoted to one vice-presidential debate, also according to the new format. The final Sunday before Election Day would feature two concluding speeches by the presidential candidates, one after the other, a flip of the coin determining who goes first, plus whatever analysis or reporting the networks choose.

That leaves five other Sundays. We propose that these five Sundays be devoted to thirty-to-forty minute "conversations" with the two presidential candidates, one after the other, again a flip of the coin determining who goes first. Each one of these five "Conversations with the Candidates" would be on a different subject, and each would be conducted by a TV moderator and two experts selected by the network responsible for that Sunday's pooling arrangements.

Network news would be encouraged to offer this unusual series to commercial sponsorship (tastefully presented, at the beginning and end of each Sunday broadcast, no interruptions in-between) so their financial losses, when and if there are any, would be limited. Given both their continuing importance as sources of news and their financial

shakiness, especially after the Persian Gulf war, network needs must be taken into account.

If, as many scholars contend, television has become the principal means of political discourse in the United States, then the "Nine Sundays" proposal is an excellent approach for elevating the discourse. No one wants a repeat of '88. This proposal is designed to provide a fixed amount of time for substantive discussion of the major problems. It insures a serious textured tone to overall news coverage of a presidential campaign. It gives voters regular, predictable access to the candidates, over a sustained period of time. It sets a framework for constructive televised exposure to the issues.

"Nine Sundays" deserves the most serious consideration and support.

THE NINE SUNDAYS PROPOSAL

....(T)he press cannot perform adequately as intermediary between the candidates and the voters no matter how conscientiously reporters approach the task. The media simply are not designed to fulfill this responsibility. They are in the news business, not the political business, and, as a result, their norms and imperatives are not those required for the effective organization of electoral coalitions.

-- Thomas Patterson

Anyone who has covered a presidential campaign knows that the substance of politics and governance is the first victim of the campaign trail. Brave attempts are often made by candidates and reporters to address substantive questions, but they are inevitably short-lived. The "stuff" of modern political campaigns is attacks, mistakes, pictures and polls. (1) Candidates cannot speak to issues; 9-second sound-bites do not allow it. Reporters cannot, for very long, take time out to work up a thoughtful explanation of a Republican or Democratic presidential nominee's "child care proposal;" they are on deadline and they are crowded by other stories that are breaking out all around them.

Issues of substance and governance are only "in play" when they have a direct bearing on the immediate political outcome. For example, Ronald Reagan's use of the Panama Canal issue in 1976 and the SALT II issue in 1980 struck real and emotional chords with key groups in the American electorate. American policy with regard to Latin America and the Soviet Union is serious and substantive business. But press coverage of Mr. Reagan's stance on these issues focused on the political implications of Mr. Reagan's conservative policies and the efforts of Presidents Ford and Carter to counteract them, and for good reason.

Candidate Reagan, after all, hammered away at the Panama Canal issue in 1976 in large measure because he felt the issue was "working" with Republican primary voters in 1976. Candidate Reagan hammered away at the SALT II treaty in 1980 in part because his position conformed with a widely-held view across the electorate that America had fallen behind in the superpower struggle with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Reagan bit his tongue on the issue of Social Security in 1980 largely because he knew, from previous experience, that once raised, the issue worked against him. Press coverage, not surprisingly, focused on the politics of these issues,

not their substance. That's the way political coverage of substantive issues of politics and governance works. Politicians are assumed to be emphasizing and de-emphasizing substantive matters based more or less exclusively upon their political "return."

Technology adds pace to this journalistic view of the political process. Presidential candidates campaign from media market to media market, jet-fueled and in constant communication with all sources of information, delivering political messages calibrated for the highest political "yield." All the while they work against the deadline clocks of the print and electronic "news cycles." The political press corps monitors each and every calibration of each and every message.

The result is that a modern presidential campaign, in all of its parts, moves too fast, in too many directions, in too short a time for there to be any orderly process through which candidates could and/or would address the major issues facing the country. Candidates now have only two major, uninterrupted opportunities to reach the electorate. The first comes at the nominating conventions, when the nominee gets thirty-five to forty-five minutes on all the major television networks to address the nation. The second comes

during the general election campaign debate(s), which are also carried, without interruption, by all the major television networks. The second is considerably more dangerous, politically speaking, than the first, which is why Republican presidential candidates tend to do everything they can to minimize the number of presidential debates. Given their nearly decisive advantage within the current composition of the electoral college, Republican presidential candidates have little incentive to broaden the playing field of the campaign. The current playing field is heavily tilted in their direction.

Another factor which mitigates against expanded coverage of substantive issues of politics and governance might be called the Hunter Thompson Factor. Hunter Thompson was the prince of "Gonzo Journalism" in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. He covered the 1972 campaign from beginning to end. By Labor Day of that year, he was so exhausted from his labors and so undone by the sheer tedium of the campaign that he basically wrote off the Nixon-McGovern battle as meaningless and instead wrote about how the whole process had ruined his health and defeated his spirit. Of course, he wrote for Rolling Stone, not the New York Times or the Washington Post, and his magazine thrived on his irreverent copy.

It goes without saying that most campaign reporters do not write and produce stories about the effect of the campaign on their health and spirit. Yet, the Hunter Thompson Factor is something that affects virtually everyone connected with a presidential campaign. By Labor Day, most everyone is already bone-weary. The candidates have given thousands of speeches, raised millions of dollars, conducted a thousand interviews, visited every conceivable interest group, criss-crossed too many time zones, committed a hundred "gaffes," done a thousand photo-ops, spoken to every issue on the political horizon. The political press corps has been there every step of the way; written thousands of column inches, filed and produced countless pieces, heard every variation of the stump speech, chronicled every staff change and monitored all of the comings and goings, ups and downs, ins and outs of winning and losing presidential campaigns.

By the time Labor Day rolls around and the opening bell rings for the general election campaign, what is relatively new and fresh for most voters is already tedious, if not meaningless, to almost everyone covering the campaign. For campaign reporters, the "road show" is as predictable as an old repeat on television. They need not take notes on George Bush's stump speech or Michael Dukakis's apparently

off-the-cuff remarks; they have long since memorized those lines. For them, the "road show" provides nothing new, save a new paragraph or two inserted into the stump speech.

So what's new? What's new and fresh for presidential campaign reporters becomes the production of the "road show" and the electronic media campaign; the marketing of the candidate, the calibration and recalibration of the "message." Not surprisingly, then, these marketing issues become the focus of the coverage. How things "play" and how things are "handled" become the political standards by which candidates and their campaigns are judged. Polls provide the "objective" ratification or refutation of the prevailing "conventional wisdom" on these matters. It needn't be this way. It just is.

This focus on political marketing, although it reaches back to the Nixon campaigns of 1968 and 1972, is, in large measure, a byproduct of the Reagan era. Political reporters have always been fascinated by the marketing of presidential candidates, but real issues of national concern tended to dominate the politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the assassination of President Kennedy, civil rights, social disorder, the Vietnam War, Watergate, oil shocks, hyperinflation, Iranian hostage crisis; all of

these real and pressing national concerns overwhelmed American politics through the 1980 election.

What was extraordinary (to the press community) about the Reagan White House was its apparent mastery over the media. This became known in Beltway vernacular as President Reagan's "teflon;" his apparently uncanny ability to emerge unscathed from whatever political or policy disaster was happening "on his watch." Mr. Reagan's "teflon" was attributed in most press reports to the public relations and marketing skills of his advisors and consultants. James Baker, then the White House Chief of Staff, and "media maestro" Michael Deaver, among others, were ascribed Merlin-like powers of image alchemy. When many of these same people left Mr. Reagan's employ to join Vice President Bush's presidential campaign, the press focus remained on the marketeers and their alleged skills.

All of which contributed to what Joan Didion and others have called the "disconnect" (between the campaign and the voters) in the 1988 presidential campaign. (2) Presidential campaigns are a world unto themselves. Candidates, staffers, consultants, reporters and producers covering the race have their own language, their own mores, their own folklore, their own class structure. A presidential campaign is a

separate culture, one that Timothy Crouse described in wonderful detail in his book about the 1972 campaign, The Boys on the Bus. After a while, it seemed as if the voters became strange and distant figures known not as human beings but as data in polls.

Those involved in either working on or covering a presidential campaign come to be disconnected from ordinary life. They work crazy hours, travel constantly, are maniacally up to date on every new tidbit of information and speak an odd and somewhat technical language.

Voters, on the other hand, go about their daily business. They are largely disinterested in politics over the course of a lengthy presidential campaign. They tune into the process in the latter stages of the campaign (be it the primary or the general election) and then look to the news media for information, context, analysis and explanation.

The news media, given its norms (what's new) and imperatives (make it snappy), feel they have already covered what many voters, belatedly awakened, now want to know about. Since they are in the news business, the campaign press corps focuses on what is new; the new ads, the new attacks, the new polls, the new marketing techniques, the most recent

article which has stirred controversy within the Republican and/or the Democratic presidential camp. One result is that voters and the press corps often pass one another like ships in the night.

Reporters and editors point out, with considerable justification, that while most voters say they are interested in the substance of politics and government, articles and news reports about substantive issues are among the least read stories in their papers and magazines. Time magazine, after all, did not expand its "Nation" section into a supermarket weekly; it created People magazine, which turned out to be the most successful magazine launch in recent publishing history. Television news abhors long, dreary takeouts on complicated issues; too wordy, not enough pictures.

And journalism, after all, is a business. People magazine and television shows like "Entertainment Tonight" are important because they are profitable. Success breeds imitation. Increasingly, the nation's leading television networks, news magazines and newspapers are no longer coddled by their parent corporations. They are being asked to perform journalistically and financially.

This raises a critically important issue. The financial health of network news is very much in doubt. Of the three major networks, only ABC News has a chance of breaking even in 1991. NBC News and CBS News are expected to lose millions of dollars, despite the relative strength of NBC television as a whole and the phenomenal success (annual profit: \$70-75 million) of CBS News' "60 Minutes." This has led NBC News to close its bureaus in New York and Miami, something that would have been unthinkable ten years ago. Even ABC News, the healthiest of the lot, recently laid off over 100 staffers and closed a number of overseas and domestic bureaus.

Most, if not all, of these cuts are being made in the three major networks' "news gathering" operations. The most expensive "news gathering" enterprise for a network news organization (except for a war) is presidential campaign coverage. Given the ongoing decline of the network news' market share of the television audience, it is virtually certain that presidential campaign coverage will be dramatically reduced in 1992 and beyond. Indeed, there are even some who argue that NBC News and CBS News, as currently constituted, will no longer exist by the mid-1990s. (3)

The dramatic increase in financial pressure on news organizations would seem to presage an even greater

"disconnect" between the voters and the campaign. Less coverage of politics is not likely to mean better coverage of politics within tighter constraints of time and money. Gary Hart, Chuck Robb and the Kennedy family can all testify that the journalism business has very deep pockets when a story seems to be moving newsstand sales and Nielsen rating charts. Stories that do not move sales charts are increasingly viewed as liabilities. It is axiomatic to editors and producers in the business of television news that politics and political coverage are Nielsen rating losers. This "market" knowledge is internalized by the men and women who produce the news shows, the news magazines and the daily newspapers. In the future, it stands to reason they will be less likely to fight uphill battles for expanded coverage of substantive political issues if political coverage remains a market loser.

That said, it should be noted that there is still a substantial amount of political coverage in the major print vehicles and on the network and cable news shows. The presidential campaign press corps is particularly good at doing certain things. Over the course of a presidential campaign, they transmit vast quantities of information about the candidates and their campaigns to their readers and viewers all across the country. They provide a daily fix on

how the campaign and the candidates stand at the end of the day or the end of the week. There are any number of vehicles ("Nightline," the morning shows, the Sunday talk shows) for the campaigns and the candidates to get out "political messages," some in sound-bite form and others at somewhat greater length. And there is a fair amount of independent reporting that tackles ambitious assignments and complicated issues within tight constraints of time and space. These reports are often genuinely illuminating and insightful.

There are three major problems. The first has already been discussed: there is less money (and therefore less space in print and time on television) available for political coverage generally and "serious" coverage specifically. The second problem is what we might call the Superficial problem: something that can be done very well if done carefully and deliberately is more often than not done sloppily and in haste and quickly reaches the lowest common denominator.

For instance: Polling, which can be remarkably informative about the mood of the electorate, its anxieties and fears, its hopes and dreams, can become so excessive as to crowd out all other discussion. In recent campaigns, polling has

been overused and abused, serving as a statistical substitute for old-fashioned reporting. The shorthand (Bush up by 10!) has changed the dialogue of the campaign. Candidates and campaign operatives are frequently amazed that they can go for days, from state to state, airport to airport, time zone to time zone and hear nothing but questions about the most recent (Gallup, Harris, CBS/New York Times, ABC/Washington Post, NBC/Wall Street Journal) poll. Walter Mondale in 1984 and George Bush in 1988 were both stunned by the sheer volume of poll-related questions, according to people who worked closely with them. (4) Indeed, in 1988, poll stories became "mega" news stories unto themselves. Prior to the second presidential debate, on October 12, 1988, ABC News devoted more than half of its "World News Tonight" broadcast to national and state-by-state polls conducted by ABC and The Washington Post.

For instance: Advertising. The Selling of the President, Joe McGinness's book on the Nixon campaign's advertising effort in 1968, was an extraordinary look into the operations of a modern presidential campaign. It captured an important element of Mr. Nixon's political re-emergence. But most campaign reporting about political television advertising is cliched, poorly researched and often misleading. One would think from reading the campaign

reportage of 1988 that the Bush campaign invested most of its media budget in something called the Willie Horton commercial. In fact, the actual "Willie Horton" commercial was produced by an independent political action committee, ran on cable television in the month of August, cost roughly \$600,000 for the media buy, was seen in its original form by a small percentage of the voting population and was probably recalled by an even smaller percentage of those who did see it. (5) The news media, by repeating clips of the Willie Horton ad on local and national news shows, gave it much greater exposure than it ever received as a paid advertisement.

Race, of course, has dominated American politics since the early part of the 19th century. It is an issue which resonates throughout our political culture and has torn the fabric of American society. It is also true that the Bush campaign repeatedly aired a "crime" spot, a revolving door "freeing" one presumed criminal after another, which raised the "furlough" issue in a different form. (6) What was lost were the distinctions and the subtleties of the advertising. The larger point is that news coverage can and does exaggerate and distort what is actually happening in a presidential campaign, in part because of superficial reporting.

Toward the end of the general election campaign, the Superficial problem is in full roar. Television news' addiction to pictures (now accompanied by words decrying the careful producing of the pictures), mistakes (Pearl Harbor Day!), attacks (Willie Horton!) and polls (Dukakis Surge!?) comes together with all manner of rumors, innuendos and various forms of character assassination to provide the electorate with a lurid picture of the political process at work. To many voters, the whole process seems not only disconnected from their day-to-day concerns but also deeply disturbing in what it seems to be saying about the political process.

It is possible that these two "realities" -- campaign world and normal life -- are simply separate and distinct worlds that intersect only if polling or some gripping event create interaction. If so, we have arrived at a dangerous political moment. The purpose of this quadrennial exercise, after all, is the consent of the governed. The country -- its democratic political system and its leadership -- belongs to the electorate. The guiding principle behind the idea of democracy is interaction and interconnection, not disconnection.

This problem of disconnection is exacerbated by the third major problem, which is that there never seems to be enough time. Time is the one commodity that is not available to candidates, reporters, editors and producers. All the best intentions of political journalism inevitably run up against this central fact. "This time around," the television news producer says before the election campaign begins, "we're really going to cover the issues." But by the time the general election campaign is in full swing, the issues are secondary to the norms and imperatives of the business.

The issue of the federal deficit, for example, is complicated and difficult. It cannot be explained, inside the context of a presidential campaign, in a one-and-a-half minute tv story. It takes half-an-hour or an hour just to scratch the surface of the issue. But as everyone knows, there will never be a one-hour network news special on the federal budget deficit. That's not what network television does.

The absence of time distorts the campaign. Candidates speak in nine-second sound-bites. Experts "explain" an issue in two 11-second bites. Fast edits and quick pace are not the stuff of deliberative choice. They are the stuff of television. That's what mainstream network television news has become.

The problems of less money, superficial coverage and the absence of time are only heightened by the collapse of network news. People who are locked into uphill battles for economic survival cannot waste any time thinking about how they "should" cover politics. They need to do everything they can to get their Nielsen ratings up, and they don't think that politics will improve their ratings. With network news locked into this deadly endgame, efforts within broadcast journalism to "improve" political coverage will necessarily be of secondary importance.

If this is an accurate and fair description of the current political-journalistic environment, the question is: How do we get the substance of politics and governance back into "play" in our general election campaigns? How do we foster interaction between the campaigns and the voters? What can we do to improve the tone and content of the debate? The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy believes that the answer may lie in a different approach to television coverage of presidential politics. We believe that what television does best is "live" coverage of the candidates in action. What candidates do best is campaign, debate and answer questions. Our idea merges the two on a regularly scheduled basis. We call it The Nine Sundays Plan.

THE NINE SUNDAYS PLAN

Presidential campaigns, at their best, are a heated argument about the future direction and leadership of the United States. Part of the press's role in presidential politics can be to enrich that debate and to expand our collective understanding of the issues and the people involved.

Above all else, a Presidential campaign needs time, on television, to engage the electorate in its political argument. It seems to us that we must focus on a better role for television in the political process.

Within the current formats of network and local television news, there is simply no time available for expanded coverage of presidential politics. There is only so much that can be done, after all, inside the Nielsen-driven confines of a 22-minute evening news broadcast. There are those programs, such as the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Nightline and the Sunday morning interview programs, which do have more time, but, whether we like it or not, the campaign managers still arrange their candidate's days to project their image and their message on the evening and morning newscasts. Their basic thrust revolves around two

news cycles; the evening tv/radio news broadcasts and morning tv/radio news/talk shows, and newspapers often take their cues from what is said on these shows.

New vehicles are therefore needed for presidential campaign debate and discussion. There is general agreement on this point. David Broder has called for weekly presidential candidate news conferences during the general election campaign. Paul Taylor has proposed the "five minute solution;" five minutes of free network air time on alternating nights for the major party nominees. In various forums sponsored by the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center, Tim Russert of NBC News, Marvin Kalb and others have proposed increasing the number of presidential debates. There are other ideas and proposals. The Nine Sundays Plan borrows generously from all of them.

Basically this is the plan: there are nine Sundays from Labor Day to Election Day. We propose that network and cable television news reserve time on each of those nine Sunday evenings for at least two presidential debates, one vice presidential debate, five live "conversations" with the presidential candidates and one concluding presidential candidate address to the nation.

Network news enthusiasm for the Nine Sundays Plan is critical to its success or failure. Sunday evening is special. It is when most Americans watch television. Therefore, we believe that it would be to everyone's benefit if the debates, conversations with the candidates, and summary addresses were held on Sunday night, at 9pm eastern time, to reach the largest number of potential voters. Obviously, if impossible scheduling conflicts arise, adjustments can be made.

If the major television networks do not agree to broadcast more than the three presidential and vice-presidential debates at 9pm eastern time on Sunday, for financial and competitive reasons (as well as scheduling conflicts), the five conversations with the candidates could be scheduled for 7pm eastern time on Sunday. The candidates' summary addresses to the nation would hopefully be broadcast at 9pm or 10pm the Sunday before the election.

Holding these events on Sunday evenings would allow the candidates ample opportunity to campaign during the week, all across the country, and yet leave them time (Saturday and all day Sunday) to recoup and prepare for a nationally televised appearance. The basic idea is to insure some "prime time" on network television on a weekly basis for

political discussion. Such an approach is serious, regular and predictable. The larger idea is to attempt to institutionalize a more substantive discussion of political issues in a way that does not penalize the networks financially, inhibit the candidates's campaign flexibility or diminish the concerns of voters and reporters. Let us look at the formats one-by-one:

DEBATES

It is impossible to know how many presidential debates there will be in the 1992 general election campaign. Recent history would suggest that there will be two presidential debates and one vice presidential debate. That was the case in 1984 and again in 1988.

Exact details will be worked out by the presidential candidates, the political parties, the networks and whichever other organizations the candidates choose. Presidential and vice- presidential debates are the subject of long and difficult negotiations which will end up determining the final shape and format of the 1992 Presidential campaign debates.

In 1988, James Baker, on behalf of candidate Bush, and Paul Brontas, on behalf of candidate Dukakis, negotiated the

terms--the number, dates and format of the debates. Baker held the better cards, and his conditions prevailed. There were to be two presidential debates, and one vice-presidential debate.

The debates were, without doubt, crucially important moments in the campaign, but they were still deeply disappointing.

CBS' Walter Cronkite described the '88 debates as "phony, part of an unconscionable fraud." The Wall Street Journal's Albert Hunt called them a "sham." CNN's Bernard Shaw said: "'88 was a charade, these were not debates." A New York Times editorial tried to be charitable, noting the debates were "deprived of novelty, crippled by poor questions--wooden and unfocused--but still, better than nothing."

There were also very specific reasons for the disappointment.

First, they were not "debates," by any definition. While the candidates shared the same platform and shook hands at the beginning and end, they did not address each other, they did not question each other, they barely looked at each other.

Second, they answered questions posed by a panel of journalists, all of whom had been invited and ultimately "cleared" by the political parties. According to the terms of the Baker-Brountas agreement, the debate was to be divided into two equal parts--one for questions about domestic policy, the other for questions about foreign policy. At one point, Baker called the control room to remind the executive producer that it was time to shift from domestic to foreign affairs--something the producer and the anchorman were intending to do in any case. The point is, Baker felt sufficiently paternalistic about the whole enterprise to believe that he could call in the middle of the program and suggest a change.

Third, the debate took place before a live audience, divided equally between Republicans and Democrats, who couldn't resist laughing at their candidate's humor or applauding his prepared throwaway lines. ("Senator, you're no Jack Kennedy.") The atmosphere was more suggestive of a political circus than of a political debate. Everything was calculated. The louder the laughter and the applause, presumably the greater the impact on the vast viewing audience.

Finally, because it was more of a circus than a debate, the networks tried to compete with one another in instant

polling and analysis. A sampling of 400-600 Americans could produce a winner or a loser within a matter of minutes. Spin doctors let loose their predictable optimism, and almost invariably it was used, raw and unchecked. One such spin doctor told a reporter before the October 13, 1988 debate: "If I don't see you later, just quote me as saying our guy won by a knockout."

No one believes that in this age of television we can suddenly return to the Lincoln-Douglas model, but our research clearly indicates that serious analysts of the political process want to change the '88 model. Simply put, they want real debates.

Some observers point to the Canadian model--the two candidates in a tv studio with a single moderator. It was spectacularly successful. A similar model was tried during the 1990 Massachusetts gubernatorial campaign, but there were so many rules and regulations imposed by the candidates' handlers that a potentially interesting debate lost much of its spontaneity.

A consensus model seemed to emerge in our many seminars, conferences and interviews--that the next series of debates be marked by simplicity and substance. The ingredients are

easily identifiable: two candidates, one moderator, a tv studio, no audience, live.

We understand that there are many different opinions about what constitutes the best format. The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center believes that we should go back to the future. A "modified" version of the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debates offers the most promising and uncluttered format. They took place in a television studio, with a moderator and no audience. A panel of reporters, though, is no longer necessary. The moderator could easily begin the debate and keep it moving along if need be. The important feature is not the moderator but the quality of the candidates. The JSB Center format would have the two candidates simply square off in front of the cameras, with the moderator making sure things are proceeding fairly. The simplicity itself would make for gripping television. This format can work in the 1992 presidential campaign.

The same format could be used for the vice presidential debate. We would argue that the vice presidential debate be held on Sunday night, and be treated as politically equivalent to a presidential debate. We understand that the presidential campaigns may negotiate a different status for the vice presidential debate.

The issue of sponsorship is problematic. Ideally, within the framework of the Nine Sundays Plan, the television networks would "sponsor" the presidential and vice presidential debates. If the networks end up as sponsors of, say, two presidential debates and one vice presidential debate, they should be allowed to sell advertising (or enlist sponsors) whose commercial messages would be seen at the very beginning and the very end of the debates to help defray costs and recover some lost revenues.

The ideal situation, of course, would be to have no advertising at all, but we believe that, if handled correctly, commercials should not diminish the value of the broadcast. Viewers and voters are sophisticated enough to understand the need for commercial sponsorship. It would be no longer than 90 seconds at the top of the show and 90 seconds at the end. The revenues from these advertisements would completely cover all costs and the profits could be pooled to pay the legal costs incurred for filings with the FCC and possible legal challenges from allegedly aggrieved parties.

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES

Assuming that there are at least two presidential debates and one vice presidential debate at 9pm eastern time on Sunday during the 1992 campaign, that leaves six Sunday nights open from Labor Day Weekend to Election Day.

Part Two of our Nine Sundays Proposal is that five of these six Sundays be devoted to two, back-to-back, 30- or 45-minute "Conversations with the Candidates." These conversations could be open to commercial sponsorship. Network coverage of these programs could rotate from ABC to CBS to NBC. Public television, CNN, other cable news organizations, and various radio networks would presumably cover all five Sunday night "Conversations with the Candidates" as regular programming. Rotating coverage worked well during the Iran-contra hearings. The first week CBS News was responsible for covering the hearings. The second week NBC News had the responsibility. The third week ABC News covered the hearings. PBS, cable news and the various radio networks covered every week of the hearings. This same model can work in the 1992 Presidential campaign.

Because of the Major League Baseball playoffs, the World Series and other network broadcasting obligations, the best

window on Sunday nights for rotating network coverage of the "Conversations with the Candidates" is from 7pm to 8:30pm eastern time. Playoff and World Series baseball broadcasts usually begin at 8:30pm. At least two and possibly three Sundays in October will be given over to these baseball broadcasts.

What about the structure of the broadcasts? We'd suggest -- in the interest of fairness -- that each presidential candidate be interviewed by a separate three-reporter panel for 28 minutes (assuming 30 minutes per candidate) or 42 minutes (assuming 45 minutes per candidate). The first panel would include a network anchorman or anchorwoman and two reporters well-versed in the evening's subject matter. The second panel would include a CNN (or PBS, or Monitor or NPR) anchorman or anchorwoman and two expert reporters.

Now what about the substance of these broadcasts? Each of the five Sunday night "Conversations" would address different issues. There are basically three major issues in American politics: the national security, the national economy (broadly defined) and the national culture (also broadly defined). Issues of national security include diplomacy, foreign policy, military preparedness and various "threats" to the national interest abroad and at home.

Issues of the national economy include national and international economic forces which, in concert, create the American economic way of life. Issues of national culture touch on a central political question: What kind of country do we want? These "cultural issues" include questions about race, crime, the environment, education, drugs, the Supreme Court's role in American society, school prayer, the role of religion, abortion and capital punishment. These "cultural issues" (and others like them) are often the most important in American presidential politics.

One Sunday would therefore be given over to national security issues, another Sunday to national and international economic issues, another Sunday to issues of our national culture. Two Sundays would be given over to whatever questions (within the three general issue groups) seemed appropriate at that stage of the campaign.

So, hypothetically, let's say the first Sunday night "Conversation with the Candidates" concerned issues of national security. Alphabetically, ABC News might be first up in the network rotation. A flip of a coin would determine candidate order. Let us assume that President Bush is the GOP nominee. He wins the coin toss, he goes first. Mr. Bush is then interviewed at his office (or

wherever he happens to be) by Peter Jennings and two expert national security correspondents. That broadcast goes out over the ABC Television network and (one hopes) PBS and various radio and cable channels from 7pm eastern time to, say, 7:30pm eastern time. Immediately afterward, the Democratic nominee would be interviewed by Bernard Shaw (e.g.) and two other expert national security correspondents. That conversation would also go out over the ABC Network, PBS, radio networks and various cable channels, ending at 8pm eastern time. CBS and NBC News could carry these conversations or run their normal entertainment programming.

The following week, the Democratic nominee would go first, the Republican nominee second. CBS News might be up next in the rotation. Dan Rather would anchor the first panel. Judy Woodruff would anchor the other. The reporters would be selected by CBS according to their knowledge of the subject matter.

The overall schedule might look something like this (assuming the Republicans won the coin toss):

<u>DAY</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>NETWORK</u>	<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>NOMINEE ORDER</u>
Sunday 1	7pm	ABC/CNN	Nat. Security	GOP First
Sunday 2	7pm	CBS/CNN	Economy	DEM. First
Sunday 3	9pm	ALL	Presidential Debate	
Sunday 4	9pm	ALL	Vice Presidential Debate	
Sunday 5	7pm	NBC/CNN	Nat. Culture	GOP First
Sunday 6	7pm	ABC/CNN	More Security	DEM. First
Sunday 7	9pm	ALL	Presidential Debate	
Sunday 8	7pm	NBC/CNN	More Nat. Culture	GOP First
Sunday 9	9pm	ALL	Summary Addresses	

Candidate participation would be voluntary. One candidate (usually the one behind in the polls) will always want to participate. Should the other candidate choose not to participate, the time allotted would simply revert back to regular entertainment or news programming.

We also recommend that voters provide, through the mail, a selection of the questions for the candidates. The anchor and the two "expert" reporters could choose the best questions submitted and read them aloud to the candidates. After the candidates responded, the reporters could follow up with questions of their own, should that seem appropriate at the time. This would give the average voter a sense of participating in the process.

Back-to-back "Conversations with the Candidates" on five Sunday evenings during the general election would significantly improve the political dialogue of the 1992 presidential campaign. The networks would not lose money, since these conversations could be sponsored. They may even be able to turn a small profit. Since each network, except CBS, which would be responsible for one, would only be responsible for two Sunday nights, lost revenues would be minimized. And the five Sunday night "Conversations with the Candidates," organized around the three major issues of American politics, would help focus the print, radio and television news coverage leading up to and following the Sunday night broadcasts, and encourage deeper, more substantive reporting.

In this way, one of the major benefits of the Nine Sundays Proposal, in our view, is that editors and producers would be able to plan some of their coverage according to the schedule of these issue-oriented programs. For instance, the executive producer of an evening news broadcast, knowing that next Sunday's "candidate conversation" was going to focus on national security issues, could order up two pieces on how the candidates stand on those issues. Editors at the major newspapers and newsmagazines could also order up

stories of considerable complexity well in advance of the actual event, thus providing the reader with an overview and some context for the issues under discussion. Monday and Tuesday newspaper, radio and television coverage could also go into more detail and analysis.

The five "Conversations" at 7pm eastern time on Sunday are likely to be very attractive to NBC Television and ABC Television, as well as the cable and public broadcasting networks. That time period (7-8pm eastern time) is currently dominated by CBS News' "60 Minutes" broadcast. Both ABC and NBC spend over \$1 million for programming in the 7pm-8pm time slot on Sunday nights. Neither of their shows does very well in the Nielsen ratings, resulting in low advertising revenue. The Nine Sundays broadcasts, on the other hand, cost no more than \$100,000 to produce (per show) and the advertising revenue generated by the broadcasts should be at least \$200-250,000 per network per night.

"60 Minutes" is the life blood of CBS News, generating \$70-75 million in annual profits. CBS is unlikely to tamper with the Sunday schedule for just that reason. However, it is not at all clear that the presidential candidate conversations pose any serious "ratings" threat to "60

Minutes" at 7pm, particularly during the first six weeks of the presidential campaign. Voter (and therefore viewer) interest in presidential politics accelerates dramatically only toward the end of the campaign. It is also true that more people watch television as time passes through the evening. On the one, or possibly two, occasions when CBS News would be responsible for carrying the presidential candidate conversations, it is likely that a delayed "60 Minutes" would garner a market share at least equal to if not greater than the one it normally gets from 7pm-8pm on Sunday nights. This might allow "60 Minutes" producers to charge a higher rate for advertising thirty-and-sixty-second commercials. It might also have the unintended consequence of strengthening CBS's Sunday night schedule, since "60 Minutes" drawing power as a "lead-in" to other shows has helped the network dominate Sunday night television. In the past, the three networks have been more competitive in the Nielsen ratings after 9pm eastern time, depending on the drawing power of their programming.

The point here is that given the enormous financial pressures under which network news divisions labor, it is important that any plan seeking to increase substantive political discussion on television be sensitive to network costs. The viability of the Nine Sundays Plan is that it makes financial as well as journalistic and political sense.

CANDIDATE ADDRESS TO THE NATION

The final piece of the Nine Sundays Plan is that the candidates be given fifteen to thirty minutes of network time on the Sunday night before the election to present their case to the nation's voters. A coin toss would determine candidate order. All the major networks would be allowed to sell advertisements that would immediately precede and follow the two major party candidate presentations. The presidential candidates would be required to appear on camera at all times during the broadcast. This would not be a campaign commercial with tape inserts. We would hope that the candidates would conduct these summary addresses in a "live" format, either in studio or from a "remote" location.

We are aware the the Nine Sundays Proposal raises a number of questions. Chief among them: Is it legal or does it violate anti-trust regulations? Attached is a professional judgment written by Frederick Schauer, who is the Frank Stanton Professor on the First Amendment at the Kennedy School's Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,

Politics and Public Policy, which states, convincingly in our view, that the Nine Sundays Plan is "doable" within the existing interpretations of the relevant statutes and regulations.

Another question: what about third party candidates? Third party candidates would be excluded from participation in all of the proposed formats unless, like George Wallace in 1968, their candidacies could reasonably be considered crucial to the outcome of the race. How does one measure whether a third party candidate is viable or not? We would suggest that a third party candidate who is able consistently to garner a double-digit poll rating (10% or better) in nationally-recognized independent polls (Gallup, Roper, CBS News/New York Times, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, ABC News/Washington Post) qualifies for inclusion in the overall plan. Those third party candidates (like Gene McCarthy in 1976 and John Anderson in 1980) whose poll numbers wallowed in the single digits and who were in fact inconsequential to the final outcome of the race would be excluded from participation in the Nine Sundays Plan. By getting a legal waiver from the FCC prior to the general election campaign, the networks could avoid frivolous legal challenges from allegedly aggrieved third party candidates.

Still another question: what about football and what happens if a game runs over? First, this is an issue that is relevant only to CBS and NBC. ABC carries football on Monday nights. Because of rules changes in the NFL, the vast majority of football games now "run to time" or take less than three hours to play. NFL Sunday games begin at either 1pm eastern or 4pm eastern. Almost all of them will be over and done with by 7pm eastern time. Inevitably, there may be one 4pm NFL game that will go into overtime and run past the 7pm starting time that the Nine Sundays Plan calls for on five Sunday nights. Since at this writing we do not know what the 1992 NFL schedule will be, the key will be to fashion the Nine Sundays schedule so as to minimize the possibility of NBC or CBS experiencing a Sports Division/News Division conflict. This too should be "doable." In the event that all the best plans nevertheless result in a conflict, the Sports Division would win, and viewers would have to turn to PBS, cable or radio networks for the Nine Sundays broadcast.

A final question: who organizes all of this? The answer is the over-the-air and cable television networks would organize the schedule in consultation with the political parties, the presidential campaigns and whichever other groups they choose to include in the process. Ideally, an

executive committee would be formed to handle all details, execute operations and arbitrate whatever disputes might arise.

This then is the Nine Sundays Proposal. Assuming two presidential debates and a vice presidential debate, we would call for the addition of five Sunday "Conversations with the Candidates" and one Sunday night concluding candidate address to the nation.

The Nine Sundays Plan rewards serious discussion of the issues. It does not hurt the network bottom line. It encourages the national political press corps to organize its coverage around a pre-arranged set of important campaign issues. Most important, it gives the voters regular access on television to the presidential candidates over the length of the general election campaign.

The Nine Sundays Plan is designed to create a fixed and reasonable amount of television time during the general election campaign when candidates can speak to issues of national concern, while insuring some political flexibility. Candidate participation is voluntary. Should the plan be adopted, the 1992 presidential campaign would be altogether different from its immediate predecessors. That alone recommends serious discussion of the plan's merits.

FOOTNOTES

1. Roger Ailes, President Bush's media consultant for the 1988 presidential campaign, is fond of saying that the media (covering politics) are interested in only three things; "pictures, mistakes and attacks." (Runkel, David R. (ed.), Campaign for President: The Managers Look at '88. Auburn House Publishing Company, 1989) We added "polls" to the Ailes formula after talking with candidates, campaign operatives and reporters, all of whom remarked upon how important and ubiquitous polls and poll stories have become in presidential campaigns and presidential campaign coverage.
2. Joan Didion wrote about the 1988 presidential campaign at some length in an article entitled "Insider Baseball," which was published in The New York Review of Books (October 11, 1988) before the election.
3. Most recently, the whole issue of whether all three networks would survive financially was reported in The New York Times. See NYT, Monday, 29 July 1991, Section D, Page 1 article by Bill Carter, NYT Media Correspondent. For a much fuller look at the network financial picture, the forthcoming Three Blind Mice, a book about the three major over-the-air broadcast networks, by Ken Auletta, will be published by Simon & Schuster in September, 1991.
4. Based on interviews with Tom Donilon and Jack Corrigan of the 1984 Mondale-Ferraro campaign conducted by the author in 1984 and in early 1991. Bush staffers interviewed by the author in 1988 included Lee Atwater, Roger Ailes, Rich Bond and George W. Bush. In private conversation with the author, President Bush described the impact of polling on his daily life while campaigning for president in quite humorous detail. But the author took no notes at the time of that conversation.
5. This data is based on interviews with Larry McCarthy, who wrote and produced the "Willie Horton" ad for the National Security Political Action Committee. Mr. McCarthy was interviewed in August, September, October and December of 1988.

was interviewed in August, September, October and December of 1988. Attempts to confirm the precise details of the media buy and its weight, frequency and reach were unsuccessful in 1988 and again in 1990.

6. The "Revolving Door" ad was produced by Dennis Frankenberry for Ailes Communications for the Bush-Quayle '88 Committee. The Bush-Quayle campaign spent over \$2.5 million airing this commercial in national and spot markets. After putting it on the air, they waited to see how Governor Dukakis's campaign would respond. The Dukakis campaign, in the eyes of Bush media strategist Roger Ailes, never did respond to the "Revolving Door" ad. Said Ailes: "I was stunned they didn't hit back. But they never really did. So we just left it on the air, basically, and it did some damage."

THE EQUAL TIME PROVISIONS AND THE NINE SUNDAYS PROPOSAL

It is possible that someone could question the compatibility of the Nine Sundays proposal with Section 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, commonly known as the "equal time" provision. Under current FCC interpretations of that provision, however, it does not appear that there could be a substantial objection. And even if this is not the case, there is no doubt that the consistency between the Nine Sundays proposal and Section 315(a) is a quite plausible position.

Section 315(a) provides that a broadcast licensee who permits "a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station" must "afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station." There are four major exemptions, those being for "bona fide newscasts," "bona fide news interviews," "bona fide news documentaries," and "on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events."

There has been continuing concern about the extent to which presidential debates are covered by this provision, or covered by the exemptions, since non-exempt coverage would entail requirements with respect to third-party and other so-called "minor" candidates. Obviously these candidates are excluded in the Nine Sundays proposal, and there is little doubt that

the literal language of Section 315(a), taken alone, would suggest that there is a legal problem. But if one traces the development of the FCC position, it appears that there may be less of a problem than appears at first sight.

The first presidential debates were held in 1960, but there was no Section 315(a) problem at that time because Congress explicitly suspended Section 315(a) for those debates. Equal time issues were debated and litigated in both 1964 and 1968, but not in any context related to actual or proposed debates. The debate issue in fact arose seriously for the first time in 1972, when CBS attempted to include on "Face the Nation" both George McGovern and Hubert Humphrey but not Shirley Chisholm. Although the Commission upheld the decision of CBS to exclude both Chisholm and Sam Yorty (35 F.C.C.2d 572 (1972)), this decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (24 R.R.2d 2061 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). As a result of this reversal the FCC granted Chisholm thirty minutes of prime time shortly before the election (35 F.C.C.2d 579 (1972)).

Since 1972, however, the courts, consistent with increasingly prevalent practice where administrative agency interpretations are concerned (see especially *Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applied

to Section 315(a) and the FCC in *Branch v. FCC*, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987)), have been more willing to defer to the FCC determinations. And the FCC, in turn, has shown itself increasingly willing to defer to the broadcasters (see *Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC*, 636 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In 1975 the Commission ruled that debates between or among candidates were within the exemption for "bona fide news events" so long as they were sponsored by someone other than the broadcaster. Moreover, the Commission said at the same time that it would be willing to defer to any "good faith" judgment of the relevant broadcasters (*Petitions of Aspen Institute and CBS, Inc.*, 55 F.C.C.2d 697 (1975)). This ruling was appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals upheld the FCC by a 2-1 vote (*Chisholm v. Federal Communications Commission*, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The full court of the District of Columbia Circuit refused to overrule that decision, and the Supreme Court, with only Justice White dissenting, refused to hear the case (429 U.S. 890 (1976)).

In response to those rulings requiring a non-broadcaster sponsor in order to be exempt from the requirements of section 315(a), the League of Women Voters sponsored a number of presidential debates in the 1970s and 1980s. As long as the League and not the broadcasters were in charge, the debates

were considered the kind of news event that broadcasters could cover without triggering the equal time requirements.

Were this the current state of the law, then there would seem to be questions about the Nine Sundays proposal. In 1983, however, the FCC (Petition of Henry Geller, 95 F.C.C. 2d 1236, 54 R.R.2d 1246 (1983)) indicated that even broadcaster-sponsored debates could be considered bona fide news events and thus exempt from Section 315(a). This ruling was challenged by the League of Women Voters, who claimed that it gave the networks excess power to prefer some candidates to others, thus violating both the letter and the spirit of Section 315(a). This challenge was rejected by the Court of Appeals, however (League of Women Voters v. FCC, 731 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), and there was no appeal to the Supreme Court. Moreover, other decisions of about the same time, such as one ruling holding that the Donahue show was a bona fide newscast under Section 315(a)(1) (Multimedia Entertainment, Inc., 56 R.R.2d 143 (1984)), make clear the increasing proclivity of the FCC to defer to broadcaster judgments and thus to remove much of the sting from Section 315(a). And this, of course, is consistent with the FCC's actions first in relaxing its enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine and then, on August 4, 1987, eliminating it entirely. Moreover, the FCC's First Amendment rationale for eliminating the Fairness

Doctrine, saying that "The First Amendment does not guarantee a fair press, only a free press," suggests that there would in 1991 be a non-frivolous challenge to the constitutionality of Section 315(a), the Supreme Court's ruling in *Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC*, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), notwithstanding.

In light of all of this, it seems more likely than not that the Nine Sundays proposal would be consistent with existing FCC and judicial interpretations of Section 315(a) and its exemptions. And even if this is not right, there seems no doubt that at the very least a professionally respectable and legally plausible argument could be made supporting that conclusion. And in any event there are arguments that could be made about Section 315(a)'s constitutionality. But it is unlikely that it would be necessary for anyone to go this far, as it seems that the proposal is likely to be found to fall within the "bona fide news event" exemption as that term is currently interpreted by the FCC.

The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center does not consider this brief analysis as a formal legal opinion, and we are confident that any broadcaster considering the Nine Sundays proposal would of course get formal legal advice before proceeding. But our initial research indicates that we not hesitate on Section 315(a) grounds from offering the proposal for consideration.

I N S T I T U T E O F
 POLITICS

JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT • HARVARD UNIVERSITY

FAX

617 495-1364

DATE: 9/5/91

TO: ANDY CARD

FAX #: 202 456-2397

PAGE 1 OF 20 PAGE(S)

FROM: JOHN ELLIS

Message: _____

Institute of Politics
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-1360

Determined NOT to be
National Security Classified Marking
By PLM (NLGB) on 03/25/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, 5 September 1991

Dear Andy:

I understand there is some concern down your way about the 9 Sundays Proposal. Attached are the exact details of the plan. You should be aware that:

1. Today's Washington Post account is inaccurate.
2. The 9 Sundays Proposal essentially calls for 5-6 nationally televised news conferences on Sunday night and a "summary" case speech by both major party nominees on the Sunday night before election day.
3. The plan was written by me (except for some bullshit that Kalb threw in about the debates) and is designed to benefit President Bush by: (a) reducing the number of debates to the established minimum and (b) maximizing the number of "press conference" formats which the President handles so well.
4. Candidate participation is voluntary. If a candidate chooses not to participate, programming returns to regular news or entertainment programming. Presidents might be unavailable due to foreign travel, for instance.
5. The proposal, if accepted by the networks (doubtful), will put the Democratic nominee side by side with President Bush on a weekly basis, but only in debate format twice (as in 1988 and 1984). You guys win that one BIG TIME.

Cheers. I can be reached at 617-495-1360.

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THE NINE SUNDAYS PLAN

Presidential campaigns, at their best, are a heated argument about the future direction and leadership of the United States. Part of the press's role in presidential politics can be to enrich that debate and to expand our collective understanding of the issues and the people involved.

Above all else, a Presidential campaign needs time, on television, to engage the electorate in its political argument. It seems to us that we must focus on a better role for television in the political process.

Within the current formats of network and local television news, there is simply no time available for expanded coverage of presidential politics. There is only so much that can be done, after all, inside the Nielsen-driven confines of a 22-minute evening news broadcast. There are those programs, such as the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Nightline and the Sunday morning interview programs, which do have more time, but, whether we like it or not, the campaign managers still arrange their candidate's days to project their image and their message on the evening and morning newscasts. Their basic thrust revolves around two

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news cycles; the evening tv/radio news broadcasts and morning tv/radio news/talk shows, and newspapers often take their cues from what is said on these shows.

New vehicles are therefore needed for presidential campaign debate and discussion. There is general agreement on this point. David Broder has called for weekly presidential candidate news conferences during the general election campaign. Paul Taylor has proposed the "five minute solution;" five minutes of free network air time on alternating nights for the major party nominees. In various forums sponsored by the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center, Tim Russert of NBC News, Marvin Kalb and others have proposed increasing the number of presidential debates. There are other ideas and proposals. The Nine Sundays Plan borrows generously from all of them.

Basically this is the plan: there are nine Sundays from Labor Day to Election Day. We propose that network and cable television news reserve time on each of those nine Sunday evenings for at least two presidential debates, one vice presidential debate, five live "conversations" with the presidential candidates and one concluding presidential candidate address to the nation.

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Network news enthusiasm for the Nine Sundays Plan is critical to its success or failure. Sunday evening is special. It is when most Americans watch television. Therefore, we believe that it would be to everyone's benefit if the debates, conversations with the candidates, and summary addresses were held on Sunday night, at 9pm eastern time, to reach the largest number of potential voters. Obviously, if impossible scheduling conflicts arise, adjustments can be made.

If the major television networks do not agree to broadcast more than the three presidential and vice-presidential debates at 9pm eastern time on Sunday, for financial and competitive reasons (as well as scheduling conflicts), the five conversations with the candidates could be scheduled for 7pm eastern time on Sunday. The candidates' summary addresses to the nation would hopefully be broadcast at 9pm or 10pm the Sunday before the election.

Holding these events on Sunday evenings would allow the candidates ample opportunity to campaign during the week, all across the country, and yet leave them time (Saturday and all day Sunday) to recoup and prepare for a nationally televised appearance. The basic idea is to insure some "prime time" on network television on a weekly basis for

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political discussion. Such an approach is serious, regular and predictable. The larger idea is to attempt to institutionalize a more substantive discussion of political issues in a way that does not penalize the networks financially, inhibit the candidates's campaign flexibility or diminish the concerns of voters and reporters. Let us look at the formats one-by-one:

DEBATES

It is impossible to know how many presidential debates there will be in the 1992 general election campaign. Recent history would suggest that there will be two presidential debates and one vice presidential debate. That was the case in 1984 and again in 1988.

Exact details will be worked out by the presidential candidates, the political parties, the networks and whichever other organizations the candidates choose. Presidential and vice-presidential debates are the subject of long and difficult negotiations which will end up determining the final shape and format of the 1992 Presidential campaign debates.

In 1988, James Baker, on behalf of candidate Bush, and Paul Brontas, on behalf of candidate Dukakis, negotiated the

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terms--the number, dates and format of the debates. Baker held the better cards, and his conditions prevailed. There were to be two presidential debates, and one vice-presidential debate.

The debates were, without doubt, crucially important moments in the campaign, but they were still deeply disappointing.

CBS' Walter Cronkite described the '88 debates as "phony, part of an unconscionable fraud." The Wall Street Journal's Albert Hunt called them a "sham." CNN's Bernard Shaw said: "'88 was a charade, these were not debates." A New York Times editorial tried to be charitable, noting the debates were "deprived of novelty, crippled by poor questions--wooden and unfocused--but still, better than nothing."

There were also very specific reasons for the disappointment.

First, they were not "debates," by any definition. While the candidates shared the same platform and shook hands at the beginning and end, they did not address each other, they did not question each other, they barely looked at each other.

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Second, they answered questions posed by a panel of journalists, all of whom had been invited and ultimately "cleared" by the political parties. According to the terms of the Baker-Brountas agreement, the debate was to be divided into two equal parts--one for questions about domestic policy, the other for questions about foreign policy. At one point, Baker called the control room to remind the executive producer that it was time to shift from domestic to foreign affairs--something the producer and the anchorman were intending to do in any case. The point is, Baker felt sufficiently paternalistic about the whole enterprise to believe that he could call in the middle of the program and suggest a change.

Third, the debate took place before a live audience, divided equally between Republicans and Democrats, who couldn't resist laughing at their candidate's humor or applauding his prepared throwaway lines. ("Senator, you're no Jack Kennedy.") The atmosphere was more suggestive of a political circus than of a political debate. Everything was calculated. The louder the laughter and the applause, presumably the greater the impact on the vast viewing audience.

Finally, because it was more of a circus than a debate, the networks tried to compete with one another in instant

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polling and analysis. A sampling of 400-600 Americans could produce a winner or a loser within a matter of minutes. Spin doctors let loose their predictable optimism, and almost invariably it was used, raw and unchecked. One such spin doctor told a reporter before the October 13, 1988 debate: "If I don't see you later, just quote me as saying our guy won by a knockout."

No one believes that in this age of television we can suddenly return to the Lincoln-Douglas model, but our research clearly indicates that serious analysts of the political process want to change the '88 model. Simply put, they want real debates.

Some observers point to the Canadian model--the two candidates in a tv studio with a single moderator. It was spectacularly successful. A similar model was tried during the 1990 Massachusetts gubernatorial campaign, but there were so many rules and regulations imposed by the candidates' handlers that a potentially interesting debate lost much of its spontaneity.

A consensus model seemed to emerge in our many seminars, conferences and interviews--that the next series of debates be marked by simplicity and substance. The ingredients are

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easily identifiable: two candidates, one moderator, a tv studio, no audience, live.

We understand that there are many different opinions about what constitutes the best format. The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center believes that we should go back to the future. A "modified" version of the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debates offers the most promising and uncluttered format. They took place in a television studio, with a moderator and no audience. A panel of reporters, though, is no longer necessary. The moderator could easily begin the debate and keep it moving along if need be. The important feature is not the moderator but the quality of the candidates. The JSB Center format would have the two candidates simply square off in front of the cameras, with the moderator making sure things are proceeding fairly. The simplicity itself would make for gripping television. This format can work in the 1992 presidential campaign.

The same format could be used for the vice presidential debate. We would argue that the vice presidential debate be held on Sunday night, and be treated as politically equivalent to a presidential debate. We understand that the presidential campaigns may negotiate a different status for the vice presidential debate.

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The issue of sponsorship is problematic. Ideally, within the framework of the Nine Sundays Plan, the television networks would "sponsor" the presidential and vice presidential debates. If the networks end up as sponsors of, say, two presidential debates and one vice presidential debate, they should be allowed to sell advertising (or enlist sponsors) whose commercial messages would be seen at the very beginning and the very end of the debates to help defray costs and recover some lost revenues.

The ideal situation, of course, would be to have no advertising at all, but we believe that, if handled correctly, commercials should not diminish the value of the broadcast. Viewers and voters are sophisticated enough to understand the need for commercial sponsorship. It would be no longer than 90 seconds at the top of the show and 90 seconds at the end. The revenues from these advertisements would completely cover all costs and the profits could be pooled to pay the legal costs incurred for filings with the FCC and possible legal challenges from allegedly aggrieved parties.

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CONVERSATIONS WITH THE CANDIDATES

Assuming that there are at least two presidential debates and one vice presidential debate at 9pm eastern time on Sunday during the 1992 campaign, that leaves six Sunday nights open from Labor Day Weekend to Election Day.

Part Two of our Nine Sundays Proposal is that five of these six Sundays be devoted to two, back-to-back, 30- or 45-minute "Conversations with the Candidates." These conversations could be open to commercial sponsorship. Network coverage of these programs could rotate from ABC to CBS to NBC. Public television, CNN, other cable news organizations, and various radio networks would presumably cover all five Sunday night "Conversations with the Candidates" as regular programming. Rotating coverage worked well during the Iran-contra hearings. The first week CBS News was responsible for covering the hearings. The second week NBC News had the responsibility. The third week ABC News covered the hearings. PBS, cable news and the various radio networks covered every week of the hearings. This same model can work in the 1992 Presidential campaign.

Because of the Major League Baseball playoffs, the World Series and other network broadcasting obligations, the best

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window on Sunday nights for rotating network coverage of the "Conversations with the Candidates" is from 7pm to 8:30pm eastern time. Playoff and World Series baseball broadcasts usually begin at 8:30pm. At least two and possibly three Sundays in October will be given over to these baseball broadcasts.

What about the structure of the broadcasts? We'd suggest -- in the interest of fairness -- that each presidential candidate be interviewed by a separate three-reporter panel for 28 minutes (assuming 30 minutes per candidate) or 42 minutes (assuming 45 minutes per candidate). The first panel would include a network anchorman or anchorwoman and two reporters well-versed in the evening's subject matter. The second panel would include a CNN (or PBS, or Monitor or NPR) anchorman or anchorwoman and two expert reporters.

Now what about the substance of these broadcasts? Each of the five Sunday night "Conversations" would address different issues. There are basically three major issues in American politics: the national security, the national economy (broadly defined) and the national culture (also broadly defined). Issues of national security include diplomacy, foreign policy, military preparedness and various "threats" to the national interest abroad and at home.

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Issues of the national economy include national and international economic forces which, in concert, create the American economic way of life. Issues of national culture touch on a central political question: What kind of country do we want? These "cultural issues" include questions about race, crime, the environment, education, drugs, the Supreme Court's role in American society, school prayer, the role of religion, abortion and capital punishment. These "cultural issues" (and others like them) are often the most important in American presidential politics.

One Sunday would therefore be given over to national security issues, another Sunday to national and international economic issues, another Sunday to issues of our national culture. Two Sundays would be given over to whatever questions (within the three general issue groups) seemed appropriate at that stage of the campaign.

So, hypothetically, let's say the first Sunday night "Conversation with the Candidates" concerned issues of national security. Alphabetically, ABC News might be first up in the network rotation. A flip of a coin would determine candidate order. Let us assume that President Bush is the GOP nominee. He wins the coin toss, he goes first. Mr. Bush is then interviewed at his office (or

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wherever he happens to be) by Peter Jennings and two expert national security correspondents. That broadcast goes out over the ABC Television network and (one hopes) PBS and various radio and cable channels from 7pm eastern time to, say, 7:30pm eastern time. Immediately afterward, the Democratic nominee would be interviewed by Bernard Shaw (e.g.) and two other expert national security correspondents. That conversation would also go out over the ABC Network, PBS, radio networks and various cable channels, ending at 8pm eastern time. CBS and NBC News could carry these conversations or run their normal entertainment programming.

The following week, the Democratic nominee would go first, the Republican nominee second. CBS News might be up next in the rotation. Dan Rather would anchor the first panel. Judy Woodruff would anchor the other. The reporters would be selected by CBS according to their knowledge of the subject matter.

The overall schedule might look something like this (assuming the Republicans won the coin toss):

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<u>DAY</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>NETWORK</u>	<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>NOMINEE ORDER</u>
Sunday 1	7pm	ABC/CNN	Nat. Security	GOP First
Sunday 2	7pm	CBS/CNN	Economy	DEM. First
Sunday 3	9pm	ALL	Presidential Debate	
Sunday 4	9pm	ALL	Vice Presidential Debate	
Sunday 5	7pm	NBC/CNN	Nat. Culture	GOP First
Sunday 6	7pm	ABC/CNN	More Security	DEM. First
Sunday 7	9pm	ALL	Presidential Debate	
Sunday 8	7pm	NBC/CNN	More Nat. Culture	GOP First
Sunday 9	9pm	ALL	Summary Addresses	

Candidate participation would be voluntary. One candidate (usually the one behind in the polls) will always want to participate. Should the other candidate choose not to participate, the time allotted would simply revert back to regular entertainment or news programming.

We also recommend that voters provide, through the mail, a selection of the questions for the candidates. The anchor and the two "expert" reporters could choose the best questions submitted and read them aloud to the candidates. After the candidates responded, the reporters could follow up with questions of their own, should that seem appropriate at the time. This would give the average voter a sense of participating in the process.

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Back-to-back "Conversations with the Candidates" on five Sunday evenings during the general election would significantly improve the political dialogue of the 1992 presidential campaign. The networks would not lose money, since these conversations could be sponsored. They may even be able to turn a small profit. Since each network, except CBS, which would be responsible for one, would only be responsible for two Sunday nights, lost revenues would be minimized. And the five Sunday night "Conversations with the Candidates," organized around the three major issues of American politics, would help focus the print, radio and television news coverage leading up to and following the Sunday night broadcasts, and encourage deeper, more substantive reporting.

In this way, one of the major benefits of the Nine Sundays Proposal, in our view, is that editors and producers would be able to plan some of their coverage according to the schedule of these issue-oriented programs. For instance, the executive producer of an evening news broadcast, knowing that next Sunday's "candidate conversation" was going to focus on national security issues, could order up two pieces on how the candidates stand on those issues. Editors at the major newspapers and newsmagazines could also order up

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stories of considerable complexity well in advance of the actual event, thus providing the reader with an overview and some context for the issues under discussion. Monday and Tuesday newspaper, radio and television coverage could also go into more detail and analysis.

The five "Conversations" at 7pm eastern time on Sunday are likely to be very attractive to NBC Television and ABC Television, as well as the cable and public broadcasting networks. That time period (7-8pm eastern time) is currently dominated by CBS News' "60 Minutes" broadcast. Both ABC and NBC spend over \$1 million for programming in the 7pm-8pm time slot on Sunday nights. Neither of their shows does very well in the Nielsen ratings, resulting in low advertising revenue. The Nine Sundays broadcasts, on the other hand, cost no more than \$100,000 to produce (per show) and the advertising revenue generated by the broadcasts should be at least \$200-250,000 per network per night.

"60 Minutes" is the life blood of CBS News, generating \$70-75 million in annual profits. CBS is unlikely to tamper with the Sunday schedule for just that reason. However, it is not at all clear that the presidential candidate conversations pose any serious "ratings" threat to "60

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Minutes" at 7pm, particularly during the first six weeks of the presidential campaign. Voter (and therefore viewer) interest in presidential politics accelerates dramatically only toward the end of the campaign. It is also true that more people watch television as time passes through the evening. On the one, or possibly two, occasions when CBS News would be responsible for carrying the presidential candidate conversations, it is likely that a delayed "60 Minutes" would garner a market share at least equal to if not greater than the one it normally gets from 7pm-8pm on Sunday nights. This might allow "60 Minutes" producers to charge a higher rate for advertising thirty-and-sixty-second commercials. It might also have the unintended consequence of strengthening CBS's Sunday night schedule, since "60 Minutes" drawing power as a "lead-in" to other shows has helped the network dominate Sunday night television. In the past, the three networks have been more competitive in the Nielsen ratings after 9pm eastern time, depending on the drawing power of their programming.

The point here is that given the enormous financial pressures under which network news divisions labor, it is important that any plan seeking to increase substantive political discussion on television be sensitive to network costs. The viability of the Nine Sundays Plan is that it makes financial as well as journalistic and political sense.

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CANDIDATE ADDRESS TO THE NATION

The final piece of the Nine Sundays Plan is that the candidates be given fifteen to thirty minutes of network time on the Sunday night before the election to present their case to the nation's voters. A coin toss would determine candidate order. All the major networks would be allowed to sell advertisements that would immediately precede and follow the two major party candidate presentations. The presidential candidates would be required to appear on camera at all times during the broadcast. This would not be a campaign commercial with tape inserts. We would hope that the candidates would conduct these summary addresses in a "live" format, either in studio or from a "remote" location.

We are aware the the Nine Sundays Proposal raises a number of questions. Chief among them: Is it legal or does it violate anti-trust regulations? Attached is a professional judgment written by Frederick Schauer, who is the Frank Stanton Professor on the First Amendment at the Kennedy School's Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,

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Politics and Public Policy, which states, convincingly in our view, that the Nine Sundays Plan is "doable" within the existing interpretations of the relevant statutes and regulations.

Another question: what about third party candidates? Third party candidates would be excluded from participation in all of the proposed formats unless, like George Wallace in 1968, their candidacies could reasonably be considered crucial to the outcome of the race. How does one measure whether a third party candidate is viable or not? We would suggest that a third party candidate who is able consistently to garner a double-digit poll rating (10% or better) in nationally-recognized independent polls (Gallup, Roper, CBS News/New York Times, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, ABC News/Washington Post) qualifies for inclusion in the overall plan. Those third party candidates (like Gene McCarthy in 1976 and John Anderson in 1980) whose poll numbers wallowed in the single digits and who were in fact inconsequential to the final outcome of the race would be excluded from participation in the Nine Sundays Plan. By getting a legal waiver from the FCC prior to the general election campaign, the networks could avoid frivolous legal challenges from allegedly aggrieved third party candidates.

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Still another question: what about football and what happens if a game runs over? First, this is an issue that is relevant only to CBS and NBC. ABC carries football on Monday nights. Because of rules changes in the NFL, the vast majority of football games now "run to time" or take less than three hours to play. NFL Sunday games begin at either 1pm eastern or 4pm eastern. Almost all of them will be over and done with by 7pm eastern time. Inevitably, there may be one 4pm NFL game that will go into overtime and run past the 7pm starting time that the Nine Sundays Plan calls for on five Sunday nights. Since at this writing we do not know what the 1992 NFL schedule will be, the key will be to fashion the Nine Sundays schedule so as to minimize the possibility of NBC or CBS experiencing a Sports Division/News Division conflict. This too should be "doable." In the event that all the best plans nevertheless result in a conflict, the Sports Division would win, and viewers would have to turn to PBS, cable or radio networks for the Nine Sundays broadcast.

A final question: who organizes all of this? The answer is the over-the-air and cable television networks would organize the schedule in consultation with the political parties, the presidential campaigns and whichever other groups they choose to include in the process. Ideally, an

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executive committee would be formed to handle all details, execute operations and arbitrate whatever disputes might arise.

This then is the Nine Sundays Proposal. Assuming two presidential debates and a vice presidential debate, we would call for the addition of five Sunday "Conversations with the Candidates" and one Sunday night concluding candidate address to the nation.

The Nine Sundays Plan rewards serious discussion of the issues. It does not hurt the network bottom line. It encourages the national political press corps to organize its coverage around a pre-arranged set of important campaign issues. Most important, it gives the voters regular access on television to the presidential candidates over the length of the general election campaign.

The Nine Sundays Plan is designed to create a fixed and reasonable amount of television time during the general election campaign when candidates can speak to issues of national concern, while insuring some political flexibility. Candidate participation is voluntary. Should the plan be adopted, the 1992 presidential campaign would be altogether different from its immediate predecessors. That alone recommends serious discussion of the plan's merits.

Determined NOT to be
National Security Classified Marking
By PLM (NLGB) on 03/25/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM~~

To: Andy Card and Ron Kaufman
From: John Ellis JE
Date: Friday, 6 September 1991
Re: Nine Sundays and Bush Re-Elect

I think the Nine Sundays proposal deserves serious consideration by the White House political operation. It was written with President Bush's re-election campaign very much in mind. Let me try to explain why I think the proposal works in your favor.

The situation as we approach 1992 is somewhat similar to the circumstances under which the Nixon and Reagan re-election campaigns were conceptualized. There are five basic strategic political goals for the Bush re-elect campaign operation. They are:

#1) Establish (as soon as possible) an awesome financial position. By engaging in a massive fund-raising effort after Labor Day (1991), the Bush 1992 campaign can easily raise the legal limit prior to 1 January 1992. Having done that, Bush fund-raisers can be turned loose on the task of raising "party" and "soft" money for the re-election effort. A massive Bush 1992 bank balance will intimidate political opponents, particularly those who are allegedly "thinking about" running, but who have not made a "final" decision.

#2) Unite the Republican Presidential coalition of conservatives and moderates. This is particularly important in key states such as California (trouble), Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Washington and New Jersey. The southern and most of the southwestern states are all very strong. As in 1988, the political progression of Bush 1992 will be from right to center over the course of the campaign. Once the Democratic presidential nominee is (in fact) chosen, right-wing concerns become secondary to the overall thrust of the campaign. The choice between President Bush and Democratic liberal essentially freezes the right wing out

(2)

of the overall picture.

#3) Enhance division among the Democrats. The longer the Democratic primary process continues, the less effective their fall campaign. This worked wonders in 1972 (Watergate not included) and 1984. The Bush White House will want to contribute in whatever legal and politically savvy way it can to perpetuating the Democratic 1992 primary season. It will also want to use that period to undermine Democratic Party confidence, by establishing organizations like Democrats for Bush (similar to John Connally's Democrats for Nixon, with a heavy southern and midwestern flavor). Democrats for Bush can play an important role in the 1992 campaign.

#4) Maintain President Bush's position as President of the United States of America throughout the campaign, from September 1991 through mid-October 1992. The presidency is your principle political asset and should be protected by all concerned at all costs. Mr. Bush should constantly be in the position of speaking for the national interest, not his own or his party's interest.

#5) Control the Dialogue. Advertising campaigns should be designed to speak to issues of presidential strength and presidential advantage. In the May-June period of 1992, advertising should be bought in spot markets to shore up political "collateral damage" from the Democratic presidential primaries and to emphasize experience as the key determinant in voter choice. The Republican National Convention should unfurl the campaign themes. September should emphasize President Bush's world leadership. Late-September through mid-October should focus on President Bush's belief in America. The campaign should close with America's role in the new world (economically, militarily and politically), under the leadership of President Bush.

Points four and five bear directly on the Nine Sundays proposal. Basically, we are talking about President Bush speaking from the mountain-top, above the fray, in a clear and commanding voice. This voice is supported by a wall of advertising which re-emphasizes everything he says publicly. The one part of the mix that is beyond your control is the news media/Democratic Party spin.

The Nine Sundays proposal offers you the opportunity to minimize the number of chances the Democratic presidential nominee has to score a "direct" hit to exactly two one-and-a-half hour debates. Basically, the Democrats will want that number to be 4 or 6 or 8 and will create much noise about it, as will the news media, all along the campaign trail. This proposal gives you an easy out and from the Liberal Boutique (no less).

It asks, however that you participate in as many as five separate news conferences on Sunday nights from 7-7:45p or 7-7:30p (depending on how the network negotiations play out). The news conferences are on distinct issue groups (national security, the

(3)

national economy and the national culture). They will be scheduled well in advance, thus allowing plenty of time for advertising to coincide with it. And they are President Bush's strongest communications tool. He has used the press conference format over the last three years with stunning command and self-control.

The best news about Nine Sundays for President Bush is that it maintains his position as President (Point #4 listed above) and allows him, through live television, to control the dialogue (point #5 listed above) without ever leaving the White House.

Since network television is in hideous financial trouble and is looking for a way not to cover the 1992 presidential campaign, the Nine Sundays plan, if adopted, may become the principle source for network news stories not only on Sunday but on Monday and Tuesday as well. This puts President Bush in the commanding position of performing in his best format, discussing a wide range of issues which he thoroughly understands, in prime time television without any "message" interference from his opposition, while he sits in a chair inside the White House.

It further allows him the opportunity to really speak to issues of national concern as President of the United States without having to engage his opposition at all during the mini-press conferences or, as they are called in the report, the "conversations with the candidates."

There are risks, of course. It lets the press at him five times on national television. But part of the success of the Bush White House's communications policy is that it communicates so much through the press conference format. This significantly reduces the tensions between the two adversaries and creates an atmosphere of context and understanding. Continuing the "press conference" mode through the general election campaign, will, I believe, work to your long term (election day) advantage.

There are other risks. It gives the Democrats some prime time exposure. (They're not likely to benefit from it and will be much more mistake-prone than GB; particularly Cuomo, should he ever get in). The chief could make a mistake. (Causing a big flap, but he hasn't made a serious mistake in a press conference in 3 years. The Dems will be the ones making mistakes.) The dialogue is outside of your control and in the hands of the questioners. (This is true to a minor degree, but GB knows all those tricks and will be able to get his messages out.)

In short, the plan is an easy fit for you guys and I'd urge you not to dismiss it out of hand. It was written, as I say, with POTUS's interests very much in mind.

Cheers and have a nice weekend.

I N S T I T U T E O F

**POLITICS**

JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT • HARVARD UNIVERSITY

FAX**617 495-1364****DATE:***9/6/91**3:40 PM***TO:***ANDY CARD***FAX #:***202 456 2397***PAGE 1****OF***4***PAGE(S)****FROM:***John ELLIS***Message:***Nine Sundays*

Institute of Politics
Harvard University
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-1360

RECEIVED

SEP 12 1991



September 10, 1991

Andy -

AC HAS BEEN

Thanks for taking the time to meet with me this afternoon.

I realize that with the Thomas hearings your schedule is quite hectic and your fitting me in was deeply appreciated.

Per your instructions - I'll get back to you in 2 weeks.

Dan Engle

RECEIVED

JUL 30 1991

file



STATE OF ILLINOIS

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

CHICAGO 60601

JIM EDGAR
GOVERNOR

July 26, 1991

Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Executive Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Card:

Illinois recently completed protracted negotiations on a \$27 billion spending plan for the State's 1992 fiscal year which began July 1. The budget negotiations stretched 19 days into the start of our fiscal year and closed a \$1.8 billion deficit to balance the State's budget.

The new health care budget features a Medicaid provider assessment plan to finance expanded Medicaid services and redistribute funds to support institutions which serve a disproportionate share of Medicaid beneficiaries. The assessment plan will also support increased payment rates to hospitals, nursing homes and mental health providers in an effort to avert further legal proceedings against the State under the so-called "Boren Amendment" mandating increased Medicaid payment rates.

The plan -- as unanimously approved by the General Assembly -- is the result of a broad and unusual coalition of the Administration, legislators, providers and beneficiary advocates. Members of the Illinois Congressional Delegation have also expressed their support for the State's assessment plan.

I am concerned that forthcoming regulations from the Department of Health and Human Services may prematurely end Illinois' ability to finance its Medicaid program in the

AC HAS SEEN

Sent
copies
to
To Deb Anderson
Lanny Griffith
Action?
F.Y.I.
Andy
7/30/91


Andrew H. Card, Jr.
July 26, 1991
Page 2

manner best determined by the State. Illinois has had escalating growth in its Medicaid program over the past two years: a 19 percent increase in the Medicaid population and a 30 percent increase in program costs (27 percent of which are the result of federal mandates).

It is absolutely essential to my State that the assessment option be preserved for federal Medicaid matching funds. The alternative will require deep cuts in participating Medicaid provider rates and the elimination of optional services -- program reductions I would rather not force on needy Illinoisans.

I appreciate your sensitivity to my situation in Springfield and my concern that the Bush Administration may change its Medicaid rules in the middle of the game. I hope I can count on your support for Illinois' Medicaid assessment plan.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jim Edgar". The signature is stylized with a large, looping "J" and a cursive "Edgar".

Jim Edgar
GOVERNOR

JE:ak

cc: David M. Carney
Director, Office of Political Affairs
170 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

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Company OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR	Department/Floor No.
Street Address 100 W RANDOLPH	
City CHICAGO	State IL
ZIP Required 60601	
To (Recipient's Name) Please Print Andrew H. Card, Jr.	Recipient's Phone Number (Very Important) ()
Company Executive Office of the President	Department/Floor No.
Exact Street Address (We Cannot Deliver to P.O. Boxes or P.O. Zip Codes.) 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.	
City Washington, D.C.	State 20500
ZIP Required 20500	

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On this Airbill, we, our and us refer to Federal Express Corporation, its employees and agents. You and your refer to the sender, its employees and agents.

AGREEMENT TO TERMS

By giving us your package to deliver, you agree to all the terms on this Airbill and in our current Service Guide, which is available on request. If there is a conflict between the current Service Guide and this Airbill, the Service Guide will control. No one is authorized to alter or modify the terms of our Agreement.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PACKAGING AND COMPLETING AIRBILL

You are responsible for adequately packaging your goods and for properly filling out this Airbill. Omission of the number of packages and weight per package from this Airbill will result in a billing based on our best estimate of the number of packages received from you and an estimated "default" weight per package, as determined and periodically adjusted by us.

AIR TRANSPORTATION TAX INCLUDED

Our basic rate includes a federal tax required by Internal Revenue Code Section 4271 on the air transportation portion of this service.

LIMITATIONS ON OUR LIABILITY AND LIABILITIES NOT ASSUMED

Our liability for loss or damage to your package is limited to your actual damages or \$100, whichever is less, unless you pay for and declare a higher authorized value. We do not provide cargo liability insurance, but you may pay forty cents for each additional \$100 of declared value. If you declare a higher value and pay the additional charge, our liability will be the lesser of your declared value or the actual value of your package.

In any event we will not be liable for any damages, whether direct, incidental, special or consequential in excess of the declared value of a shipment, whether or not Federal Express had knowledge that such damages might be incurred including, but not limited to, loss of income or profits.

We won't be liable for your acts or omissions, including but not limited to improper or insufficient packing, securing, marking or addressing, or for the acts or omissions of the recipient or anyone else with an interest in the package. Also, we won't be liable if you or the recipient violates any of the terms of our agreement. We won't be liable for loss of or damage to shipments of cash, currency or other prohibited items.

We won't be liable for loss, damage or delay caused by events we cannot control, including but not limited to acts of God, perils of the air, weather conditions, mechanical delays, acts of public enemies, war, strikes, civil commotions, or acts or omissions of public authorities (including customs and quarantine officials) with actual or apparent authority.

DECLARED VALUE LIMITS

The highest declared value we allow for Overnight Letter and Courier-Pak Overnight Envelope shipments is \$100. For other Priority-1 and Standard Air shipments, the highest declared value we allow is \$25,000 unless your package contains items of "extraordinary value," in which case the highest declared value we allow is \$500. Items of "extraordinary value," include artwork, jewelry, furs, money, precious metals, negotiable

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

instruments, and other items listed in our current Service Guide.

If you send more than one package on this Airbill, you may fill in the total declared value for all packages, not to exceed the \$100, \$500 or \$25,000 per package limit described above. (Example: 5 packages can have a total declared value of up to \$125,000.) If more than one package is shipped on this Airbill, our liability for loss or damage will be limited to the actual value of the package(s) lost or damaged (not to exceed the lesser of the total declared value or the per package limits described above). You have the responsibility of proving the actual loss or damage.

FILING A CLAIM

ALL CLAIMS MUST BE MADE BY YOU IN WRITING: You must notify us of your claim within strict time limits. See current Service Guide.

We'll consider your claim filed if you call and notify our Customer Service Department at 800-238-5355 and notify us in writing as soon as possible.

Within 90 days after you notify us of your claim, you must send us all relevant information about it. We are not obligated to act on any claim until you have paid all transportation charges, and you may not deduct the amount of your claim from those charges.

If the recipient accepts your package without noting any damage on the delivery record, we will assume that the package was delivered in good condition. In order for us to process your claim, you must, to the extent possible, make the original shipping cartons and packing available for inspection.

RIGHT TO INSPECT

We may, at our option, open and inspect your packages prior to or after you give them to us to deliver.

NO C.O.D. SERVICES

We don't provide C.O.D. services.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PAYMENT

Even if you give us different payment instructions, you will always be primarily responsible for all delivery costs, as well as any costs we may incur in either returning your package to you or warehousing it pending disposition.

QUALIFIED ACCEPTANCE

We reserve the right to reject a shipment at any time, when such shipment would be likely to cause damage or delay to other shipments, equipment or personnel, or if the transportation of which is prohibited by law or is in violation of any rules contained in this Airbill or our Service Guide.

MONEY-BACK GUARANTEE

In the event of untimely delivery, Federal Express will at your request and with some limitations, refund or credit all transportation charges. See current Service Guide for further information.

THE WHITE HOUSE

8-1-91

Dear Robert -

I'm sorry that I couldn't
meet with you when you were
here earlier today with Sandy.
You've got a rain check.

Sincerely,
Andy Card

Andrew Card
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Robert J. Eisenberg
Chairman
Committee for a Better America
P.O. Box 339
Topfield, MA 01983



COMMITTEE FOR
A BETTER AMERICA

Campaign '92

R • E P • L • Y

☐ Yes, I share the philosophy of supporting a strong national defense, a more localized government and the enhancement of private enterprise.

I have enclosed my check as an investment in the work of the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA for:

☐ \$5000 ☐ \$2500

☐ \$1000 ☐ \$500 ☐ \$250

☐ \$100 ☐ \$50 ☐ Other

Please make your check payable to the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA. Mail to: P.O. Box 339, Topsfield, MA 01983. Corporate checks are prohibited by law.

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

Telephone _____ home _____ work _____

Occupation* _____

Employer* _____

*Requested by the Federal Election Commission

Contributions to the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA are not tax deductible.



COMMITTEE FOR
A BETTER AMERICA

Campaign '92

P.O. Box 339

Topsfield, MA 01983



COMMITTEE FOR
A BETTER AMERICA

Campaign '92

ROBERT J. EISENBERG
Chairman

617-451-3363

P.O.Box 339, Topsfield MA 01983



COMMITTEE FOR
A BETTER AMERICA

Campaign '92

Paid for by the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

Protecting the Rights of Every American Citizen

The Committee For a Better America embraces the political philosophy forming the cornerstone upon which this nation was crafted. A philosophy which holds that government should protect the right of every citizen to lead a productive and rewarding life uncluttered by political interference. By seeking out and supporting candidates for office who support less government intrusion into private lives, the Committee for a Better America stands ready to demonstrate its commitment to a philosophy of private dignity and public restraint.

Believing in a Strong National Defense to Preserve World Peace

Specifically, the Committee For a Better America believes a strong and unwavering national defense is essential to the preservation of real world peace. Only in peace can the true potential of America be realized. Peace is essential for business planning, for scientific inquiry, and for artistic expression. America's cultural richness and diversity can only find expression in peace. The Committee For a Better America is dedicated to working with candidates who share that philosophy.

Supporting a Government that Enhances Private Business

Likewise, the government that safeguards a peaceful arena for business must resist the temptation to intrude on

that arena. The Committee For a Better America believes that government policies should support and enhance business interests, not compete with them. Government, especially at the national level, should be more responsive to, and demand fewer responses from, America's entrepreneurs.

Promoting a Less Intrusive and More Localized Government

The Committee For a Better America is dedicated also to a reversal of a decades-long migration of power away from local and state governments, to the federal government. Local government is, by nature of its proximity, most responsive to the needs and desires of each member of the community. Citizens no longer should have to wait for distant pronouncements concerning problems on the next street. The uniqueness of each citizen, the potential of each community is best realized by local partnerships and local initiative.

Bringing Together Citizens and Candidates to Meet America's Needs

The Committee For a Better America seeks to bring together those candidates and those citizens who believe that a strong national defense, responsive government, and business innovation can best meet America's needs on the eve of the twenty-first century.

Contributions to the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA are not tax deductible.

You're invited to join with us to preserve the rights of all American citizens. Your generous contribution will help support:

- **A STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE**
- **PUBLIC POLICIES THAT ENHANCE PRIVATE BUSINESS**
- **SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH STRONGER LOCALIZED GOVERNMENT**

Please fill out the Reply Card on the reverse side and make your check payable to the COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA.

We thank you for your support.



COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

CAMPAIGN '92

HONORARY CHAIRMAN

Raymond Shamie

CHAIRMAN

Robert J. Eisenberg

TREASURER

Brenda Attia

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Randall L. Pinch

OPERATIONS DIRECTOR

Victoria G. Haggstrom

July 9, 1991

Aug-19th
Sept 5th
Oct 15th, 16th?
638-0900 Hotel

Dear Friends,

Less than a year ago Massachusetts was a ship becalmed, if not aground. State debt was growing daily and bonds to pay that debt were on the verge of worthlessness. State spending was growing unchecked and the Democrats on Beacon Hill showed no desire to change their tax and spend ways. Then a fresh political wind began to nudge the ship.

Bill Weld was elected governor, Paul Cellucci, Lt Governor and Joe Malone Treasurer. Stunning GOP gains in the Senate completed the greatest Republican victory in a generation.

But now the real work begins. The Massachusetts Congressional delegation is a national embarrassment. THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA, with your help and generous support, will commit itself to the scrutiny and unmasking of voting records and positions of our so-called leaders in Washington. Democratic incumbents are traditionally so secure in their offices that only the most critical of examinations will allow voters to see through the haze of Democratic rhetoric.

THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA is pledged to this critical analysis and pledged too, to enabling new and qualified candidates to challenge the old order. Only, when balance is introduced to our Congressional delegation can we begin to congratulate ourselves. Until then we face a daunting task. Your support is critical to the attainment of that beginning.

Thanks and regards,

Ray Shamie

Ray Shamie
Honorary Chairman

Bob Eisenberg
Bob Eisenberg
Committee Chairman

Friends of Newt Gingrich

June 28, 1991

Mr. Raymond Shamie
Honorary Chairman,
Committee For A Better America
P.O. Box 339
Topsfield, Massachusetts 01983

Dear Ray,

I would like to take this opportunity to wish you all the best as the Committee For A Better America kickoffs campaign '92. The political philosophy and ideals of this committee certainly have my support and encouragement as they begin this worthwhile endeavor.

As our country rapidly approaches the twenty-first century, it is important that we take the "back to basics" government message to the American people. I can think of no better vehicle to effectively deliver this message than the Committee For A Better America.

Please accept my best wishes, Ray. I know that with your leadership, we will be hearing a lot about the new "Massachusetts Miracle" that your committee will deliver.

Your friend,



Newt Gingrich
Republican Whip

P.O. Box 130 • Riverdale, Georgia 30274 • (404) 968-1417

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

CAMPAIGN '92

HONORARY CHAIRMAN

Raymond Shamie

CHAIRMAN

Robert J. Eisenberg

TREASURER

Brenda Attia

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Randall L. Pinch

OPERATIONS DIRECTOR

Victoria G. Haggstrom

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Committee For a Better America embraces the political philosophy upon which this nation was crafted: That government should protect the right of every citizen to lead a productive and rewarding life uncluttered by political interference. By seeking out and supporting candidates for office who support less government intrusion into private lives, the Committee for a Better America stands ready to demonstrate its commitment to a philosophy of private dignity and public restraint.

Specifically, the Committee For a Better America believes a strong and unwavering national defense is essential to the preservation of real world peace. Only in peace can the true potential of America be realized. Peace is essential for business planning, for scientific inquiry, and for artistic expression. America's cultural richness and diversity can only find expression in peace. The Committee For a Better America is dedicated to working with candidates who share that philosophy.

Likewise, the government that safeguards a peaceful arena for business must resist the temptation to intrude on that arena. The Committee For a Better America believes that government policies should support and enhance business

interests, not compete with them. Government, especially at the national level, should be more responsive to, and demand fewer responses from, America's entrepreneurs.

The Committee For a Better America is dedicated also to a reversal of a decades-long migration of power away from local and state governments, to the federal government. Local government is, by nature of its proximity, most responsive to the needs and desires of each member of the community. Citizens no longer should have to wait for distant pronouncements concerning problems on the next street. The uniqueness of each citizen, the potential of each community, is best realized by local partnerships and local initiative.

The Committee For a Better America seeks to bring together those candidates and those citizens who believe that a strong national defense, responsive government, and business innovation can best meet America's needs on the eve of the twenty-first century.

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

(as of 7/30/91)

MIKE ARMINI

RAFIK ATTIA

JOHN BARRANCO

LARRY BEARFIELD

HON. EDNA BOGOSIAN

DALE BOCH

REP. MARIANNE BRENTON

THOMAS BRUCE

JAY COGLIANO

JOHN COGLIANO JR.

ANGELO COLLINS

REP. GARY COON

THOMAS CORKERY

THOMAS DI BENEDETTO

FREDERICK DUMAINE

ROBIN EMERSON

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CHARLES WEBER JR.

HERMAN WHEELER

CAROL YENNACO

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

SUPPORT PLEDGE SHEET

(please circle yes for your choices)

YES - I would like to attend the August 19th Red Sox fundraiser game.
(Owners Box & Special Guest TBA). I have enclosed my contribution
for \$500. (limit 20 people)

YES - I will support the **COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA'S** first
major fundraising event on September 5, 1991 at the Colonial
Hilton Hotel with Guest of Honor, Lt. Governor Paul Cellucci.

I will purchase a table for ten for \$150 ____

I will sell 10 tickets at \$15 each. ____

I will attend the roundtable discussion at \$500. ____

I will attend photo-op and reception for \$100 ____

YES - I will sponsor or host a fundraising event or reception. I will
provide the names of other people who might host a reception.

YES - I will do one of the following to support the **COMMITTEE FOR A
BETTER AMERICA'S** fundraising program.

I will distribute fundraising packages. ____

Please provide me 5__, 10__, 15__, other__ packages.

I will call 5 people each month for support. ____

I will commit to raise: \$____.

YES - I wish to serve on the Advisory Committee and you may use my
name for prospect fundraising efforts in contacting the names I've
listed on the reverse side.

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

PHONE _____
(home) (business) (fax)

EMPLOYER* _____ OCCUPATION* _____

PLEASE SIGN _____

* Federal law requires this information be requested

Contributions are not tax-deductable.

PAID FOR BY THE COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

PO BOX 339, TOPSFIELD, MA 01983

You may use my name to contact the following people for the purpose of fundraising or scheduling a fundraising event:

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ **STATE** _____ **PHONE** _____

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ **STATE** _____ **PHONE** _____

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ **STATE** _____ **PHONE** _____

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ **STATE** _____ **PHONE** _____

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ **STATE** _____ **PHONE** _____

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA

Contact:

PRESS RELEASE

For Immediate Release

HONORARY CHAIRMAN

Raymond Shamie

CHAIRMAN

Robert J. Eisenberg

TREASURER

Brenda Attia

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Randall L. Pinch

OPERATIONS DIRECTOR

Victoria G. Haggstrom

COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA CAMPAIGN 92'

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA will be holding its CAMPAIGN 92' kickoff breakfast at 8:30 A.M. on July 9th at the Bostonian Hotel. Committee advisory board members, administration officials and interested voters are expected to hear Honorary Chairman Ray Shamie and Chairman Robert Eisenberg discuss priorities for next year's congressional elections.

At least six New England House congressional seats, including three or four in Massachusetts, are targeted by CAMPAIGN 92' for increased incumbent scrutiny and issue analysis.

The COMMITTEE FOR A BETTER AMERICA is fashioned after national PACs such as GOPAC, and dedicated to the two-fold purpose of incumbent scrutiny and the enabling of qualified new candidates. Working in support of and with the state GOP committee, CAMPAIGN 92' will concentrate its efforts on issues of national defense, business/government relations, and the localization of government.

For more information consult the enclosed Statement of Purpose, or call Executive Director, Randy Pinch.

Telephone: (617)-270-3724



**COMMITTEE FOR
A BETTER AMERICA**

Campaign '92

Honorary Chairman
RAYMOND SHAMIE

Chairman
ROBERT J. EISENBERG

Treasurer
BRENDA ATTIA

Executive Director
RANDALL L. PINCH

Director of Operations
VICTORIA G. HAGGSTROM

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 23, 1991

Dear Susan -

Thank you for keeping me
up to date with your new address
and phone numbers. I hope all
is well at Honeywell. (Not many
day ago I met with Michael Bonsignore.)

Keep in touch.

Sincerely,
Andy Card

Andrew Card
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Susan Engleiter
Honeywell Inc.
P.O. Box 524
Minneapolis, MN 55440

Susan S. Engeleiter
Vice President and
Staff Executive

Honeywell Inc.
Honeywell Plaza
P.O. Box 524
Minneapolis, MN 55440-0524
612 870-6688

AC HAS SEEN

April 3, 1991

Mr. Andy Card
Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Andy:

I thought you would like to know my new address at Honeywell:

Susan Engeleiter
Honeywell Inc.
P.O. Box 524
Minneapolis, MN 55440

OR

Susan Engeleiter
Honeywell Inc.
Honeywell Plaza
Minneapolis, MN 55408

612/870-6688

612/870-2011 - Secretary, Jean McAtee

Mail Station MN12-5180

FAX: 612/870-6696

A-
I made Rolodex cards
for you.
Jc

Sincerely,

Susan/jm

SSE/jm

THE WHITE HOUSE

4-18-91

Richard -

Thank you for your note on
behalf of Randy Erbe. I, too,
find him impressive.

As you may now know, Steve Hart,
another able long-time Bush supporter,
has been selected for the slot Randy sought.
Keep in touch.

Andy Card

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Honorable Richard D. English
Post Office Box 17431
Arlington, Virginia 22216



Richard D. English
P. O. Box 17431
Arlington, VA 22216

April 2, 1991

AC HAS SEEN

Dear Andy,

I understand that Randy Erben is being considered for a position in the White House Legislative Office.

I worked with him for ten months in the Texas Secretary of State's Office. From first hand experience, I can tell you that Randy ~~is~~ is a hard-working lawyer with excellent managerial and executive skills. Also, he was for the President in 1980

and in 1988, I think
very highly of him
and have great confidence
in his abilities, especially
in the area of
legislative relations. I
recommend him very, very
highly.

I'm off to conferences
in Berlin and Brussels
and doing fine.

Hope this finds you
well. Pardon this
hasty scrawl.

Warmest regards
Richard Luth