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Series:	Brady, Phillip D., Files
Subseries:	Chronological Files

OA/ID Number:	05480
Folder ID Number:	05480-002

Folder Title:
Chron File 1/91 [2]

Stack:


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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 01/24/91

NOTE FOR: EDE HOLIDAY

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is
forwarded to you for your:

Information ☐

Action ☒XX

Thank you.

PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)



cc:

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 23, 1991

91 JAN 23 PM 2:54

*Signed
1-24*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: EDE HOLIDAY *EH*

SUBJECT: Domestic Policy Council Decision Memorandum on Empowerment

A final decision memorandum from the Domestic Policy Council (DPC) on empowerment is attached. The memorandum seeks your final confirmation of nine empowerment options.

You will recall that the DPC forwarded an information memorandum to you on December 27, 1990. You directed that only those options consistent with the FY92 Budget be maintained in this package. Accordingly, the attached decision memorandum includes only those options consistent with the FY92 Budget or that have no budgetary implications. All of the options are supported by a consensus of the DPC.

We have not scheduled a meeting with you to discuss this package, but would be happy to pull together a small group should you so desire.

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01. Memo	The Domestic Policy Council to the President Re: An Action Plan for Economic Empowerment of People (11 pp.)	1/22/91	P-5/ Open on Expiration of PRA (Document Follows) By <u>DL</u> (NLGB) on <u>6/7/05</u>	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Brady, Philip D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Chron File 1/91 [2]

Date Closed: 6/8/2000	OA/ID Number: 05480-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1999-0735-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 22, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: An Action Plan for Economic Empowerment of People

BACKGROUND:

The Domestic Policy Council (DPC) met on November 28, 1990, to consider a series of ideas designed to give people access to jobs and the power to make choices that will better their own lives and the lives of their families and communities. An information memorandum outlining the DPC's empowerment ideas was forwarded to you on December 27, 1990. This memorandum now presents for your confirmation only those options consistent with initiatives to be proposed in the FY92 Budget and reflected in the FY92 Budget settlements previously presented to you by OMB.

These options outline the beginning of an entrepreneurial, market-oriented war against poverty. We can expand opportunities by changing expectations and attitudes about the future. People with access to property, jobs, and quality education have a stake in their community, more pride, and greater incentive for productive social behavior. More important, poor people with new and abundant economic opportunity have hope for the future -- the single greatest weapon against poverty and despair. There is nothing new about free enterprise principles. What is new is a bold determination to offer solutions, to break down barriers to opportunity, and to question status quo thinking.

WHAT WE ARE DOING NOW:

1. Evaluations of Existing Demonstration Projects: During the Reagan Administration, the Low Income Opportunity Board (LIOB) received requests from 26 States for waivers from current Federal rules to launch welfare demonstration projects. Of these, 14 State requests were approved and are now under way. There is a great deal of diversity in the 14 State demonstrations. Alabama, for example, is testing a major simplification project, in which the AFDC, Food Stamp, and Low Income Home Energy Assistance programs are merged into one cash grant with a unified set of rules. West Virginia is encouraging welfare recipients to start their own small businesses. Wisconsin requires both teenage parents receiving AFDC as well as teenagers in families receiving AFDC benefits to stay in school.

2. Recent Administration Accomplishments: The Administration has already accomplished a great deal in its first two years. For instance, Congress enacted your child care proposal and HOPE proposal and expanded Head Start. You have promoted volunteerism and your advocacy of educational choice has helped to spark a grassroots movement across the country. The recent budget agreement also included several initiatives to empower people, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit expansion (\$12 billion over five years), the Child Health Tax Credit (\$5 billion over five years), and funding for child care vouchers. All are part of the Administration's effort to protect and enhance individual power.

EMPOWERMENT REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES THAT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER EXISTING AUTHORITY:

The Economic Empowerment Task Force, chaired by Secretary Kemp, learned that all of the Departments are actively looking for ways to empower people and make government work better for people. These activities are primarily administrative or regulatory in nature. For instance, USDA in concert with other Cabinet agencies will improve coordination between the Food Stamp Employment and Training program, the new Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) welfare work program, and possibly Labor's JTPA program. Education has opened an educational choice center and clearinghouse. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has been working with the Chicago Housing Authority on an "Operation Cleansweep" to rid public housing of gangs and drug trafficking.

Other issues are being addressed in the FY92 Budget. For example, funding for the WIC program, which provides supplemental food for mothers, infants, and children, will be significantly increased. There will also be a series of voucher and choice initiatives in Education's budget. An important component of any empowerment strategy is encouraging parents to make responsible decisions for their children and to contribute to their children's development.

OPTIONS REQUIRING PRESIDENTIAL DECISION:

Nine options are presented here for your confirmation. These include some of the options you have previously seen in the information memorandum forwarded to you on December 27. Pursuant to your direction, only those options consistent with initiatives to be proposed in the FY92 Budget have been maintained here.

We should also note that a vital component of economic empowerment is the vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws. Racial, sex, and religious discrimination create insidious

barriers to economic opportunity. The Administration will continue in its commitment to tear down these barriers wherever they exist. There are other barriers to opportunity that have a disproportionately adverse impact on minorities and women. Regulations, like those issued under the Davis-Bacon Act (discussed below) and local economic licensing laws, can remove the lowest rungs from the ladder of economic opportunity.

1. Fund HOPE: You signed HOPE (Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere) legislation in November. HOPE authorized several important initiatives, such as empowering public housing residents by encouraging them to own or manage public and assisted housing, and improving the link between housing and services for the homeless. HOPE is the most far-reaching housing legislation since 1974. No funds, however, were appropriated for important components of HOPE in FY91. According to HUD, funding HOPE is vital to achieving the Administration's public goal of a million new low-income homeowners in 1992. OMB has approved HUD's request to reprogram FY91 funds to fund HOPE immediately.

Pros:

- o HOPE demonstrates the Administration's commitment to housing for poor families and children, the homeless, and first-time home buyers.
- o HOPE is a model empowerment initiative. Funding it now will demonstrate the Administration's conviction to empower people and will give impetus to this approach to social problems.
- o HOPE targets Federally-owned properties currently in FHA or RTC inventories. Transferring these units to first-time home buyers will add dollars to the Federal Treasury.

Cons:

- o Funding a new program at the same time that the Administration proposes a FY92 budget with cuts in established programs may not be supported by Congress.
- o It is likely that, in return for fully funding HOPE, Congressional Democrats will want to fund their new housing program, HOME, at a potential cost of \$1 billion in FY91.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

2. Promote Educational Choice: During the last two years,

educational choice initiatives have been initiated in more and more jurisdictions across the country. East Harlem, New York; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Minnesota have implemented choice programs that permit parents to determine which schools their children should attend.

The Federal government could encourage restructuring through choice demonstrations and voucher programs. States could be awarded grants for demonstration projects in return for a mutual agreement with the Federal government to waive certain regulations that impede choice. Projects would provide for, but not be limited to, educational choice among public schools and include special awards for excellence to high-performing schools. In the FY92 Budget, the Administration will propose a new \$200 million fund available to schools implementing choice programs. A portion of Education's new funds would also be targeted to low-income or high-dropout school districts that employ voucher or certificate programs. Legislation would be required.

Pros:

- o Emphasis on urban areas targets Federal resources on highest concentration of low-income families and at-risk children.
- o Targeting school districts with high dropout rates provides an opportunity to help the districts most likely to have difficulties attaining the National Education Goals.
- o Provides maximum flexibility for communities and school districts to select options most appropriate to local educational problems.

Cons:

- o Legislation may face opposition on the Hill and in the public education arena.
- o Could face a constitutional challenge if potential choice options include religiously-affiliated schools.
- o Might be difficult to administer the transfer of funds from local school districts to other providers.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

3. Reintroduce "Charlottesville" Flexibility Legislation: A proposal supported by the Administration for increased flexibility in exchange for enhanced accountability failed to pass Congress last year.

Pros:

- o Flexibility would permit the resources from HHS, Labor, and Education programs to be spent at State and local levels with fewer regulatory constraints and greater effectiveness.
- o Flexibility legislation would follow through on a commitment of the Education Summit.
- o This would enhance services integration efforts by granting Education, HHS, and Labor coordinated waiver authority coupled with enhanced accountability.

Cons:

- o The proposal received opposition from both conservative Republicans and Democrats. Some Members believed that flexibility would allow services to be shifted away from traditionally targeted populations, such as the disadvantaged, now mandated by law.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

4. Provide Job Training to Public Housing and Other Low-Income Residents: The Administration could actively promote an aggressive services integration initiative now being developed by HUD, HHS, and Labor. The goal of this initiative is to bring job training to public housing residents. Recent research by the Rockefeller Foundation shows that job training programs that integrate an array of basic education and specific skill competencies are most effective in making low-income people self-sufficient. No new FY92 funds are required for this initiative.

Pros:

- o Targeting job training to residents of public housing, and combining training with other empowerment initiatives for public housing residents, should create a highly productive synergy.
- o Targeting job training on public housing residents targets those who need help most because about one-third of all public housing residents are receiving public assistance.

Cons:

- o Combining services at public housing sites will increase the attractiveness of remaining in public housing, which could

have the unintended consequence of discouraging people from moving out of public housing.

- o Neither public housing nor job training are entitlements. Targeting those who are fortunate enough to receive housing aid could create the appearance of inequitably helping one group at the expense of others.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

5. Create Enterprise Zones: Enterprise zones were removed in the final stages of the budget agreement last year and could be proposed again this year. The enterprise zone legislative proposal would include both employment and investment incentives and could be tied to Federal, State, and local regulatory relief. With a slower economy, enterprise zones are needed more than ever. States have been experimenting with enterprise zones for several years. Former Governor Kean implemented enterprise zones with great success in New Jersey.

The proposal included in the FY92 Budget is similar to last year's proposal: 1) a 5 percent refundable tax credit for the first \$10,500 of wages earned by qualified employees in an enterprise zone; 2) elimination of capital gains taxes for tangible property used in a business located in an enterprise zone for at least two years; and 3) permitting individuals to expense some of the capital invested in enterprise zone businesses. Treasury estimated last year that phasing in these initiatives in 50 zones would reduce tax revenues by \$1.9 billion over five years.

Pros:

- o The enterprise zone concept includes more than tax incentives; it also requires reduction of Federal, State, and local regulatory barriers and a comprehensive local strategy to deal with the most distressed parts of rural and urban areas.
- o Enterprise zones would concentrate incentives solely in the most distressed communities, thus targeting tax expenditures where they are most needed.

Cons:

- o Some think enterprise zones would primarily stimulate the shifting of assets into the zone from areas surrounding the zone and not generate sufficient new investment to pay for the incentives.

- o Targeting powerful pro-growth incentives into just a few areas might unfairly benefit some people. Across the board incentives might be seen as more equitable.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

6. Improve Access of the Poor to More Jobs by Reforming Davis-Bacon: Davis-Bacon was enacted in the 1930s to require workers on Federally-financed projects to be paid the "prevailing wage." Some who supported the measure also sought to bar blacks from benefiting from the profusion of public works under the New Deal. Davis-Bacon may increase costs by as much as 25 percent for small enterprises and it prevents the least skilled people, many of whom are black, from participating equally in open bidding for contracts with the Federal government. At the current threshold, virtually no project is beyond the reach of Davis-Bacon.

A higher minimum threshold for Federal programs could be established under which prevailing wages would not apply. Both the FY91 and the FY92 Budgets call for raising the threshold to \$250,000. Legislation would be required.

Pros:

- o Raising the threshold would generate significant budgetary savings.
- o Raising the threshold would be easier to pass in Congress than outright repeal, but it would still be difficult.

Cons:

- o Even if the threshold were raised, Davis-Bacon still imposes a regulatory burden.
- o There would be strong labor opposition. The labor community views Davis-Bacon as necessary to keep wages high.
- o Past efforts to enact such reforms have failed and, if attempted now, might lead to Congressional reversal of significant reforms just implemented, such as the Department of Labor's new "helper" rule (which is expected to save up to \$610 million per year).

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

7. Target SBA Programs: The Small Business Administration (SBA) operates several loan and technical assistance programs which could be better targeted to promote entrepreneurship among low-income persons.

- Cottage Capitalism Initiative: The SBA proposes extending a joint HUD/SBA experiment in Salt Lake City, Utah, to 10 new sites by reprogramming FY91 funds. In this experiment, SBA is teaching public housing residents about basic business concepts and helping them develop business plans. Local lenders have made small loans with private funds to provide the start-up capital needed by graduates of the training program. SBA will also work with the new Rural Development Administration to develop similar programs in low-income rural areas.
- Entrepreneur Training for Disadvantaged Youth: The SBA has asked for \$425,000 in its FY92 budget submission to launch a new program for entrepreneurial training materials for low-income youth, designed to inform and motivate young people about the opportunity of small business.

Pros:

- o Coordinating SBA activities with other programs creates synergies and helps leverage private sector involvement.
- o Efforts by several private, nonprofit organizations to lend small amounts of money to low-income entrepreneurs have shown promising success rates.

Cons:

- o Entrepreneurial training for low-income clients is regarded by some experts as the least efficient use of business-development resources. Because low-income clients may lack requisite academic skills, or may not be able to obtain child care and other needed assistance, the business failure rate could be greater than among other client groups.
- o The increased FY92 spending needed to make these programs successful will need to be offset by reductions in other programs. If these funds come from other business-development programs, we may be replacing more-efficient services with less-efficient services.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

8. Revamp the Public Employment Service: The Employment Service is a State-run, Federally-funded program intended to help unemployed workers find jobs. It is an important, but not wholly successful, tool in minimizing the financial hardship and length of unemployment for workers. Currently, the Employment Service interprets its mission as finding available jobs and then placing unemployed workers in those jobs. As a practical matter, the Service "skims" by placing only the best workers -- so that employers will continue to work with the Service in the future.

The focus of the Employment Service could be changed. The Service would focus its resources on job counseling targeted to low-income people and steering them to available training opportunities. The Administration could also propose tying continued Federal funding for each office to placement rates for both low-income people and the long-term unemployed. This could be accomplished through regulation; Labor has already invited public comment on how to restructure the Employment Service.

Pros:

- o Changing the focus of the Employment Service and instilling performance standards and incentives would increase the social benefit of a program that is not currently working well.

Cons:

- o If the economy has slipped into a recession, this could be perceived as the wrong time to be changing the Employment Service -- a time when more people may be in need of the types of services provided by the Employment Service.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

9. Establish Empowerment Opportunity Areas: This option seeks a fresh start in programs for poor people by granting waivers from Federal requirements to localities that develop plans for new approaches to low-income programs. It would have two forms: one organized around geographic concentrations of low-income people; the other defined in terms of a target group such as unmarried first-time mothers. In each, we would encourage use of waivers from regular program rules and flexibility in the administration of Federal, State, and local laws and programs.

Each plan must identify performance criteria before being approved; any project failing to meet the criteria would be subject to termination. Legislation would be required to

authorize broader waiver authority than currently exists. Empowerment Opportunity Areas would operate on an experimental basis, probably for a period of three to five years. There would be no FY92 Budget impact.

Pros:

- o Shows the Federal government believes in the potential for developing "bottom up" solutions.
- o Allows an opportunity to see if our rhetoric of community control meshes with reality.

Cons:

- o There is no guarantee of success. This approach might merely shift the bureaucratic presence from the Federal level to the community level.
- o Further State and local experimentation may not be perceived as an adequate response to the problems that low-income people face.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

RECOMMENDATION:

The Domestic Policy Council recommends your approval of each of the nine options discussed above as an initial package of Administration empowerment initiatives. Each proposal is consistent with decisions made for the FY92 Budget.

DECISION (Summary):

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Modify</u>
Option 1: Fund HOPE.	☒	☐	☐
Option 2: * Promote Educational Choice.	☒	☐	☐
Option 3: * Repropose Flexibility Legislation.	☒	☐	☐

Option 4:
Job Training in
Public Housing.

✓

Option 5: *
Create Enterprise
Zones.

✓

Option 6: *
Reform Davis-Bacon.

✓

Option 7:
Target SBA Programs.

✓

Option 8:
Revamp the Public
Employment Service.


✓


Option 9: *
Create Empowerment
Opportunity Areas.

✓

* Legislation will be required.

6/7
1-24-91


Dick Thornburgh
Chairman Pro Tempore




THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 1/24

TO: BILL SITTMANN

FROM: JOHN S. GARDNER
Special Assistant to the President
and Assistant Staff Secretary

Please have NSC provide a
recommendation as to the
President's doing a video
message for this conference
ASAP.



Thanks.





Château de Bellerive
1245 Collonge-Bellerive

24 January 1991

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

Mr. President, dear George,

The World Economic Forum which we discussed and which I wrote you about on 10 October 1990, convenes in Davos, Switzerland, on February 1st.

I am the Chairman.

President Gorbachev is sending a video message.

This is a valuable forum for a message from the President of the United States particularly as the Gulf crisis and its impact on the world economy will be high on the agenda of this world wide meeting of Heads of State and Governments, Ministers, Chief Executive Officers, top financial leaders and some 200 members of the media's best.

The President would be demonstrating that despite his unusually great burdens he is not losing sight of the larger picture and long term objectives in a new world order.

He might for example, sound the call for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, tying trade not only to prosperity, but also to peace.

Recent great swings in the stock markets demonstrate the close ties of the world of business and finance to the perceptions of America's fortunes and its leadership.

The following are few of the participants:

- Presidents Fujimori, Menem, Ozal, Perez;
- Mubarak announced, confirmation awaited;
- Prime Ministers Bielecki of Poland, Rocard of France and Vranitzky of Austria;
- Foreign Ministers Genscher, Velayati;
- Raymond Barre, Camdessus (IMF), Dunkel (GATT)

- Business leaders:

- Keogh, President of Coca Cola;
- Top Keidanren delegation of Japan;
- Morita, (SONY);
- Van Wanchem (SHELL);
- Sir James Goldsmith;
- Robert Maxwell

May I request that you let us know at the earliest opportunity if we can look forward to your message. It would be a tremendously important contribution to our deliberations.

As Chairman, and on behalf of the Forum and its participants, I thank you in advance.


*We need your statement!
With highest consideration and warmest
personal esteem.*

As always,

Sadrin.

Sadrudin Aga Khan

The Hon. George Bush
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington D.C. 20500
USA



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


January 24, 1991

TO CHIEF OF STAFF

Please find attached certain remarks by Senator Kerrey which have been forwarded to the President pursuant to his request. Remarks relate to Secretary Yeutter's alleged statement "politicizing war".

Phil

Phillip D. Brady



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

91 JAN 24 1/24 PM 12:24

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRED McCLURE *fm*
Assistant to the President
for Legislative Affairs

- ☒ FYI
☐ Comment
☐ Action

As you requested, attached are the remarks made by Bob Kerrey yesterday. This is the speech that you and Bob Dole spoke about before the leadership meeting this morning.

UNITY DESPITE MR. YEUTTER'S STATEMENT

Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, yesterday in Lincoln, NE, the man who in a matter of days is expected to become chairman of the Republican National Committee, the current Secretary of Agriculture, Clayton Yeutter, made what I regard as some very unfortunate and untimely remarks.

He said, during a press conference following a speech to the Lincoln Rotary Club, that he hopes the American public will hold accountable the Democratic opponents of President Bush's request for authority to go to war against Iraq. He said that Democrats are politically vulnerable because of those votes.

Secretary Yeutter said "I would guess 90 percent of them now wish they had cast their votes the other way." He said: "They picked the wrong side. If the conflict goes well that will work against them." He said their opposition to the President on this issue could be "a very significant factor" in next year's Presidential and congressional elections.

Mr. President, to me and to me personally, these remarks are deeply troubling. They attempt to politicize this war and to define victory in terms of electoral gain rather than policy achievements. They trivialize the deep misgivings which all Americans have about sending our sons and daughters into combat and fail to acknowledge the remarkable—up to now—bipartisan effort to define the circumstances under which force is to be used to defend an American interest.

I did not "pick a side" when I voted, Mr. President. When voting to ask Americans to risk it all, the least I can do is risk losing an election by trying to decide what I believe is right. If I become a candidate for reelection, the voters of Nebraska—Democratic and Republican—will obviously have the opportunity of deciding whether my vote is a mistake for them.

They may decide the alternative I supported—the use of force to contain Iraqi aggression and more time for sanctions to work—was wrong. They may decide that my dissent was unacceptable. They may decide my arguments evidenced an unwillingness to defend America's interests.

The people of Nebraska have a right to make these judgments. Those Nebraskans who actually live and vote in the State hardly need Mr. Yeutter to confirm that right. Those of us who have actually stood for elective office already understand that our job is to state our opinions, vote our con-

January 23, 1991

sciences, and take the electoral consequences.

Mr. Yeutter is right that we will all be held accountable for our decisions. However, he is wrong to assume I regret my vote because I simply do not. It was a difficult vote, and the difficulty was born of the caution acquired from my own experiences in the Vietnam war. If there are others in my party or in this Senate who regret their vote, I have not heard them say so. The fact that Mr. Yeutter thinks Democrats and Republicans made up our minds on the gulf according to some political calculus says more about his approach to foreign policy than ours.

In fact, there has been an unmistakable and little recognized bipartisan support from the beginning for the use of force—to contain Iraqi aggression and to enforce an embargo so thorough that in any other period of history it would have been considered an affirmative act of war. The debate, despite the efforts of some to recast it for partisan purposes, has never been over whether we should use force. It has centered instead on the appropriate level and timing of force. And now that we have decided as a nation to begin this war, there is again bipartisan support—to see it through to an unknown but successful conclusion.

In fact, I am not on the sidelines. In spite of earlier dissent and at some risk of doing so, I have been actively supporting our President and our military effort now that this war has begun. I have been active because I want to help sustain public support in a way it was not sustained during the Vietnam war. I find it surprising and dangerous to the very consensus we will need for success that less than 1 week into this war, before we know how long it will last or how difficult it will be, the President would allow these kind of divisive comments.

For what we need now is unity, and unity is what we have, in spite of Mr. Yeutter's statements. In the interest of that unity, I would suggest the President to reconsider Mr. Yeutter's appointment as party chair, or ask him to hold his tongue until our soldiers are safe again.

Mr. President, we are headed into uncharted territory in America's foreign policy, not just in how President Bush will succeed in winning this war, as I confident he will, but also in what the new world order we are fighting for will look like, and how we will pursue it. America's unity regarding the war we are now waging flows in large part from the openness and thoroughness of the public debate that preceded it.

Our ability to discern and shape the new world order will be better served by that kind of open and thorough examination than by a poisoned, polarized, partisan environment. Those who invite such an environment not only undermine the conduct of this war, but also America's leadership in the

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

new world order that we will inhabit when this war is over.

I yield the floor.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, is the Senate in morning business at this hour?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The senior Senator from Idaho is recognized. The Senate is in a period for the transaction of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for not to exceed 10 minutes each.

Mr. SYMMS. I thank the distinguished President pro tempore.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Idaho is recognized for not to exceed 10 minutes.

Mr. SYMMS. I thank the Chair.

(The remarks of Mr. SYMMS pertaining to the submission of Senate Resolution 17 are located in today's Record under "Submission of Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.")

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KERREY). Two minutes, thirty-five seconds.

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might have about 2 more minutes in addition to that 2 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 01/23/91

NOTE FOR: NSC

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is
forwarded to you for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐

Thank you.

PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:



THE PRESIDENT

January 23, 1991

Dear Jim,

At your next meeting, please let the board know that I read with keen interest your report of December 28.

I am so glad the board is taking such an active and productive role in the affairs of the Naval Academy. Thanks and keep up the fine work.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Bush".

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

91 JAN 22 PM 3:48

January 22, 1991

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
1-23-91INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Board of Visitors 1990 Report on the U.S. Naval Academy

Purpose

To forward the annual report of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors at Tab A.

Background

The Board of Visitors is required to report to you annually on the state of the Naval Academy. This is the first review in which your two appointees to the Board, Gerry Bemiss and Jack Fitch, participated, and their personal efforts to make the Board more active are highlighted on page 2.

The Board concluded that the Naval Academy is a strong and justifiably proud national institution that serves a vital role in America's national defense. They believe that the single negative finding, a single (and well-publicized) incident of sexual harassment in 1990, was an isolated event and the Naval Academy has aggressively taken steps to ensure the environment which led to the incident has been eliminated.

Attachment

Tab A Report from the U.S. Naval Academy

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



Ba

January 23, 1991

Dec. Summary
- Summary

Close

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1/23/91

FYI - the original NSC memo
was returned to NSC with
a copy of the P's note

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S. Wagner/
P. Bradys of c

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1991

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Attachment

Tab A Report from the U.S. Naval Academy

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21402-5000

Staff please 0

28 December 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Board of Visitors of the United States Naval Academy is required to meet each year and report to you on the state of the Naval Academy.

The Board met twice in 1990 -- in Annapolis on April 23, 1990, and on October 9, 1990, in Room EF 100 of The Capitol. As Chairman of the Board, and in accordance with Section 6968, Title 10, of the U.S. Code, I respectfully submit this report.

Summary

At the outset, and on behalf of the Board, it is important that the President know the United States Naval Academy is performing a commendable job of training officers who are highly qualified to serve the country in the Navy and in the Marines. At the same time the Academy is educating midshipmen, men and women, to be leaders, to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.

There are problems at the Naval Academy, to be sure, and we had to deal with one serious problem in 1990. But in May I had the privilege of attending the Academy graduation exercises; and as I observed Vice President Quayle hand diplomas to 990 young women and men, I realized that in front of me were 990 reasons that you, the entire command of the United States Navy, and the country can be proud.

State of the USNA

The charge to this Board is "to inquire into the state of morale and discipline, and curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy..."

Morale is high among the midshipmen. Discipline is good and getting better. The curriculum is relevant to the Navy's needs, but warrants examination. Instruction is, on balance, of high quality; some improvements are in order. The physical plant is sound, but maintenance suffers because of budget restrictions.

Conclusion


On behalf of the Board of Visitors, I want to express to you my gratitude for the support and cooperation we had during 1990 from Secretary Garrett, Admiral Frank Kelso, Rear Admiral Hill, and from other members of your official family.

We believe that the United States Naval Academy is a strong and justifiably proud national institution that serves a vital role in America's national defense.

The Commandant of the Academy, a Navy pilot, and I were recently reviewing the productive but turbulent year at the Naval Academy. He spoke of the Board of Visitors in words that a former Navy pilot may appreciate: "We were grateful that you guys were up there flying high cover for the midshipmen."

We consider it to be the responsibility of this Board to support and advance the U.S. Naval Academy and the quality of the men and women trained in Annapolis as officers.

Respectfully submitted,



James M. Cannon
Chairman, Board of Visitors

Members:

FitzGerald Bemiss
James M. Cannon
Arthur B. Culvahouse
John C. Fitch
L.E. "Tommy" Thomas
John C. Tuck
Senator Mark O. Hatfield
Senator John S. McCain
Senator Barbara Mikulski
Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
Representative Helen D. Bentley
Representative Larry J. Hopkins
Representative C. Thomas McMillen
Representative Joseph R. Skeen
Representative Charles Wilson

CC:

Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Superintendent, USNA

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


DATE: 01/23/91

NOTE FOR: WILLIAM SITTMANN

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is
forwarded to you for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐



Thank you.

PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)

cc:



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

January 11, 1991

Haji Syed A. R. Hussaini
142-41 41st Avenue, Apt. 504
Flushing, Queens, New York.

Dear Mr. Hussaini:

President Bush and Secretary Baker asked that I respond to your letter of November 29, 1990 in which you offer your assistance to the United States government regarding the current crisis in the Gulf. As you know, the United States very much desires a peaceful resolution of the crisis. With the firm backing of the international community, as expressed in the 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions on the Gulf, and the support of Americans like yourself for the President's policies, we remain hopeful a peaceful solution can be achieved.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Paul R. Sutphin", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Paul R. Sutphin
Country Officer for Pakistan
Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Bangladesh Affairs

519041

Scotiabank 
THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA

New York Agency, One Liberty Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10006

His Uncle did in fact
serve with GB at the UN,
so an appropriate reply
should be assured.

Thanks.

Jan
12/12

PERSONAL.1

RESPECTED HONORABLE MR JAMES BAKER:
SIR, I HAVE RECEIVED MY U.S. PASSPORT TODAY AND I THANK YOU ALL
FOR YOUR KINDNESS AND NOBILITY. I ALSO OFFER MY SERVICES TO GO
TO SAUDI ARABIA OR ANYWHERE ELSE TO GIVE MY LIFE AND BLOOD FOR
MY COUNTRY THE UNITED STATES. MY RELATIVES FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER
AND AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND RED CHINA
(WITH MR BUSH), MR AGHA SHAHI AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED
STATES, MR AGHA HILALY ARE ALSO YOUR ADMIRERS AND ADMIRERS OF MR BUSH
I HAVE M.B.A DEGREE FROM MANHATTAN COLLEGE, NEW YORK AND FROM INDIA
ALSO AND I HAVE FORTY ONE YEARS BANKING EXPERIENCE.
I ASSURE YOU OF MY LOYALTY TILL THE LAST MOMENT OF MY LIFE.
YOUR LOYAL SERVANT

S.A.R. Hussaini 11/29/90
HAJI SYED A.R. HUSSAINI M.B.A
HOME:
142-41-41st avenue, apt 504
FLUSHING, QUEENS, NEW YORK NY 11355

NOV 29 1990

TO HONORABLE MR JAMES BAKER,
SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON D.C

MY HOME PHONE: 718-961-0948
BANK: ~~212~~-212-225-5419
DATED NOVEMBER 29-90

To, *Page # 202-456-2297*

✓ COPY TO HONORABLE MR GEORGE BUSH: TO GIVE ME A CHANCE TO GIVE MY LIFE
FOR MY BELOVED COUNTRY THE UNITED STATES. PREVIOUSLY I HAD OFFERED MY
SERVICES TO GO TO VIETNAM FOR MILITARY BANKING BUT I WAS THEN NOT A
CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES AND COULD NOT GO. YOU MAY REMEMBER MY
UNCLE MR AGHA SHAHI THEN AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN TO
THE UNITED NATIONS, WHO ADMIRES YOU ALWAYS.

YOUR LOYAL CITIZEN

S.A.R. Hussaini

PLEASE HELP AND PLEASE REPLY

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 9026565

Date January 12, 1991

FOR: Mr. William F. Sittmann
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: James Baker
From: Mr. Haji Hussaini
Date: November 29, 1990
Subject: Letter stating that the nephew of a former Pakistani
official offers his services to U.S. Government


WH Referral Dated: December 19, 1990
NSCS ID# (if any): 199041

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
_____ A translation is attached.
☒ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
_____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:


Director
Secretariat Staff

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

9026565

'90 DEC-20 11:26 AM
DECEMBER 19, 1990

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 199041

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED NOVEMBER 29, 1990

TO: JAMES BAKER

FROM: MR. HAJI HUSSAINI
SCOTIABANK
THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA
NEW YORK AGENCY
ONE LIBERTY PLAZA
NEW YORK NY 10006

SUBJECT: NEPHEW OF FORMER PAKISTANI OFFICIAL OFFERS
HIS SERVICES TO U.S. GOVERNMENT

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ 0 - OUTGOING

☐ 15 - INTERNAL

☒ 1 - INCOMING

Date Correspondence
Received (YYMM/DD)

9011202

Name of Correspondent: ☐ Mr. ☐ Mrs. ☐ Miss ☐ Ms. Haji Hussaini

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject:

Nephew of former Pakistani official
offered services to U.S. Government

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YYMM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YYMM/DD
	<u>Burn</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>9011217</u>	<u>LJ</u>		<u>901121</u>
	<u>DoS</u>	Referral Note:	<u>9011219</u>	<u>LJ</u>		<u>9011211</u>
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

A - Approval Action
C - Consider Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Forward Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.

Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, GEOS).

Always return completed correspondence record to Central FI

Relinquish about 1 copy per use tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2880

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/24/91

TO: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 JAN 23 PM 2:54

January 23, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

EDE HOLIDAY 

SUBJECT:

Domestic Policy Council Decision Memorandum on
Empowerment

A final decision memorandum from the Domestic Policy Council (DPC) on empowerment is attached. The memorandum seeks your final confirmation of nine empowerment options.

You will recall that the DPC forwarded an information memorandum to you on December 27, 1990. You directed that only those options consistent with the FY92 Budget be maintained in this package. Accordingly, the attached decision memorandum includes only those options consistent with the FY92 Budget or that have no budgetary implications. All of the options are supported by a consensus of the DPC.

We have not scheduled a meeting with you to discuss this package, but would be happy to pull together a small group should you so desire.

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	The Domestic Policy Council to the President Re: An Action Plan for Economic Empowerment of People (11 pp.)	1/22/91	P-5 Open on Expiration of PRA (Document Follows) By <u>GA</u> (NLGB) on <u>6/7/05</u>	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Brady, Philip D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Chron File 1/91 [2]

Date Closed: 6/8/2000	OA/ID Number: 05480-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1999-0735-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 22, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: An Action Plan for Economic Empowerment of People

BACKGROUND:

The Domestic Policy Council (DPC) met on November 28, 1990, to consider a series of ideas designed to give people access to jobs and the power to make choices that will better their own lives and the lives of their families and communities. An information memorandum outlining the DPC's empowerment ideas was forwarded to you on December 27, 1990. This memorandum now presents for your confirmation only those options consistent with initiatives to be proposed in the FY92 Budget and reflected in the FY92 Budget settlements previously presented to you by OMB.

These options outline the beginning of an entrepreneurial, market-oriented war against poverty. We can expand opportunities by changing expectations and attitudes about the future. People with access to property, jobs, and quality education have a stake in their community, more pride, and greater incentive for productive social behavior. More important, poor people with new and abundant economic opportunity have hope for the future -- the single greatest weapon against poverty and despair. There is nothing new about free enterprise principles. What is new is a bold determination to offer solutions, to break down barriers to opportunity, and to question status quo thinking.

WHAT WE ARE DOING NOW:

1. Evaluations of Existing Demonstration Projects: During the Reagan Administration, the Low Income Opportunity Board (LIOB) received requests from 26 States for waivers from current Federal rules to launch welfare demonstration projects. Of these, 14 State requests were approved and are now under way. There is a great deal of diversity in the 14 State demonstrations. Alabama, for example, is testing a major simplification project, in which the AFDC, Food Stamp, and Low Income Home Energy Assistance programs are merged into one cash grant with a unified set of rules. West Virginia is encouraging welfare recipients to start their own small businesses. Wisconsin requires both teenage parents receiving AFDC as well as teenagers in families receiving AFDC benefits to stay in school.

2. Recent Administration Accomplishments: The Administration has already accomplished a great deal in its first two years. For instance, Congress enacted your child care proposal and HOPE proposal and expanded Head Start. You have promoted volunteerism and your advocacy of educational choice has helped to spark a grassroots movement across the country. The recent budget agreement also included several initiatives to empower people, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit expansion (\$12 billion over five years), the Child Health Tax Credit (\$5 billion over five years), and funding for child care vouchers. All are part of the Administration's effort to protect and enhance individual power.

EMPOWERMENT REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES THAT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER EXISTING AUTHORITY:

The Economic Empowerment Task Force, chaired by Secretary Kemp, learned that all of the Departments are actively looking for ways to empower people and make government work better for people. These activities are primarily administrative or regulatory in nature. For instance, USDA in concert with other Cabinet agencies will improve coordination between the Food Stamp Employment and Training program, the new Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) welfare work program, and possibly Labor's JTPA program. Education has opened an educational choice center and clearinghouse. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has been working with the Chicago Housing Authority on an "Operation Cleansweep" to rid public housing of gangs and drug trafficking.

Other issues are being addressed in the FY92 Budget. For example, funding for the WIC program, which provides supplemental food for mothers, infants, and children, will be significantly increased. There will also be a series of voucher and choice initiatives in Education's budget. An important component of any empowerment strategy is encouraging parents to make responsible decisions for their children and to contribute to their children's development.

OPTIONS REQUIRING PRESIDENTIAL DECISION:

Nine options are presented here for your confirmation. These include some of the options you have previously seen in the information memorandum forwarded to you on December 27. Pursuant to your direction, only those options consistent with initiatives to be proposed in the FY92 Budget have been maintained here.

We should also note that a vital component of economic empowerment is the vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws. Racial, sex, and religious discrimination create insidious

barriers to economic opportunity. The Administration will continue in its commitment to tear down these barriers wherever they exist. There are other barriers to opportunity that have a disproportionately adverse impact on minorities and women. Regulations, like those issued under the Davis-Bacon Act (discussed below) and local economic licensing laws, can remove the lowest rungs from the ladder of economic opportunity.

1. Fund HOPE: You signed HOPE (Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere) legislation in November. HOPE authorized several important initiatives, such as empowering public housing residents by encouraging them to own or manage public and assisted housing, and improving the link between housing and services for the homeless. HOPE is the most far-reaching housing legislation since 1974. No funds, however, were appropriated for important components of HOPE in FY91. According to HUD, funding HOPE is vital to achieving the Administration's public goal of a million new low-income homeowners in 1992. OMB has approved HUD's request to reprogram FY91 funds to fund HOPE immediately.

Pros:

- o HOPE demonstrates the Administration's commitment to housing for poor families and children, the homeless, and first-time home buyers.
- o HOPE is a model empowerment initiative. Funding it now will demonstrate the Administration's conviction to empower people and will give impetus to this approach to social problems.
- o HOPE targets Federally-owned properties currently in FHA or RTC inventories. Transferring these units to first-time home buyers will add dollars to the Federal Treasury.

Cons:

- o Funding a new program at the same time that the Administration proposes a FY92 budget with cuts in established programs may not be supported by Congress.
- o It is likely that, in return for fully funding HOPE, Congressional Democrats will want to fund their new housing program, HOME, at a potential cost of \$1 billion in FY91.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

2. Promote Educational Choice: During the last two years,

educational choice initiatives have been initiated in more and more jurisdictions across the country. East Harlem, New York; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Minnesota have implemented choice programs that permit parents to determine which schools their children should attend.

The Federal government could encourage restructuring through choice demonstrations and voucher programs. States could be awarded grants for demonstration projects in return for a mutual agreement with the Federal government to waive certain regulations that impede choice. Projects would provide for, but not be limited to, educational choice among public schools and include special awards for excellence to high-performing schools. In the FY92 Budget, the Administration will propose a new \$200 million fund available to schools implementing choice programs. A portion of Education's new funds would also be targeted to low-income or high-dropout school districts that employ voucher or certificate programs. Legislation would be required.

Pros:

- o Emphasis on urban areas targets Federal resources on highest concentration of low-income families and at-risk children.
- o Targeting school districts with high dropout rates provides an opportunity to help the districts most likely to have difficulties attaining the National Education Goals.
- o Provides maximum flexibility for communities and school districts to select options most appropriate to local educational problems.

Cons:

- o Legislation may face opposition on the Hill and in the public education arena.
- o Could face a constitutional challenge if potential choice options include religiously-affiliated schools.
- o Might be difficult to administer the transfer of funds from local school districts to other providers.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

3. Reintroduce "Charlottesville" Flexibility Legislation: A proposal supported by the Administration for increased flexibility in exchange for enhanced accountability failed to pass Congress last year.

Pros:

- o Flexibility would permit the resources from HHS, Labor, and Education programs to be spent at State and local levels with fewer regulatory constraints and greater effectiveness.
- o Flexibility legislation would follow through on a commitment of the Education Summit.
- o This would enhance services integration efforts by granting Education, HHS, and Labor coordinated waiver authority coupled with enhanced accountability.

Cons:

- o The proposal received opposition from both conservative Republicans and Democrats. Some Members believed that flexibility would allow services to be shifted away from traditionally targeted populations, such as the disadvantaged, now mandated by law.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

4. Provide Job Training to Public Housing and Other Low-Income Residents: The Administration could actively promote an aggressive services integration initiative now being developed by HUD, HHS, and Labor. The goal of this initiative is to bring job training to public housing residents. Recent research by the Rockefeller Foundation shows that job training programs that integrate an array of basic education and specific skill competencies are most effective in making low-income people self-sufficient. No new FY92 funds are required for this initiative.

Pros:

- o Targeting job training to residents of public housing, and combining training with other empowerment initiatives for public housing residents, should create a highly productive synergy.
- o Targeting job training on public housing residents targets those who need help most because about one-third of all public housing residents are receiving public assistance.

Cons:

- o Combining services at public housing sites will increase the attractiveness of remaining in public housing, which could

have the unintended consequence of discouraging people from moving out of public housing.

- o Neither public housing nor job training are entitlements. Targeting those who are fortunate enough to receive housing aid could create the appearance of inequitably helping one group at the expense of others.

-- Decision:

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Modify _____

5. Create Enterprise Zones: Enterprise zones were removed in the final stages of the budget agreement last year and could be proposed again this year. The enterprise zone legislative proposal would include both employment and investment incentives and could be tied to Federal, State, and local regulatory relief. With a slower economy, enterprise zones are needed more than ever. States have been experimenting with enterprise zones for several years. Former Governor Kean implemented enterprise zones with great success in New Jersey.

The proposal included in the FY92 Budget is similar to last year's proposal: 1) a 5 percent refundable tax credit for the first \$10,500 of wages earned by qualified employees in an enterprise zone; 2) elimination of capital gains taxes for tangible property used in a business located in an enterprise zone for at least two years; and 3) permitting individuals to expense some of the capital invested in enterprise zone businesses. Treasury estimated last year that phasing in these initiatives in 50 zones would reduce tax revenues by \$1.9 billion over five years.

Pros:

- o The enterprise zone concept includes more than tax incentives; it also requires reduction of Federal, State, and local regulatory barriers and a comprehensive local strategy to deal with the most distressed parts of rural and urban areas.
- o Enterprise zones would concentrate incentives solely in the most distressed communities, thus targeting tax expenditures where they are most needed.

Cons:

- o Some think enterprise zones would primarily stimulate the shifting of assets into the zone from areas surrounding the zone and not generate sufficient new investment to pay for the incentives.

- o Targeting powerful pro-growth incentives into just a few areas might unfairly benefit some people. Across the board incentives might be seen as more equitable.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

6. Improve Access of the Poor to More Jobs by Reforming Davis-Bacon: Davis-Bacon was enacted in the 1930s to require workers on Federally-financed projects to be paid the "prevailing wage." Some who supported the measure also sought to bar blacks from benefiting from the profusion of public works under the New Deal. Davis-Bacon may increase costs by as much as 25 percent for small enterprises and it prevents the least skilled people, many of whom are black, from participating equally in open bidding for contracts with the Federal government. At the current threshold, virtually no project is beyond the reach of Davis-Bacon.

A higher minimum threshold for Federal programs could be established under which prevailing wages would not apply. Both the FY91 and the FY92 Budgets call for raising the threshold to \$250,000. Legislation would be required.

Pros:

- o Raising the threshold would generate significant budgetary savings.
- o Raising the threshold would be easier to pass in Congress than outright repeal, but it would still be difficult.

Cons:

- o Even if the threshold were raised, Davis-Bacon still imposes a regulatory burden.
- o There would be strong labor opposition. The labor community views Davis-Bacon as necessary to keep wages high.
- o Past efforts to enact such reforms have failed and, if attempted now, might lead to Congressional reversal of significant reforms just implemented, such as the Department of Labor's new "helper" rule (which is expected to save up to \$610 million per year).

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

7. Target SBA Programs: The Small Business Administration (SBA) operates several loan and technical assistance programs which could be better targeted to promote entrepreneurship among low-income persons.

- Cottage Capitalism Initiative: The SBA proposes extending a joint HUD/SBA experiment in Salt Lake City, Utah, to 10 new sites by reprogramming FY91 funds. In this experiment, SBA is teaching public housing residents about basic business concepts and helping them develop business plans. Local lenders have made small loans with private funds to provide the start-up capital needed by graduates of the training program. SBA will also work with the new Rural Development Administration to develop similar programs in low-income rural areas.
- Entrepreneur Training for Disadvantaged Youth: The SBA has asked for \$425,000 in its FY92 budget submission to launch a new program for entrepreneurial training materials for low-income youth, designed to inform and motivate young people about the opportunity of small business.

Pros:

- o Coordinating SBA activities with other programs creates synergies and helps leverage private sector involvement.
- o Efforts by several private, nonprofit organizations to lend small amounts of money to low-income entrepreneurs have shown promising success rates.

Cons:

- o Entrepreneurial training for low-income clients is regarded by some experts as the least efficient use of business-development resources. Because low-income clients may lack requisite academic skills, or may not be able to obtain child care and other needed assistance, the business failure rate could be greater than among other client groups.
- o The increased FY92 spending needed to make these programs successful will need to be offset by reductions in other programs. If these funds come from other business-development programs, we may be replacing more-efficient services with less-efficient services.

-- Decision:

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Modify _____

8. Revamp the Public Employment Service: The Employment Service is a State-run, Federally-funded program intended to help unemployed workers find jobs. It is an important, but not wholly successful, tool in minimizing the financial hardship and length of unemployment for workers. Currently, the Employment Service interprets its mission as finding available jobs and then placing unemployed workers in those jobs. As a practical matter, the Service "skims" by placing only the best workers -- so that employers will continue to work with the Service in the future.

The focus of the Employment Service could be changed. The Service would focus its resources on job counseling targeted to low-income people and steering them to available training opportunities. The Administration could also propose tying continued Federal funding for each office to placement rates for both low-income people and the long-term unemployed. This could be accomplished through regulation; Labor has already invited public comment on how to restructure the Employment Service.

Pros:

- o Changing the focus of the Employment Service and instilling performance standards and incentives would increase the social benefit of a program that is not currently working well.

Cons:

- o If the economy has slipped into a recession, this could be perceived as the wrong time to be changing the Employment Service -- a time when more people may be in need of the types of services provided by the Employment Service.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

9. Establish Empowerment Opportunity Areas: This option seeks a fresh start in programs for poor people by granting waivers from Federal requirements to localities that develop plans for new approaches to low-income programs. It would have two forms: one organized around geographic concentrations of low-income people; the other defined in terms of a target group such as unmarried first-time mothers. In each, we would encourage use of waivers from regular program rules and flexibility in the administration of Federal, State, and local laws and programs.

Each plan must identify performance criteria before being approved; any project failing to meet the criteria would be subject to termination. Legislation would be required to

authorize broader waiver authority than currently exists. Empowerment Opportunity Areas would operate on an experimental basis, probably for a period of three to five years. There would be no FY92 Budget impact.

Pros:

- o Shows the Federal government believes in the potential for developing "bottom up" solutions.
- o Allows an opportunity to see if our rhetoric of community control meshes with reality.

Cons:

- o There is no guarantee of success. This approach might merely shift the bureaucratic presence from the Federal level to the community level.
- o Further State and local experimentation may not be perceived as an adequate response to the problems that low-income people face.

-- Decision:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Modify _____

RECOMMENDATION:

The Domestic Policy Council recommends your approval of each of the nine options discussed above as an initial package of Administration empowerment initiatives. Each proposal is consistent with decisions made for the FY92 Budget.

DECISION (Summary):

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>	<u>Modify</u>
Option 1: Fund HOPE.	_____	_____	_____
Option 2: * Promote Educational Choice.	_____	_____	_____
Option 3: * Repropose Flexibility Legislation.	_____	_____	_____

Option 4:
Job Training in
Public Housing.

Option 5: *
Create Enterprise
Zones.


Option 6: *
Reform Davis-Bacon.

Option 7:
Target SBA Programs.

Option 8:
Revamp the Public
Employment Service.

Option 9: *
Create Empowerment
Opportunity Areas.

* Legislation will be required.



Dick Thornburgh
Chairman Pro Tempore

DB cc Cs
JA
PB

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/24/91

TO: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/24/91

BOYDEN GRAY

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 JAN 23 PM 2:22

January 23, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: FRED McCLURE 

SUBJECT: Resolution of Impeachment by Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez (D-TX)

Attached are highlighted copies of the Gonzalez resolution, his statement in the January 16, 1991 Congressional Record, a wire service story on the resolution, and excerpts from a press conference Congressman Gonzalez held with former Attorney General Ramsey Clark on January 15.

The introduction of this resolution is not a first for Chairman Gonzalez. He introduced a resolution to impeach President Reagan and supported another (following Grenada and regarding Nicaragua).

This latest effort has no apparent support in the House and is not taken seriously by his colleagues.

Attachments

102nd Congress
1st Session

H.Res.34

Impeaching George Herbert Walker Bush, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 16, 1991

Mr. GONZALEZ submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Judiciary.

A RESOLUTION

Impeaching George Herbert Walker Bush, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors.

1 Impeaching George Herbert Walker Bush, President of the United States, of
2 high crimes and misdemeanors.

3 Resolved, That George Herbert Walker Bush, President of the United
4 States is impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the
5 following articles of impeachment be exhibited to the Senate:

1 Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in the name of itself and of all of
3 the people of the United States of America, against George Herbert Walker
4 Bush, President of the United States of America, in maintenance and
5 support of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

6 ARTICLE I

7 In the conduct of the office of President of the United States,
8 George herbert Walker Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath
9 faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and,
10 to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
11 tion of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to
12 take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has violated the equal
13 protection clause of the Constitution. U.S. soldiers in the Middle East
14 are overwhelmingly poor white, black, and Mexican-American, and their
15 military service is based on the coercion of an system that has denied
16 viable economic opportunities to these classes of citizens. Under the
17 Constitution, all classes of citizens are guaranteed equal protection,
18 and calling on the poor and minorities to fight a war for oil to preserve
19 the lifestyles of the wealthy is a denial of the rights of these
20 soldiers. In all of this George Herbert Walker Bush has acted in a
21 manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of
22 constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and
23 justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

24 Wherefore George Herbert Walker Bush, by such conduct, warrants
25 impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

ARTICLE II

1
2 In the conduct of the office of President of the United States,
3 George Herbert Walker Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath
4 faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States
5 and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the
6 Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his
7 constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
8 executed, has violated the U.S. Constitution, federal law and the United
9 Nations Charter by bribing, intimidating and threatening others,
10 including the members of the United Nations Security Council, to support
11 belligerent acts against Iraq. In all of this George Herbert Walker Bush
12 has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive
13 of constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law
14 and justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United
15 States.

16 Wherefore George Herbert Walker Bush, by such conduct, warrants
17 impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

ARTICLE III

18
19 In the conduct of the office of President of the United States,
20 George Herbert Walker Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath
21 faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and,
22 to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
23 tion of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to
24 take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prepared, planned,
25 and conspired to engage in a massive war against Iraq employing methods

1 of mass destruction that will result in the killing of tens of thousands
2 of civilians, many of whom will be children. This planning includes the
3 placement and potential use of nuclear weapons, and the use of such
4 indiscriminate weapons and massive killings by serial bombardment, or
5 otherwise, of civilians violates the Hague Conventions of 1907 and 1923,
6 the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I thereto, the Nuremberg
7 Charter, the Genocide Convention and the United Nations Declaration of
8 Human Rights. In all of this George Herbert Walker Bush has acted in a
9 manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of
10 constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and
11 justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

12 Wherefore George Herbert Walker Bush, by such conduct, warrants
13 impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

14 ARTICLE IV

15 In the conduct of the office of President of the United States,
16 George Herbert Walker Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath
17 faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States
18 and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the
19 Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his
20 constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
21 executed, has committed the United States to acts of war without
22 congressional consent and contrary to the United Nations Charter and
23 international law. From August, 1990, through January, 1991, the
24 President embarked on a course of action that systematically eliminated
25 every option for peaceful resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis. Once

1 the President approached Congress for a declaration of war, 500,000
2 American soldiers' lives were in jeopardy - rendering any substantive
3 debate by Congress meaningless. The President has not received a
4 declaration of war by Congress, and in contravention of the written word,
5 the spirit, and the intent of the U.S. Constitution has declared that he
6 will go to war regardless of the views of Congress and the American
7 people. In failing to seek a declaration of war, and in declaring his
8 intent to violate the Constitution in disregarding the acts of Congress -
9 including the War Powers Resolution - George Herbert Walker Bush has
10 acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of
11 constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and
12 justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

13 Wherefore George Herbert Walker Bush, by such conduct, warrants
14 impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

15 ARTICLE V

16 In the conduct of the office of President of the United States,
17 George Herbert Walker Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath
18 faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States
19 and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the
20 Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his
21 constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
22 executed, has planned, prepared, and conspired to commit crimes against
23 the peace by leading the United States into aggressive war against Iraq
24 in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, the Nuremberg
25 Charter, other international instruments and treaties, and the Constitu-
26 tion of the United States. In all of this George Herbert Walker Bush has

1 acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive of
2 constitutional government, to the great prejudice of the cause of law and
3 justice and to the manifest injury of the people of the United States.

4 Wherefore George Herbert Walker Bush, by such conduct, warrants
5 impeachment and trial, and removal from office.

Press Transcripts to Find 1...

Limited to transcript 671131

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- Tuesday, January 15, 1991

Press Conference: Ramsey Clark, Fmr US Attorney and Rep. Henry
Gonzalez - Impeachment of President Bush
Transcript ID: 671131 (862 lines)

**PRESS CONFERENCE
WITH FORMER US ATTORNEY RAMSEY CLARK
AND REP. HENRY GONZALEZ (D-TX)**

**MODERATOR: MS. SAHU BARRON,
ORGANIZER FOR NATIONAL COALITION TO STOP
US INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

**SUBJECT: CALL FOR IMPEACHMENT OF
PRESIDENT BUSH AND VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE**

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1991

MS. BARRON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Every day this week, scores of protesters will be gathering at the White House to protest the impending war by the United States against the Arab people. Today, the Howard students, as well as students from the University of the District of Columbia, will be assembling at Metropolitan AME Church for a rally, and will then proceed to the White House for a press conference and a late afternoon vigil. Tomorrow through Friday there will be similar activities at the White House. All these actions will culminate in the first national march to stop the US war in the Persian Gulf, Saturday January 19th, beginning at 11:00 a.m. at Lafayette Park, across the street from the White House.

These actions will be a response, especially to the fact that today the people of this country, the people of the world stand on the very precipice of a US war in the Persian Gulf, which will inevitably lead to the deaths of tens of thousands of Arab peoples, and Americans -- lives we are convinced will be sacrificed only for the greater profit of the big oil companies.

We stand firm in our conviction that the full responsibility for this war rests on the shoulders of President George Bush, and unfortunately

on a Congress which has endorsed blatant, naked US aggression against the Arab people. In Newsweek of January 14th, it was reported that at least a hundred more nuclear armed Pershing missiles have been shipped to the Persian Gulf and that General Schwarzkopf has asked permission to explode one of these bombs over Iraq. Clearly, this administration deserves to be indicted and George Bush deserves to be impeached for the blatant illegalities and abridgement of domestic as well as international law for these unprecedented actions.

The congressional vote this week has made it absolutely clear that only the people organized and active and vigilant can and will stop this war. Already we have seen that across this country and around the world, hundreds of thousands have taken to the streets to demand, Stop the US war in the Middle East, because clearly so many people understand that it is the United States that is the chief perpetrator and would be the chief benefactor in such a war.

On Saturday, we expect a massive turnout of protestors from over 90 cities and 25 states to converge here in Washington on the White House and to come together in San Francisco, in Houston, in Honolulu, in Sydney, Australia, and elsewhere. Unanimously the world over the demand will be on January 19th, bring all the troops home now unconditionally.

This is the only solution to the crisis. This is the only way to end the war. Working people, youth and students, the poor, peoples of color, women, they all know that the real fight must be against poverty, joblessness, hunger, racism, sexism, anti-gay and lesbian bigotry here at home; that they will benefit if that \$100 million a day that is being spent in this military war buildup is brought back and placed at the disposal of the communities. They know that they will not benefit, not in terms of the quality of their lives or in their living, for those who are there in Saudi Arabia, in a war for the big oil companies in the Persian Gulf.

We will now hear from Ramsey Clark, former US Attorney General.

(Applause.)

MR. CLARK: Good morning. We meet in Washington, D.C., on the morning of January the 15th, 1991, in what may seem to be a quiet moment, but it's the quiet that is the eye of the storm. The wild turbulence surrounding this place, this whole nation and nations across the world, ought to be pretty evident to everyone by now. The candlelight ceremonies of hundreds of thousands of religious across this country and across the planet, the constant demonstrations at the UN and the White House, staggering crowds in West Europe, where we're told our allies support us, 100,000 people in Rome protesting the peril of war, over 200,000 in the cities of Germany, 40,000 in London at Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park, 40,000 in Paris, 40,000 in Ankara. The people of the planet do not want this war, and the people of the United States overwhelmingly do not want this war, and they have been given no reason for it.

But we're not here to discuss all of that; we're here for a more somber purpose. Those who believe in Constitutional government have to address the question of whether President Bush and Vice President Quayle and Secretary Baker and others have committed and are threatening to commit additional high crimes and misdemeanors that call for their impeachment.

This is not a subject you take too lightly. Over the years, even my many years, I've been called on only a few times to be involved in it. I was a lead counsel for Justice William O. Douglas in what was an assault on the independence of our judiciary in the early '70s. I was involved in perhaps maybe one of the

powerfully prevail. But here, we've been able to bottle up opinion so that only one view dominates.

And we've seen now, finally, among the many lessons from Vietnam, that there will be so severe a censorship that Ernie Pyle and heroes from other times must be turning over in their graves as we go toward war, if we do, in the Persian Gulf.

We see the use of experimental medical injection without the informed consent, without the knowledge at all of military personnel -- a violation of not just human rights, but of the Nuremberg Charter itself or the Nuremberg code anyway. We see that as history has told us, war will justify any crime, but we believe we have a Constitution, and we believe that the Constitution makes it a high crime for any of our officials to engage in such conduct, to authorize, permit or condone it. And they must be impeached if they plan, prepare and act to do it.

It's not as if this hadn't happened before during the Bush administration. The invasion of Panama was absolutely as lawless as the invasion of Kuwait. The president had no authority.

We've never been told what it was all about. Sometimes it's a drug bust. A drug bust with stealth bombers? Is it really conceivable that you could have spared the civilian population? Have we seen El Chorrillo, where 30,000 people were left homeless from artillery and helicopter gunfire? And hundreds killed? Even by the Pentagon's statistics -- which are false -- there were three Panamanian civilians killed for every Panamanian military person killed, and that is a crime.

It wasn't necessary. We were bombing and strafing from Colon to Panama City, San Miguelito, every military and police installation -- why? By what right? And without the authority of the Congress? And we killed hundreds and hundreds of Panamanians. And the President of the United States ordered it, and that too is a high crime and misdemeanor.

I'm a private citizen, and like nearly everyone in this country have the power of my voice, the power of my persuasion. I can propose. I've spoken before of a friend of many years, an American of enormous courage because as a long-time member of the United States House of Representatives, as a chairman, as a person who has always put constitutional principle and human rights first, he has the power to dispose.

We'll now hear from Congressman Henry Gonzalez of Texas.

(Weak applause.)

REP. GONZALEZ: Thank you very much, Mr. General. It's a privilege to share this table with you. Ramsey Clark is a name that I have long admired and cherished. His father, Justice Clark, was a great friend and also a great justice, a great Texan. And so it's an honor to be here.

I said on December the 31st in my hometown of San Antonio, where I had a local press conference, that in answer to a question: "Would I introduce a resolution of impeachment?" -- my answer was that it would depend on some study, as I always have, when I've

entered into that kind of activity, and also the future actions of the President.

I have introduced a total of three impeachment resolutions during my service in the House of Representatives. Each one of them was after months of preparation. It wasn't something just concocted and put together, willy-nilly.

In the case of President Reagan, the first resolution I joined my colleague, Ted Wise, and ultimately, five others who first signed and then one withdrew after the pressure hit. In the case of Reagan's invasion of Grenada, Mr. Wise did an excellent job of preparing the specificities of that resolution. And I joined him.

I then -- on March the 5th, 1987, introduced an impeachment resolution, again directed to President Reagan, because of the preparations then being made for a planned invasion of Nicaragua, and I felt that his actions up to then were in systematic defiance of the Constitution.

The only thing now is just a question of evaluating. I think our own Ramsey Clark in his expertise has prepared a very good outline. I intend to take it, evaluate it, and based on some preparation already underway by a member of my staff, it will be my intention to introduce a resolution of impeachment.

The only thing is that I'm very much tempted to extend it to include some of the congressional leaders, because frankly, they have been in rather craven abdication of the solemn and the all-inclusive constitutional responsibility to stand up for the independence, co-equality and separation of this most important branch of our government.

← Dem.
Leadership

Yes, it is true, we have a Constitution, but not in force. It is being honored more in the breach than in its terms. Do we have a president? No. Not as intended in Article 2 by the men who wrote the Constitution and debated that very much and this specific issue at great length.

What do we have? I sincerely believe we have modern day Caesars, not presidents, or maybe monarchs, except monarch implies something else. But Caesars would be the best comparison, modern day 20th century Caesars.

We don't read history much in our country but Caesars aren't -- in history and in reading the details of the evolution of the Roman Republic and the development of Caesarism, the Caesars were not dictators a la Hitler. They were men that wanted to be loved by the people, like our presidents. They had the equivalent of what we call polls today. And -- but they exercised and they argued for and justified the amassing of tremendous power by necessity.

I don't know who it was, I think it was Pitt in England who said that necessity was the argument of tyrants and the creed of slaves. Corrupted free men and women are the worst of slaves. We have departed from the Constitution. We do not have a president as viewed and called for in the Constitution. We have now two administrations, the Reagan-Bush and now the Bush administration that have warred against the poor. And now, to add insult to

injury, it's the poor who will be fighting this war in the sands of Arabia.

[An] Overwhelming proportion of our armed services personnel come from the poor sections of our society. So it's ironic that they'll have to fight it, and at the same time even diminish the meagerly few programs that still exist, housing, education and the like, that some of our congresses had intended in order to redress the economic imbalance and injustice in our society. It's ironic that with very little discussion -- what passed or was called debate last week would hardly fit that description -- the issue was never addressed. The issue boiled down as once before in 1982 when we had the Bolden amendment and subsequent to that. The issue was are you loyal to the President or are you going to be disloyal to the President, not is the Congress going to exercise and honor its own laws, like the War Powers Limitation Act?

This situation is worse because we have allowed the imbalance to set in in what from time immemorial in the beginning of our nation we desperately were seeking to have, a countervailing of powers, where you would have the co-equality, the independence and the separation of the three basic organs of government. We don't have, and we haven't had for some time.

When the President gets up and tells the American people that he's the commander-in-chief of the people, then we know we're in trouble. He's the commander-in-chief of the armed forces but not of the United States. And beginning with that, the fact remains that even though there are those that, as in the previous cases, would say, well, these are acts of futility, if anything, don't you think that it would be receiving ridicule, well, the truth stands the test of time.

And regardless of the mood and the controlling factors at this moment and so-called public opinion that the President bases his assumption of these powers -- illegally, unconstitutionally -- notwithstanding that, time will tell whether, in effect, this is to be ridiculed and was a futile effort or not.

It certainly in 1957 in the State Senate of Texas was considered futile, ridiculous to stand up and argue against a (massive hit ?) of resistance that had passed every one of the ten other Confederate states, in some cases in 15 minutes, and yet by taking hold and making use of the available traditions of the Texas Senate of unlimited debate, it was only in the Texas Senate that there was resistance, and of the 14 total bills, only 12 -- only two were enacted, and subsequent to that, those two were declared unconstitutional, even by Texas tribunals, not even US tribunals.

So I can tell you from experience that the people -- and it was considered suicidal politically -- the people are there. Our leaders aren't, and haven't been. The people don't want war. Mr. Clark is absolutely correct. I can assure you of that. Since August, I have been imploring the congressional leadership, "Call back the Congress in August, not in November, not in December; in August." When we came back after the Labor Day, I introduced a resolution, and the resolution invoked the war powers resolution. I would have been satisfied with a hearing. Now, the fact that the Congress does not respect its own laws

is a reason why the courts are not going to go against their own precedents. And this is a reason I did not join Mr. Dellums in his lawsuit. And I told Mr. Dellums why I wasn't.

I said, this is going to be considered a political difference between the two organs of government, the executive and the legislative. The court will not immerse itself in that kind of a political difference. The court will point out that the non-delegable power to declare war resides inherently in the Congress.

But, the court will also tell you that rather than going to it, to let the court do what the Congress ought to be doing, the Congress has not exhausted its resources, to wit, its own laws, and in turn, by definition, the 1973-74 War Powers Limitation Act.

So, I introduced that resolution. That resolution would have mandated the President to get all those men out by October the 15th. And that's the only thing that should be done. That was the only thing that should have been debated in the Congress -- not the folderol of saying, "Well, are you going to be supporting the President against this nasty villain? Why, certainly you're not going to abandon our President." That's not at all the issue.

The issue is, and I think Mr. Clark has very well outlined it -- no use my repeating it -- whether or not we in our day and time, and ironically, right about the turn of the 200th anniversary of this form of government, this Constitution -- whether we in our day will uphold and reaffirm that basic -- that basic, fundamental law of the land. That has been the issue for some time here.

During the Vietnam era, we all agonized -- I think I particularly because the President was a friend, a neighbor, 50 miles away from my birthplace -- magnificent man, when it came to the domestic needs that some of us had long hungered and fought for. But when it came to the war in Southeast Asia, the impressing and conscripting of unwilling Americans, I knew that was a violation of the terms of the very first draft act, and I spoke out on the House floor. Sure that was futile. And sure, now and then the President would send one of his aids to tell me that his feelings were hurt. What did I mean, was I going to then join the demonstrators and double my fists, and I said no, I don't believe in that. But I do know and I said this long before I thought I'd be in the Congress, and beginning with the Korean conflict, that a president -- if a president has a right to conscript an American and send him outside of continental United States in an undeclared war, we did not have a Constitution, we did not have a president, we had gone back to that which the founding fathers who wrote the Constitution feared the most, and that was king made wars. And that's where we are now.

And we even have the despicable scene of a president of the United States lowering himself in a personal, personal, name calling with the very man that he considers inferior in every respect -- put himself on the same level, shamed, I think, the office of the presidency. And I certainly do intend to prepare a resolution of impeachment. And with the help here of this big man and great man and counsel, and the staff, we should be able to come up with something pretty soon. Thank you very much

obviously we think we can do, then what kind of a balance remains in the Middle East? Are we going to occupy, reinstall the emirates in Kuwait?

Hey, you know, look at Panama. We're still occupying Panama. Our military are governing Panama. We dare not move those better than 10,000 troops, because there won't be one American life safe in Panama. Even in the smallest country, El Salvador, after \$6 billion and 10 years, we're no closer to anything called -- any satisfactory solution than we were in 1980, 1981, when Haig drew the line, so-called. So I think the General here is absolutely correct. There has been no thought given as to what will Bush call victory? What will be victory?

Q So what you're saying, you and Mr. Clark are saying that the President wants this war. He must want something other than dead Americans. What is it that you believe he wants?

REP. GONZALEZ: Well, I can't answer that. The President should and he hasn't. What I'm saying is he hasn't answered that very, very pertinent question. Is it -- is it what he said at first, to protect the oil lines and supplies to the United States that are vital? If that's the case, let me tell you what the Saudi kings have done already. They have mined every inch of that pipeline, because they have said, if they go under and they're not too sure they wouldn't, they're taking the pipeline with them. So where is victory there? Is it to protect Saudi Arabia. Is it to roll back -- that's what I'm asking you. We can't answer that question. All we can say is, obviously the President has gone lusting after that false god of war.

Q (Name inaudible.) In this memorandum that we've got, isn't it a fact that -- it suggests an impeachment resolution against President Bush, the Vice President and Secretary of State Baker and other -- (inaudible.) Would your own resolution include all those people?

REP. GONZALEZ: I would think so.

Q All right.

REP. GONZALES: And there is not, as I sense, a sense of I think the congressional leaders have been derelict in upholding the prerogatives and immunities and the powers of the Congress under the Constitution.

Q Who are the other officials, Mr. Clark?

MS. BARRON: Excuse me, excuse me.

Q Mr. Clark, who are the other officials?

MS. BARRON: This is the way we'll proceed. One question at a time, and please let us recognize and ask permission to a follow-up question please. All right? All right.

Q And who are the other officials, Mr. Clark.

MR. CLARK: Well, unlike Gerald Ford when he introduced his

Remarks by GONZALEZ (D-TX) on H.Res. 34
RESOLUTION OF IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
[CR page H-520, 132 lines]

Attributed to GONZALEZ (D-TX)

RESOLUTION OF IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH

[...Intervening text...]

Mr. GONZALEZ. Madam Speaker, it is with great sadness, and yet with equally great, if not greater, conviction, that I introduce today a resolution of impeachment of President Bush. It is known as House Resolution 34, and I will provide this resolution as introduced to be appended at the end of my remarks today.

At a time when our Nation is deeply divided over the question of war, we find ourselves on the brink of a world war of such magnitude that our minds cannot fully comprehend the destruction that is about to be leveled. The position we are in is a direct result of the actions of one man and the reactions of another. The Iraqi people are as opposed to war as are the American people. The difference is that the Iraqi people have no choice but to support their country's leader, but the American people not only have the right to oppose and speak out in disagreement with the President, but they have the responsibility to do so if our democracy is to be preserved. Today I exercise this constitutional right and responsibility to speak out in opposition to war in the Middle East and in support of removal of our Nation's Chief Executive.

When I took the oath of office earlier this month, as I had numerous times before, I swore to uphold the Constitution. The President's oath was the same, to uphold the Constitution of the United States. We did not pledge an oath of allegiance to the President but to the Constitution, which is the highest law of the land. The Constitution provides for removal of the President when he has committed high crimes and misdemeanors, including violations of the principles of the Constitution. President Bush has violated these principles.

My resolution has five articles of impeachment. First, the President has violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Our soldiers in the Middle East are overwhelmingly poor white, black, and Mexican-American or Hispanic-American. They may be volunteers technically, but their voluntarism is based on the coercion of a system that has denied viable opportunities to these classes of our citizens. Under the Constitution, all classes of citizens are guaranteed equal

protection, and calling on the poor and the minorities to fight a war for oil to preserve the lifestyles of the wealthy is a denial of the rights of these soldiers.

Let me add that since 1981 we have suffered the Reagan-Bush and now the Bush war against the poor, and to add insult to injury, we now are asking the poor to fight while here, as a result of this fight, even the meager programs that the Congress had seen fit to preserve as a national policy will suffer because the money for those programs will be diverted to the cause of this unnecessary war.

Article II of this resolution states that the President has violated the Constitution, Federal law, and the U.N. Charter by bribing, intimidating, and threatening others, including the members of the U.N. Security Council, to support belligerent acts against Iraq. It is clear that the President paid off members of the U.N. Security Council in return for their votes in support of war against Iraq or to abstain from voting contrariwise. The debt of Egypt was, for example, forgiven--\$7 billion, without congressional approval. That, I think, casts doubtful validity on that Presidential action. The reason for the cancellation of that debt is so that we can then provide an equally enormous amount of armament for Egypt which it cannot obtain because of the debt outstanding. A \$140 million loan to China was agreed to. The Soviet Union was promised over \$7 billion in aid. This is a sum totally unreported in our country but very well discussed in foreign country presses such as Germany and others. Colombia was promised assistance to its armed forces. Zaire was promised military assistance and partial forgiveness of its debt. Saudi Arabia was promised \$12 billion in arms, and more than that. Actually in October, the President let them have \$2.2 billion, and there was a commitment for \$21 billion more, but because of the outcry in Congress and the Israeli opposition, that is being postponed. But there is still a commitment for \$22 billion. I am sure this month will see the initial efforts to bring about compliance with that commitment.

Yemen was threatened with the termination of support, and the United States finally paid off \$187 million of its debt to the United Nations after the vote President Bush sought was made.

This is all so ironic. When our President ran for the U.S. Senate in the 1960's, he told the people of Texas that if he would be elected to the Senate, he would lead the fight to remove the United States from the United Nations if what he called Red China at that time was admitted. Fate and power almighty have a very, very mysterious way of working together. Who was to believe

during that year in that race in Texas that years later this same man, now the President, would be the man the President would appoint to represent us in the United Nations and welcome Red China as a member of the United Nations.

The vote was bought, and it will be paid for with the lives of our poor elements who are going to shoulder the fight.

Article III states that the President has conspired to engage in a massive war against Iraq, employing methods of mass destruction that will result in the killing of tens of thousands of civilians, many of whom will be children. No civilian lives have yet been lost that we know of, but when we start using the weapons of massive destruction that are in place for this war, there is no doubt that thousands of innocent civilians will lose their lives. As killings occur, the principles laid down in the Nuremberg trials will be applicable. Their deaths will not only be a moral outrage, they will constitute violations of international law.

Article IV states that the President has committed the United States to acts of war without congressional consent and contrary to the U.N. Charter and international law. From August 1990 through January 1991 the President embarked on a course of action that systematically eliminated every option for peaceful resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis. Once the President approached Congress for a declaration of war, 500,000 American soldiers lives were in jeopardy, rendering any substantive debate by Congress meaningless.

It is also ironic that what we have ended up with now is that the President has exchanged about 200 to 250 so-called hostages, Americans, all of them employees of oil companies in Kuwait or Iraq, and in exchange we now have close to 500,000 American soldiers as hostages. Hostages to the whims, the caprices, and the decisions and judgments made by other leaders, over which this President and our country has no control, all the way from Shamir of Israel to the immigrants in the Saudi sands.

Article 5 states that the President has conspired to commit crimes against the peace by leading the United States into aggressive war against Iraq, in violation of article 24 of the U.N. Charter, the Nuremberg Charter, other international instruments and treaties, and the Constitution of the United States.

Again, there is a violation of law by a President, who, believing and acting as if he is king, decides for the country, unilaterally, that war is the answer.

Madam Speaker, it is a sad day for our country, and it will be an even sadder day once the fighting starts. President Bush must be stopped. A divided Congress reflecting the divided country is no way to conduct a war.

The preservation of lives is at stake, and the preservation of our country, indeed, our democracy, is at stake as well.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution. All I ask is a hearing, as I have before, before the proper committee of proper jurisdiction, and that is it. I will argue the case there. The rest is up to the Members' judgment.

Madam Speaker, I urge interest and support of this resolution, and to stand up to the President on behalf of the soldiers who will die, the civilians who will be massacred, and the Constitution that will be destroyed if this country goes to war in the Middle East.

- Wednesday, January 16, 1991, filed at 4:10pm
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Article ID: 1608 (35 lines)

Rep. Gonzalez Calls for Bush Impeachment

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 -- Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, D-Texas, Wednesday introduced an impeachment measure against President Bush in a desperate attempt to stop a U.S. war with Iraq.

"It is a sad day for the country," Gonzalez said. "President Bush has to be stopped."

Gonzalez accused Bush of "high crimes and misdemeanors" relating to his conduct during Operation Desert Shield. Bush, he charged, was guilty of violating the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution by using armed forces which were predominately poor and minorities to defend the wealth of the moneyed class.

In addition, Gonzalez said Bush had violated the Constitution and federal law by bribing, threatening and intimidating United Nations members to win approval of the resolution authorizing force to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The U.S. government has forgiven loans to Egypt and China, the Soviet Union and Zaire, he charged. Saudi Arabia has been given \$12 billion in arms, Gonzalez said.

A war against Iraq, the Texan said, would result in tens of thousands of civilians being killed, which would be a "moral outrage" in violation of international law.

Gonzalez argued that the congressional authorization to use force approved on Saturday did not constitute congressional consent because Bush engaged in "a course of action which systematically eliminated every option" for peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Previously Gonzalez introduced an impeachment measure against President Reagan and supported another.

DB cc: CoS
Fitzwater
P/B

TO: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


01/24/91

TO: MARLIN FITZWATER

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


Date: January 23, 1991
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FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ED ROGERS

- ☐ Action
- ☐ Your Comment
- ☐ Let's Talk

☒ FYI



IN THE PUBLIC EYE

BUSH AT MIDPOINT

A POPULAR PRESIDENT MISUNDERSTOOD

FOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS NOW, as he campaigned for the presidency and has served in that office, George Bush has repeatedly been seen as vulnerable electorally. But in fact, his public standing throughout this span has been generally secure and often very strong indeed. Other presidents may have been more misunderstood in the areas of policy or their approach to managing the office, but probably no modern president has been so misjudged as to popular backing.

Little Support, Soft Support?

In hundreds of surveys taken from late 1986 through early 1988, the race for the Republican presidential nomination was shown to be basically a two-person contest: Bush was the evident frontrunner, Senator Robert Dole well behind

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in second place. Nonetheless, analysts kept prophesying that Bush could soon go under. During the first half of 1987, it was the tarnishing of the Reagan administration in the Iran-Contra affair that would doom his candidacy. Then the "wimp factor" came into vogue: that Bush lacked the forceful, independent personality that voters look for in presidential candidates. When he finished 20,000 votes behind Dole in Iowa's caucuses and behind Pat Robertson as well, many commentators were sure he was through. According to a favored metaphor, Bush was a "political hemophiliac"—once wounded in electoral combat, he would bleed to death politically. It was thought at the time that Iowa had inflicted that wound. Of course, only one month after Iowa, Bush looked remarkably healthy, having defeated Dole by a combined margin of 56-24 percent in the southern primaries, with Robertson further back at 14 percent and Jack Kemp at just 5 percent.

Then in the summer of 1988, the nomination contests settled, the story shifted to Bush's supposedly weak posi-

tion against Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis. While trial heats taken in July, just before and after the Democratic convention, did show Dukakis ahead, it should have been evident that the lead was exceedingly soft and probably not a lead at all. This was borne out in August: when it was his turn to get a boost from his party's convention, Bush overtook Dukakis in the polls.

Elected by an 8-percentage-point margin, Bush soon began getting good marks from the public for his handling of the presidency. In early March, for example, Gallup found 63 percent approving his handling of the job, only 13 percent disapproving. From June 1989 until last October, his approval ratings remained continuously above the 60-percent level—sometimes rising far above it, as they did following the U.S. intervention in Panama and again after the president's vigorous response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Despite such robust poll readings, however, the judgment in the press and throughout the Washington political community was often that Bush's support was shallow—

BY EVERETT CARLL LADD

ILLUSTRATION BY TIM GABOR

"a mile wide and an inch deep." Analysts kept expecting it to blow away.

October 1990 was obviously the president's toughest month of his first two years in office. Our economy had slowed and prices had soared at the gas pumps; news coverage became a "recession watch." With the United States in the midst of a tax revolt, Bush went on television October 2 and completed his reversal on "no new taxes" by insisting that tax hikes were needed as part of a budget deal. The administration's focus shifted from whether taxes really had to be raised to who should pay for the hike—and the president came out seeming to be more upset at raising levies on the rich than anything else.

Against this backdrop, the prevailing interpretation—which all along had minimized Bush's electoral strength or emphasized his weaknesses—quickly became one that saw his presidency in "free fall." The *Washington Post's* Paul Taylor wrote on October 26, "Bush's polls are in a tailspin." Analyst William Schneider argued in the *Baltimore Sun* the same day that the president's plunge "could be politically fatal" and compared his image to Jimmy Carter's—the highest form of political disparagement. Pundit Kevin Phillips opined in the *Los Angeles Times* October 28 that "some congressional Republicans are already describing Bush as 'dead meat' in 1992" and that "Washington's vultures are beginning to think about what could be another political death watch." Such coverage came in a steady drumbeat on television and in the print media throughout the last three weeks of the month. Actually, as we will see, Bush's standing, while diminished somewhat, was holding up remarkably well.

Not the Strongest Hand

The story journalists might have written, but did not, is that Bush sustained generally high approval despite having a number of factors working against him. This is in fact what has happened. Coming after Ronald Reagan, a leader who shifted the course of public policy,

**RONALD REAGAN IS RIGHTLY
SEEN AS A POPULAR PRESIDENT,
BUT BUSH'S APPROVAL
LEVEL EXCEEDED REAGAN'S
AT ALMOST EVERY POINT
FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE
INAUGURATIONS THROUGH
THE MIDTERM ELECTIONS.**

won the public's confidence, and then retained it throughout two full terms. Bush faced a daunting task in establishing his own political identity. He came to office after his party had held the White House for eight years, a tenure that is bound to spur some restiveness—the feeling that "it's time for a change." Though he won their support in 1988, Bush never entirely dispelled the suspicion of many conservative activists. Reagan's core supporters, that his heart wasn't really with them. The strains in the Republican coalition increased—as they would almost inevitably in any big, diverse party after it had held power for an extended span.

Having been mauled politically throughout Reagan's first six years, the Democrats had become more confident and aggressive in the last two—after Iran-Contra and after regaining a Senate majority. This renewed assertiveness was bound to continue under Reagan's successor. Bush had to operate from day one of his presidency with the Democrats in charge of both houses of Congress. In addition, Bush faced in 1990 a slowing economy and a rising budget deficit.

A Popular President

Bush took office with a number of distinct assets bequeathed him as well, of course, including his party's having been established in the public's thinking as best in managing the economy, and the optimism generated by communism's collapse in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But surely nothing in the overall mix of conditions ordained the high levels of public approval that Bush and his administration have experienced over their first two years.

Ronald Reagan is rightly seen as a popular president, but Bush's approval level exceeded Reagan's *at almost every point* from their respective inaugurations through the midterm elections. Table 1 shows this, using CBS/*New York Times* polls. Surveys by other organizations show the same thing. Whatever judgment one makes about the caliber of his leadership compared to Reagan's or any

TABLE 1
BUSH AND REAGAN: THEIR FIRST TWO YEARS
IN OFFICE
(Percent Approve)

Bush		Reagan	
2/89	61%		
3/89 ¹	61		
4/89	61	4/81	67%
5/89	61		
6/89 ²	61	6/81	59
7/89	67	7/81	59
9/89			
(early)	70		
(late)	69	9/81	53
11/89	63		
1/90	76	1/82	49
3/90	72	3/82	43
5/90	69	5/82	43
6/90	69		
8/90			
(7-8 ¹)	66		
(9-10 ²)	72		
(8-16)	76	9/82	42
10/90			
(early)	60		
(late)	52	10/82 ⁴	48
11/90 ³	59	11/82	48

Notes: ¹=CBS only; ²=NYT only; ³=Exit poll; ⁴=Registered votes.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of November 6, 1990.

predecessor's, the fact is that George Bush has thus far maintained high measure public confidence.

The October "Plunge"

Commentary on Bush's standing in October and November 1990 centered on his steep decline in public approbation—from job-approval ratings in the 70–80-percent range in August and September to between the high 40s and high 50s. Averaged out for all the polls, the drop from the post-Iraq high was about 20 percentage points.

Given the long-prevailing tendency to stress Bush's electoral weakness, it is not surprising that the other half of the story told by the October–November polls was largely ignored: that the president's standing, while diminished, remained quite high. For example, the ABC News "voter poll"—taken by telephone on November 6 of persons who said they had voted or were going to vote—found 57 percent approving Bush's handling of his job as president, 40 percent disapproving. The exit poll taken by VRS, the four-network consortium, of persons who had just cast ballots got similar results: 59 percent approving, 36 percent disapproving. The Gallup poll of November 15–16 recorded 58 percent endorsing Bush's job performance, just 33 percent disapproving. Surely it is at least arguable that such figures, achieved after a month of a severe battering from the left and right alike, from members of his own party as well as from the Democrats, indicate that the president's popular standing is pretty durable.

Even if his position among those going to the polls November 6 is compared to Reagan's on election day 1986 when the latter's popularity was near its peak (rather than to Reagan's on election day 1982 when recession dominated), Bush's support is nearly equal to his predecessor's (see Table 2). The 1986 CBS/*New York Times* exit poll put Reagan's approval/disapproval proportion at 60–35 nationally, while the 1990 VRS election-day survey found Bush's a virtually identical 59–36.

TABLE 2
REAGAN APPROVAL NOVEMBER 1986, AND
BUSH APPROVAL NOVEMBER 1990

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way (Ronald Reagan/George Bush) is handling his job as president?

	Reagan 1986 Exit Poll (CBS/NT)		Bush 1990 Exit Poll (VRS)	
	Approve	Disapprove	Approve	Disapprove
National	60%	35%	59%	36%
AL	63	30	57	38
AZ	—	—	59	37
AR	—	—	52	44
CA	58	36	54	42
CO	56	39	61	35
CT	63	33	58	38
DE	—	—	54	41
FL	67	28	57	41
GA	59	32	54	41
HI	—	—	55	41
ID	60	34	55	39
IL	61	34	52	45
IN	—	—	59	38
IA	46	48	56	40
KS	—	—	57	39
KY	—	—	49	46
ME	—	—	57	39
MD	—	—	54	43
MA	—	—	63	34
MI	—	—	58	39
MN	—	—	63	35
MT	—	—	45	51
NE	—	—	65	32
NV	64	31	56	41
NH	67	30	62	34
NJ	—	—	64	32
NM	—	—	52	44
NY	58	37	54	42
NC	61	35	61	37
OH	—	—	55	42
OK	—	—	55	41
OR	53	41	53	41
PA	55	42	51	44
RI	—	—	49	47
SC	—	—	58	39
SD	—	—	48	49
TN	—	—	54	40
TX	61	33	61	34
VT	56	38	51	45
WV	—	—	49	45
WI	—	—	45	53

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* Exit Poll, November 1986; VRS, a consortium, Exit Poll, November 1990.

Other poll data confirm this picture of underlying strength rather than extreme electoral vulnerability. The tracking poll of KRC Communications Research, for example, showed the proportion viewing Bush favorably "plunging" from a high of 82 percent September 23–25 to 65 percent October 28–30. Those viewing him unfavorably "soared" from 13 to 26 percent.

The NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* survey of October 19–21 found Bush preferred in a trial heat with Mario Cuomo by 52–35 percent. Similarly, the ABC News November 6 voter poll saw Bush preferred over all mentioned Democratic rivals: 53–33 percent over Lloyd Bentsen; 53–34 over Bill Bradley; 51–35 over Richard Gephardt; and 63–26 over Jesse Jackson. This doesn't mean that Bush would beat all comers; it does indicate that the president's effective standing had declined only moderately. Describing his popularity as in "free fall" is nothing short of absurd. Proof that Bush's October drop in popular standing was modest rather than presidency-threatening came quickly in November and early December. As the president got beyond his October trouble, his standing rebounded. Thus Gallup, which had found just 48 percent approving Bush's handling of the presidency October 25–26, recorded his approval at 58 percent November 15–16 and at 63 percent December 6 and 7. There were plenty of stories on the "20-point plunge" in October, but where were the stories on the "15-point surge" in November and early December?

What really counts in a presidency, of course, isn't the job-approval ratings but the quality of leadership. As long as the poll numbers are going to be invoked so earnestly, though, we should try to get their meaning straight. The "votes" on George Bush have been tallied through year two in office. They show a generally popular president who has maintained a solid base even through a period of political adversity.



IN THE **BUSH** AT MIDPOINT **MEDIA** **SPOTLIGHT**

**BAD
PRESS BY
DEFAULT**

A DECADE AGO, political scientist Robert Entman created a brief stir in Washington political and media circles with his advice on how the new president should deal with the media: don't, if you can avoid it. Mindful of Jimmy Carter's disastrous experience with the press, Entman counseled Carter's successor to avoid media events, stay off television, dampen public expectations, and minimize conflicts with Congress. When you must use the airwaves, he continued, concentrate your efforts on foreign policy initiatives, which tend to attract less criticism. To do otherwise would only give the "imperial media" (Entman's phrase) opportunities to drown the presidency in a tide of bad press.

Ronald Reagan did not follow this advice, to put it mildly. He sought to dominate the airwaves, polarize the political process, and redirect the

S. Robert Lichter is codirector of the Center for Media and Public Affairs. Richard E. Noyes directs the Center's White House News Project.

domestic agenda. To accomplish these goals, he and his advisers proved willing to outflank, manipulate, and generally infuriate the White House press corps. The "imperial media" were soon reduced to carping about the Teflon President as the balance of power between press and presidency shifted back to the White House.

A decade later, however, the Entman doctrine has found a disciple in George Bush. He has inverted Reagan's approach to the media by lowering his own visibility and increasing his access to reporters. Reagan had used television to polarize the political debate and appeal to the public over the heads of official Washington and the press. Bush tries to deal with the adversarial media the same way he deals with a hostile Congress: by sidestepping public conflict while winning over his opponents with personal contact behind the scenes. This nondirective media-management style seems suited to a not-ready-for-prime-time presidency. Its goal is to minimize the extent of media criticism and, when it can't be avoided, to soften its impact.

Analyzing Network News

Until recently, this approach worked surprisingly well, but its limitations are becoming increasingly apparent. These and other conclusions about Bush's media profile come from an ongoing study of the presidency and the media by the Center for Media and Public Affairs. The Center has analyzed all stories on the Bush administration that have appeared on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening network newscasts. Each sound bite is scrutinized for its topic, source, and any positive or negative evaluations of the president, his policies, and his administration. This is more than simply counting reports of good or bad news; what matters are the media-borne evaluations of the president's conduct.

Figure 1 (page 51) shows just how low Bush's TV profile has been. During his first 22 months in office, through October 1990, he was the focus of 1,487 news stories, averaging fewer than one story per network per night. During Bush's first year in office, he attracted only a third as much coverage as Reagan

BY S. ROBERT LICHTER AND
RICHARD E. NOYES

ILLUSTRATION BY TIM GABOR

had in 1981 (642 stories versus 1,782). Even excluding the surge of coverage after Reagan was shot in April 1981, Bush made less than half as much news as his predecessor. By contrast, he has already held 76 press conferences, compared to Reagan's 48 during eight years in office. During the first half of 1990, the three networks' White House correspondents were on the air less frequently than their Moscow correspondents. As CBS's Lesley Stahl remarked incredulously, "This White House doesn't *care* if the president gets on the evening news or not."

Yet, buoyed by continuing economic growth and the worldwide collapse of communism, Bush racked up higher approval ratings in the polls than any president since John Kennedy. Meanwhile, the media's sour aftertaste from the 1988 campaign seemed to dissipate, leading critics to complain that Bush was killing them with kindness. Writing in *Esquire* last October, Andrew Sullivan called the White House press corps "the monarch's obsequious court." He charged that "Bush may go down in history as the guy who called for a kinder, gentler nation. But the only people who've taken him up on it so far have been the press." The implication of such criticism is that the press must not be doing its job if the president remains popular. But the Center's systematic study shows that the watchdogs really haven't lost their bite.

Table 1 shows that the network news departments have been neither kind nor gentle in covering the White House. In just over 21 months, they aired 2,818 evaluations of the Bush administration. About three out of five were negative, giving the administration a good press score of only 39 percent. The president himself fared better, receiving mildly negative coverage (44 percent positive). But assessments of Bush policies were negative by a nearly two-to-one margin (65 to 35 percent). Even during the rally-round-the-flag period in August, criticism of U.S. policies toward Iraq outweighed praise by 58 to 42 percent (although Bush personally got better

TABLE 1
MEDIA EVALUATIONS AND STORIES ON
GEORGE BUSH

	Good Press	All Stories
George Bush	44%	695*
Total Administration	39	2,818
Policy Issues	35	1,237
Foreign (all)	44	582
Arms control	59	49
Nicaragua	55	29
Panama	52	107
Persian Gulf	47	96
China	36	73
USSR	27	35
Domestic (all)	27	655
Drugs	40	78
Taxes	29	59
S&Is	25	58
Environment	25	77
Budget	19	105

Note: * = number of positive or negative evaluations on ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news, 1/20/89-10/31/90.
Source: Center for Media and Public Affairs.

marks, drawing 64 percent positive comments for his leadership at that time).

So the networks have acted as a kind of permanent opposition toward the Bush administration's policies, in contrast to their balanced coverage of the president himself. These cumulative totals in Table 1 do not include the increasingly critical commentary on Bush policy in the Gulf after the November elections, but they do include the upsurge in on-air criticism stimulated by the budget battle in October 1990. A sample comment in early November, from NBC's Jim Miklaszewski, indicates the tenor of this coverage: "After two days of flopping, flipping, and flailing around the budget and taxes, President Bush told reporters he would make it all perfectly clear. But it only got worse."

Critics of the allegedly pliant press corps like Sullivan forget that Lesley Stahl did her first "failed presidency" piece in March 1989, only ten weeks into the new administration: "More and more observers are giving [Bush] failing grades... for policy drift and slowness... too much emphasis on style, not enough on developing a coherent policy... an administration floundering." At the time, Gallup polls showed that Bush's supporters in the general public outnumbered those who were dissatis-

fied with his performance by a three-to-one margin.

Even Bush's 44 percent good personal press rating is deceptive. He received four brief but concentrated bursts of good press: during the traditional "honeymoon" following his inauguration in January 1989, during his triumphant visits to Europe in May and July 1989, after the Panama invasion in December 1989, and after he dispatched troops to the Persian Gulf in August 1990. Each time, his approval ratings rose. (The monthly totals in Figure 2 mask a spurt from only 20 percent to 69 percent positive evaluations during his trip to West Europe in late May.) Nearly 40 percent of Bush's positive evaluations since his inauguration came during these months. During the other 18 months of his presidency, his press was 64 percent negative. But he was also far less visible during these more-"typical" months (see Figure 2).

This points to the secret of Bush's success in getting the most mileage from his limited media coverage. TV news evaluations of the president show a clear trend over time. Bush has gotten his best press during periods of high visibility. For the most part, as the overall number of his evaluations rose and fell, so did the proportion of good press (that is, positive evaluations). With these figures for comparison, there is a second clear trend: Bush's public-approval ratings climbed during his periods of good press but dropped only slightly or not at all whenever his media coverage turned negative.

These two trends may be linked in ways that illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of Bush's media strategy. His poll ratings rose when he commanded center stage and attracted a chorus of public praise. Since his January 1989 "honeymoon," this has happened only when international crises cast Bush in the role of world leader, dispatching troops abroad or taking a victory lap around Europe to celebrate the end of the Cold War. Each time, the coverage soon returned to domestic affairs, with an accompanying upsurge of criticism.

Comments on Bush's domestic policy have been substantially more negative than those on foreign policy—73 percent negative overall and worse on such key issues as the federal budget, the savings-and-loan bailout, and the environment.

For nearly two years, however, Bush managed to reduce his own visibility each time the coverage turned sour. When the press bouquets over news from abroad turned to brickbats on the home front, he retreated from center stage to the sidelines. Given the public's lack of attentiveness to politics in the absence

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
of momentous events, Bush's bad press usually failed to penetrate the public consciousness. Only after the Panama invasion did TV's cheers turn into jeers at the same volume, and his sky-high poll ratings soon fell back to earth. This pattern suggests that a slow and steady trickle of media-borne criticism may not reach the threshold of public attention necessary to harm this president's image. As long as most Americans feel no immediate threat to their personal security or economic well-being, the Washington policy debate on TV news is just a passing show for them.

A Minimalist Strategy

Bush's minimalist media strategy proved successful because it corresponded to his vision of the presidency—build your reputation on foreign policy successes while downplaying the more partisan and acrimonious domestic debate. But the strategy broke down in October 1990. The budget debate trained the media spotlight on him, and he wilted under its constant glare. For the first time in almost two years, he was exposed to a heavy onslaught of bad press. Note the sudden change in Figure 2 during October 1990. When both his visibility and bad press increased, Bush's approval ratings dropped sharply for the first time.


Thus, the president's public image has been affected by the tone of his television coverage. But it took a concentrated dose of either good or bad press to alter his approval ratings. It is important to remember that good and bad press are defined in terms of the evaluations aired rather than events reported. This helps eliminate other interpretations of the relationship between Bush's media ratings and his poll ratings. For example, one might argue that the tone of media coverage followed from the poll results rather than vice versa, which would mean that the media coverage represented the new "reality" of changing public opinion. But this logic quickly breaks down. It might explain the peaks in Bush's coverage but not the valleys, because negative coverage has been the

FIGURE 1
VISIBILITY: BUSH VERSUS REAGAN*



Note: *Number of TV news stories focusing on the president.
Source: Center for Media and Public Affairs

FIGURE 2
POLL RATINGS AND TV NEWS RATINGS OF BUSH



Sources: Center for Media and Public Affairs; Gallup polls.

norm even in times of high public approval. Alternatively, both media coverage and poll ratings might change in response to real-world events. This interpretation also treats media coverage as a proxy for political reality. Once again, however, this would not account for the frequent periods when TV news evaluations and public approval have diverged.

It is more likely that public *perceptions* of real-world events drive poll responses. These perceptions are partly shaped by the media's presentation of the events, which is the only way the public encounters reality beyond their personal realm of experience. But it takes an intense or prolonged surge of media coverage to pass the threshold of public interest that produces effects on opinion, in either a positive or negative direction. Absent such a surge, presidential approval depends far more on economic conditions than media images.

Of course, national media coverage also reflects journalists' own perceptions of the popular mood as evidenced by their readings of the polls. But journalists are more attuned to mood shifts among political elites than among the mass public. The adversarial character of White House reporting comes from the media's tendency to dramatize and magnify conflicts that arise among advisers and policymakers and to demystify a president's authority by treating him as a partisan politician rather than a national leader.

This accounts for the president's advantage in foreign affairs. He represents the nation on the world stage, making it more difficult for domestic elites and the media alike to attack him. But all presidents must eventually come home to face the less-palatable prospect of partisan conflict over domestic policy. This has proven especially difficult for Bush, because it exposes the Achilles' heel of his media strategy. When political conflict breaks out, Bush's attempts to avoid criticism let the initiative pass to his opponents. The White House becomes mired in a permanent posture of damage control, and the initiative in

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setting the public agenda belongs to those who are more adept at using the media for that purpose.

Thus, George Bush's television news image helps account for several trends in his public-approval ratings in the same way other recent occupants of the White House experienced—the brief initial “honeymoon,” the rally-round-the-flag effect in moments of international crisis, the difference between a president's personal popularity and that of his policies, and the president's greater latitude in pursuing foreign rather than domestic initiatives. On all these fronts, public opinion follows media images.

Friendly Persuasion

In sharp contrast to his predecessor, Bush has tried to win journalists over to his point of view. He has replaced acrimony with access, establishing personal relationships and a friendlier atmosphere. Reporters who had spent years trying to shout over the din of Reagan's waiting helicopter suddenly found themselves having dinner with the president or playing horseshoes with him.

The assumption for this maneuver was that friendly relations would produce friendlier coverage than Bush had received during his election campaign. Unfortunately for him, journalists have substantial professional disincentives to play along with this game. A critical, if not adversarial, stance enhances their professional status, while perceived “softness” brings derision from their peers. Few reporters will risk their reputations for a game of horseshoes with the president. They may toss shoes, but they won't jump through hoops.

In addition, the standard operating procedures of network journalism preclude frequent personal interventions by reporters into their own stories. Few of the TV news evaluations we have noted were made by reporters themselves. Instead, reporters rely on members of Congress, think-tank experts, and others in the Washington community for evaluations of the president and his staff. The White House counters by providing

a steady stream of positive evaluations of its own achievements. The result is a balanced story. Yet Bush and his team seem to delight not in promoting their work, but in neutrally analyzing policies and problems in language devoid of enthusiasm or vivid imagery. The frequent result is a story defined and dominated by their critics.

It should surprise no one that Bush's best press comes in times of national celebration and military conflict; what is surprising is that these have been Bush's *only* periods of good press since his brief inaugural honeymoon. It is instructive to compare this media treatment to that of candidate Bush during 1988. Throughout the fall campaign, Bush faced a hostile press that was angry over his negative advertising and manipulative techniques. In this atmosphere, our content analysis found that Bush received only 34 percent positive evaluations on network evening news shows—a two-to-one margin of bad press over good press. Yet his opponent Michael Dukakis received precisely the same proportions of good and bad press. This suggests that Bush's negative coverage stemmed more from general media negativity than from personal ill will. Moreover, that two-to-one negative ratio is not much worse than Bush receives now in a "typical" month when he doesn't benefit from a foreign crisis.

Finally, Bush's treatment by CBS can be viewed as a test case of his efforts to win friends and influence journalists. His relations with CBS have been sour ever since his televised set-to with Dan Rather in January 1988, and that network gave Bush his worst press during both the primaries and the general election. For all his fence-mending efforts, this pattern has not changed since inauguration day. Through October 1990 CBS broadcast only 39 percent favorable evaluations of Bush as president, compared to 44 percent broadcast by NBC and 52 percent by ABC. The same pattern holds for the networks' evaluations of the administration and its policy initiatives.

The real change in coverage since the 1988 election is Bush's loss of control

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over the policy agenda. During the campaign, the Republicans were able to inject their own issues and their own agenda into the news by stubbornly sticking to their prearranged message and predesigned sound bite of the day. Thus, four of the five issues that were mentioned most frequently favored the Republicans—crime, defense, economic growth, and taxes. The only Democratic issue to make the top five was unemployment. Ironically, Bush now finds himself increasingly in Michael Dukakis's shoes, countering critics rather than charting the course.

White House Chief of Staff John Sununu defends his boss's low media profile by noting, "George Bush's feeling is that achievements will count, not sound bites." But an administration's achievements are rarely self-evident. Like it or not, they are defined daily for the American people in the morning headlines and the evening newscasts. Someone has to portray the presidency to the public, and when the president steps aside, the press will turn elsewhere to fill in the blanks. By disdaining sound bites, an administration hands over the agenda-setting machinery to its critics.

For all its excesses, the Reagan White House understood that presidential leadership requires the willingness and ability to communicate with the public through the media marketplace. The press may have felt used and abused by Reagan's media skills, but they were always able to get out the other side of the story. The electorate could hear the president's message as well as those of his critics and choose between them. Reagan's genius lay in structuring both his own position and the entire debate in ways that polarized the audience to his advantage. By contrast, Bush's nondirective media style appears better suited to a president who makes way than to one who makes waves.





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1991

NOTE FOR ANDY CARD:

I'm not sure this is worth
the President's time, but
I thought you would want to
see it given your liaison
responsibilities with former
Presidents.

Thanks.




Phillip D. Brady

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A Periodic Report on President Nixon's Addresses and Statements

Bulletin 1

January 18, 1991

In view of recent events in the Persian Gulf and in Lithuania, I thought you might be interested in seeing the full text of an address President Nixon gave to the Republican Congressional Committee in New York City on December 7, 1990.

John H. Taylor, Director

A WAR ABOUT PEACE

by Richard Nixon

In his book Great Contemporaries, Winston Churchill described Lord Rosebery, a 19th century British Prime Minister, as one who had the misfortune of living in a time of great men and small events. Our leaders today do not have that problem. There is no question but that we live in a time of great events.

Nineteen eighty-nine, even more than 1945, which marked the end of World War II, will be remembered as the year of the century for the forces of freedom in the world. Nineteen forty-five marked the defeat of fascism. Nineteen eighty-nine marked the defeat of communism, an even greater threat to peace and freedom.

As a result of what happened in this historic year, we hear today:

The Cold War is over.

The United States and the Soviet Union are no longer adversaries but allies, as we were in World War II.

We are witnessing the end of history -- a time when great strategic issues no longer

divide us and when we will compete economically rather than militarily and when we can direct our attention to the environment, global warming, world poverty, and other issues where we have common interests.

We are told that we can rely on the United Nations to deal with aggressive nations.

We see an unholy alliance developing between isolationists on the right and the left, who for different reasons say that the United States should withdraw its forces from Europe and Asia and concentrate on solving our problems at home.

Conventional wisdom in the Washington Beltway -- the modern version of Plato's Cave -- is that we are on the brink of forging a new world order in which all nations will be dedicated to justice and international law.

Before going that far, let us see what has changed, why changes have occurred, what has not changed, and what America's

PM

role should be on the world stage now that the Cold War seems to be over.

The changes in 1989 have been breathtaking. The Berlin Wall came down. Germany was united. Communist governments were driven from power in all of the countries in Eastern Europe and except in Romania, this was accomplished peacefully.

The frosting on the cake occurred in our own hemisphere early this year when Violetta Chamorro defeated Daniel Ortega in a free election, the first time this has happened to a communist leader in seventy years.

The most significant changes have occurred in the Soviet Union symbolized by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mikhail Gorbachev. Consider what he has done:

He withdrew the Red Army from Afghanistan.

He did not use the Red Army to keep communist clients in power in Eastern Europe as did Krushchev in 1956 in Hungary and Brezhnev in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

He has allowed West Germany to unite with East Germany.

He has negotiated arms control agreements.

He has adopted political and economic reforms which are so revolutionary that some observers have speculated, that rather than being a dedicated communist and a Russian nationalist, he may be a closet democrat and a closet capitalist at home and a sincere partisan of peace and freedom abroad.

Before reaching those conclusions, let us see why he acted as he did. In 1985, shortly after Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, I asked Hu Yaobang, the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, if he thought Gorbachev would adopt economic reforms in the Soviet Union like those Deng Xiaoping had adopted in China.

He replied, "If he doesn't, the Soviet Union will disappear as a great power in the twenty-first century." He was right and Gorbachev knew it.

Look at what he confronted when he came to power six years ago. Everywhere he looked, communism was suffering from terminal illness.

His Third World communist colonies were all liabilities costing huge subsidies from Moscow and in Afghanistan costing lives as well as money.

In Eastern Europe, forces of revolution against Soviet-supported rulers were ready to explode.

At home, the Soviet economy was a basketcase plagued with corruption, alcoholism, and inefficiency.

Abroad, he saw that his major adversary -- the United States, under the leadership of President Reagan, had recovered from the malaise of the late seventies, was restoring its military strength, and was embarking on a new weapons system -- SDI -- which the Soviet Union lacked the resources to match.

Gorbachev had no choice. He had to retrench abroad and reform at home. His first priority, then and now, was to restore the health of the Soviet economy. This was the most revolutionary decision of a Soviet leader since the Russian Revolution which brought the communists to power in 1917. For seventy years, Soviet economic policy had served Soviet foreign policy. Now Soviet foreign policy had to serve Soviet economic policy.

This explains his actions:

He withdrew the Red Army from Afghanistan not only because it was costing men as well as money, but primarily because it helped create a peaceful image for Gorbachev which opened the door for good relations with the West and economic assistance he needed for his desperately sick economy.

He had to choose between using force to keep his puppets in power in Eastern Europe and economic aid from Western Europe. Not surprisingly, he chose Western Europe.

He let East Germany go because he needed financial aid from West Germany.

In the Gulf, he had to choose between his ally Iraq and financial aid from the nations allied against Iraq. Again, not surprisingly, he chose the allies. It has already begun to pay off. Just last week he negotiated a loan of \$3 billion from Saudi Arabia, a country which before Iraq invaded Kuwait, had not even recognized the communist government of the Soviet Union.

Whatever the reason, we welcome what he did. He is, without question, very different from the Soviet leaders of the past. He has changed since the time he totally supported Brezhnev's aggressive policies in his relentless climb to power. But it is a change of the head, not the heart. At a time he is using his head, we should not lose ours.

Let us take a hard look at the Soviet Union after six years of Gorbachev's leadership.

His political reforms have been revolutionary. Where there was no freedom of the press, there is now some. Where there was no freedom to criticize Soviet leaders, there is now some. Where there were no free elections, there are now some. But we must bear in mind that while Gorbachev deserves great credit for these reforms, he has also put through legislation which makes him the most powerful Soviet leader since Stalin. All of the evidence points to the conclusion that his goal is not to abandon communism but to save it, not to dismantle the Soviet Union but to preserve it -- peacefully if possible, but using force is necessary.

While he deserves credit for his bold political reforms, we must face up to the fact that his economic reforms have been a total failure. For example, while China's per

capita income has doubled in the past ten years, Soviet per capita income under Gorbachev has gone down. Bread lines have replaced vodka lines. To get through the winter, Gorbachev has had to go hat-in-hand to get assistance from his new friends in the West. The shopping list he gave Prime Minister Mulroney indicates the depth of his problem. It included pork, beef, flour, powdered milk, and peanut oil.

The results of Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union are now clear for everyone to see. To put it bluntly, the Soviet economy is collapsing and the Soviet empire is disintegrating. Fourteen of the fifteen Soviet republics have declared independence from Moscow. The communist idea -- the glue that held the Soviet empire together -- has lost its potency. Of all the changes in 1989, the most significant is that communism has lost the ideological battle. In the Third World, in Eastern Europe, and most significantly in the Soviet Union, people know that communist socialism doesn't work. The most dramatic proof of this is that while Gorbachev is enormously popular in the United States and in other non-communist countries, he is supported by less than twenty-five percent of the Soviet people. As has been the case in Eastern Europe, instead of a reforming communist as their leader, the people of the Soviet Union want reforms without communism.

This raises the key question. Because of his more benign foreign policy, should we help Gorbachev with his problems at home? The answer is that except for humanitarian aid we should help him only if it serves our interests as well as his.

His economic reforms do not meet that test. It is now obvious that they do not serve his interests. He is trying to combine a command economy with a free market economy. It won't work. There is no halfway house between communism and capitalism. As Andre Sakharov observed shortly before

his death, "In the absence of radical reforms, to provide aid and technological assistance to the Soviet Union only serves to prop up a failed system and to delay the advent of democracy."

Even if his economic reforms go far enough to work, it does not serve our interest to provide aid to Gorbachev unless he adopts a less threatening defense and foreign policy. While he has announced cuts in his defense budget, his Foreign Minister has stated that the Soviet Union is still spending twenty-five percent of its GNP on defense. In contrast, the United States is spending six percent of its GNP on defense. Even with his cuts in his Soviet military forces, as a result of modernization, they will be leaner but stronger than when Gorbachev came to power six years ago. After the projected cuts in long range nuclear weapons in the START agreement, Gorbachev will still have thirty thousand nuclear weapons, the largest conventional army in the world, and a modern blue-water navy.

There are some who say that if the United States makes further cuts in its defense budget, Gorbachev will follow suit. They are wrong. There is no question but that Gorbachev is a refreshing new kind of Soviet leader. But he is not a philanthropist. We should reduce our nuclear forces and our SDI program only if he agrees to reduce his.

In foreign policy, we should applaud his withdrawing the Red Army from Afghanistan. But except for Nicaragua where the people voted out their communist leader, every one of Gorbachev's communists clients in the Third World is still in power subsidized by as much as \$15 billion a year by the Soviet Union.

Before we consider helping Gorbachev, he should help himself by drastically cutting his huge military budget and by cutting off aid and arms sales to Castro and other anti-U.S. communist dictators.

The Cold War may be over in Eastern Europe. It is time for Gorbachev to end the Cold War in the Third World.

What will happen to Gorbachev? Some of the experts give him only a fifty percent chance of staying in power over the next year. I believe the odds are considerably better than that. There are three possible scenarios. He could adopt bolder, free market reforms which might have a chance to rescue the Soviet economy from its enormous crisis. I do not think this is likely because I believe Gorbachev will not be able to bring himself to cut the umbilical cord which unites him with his life-long Marxist ideology. A second possibility is that he could be replaced. This is not likely because there is no one currently on the scene, including Boris Yeltsin, who has the support in the armed forces, the KGB, and the Soviet bureaucracy necessary to bring about a successful coup. The third scenario, and the most likely one, is that Gorbachev, the tough-minded pragmatic politician that he is, will use the extraordinary new powers he has acquired for himself as President of the Soviet Union to crack down on dissident groups -- using military force if necessary -- and will stay in power by revoking some of the progressive political reforms he has previously initiated. This will cost him some support in the West. But unless he resumes an aggressive foreign policy abroad, most Western political leaders will conveniently ignore the repressive measures he adopts at home to stay in power. As far as the United States is concerned, we should base our defense and foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, not on speculations about Gorbachev's intent but on the reality of Soviet capabilities as a nuclear and conventional superpower.

Let us now turn to Europe. We are witnessing the unusual phenomenon of isolationists on the right and left urging that since the cold War is over, we should

withdraw all of our forces from Europe, particularly since the nations of Europe have recovered from the devastation of world War II and should be able to provide for their own defense.

But what would Europe be without an American military presence? Great Britain and France are minor nuclear powers. Germany is an economic superpower without nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, even without Eastern Europe, will still be a nuclear superpower with the world's largest conventional army. No one can seriously suggest that the British and French would use their nuclear forces to deter a Soviet attack on Germany. With United States forces gone from Europe and NATO dissolved, Germany would have the option of going nuclear or neutral and would be strongly tempted to become a political and economic ally of the Soviet Union. Either of these options is bad for Europe, bad for Germany, and bad for the United States.

We can and should cut our NATO forces substantially because of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. But a significant conventional and nuclear U.S. presence in Europe is necessary as insurance against a possible renewal of the Soviet threat and as reassurance for those who fear a resurgent German threat. I do not share the concern that a united Germany would again become an aggressive military power. But despite their public statements, many leaders have that concern.

Let us now look at Asia. Conservative and liberal isolationists say that because there is no longer a Soviet threat, we should bring our forces home from Japan and Korea particularly since they are now rich enough to defend themselves. They are wrong. Keeping an American military presence in Europe is important. Keeping one in Asia is indispensable if we are to have peace in the Pacific. Let us look at Asia without the United States.

You have the Soviet Union, a nuclear superpower which while reducing its forces in Europe has strengthened its naval and nuclear forces in Asia.

You have China which will be a nuclear superpower within ten to twenty years.

You have Japan, an economic superpower without nuclear weapons and without a U.S. defense guarantee. Japan would have no choice but to go nuclear or to make a deal with the strongest of its neighbors, the Soviet Union. Japan can afford to massively increase its defense forces. But even more than is the case with Germany's neighbors in Europe, the Japanese in Asia are feared by the Koreans, the Chinese, the Philipinos, the Taiwanese, the Malaysians, and the Indonesians, all of whom suffered under Japanese occupation in World War II. A U.S. military presence in Japan and Korea is indispensable if we are to preserve peace in the Pacific.

Let us now look at China. We should continue to deplore the tragedy of Tiananmen Square eighteen months ago. But the Bush Administration is right to restore diplomatic and economic cooperation with the P.R.C. This is in our interest and in the interest of the Chinese people. It is in our interest because China has a veto in the U.N. Security Council and plays an indispensable role in trying to resolve the continuing conflicts in Southeast Asia. And in the non-military area, how can we possibly have a coordinated international initiative on problems of the environment with one-fifth of the world's people not cooperating?

The restoration of a cooperative relationship between China and the United States is without question in the interest of human rights for the Chinese people. China is not a democracy and will not become one in the foreseeable future. But as we saw in Korea and in Taiwan, economic progress inevitably leads to political progress.

Economic cooperation, tourism and Chinese students studying in the United States will strengthen the prospects for political reform. That is why Secretary Baker was following the right course in meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister and why the Administration was justified in supporting the resumption of World Bank loans to China. For the United States to continue to isolate China economically and diplomatically only strengthens the hardliners in China. The only hope for political reform is to re-establish the cooperative relationship we had with China before the tragic events at Tiananmen some eighteen months ago.

Let us now look at the crisis in the Persian Gulf. It is time for some straight talk as to why 400,000 young Americans are spending Christmas in the deserts of Saudi Arabia.

Some liberal pundits and politicians have criticized Bob Dole for saying that we are there for oil and Jim Baker for saying that we are there for jobs. There are more important reasons, but let us not be so hypocritical as to say that preventing an international outlaw from controlling forty percent of the world's oil reserves was not of critical interest to the United States and a justifiable reason for sending forces to the Gulf. Let us suppose that instead of Kuwait this was Nepal, or Upper Volta, or Paraguay being gobbled up by a neighboring state. Does anyone seriously suggest that we would be sending in the Marines to liberate them?

It is equally hypocritical to contend that we are there in support of democracy. None of our Arab allies are democracies and putting the Emir of Kuwait back in power is not going to bring democracy to the Kuwaiti people.

And this is not enough to justify our sending armed forces to the Gulf because Saddam Hussein happened to be a cruel leader. President Bush has been criticized for equating him with Hitler. Whether he is

that bad is irrelevant. He is bad enough. His army rapes, loots, and murders the defenseless people of Kuwait. He has held thousands of hostages as human shields. To praise him for releasing hostages he should not have taken in the first place is ludicrous. He has violated international law by using chemical weapons in his war against Iran and even against his own people. If our aim in the Gulf were to punish cruel leaders, we would not be allied with Syria's Hafez Assad who ordered the massacre of 20,000 innocent men, women, and children in the city of Hama in his own country, who has supported international terrorism and possibly the bombing of civilian aircraft, and whose troops have committed brutal atrocities in his campaign to dominate Lebanon.

We are in the Gulf for two major reasons.

Sadam Hussein has unlimited ambitions to dominate one of the most important strategic areas in the world. Because he has oil, he has the means to acquire the weapons he needs for aggression against his neighbors, including at some future time, a nuclear arsenal. If he succeeds in Kuwait, he will attack others and will use whatever weapons he has, including chemical and nuclear to achieve his goals. If we don't stop him now we will have to stop him later when the cost in the lives of young Americans will be infinitely greater. If the Baker diplomatic initiative fails to get him out of Kuwait and if it becomes apparent that sanctions won't work, we must use force as approved by the United Nations resolution. If it comes to that, our diplomats should always remember that where an insatiable aggressor is involved, while war is bad, a bad peace is worse because it can lead to a bigger war.

There is an even more important long-term reason for turning back his aggression. The whole world is heaving a collective sigh of relief as the Cold War appears to be

coming to an end. Many believe that we are entering a new era where armed aggression will no longer be an instrument of national policy. We can't be sure that their hopes will be justified. But we can be sure that if Saddam Hussein gains from his aggression against Kuwait there are other potential aggressors in the world who will be tempted to wage war against their neighbors. If we fail to roll back his aggression -- peacefully if possible, by force if necessary -- no potential aggressor in the future will be deterred by warnings from the United States or by U.N. resolutions. If we succeed in getting him out of Kuwait and in eliminating his capacity to wage aggressive war elsewhere without sending in American armed forces, potential aggressors will know that when the United States warns against aggression we have the means and the will to back up our warnings.

We all hope that Saddam Hussein will wake up out of his dream world and get out of Kuwait. Some of the Administration's critics sincerely believe that diplomacy and sanctions will eventually convince Saddam Hussein that he should get out of Kuwait. We cannot be sure that they are right, but we can be sure that diplomacy and sanctions will have no chance whatever of succeeding, unless Saddam Hussein knows that if he doesn't get out of Kuwait peacefully, the American people and our allies will be united in using military force to drive him out. His choice is between peace now or suicide later for his country, and possibly for himself.

If we have to resort to force, it will not be just a war about oil. It will not be a war about hostages. It will not be a war about democracy. It will be a war about peace -- not just peace in our time, but peace for our children and grandchildren for generations to come. That is why our commitment in the Persian Gulf is a highly moral enterprise.

Now that we have traveled around the world, let us look at the United States. Forty-four years ago in his Iron Curtain speech in

Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill said, "The United States stands at the pinnacle of world power. This is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with primacy in power is joined an awe inspiring accountability for the future."

Those words are as true today as they were then. The Soviet threat has declined, but as the crisis in the Gulf demonstrates, the world is still a dangerous place and the United States must continue to play the leading role on the world's stage -- not as a world's policeman, but in conflicts like the Gulf where our vital interests are involved. We have to play that role because there is no one else to take our place -- not the British, not the French, not the Russians, not the Japanese, and despite some woolly-headed dreaming to the contrary, not the United Nations.

Some question whether we are able to play that role. It is fashionable in some academic circles to say that the United States, like the Soviet Union, is in decline and no longer has the means to play a leading role on the world's stage.

Don't you believe it. We have some awesome problems -- drugs, crime, the urban underclass, the deficit. But before World War II, the United States produced twenty-four percent of the world GNP, today we produce twenty-six percent and by the end of the century it will be twenty-eight percent -- two and one-half times as much as Japan and five times as much as a united Germany.

The United States today is the world's only complete superpower -- economic, military, and political. As Herb Stein has pointed out, "The United States is a very rich country -- not rich enough to do everything, but rich enough to do everything important."

There is a major new factor however, since Churchill spoke those words in 1946. For forty-five years after the end of World War II the United States has carried the major burden of foreign aid, including aid to

RN

Japan and Germany who are now our major economic competitors. It is time for other rich countries like Japan and the nations of Western Europe to assume the major portion of that burden since our military power still protects them as well as ourselves. For example, Japan gets sixty-percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf. The United States gets ten percent of its oil from the Gulf. At a time when we are doubling our troop strength in the Gulf, Japan should, at the very least, double its economic contribution which now is only \$2 billion a year.

This brings us to America's major role in the world today. It is not military or economic. It is ideological.

Communism has been rejected because it didn't work. Freedom is now on trial: will freedom provide the economic and political progress the communists promised and did not produce? Democracy and freedom do not automatically produce progress. Look at the enormous problems in the new democracies in Eastern Europe, and the problems in Brazil and Argentina, which are trying to make the painful transition from command to free-market economies.

The United States is the oldest and most successful democracy in the world. Our challenge is to provide an example for others to follow.

If we are to provide that example, we cannot tolerate a permanent underclass. We cannot tolerate second-rate education. We cannot tolerate poor productivity. We cannot tolerate political gridlock. There are some who say that the answer to our problem is to give more power to government. We reject that proposition. Our answer is for government to adopt policies which give more power to people.

America is a great country. We have become great not because of what government has done for people, but because of what people have done for themselves and their country. Only by policies which make

our economy sound, protective, compassionate and free, can we provide an example for others to follow.

It is because I believe our Republican candidates support such policies that I am here today. And that is why I believe that by contributing to their campaigns you are contributing to a better future for America and the world.

As you know, this is the centennial of the birth of one of the greatest of our Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower. It is also the centennial of the birth of another giant of the twentieth century -- Charles de Gaulle. DeGaulle once said, "France is never her true self except when she is engaged in a great enterprise."

I profoundly believe that is true of America; it is true of individuals; it is true of every man and woman in this room.

What is our great enterprise? Exactly 49 years ago today, the attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into World War II. Fifty-six million people lost their lives in that war, making the twentieth century the bloodiest in history. Our challenge is to make the twenty-first century a century of peace and to leave our legacy, not just the defeat of communism and fascism, but the victory of freedom.

This is truly a great enterprise worthy of a great people. Only by meeting that challenge can we be true to ourselves.



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
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
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


★ *The House His Father Built:*
Hear RN's voice describe life in the modest farmhouse where he was born in 1913. Still on the same site, the house has been restored and filled with original family furniture, including the piano he learned to play as a boy.



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★ *Domestic Affairs Gallery,* reminiscent of the Capitol rotunda in Washington, features RN's achievements in Space, Civil Rights, the Environment, Energy, Urban Affairs, Crime, the Economy, Health and other issues.




What you will see here, among other things, is a personal life – the influence of a strong family, of inspirational ministers, of great teachers. You will see a political life – running for Congress, running for the Senate, running for governor, running for president three times. And you will see the life of a great nation – 77 years of it. A period in which we had unprecedented progress for the United States. And you will see great leaders – leaders who changed the world, who helped to make the world what we have today.”

President Richard Nixon
Dedication Ceremonies, July 19, 1990



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


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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 23, 1991

TO MARLIN FITZWATER:

Thought the attached might
be helpful in view of Q&A's
at this morning's briefing.
I would not recommend regular
use of statistics such as
these.



Phil

Phillip D. Brady



WHITE HOUSE COMMENT OFFICE TALLIES AND COMMENTS

91 JAN 23 PM 2:54

JANUARY 23, 1991

ISSUE

OPPOSE MEDIA COVERAGE/EXCESSIVE/GIVING THE ENEMY
INFORMATION/BIASED AGAINST POTUS/TOO MUCH COVERAGE
OF PROTESTORS AGAINST THE WAR/CALLERS FEEL THIS IS
PROPAGANDA FOR HUSSEIN/AIDS HUSSEIN IN EXPLOITING
THE POW'S.

TOTALS FROM JANUARY 16TH THROUGH JANUARY 23RD -

OPPOSE COVERAGE BY PRESS	-	1,990
SUPPORT COVERAGE BY PRESS	-	34

DB
DB
DB
cc: Clerk
OK PRH

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/23/91

TO: RON GEISLER - FYI

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

91 JAN 22 PM 3:49

January 22, 1991

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Board of Visitors 1990 Report on the U.S. Naval Academy

Purpose

To forward the annual report of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors at Tab A.

Background

The Board of Visitors is required to report to you annually on the state of the Naval Academy. This is the first review in which your two appointees to the Board, Gerry Bemiss and Jack Fitch, participated, and their personal efforts to make the Board more active are highlighted on page 2.

The Board concluded that the Naval Academy is a strong and justifiably proud national institution that serves a vital role in America's national defense. They believe that the single negative finding, a single (and well-publicized) incident of sexual harassment in 1990, was an isolated event and the Naval Academy has aggressively taken steps to ensure the environment which led to the incident has been eliminated.

Attachment

Tab A Report from the U.S. Naval Academy

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

12 Jan 91

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: *Gen Scowcroft*

FROM: CHASE UNTERMEYER

☐ FYI

☒ Action

once responsible for
overseeing the Naval
Academy, I consider
this an excellent
report, showing that
the Board of Visitors
is taking its job ser-
iously.

Chase



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21402-5000

28 December 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Board of Visitors of the United States Naval Academy is required to meet each year and report to you on the state of the Naval Academy.

The Board met twice in 1990 -- in Annapolis on April 23, 1990, and on October 9, 1990, in Room EF 100 of The Capitol. As Chairman of the Board, and in accordance with Section 6968, Title 10, of the U.S. Code, I respectfully submit this report.

Summary

At the outset, and on behalf of the Board, it is important that the President know the United States Naval Academy is performing a commendable job of training officers who are highly qualified to serve the country in the Navy and in the Marines. At the same time the Academy is educating midshipmen, men and women, to be leaders, to assume the highest responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.

There are problems at the Naval Academy, to be sure, and we had to deal with one serious problem in 1990. But in May I had the privilege of attending the Academy graduation exercises; and as I observed Vice President Quayle hand diplomas to 990 young women and men, I realized that in front of me were 990 reasons that you, the entire command of the United States Navy, and the country can be proud.

State of the USNA

The charge to this Board is "to inquire into the state of morale and discipline, and curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy..."

Morale is high among the midshipmen. Discipline is good and getting better. The curriculum is relevant to the Navy's needs, but warrants examination. Instruction is, on balance, of high quality; some improvements are in order. The physical plant is sound, but maintenance suffers because of budget restrictions.

Change in Membership

Our year of 1990 began with sadness at the death of C. Fred Chambers, who had honored the Board as Chairman since 1987. I know that Fred was your good friend; he was also a loyal friend and supporter of the midshipmen and leadership at Annapolis. With Fred's death the Navy lost a friend, as did each of us who knew him and served with him.

In January we welcomed your first two appointees to the Board of Visitors, Gerry Bemiss and Jack Fitch. From the beginning, each demonstrated a strong interest in the training and education of the midshipmen, a willingness to devote time and energy and ideas to Academy affairs. Both know the importance of a strong Naval Academy to national security, and are committed to make the Academy better and better.

A More Active Board

Gerry and Jack also made it clear that your intent was to encourage the Board to become more active, to establish a clear mission, and to set an agenda to carry it out.

All members of the Board, including the members of the House and Senate, expressed their enthusiasm for your desire to have a more active Board.

As a first step, the Board accepted a proposal by Gerry Bemiss to appoint three standing committees to keep board members continuously informed about activities and problems at the Naval Academy, and to report to the Board members' concerns and recommendations for action.

Gerry Bemiss will chair a Standing Committee on Academics, with responsibility for curriculum, instruction and academic methods. The charter for this committee is what is taught, and why, and how well. One particular goal is to place even greater emphasis on ethics, to teach ethics as a concept and to provide practical training in deciding issues they may face as officers. Members are Senator Hatfield, Senator Sarbanes, Representative Charles Wilson and John Tuck.

A. B. Culvahouse, Jr. will chair a Standing Committee on Midshipmen. The focus of this committee is on the student and how he learns and develops into an officer and leader. The committee will be concerned with midshipmen's morale and discipline, the honor system, proper conduct on and off Academy grounds, ethical standards, behavior and decorum appropriate to an officer of the U.S. Navy. Members are Senator McCain, Representative Bentley, Representative McMillen and myself.

Jack Fitch will head the Standing Committee on Finance and Property, with responsibility for fiscal affairs, buildings and facilities. The priority for this committee will be the condition

of the physical plant. As an example, Bancroft Hall, the dormitory for the entire Brigade of Midshipmen, needs considerable repair. Federal budget restrictions in recent years required that some necessary maintenance be deferred. Fitch and his committee are already at work with Naval Academy officials to maintain and improve Bancroft Hall and other facilities. Members are Senator Mikulski, Representative Skeen, Representative Hopkins and Tommy Thomas.

Our objective is not to intervene in the day-to-day operations of the Naval Academy, but to support its mission, to cooperate, to advise, counsel, and provide a civilian perspective.

We hope that each Standing Committee will also find opportunities to improve public understanding of the Naval Academy and its important role in national security.

Incident of Sexual Harassment

In 1990 an unfortunate event required the Board to become deeply involved. On May 13 the Annapolis Evening Capital reported that Midshipman Gwen Dryer had resigned from the Naval Academy because she had been handcuffed to a urinal in Bancroft Hall and humiliated by male midshipmen.

The story quickly gained national attention. It appeared to be an egregious example of discrimination against women.

To its great credit, the U.S. Navy turned out all hands to get the facts, find the problem, and repair it. Four related actions began:

The Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral Virgil Hill, personally disciplined the offenders and stated publicly that the incident was "crude and totally unacceptable." Admiral Hill promptly convened a special group of faculty and midshipmen to report on the status of the integration and assimilation of women at the Naval Academy, and to recommend steps to speed progress toward the Academy's goal: "Fair and equal treatment of women midshipmen."

Admiral Hill asked me to convene a committee of the Board of Visitors to review the work of the Academy group. After discussion with Admiral Hill, Secretary of the Navy Larry Garrett, and Board members, we broadened our responsibility to make "an independent appraisal of women's issues" at the Naval Academy. To be chairman of the committee I appointed A. B. Culvahouse. His good judgement and judicial temperament suited the need. To serve with him I selected Senator Barbara Mikulski, Representative Helen Bentley, Gerry Bemiss, and myself, ex-officio.

Secretary Garrett directed the Naval Inspector General to conduct an assessment of the equal opportunity and human relations climate at the Academy.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso, directed the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral J. M. Boorda, to review the Naval Academy's Honor Concept and Conduct System.

On October 9, 1990, the Board met to review the reports of all four groups. In Summary, the Committee on Women's Issues chaired by A. B. Culvahouse found that the Naval Academy is committed in principle to the equality of midshipmen, but there is continuing room for improvement in fully integrating women at the Academy. The committee made a series of recommendations relating to equality for women, discipline for sexual harassment, sexual discrimination and hazing, and reinvigorating the Honor Concept and Conduct System. (Executive Summary at Tab A.)

Admiral Hill, in reply and comment, reported that of 122 specific recommendations made by the four groups, 94 had been carried out and the others were under way. Many, he added, were in progress at the time of the incident and investigation.

Admiral Hill emphasized that the goal of the Naval Academy is "zero tolerance" for sexual harassment or discrimination, and he detailed the actions he had already taken and will take to ensure that the concepts and practice of equality, ethics, honor, and correct behavior are instilled in the midshipmen.

The Board decided to continue the Committee on Women's Issues with the responsibility to monitor the progress of integration and assimilation of women at the Naval Academy.

Press Conference

Because the Dryer incident had prompted such wide and often inaccurate news stories, Secretary Garrett and I decided to make all four reports public after the Board meeting. We also held a press conference to answer any and all questions about the incident and what was being done to correct the problem. Senator Mikulski told the press, "This report is neither a whitewash nor a witch hunt, and I am proud to be part of it." Representative Bentley emphasized, in endorsing the report, that the Academy "will never be perfect but must strive to do everything in its power to eradicate the feeling that many male midshipmen have toward their female peers."

Admiral Hill responded with directness and in detail to press questions about how he and his staff and faculty are working with the midshipmen to move toward the goal of equality for all at the Naval Academy.

Conclusion


On behalf of the Board of Visitors, I want to express to you my gratitude for the support and cooperation we had during 1990 from Secretary Garrett, Admiral Frank Kelso, Rear Admiral Hill, and from other members of your official family.

We believe that the United States Naval Academy is a strong and justifiably proud national institution that serves a vital role in America's national defense.

The Commandant of the Academy, a Navy pilot, and I were recently reviewing the productive but turbulent year at the Naval Academy. He spoke of the Board of Visitors in words that a former Navy pilot may appreciate: "We were grateful that you guys were up there flying high cover for the midshipmen."

We consider it to be the responsibility of this Board to support and advance the U.S. Naval Academy and the quality of the men and women trained in Annapolis as officers.

Respectfully submitted,



James M. Cannon
Chairman, Board of Visitors

Members:

FitzGerald Bemiss
James M. Cannon
Arthur B. Culvahouse
John C. Fitch
L.E. "Tommy" Thomas
John C. Tuck
Senator Mark O. Hatfield
Senator John S. McCain
Senator Barbara Mikulski
Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
Representative Helen D. Bentley
Representative Larry J. Hopkins
Representative C. Thomas McMillen
Representative Joseph R. Skeen
Representative Charles Wilson

CC:

Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Superintendent, USNA

**REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WOMEN'S ISSUES
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
BOARD OF VISITORS**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OCTOBER 9, 1990

On May 13, 1990, press reports first disclosed an incident that occurred in December of 1989 when United States Naval Academy Midshipman Gwen Dreyer was handcuffed to a urinal in a men's bathroom by two male midshipmen. Midshipman Dreyer subsequently resigned from the Academy.

This incident, aptly described by the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Rear Admiral V.L. Hill, Jr., as "crude and totally unacceptable," initiated a series of internal and external reviews focusing on the integration of women at the Naval Academy. These examinations included:

- the Women Midshipmen Study Group, reconvened by the Superintendent in April of 1990;
- the equal opportunity of human relations climate assessment completed by the Naval Inspector General, Rear Admiral M.E. Chang, at the direction of the Secretary of the Navy;
- the Report of the Informal Review Board on the Naval Academy's Honor Concept and Conduct System prepared by the Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice Admiral J.M. Boorda, at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- the ongoing study by the General Accounting Office commissioned by certain Members of the United States Senate;
- the review conducted by the Committee on Women's Issues, comprised of five members of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors.

The following constitutes the findings and recommendations of the Report of the Board of Visitors' Committee on Women's Issues. Just as the incident prompting this report was regrettable and unacceptable, Ms. Dreyer's departure from the Academy likewise is regrettable. We hope and expect that the Naval Academy will learn from this unfortunate experience and that some good therefore will come of this sad episode.

If we are to achieve a fair and just society, and a fair and just Navy, it is essential that the Academy lead the fleet, not follow the fleet, in eliminating bigotry, prejudice and sexism.

FINDINGS

Finding No. 1: The Naval Academy is committed in principle to the equality of women midshipmen, but there is continuing room for improvement in fully integrating women at the Academy. (pp. 9-10).

Finding No. 2: There are structural impediments to successful assimilation of women midshipmen. (pp. 11-12).

Finding No. 3: The Naval Academy is not immune from the cultural prejudices confronting both the military and civilian institutions of higher learning. (pp. 12-13).

Finding No. 4: There is a breakdown in civility and discipline, which contributes to an environment conducive to sexual harassment and discrimination. (pp. 13-14).

Finding No. 5: The Honor Concept and the Administrative Conduct System lack clarity and consistent and just application. (pp. 14-15).

Finding No. 6: The Academy's investigation of the handcuffing of Midshipman Dreyer and its response thereto, was insufficiently sensitive to sexual harassment issues. (pp. 15-17).

Finding No. 7: The assimilation of women midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy lags behind the assimilation of women officers and enlisted personnel in the Navy. (pp. 17-18).

Finding No. 8: The United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors has been insufficiently active in overseeing the Academy's programs and procedures for assimilating women midshipmen. (p. 19).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No. 1: The recommendations of the Women Midshipmen Study Group should be adopted by the Academy. (pp. 19-20).

Recommendation No. 2: Sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and hazing must be disciplined very severely. (p. 21).

Recommendation No. 3: The Honor Concept and Conduct System should be reinvigorated, simplified and clarified. (pp. 21-22).

Recommendation No. 4: The Department of the Navy and the Academy should structure faculty composition, company officer assignments and administrative staffing to provide more women officer role models for both male and female midshipmen at the Academy. (pp. 22-23).

Recommendation No. 5: The Women's Midshipmen Study Group should continue in existence and should report to the Board of Visitors, through the Superintendent, on the status of women's issues and implementation of its recommendations at each meeting of the Board of Visitors. (p. 23).

Recommendation No. 6: The Board of Visitors should receive a briefing at each meeting on the status and disposition of disciplinary cases involving allegations of sexual, racial or ethnic harassment, discrimination or hazing. (p. 23).

Recommendation No. 7: The Superintendent of the Naval Academy should be appointed for a minimum five year tour of duty. (p. 24).

Recommendation No. 8: The Reevaluation and Reappointment (R&R) Program should be terminated. (pp. 24-25).

Recommendation No. 9: The Board of Visitors
should more actively pursue its statutory responsibilities.
(p. 25).

Respectfully submitted,


Barbara A. Mikulski,
United States Senator

Helen D. Bentley
Member of Congress

FitzGerald Bemiss

James M. Cannon

Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr.
Chairperson



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/22/91

NOTE TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT

The 'original' Boyden Gray memo to the President is being kept in Phil Brady's (tickler file) office for response from Boyden Gray on the President's question.

Sharon Wagner



Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. Note	The President to Boyden/John Sununu Re: Amendment Options (1 pp.)	1/22/91	P-5 Open on Expiration of PRA (Document Follows) By <u>de</u> (NLGB) on <u>4/7/05</u>	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Brady, Philip D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Chron File 1/91 [2]

Date Closed: 6/8/2000	OA/ID Number: 05480-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1999-0735-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE:

1-22-91

FROM THE PRESIDENT

02

TO:

Boyden/ John Sununu

I checked three of hte four options.

I would like advice on (2). I am inclined ot feel that if one sits out a hwile, he should be allowed to run again.

But, is there a a way to do this whole limitation question by encouraging the states ot take action or do we have to sponsor a Constiutional; Amendment.

I worry abotu trying to amend for so mmany different causes, (Balanced budget, flag, etc etc.)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Memo	C. Boyden Gray to the President Re: Options for a Constitutional Amendment Limiting Congressional Terms (4 pp.)	1/18/91	P5 Open on Expiration of PRA (Document Follows) By <u>CR</u> (NLGB) on <u>6/14/05</u>	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Brady, Philip D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Chron File 1/91 [2]

Date Closed: 6/8/2000	OA/ID Number: 05480-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1999-0735-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 JAN 18 PM 6:35

January 18, 1991

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

1-22-91

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

C. BOYDEN GRAY *cmh*

SUBJECT:

Options for a Constitutional Amendment Limiting
Congressional Terms

We are currently preparing a draft constitutional amendment to limit the term of service of U.S. Senators and Representatives. Before we can draft such an amendment, we need your guidance on several key provisions. This memorandum explains briefly the various state provisions recently enacted and sets forth the options available to us.

BACKGROUND

Three states, California, Colorado, and Oklahoma, have recently adopted some form of term limitation for their state legislators. One state, Colorado, has also amended its Constitution to limit the terms of its U.S. Senators and Representatives as well. Each of these proposals differs slightly from the other two in regards to the term of service permitted, whether the limitation applies to total service or merely prohibits serving consecutive terms, and whether the limitation covers service in both houses of the legislature.

California. California's constitutional amendment finds that the "increased concentration of political power in the hands of incumbent representatives has made our electoral system less free, less competitive, and less representative," resulting in "a class of career politicians," who have "become representatives of the bureaucracy, rather than of the people whom they are elected to represent." The amendment limits the terms of state senators to two four-year terms and state representatives to three two-year terms.

Colorado. The Colorado amendment limits the terms of U.S. Senators to two consecutive six-year terms and the terms of U.S. Representative to six consecutive two-year terms. State senators are limited to two consecutive four-year terms; and state representatives to four consecutive two-year terms. Terms are considered consecutive unless they are at least four years apart.

Oklahoma. The Oklahoma amendment provides that no one shall be eligible to serve more than 12 years in the Oklahoma State Legislature. The amendment specifically provides that years in

the legislature need not be consecutive and that years of service in both the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be included in determining eligibility.

OPTIONS IN DRAFTING A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

As the various proposals of California, Colorado, and Oklahoma demonstrate, there are a number of ways of approaching term limitations. We need your guidance on three interrelated questions: (1) How long shall U.S. Senators and Representatives be allowed to serve? (2) Shall the limitation apply to total terms or only to consecutive terms? (3) Shall the limitation apply to service in both houses? Each of these options are discussed briefly below.

(1). Limit on Term of Service. Fundamental to any term limitation proposal is the limit on the number of years or the number of terms that a senator or representative may serve. The term of service limit most frequently mentioned is 12 years for Senators and Representatives, although Colorado and California permit state senators to serve longer than state representatives. A further option as to whether the time limitation applies to consecutive terms only or to total years of service is addressed below.

- (a). Term Limits for U.S. Senators. Anything less than two terms (12 years) would seem unreasonably short; anything more than 12 years would seem to defeat the purpose for the amendment. The 12 year limit is reasonable and finds support in the press and in the three states that have enacted term limitations.

DECISION: The term limit amendment shall provide that no U.S. Senator shall serve more than two terms.

☒

Approve

☐

Approve as modified

☐

Disapprove

- (b). Term Limits for U.S. Representatives. There is no compelling argument for limiting Representatives to a different term of service than Senators, and different term limits would undoubtedly deflect debate from the principle of term limits to the nuances.

DECISION: The term limit amendment shall provide that no U.S. Representative shall serve more than six terms.

☒ Approve
☐ Approve as modified
☐ Disapprove

(2). Limiting Total Terms or Consecutive Terms. There are two basic options here. One option (followed by California and Oklahoma) limits the total number of terms or years that state senators and representatives may serve without regard to whether the terms were served consecutively. This option reflects a philosophy that the legislature should be representative of the public, and that that can best be accomplished by rotating public office. This proposal gives finality to public service in the legislature. On the other hand, this option would prevent the electorate from selecting citizens with prior legislative experience.

A second option (followed by Colorado) would prohibit U.S. Senators and Representatives from serving more than a specified number of consecutive terms. Under this option a U.S. Senator, for example, could serve two terms, sit out for a term and then stand for election again. This proposal is similar to laws in many states which apply to gubernatorial terms and similar to the limitation on Presidential terms found in the 22nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It has the advantage of allowing the electorate to choose experienced representatives for office, while at the same time preventing those individuals from exploiting the perquisites of elective office -- immediate access to the press, access to Congressional media facilities, and the frank -- to retain the seat in perpetuity. This proposal would slow, but not prevent, lengthy service in the House or Senate.

DECISION:

☐ The term limitation amendment shall limit total terms or total service.
☐ The term limitation amendment shall limit consecutive terms.

(3). Limiting Service in Both Houses or a Single House. (This option need be considered only if the decision in (2) is to limit total terms or total service.) There are again two basic options. Under the first (adopted by Oklahoma), service in both houses is considered in determining eligibility. This option

effectively rotates the seats and prevents a member who has served the limit from using the perquisites of office to run for a seat in the other house.

Under the second option (followed by California and Colorado) members of one house, who are no longer eligible for re-election to that house, may run for a seat in the other body. This option focuses more narrowly on rotating membership in a single house.

DECISION:

_____ The limitation on total service shall
include service in both houses of Congress.

✓_____ The limitation on total service shall apply
to service in a single house in Congress.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Note	The President to Boyden/John Sununu Re: Amendment Options (1 pp.)	1/22/91	P-5 Open on Expiration of PRA (Document Follows) By <u>CL</u> (NLGB) on <u>10/13/05</u>	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Brady, Philip D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Chron File 1/91 [2]

Date Closed: 6/8/2000	OA/ID Number: 05480-002
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1999-0735-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE:

1-22-91

FROM THE PRESIDENT

CS

TO:

Boyden/ John Sununu

I checked three of hte four options.

I would like advice on (2). I am inclined ot feel that if one sits out a hwile, he should be allowed to run again.

But, is there a a way to do this whole limitation question by encouraging the states ot take action or do we have to sponsor a Constiutional; Amendment.

I worry abotu trying to amend for so mmay different causes, (Balanced budget, flag, etc etc.)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Memo	C. Boyden Gray to the President Re: Options for a Constitutional Amendment Limiting Congressional Terms (4 pp.)	1/18/91	P-5 Open on Expiration of PRA (Document Follows) By <u>DA</u> (NLGB) on <u>6/7/05</u>	

Collection:

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Office: Chief of Staff to the President, Office of the
Series: Brady, Philip D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed: 6/8/2000	OA/ID Number: 05480-002
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☒ Approve

☐ Approve as modified

☐ Disapprove

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
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 01/22/91

FOR: SHIRLEY GREEN

FROM: PHILLIP BRADY
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary

- ☐ Information
- ☒ Action
- ☐ Let's Discuss



POTUS
has not
seen
Jo Corrospndr

NORMAN A. BERG
1508 GAMON ROAD
WHEATON, ILLINOIS 60187

January 10, 1991

President George M. Bush
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Bush,

You have the unqualified support of my wife and myself with regards to your handling of the Middle East crisis.

We think you are doing a splendid job, and we want you to know that we support you in every aspect of your handling of this, a most difficult situation.

Sincerely,

Norm and Sherie Berg

Post- ^{it} brand fax transmittal memo 7671		# of pages ▶ 3
To <i>George Bush</i>	From <i>N. Berg</i>	
Co.	Co.	
Dept.	Phone #	
Fax #	Fax #	



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 01/22/91

NOTE FOR: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is
forwarded to you for your:

Information ☒

Action ☐



Thank you.

PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
(x2702)



cc:

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN



MEMO

To: All Interested Parties
From: David M. Mason, ^{DM} Director, Executive Branch Liaison
Date: January 10, 1990
Subject: Policy Review Interview with Newt Gingrich

*John -
I'm afraid Newt
has it. There with
not help here!
ds*

"I didn't torpedo the budget deal. The American people did," argues Newt Gingrich in the upcoming issue of Policy Review.

In this advance copy of his interview, Gingrich discusses the mistakes of the budget negotiations, why he was almost defeated in his reelection bid, what the Bush administration needs to do to shore up Republican support in the Congress, and how the GOP can do better in congressional elections in 1992.

According to Gingrich, "the White House needs three things it doesn't have now: a visionary agenda, a consistent communications strategy to articulate and reinforce that agenda among the American people, and a grass-roots outreach operation that will overwhelm the Washington establishment if it resists the President's reforms."

I trust that you will find this article interesting. If you have any comments or questions, please feel free to contact me.

MIRACLE WHIP

Can Newt Gingrich Save the Bush Presidency?

Dec 13 1992

AN INTERVIEW BY ADAM MEYERSON

Never one to shy away from a fight, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA) became a true conservative hero this past October when he followed the lead of Republican backbenchers and came out against President Bush's budget agreement. The shabby treatment he then received from the White House further strained relations between the administration and conservatives, already badly damaged by the president's betrayal of his tax promise.

In an interview with *Policy Review* editor Adam Meyerson in November 1990, Gingrich discussed the most serious mistakes in the budget negotiations, how House Republicans and the White House can work together if the White House is interested, how the GOP can do better in congressional elections, and why he came so close to losing his own race in Georgia.

Policy Review: The elections in 1990 were the third disaster in a row for House Republicans. Why were Republicans so successful in picking up House seats in 1978, 1980, and 1984? And why did they lose seats in 1986, 1988, and 1990? Have Republicans abandoned issues and coalition strategies that used to work for them? Are there some issues that worked once for the GOP but don't work any more?

Gingrich: I don't agree that 1990 was a disaster—the party in the White House usually loses seats in off-year elections, especially third-term off-year elections. What we lost was the opportunity to make history—by beating the odds and picking up seats in the House and Senate as well as a few governorships.

Obviously anti-Communism isn't the issue it used to be. But one of the lessons of 1990 is that the tax issue still works. Anti-tax Democrats beat incumbent Republican governors in Nebraska and Kansas. Republicans John Engler in Michigan and George Voinovich in Ohio won on an anti-tax platform. Even Mario Cuomo got the message, and has just introduced a no-new-taxes budget. The values of the Reagan movement still win at the polls, as we saw with the defeats of Big Green in California and of Jim Hightower in Texas. Republicans who have strayed from Reaganism tended to get hurt.

Another important lesson of 1990 is that if you don't run, you can't win. In Virginia, not one of the five Democratic incumbents in the House was challenged. All five Republicans were. Is it any surprise, looking at the arithmetic, that the Democrats picked up a seat? No one predicted a Republican would beat Douglas Bosco in California, Doug Walgren in Pennsylvania, or Robert Kastenmeier in Wisconsin, but we pulled off victories because we had someone running. The GOP needs 210 serious challengers if it's going anywhere in '92.

P.R.: Presumably, one of the differences between 1978-80-84 and 1986-88-90 is that conservative grass-roots groups are much less involved in congressional elections than they used to be.

Gingrich: I do think conservative grass-roots efforts have lost momentum in the past four to six years. I don't see the same drive and energy among the activists that I saw in the early '80s. Maybe they have lost faith in Congress as a place to get things done. Perhaps the national mood has shifted, with new issues such as environmentalism becoming a little more important. But in the past year we've seen the conservative grass roots aroused over the child-care and quota bills. I expect we'll see a revival of conservative activism if the Democrats move left and adopt a more union-driven agenda.

P.R.: Have the Reagan Democrats been going back to the Democratic Party in congressional elections, and if so, why? How do Republicans get them back?

Gingrich: The Reagan Democrats voted Republican because of the no-new-taxes pledge, strong Republican positions on foreign policy and Communism, and the sense among many Democrats that the national Democratic leadership was unacceptable to their values. In addition to his tax reversal, President Bush made a terrible mistake by constantly inviting House Speaker Tom Foley, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, and other congressional Democrats down to the White House for negotiations and photo opportunities. This

DEC 13 1990



Drawing by Alexander Hunter for Policy Review

legitimized the Democratic leadership in the eyes of the American people.

Still, Republican victories in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Alabama showed that in parts of the country the Reagan coalition is alive and well. Phil Gramm, who is becoming a major conservative spokesman, won more than 60 percent of the vote—the highest margin ever for a Republican Senate candidate in Texas—with the support of a lot of Democrats. In California, Pete Wilson used the quota issue very effectively in

A free society functions well only if there is honesty. That's why breaking the no-new-taxes promise was so destructive.

his gubernatorial campaign to break up Dianne Feinstein's coalition and win Democratic votes, especially from Asians.

The way to win the support of Reagan Democrats hasn't changed: We have to show that the Democratic Party is irresponsible on crime, values, fiscal issues, and foreign policy.

P.R.: What effect did the budget controversy and President Bush's reversal of his no-new-taxes pledge have on congressional races?

Gingrich: They were harmful at the margins. Our great loss was the opportunity to gain seats rather than lose them. The election results in places like New York and New Jersey showed how vulnerable the Cuomo-Florio Democrats were. But our side got confused by the reversal of the tax pledge. A lot of Republican voters stayed home. The breaking of a campaign commitment lowered the Republican Party's believability. And the president's fund-raising ability was substantially weakened in October, which may have had an effect on some close races.

P.R.: In your own race, were you helped or hurt by your opposition to the summit agreement?

Gingrich: I was hurt either way. I ended up losing votes from Republicans angry with me for going against the president. I also would have lost votes of conservative Democrats, independents, and Republicans if I didn't go against him.

P.R.: What other reasons do you give for your own brush with defeat? Are there issues, such as the Eastern Air Lines strike, where you would respond differently if you could do it over again?

Gingrich: There are four main reasons I came so close to losing. First, my district sent me a message: come on home. People said they wanted me to be a representative first, and a whip second. They wanted to see me a little less on the "Today Show" and a little more in Clayton County. Bob Michel warned me of this. He said he had his closest race right after he was elected minority leader.

Second, my opposition to federal intervention in the Eastern strike clearly hurt. A lot of my constituents work at the Atlanta airport, which is a big hub for Eastern. The machinists union remained deeply bitter about my stand, and actively worked against me.

Third, the Republican ticket was weaker than I thought in Georgia. We had a terrific year in '88, but in '90 there was an anti-tax vote against Republican officials in two of my counties.

Fourth, my support for the congressional pay raise also hurt. My opponent sent out five pieces of direct mail on the pay raise.

What have I learned? I'm going to spend much more time in my district, get on the airplane more often to come home. I would not change my vote on the Eastern strike. I think I did the right thing for the country. And I would rather pay the price of running harder in the district than voting for something I don't believe in.

P.R.: What were the president's major mistakes in the budget agreement?

Gingrich: In retrospect, Bush shouldn't have gone to the summit at all. He's head of one of two teams in the Super Bowl, not commissioner of the National Football League. Any time he negotiates with the Democratic leadership, he weakens his own team. For the same reason, it was a mistake that I initially joined him.

Giving up the tax pledge was a terrible error, because it struck at the core of people's respect for politicians. Bush had built up a rapport with the American people, who thought he was someone who would do what he promised. They trusted him. Losing that trust was a more serious consequence of Bush's raising taxes than any damage done to the economy. Americans are now going to find it harder to trust any politician.

Another error has to be the White House's failure to develop a consistent communications strategy. The president started with a strong bargaining position on almost every issue he cared about, but the strength of his hand was seriously eroded because he failed to cultivate the support of the American people.

Capital gains is one of the best examples. This was, and is, a winnable issue. The American people want more investment, they want better jobs, they want economic growth; lowering capital gains taxes is a way to achieve all these things. In October '89, the House carried a capital gains tax cut, without a tax increase, by 264 votes. By October '90 we ended up with a tax increase without a capital gains cut. Without a coherent communications strategy, the administration was put on the psychological defensive. The president let the Democrats define the capital gains issue as one of rich against poor. It's not. It's an issue of growth.

One last mistake was Budget Director Richard

Darman's decision to make a deal with Senator Robert Byrd. The result was a fiasco—a more than 10 percent increase in discretionary spending in the name of fixing the deficit! This was clearly a victory of Washington insiders over the American people.

P.R.: What lessons do you hope the White House will learn from the budget fiasco?

Gingrich: That in '91 and '92 the Democrats should be dealt with at arm's length, and with a veto strategy. And that cutting spending, not raising taxes, is the best opportunity to build a majority.

I also hope the White House will work on its communications strategy right away. In the Persian Gulf crisis we're seeing the same problem we saw with the budget. The president started with a very strong domestic hand in his response to Saddam Hussein. But without a consistent communications strategy, his position has been eroding week by week. The president will have to resolve this weakness if he hopes to do well in 1992.

P.R.: What have you learned from your own role in the budget agreement? Did we get a worse budget deal because you helped torpedo the first one, and if so, was it worth it?

Gingrich: I should have been negative about the budget summit much earlier. I should have reacted to initial discussions of tax increases much more publicly and strongly than I did. Allowing comity in negotiations to prevail over the articulation of values was a mistake.

I didn't torpedo the budget deal. The American people did. The president asked for their support; he got their rejection. In my office, 83 percent of 775 phone calls were against the deal. The president then had the option of letting the deal collapse and going to veto strategy. It's not my fault that when the country rejected the deal, the White House decided to cut a worse deal with the Democrats. That's Darman's problem, not mine.

P.R.: What are the most effective ways President Bush and House Republicans can work together? Are there enough conservative Democrats for Bush to build a conservative base comparable to Reagan's boll-weevil coalition in 1981 and 1982?

Gingrich: House Republicans and the president have far more in common than the president has with the Democratic leadership. We ought to sit down and lay out a reform agenda not just for Republicans but for all Americans.

The president has to pursue a veto strategy, and we can give him the votes to make it succeed. There aren't enough conservative Democrats to win 218-vote victories. But there are more than enough conservative Republicans and Democrats for the president to win the 146 votes he needs to sustain vetoes. The goal should be two years of vetoing bad legislation, bringing spending under control, and defining where we would take the country, plus finding 210 Republican candidates to run in '92.

P.R.: Can conservative House Republicans work with Chief of Staff John Sununu after what he has been saying about them?

Gingrich: We can work with Sununu. I'm encouraged by the choice of Bill Bennett as Republican National Committee chairman. The sniping we have seen from the White House doesn't help President Bush or the Republican Party. Some of it has been childish. But we want to help the president succeed. If the White House says it wants to cooperate, and the offer is sincere, we'd like to work with them. The next couple of months will tell us how sincere they are.

P.R.: What role should the House minority whip play when House Republicans and the president disagree about a major issue?

Gingrich: I represent the 6th District of Georgia, and as whip I represent the House Republican Party. I don't represent the president. My duty was to stand with the

I didn't torpedo the budget deal. The American people did.

60 percent of House Republicans who voted against the budget agreement. I'm prepared to be President Bush's ally, not his deputy floor manager.

P.R.: What advice would you give the White House in terms of its operations?

Gingrich: The White House needs three things it doesn't have now: a visionary agenda, a consistent communications strategy to articulate and reinforce that agenda among the American people, and a grass-roots outreach operation that will overwhelm the Washington establishment if it resists the president's reforms.

The White House also has to stop thinking that politics and governing can be separated. The American people don't wear one hat as citizens and another hat as voters. You cannot manipulate the American people by cynically running political campaigns differently than the way you run the country. Americans are looking for genuine ideals and values in politics. They want politics to reinforce governing.

P.R.: What explains the relatively high—22 percent—black vote for Republican congressional candidates in 1990? What should the GOP do to increase that percentage?

Gingrich: The black community is increasingly interested in becoming part of mainstream America. More and more blacks are joining the middle class, going to school,

building businesses and professional careers. I think it's entirely natural that more and more, especially younger blacks, are voting Republican.

Gary Franks' victory in Connecticut this past year was very important. We now have a conservative Republican in the Congressional Black Caucus. Other rising conservative spokesmen—Keith Butler in Detroit, Ken Black-

President Bush has to pursue a veto strategy. House Republicans can give him the votes to make it succeed.

well in Cincinnati, Louis Sullivan at Health and Human Services, to name just a few—are providing a new kind of black leadership. I hope and expect that black support for Republicans will go up.

P.R.: Why do you think David Duke won so many votes in Louisiana? Is public sentiment against racial quotas growing, and if so, is there a way to address the concerns of quota opponents in a way that isn't racially polarizing?

Gingrich: One of the unsung positives of 1990 is the pro-civil rights, anti-quota argument that the president has been articulating. Being against quotas and for integration is overwhelmingly the majority opinion in America. It is also a position a very significant part of the black community feels comfortable with.

Quotas are the way to get David Duke more votes.

Conservative Republicans are opposed to quotas precisely because we're against people like David Duke. We are explicitly for integration and civil rights for everyone—but civil rights based on individual characteristics, not genetic code. I would urge President Bush to sign the LaFalce bill, which would protect civil rights, and at the same time be very firm against quotas.

P.R.: What are the cutting-edge issues for conservatives in the next two years?

Gingrich: America is much more prepared for systematic reform than its politicians are. Big-city schools don't teach. Health care is too expensive and chaotic. Crime is rampant. Most government is much too bureaucratic. Probably no more than 25 percent of the American people would say the current system works and that we just have to raise taxes for it to work better. The other 75 percent will embrace an agenda of systematic reform.

Reform conservatism means taking government seriously. If there's going to be a Department of Labor, conservatives have to know how to run it. We have to know enough of the details to know how to give each program and agency a thorough overhaul.


I see seven key words for the conservative reform agenda. Safety—both personal and national. Working—a strong economy, a welfare system that encourages work, homework. Saving—IRAs for everybody, savings plans for health costs. Investing—a good start would be capital gains tax cuts. Learning—whether through Polly Williams's vouchers or the earning by learning plan in Georgia or decentralized, computerized learning by adults. Health—environmental protection, incentives for personal health. Honesty. The last theme is where breaking the no-tax-increase promise was so destructive. A free society functions well only if there is honesty. Cynicism and corruption destroy a free society. **T**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1991

NOTE TO MARLIN FITZWATER

Pursuant to our conversation
the attached has been approved
and is ready for release.



Phillip D. Brady

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 22, 1991

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have today regretfully accepted the resignation of Susan Engeleiter as Administrator of the Small Business Administration to be effective on or before May 1, 1991. Susan has notified me that she intends to return to the Midwest to pursue a career in the private sector.

When I asked Susan to join my Administration in May 1989, I gave her the assignment of revitalizing the SBA and setting it upon a stable course for the future -- a course of encouraging entrepreneurship and helping men and women of all ethnic and economic groups utilize small business ownership as a path to full participation in the American economy. She has certainly accomplished that important mission.

In addition, she has been an effective advocate for women and minorities in this Administration, serving as Chairwoman of the National Women's Business Council, a member of the President's Commission on Minority Business Development and successfully expanding the Women's Network for Entrepreneurial Training to a nationwide mentoring program for new business owners.

Administrator Engeleiter has been a forceful advocate for small businesses throughout the country and a valued member of this Administration. I sincerely thank Susan for her service. Both Barbara and I wish her the very best as she returns home to the Midwest.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 1/18

91 JAN 18 PM 10:54

TO:

~~Sharon~~ Phil

FROM:

MICHAEL P. JACKSON
Special Assistant to the President
and Executive Secretary
for Cabinet Liaison

mf

No changes, except Cal.
Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/19/91

Phil -
FYI

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President

(The attached was not
included in the Senior
Staff's copy of the
Cabinet Report.)



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/19/91

TO: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President
(The attached was not
included in the Senior
Staff's copy of the
Cabinet Report.)



*Cabinet
Correspondence*

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,


THURSDAY, JANUARY '17

HOW PROUD WE WERE OF YOUR ADDRESS TO THE
NATION ON THE PERSIAN GULF HOSTILITIES!

PLEASE KNOW THAT YOU ARE IN OUR THOUGHTS AND
PRAYERS DURING THESE CHALLENGING TIMES.

SIMPLY AND I SEND OUR BEST TO
YOU AND YOUR FAMILY.





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

01/18/91

TO: PATTY PRESOCK

FROM: PHILLIP D. BRADY
Assistant to the President and
Staff Secretary

The attached has been forwarded
to the President on the early
Saturday morning run to
Camp David.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1991

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Scowcroft will deliver
the briefing paper for your
meeting with former Prime
Minister Lee Kwan Yew to you
this weekend at Camp David.

Phillip D. Brady



SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT

Monday, January 21, 1991

Martin Luther King, Jr.
Birthday Holiday Observed

B Camp David

TBD

B Arrive White House

South Lawn

5:00 pm
(60 min)

Meeting with former
Prime Minister of Singapore
Lee Kwan Yew
(Scowcroft)

Residence

(Distributed Separately)

UNP 01/18/91
4:00 pm

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
Proposed & Tentative for Administrative Use Only T Tentative B First Lady * Away from White House		1 New Years Day B* 2:30 Depart for Washington B 3:00 Arrive White House RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	2 7:30 Photo Op 11:30 Photo Ops 12:00 Lunch with VP 1:30 Mtg. w/Sec. Baker 3:00 Admin. Time RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	3 Senate Committee 8:00 Mtg. with Select Members of Congress 8:30 Congressional Leadership Meeting 10:00 Staff Time 3:30 Video Taping Session RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	4 B 7:15 Coffee with Mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon 8:30 Coffee with House Republicans 10:00 Radio Taping 11:00 Mtg. with Sec. Baker 1:15 Staff Time 3:15 Radio Taping 3:20 Photo Op B 3:30 Depart for Camp David RON CAMP DAVID	5 * 10:45 Mtg. w/Sec. General of the U.N. B* 12:00 Lunch w/Dr. & Mrs. Javier Perez de Cuellar RON CAMP DAVID
6 B 4:00 Arrive White House RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	7 11:00 Staff Time 1:30 Staff Time 2:45 Mtg. w/Clayton Yeutter 3:30 Mtg. with Sec. Cheney RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	8 7:30 Hold 9:30 Video Taping Session 10:00 Economic Policy Council Mtg. 1:30 Staff Time B 3:30 Photo Op and Drop-by Receipt w/Fundraisers f/Eagle's Inaugural Event 5:15 Haircut RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	9 7:15 Hold 10:00 Presen. of the 1990 Senior Exec. Service Presidential Rank Awards 11:30 Photo Ops 1:00 Congressional Leadership Meeting 3:55 Press Conference 4:30 Cabinet Meeting RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	10 7:45 Photo Op 10:00 Staff Time 11:45 Photo Op with Crew of Space Shuttle Columbia 11:55 Photo w/Sen. Seymour 12:00 Lunch with VP 2:00 Mtg. w/Senator Dole 2:30 Mtg. w/Senators RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	11 8:30 Brief. w/Members of Congress 10:00 Mtg. w/Sen. Moynihan 11:00 Staff Time 11:30 Photo Op with Veronica Khilchevski B 7:05 Depart for Camp David RON CAMP DAVID	12 3:25 Arrive White House 4:00 Press Conference 4:40 Depart for Camp David RON CAMP DAVID
13 B 3:55 Arrive White House 4:00 Press Conference RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	14 1:30 Mtg. w/Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama 2:00 Mtg. w/Joseph Wilson 3:30 Mtg. w/Sec. Brady 4:00 Congressional Leadership Mtg. RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	15 B 1:30 Photo Ops 1:45 Video Taping Session 2:45 Mtg. w/ Ambassador to New Zealand RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	16 11:50 Photo Op w/Mike DeLand 1:30 Meeting with Sec. Baker 2:00 Drop-by mtg. of Educ. Policy Advisory Comm. 3:00 Admin. Time 9:00 Press Conference RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	17 7:45 Photo Ops 9:30 Congressional Leadership Mtg. Arlington, VA B* 11:00 Church Service at Ft. Myer 3:00 Cabinet Mtg. RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	18 B 7:30 Hold 11:00 Mtg. with Sec. Baker 12:00 Press Conference 12:30 Lunch with VP Arlington, VA * 2:30 Pentagon Briefing B* 3:30 Depart for Camp David RON CAMP DAVID	19 RON CAMP DAVID
20 RON CAMP DAVID	21 M.L. King, Jr. B-Day Observed B TBD Arrive White House 5:00 Mtg. with former Prime Minister of Singapore RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	22 RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	23 Senate Reconvenes 11:00 Mtg. w/Pres. Ochirbat of the Mongolian People's Republic 12:15 Working Luncheon with President Ochirbat 1:15 Departure Statements 1:30 Mtg. with Sec. Baker 3:00 Admin. Time B* 7:15 Reserve Officers Association Dinner (Black Tie) RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	24 10:00 Congressional Leadership Mtg. 12:00 Lunch with VP 1:30 Photo Ops March of Dimes Nat'l Poster Child RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	25 7:45 Mtg. w/Members of the RNC 11:00 Mtg. with Sec. Baker B TBD Depart for Camp David RON CAMP DAVID	26 RON CAMP DAVID
27 B 4:00 Arrive White House RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	28 B* 8:45 Address Nat'l Religious Broadcasters Assoc. 12:00 Lunch with VP 3:30 Mtg. with Sec. Cheney RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	29 10:00 Cabinet Mtg. B* 9:00 State of the Union Address RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	30 * 11:00 50th Anniversary of Four Freedoms Speech 1:30 Meeting with Sec. Baker 3:00 Admin. Time RON WASHINGTON, D.C.	31 B* 8:00 National Prayer Brief. f. 10:30 Congressional Leadership Meeting 3:30 Congressional Hour RON WASHINGTON, D.C.		

SENSITIVE — DO NOT COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1991

91 JAN 18 PM 1:14

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH

FROM:

SIG ROGICH *SR*
LAURIE FIRESTONE *LF*

SUBJECT:

APPROVAL FOR CHANGE IN NAME OF WHITE HOUSE CONCERT
SERIES

There has been some discussion about changing the title of the
White House concert series from "In Performance" to:

In Concert at the White House
with the President and First Lady

The change is more suitable and not only denotes the location but
the hosts as well. A new title for the program would be more
promotable and would ensure a larger viewing and listening
audience in the future.

Thank you.

_____ Approve

_____ Approve as amended

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91 JAN 18 PM 3:09

January 18, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Fred McClure *FM*

SUBJECT:

Weekly Report on Congressional Correspondence

Attached is a report of selected congressional mail received from January 11 through January 17, 1991. This correspondence is being handled by the Office of Congressional Correspondence.

Attachment

91 JAN 13 PM 10:54

*Office of
Cabinet Affairs*



**CABINET
REPORT**

For the Week of:

January 20 - 26

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 18, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

EDE HOLIDAY ~~DNX~~

SUBJECT:

Cabinet Report -- January 20 - 26

* * * THE WEEK AHEAD * * *

AGRICULTURE

January 21. Secretary Yeutter will travel to Des Moines to address the American Grain and Related Industries Meeting (AGRI), a large grain marketer in Iowa. Topic: the future of world agriculture, particularly as it relates to the grain market. Yeutter will also meet separately with the Board of Directors of AGRI.

January 22. Yeutter will travel to Lincoln, Nebraska to receive the Nebraskan of the Year award given by the Rotary Club.

January 25. Yeutter will travel to Chicago to address the membership of the Mid-America Committee for International Business and Government Cooperation. Topic: the future of American agriculture.

COMMERCE

January 22. Secretary Mosbacher will meet with former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Topics: the Uruguay Round, Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation and bilateral relations. Ambassador Hills will also meet with Lee. Topic: bilateral trade issues.

January 23. Mosbacher will meet with California Senator John Seymour. Later in the day, he will meet with Mongolian President Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat. Topic: U.S. commercial opportunities in Mongolia.

January 23. U.S. Travel and Tourism officials will sign a tourism agreement with Mongolia. The agreement will include a tourism side letter that guarantees that the rights and obligations under the trade agreement will apply to the travel and tourism industry in Mongolia as fully as they do to all other industries and services.